REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SandiganbayanQUEZON CITY

SEVENTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No. SB-ll-CRM-Plaintiff, 0203

-versus-

TOMAS P. BONGALONTA, JR.Aecused.

Present:

Gomez-Estoesta, J., ChairpersonTrespeses, J. andHidalgo, J.

Promulgated: ' ̂v>, wiS Uu

X

DECISION

GOMEZ-ESTOESTA, J.:

This charge has come a long way^ JTie c^^ has become theaccused in a hapless reversal of fortune, after a series of turns in the resolutionof the administrative case filed against Municipal Accountant Eileen Ceron ofthe Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur. What eventually became the centerof this charge was the dismissal from .serv/ce imposed upon Eileen Ceron bythen Municipal Mayor Tomas P. Bpngalota, fc ["accused"] invoking hisvested powers imder the Local Gpyermnent Code ai ia time when the formerhas just served the administrative penalty of suspension of six (6) monthswithout pay imposed by the Ombudsman, and pending the resolution of herappeal for a finding of probable , cause for a criminal charge of estafa thorughfalsification of public documetit.

Tht Information filed on June 8,2011 for Violation of Section 3 (e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019 dXXQgQfr,

That on or about 25 October 2005 or sometime prior or subsequentthereto,; in Pili, Camarines S.ijr, and within the juris^ctipn of this HonorableCoi^ acct^ed TOMAS P. BONGAL0fflA[,]^^ ranking publicofficer, beiiig the Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, committing theoffense herein charged in relation to his office and taking advantage of hisofficial functions, and thru (sic) naahifest p^ality; evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

' Records, Volume 1, pp. 1-3

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 21P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-11 -CRM-0203

DECISION

criminally issue Memorandum Order dated 25 October 2005 implementinganew against EILEEN D. CERON a different and more severe penalty ofdismissal from service for the same offense after the latter has served the

penalty of suspension from office which was imposed by ftie Office of theOmbudsman, the accused knew fully well that the penalty of dismissal fromthe service has no legal basis, thereby depriving EILEEN D. CERON notonly her office but also the salaries and monetary benefits attached theretoamounting to Nine Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Two Hundred Eighty FivePesos and Six Centavos (P955,285.06) more or less, thus causing undueinjury to her in the afore-stated amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A Hold Departure Order was issued by the Court on July 20,2011

Arraignment took place on October 28, 2011, in which the accused,with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.^

Pre-Trial was terminated on November 28, 2012, in which the partiesentered into the following admissions:"^

XXX

STIPULATION OF FACTS

PROSECUTION:

1. Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. - ADMITTED

2. Identity and position of accused Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. as the sameperson who is the accused in this case. - ADMITTED

3. That at the time material to the Information, accused Tomas P.Bongalonta, Jr. was the Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur. -ADMITTED

DEFENSE:

1. That the private complainant is the Municipal Accountant of Pili,Camarines Sur at the time she was dismissed - ADMITTED

XXX

3. That the complainant has already been paid by the Local Government ofPili, Camarines Sur, her full back wages - ADMITTED (With regard toother benefits, not all pajmients were given/paid)

XXX

The Pre-Trial Order was later amended^ to include additional

documentary exhibits for the prosecution.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

^ Records, Volume 1, p. 1083 Id., p. 157Md..pp. 357-362,427-4345 Id., pp. 427-434

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. . 3 | P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

As this case is covered by the Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No, 12-8-8-SC, effective January 1,2013), judicial affidavits of witnesses^ were submittedwhich took the place of their direct testimonies.

The prosecution presented: (1) Caterina S. Munez ["Munez"],Supervising Administrative Officer and/or Human Resource ManagementOfficer IV of the LGU of Pili, Camarines Sur, to identify records of personnelkept in her custody, and (2) Eileen D.* Ceron ["Ceron"], MunicipalAccountant of the LGU of Pili, Camarines Sur, who testified in her capacityas the private complainant. Their testimonies in conjunction wi^ thedocumentary evidence presented may be summed up in this wise:

The accused, as then Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, filedadministrative and criminal cases before the Office of the Ombudsman

("Ombudsman") against Municipal Accountant Eileen Ceron accusing her ofacts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Estafa, respectively. While thecriminal charge was eventually dismissed by Branch 31 of the Regional TrialCourt of Pili, Camarines Sur,^ the administrative charge prospered. OnNovember 9,2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ("DeputyOmbudsman") issued a Decision in OMB-L-A-03-0541-F,® which decretalportion read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully• recommends that respondent EILEEN D. CERON be SUSPENDED fromOffice for six (6) months without pay with a stem warning that a repetitionof the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO RESOLVED.

This was approved by then Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C.Fernandez.^

Not satisfied, Ceron moved for the reconsideration of the aboveDecision, but the same was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon inan Order^^ dated March 28,2005 which stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfullyrecommended that the Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

In a 1^ Indorsement dated 5 April 2005, the administrative decision wasforwarded by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to MayorBongalota, Jr. for immediate implementation.^^ Thus, the accused issued a

® Judicial Affidavit dated October 13, 2014 of Caterina S. Mufiez (Records, Vol. 2, pp. 15-27); Judicial"Affidavit dated October 13,2014 of Eileen Ceron (Records, Vol. 2, pp. 103-116)' TSN dated November 12,2014, pp. 40-41

»Exhibit "D"^ Id.

Exhibit "E"

" Exhibit "G"

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 41P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-ll-CRM-0203

DECISION

Memorandum Order dated April 25, 2005^^ addressed to Eileen Ceron whichput into effect the order of suspension without pay for six (6) months. Ceronapparently complied with the Suspension Order and did not report for work.^^

Meantime, however, Ceron endeavored to file an Appeal (To the Officeofthe Ombudsman-Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo) to have the order of suspensionlifted and the filing of a criminal information for estafa recalled.

Pending such appeal, the service of her 6-month suspension periodended as of October 25, 2005, following which Ceron wrote the accusedexpressing that she desired to be reinstated to her position. She personallyserved a copy of her letter to the Office of the Mayor on October 25, 2005,and while thereat, was able to personally speak to the accused who concededto being "tired of these cases " and alluded to submitting their dispute to anarbiter. Accused then admitted to having issued a dismissal order againsther but evinced to no longer pursue the same. The dismissal order was thusripped in front of her.^^ Ceron waited at the Mayor's Office until about 4:00p.m. until a different action again shook her. This time around, she insteadreceived a Memorandum dated Octpber 25, 2005^^ ordering her terminationfrom service and dismissal. The Memorandum dated October 25,2005 stated:

MEMORANDUM

TO: MS. EELBEN D. CERON

Municipal AccountantLGU - Pili, Camatrines Sur

FROM: THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR

Pili, Camarines Sur

SUBJECT: DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE DUE TO

DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE

DATE: OCTOBER 25,2005

In view of the findings of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty inOffice by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0541-F andfindings of probable cause of six (6) counts of Estafa Through Falsifiationof Publi Document in OMB-L-C-03-0679-F, the pertinent Informationdocketed as Criminal Case Nos. P-3716, 3717,3718,3719,3720, 3723 arenow filed and pending before the Regional Trial Courts Branches 31,32 and33, all sitting at the Provincial Capitol, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, and inthe best interest of public service pursuant to the dictum that a public serviceis a public trust, by virtue of the powers in me vested as Ae MunicipalMayor under the Local Government Code and other pertinent laws, andestablished jurisprudence including but not limited to (Nera vs. Garcia, 106Phil. 1031 [I960]; (Bautista vs. Negado, 108 PMl. 283 [I960]) and

^2 Exhibit "H"

Vide: Judicial Affidavit of Eileen Ceron, Q&A 28-29; Records, Volume 2, p. 106'^Exhibit"?"

Exhibit "I"

Vide: Judicial Affidavit of Eileen Ceron, Q&A 35-58; Records, Vol. 2, pp. 107-108"Id., Q&A46-47

Exhibit "B"; Records, Vol. 2, p. 109

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 51P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

(Armando F. Bemardo vs. Court of Appeals, CSC, and Land Bank of thePhil., G.R. No. L-124261, May 27, 2004), you are hereby TERMINATEDAND DISMISSED from government service effective this date.

You are hereby ordered to tum-over any property owned by theLGU-Pili entrusted to yu and such other pertinent documents in yourcustody.

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

TOMAS P. BONGALOTA, JR.

Municipal Mayor

Aggrieved, Ceron moved for the reconsideration of her dismissal, butthe same was denied by the accused in his Memorandum dated November 8,2005.20

As her next recourse, Ceron turned to the Civil Service Commission("CSC") to appeal her dismissal by filing a Complaint/Appeal-Memorandumon November 9,2005.2^

More, she turned the tide against the Municipal Mayor by filing herown Affidavit-Complaint against him on November 11,2005 before the Officeof the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 3 (e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019.^^ Her Affidavit-Complaint likewise incorporated anadministrative charge for Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, GrossIgnorance of the Law, and Oppression.2^

In the interim, insofar as Ceron's appeal of the 6-month order ofsuspension in OMB-L-A-03-0541-F and the filing of criminal charges underOMB-L-C-03-0679-F, the Ombudsman belatedly issued a Joint Order2'^ onDecember 12,2005, which disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the appeal beDENIED and that the administrative penalty of six (6) months suspensionimposed upon the respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0541-F be modified toDISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of benefits anddisqualification from reemployment in the government.

No motion for reconsideration or any pleading of similar nature shallbe entertained henceforth.

SO ORDERED.

The same was, however, approved by then Acting Ombudsman OrlandoC. Casimiro only on November 28,2008?^

Exhibit "Z"

20 Exhibit "AA"2> Exhibit "GG-2"

22 Exhibit "A"22 Id. at page 1 of Exhibit "A2" Exhibit";"22 Id. at page 13 of Exhibit "J"

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. » 61P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

Meantime, before the Casimiro Resolution came out, the Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon actually sided with Ceron insofar as thedismissal order was concerned. In its letter dated January 4, 2006 addressedto Municipal Mayor Bongalota, Jr.,^^ the latter was actually requested towithdraw his Memorandum dated October 25,2005 and reinstate Ceron to herformer position as her dismissal was in conflict with its ruling which shouldonly mete the penalty of suspension. After a series of exchanges between theaccused and the Deputy Ombudsman,^^ Ceron wrote the accused expressingher desire to be reinstated, but the latter remained steadfast and did not heedher wishes.^®

On November 8, 2006, the CSC action on the order of dismissal ofCeron was reflected in its Resolution No. 06-1971^^ which decreed, asfollows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Eileen D. Ceron is herebyGRANTED. Accordingly, Municipal Mayor Tomas R Bongalongta, Jr. isDIRECTED to immediately reinstate Eileen D. Ceron as MunicipalAccountant and to cause the payment of her back salaries and other benefitsfrom the date of her illegal dismissal on October 25, 2005 up to herreinstatement to the service. The-memorandum dated October 25, 2005 ofMayor Bongalonta, Jr. dismissing Eileen D. Ceron from the service isdeclared NULL and VOID.

Quezon City, Nov. 08,2006.

This time, it was the accused who sought the reconsideration of theabove-quoted ruling, but the same was denied by the CSC in its Resolutiondated March 7, 2007.^® Not swayed, the accused appealed the afore-citedrulings of the CSC before the Court of Appeals.

Once again, Ceron wrote the accused in her letter dated March 27,2007seeking reinstatement by invoking the CSC resolutions but to no avail.^^

The end of accused's term as Municipal Mayor forthwith endedCeron's ordeal with her battle for reinstatement. On July 2, 2007, followingthe election ofAlexis San Luis as the new Municipal Mayor, Ceron was finallyreinstated to her position as Municipal Accountant.^^ Thereafter, Ceron wrotethen Municipal Mayor San Luis requesting payment of her backwages andother benefits.^^

On August 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision^"^ whichaffirmed the challenged rulings of the CSC and dismissed the petition filed by

Exhibit "BB"

" Exhibits "BB", "CC", and "DD" "GG"28 Exhibits "EE" and "FF"29 Exhibit "T'

2® Exhibit "U"21 Exhibit "JJ"22 Reinstatement Order dated July 2,2007 (Exhibit "II")22 Vide: Judicial AfBdavit of Eileen Ceron, Q&A 119-120; Records, Vol. 2, p. 114; Exhibit "II:2" Exhibit "V"

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 71P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

the accused. Subsequently, entry of judgment was issued on August 30,2008.35

When witness Munez testified in court, she disclosed that Ceron hasalready been paid her backwages, but said witness has not seen any documentwhich would show that Ceron has withdrawn the complaint she has filedbefore the Ombudsman.^^ Munez was not aware of the exact date of full

pa5mient of Ceron's backwages, but only that the same were tendered duringthe incumbency of the accused as Mayor.^"^

Upon taking the witness stand, Ceron recalled that she had executed anaffidavit of desistance because she had been reinstated to her position asMunicipal Accountant, and she had been partially paid of her backwages, andshe wanted a peaceful working environment at her office.^® In fact, she averredthat she had voluntarily filed a motion to withdraw the complaint before theOmbudsman.3^ At the time that she filed her affidavit of desistance, Ceron hadnot yet been fully paid her backwages. However, the remaining balance hadbeen satisfied in fUll sometime 2013.""^ The first installment of payment ofCeron's backwages was made by then Mayor San Luis in 2007."^^Subsequently, when the accused was re-elected as Mayor, it was during histerm that the rest of the installments of backwages and other benefits werepaid, which approximately amounted to One Hundred Eighty Eight ThousandPesos (P188,000.00).42

In lieu of presenting the respective records custodian of the CivilService Commission and the Court of Appeals to identify the resolutions andorders issued by said bodies, the prosecution and defense instead submittedJoint Stipulations and jointly admitted the existence and authenticity ofExhibits "L," "L-1," "M," "M-1," "W," "N," "O," "P," "Q," "R;" and theexistence of Exhibits "Y," "Y-l," "G," "D," "H," "I," "B," "Z," "AA," "A,""BE," "CC," "DD," "EE," "FF," "GO," "T," "HH," "11," "LL," "J," "E," "F,""JJ," "KK," and "U" identified in the judicial affidavits of Eileen D. Ceronand Caterina S. Munez.'^^

On August 8,2016, the prosecution formally offered its exhibits listedbelow:

Exhibit Description

"A" Affidavit-Complaint dated November 9,2005 of Eileen Ceron"B" to "B-1" Memorandum dated October 25,2005 of the accused

Deputy Ombudsman Order dated March 28,2005«D" Deputy Ombudsman Decision dated November 9,2004«E" Deputy Ombudsman Order dated March 28, 2005

Appeal dated April 29,2005 of Ceron

Exhibit "W"

TSN dated November 11,2014, p. 25TSN dated November 11,2014, p. 27TSN dated November 12,2014, pp. 24-25TSN dated November 12,2014, p. 26

^ TSN dated November 12,2014, p. 27TSN dated November 12,2014, p. 28TSN dated November 12,2014, pp. 29- 30 ^Joint Stipulations; Records, Volume 2, pp. 280-284

People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr.Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0203

DECISION

81P a g e

«G" P* Indorsement dated April 5,2005 of the Deputy Ombudsman"H" to «H-2" Memorandum dated April 25,2005 of the accused

«r' to "I-l" Letter dated October 25,2005 of Ceron addressed to the accused"J" Ombudsman Joint Order dated December 12,2005

"K" Notice of Decision dated October 5,2010 of the CA in C.A.-G.R. SPNo. 110593

«L" CA Decision dated October 5,2010 in C.A G.R. SP No. 110593

"M" Supreme Court Resolution dated November 16, in G.R. Nos. 189783-84

"N" CSC Resolution No. 050664 dated May 23,2004

«0" CSC Order dated January 15,2004

CSQ Order dated March 24,2004"Q" CSC Order dated March 21,2005"R" CSC Order dated November 25,2004

"S" CSC Notice of Resolution dated November 10,2006CSC Resolution No. 06-1971 dated November 8,2006

«U" CSC Resolution No. 070442 dated March 7,2007<ty» CA Decision dated August 8,2008 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 98493

Entry of Judgment of the CA Decision dated August 8,2008 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 98493

"X" Letter dated August 24,2007 of Ceron addressed to Mayor San Luis"Y" to "Y-1" Appointment and Service Record of Ceron

"Z" Motion for Reconsideration of Ceron addressed to the accused

«AA" to "AA-

1"

Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 8,2005 bythe accused '

"BB" to "BB-

1"

Letter dated January 4, 2006 of Director Emilio Gonzalez IIIaddressed to the accused ̂

"CC" to "CC-

1"

Letter dated February 3, 2006 of the accused addressed to Dir.Gonzalez

"DD" to «DD-

1"

Letter dated April 7, 2006 of Deputy Ombudsman Victor C.Fernandez addressed to the accused

"EE" to "EE-

2"

Letter dated May 3,2006 of Ceron addressed to the accused

"FF" to "FF-

1"

Reply Letter dated May 9,2014 of the accused to Ceron

"GG" to "GG-

3"

Reply Letter dated May 9, 2014 of the accused to DeputyOmbudsman Fernandez; Notice of Appeal and Complaint/AppealMemorandum filed by Ceron

"HH" to "HH-

1"

Letter dated December 11,2006 of Ceron addressed to the accused

"H" to «n-i" Reinstatement Order dated July 2,2007 of Mayor San Luis"JJ" to "JJ-1" Letter dated March 27,2007 of Ceron addressed to the accused

"KK" to "KK-

1"

Reply Letter dated April 2,2007 of the accused addressed to Ceron

"LL" to "LL-

1"

Letter of the accused addressed to Director Lida C. Ayon

In its Resolution"^ dated September 28,2016, the Court admitted all ofthe above-mentioned exhibits.

Records, Vol. 3, pp. 12-13

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr, 91P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

VVmRNrE FOR THE DEFENSE

The lone witness presented by the defense was accused Tomas P.Bongalonta, Jr. ["accused"].

In his Judicial Affidavi^^ dated April 20,2017, the accused averred thatCeron had been given a 6-month suspension by the Ombudsman for herdishonesty in the service, which penalty was modified to dismissal uponappeal. "V^en the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the penalty waslowered to a period of one (1) year suspension. Ceron also faced criminalcharges of six (6) counts of Estafa."*^

Although the accused admitted that he and Ceron tried to amicablysettle their differences, no such settlement had been reached.

The accused asseverated that he acted in good faith in dismissingCeron. He has not attained a college degree and merely relied on the adviceof his. legal counsel that he can lawfully terminate Ceron's services because,as Municipal Mayor, he had the power to remove employees. The accuseddid not intend to cause undue injury against her. Even when he received therulings of the Ombudsman and the CSC, the accused's legal counsel wasentrusted to act appropriately on the matters."^^

Ceron has been fully paid of her backwages and other benefits, theremaining balance of which had been satisfied after the accused was re-electedas Mayor."*^

In 2010, after his re-election as Municipal Mayor, the accused andCeron agreed to bury the hatchet. The six (6) counts of Estafa filed againstCeron were dismissed, and in turn, Ceron filed a Motion to AllowComplainant to "V^thdraw the Complaint dated June 24, 2011 before theDeputy Ombudsman.

On cross-examination, the accused recalled that the initial penaltymeted to Ceron was a 6-month suspension, that he issued an Order dismissingher, following which in a Joint Order dated November 28, 2008 theOmbudsman modified said penalty to dismissal fi-om the service."^^Subsequent thereto, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision on August 5,2010modifying said penalty to one (1) year suspension.^®

The accused testified that he had exchanged written commimicationswith the Ombudsman regarding Ceron's dismissal.^ ̂ Ceron was eventuallypaid in full of her backwages. and other benefits in 2010.^^

Records, Vol. 3, pp. 38-41Records, Vol. 3, pp. 38-39Records, Vol. 3, pp. 39-40

^ Records, Vol. 3, p. 40TSN dated April 25,2017, pp. 13-14TSN dated April 25,2017, p. 14TSN dated April 25,2017, pp. 15-17 /

52 TSN dated April 25,2017, pp. 18-19 J

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 101P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-11 -CRM-0203DECISION

Although given an opportunity to submit his written formal offer ofdocumentary exhibits, the accused failed to file such. As such, he was deemedto have waived the filing of the same.^^

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Before the prosecution could call on Eileen Ceron as its witness forrebuttal, the defense stipulated on the fact that full payment was made ofCeron's backwages and other benefits, but did not stipulate on the date whenthe same were paid.^"^

Thus, witness Ceron was again called to testify. She revealed that herclaims were fully satisfied on February 8,2013 as evidenced by DisbursementVoucher ("DV") No. 100-11-08 and Check No. 0000505784.^^ Ceronlikewise authenticated said DV by identifying the signatories appearingthereon.^^ The authenticity and existence of said documents then became thesubject of stipulation by the parties.^^

The prosecution then proceeded to formally offer Exhibits "MM(Rebuttal)" and "MM-1 (Rebuttal)", respectively referring to DV No. 100-11-08 and Check No. 0000505784 both dated February 8, 2013, whichdocuments were admitted by the Court.^^

Later, the accused failed to appear in court to present sur-rebuttalevidence despite due notice. Consequently, he was deemed to have waivedthe presentation of the same.^^

The case was thus submitted for decision.

In the interim, the prosecution filed its Memorandum on June 19,2018while the accused submitted his Memorandum on July 16,2018.

THE COURTIS RULING

The present charge is but the drawback of several legal moorings whichcontinued to defy the authority exercised by the accused in dismissingMunicipal Accountant Eileen Ceron from the service. While the resolutionsof the reviewing tribxmals vacillated between reinstating^® Eileen Ceron and

Vide: the Court's Resolution dated December 18,2017 (Records, Vol. 3, p. 226)TSN dated January 29,2018, pp. 7-8TSN dated January 29,2018, pp. 16-17

56 Exhibits "MM (Rebuttal)" and "MM-1 (Rebuttal)"; TSN dated January 29,2018, pp. 17-195' TSN dated January 29,2018, p. 2758 TSN dated January 29,2018, pp. 27-285' Vide: the Court's Order dated May 10,2018 (Records, Vol. 3, p. 323)60 Exhibits "N," "O," "P," "Q," "R," "S," "T," and "V"

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 111P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203DECISION

actually dismissing^^ her from the service, the catalyst that may finally goadthis case to its finis is one that has been resonated from the begmningEileen Ceron has been fully paid of her backwages and other benefits.Regardless of the legal obstacles to which this charge was pursued to the end,this may directly impact the existence or non-existence of the elements of theoffense charged.

To sustain a conviction under Section 3 (e) of 3019, the followingelements must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt:^^

(1) that the accused must be a public officer dischargingadministrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual actingin conspiracy with such public officers);

(2) that he [or she] acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,or inexcusable negligence; and

(3) that his [or her] action caused any undue injury to any party,including the government, or giving any private party unwarrantedbenefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his [or her] functions.[Emphasis supplied]

In its Memorandum, the prosecution argues that its evidence^^overwhelmingly proves the guilt of the accused beyond doubt of the crimecharged The first element was established by the accused's admission thathe was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, atthe time the acts complained of occurred. It was accused's illegal dismissalof Eileen Ceron which showed the presence of the second element, havingbeen tainted with evident bad faith since Ceron has already been imposed thepenalty of suspension of six (6) months. Accused, therefore, cannot reckonon the same set of circumstances which caused Ceron's suspension andimpose the severe penalty of dismissal. Worse, the accused failed to heedrulings of the CSC or of the Ombudsman on the matter of the reinstatementof Ceron. While Ceron eventually received full payment of her salary andother benefits, what was material was that at the time the Information wasfiled before the Court, the same were not yet fully paid which consummatedthe existence of the third element: undue injury. The prosecution thus praysthat the accused be convicted of the crime charged.

For his part, the accused pounds on the perceived delay in theprosecution of the charge which allegedly violated his constitutional right todue process and speedy disposition. Insofar as the elements of the crime areconcerned, accused asseverates that this Court need only assess the presenceof imdue injury and evident bad faith, both of which were not sufficiently

Exhibit "J"

Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, April 17,2017Records, Vol. 3, p. 331

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. . 121P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203DECISION

established. Accused terminated Eileen Ceron in good faith upon the legaladvice of his counsel at a time when die resolution of the Ombudsman wasnot yet final. Later, the Office of the Ombudsman itself imposed the penaltyof dismissal from service. Besides, Ceron was already fully paid of herbackwages, leaving her claim to damages purely a guess work.^"^

After judiciously considering the evidence presented, it rather appearsthat it is the non-presence of the third element which proved fatal to the causeof the Prosecution.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that there are two ways bywhich a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in theperformance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to anyparty, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party anyimwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be chargedunder either mode or both. The disjunctive term "or" connotes that either actqualifies as a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.^^

The prosecution did not argue that the accused had intentionally givenany person unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, but insteadfocused on its theory that his acts caused undue injury towards Ceron bydepriving her of her backwages, emoluments, and other benefits after herdismissal was deemed illegal or void.

Despite doing so, by this time, it is no longer the deprivation of suchbackwages, emoluments, and other benefits ftiat concems Eileen Ceron. Asshe spontaneously admitted on the witness stand, she has htQui fully paid ofthe same which stands to negate the existence of "undue injury."

The case of Alvarez v. People expounds that "[t]he term 'undue injury'in the context of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act hasa meaning akin to the civil law concept of "actual damage."^^ While it is notnecessary that a specific amount of the damage be proven with absolutecertainty, there must be some reasonable basis by which the court can measureit.6^

In this case, upon her reinstatement as Municipal Accountant of Fill,Camarines Sur, private complainant Eileen Ceron bewailed the non-paymentof her backwages and other benefits as the result of having been dismissedfrom the service by the accused. Later, however, it was divulged that Ceron's

^ Vide: Memorandum filed by the accused; Records, Volume 3, pp. 341-350Rivera v. People, G.R. Nos. 156577, 156587 & 156749, December 3,2014

^ G.R. No. 192591, June 29,2011, quoting Santos v. People, G.R. No. 161877, March 23,2006, which citedLlorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998Soriano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 163178, January 30,2009

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr.Criminal CaseNos. SB-ll-CRM-0203

DECISION

131P a g e

npLoney claims have already been fully settled. While Ceron has only beengiven partial payment of her claims sometime in 2007 during theadministration of fomier Mayor San Luis,^^ the same were fully satisfied onFebruary 8,2013 as evidenced by the issuance of DV No. 100-11-08^^ and herreceipt of Check No. 0000505784^® in the amount of One Himdred EightyEight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Fifteen Centavos(P188,752.15).

Said DV and Check are reproduced below:

L

^ Irnnf)

Vdaa

Republic of die VtaiippioBSLocal Government of PiU

Province of Camarinepf^COA FILE

IISBURSEMENT VOUCHER 1004m.

rieofPaymoit □Chedt L1 Cash U Odters

Payee EILEEN D. CEROM'MunAocauntamTIN/EiniiloyeeNe. lOtiligsttaaBeqaatNo.

ll^5I44a(l —'Address LOU-PILL CAM, SUE

Goiter

EXPLANATION

FUllPosnnentQfB<ckitdtri<sanfioiiher &TwlunK[C£/B«t«fitaosp«rC3CRe& Ho07a750<tatoIAfinl ]£, 2007, C3CR<& Ma 0704424ol«ciMarch 07.2007 and COAopitticn dibid Aufflrtt 30i. 20QS, uperau^pattRg papas ami ooinpUtel as Goltawa:RATACtett:

BalPofwaiiel P175425.00Add: TERh 4.2274B

CMA 5,00fto6FIB 4,00000

F<fe.-D«.20M -P 55,165.00Jm .'Apr -KXS • 2^06000-Hcw-Dae *2005 - 1O.(B0l00Jen.-Dec.-2006 • 60,18000Jai -Aiaie2007 - 30,090,00 (PUtteffiudiaonpuUttQcO

Total 175425.00 Total CoUectibles: P18S.752td;

JOURNAL ENTRY VOUCHER

CashtnBank-Local CiorEQcy. Cmrait Account

l AKEN UP AS PAYABLE

TOTAL {

CBR

obligated for the Purpose as indicated obovcDociBEcnts complete.

istedime

'^t/VElLEsNiyCERON Date

Muni Aooosstsut

Had. Aecoundqg UnltfAutlMrized Representative

AmiOVED PAYMENT

gnatute

VaCu

Bme

Mitlon

TOMAS

gP. BONGALONTA JR.

Dale

Municipal MayerAaMirv Hmi1/Aii«>uw<M>ri Rgucwtfllive

AMOUNT

Gross 18&751|^

ACT. CODE

40S(OI)111(01)

DEBIT

18^7521

1S8.7521

CREDir

188,7521

188.752

B. CERTIFIED

I am rogiste-ing my mbjoetisn in w-iting

Signature

PrintedName

PosMoa

• .RIA OTTA I llOFi'TAIKJHE, ^

^TC?TtMBfc^dI)5S5erTtcasurci/Autliorizcd Rqaeseattlive

D. RECEIVED pa:Cheek No.

SignuurcPnntedName

-Okie

OR/Odter Document!

Name

ftsneii

Dale

ia>-u4»-gg^JEVNo.

^ TSN dated November 12,2014, p. 28Exhibit "MM (Rebuttal)"Exhibit "MM-1 (Rebuttal)"

^ /

People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr.Criminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

14|P a g e

Exh., /»/>!

II- tv, » . , .'A:;

V /' ^

i. MONfeflLEGm- .-OMA<^b BC^r--• r- 71•:r MUMJCtPXJL TREASUREP _

fiHsrsA£^^

ckf^ttrT^ '

The unbidden fact that Ceron's backwages and other benefits have beenpaid in full is bolstered by Ceron herself who cited said settlement as part ofher motivation in filing a motion to withdraw the complaint before the DeputyOmbudsman.^^ Further, the fact of full payment of Ceron's claims has beenthe subject of stipulation by the parties during trial, viz:^^

XXX

CHAIRPERSON:

Can a stipulation be made, I don't think that even the complainantwould deny that.

PROSBC. ZALES

Yes, your Honors.

We would like to offer for stipulation your Honors:

1) That it was only on February 8, 2013 that private complainant,Eileen Ceron was paid in full of her [backwages], and emolumentsand other benefits arising from her illegal dismissal, that is thesubject of this case;

2) That the full payment was done after the case was filed;

TSN dated November 12,2014, pp. 24-25^ TSN dated January 29,2018, pp. 8-9

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 151P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203DECISION

That will be the only subject of the testimony of Miss Ceron forrebuttal.

XXXh ' '

ATTY. GALIT

Your Honor, insofar as the fact of payment, it is the position of thedefense, your Honor, that the same is admitted and stipulated fact. Withregard to the date of payment that is now being presented by thedistingmshed Public Prosecutor, which according to the defense counsel,they cannot stipulate on the date, your Honor.

They are willing to stipulate on the fact of payment.

XXX

The effect of full payment of the private complainant's claims isconsequential. By citing the following jurisprudential cases, it is clear that theSupreme Court has held on several occasions that the full satisfaction of thecomplainant's money claims did not result in real or actual damage, theabsence of which negated the presence of undue injury.

In Jacinto v. Sandiganhayan Q'Jacmto'% the Highest Courtpronounced:^^

In this case, it is not denied that the salary of the complainant. Dr.Munar, was withheld for sometime upon instruction of petitioner. Biit hisexplanation therewith is that complainant failed to submit her daily timerecords duly approved. Indeed her daily time records for May, June, Julyand August, 1985 were submitted by her only on September 24,1985. It isa well-known fact that in the government service an employee must submithis daily time record duly accomplished and approved before he can collecthis salary.

Furthermore, petitioner asserted that he withheld the salary of thecomplainant from May 13 to May 19,1985, which was the period when sheapplied for sick leave because he disapproved her application for sick leave.He found out she was not sick from Dr. Padre who confided to him that shewas merely persuaded by the complainant to issue said medical certificate.

At any rate, while there was indeed some inconvenience in thefailure of complainant to immediately get her salary for the aforesaid period,upon recdving the handwritten note of the Minister of Health, the petitionernevertheless authorized the payment of the salary of the complainant.

The petitioner also admits that he caused the removal of thename of the complainant from the plantilla but obviously his action wasthe net result of his dissatisfaction with the services of complainant. Thecomplainant was undeniably moonlighting even during her office hours inthe ERMH. She also refused to yield to the advice of petitioner not to furtherprotest the promotion of Dr. Tica. When her salary was withheld, instead of

G.R. No. 84571, October 2,1989

People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 161P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203DECISION

appealing to petitioner who was her immediate superior, she went directlyto higher authorities for assistance. When her name was omitted in theplantilla, she again by-passed petitioner.

Nevertheless, no real or actual damage was suffered by her. Shegot her withheld salary released. Her name was restored in theplantilla. Thus, the complainant did not suffer undue injury as anelement required by the law. Such an injury must be more thannecessary, excessive, improper or illegal. The injury suffered bycomplainant in this instance, if at all, is negligible. [Emphasis supplied]

Similarly, in Alejandro v. People Alejandro "), it was concluded that,"[m]oreover, one of the elements of the crime described in Sec. 3(e) of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is that there should be xmdue injurycaused to any party. However, in the 30 July 1987 decision of the respondentSandiganbayan, it is recognized that there was no proof of damage causedto the employees of the hospital since they were in fact paid on 27 October1982 their salaries for the entire third quarter of 1982."

In line with the above cases is the Highest Court's reversal of thejudgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan in Caugma v. People(^^Caugma")J^ The petitioners in this case were members of the DisposalCommittee of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources who hadbecome entangled in the sale by the government of the MA^ Malasugyi, whichhad been deemed a non-performing asset, to awardee V/L ShipyardCorporation for the bid price of PI38,900.00. Incidentally, said Corporationhad billed the government amounting to P103,l 11.40 for services renderedinvolving said ship. In acquitting the petitioners of Violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A. 3019, the Supreme Court reasoned out:

XXX

We agree with petitioners' contention that the crime of violation ofSection 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 was not committed when the Committeeconducted the bidding on November 28, 1985 and resolved to recommendto the Minister, through the BEAR Director, to award the sale of the vesselto the Corporation; neither was it committed when the award was made bythe BEAR Director to the Corporation. This is so because there was as yetno evidence that the government sustained a loss of P53,529.60. The crimewould have been committed if the Corporation had remitted to the NationalTreasurer the P138,900.00, and the P103,l 11.40 was applied by way of set-off against Bureau's account to said Corporation for Bill Nos. 1529 and1589.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that thegovernment lost P53,529.00 in the sale of the vessel. The only evidencepresented is the Corporation's bid and the Report of Villa Bemaldo on June18^ 1986. The Prosecution offered no cornpetent and sufficient evidence to

G.R. No. 81031, February 20, 1989G.R. No. 167048, April 7,2006

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 171P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0203DECISION

prove the actual damages caused to the government. On the other hand, theBFAR Director declared that the vessel was sold to the Corporation forP138,900.00, which accepted and remitted the amount to the nationaltreasury, as full payment of the vessel. The government receipted theamount "as proceeds of the sale" of the vessel. 92 To reiterate, there is noevidence on record that, after the Corporation had remitted the PI38,900.00on February 28, 1986, P103,l 11.40 thereof was applied to the Bureau'saccount under Bill Nos. 1529 and 1589 by way of set off. In fact, on January6, 1986, before the sale of the vessel was awarded to the Corporation, thegovernment had already remitted the P69,653.60 to it in payment of BillNo. 1589. The government did not even apply a portion of the PI 38,900.00as payment of its account of P33,388.60 under Bill No. 1529, and insteadpaid die amount to the Corporation on May 12,1986.

Thus, the full amount of the bid price, PI38,900.00, which theCorporation remitted to the national treasury was intact as Bemaldo statedin her June 18,1986 Report; yet, petitioners were prosecuted and convictedof violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

In fine then, the Court holds that the travesty which had beencommitted must be undone.

XXX

While the prosecution makes issue of the fact that Ceron's claims hadnot yet been fully settled at the time of the filing of the present Information,such tardiness in payment still does not establish an instance of undue injury.

Illustrative is the case of Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganhayan ( "Llorente ").In this case, petitioner Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., then Municipal Mayor ofSindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was charged with Violation of Sec. 3 (e) ofR.A. 3019 in an Information dated October 22. 1992. The charge stemmedfi*om the allegation that petitioner unjustly refused to sign and approve thepayrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and otheremoluments of private complainant Leticia G. Fuertes. As it happened, whilethere was payment made to the private complainant in 1994. which occurredafter the filing of said Information, the Highest Court was imconvinced of thepresence of undue injury and acquitted petitioner of the charge, in this wise:76

XXX

The solicitor general, in his manifestation, points out that "imdueinjury" requires proof of actual injury or damage, citing our ruling inAlejandro vs. People and Jacinto vs. Sandiganhayan. Inasmuch ascomplainant was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no "undueinjury" established. [Emphasis supplied]

This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury inSec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a righthas been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of

76 G.R. No. 122166, March 11,1998

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 181P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203

DECISION

the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of anyunwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very actpunished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury bespecified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as"actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, notproper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another,either in his person, rights, reputation or property; that is, the invasion ofany legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context ofthese definitions, is akin to that in civil law.

In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199of the Civil Code as follows:

"Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, oneis entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary losssuffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation isreferred to as actual or compensatory damages."

Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breachof a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fairand just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence

of the defendant's act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as ageneral rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of otherkinds, of damages. Actual damages are primarily intended to simply makegood or replace the loss caused by the wrong.

Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but mustbe actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot bebased on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation,conjecture or guesswork. They cannot include speculative damages whichare too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.

In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and allowancefor the period beginning July 1990 were withheld, and that her familyunderwent financial difficulty which resulted from the delay in thesatisfaction of her claims. As regards her money claim, payment of her

salaries froni January 1991 until November 19,1991 was evidenced bythe Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991. She also admitted

having been issued a check on January 4,1994 to cover her salary from

June 1 to June 30, 1990; her salary differential from July 1, 1989 toApril 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and herclothing allowances. Respondent Court found that all her monetaryclaims were satisfied. After she fully received her monetary claims,there is no longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury,there being nothing more to compensate.

Complainant's testimony regarding her family's financial stress wasinadequate and largely speculative. Without giving specific details, shemade only vague references to the fact that her four children were all goingto school and that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however, didnot say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damagebrought by such nonpayment. The fact that the "injury" to her family was

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. 191P a g eCriminal Case Nos. SB-ll-CRM-0203DECISION

unspecified or imquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, asakin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supportedby evidence on record, cannot be considered.

Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances whichwere eventually received, the prosecution failed to specify and to prove anyother loss or damage sustained by the complainant. (Emphasis supplied;citations omitted)

XXX

As can be gleaned from the cases of Jacinto, Alejandro, Caugma, andLlorente, on the premise that undue injury is akin to the civil law concept ofactual damage, the full satisfaction and/or payment of the complainant's orinjured party's monetary claim(s) obviates the presence of real or actualdamages, which forms the basis of undue injury. Heeding said jurisprudence,it is but imperative that the Court follow the same path laid before it.

Jurisprudence teaches that "[t]he prosecution is burdened to prove thefactual basis and amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by theinjured party. Courts cannot simply rely on speculations, conjectures orguesswork in determining the fact and the amount of damages."^^ While it hasshown that undue injury was suffered by Ceron, albeit only at the outset, it isundeniable that the same has already been completely settled. As such, no realor actual damage has been suffered by her. Inconvenience, if any was sufferedby Ceron, is certainly not constitutive of undue injury."^^ Consequently, theabsence of such damage robs the presence of undue injury, resulting in anincomplete set of elements comprising the offense of Violation of Section 3(e) oiRA. 3019.

Having thus foimd that no undue injury exists, the elements of the crimecharged leave much to be desired. In this essence, no disquisition need bemade of the first and second elements.

The acquittal of the accused is thus warranted.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt ofaccused TOMAS P. BONGALONTA, JR. beyond reasonable doubt, he isACQUITTED of Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The cash bond posted by accused Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr. is orderedreleased subject to the usual accounting procedures. The Hold DepartureOrder issued by this Court on July 20, 2011 is set aside, and the Order issued

" Caugma v. People, G.R. No. 167048, April 7,2006^ Go V. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131399, October 17,2003

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People V. Tomas P. Bongalonta, Jr.Criminal Case Nos. SB-1 l-CRM-0203DECISION

201P a g e

by the Bureau of Immigration incoiporating his name in the Hold DepartureList is ordered recalled and cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

MA. THERESA DOWRES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associate Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

rarSPESES

\ssociaMJustice

GEORGINID.HTOALGO

LyAssoc fate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of theCourt's Division.

MA. THERESA DOli^RES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTAAssociate Justice, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and theDivision Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions inthe above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assignedto the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

AJE-[PARO Ml

Presiding,