Defining Firearms Trafficking in Australia (New Century, New Challenges, New Thinking: The

changing face of Firearms Trafficking in Australia)

By: Steve Pavlovich

Forensic Firearms Examiner. Western Australia.

Keywords: firearm, organised crime, firearm trafficking, firearm identification, Seized

Trafficked Gun, High Risk Firearm, STG Bulletin, ABIN, NIBIN, NTI, NCIC, Handgun.

Abstract: Policing agencies will need to develop and use new techniques which can

adapt to stop the development and spread of firearm trafficking networks. Bold

legislative changes may be required to assist Australian Police and Border Force

officers to identify trafficked firearms including trafficable firearm component parts

and accessories to reveal information relating to the origin and distribution patterns of

illegally sourced, imported or workshop manufactured firearms

INTRODUCTION

The provision of a best practice model for the identification and examination of seized

trafficked firearms, parts and accessories within Australian policing agencies and the

Australian Border Force has become a necessary requirement for the effective

investigation of firearm trafficking within this country and the subsequent distribution of

‘trafficked firearm’ intelligence between law enforcement agencies internationally.

The purpose of this article is to identify what these new challenges are and discuss how

new methodology for the examination of seized trafficked firearms and ammunition will

assist Australian Police agencies to identify possible local and national crime involvement,

patterns of organised firearms trafficking activity and assist in any subsequent

prosecutions.

Australian policing agencies must be highly selective as to the investment of resources

which will return the best results. Some Australian Police agencies have cast their

trafficking net very wide at this time and will have difficulty examining, analysing,

interpreting and distributing the large volume of results from many sources. Multiple data

sources can record firearm examinations using different methods which make the

gathering together of important information difficult and laborious. This can result in critical

information being overlooked, lost in a forest of mismatching terminology and

descriptions.

The term “High Risk Firearm” commonly in use in past years is a broad and somewhat

misleading term which is more of an investigative direction than a definition. Firearms

Trafficking, trafficable firearms and trafficked firearms are terms which are relatively new

to Australian legislation especially in today’s modern context and they must be clearly

understood and defined if illicit firearms, parts and accessories are to be identified to

reflect their illegal status.

Federal Government measures to increase penalties for firearm trafficking offences have

been occurring as recently as December 2015.i

Firearm trafficking is a term which until recent years has not been seriously considered in

the Australian context. Now however links to organised crime have been identified as can

be seen in a report by the Australian Institute of Criminology dated 2012. ii

This 2012 publication by the AIC (Australian Institute of Criminology) in reference to the

Characteristics and dynamics of firearm trafficking does make the point of ‘an absence of

complete data’iii which will be discussed later in this article.

“…Information on firearm trafficking and the intricate workings of the illicit market in

Australia is similarly limited. There is general agreement on the likely sources of illicit

firearms, and the conduits through which they are trafficked, but less consensus on the

importance of these in supplementing the illicit market. Some of this difference in opinion

relates to the viewpoint of different interest groups, in particular whether market

replenishment is mostly derived from ‘internal’ sources (such as the theft of legal firearms)

or reliant on a consistent flow of items from outside Australia (through illegal importation).

Yet much of this uncertainty ultimately derives from the difficulty in estimating contribution

in the absence of complete data.”

However, the recent focus of ‘firearm trafficking’ legislation is now counter terrorism

related and will remain so for some time to come. This effectively creates a new third tier

of possible firearm trafficking activity in Australia with sinister methodologies, distinct and

separate from other groups relating to the types of firearms that are required by the

agents of terrorism;

1. Gang crime,

2. Organised Crime and

3. Terrorism Crime.

WHAT IS A TRAFFICKED FIREARM ANYWAY?

The quick answer is of course that there is no such thing, Not in legal definitions or

legislation anyway. Firearm trafficking is the illegal or unauthorised acquisition or

disposal(sale) of firearms by a person.iv

Firearm Legislation in all Australian states and Territories will require review over the next

few years. This review will need to establish new firearm trafficking offences, allowing

investigating officers to clearly identify the trafficking of firearms by legal definition.

Hopefully these definitions will be consistent between Australian State, Territories and the

Australian Border force.

‘Unlike criminal misuse of guns, however, firearms trafficking charges can be hard to

prove. This has often made cases against firearms traffickers more complicated and

challenging than other kinds of gun cases,v

states an article prepared by the US Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms, June 2000.

The creation of a ‘trafficked firearm’ definition could more accurately identify such

firearms and introduce a new and more focused direction for investigators in the field.

Currently the emphasis of any firearm trafficking prosecution is directed toward any

person whose actions create the charge of firearm trafficking, rather than upon the

possession of the firearm, firearm parts or ammunition to which the firearm trafficking

charge would relate. It is my opinion that the latter ‘possession’ would in many cases

provide better service to the investigator and prosecutor.

Figure 1: (FT1 FT4 5PS CN3 8AS SHP)vi A shortened La Salle pump-action shotgun used by

Sydney siege gunman Man Haron Monis during the Lindt cafe siege in Sydney,

December 2014. Photograph: Department of Justicevii

This firearm (Figure 1) is not licensable in Australia because:

1. It cannot be traced to a lawful point of origin (manufacture). This firearm has no

legitimate history; it is for all practical purposes “untraceable”.

2. It may be stolen.

3. It may be comprised in part of ‘workshop made’ (homemade) components?

4. It may be comprised in part of ‘factory manufactured’ parts of unknown origin.

5. It has been unlawfully modified.

6. This firearm may have already been used in other crimes or criminal activities which

Australian policing agencies are not yet aware such as;

a. illegal importation. (requiring Australian Border Force involvement)

b. illegal modification or manufacture

c. distribution by firearm trafficking networks.

The modifications that have been made to this shotgun such as the shortening of the

stock and barrel are a clear indication that this gun is the product of criminal activity. It

cannot be identified to determine its origin and cannot be purchased, sold, licensed,

possessed or used in any Australian State or Territory.

A criminal charge which relates to the seizure of any such firearm whether found in the

possession of a religious zealot, an OMCG gang member, or a 15-year-old school boy

should be able describe the possession of such a firearm as ‘absolutely prohibited’.

In another example, a simple case of an erased or destroyed serial number found upon a

seized handgun–

Figure 2. (FT1 PTS) A seized handgun with

destroyed serial numbers.

The destroyed serial numbers on

the pistol in Figure 2 is a clear indication

that this gun is the product of criminal

activity. It cannot be identified to

determine its origin and therefore cannot

be purchased, sold, licensed, possessed or

used in any Australian State or Territory.

Has the destruction of the serial numbers created a firearm licensing offence, or are there

other factors which should be considered?

This firearm (Figure 2) is not licensable in Australia because:

1. It cannot be traced to a lawful point of origin(manufacture). This firearm has no

legitimate history; it is “untraceable”.

2. This firearm has no individually identifying serial numbers.

3. It may be stolen.

4. It may have ‘workshop made’ (homemade) components?

5. It may have ‘factory manufactured’ parts of unknown generic brand origin.

6. This firearm may have been used in other crimes or criminal activities nationally or

internationally of which policing agencies are not yet aware such as;

a) illegal importation. (requiring Australian Border Force involvement)

b) illegal manufacture. (possibly interstate)

c) firearm trafficking networks (national and/or international).

7. These firearms may, by the nature of their construction and components be unsafe

(Section 12, 1(b) Firearms Act 1973, Western Australia.

Should prosecution charges relating to these types of firearms be able to proceed as

‘Possess Prohibited Firearm’? Could this ‘untraceable firearm’ definition be included in the

Table of Prohibited Firearms and Ammunition thus removing it from any connection to

irrelevant firearm licensing offences?

For example; the Prohibited Firearm description to include the definition;

‘A firearm or major firearm part which cannot be traced to a lawful point of

origin(manufacture). Having no legitimate or lawful history at the moment of its seizure or

has been recorded as stolen’?

This definition could be included in Prohibited Firearm legislation as demonstrated in red

text below.

Table of prohibited firearms and ammunition (ref: Western Australia Firearm Regulations

1974 Reg 26)

a firearm of category D

a firearm or major firearm part which cannot be traced to

a lawful point of origin(manufacture). Having no known

legitimate or lawful history at the moment of its

seizure or has been recorded as stolen.

a machine gun, or ammunition for it

a hand grenade

a mortar gun, or ammunition for it

a bazooka gun, or ammunition for it

a fully automatic firearm

a firearm designed to discharge tear gas, or ammunition for it

a “forward venting” blank firing imitation firearm

ammunition the missile from which includes any high explosive, smoke,

chemical, lachrymatory agent, or flechettes

tracer ammunition

incendiary ammunition

armour piercing (hard steel core) ammunition

?

imprint free (accelerator) ammunition

frangible ammunition

ammunition the missile from which has a calibre of 20 mm or more

If an untraceable handgun (Figure 2) could be categorised as a Prohibited Firearm, then

this would arguably be a better starting point for further firearm related charges which

may be developed into firearm trafficking offences.

The usual connection to firearm licensing charges must be cut as we are no longer

referring to a licensable firearm. Prosecution charges which relate to an unlicensed firearm

in these instances seem to me to be not only misleading but wholly inaccurate. It would

be better in my view to focus upon the unlicensable characteristics of such seized firearms

as it is not possible to possess this firearm (Figure 2) lawfully on any firearms licence in

Australia. Therefore, any lesser charge which might infer the existence of a firearms licence

which might be produced in some instances, that is …to possess an unlicensable firearm is

misleading at best.

The destruction of serial numbers on any firearm should be sufficient to enable the firearm

to be categorised as a Prohibited Firearm, as the possession of such a firearm must always

be ‘absolutely prohibited’. This is a first step toward further investigations which may

indicate firearm trafficking offences. It is the nature of firearm trafficking that the origins of

firearms and/or firearm parts are difficult or impossible to determine and a destroyed serial

number is clear evidence of an intent to render the firearm untraceable.

Over any given period in Australia, many firearms are seized by Police and Customs

agencies and the identification of ‘trafficable items’ or ‘trafficked guns’ should be made

quickly and efficiently to enable further timely examination. (Chart 1)

Chart 1; A hierarchical graph showing the distributions of firearms

seized by Police by category and offence types

A new STG (Seized Trafficked Gun) or prohibited firearm definition may assist in the

investigation and identification of the relatively small subcategory of trafficked and

prohibited firearms from the much larger numbers of firearms seized by Police from all

Firearms and Ammunition seized by Police from all

sources

Firearms Seized; Prohibited Firearms

Seized Trafficked Guns

Firearms seized; Criminal Offences

Firearms Seized; Firearm offences

Firearms Seized; Firearm Licensing

Offences

sources. Many firearms seized by policing agencies fall within the scope of firearm

licensing offences and these can be quickly discounted for the purposes of trafficked

firearm investigations.

Many trafficked firearms are seized as a result of drug squad, gang crime squad and

organised crime squad searches, which have not been used in an offence but are seized

in conjunction with other offences.

Seized Trafficked Gun – A firearm or major component which may include ammunition,

intended for illegal sale and/or distribution that is:

suspected of having a drug, organised crime or gang crime association;

workshop fabricated in part or in its entirety;

illegally assembled from commercially available manufactured firearm or

ammunition component parts;

diverted from legitimate sources for the purpose of illegal sale and distribution;

not licensable;

a prohibited firearm

One of the most obvious characteristics of any trafficable firearm is that it must be a

readily saleable commodity. A firearm which is intended for personal use, rudimentary or

primitive in both construction and operation is an ‘Improvised firearm’, commonly known

as a “home-made gun” and is not by definition an STG because it is not a readily saleable

commodity and can be discounted for the purposes of trafficked firearm investigations.

Figure 3; (FT1 PTS):

A seized handgun and ammunition

Example;

The seized firearm in Figure 3 has a STG

(Seized trafficked Gun) classification. The

serial number has been deliberately

destroyed and it was in the possession of a

person of interest who was subsequently

charged with a number of drug offences.

Any prosecution charges relating to this type of firearm (Figure 3) would be more

accurately worded if it contained the term ‘Possess a Prohibited Firearm’ as this is the most

logical conclusion which can be reached regarding the true nature and illicit purpose of

this firearm. Unfortunately, firearm legislation will not always allow such logical conclusions.

This indicates to me that Legislators have yet to come to terms with trafficked firearms,

what they are and the circumstances in which they are used and distributed.

The accurate recording of firearm, firearm accessory and ammunition descriptions as

close to or at the time of seizure is an extremely important and critical consideration; this

logical step can often be overlooked.

I can see no purpose in the use of police resources to provide accurate firearm

descriptions weeks or months after the date of seizure when any criminal proceeding

related to these firearms might be well underway or have been concluded. These

procedures are counter- intuitive and in the current world environment where time is a

factor which will always work against policing agencies, we must address the requirement

for more urgent timelines which must be set and adhered to.

The firearms in Figure 2 and Figure 3 have no individually identifying characteristics i.e.

serial numbers. The firearms in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 have unknown histories. These

firearms have black market values that may exceed $5000 and possibly go as high as

$15000. The firearms in Figure 2 and Figure 3 have been seized in conjunction with large

quantities of illicit drugs. All three firearms have been prepared solely for illegal sale and

distribution as trafficable illicit firearms. Police do not know whether the Person of Interest in

each instance is the first owner or the fiftieth owner. As such these firearms and

components must be identified and categorised as seized trafficked firearms and the

possession of such firearms is and must be absolutely prohibited.

If it is the intention of State and Territory Court Prosecutors to argue that any person or

group was involved in the distribution of illegal firearms, then the charges should reflect

the true nature and intent of these seized firearms.

The identification of Seized Trafficked Guns (STG’s) cannot be limited to whole firearms

(which are capable of being fired) but must also include firearm parts, firearm accessories

and ammunition seized separate to, or in conjunction with whole firearms.

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAIL

In the AIC report entitled “Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs” by

Dr Samantha BRICKNELL (Australian Institute of Criminology)viii states;

“It is not possible, however, to estimate the size of either the grey or illicit [FIREARM]

markets. The grey[FIREARM]market may be substantial but there are no reliable estimates

of the volume of it or the illicit market.”

Further on October 14, 2014 the Australian magazine “Government News” reported in an

article by Marie Sansomix;

“The number, distribution and source of illegal guns in Australia is a statistical black hole…

One of the most consistent themes is the lack of adequate data about where illicit

firearms are from, whether they are imported or stolen from legal owners or are being

manufactured in Australia, Senator Wright (Legal and Constitutional Affairs References

Committee) said.”

The use of data and information that is known to be unreliable or inadequate is clearly not

an effective way to formulate any plan to combat the issue of firearm trafficking in

Australia. The way forward requires a combined and determined effort on the part of all

Australian Policing and Custom agencies developing uniform and consistent investigative

methodology with clear, unambiguous firearm definitions and terminology.

THE CATEGORIZATION OF SEIZED FIREARMS AND COMPONENTS

A critical consideration which relates to the examination of STG’s is the accurate retrieval

of firearm specific data. It is very important that such data accurately include all the

identifying characteristics of firearms such as make, model, calibre and serial number but

must also record factory or aftermarket firearm parts, accessories, workshop made

components and any modifications as these are also critical aspects of the illicit firearm

trade.

Police and Customs officers conducting searches and seizing firearms must ensure not

only that the identifying characteristics are correctly recorded but also that the correct

charges (which relate to the categorization of these firearms) are preferred against

accused persons.

The high seizure rate of illegal firearms within Australia and the widespread availability of

firearm components on the internet necessitates accurate and detailed recording of all

seized firearm parts. STG’s (seized trafficked guns) require close scrutiny of all associated

component parts and accessories. The effective and accurate recording of firearm parts

and accessories is still a major challenge for Australian law enforcement agencies

attempting to combat the distribution of illicit firearms.

Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 below, show workshop made firearm seizures in Australia.

These types of firearms and their components have not yet appeared in any police

searches in Western Australia.

It is imperative that Police and Customs investigators are conversant with significant

firearm seizures in all States and Territories so that they can remain vigilant as to the

appearance of STGs having similar design characteristics which may assist investigators to

identify firearms trafficking patterns throughout Australia.

Figure 4; (FT3 CN3 1A 7A M):

Seized workshop manufactured STG in

New South Wales.

Figure 5; (FT3 CN3 1A M):

Seized workshop manufactured STGs in

New South Wales.

Figure 6; (FT3 CN1 10AR CN3 3A M):

Seized workshop manufactured STGs in

South Australia.

Figure 7; (FT3 M):

Seized workshop manufactured STGs in

Western Australia.

Four different STG seizures across Australia, (Figure 4 – Figure 7 incl.) resulting in four

different designs of ‘workshop’ made machine guns.

The POI for the seized firearm in Figure 5, Angelos KOOTS has admitted that he

manufactured at least one hundred firearms using this design.

Although it is likely that a recent Queensland firearm seizure (Figure 8 below) is a

‘workshop’ made firearm produced by Angelos KOOTS there can be no positive

conclusion as to the origin of this firearm unless an examination is made to compare the

manufacturing techniques used in each of these firearms.

Figure 8; (FT3 M):

Seized workshop manufactured STGs in Queensland.

This requires the sharing of firearm examination reports between the NSW and QLD Police

or a determination made by a third independent agency to which all previous

examination information has been sent.

These five examples of seized firearms (Figure 4 -8 inclusive) highlights the requirement to

accurately record differences in the design and manufacture of such firearms and their

component parts. All these designs are capable of full automatic fire and are therefore

absolutely prohibited firearms. However Australian firearm recording systems may not be

able to differentiate between these four designs effectively losing important Intelligence

information relating to these four distinctly different designs and their construction

methods and components.

The efficient collection and distribution of information relating to firearms, firearm parts

and accessories will assist investigating officers by allowing the recognition of firearm parts

which may be found during Police searches in the absence of whole firearms. The flow of

information to the investigating officers within a time frame that ensures the such

information is still useful is a critical requirement to successful prosecutions.

AUSTRALIAN FIREARM DATABASES

There are a number of current Australian databases which operate nationally to provide

detail on firearms, owners and firearm trace requirements;

The National Firearms Identification Database (NFID) is a reference that assists Australian

policing agencies to identify and record firearms using consistent methodology.

The Australian Ballistic Information Network (ABIN) can electronically match crime scene

ballistic evidence such as fired cartridge cases and recovered bullets to determine if a

firearm has been used in the commission of a crime. It also links different crimes in which

the same firearm has been used.

The National Firearm Trace Database (NFTD) maintained by the Australian Crime and

Intelligence Commission ACIC, is a compilation of recorded data on unregistered firearms

recovered by federal, state and territory police agencies.

The National Firearms Interface (NFI) is a system in development by the Australian Crime

and Intelligence Commission ACIC, will include information about a firearm's ownership

history, whether it is suspected of being used in a crime, and whether it has been reported

stolen.

The National Firearms and Licensing Registration System (NFLRS) administered by the

Australian Crime and Intelligence Commission ACIC holds information on past and current

firearm license holders, licensed firearms dealers, registered, lost or stolen firearms.

A new National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) pilot program is now underway within

Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission intended to strengthen criminal information

and intelligence sharing across law enforcement agencies by connecting the data

holdings making searching across these more efficient.

State and Territory Firearm Registries have not been included. There are currently more

than 30 different firearms registers and databases across federal, state and territory

agencies. All of these were introduced in an effort to streamline of simplify existing data

holdings. Any new systems which are introduced must be carefully monitored to ensure

that the new processes are more efficient than the older processes they have replaced.

A 2015 media releasex states “…At present there are four separate CrimTrac national

systems involved in national firearms surveillance…”, citing the National Firearms

Identification Database (NFID) as one of these critical databases. I am unconvinced that

this reference only database has any real usefulness within firearm registries. The usefulness

of the NFID in recording trafficked firearms including parts and accessories is questionable

at best.

One of the newest of these systems is the

Australian Ballistic Information Network

(ABIN) which was launched nationally in

mid-2014.xi

The comparable system in the United States of America is the National Integrated Ballistic

Information Network (NIBIN) which was initially deployed in 2001. An Investigation to

improve NIBIN in its twelfth year of operation was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice

and was entitled;

“Opening the Black Box of NIBIN: A Descriptive Process and Outcome Evaluation of the

Use of NIBIN and Its Effects on Criminal Investigations.”xii

Author(s): William King, William Wells, Charles Katz, Edward Maguire, James Frank

This 116-page report was summarized by the US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) which is

the research, development and evaluation agency of the United States Department of

Justice in an article entitled;

‘STUDY IDENTIFIES WAYS TO IMPROVE ATF BALLISTIC EVIDENCE PROGRAM’xiii by Nancy Ritter

This author states that, “It is important to understand that this study did not examine the

science of firearm and tool mark examination itself; rather, the study looked only at the

operations of the NIBIN program as an investigative tool.”

The author in her summary of the US NIBIN system report says-

1. “…the timeliness of processing evidence varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Some identified hits against the national gun-crime evidence database within a few days

of a crime, and others produced hit reports so slowly that they had no investigative value.”

“Delays in processing ballistic evidence are the single greatest threat to the utility of NIBIN

as an investigative tool,” the researchers said, noting that in the 19 sample sites, the

median elapsed time between a crime and identification of a NIBIN hit was 101 days; the

mean was 337 days.

2. “The bottom line seems to be that criminal investigators rarely used NIBIN hit reports to

identify unknown suspects… They reported, however, that NIBIN hit reports were useful as

background or to confirm (or disconfirm) information provided by suspects, witnesses and

informants. The researchers said that this means that police are currently using NIBIN hits

and other forms of forensic intelligence in similar ways.”

These observations of the US NIBIN could in a similar way be reflected within the Australian

ABIN system indicating a need to learn from the mistakes of others. Australian Policing

must remain vigilant and review such systems as ABIN regularly to maintain or increase

effectiveness and reduce inefficiencies.

In the original NIBIN reportxiv beginning on page 34 there is a paragraph which deserves

mention;

“Labs and law enforcement agencies also differ in the nature and comprehensiveness of

the processes used for routing firearms evidence from a police agency to the crime lab.

For example, in some labs, a firearm is processed by the firearms unit only if an investigator

requests an analysis. In these agencies, a portion of criminal firearms (and most firearms

confiscated by police for safekeeping) will not be processed by the lab and will not be

entered into NIBIN. Instead, these firearms sit unanalysed in a property storage facility;

usually a police facility. In other labs, all firearms are routed to the lab for analysis and

entry into NIBIN. Routing all firearms to the lab for testing is no panacea” …” Improved

communication between labs and law enforcement agencies would help in these

situations as would a process of attaching additional information to submitted firearms so

that labs can determine if the firearm is suitable for NIBIN.”xv

Although there is an order of magnitude between the US NIBIN and the Australian ABIN

systems, comparisons may still be made as they involve the same types of processes. In

the Australian ABIN system an STG categorisation system could reduce the workload of

Police Firearm Units and Forensic Firearm Examiners considerably by effectively identifying

which firearms should be forwarded for ABIN analysis.

The flow of clear and accurate Intelligence data will alleviate the substantial challenges

faced by policy makers and investigators by providing valuable information relating to the

complex workings of firearm trafficking groups in Australia.

It is the responsibility of Australian policing agencies to take the initiative and develop

operational links with all investigative partners. The creation of these operational pathways

will facilitate the ‘timely’ passage of firearm related intelligence which may be in the form

of a special request for firearms information relating to a specific investigation or the

routine distribution of important technical/intelligence detail for the information of all

strategic policing partners such as the Australian Crime and Intelligence Commission

(ACIC), Australian Border Force Firearms Intelligence and Targeting Team (FITT), Australian

Federal Police, State Police and Interpol. It would be useful if such information could be

distributed in a timely manner. Ideally the distribution of important information relating to

firearm trafficking or seized trafficked firearms should occur within 24 - 48 hours so this

information can be useful to investigators.

HOW DO WE DISTRIBUTE FIREARM INFORMATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE INVESTIGATORS?

Police agencies facilitate the reporting of firearm intelligence data within extranet

websites such as the IDM (Intelligence Data Management) system. However, it has been

my experience that such reports are written by Intelligence Analysts and reading them

can be a little boring dispiriting.

Perhaps a better solution and one which in my opinion should be given urgent

consideration is the initiation of a Seized Trafficked Gun Bulletin, an extranet web Bulletin

linked to a Firearm trafficking and Intelligence Desk within the national ACID/ALEIN

website. The firearm trafficking desk would receive and distribute firearm reports and

information including photographs and specific technical information relating to

important firearm, ammunition and firearm component seizures.

The Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN) is a secure extranet

providing a web-like environment, with access to the latest ACC intelligence products.

ALEIN desks provide a gateway for international, Commonwealth, state and territory law

enforcement agency partners to access intelligence products stored within a ‘desk’

based structure. ALEIN is also a secure messaging channel for sharing criminal information

and intelligence between Commonwealth, state and territory partners.

The ALEIN system within the Australian Crime and Intelligence Commission (ACIC) would

provide an excellent platform for firearm trafficking data and intelligence.

Figure 9 (FT2 CN3 2A M):

Sample page “STG Bulletin”

The sample page (Figure 9) from the

proposed STG Bulletin shows a Glock pistol

with a workshop manufactured select fire

device which was located during a

search by members of the Gang Crime

Squad in Western Australia. This device

allows the firearm to operate in either

semi-automatic or fully automatic fire

modes. The article describes the

appearance and method of operation of

the device comparing it to other related

seizures.

Figure 10: Sample page STG Bulletin

The ACIC ALEIN Firearm Trafficking Desk

would distribute information including

photographs and specific technical

information relating to firearm,

ammunition and firearm component

seizures. (Figure10). This would provide a

searchable data table providing quick

access to information, firearm and POI

images and further links to case file

resources on POI’s or related firearm

seizures.

Dr Samantha BRICKNELL (AIC) Australian Institute of Criminology has identified in a

published study ‘Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs’,xvi three key

elements essential to accurate first capture recording of firearm data-

1. “A critical fundamental in producing data suitable for tracing is the accurate recording of

a firearm’s identification marker—the serial number—and other classifying features (e.g.

make, model)”

2. “Firearm identification is highly technical and requires considerable proficiency and

knowledge. The technical nature of firearm identification creates the risk (and the reality)

that personnel, such as staff in firearm registries, may not always have the knowledge or

training to accurately record the features that are vital to identifying individual firearms.”

3. “Comprehensive training in firearm identification is an obvious response to rectify

inaccurate recording practices and ideally would extend to all personnel responsible for

extracting identification material from firearms… other measures need to be applied that

assist in self-correcting and/or standardising identification material...”

Firearms Identification is a skill that comes with years of experience and training. An

inquisitive mind and the ability to conduct research is a necessary requirement to maintain

a grasp of new firearm types, new ammunition types, firearm manufacturing methods and

the myriad of new and upcoming firearm and firearm parts manufacturers. The pace of

development of new firearm technologies and manufacturing techniques is more than

sufficient to occupy the time of any Firearms examiner or investigator who might wish to

’stay current’.

-current world levels of firearm development, manufacturing and the sheer marketing

force of firearms manufacturers via books, magazines and especially internet media has

never been seen or experienced before-

In Australia there have been several clear examples of firearm and ammunition

development outrunning any relevant Firearm Legislation. The most notable recent

example is the ADLER lever action shotgun originally intended to be sold in Australia with a

7+1 shotshell capacity. (Note: 7+1 indicates 7 shotshells in the magazine and 1 shotshell

chambered in the barrel for a total capacity of 8 shotshells)

Figure 11 (FT1 9P SHL): An ADLER lever action 12g shotgun with 7+1 shotshell capacity

This 7+1 lever shotgun initially sidestepped Australian Firearm Legislation as it could not be

effectively categorised for licensing purposes. The Turkish-made lever-action shotgun was

banned for 12 months from August 2015 after a Government review was ordered. A

modified version with a magazine capacity of five shots was made available, however

recently there have been indications that this ban may be soon lifted.

This recent test of Australian Firearms legislation is I believe a modest precursor for the

challenges yet to come. Australian Policing and Border Force legislation will be thoroughly

tested in the coming years as developments in firearms and ammunition challenges

traditional fundamental views of what constitutes a firearm, how firearms are

manufactured, how they function and what materials can be used to construct them.

These new technologies and developments will not be lost upon the firearm traffickers

who will strive to use this new knowledge to best advantage to avoid detection and

prosecution.

THE NEED FOR TRAINING IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF FIREARMS AND FIREARM COMPONENTS

The components seen in Figure 12 below comprise the trigger group assembly of an AR15

rifle capable of fully automatic fire. These components are small, light, easily concealed.

Figure 12 (FT2 6P M IC): AR15 rifle trigger parts.

The firearm component seen in Figure 13 is a pre-cut, pre-drilled lower receiver assembly

for a machine gun produced in flat sheet which only requires that it be bent into shape.

This machine gun component is similar to those used in the firearms seized by NSW Police.

(Figure 5)

Figure 13 (FT2 3P M IC): MAC 10 machine gun Lower receiver flat.

Question:

What is the name of the major firearm part missing from the collection of AR15 firearm

components seen in Figure 14?xvii (see footnotes)

Figure 14 (FT1 2P 5P 6P 7P 11P CN1 4A 6A 8A RFS IC):

AR15 self-loading rifle components

The AR15 rifle is one of the most popular and prolific firearms in the world today, it and its

variants are commercially manufactured by a myriad of companies worldwide and the

different component parts and accessories available for it would literally number in the

thousands.

Figure 15 (FT2 3P RFS IC):

An 80% complete lower receiver for a AR15 rifle.

The AR15 lower receiver assembly shown in Figure 15 is identified 80% complete. If located

in Australia this lower receiver is likely to have been manufactured and purchased in the

United States (without the need for licensing) and imported illegally into Australia. This

example (Figure 15) is made of aluminium although it is also available in 80% complete

polymer mouldings which do not require specialist machining tools to complete.

The training requirement needed to enable identifications of components shown in these

examples may be in the form of informational lectures using actual seized exhibits and

directed towards operational investigation officers, such as those in Gang Crime Squads

and Border Force teams.

Gang Crime Squad and Organised Crime Squad officers in particular require up skilling in

the field of the practical identification of firearm parts and/or components relating to

handguns and prohibited firearms in order to more effectively fulfil their operational role. It

has been my experience that these officers have in the past relied upon the personal

firearms knowledge of individual officers within the squads. Unfortunately, this has resulted

in inconsistent terminology and incorrect firearm identifications. This continuous

improvement training will maintain a contemporary awareness of trafficked guns, parts,

accessories and firearm trafficking methodology. Operational officers will require

assistance and direction with regard to firearm related offences associated with the

possession of Prohibited Firearms, specialised or unusual firearm components and

ammunition which may also be prohibited.

Figure 16 Ammunition is often overlooked in ‘Prohibited possession offences’.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONSISTANT TERMINOLOGY RELATING TO THE RECORDING OF

FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION

The use of confusing/inaccurate or incorrect terminology has for many years been

accumulating in Australian Police data systems. The adoption of consistent descriptive

standards by law enforcement agencies will facilitate the distribution of reliable and

unambiguous information.

From a Police perspective, terminology errors are commonplace and many firearms

descriptions are incorrect with regard to type, description of calibre, identifying make,

model and serial number. Common errors involve the description and identification of

machine guns, self-loading rifles, shotguns, handguns and the over use of the perennial

favourite ‘unknown firearm’.

Police Intelligence units rely on firearm data which they obtain from a number state and

federal recording systems such as property and exhibits record systems, Forensic

examination reports and Firearm Registries. If consistent terminology is not used, then this

presents the possibility of introducing further errors into subsequent reports and statistical

data.

Until such time as accurate and reliable systems exist for the analysis of firearm intelligence

then inferences and conclusions drawn from current information should always be viewed

with suspicion.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR ACCURATE RECORDING OF FIREARM PARTS AND ACCESSORIES

Example;

Two seized Glock pistols, the Glock pistol in Figure 17 has all Glock parts, the pistol in Figure

18 has a generic brand slide and barrel.

Figure 17 (FT1 PTS); Standard Glock Pistol

Figure 18 (FT2 4P 5P PTS); Standard Glock

frame with generic slide and barrel parts.

What are the recording protocols required for these two pistols? The most necessary

requirement is to ‘break down’ of each Seized Trafficked Gun into readily recordable and

searchable components. The generic brand slide and barrel parts must be recorded

otherwise these pistols will be recorded as two Glock pistols and this additional important

data is lost. It will take longer to examine firearms in this way, but the information that will

be extracted from these trafficked firearms will far outweigh this extra time requirement. A

lack of useful firearm trafficking data from the 30 different firearms registers and databases

across federal, state and territory agencies has been a constant complaint for many

years; therefore, I suggest that we begin to wring every piece of information we can out

of every seized trafficked gun.

The firearm in Figure 19 is fitted with a number of generic parts and accessories which may

not be documented correctly because they cannot be recorded accurately within

evidence and exhibit databases. These are; detachable shoulder stock (generic), vertical

grip (generic), extended magazine (Glock), select fire device (generic), barrel (generic).

Figure 19 (FT1 5P 9P CN2 2A 5A 7A M);

A heavily accessorised Glock Pistol - Machine gun conversion

Whatever recording system is used it needs to be simple and must utilize the standardised

definitions currently in use. The system must be searchable and reliable and most

importantly compatible with the data records in other agencies, otherwise data which is

shared between agencies may be unusable.

Each firearm image seen in this article is coded with a series of identifying letters and

numbers of my own design which relate to firearm characteristics, parts and accessories.

This provides a searchable data table providing quick access to information, images

statistics and further links to case file resources on POI’s or firearm seizures. This recording

system is simple, straightforward and uses most of the firearm part and accessory

definitions used in state and territory legislation, such data records should be a part of

every firearm examiners working notes.

THE PURPOSE OF TRAFFICKED FIREARMS INVESTIGATIONS

Aim;

To expedite the methodical examination and subsequent interpretation of seized firearms,

firearm parts, accessories and ammunition of interest to reveal firearm specific data which

can be identified, recorded and catalogued for database entry, which will then be used

to assist in determining a firearms origin and reveal information relating to the distribution

patterns of illegally imported and trafficked firearms and trafficking routes within Australia.

By;

1. Use of correct firearm related definitions

2. The accurate categorization of seized firearms.

3. Liaison and cooperation with investigative partners.

4. Developing and maintaining operational and investigative pathways.

5. The distribution and collection of firearm intelligence data via IDM and ALEIN sites.

6. Firearms identification training.

7. Assisting investigators in the formulation of correct firearm related prosecutions.

8. Providing and maintaining consistent and uniform procedures and terminology as

they relate to firearm examination and recording protocols.

9. Provide and maintain a Seized Trafficked Gun Intelligence, POI and seized firearm

Image database.

Four years ago in 2012 it was conservatively estimated there were 250,000 long barrel guns

and 10,000 handguns in the Australian illegal firearms marketxviii. This would equate to

approximately 25 truckloads of the size seen in the image below.

‘Any opinions outlined in this report are the views of the author and should not be taken as the view of the

Western Australia Police.’

i Media Release, ‘Tough new penalties for illicit firearms’, Minister for Justice, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Counter-Terrorism, The Hon Michael Keenan MP, 2015, https://www.ministerjustice.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2015/FourthQuarter/2-December-2015-Tough-new-penalties-for-illicit-firearms.aspx, accessed (26 March 2016) ii Samantha Bricknell, ‘Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs’, Australian Institute of Criminology 2012, http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/116/rpp116.pdf, p 23, (accessed 26 March 2016) iii Samantha Bricknell, ‘Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs’, Australian Institute of Criminology 2012, http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/116/rpp116.pdf, (accessed 26 March 2016)

iv Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms. (June 2000). Firearms Trafficking and Firearms Trafficking laws. Available from: https://www.atf.gov/file/11881/download. [Accessed: 27/3/2016]. v Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms. (2000). Firearm Trafficking and Firearm Trafficking Laws. Available from: https://www.atf.gov/file/11881/download. [Accessed: 28/3/2016]. vi Steven Pavlovich. (2016) SEIZED TRAFFICKED GUN (STG) IDENTIFICATION CODES © To identify and record the design, modifications, component parts and accessories of seized firearms vii Michael Safi, The Guardian. (2015). Sydney siege shotgun 'fired' in chilling courtroom reconstruction. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/02/sydney-siege-shotgun-fired-in-chilling-courtroom-reconstruction. [Accessed: 28/3/2016]. viii Samantha Bricknell. (2012). Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs. Available from: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp116.html. [Accessed: 27/3/2016]. ixMarie Sansom. (2014). Illegal guns a statistical black hole. Available from: http://www.governmentnews.com.au/2014/10/illegal-guns-statistical-black-hole/. [Accessed: 2/4/2016]. x Christopher Jay. Financial Review. (2015). CrimTrac consolidates firearms databases. Available from: http://www.afr.com/technology/web/security/crimtac-consolidates-firearms-databases-20150826-gj82yp. [Accessed: 5/8/2016]. xi CRIMTRAC. 2014. CRIMTRAC. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.crimtrac.gov.au/news-media/news/launch-australian-ballistics-information-network. [Accessed 28 March 16]. xii King, W., Wells, W., Katz, C., Maguire, E. and, F. J., (2013) Opening the Black Box of NIBIN: A Descriptive Process and Outcome Evaluation of the Use of NIBIN and Its Effects on Criminal Investigations, Final Report. [online] Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243875.pdf [Accessed 29 Mar 2016]. xiii Ritter, Nancy, “Study Identifies Ways to Improve ATF Ballistic Evidence Program,” NIJ Journal 274 (2014): 12-18,

available at http://nij.gov/ journals/274/Pages/ways-to-improve-nibin.aspx. [Accessed 28 March 16].

xiv King, W., Wells, W., Katz, C., Maguire, E. and, F. J., (2013) Opening the Black Box of NIBIN: A Descriptive Process and Outcome Evaluation of the Use of NIBIN and Its Effects on Criminal Investigations, Final Report. [online] Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243875.pdf [Accessed 29 Mar 2016]. xv King, W., Wells, W., Katz, C., Maguire, E. and, F. J., (2013) Opening the Black Box of NIBIN: A Descriptive Process and Outcome Evaluation of the Use of NIBIN and Its Effects on Criminal Investigations, Final Report. [online] Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243875.pdf [Accessed 29 Mar 2016]. xvi Samantha Bricknell. (2012). Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs. Available from: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp116.html. [Accessed: 27/3/2016].

xvii Answer: The lower receiver.

xviii unknown. (May 2013). Gun trafficking targeted. Available from: file:///C:/Users/stg19/Downloads/ATH47_law%20(3).pdf. [Accessed: 3/4/2016].