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The Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia

Rivalry and Accommodation

Professor Muhamad S. Olimat

Energy Studies Unit

October 2, 2017

Research Paper

Emirates Policy Center

An independent think tank established in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab

Emirates on September 2013. EPC’s interest mainly focuses on the UAE and

its foreign relations, as well as the Arabian Gulf region and its regional and

international interactions. The Center undertakes the task of foreseeing the

future of the region, regional and international policy trends and the

impact of different geopolitical projects on the region.

About the Author

Dr. Muhamad S. Olimat is a Professor of International Relations and Middle

East politics at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy. His areas of expertise

include Middle East Studies, the US foreign policy toward the Middle East

and North Africa, and Sino- Middle Eastern relations. He is the author of

five books, several book chapters, and articles on Middle East politics, the

political economy of the Middle East, political development of the Middle

East, Sino-Middle Eastern relations, Sino-Central Asian relations, and the

geopolitics of energy. His most recent manuscript is China and the Gulf

Cooperation Council Countries: Strategic Partnership in a Changing World,

was published on September 20, 2016, by Lexington-Rowman and

Littlefield Publishers.

© 2017 Emirates Policy Center

Emirates Policy Center

Khalidya, St. 32, Das Tower P. O. Box 107939

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Tel: +971 2 40 90 000 Fax: +971 2 66 66 953 E-mail: [email protected]

Website: http://www.epc.ae

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.epc.ae/

Contents

Abstract ………………………………………………………………………….………….…………….…………………..………………………………. 1

The Geopolitics of Central Asia ………………………..………………….….…………………….………………………………………. 1

Energy, Energy Cooperation, and the Politics of Energy in Central Asia ……………………….…………… 3

Global Rivalry and Accommodation in Central Asia ………………………………..………………………………………. 6

The US, China, and Central Asia …………………………………………………………….………………………………………………. 13

Japan, China, and Central Asia ………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………. 17

Turkey, China, and Central Asia …………………………………………………….………………………………………………………. 19

Malaysia, China, and Central Asia …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20

Iran, China, and Central Asia …………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………. 21

Pakistan, China, and Central Asia ……………………………………………………….…………………………………………………. 22

Saudi Arabia, China, and Central Asia ……………………….………………….……………………………………………………… 24

India, China, and Central Asia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22

South Korea, China, and Central Asia …………………………….……………………………………………………………………. 62

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 28

References ………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………. 22

Research Paper | The Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia: Rivalry and Accommodation

1 | Emirates Policy Center

Abstract

The Central Asian republics have emerged as major players in the energy markets in the post-Soviet

era, along with some Eurasian players such as Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

are major producers of natural gas and crude oil supplying consumers, and feeding international

pipelines that traverse their territories. The “Big Three: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan)”

play a key role in the dynamics of the industry on regional and international levels because of their

strategic location, and the abundance of their wealth. However, such growing profile in the energy

sector and its Spillover Effect on trade, security arrangements, political partnerships, and cultural

relations have created a “New Great Game” in the region where Great Power rivalry is most apparent,

especially in pipeline construction and routes. The aim of this article is to examine the geopolitics of

Central Asia and the rivalry occurring among major international actors subsequent to the energy

sector.

The Geopolitics of Central Asia

Since the early 1990s, oil, and later natural gas have become major sources of foreign revenue for

Central Asian producers, particularly for Kazakhstan (55%), Turkmenistan (86.21%), and Uzbekistan

(33%). Central Asia “is considered the world's second largest source of oil and gas after the…Gulf with

over 30 billion tons of exploitable crude and more than one trillion cubic meters of natural gas.”1 The

richness of the region’s energy reserves brought Central Asia to the epicenter of international rivalry

among global oil corporations such as American, Italian, British, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, South

Korean, Malayan, Japanese, Indian, and Turkish. Rivalry, competition, accommodation, and even

conflict among the players in the region occur frequently, albeit with some mechanisms of control

that keep the game in check. Chinese corporations have been making breakthroughs in the region

especially China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec. Rivalry stems not only from the

richness of the region in its fossil fuel, natural gas, abundance of uranium deposits, or hydraulic power,

but also from its strategic location and the geopolitics of pipeline construction and access.

Additionally, some of the largest producers and consumers such as Russia and China surrounds the

region, simultaneously; Central Asia is a natural extension of both the Middle East and the Eurasian

region, two vital regions for international security and stability.

Central Asia was a major regional contributor to former Soviet Union’s oil and gas production.

Kazakhstan’s Daily oil production reached 485,000 bpd in 1985 (table 2), while Turkmenistan’s gas

production was estimated at 7.3 billion cubic feet/in the same year (table 3). The collapse of the USSR

was a huge drawback in production, but in the post-Soviet era Russian oil and gas corporations

managed to recover and exercised dominance and monopoly over Central Asia’s production,

processing, and marketing, for the period from 1991-2006. Gazprom purchased Central Asian oil and

gas at minimum prices, channeled it through its network of pipelines, and in turn marketed it to

international consumers at the highest prices in the industry. Russian monopoly was broken in the

mid-2000s when international oil corporations, particularly Chinese, infiltrated the region. The most

indicative aspect of China’s involvement in the energy sector is the construction of the Central Asia-

China Oil and Gas Pipeline, a four-lane project that connects source producers to China. The table

below illustrates Soviet oil and gas production for the period from 1965 to 1985.



Table 1: Soviet Union’s Crude Oil Production in thousands of Barrels/day and Gas Production in

Billion Cubic Feet/Day for the Period from 1965-1985.

Year Oil Production Gas Production

BCF/Day

Year Oil Production Gas Production

BCF/Day

1984 12297 51.3 1974 9270 22.8

1983 12403 46.9 1973 8664 20.7

1982 12330 43.8 1972 8064 19.3

1981 12260 40.7 1971 7610 18.6

1980 12116 38.0 1970 7127 17.3

1979 11805 25.6 1969 6566 NA

1978 11531 32.6 1968 6167 NA

1977 11010 30.3 1967 5762 NA

1976 10466 28.0 1966 5302 NA

1975 9916 25.3 1965 4858 NA

Source: This table is constructed from data provided by British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy Outlook,

2016 at: http://www.bp.com/energyoutlook

Evidently, the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1991 had a colossal impact on world politics. This

downfall provided the Central Asia region a historical opportunity to declare its independence,

influence regional and international affairs, and highlight its role as never before in modern history.

Kazakhstan was enthusiastic the most, and seized the moment. It declared its independence on

October 25, 1990, formed a state with an ambitious development process, and took the initiative to

engage actively in regional and international relations. An example of this early trend was President

Nursultan Nazarbayev’ s proposal in October of 1992, during the 47th Session of the General Assembly

to establish the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

Kazakhstan mobilized regional and international support for CICA, hosted it, funded it, and made it

one of the most active international organizations. Most recently, the Astana Framework is

fundamental in the current mediation talks over resolving the Syrian conflict for the past two years.

Kazakhstan’s strategic location at the crossroads of ancient and modern trade routes, the depth, and

richness of its history and the network of ties with Eurasia (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and

Armenia), and with other parts of the world substantiates this rising role.

Central Asia’s strategic prominence is also derived from the fact that, it is a civilizational, historical,

cultural, religious, and territorial extension of the Middle East, a region at the center of global affairs,

international rivalry, and conflict. Central Asia is geographically adjacent to rising China as well, hence

of strategic nature for both Moscow and Beijing. The region was an integral part of the Communist

world and party to post-Soviet political, economic, and geostrategic arrangements, such as the

Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) and the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU). Central Asia

has thousands of years of rich history, ancient civilizations, legends, warriors, and conquerors such as

Tamerlane, Avicenna, and Al Farabi, renown in military affairs and expansionism, in medicine and



politics and philosophy. Major battles, conflicts, and games occurred on its territory. The region lies at

the crossroads of contending powers over Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea region, and

the Caucasus. Hence, it is a strategic theater for Great Power rivalry, competition, alignment,

realignment, and conflict.

Energy, Energy Cooperation, and the Politics of Energy in Central Asia

The importance of Central Asia to global energy markets stems from its richness in natural gas (table

3), crude oil production (table 2), and the politics of pipelines originating and crossing the territories

of the Central Asian republics. In terms of oil production, Kazakhstan is leading the region with 1.6

million barrels per day, followed by Turkmenistan with 261,000 barrels per day, and Uzbekistan with

64,000 barrels per day, but its production has been in decline. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are oil

importers, but Kyrgyzstan produces sufficient hydraulic power to meet its national needs and exports

excess energy to some neighboring countries. Table 2 illustrates oil production of some Central Asian

and other countries actively engaged in the energy sector in the region, and the politics of energy.

Table 2: Central Asian Republics of Oil Production in Comparison with Some Regional and

International Producers in Thousands of Barrels/Daily for the Period from 1979 to 2015.

Year Kazakhstan Russia China Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan India Malaysia US Iran KSA

2015 1669 10980 4309 841 261 64 876 693 12704 3920 12014

2014 1701 10838 4246 849 249 66 887 650 11723 3736 11505

2013 1720 10779 4216 877 240 68 906 621 10059 3611 11393

2012 1662 10639 4155 872 229 68 916 654 8883 3814 11635

2011 1684 10518 4074 919 220 77 882 650 7853 4466 11144

2010 1676 10366 4077 1023 220 78 816 717 7550 4420 10075

2009 1609 10139 3805 1014 214 95 803 701 7264 4250 9663

2008 1483 9950 3814 895 211 102 768 741 6785 4361 10663

2007 1413 10043 3742 856 199 104 760 742 6860 4333 10268

2006 1368 9818 3711 646 187 114 737 713 6826 4290 10671

2005 1294 9597 3642 445 193 115 773 757 6900 4216 10931

2004 1248 9335 3486 309 193 138 756 776 7250 4142 10458

2003 1081 8603 3406 308 200 151 753 760 7367 4032 10141

2002 993 7755 3351 307 179 153 727 740 7625 3580 8907

2001 841 7106 3310 300 159 153 726 702 7669 3825 9188

2000 740 6583 3257 281 142 159 736 722 7732 3852 9470

1999 656 6119 3218 279 143 191 737 691 7731 3603 8800

1998 558 6110 3216 231 129 191 754 725 8011 3855 9449



1997 557 6171 3175 182 108 82 736 714 8269 3776 9428

1996 493 6062 2993 183 90 174 774 716 8295 3759 9244

1995 450 6236 2934 185 84 172 684 704 8322 3744 9092

1994 446 6371 2892 193 97 124 590 657 8389 3730 9084

1993 507 7119 2845 207 92 94 615 645 8583 3712 8962

1992 569 7978 2831 228 109 79 677 657 8868 3523 9098

1991 589 9264 2778 240 113 69 715 648 9076 3500 8820

1990 571 10342 2764 254 120 69 719 622 8914 3270 7105

1989 556 11070 2745 268 121 66 672 589 9159 2894 5635

1988 545 11373 2694 280 120 60 639 540 9765 2349 5720

1987 523 11416 2625 286 135 64 658 949 9944 2342 4599

1986 503 11247 2508 268 138 61 627 500 10231 2054 5208

1985 485 10863 2295 274 142 55 583 445 10580 2205 3601

1984 NA NA 2130 NA NA NA 525 446 10509 2043 4534

1983 NA NA 2051 NA NA NA 412 385 10247 2454 4951

1982 NA NA 2130 NA NA NA 309 304 10199 2397 6961

1981 NA NA 2033 NA NA NA 193 259 10181 1321 10256

1980 NA NA 2122 NA NA NA 256 276 10170 1479 10270

1979 NA NA 2132 NA NA NA 233 282 10136 3218 9841

Source: This table is constructed from data provided by British, the British Petroleum Energy Outlook 2035, January 2017

at: http://www.bp.com/energyoutlook

Clearly, Russia is a major oil and gas producer but suffers deeply from American and European

sanctions imposed because of the Ukraine Crisis since 2013. Moscow’s main goal is to search for

alternative markets and consistent consumers, and the answer is in the Far East, with China as its main

gate to oriental markets, thirsty for both natural gas and oil. Kazakhstan has also constructed a

strategic partnership with China based on energy security and security cooperation, thus freeing itself

from the Russian monopoly and providing alternative access to international markets. This partnership

has also enabled Kazakhstan to access top technology in the areas of upstreaming and

downstreaming, as well as oil and gas Recovery Technology.

Turkmenistan is another gas and oil producer that has benefited tremendously from the changing

nature of the geopolitics of Central Asia, in both upstreaming and downstreaming of oil and natural

gas, most notably marketing and access to major consumers. It enjoys a strategic location adjacent to

Eurasia (Caspian Sea-Azerbaijan), the Middle East (bordering Iran- Turkmenistan-Iran Gas Pipeline),

and Western Asia (Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline- TAPI), which makes Turkmenistan an ideal

choice for any continental oil and gas project. Turkmenistan is one of the world top five natural gas

producers, and the fourth in gas reserves.



For two decades, Turkmenistan’s growth potential was stalled because of Russian-Gazprom’s

monopoly over its oil and natural gas production -during which Gazprom set price and quantity- and

prevented Ashgabat from becoming a major player, particularly in the production of natural gas.

However, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan partnership with China enabled both to reach new heights in

the production of oil and gas. Uzbekistan is also an integral partner with China, and a major contributor

to the Central Asia-China Oil and Gas Pipeline (CACOGP). While its crude oil production is declining, its

natural gas production is increasing. In fact, Central Asia as a region has not yet been fully explored,

and this may be of value in a possible new avenue of cooperation with Beijing, in both areas oil and

gas exploration and production.

The Kyrgyz Republic controls nearly all the region’s water resources. It produces abundant low cost

hydraulic power for its national needs and export its excess to neighboring countries especially China.

Kyrgyzstan produces abundance of energy during the summer months and exports some of it, while

imports electricity from China in wintertime when its rivers, waterfalls, and lakes are frozen. On the

other hand, Tajikistan imports over 90% of its energy needs, but its strategic location is extremely

valuable to China’s expansion of the CACOGP. Beijing keeps looking for new routes to connect the

region with a network of pipelines that cross the Tajik and Kyrgyz territories toward China and from

China toward Far East markets. Tajikistan is a vital partner in the Xi Jinping One Belt One Road Initiative

(OBOR), a major aspect of which is Energy cooperation and energy security for member states. In fact,

major projects of the OBOR such as highways, railroads, and connectivity projects pass through

Tajikistan’s territory. Central Asia’s natural gas and oil production is significant to world energy. Table

3, below illustrates Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan’s gas production in billions of cubic feet

per day, compared to some regional producers and consumers.

Table 3: Central Asia’s Gas Production in Billion Cubic Feet Daily in Comparison with some

Regional Producers

Year Russia Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Azerbaijan Ukraine China Iran India Pakistan

2015 55.5 1.2 7.0 5.6 1.8 1.7 13.3 18.6 2.8 4.1

2014 56.3 1.2 6.7 5.5 1.7 1.7 12.7 17.6 2.9 4.1

2013 58.5 1.1 6.6 5.5 1.6 1.8 11.8 16.1 3.1 4.1

2012 57.1 1.1 6.6 5.5 1.5 1.8 10.8 16.0 3.7 4.2

2011 58.7 1.0 5.8 5.5 1.4 1.8 10.5 15.5 4.3 4.1

2010 57.0 1.0 4.1 5.3 1.5 1.8 9.6 14.7 4.8 4.1

2009 51.1 1.0 3.5 5.4 1.4 1.9 8.5 13.9 3.6 4.0

2008 58.1 1.1 6.4 5.6 1.4 1.8 8.0 12.6 2.9 4.0

2007 57.3 0.9 6.3 5.6 0.9 1.8 6.9 12.1 2.9 3.9

2006 57.6 0.9 5.8 5.5 0.6 1.8 5.9 10.8 2.8 3.9

2005 56.1 0.9 5.5 5.2 0.5 1.8 4.9 9.9 2.9 3.8

2004 55.3 0.8 5.1 5.2 04 1.8 4.1 9.3 2.8 3.5



2003 54.3 0.7 5.2 5.0 0.4 1.7 3.5 8.0 2.9 3.0

2002 52.1 0.5 4.7 5.0 0.5 1.6 3.3 7.6 2.7 2.4

2001 50.9 0.4 4.5 5.0 0.5 1.6 3.0 6.4 2.6 2.2

2000 51.0 0.5 4.1 4.9 0.5 1.6 2.7 5.8 2.5 2.1

1999 51.8 0.4 2.0 4.9 0.5 1.6 2.5 5.4 2.4 2.0

1998 51.5 0.3 1.2 4.8 0.5 1.6 2.3 4.6 2.4 1.7

1997 49.8 0.4 1.5 4.5 0.5 1.6 2.3 4.0 2.2 1.6

1996 52.4 0.3 3.1 4.3 0.6 1.6 2.0 3.8 2.0 1.6

1995 51.5 0.4 2.8 4.3 0.6 1.6 1.8 3.3 1.8 1.5

1994 53.2 0.3 3.1 4.9 0.6 1.6 1.8 2.7 1.6 1.5

1993 54.1 0.5 5.7 3.9 0.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4

1992 56.2 0.6 5.2 3.7 0.7 1.8 1.6 3.2 1.4 1.3

1991 56.3 0.5 7.4 3.7 0.8 2.1 1.5 3.0 1.3 1.3

1990 57.1 0.6 7.7 3.6 0.9 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.2 1.2

1989 53.9 0.6 7.9 3.6 1.0 2.7 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.1

1988 51.7 0.6 7.7 3.5 1.0 2.8 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.0

1987 47.7 0.5 7.7 3.5 1.1 3.1 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.0

1986 44.0 0.5 7.4 3.4 1.2 3.5 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.9

1985 40.5 0.5 7.3 3.3 1.2 3.8 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.9

Source: This table is constructed from data provided by British Petroleum Energy Outlook 2035, January 2017 at:

http://www.bp.com/energyoutlook

Global Rivalry and Accommodation in Central Asia

Over the past two decades, Central Asia’s geostrategic location has become the new frontier of Great

Power rivalry over crude oil and natural gas, and the focus of pipeline construction and access routes.

The result is a New Game, which is expected to continue for many decades to come. This section looks

at why the region became so important to global rivalry among major players in the energy sector,

and how -using “Spill Over” logic- this sector fed a wide range of other interests in the region. Topping

the list are security cooperation, trade partnerships, political partnerships, and cultural ties. Central

Asia’s prominence is well established in three primary areas: oil and gas production (tables 2, 3) , the

geopolitics of pipeline construction, and its importance to the national security of major world players

in the region, such as Russia, China, the US, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan. The

region’s importance to China, particularly toward the One Belt One Road Initiative, is very evident.

China is an integral party of every cooperative, competitive, or even conflictual set of relationships

occurring in the region. In the next section, we’ll look at how contending interests coexist in the region,

and how Central Asian republics react to such rivalry, individually and collectively. In a three-



dimensional game-type approach, China and Central Asia will be treated as constant factors, while

third party changes frequently.

China, Russia, and Central Asia

China’s interest in Central Asia stems primarily from a national security perspective. Kazakhstan has

the second longest border with China (1533 km), along with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and

Pakistan. Kazakhstan also hosts the largest Uighur diaspora (180,000), migrated from China’s restless

Xinjiang Province (East Turkistan). Central Asia also provides China with a substantial percentage of its

energy needs, especially in the natural gas sector whereby, the region provides China with 40% of its

needs annually by 2020, through the Central Asia-China Oil and Gas Pipeline. Furthermore, Central

Asia is at the heart of the New Silk Road Initiative, best known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), a

natural sphere of influence since the early days of the Silk Road trade route (138 BC)2. In fact, Xinjiang,

China’s northwestern region has similar geographic characteristics as the other countries in Central

Asia, as well as cultural similarities; China’s Muslim minority resides in this part of the country. Xinjiang

produces most of China’s oil and natural gas as well.

As in ages past, the region is China’s access to European markets. Currently, a network of railroads

exports goods from factories in the heartland of China to consumers in Western and Northern Europe.

The table below illustrates bilateral trade volume between China and its Central Asian partners from

2000 to 2015.

Table 4: China-Central Asia and Some Euro-Asian Countries’ Volume of Trade in $ millions from

2000 to 2015

Countr

y

201

5

201

4

201

3

201

2

201

1

201

0

200

9

200

8

200

7

200

6

200

5

20

04

20

03 2002

200

1

200

0

Afghani

stan

373

59

410

93

337

85

469

2

234

41

178

95

214

89

154

32

171

81

100

67

527

2

34

52

52

4

6207

6607

174

2

252

9

Kazakh

stan

142

901

9

224

516

7

285

959

6

256

815

7

249

612

3

204

485

2

141

291

3

175

523

4

138

777

7

835

775

680

611

11

25

0

21

26

9

1954

75 128

837

155

696

Kirgizst

an

434

069

529

794

513

770

516

232

497

645 419

964

533

028 933

338

377

923

222

570

972

20

12

48

8

10

37

6

2018

8 118

86

177

61

Tajikist

an

184

742

251

594

195

812

185

670

206

901

143

256

140

669

149

993

524

05

323

78

157

94

13

31

64

6 1239

107

6

171

7

Turkme

nistan

864

313

104

704

4

100

309

0

103

725

0

547

734 156

964

957

44 830

38

352

68

178

58

109

96

59

80

72

97 8752 327

1

161

6

Uzbekis

tan

349

583

427

612

455

145

287

519

216

661

248

327

192

087

160

670

112

819

972

09

680

56

45

82

60

79

1317

7

583

0

514

6

Sources: For the period from 2001 to 2010: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010, China Statistics Press, Beijing: PRC, P. 238, also

at: www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexee.htm For 2011 and 2012: China Statistical Yearbook, 2013, China Statistics Press,

Beijing: PRC, P. 233. For the period from 2013-2015: China Statistical Yearbook, 2016, at:

www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexee.htm



China’s main goal in its global engagement is energy security, defined in terms of access to oil and gas

at reasonable prices. China’s energy security is hindered by three main factors. First, insufficient

domestic oil and gas production, economic growth rate, and an increasing demand for energy. Second,

a lack of control over oil export routes, both land and sea. Third, the fluctuation of oil prices over the

past two decades, which provides no certainty into the energy markets, and makes China vulnerable

to price hikes. Since 2014, China replaced the United States in annual net oil importing, with an

average of 6.1 million barrels per day (Graph 1).

Graph 1. Top Ten Annual Net Oil Importers in 2014.

Source: Energy Information Administration, 2016, China, Reprinted with EIA’s permission at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN

China learned a difficult lesson when the price of oil shot to $147.50 per gallon in July of 2007. In order

to confront energy security challenges, China established three oil corporations since early 1990s, the

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum, and Chemicals Corporation, best

known as Sinopec, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), all with one main goal:

energy security. Their operations extend from the Far East to the Middle East and Central Asia, to

Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Their resolve, technology, management, efficiency, and success are

unmatched in the industry. Their ability to construct pipelines in record time and their ability to

overcome the challenges of weather, terrain, and topography is a testament to the efficiency of their

operations. It has also yielded the current consistent and stable supply of oil and gas to China, and

moved the nation to become a major player in the global energy market. The table below illustrates

China’s oil production, consumption, growth rates, and net imports from 1993-2014. China became a

net-oil importing country in 1993.

Table 5. China’s growth rates, oil production, oil consumption, and net oil imports in millions of

barrels per day, during 1993-2014.

Year Growth Rate Production mb/d Consumption mb/d Net imports mb/d

2014 7.50 4,444,000.00 10,360,000.00 5,916,000.00

2013 7.70 4, 215,000.00 10, 190,000.00 5,975,000.00

2012 8.10 4,300,000.00 9,963,000.00 5, 663,000.00

2012 8.10 4,300,000.00 9,963,000.00 5, 663,000.00



2011 9.20 4,100,000.00 9,510,000.00 5,410, 000.00

2010 10.3 4,071, 000.00 9,057,000.00 4,986,000.00

2009 9.20 3,995.620.00 8,537.860.00 4,210.000.00

2008 9.60 3,725,000.00 7,937,000.00 4,212,000.00

2007 11.40 3,900,958.00 7,817,000.00 3,677,000.00

2006 10.50 3,844,870.00 7,201,278.00 3,356,404.00

2005 9.90 3,781,760.00 6,720,000.00 2,939,240.00

2004 9.10 3,657,452.00 6,437,484.00 2,780,031.00

2003 9.10 3,559,006.00 5,578,111.00 2,019,105.00

2002 8.00 3,529,761.00 5,160,714.00 1,630,953.00

2001 7.30 3,434,535.00 4,917,882.00 1,483,347.00

2000 8.00 3,377,527.00 4,795,715.00 1,418,188.00

1999 7.00 3,317,028.00 4,363,601.00 1,046,573.00

1998 7.80 3,301,740.00 4,105,835.00 804,090.00

1997 8.80 3,284,550.00 3,916,270.00 631,720.00

1996 9.70 3,211,280.00 3,610,085.00 398,780.00

1995 10.30 3,059,620.00 3,363,155.00 303,530.00

1994 11.80 2,957,310.00 3,160,605.00 203,290.00

1993 13.40 2,903,463.00 2,959,491.00 56,028.00

Sources: Oil production and consumption British Petroleum Statistical Review for World Energy, 2014 at: http://www.bp.com/

2014 figures: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China-Country energy Profile at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ch Growth rates, World Bank, China-Country Profile at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/china

China achieved energy sufficiency for nearly two decades (1963-1993); however, in the Economic

Reform Era it became evident that China’s oil and gas production was insufficient to meet its growing

needs. Beijing began importing oil from Oman in 1983, and since then Oman and other oil producers

in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and the UAE have become energy partners,

assisting China in achieving its energy security goal. Table 5 points out that China’s imports were

associated with its economic growth rates over the past three decades ranging from 7.5% to 13.4%.

Its massive urbanization process, whereby 600-700 million people moved from poverty to middle

class, is fueling the current growing demand for housing and vehicles. China’s transformation over the

past three decades is unprecedented in its history, and so is the growing demand for energy.

Russia’s interests in Central Asia date back to the Czarist era and the Great Game. In the 1920s, the

Soviet Union’s expansionist policies led to the annexation of the region and a redrawing of the Socialist



Republics’ map. During the Cold War, the Central Asian border, or the Eastern Front, was second in

importance after the Western Front (the Berlin Wall), for the defense of the Soviet Union, and the

Eastern Bloc. In late 1980s, the Soviet Union stationed 460,000 soldiers to guard its borders with China,

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Iran. The collapse of the USSR in the 1991 provided the people

of Central Asia the exceptional moment in history to declare their independence and establish modern

states, but while each of newly independent republics had their own level of success, degree of

autonomy, and potential for development, Russia’s interest in the region has remained consistent all

along. Russia went through a period of instability under Boris Yeltsin’s leadership, but his successor,

Vladimir Putin, brought back stability and discipline to Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. He also

renewed Russia’s cooperation with its former Soviet Republics, sometimes using the “carrot method,”

as in the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and sometimes using the “stick,” as in

the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. In fact, Moscow invented several mechanisms, unions,

organizations, and frameworks to keep its influence on the newly independent republics, and

intended to shield them from Western expansionist policies, namely the threat of NATO and the

European Union.

Moscow’s policy is designed to safeguard its interests in Central Asia defined primarily in terms of

security, energy, trade, culture, and politics. Several mechanisms such as the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Customs Union

(EACU), and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) are major avenues of cooperation between the

two sides. These strategic frameworks strengthen multilateral ties, and collectively solidify the former

Warsaw Front from Western infiltration. However, while Russia was successful in Central Asia, it failed

drastically in East Europe, where major former members of the previous alliance, such as Poland,

Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia joined the EU. Thus, Moscow reached a variety of results

ranging from close cooperation with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan, to total failure and animosity, war and conflicts as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. In

fact, Central Asian republics were remarkably loyal to the Soviet Union and Russia, to the extent; they

were very reluctant to declare their independence. They also remained loyal to Moscow in the post-

independence period. Russia rewarded these countries generously especially in providing them with

a security umbrella, while rebellious Georgia and Ukraine lost the territories of Crimea, Abkhazia, and

South Ossetia. Meanwhile, during the turbulent decade long of Yeltsin’s rule (1991-1999), external

actors watched Moscow struggle to maintain its interests in these regions, some of them (US) sought

to weaken Russia’s influence in the region utilizing different measures. The American-European

expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence (Baltic Republics, East Europe, and Central Europe) can be

described as strategic and military in nature, while China’s expansion into Central Asia can be defined

as “harmonious”, and much more accommodating than threatening to, or undermining Russia’s

interests. The expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU) into Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia,

Lithuania, Estonia, and Croatia, and its growing influence in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldavia was

conflictual in nature and critically resented by Moscow. It led to a strategic alignment between Russia

and China.

China’s increasing influence in Central Asia has been more “disciplined” compared with the Western

“zero-sum game” approach. Beijing changed the cards of the game: instead of using the traditional

approach that undermines Russia’s interests and increased its animosity, it built on common interests

with Russia and created the necessary conditions for its involvement in Central Asia. Through

incentives and joint ventures, China created a complex interdependence with Russia in several sectors,



especially in the energy sector. In 2014, China and Russia signed the largest energy cooperation

agreement to date, a $400 billion deal whereby Russia supplies China with oil and natural gas for the

coming 30 years, a renewable agreement, at a rate of 38 Billion Cubic Feet annually of natural gas and

a 300,000 bpd, of crude oil. Russia’s aim is to “diversify its consumer base of natural gas and oil

exports.”3 In 2015, the two countries inaugurated the 3,968-kilometer China-Russia Far East Route

Natural Gas Pipeline (CRERNGP) that begins in Russia’s Far East and reaches China’s southern port and

business capital, Shanghai. The construction commenced in June 2015, and on May 30 2016, the two

countries resumed talks on the construction of the Russia-China West Route Gas Pipeline, another

mammoth project that strengthens their bilateral energy cooperation.4 These projects will connect

the two countries with a network of oil and gas pipelines, from end to end, from producer to

consumer. Chinese oil corporations have also masterminded energy-coalition building, i.e., working

closely with Russian corporations in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Basin, therefore creating energy

interdependence with Russian Gazprom and Lukoil Rosneft. China and Russia are also connected by

two other important pipelines: the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline (ESPO), with a daily

export of 300,000 bpd, and the Russia-China Oil Pipeline (RCOP), which runs from Western Siberia to

Daqing, in northeastern China, a distance of 4700 kilometers. The pipelines’ goal is to double crude oil

and natural gas exports to China, thus easing its dependence on coal.

Clearly, energy cooperation and security are the central themes and core ingredient of the Russian-

Chinese bilateral strategic partnership. The two countries are also bound in the areas of trade, political

coordination, and cultural ties. The objective is a multi-polar world system where the US is one among

equals, rather than a hegemonic power that threatens their national security and interests. However,

“Chinese scholars have discerned some contradictions in Russia’s conceptualization of multipolarity.”5

Moscow opposes NATO’s expansionist agenda in its backyard, and Beijing understands the security

dilemma it poses for both countries. Most certainly, “NATO’s expansion would increase Washington’s

ability to shape East-Central and Southeastern European political developments and security.”6 China

also resents American naval harassment in the Southeast China Sea, and the stationing of the THAD

defense system in South Korea that began in April of 2017.

On strategic and national security matters, China stood by Russia in the past two decades, and recently

in several events. The two countries managed successfully to redraw their borders, in addition drawing

the Chinese borders with its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China stood by

Russia and vice versa in the ongoing Ukraine and Syrian Crises. In his annexation speech of Crimea on

March 18, 2014, President Putin recognized one country for its support, China. He also recognized the

Chinese President by name, Xi Jinping, and expressed appreciation for the support he had received.

Secondly, the two countries developed the “Double Veto Mechanism”, whereby the two countries

cast a veto on resolutions related to Syria at the UN Security Council. They managed to shield their

ally, Assad’s regime, from any meaningful sanctions over the past six years. Thirdly, they closely

coordinated their efforts to conclude the 5+1 Nuclear Deal with Iran. In fact, Chinese diplomats ironed

out the details of the agreement, while their American counterparts took the credit. The multiplicity

of methods of bilateral cooperation between China and Russia are a clear implementation of the

“Linkage Politics” principle in international relations, whereby two countries link two or more issues

of strategic nature to their national interests. Therefore, China lowered the stakes in its involvement

in Central Asia, and Russia no longer views China’s presence in that region as “threating of its national

interests”, but complementary to their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Russia’s interests have

been reconciled with those of China, and mutual accommodation of core interests distinguishes their



ties. This game can be described as accommodative, rather than conflictual, such as that of other

players like the US and Japan.

China has developed strategic partnerships and strong trade ties with its rivals that keep rivalry over

Central Asia in perspective. The table below illustrates bilateral trade volume between China and its

rivals and competitors in Central Asia, for the period from 2000-2015.

Table 6. Sino-Rivals Trade Volume since 2000 in $ billions for the period from 2000-2015.

Cou

ntry

2015 2014 2013 201

2

201

1

201

0

200

9

200

8

200

7

200

6

200

5

200

4

200

3 2002

200

1

200

0

Iran

33,8

27.5

5

51,8

42.3

4

3700

0.00

364

65.8

4

451

03.4

0

293

91.0

8

212

19.0

9

277

57.6

2

205

89.6

5

114

44.3

100

83.2

7

704

5.46

562

2.52

3739

.57

331

2.8

9

2,4

86.

50

Jap

an

2785

1902

3123

1185

312.

000.

0

329

455

78

342

834

01

297

779

59

228

782

56

266

732

50

235

950

96

207

295

25

184

393

96

167

835

77

133

556

83

75,2

40.0

0

877

544

8

831

639

9

Rus

sia

68,0

15.5

4

95,2

70.4

5

88,8

00.0

0

882

109

9

792

733

9

555

331

1

387

515

5

569

086

1

481

547

8

333

868

1

291

012

2

339

77

205

32

1192

743

106

692

7

800

324

Indi

a

71,5

96.5

8

70,5

76.1

1

65,4

70.0

0

664

733

3

739

082

4

617

612

0

433

833

2

518

442

7

386

285

6

248

587

5

187

005

0

136

140

4

759

461

10,6

30.0

0

3,5

96.

24

291

421

Tur

key

23,0

10.8

5

21,5

51.4

8

22,2

33.2

3

190

955

7

187

373

3

151

105

8

100

947

5

125

692

5

117

680

2

806

924

487

547

210

9

446

4

1377

83 905

02

120

464

US

557,

022.

97

555,

123.

55

561,

780.

11

484

674

25

446

582

27

385

385

29

298

262

60

333

743

48

302

067

16

262

659

46

211

512

52

169

598

58

126

332

86

189,

600.

00

737

456

744

623

7

Mal

aysi

a

97,2

57.7

2

102,

005.

63

106,

000.

00

948

320

5

900

227

0

742

488

4

519

676

9

535

565

7

463

863

2

371

095

1

306

995

6

262

608

0

201

273

0

17,5

90.0

0 942

547

804

487

S.

Kor

ea

275,

792.

47

290,

442.

22

270,

000.

00

256

415

29

245

626

35

207

115

12

156

214

79

186

069

91

159

850

81

134

246

35

111

928

18

900

456

6

632

228

2

31,4

60.0

0

359

099

0

344

997

7

Paki

sta

n

15,9

98.3

5

18,9

16.6

5

13,0

00.0

0

124

136

5

105

583

3

8,66

8.62

6,78

8.34 7,05

7,87

6,89

3.27

5,24

6.58

4,26

0.83

3,

060.

54

242

993

2,10

0.00

1,3

96.

95

1,1

62.

50

Sources from 2001 to 2010: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010, China Statistics Press, Beijing: PRC, P. 238, also at:

www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexee.htm For the years of 2011 and 2012: China Statistical Yearbook, 2013, China

Statistics Press, Beijing: PRC, P. 233. For the United States, 2013 and 2014:

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/



The US, China, and Central Asia

Central Asia’s strategic value has always been a constant to China, an enduring principle in its foreign

policy for the past two millennia. On the other hand, Russia’s interest in the region began in the 19th

Century with the Great Game, while the US contemplates the regions’ importance based on

fluctuations of events and current affairs. For instance, Afghanistan’s strategic importance to the US

stemmed from the Soviet invasion in 1979 and its impact on the delicate balance of power between

the two rivals, NATO and Warsaw Pact. The USSR’s goal was to reach the “Warm Waters”, however,

such move provided the US and its allies a valuable opportunity to avenge the manner the USSR and

China dragged the US into the swamps of Vietnam just a few years earlier, with disastrous

consequences. The US, Europe, China, and some Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia were

determined to defeat the Red Army for different reasons. Eventually, the Soviet Union was defeated,

forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988, and collapsed three years later. This collapse and the

reunification of Germany were the two most notable world events occurred toward the end of the

20th Century.

In the post-Soviet era, Central Asian countries refrained from celebrating the demise of the USSR, but

cautiously declared their independence. The US and Europe, along with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and

China, sensed endless opportunities in the region. The US hoped for stability in Afghanistan and that;

the Taliban regime would bring some calm and putts an end to violence and rivalry among the

Mujahedeen forces, America’s former allies. American oil corporations such as Unocal pushed hard to

organize trips for Taliban officials to visit the US in mid-late 1990s, in efforts to pave the way for the

construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI), and the Trans Caspian

Gas Pipeline (TCGP). Chinese corporations were also eager to exploit Afghanistan’s untapped mineral

wealth. However, the Taliban’s alliance with Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization with a global reach,

brought destruction to Afghanistan and undermined its future for decades to come.

Al Qaeda waged war with a series of attacks against American interests in Africa and the Middle East,

and other non-American targets, such as Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Al Qaeda perpetrated the

September 11, 2001 attacks on the American homeland. In the aftermath of the attacks, the US

declared War on Terror and rallied international support. In essence, the Bush Administration gave

countries around the world with the option of “either being with us or with the terrorists.”7

Washington’s rationale is that extremists (Taliban) and terrorists (Al Qaeda) are a common enemy,

and therefore, requested the support of Central Asian republics in particular, for its campaign in

Afghanistan. China and Russia understood the American demand, and instructed their partners to

cooperate with the US.

The War on Terror enjoyed China’s support due to the fact that, the US pledged to provide concessions

to Beijing in its own war against the Uyghur separatists, close allies of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the

Uzbekistan Islamic Movement. China utilized the rhetoric of the War on Terror as a vehicle to tighten

its national security and its security goals in Central Asia, namely, ending the threat of East Turkistan

organizations and their allies operating in Afghanistan. Above all, China sought to dry up any support

the Uyghur may have had in the US and Europe, where East Turkistan movements enjoyed

tremendous sympathy. The World Uyghur Congress and the overall national liberation movement

much like the Tibet seeking self-determination, sought independence from China. The Bush

Administration found convenient the adoption of the Chinese narrative on Xinjiang and the Uyghur



organizations. Consequently, “the United States designated the East Turkistan Islamic Movement

(ETIM) as a terrorist organization under the Executive Order 13224 in 2002.”8 In terms of the

Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (UIM), a close ally of the ETIM, the US Department of State designated

it as a terrorist organization in 2002.9 The US, therefore, enjoyed the support of its “new partners”

Russia, China, and Central Asia in the War on Terror. Central Asian countries provided logistical

support to the American forces based in Afghanistan fighting terrorist organizations in the region.

Throughout 2002, the Bush Administration made the case to invade Iraq. This invasion (on March 19,

2003), Washington’s mismanagement of the war in Afghanistan, and the War on Terror in general

encouraged China and Russia to pressure their Central Asian partners to request an early departure

of the American forces stationed in the region, as early as 2005. The US did not devote the necessary

resources to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda and put an end to their threat. The Afghani government

had no tangible control beyond the capital city of Kabul, and efforts to stabilize the country with a

serious political process were marginal and unsuccessful at best. Additionally, the US moved most of

its strategic assets of Afghanistan to wage war in Iraq, a decision that dragged it into the longest

conflict in its history. In fact, American mismanagement of the occupation of Iraq created instability

in most of the Middle East. It revived sectarian conflicts between Islam’s two branches, Sunni and Shi’i,

causing an attrition war between archenemies Saudi Arabia and Iran.

On its part, and under the Obama Administration, Washington alerted Russia, China, and the Central

Asian republics of its long-term intentions in the region. In fact, the US convened a conference to

promote the revival of the “Silk Road,” and presented itself as an Asian power through its membership

in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The US also developed an alternative

framework of trade and security, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), with the purpose of rivaling

Chinese-controlled forums such as the APEC and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing

views such efforts as continued attempts at encirclement. Washington also began to criticize regimes

in Central Asia for their domestic governance practices and their records of human rights violations,

especially Uzbekistan and its treatment of protesters in 2005 in the city of Andijan, prompting a

request of early departure from the country in the same year. Kyrgyzstan refused to renew the

American lease at Manas Base, citing “insufficient rent”. However, what sped up the American

departure from the region has to deal more with strategic considerations. The American military

presence in Central Asia was a threat to the national security of both China and Russia.

Moscow never wanted the American presence in the region, but approved it to combat a joint enemy:

the Taliban, terrorist and fundamentalist forces in the region. However, the American mishandling of

the Afghanistan operation only increased terrorist incidents in Central Asia, in the Caucuses, the

Middle East, and around the world. Russia was also convinced that the US was not “serious” enough

in uprooting the Taliban regime; otherwise, it would have devoted enough resources to accomplish

the task. From Russia’s perspective, the US used the invasion of Afghanistan to advance its interests

in the region and follow a regime-change path, while Beijing felt even more encircled with the US

presence in Central Asia, and Washington’s alliance with India. While the Bush Administration was

forthright about its regime-change policy, the Obama Administration encouraged “Arab Spring”, its

revelations and uprisings to topple existing governments.

Under the Obama Administration, American foreign policy circles began advocating “Pivoting In”

Central Asia and the South China Sea, while “Pivoting Out” and reducing its security assets in the



Middle East. The newly elected president made the American withdrawal from Iraq a priority, and

accomplished it in his first two years in office, by the end of 2010. The US withdrew its forces from

Iraq but left behind chaos, destruction, sectarian divisions, terrorism, and violence as never before in

the history of the Middle East. Moreover, both China and Russia viewed the “Arab Spring-2010-2015”

as an American policy aimed at regime change and a process of destabilization in the Middle East.

As far as the energy sector is concerned, the question remains on what conditions would bring back

American oil corporations to Afghanistan and Central Asia? In terms of Afghanistan, the American-

Saudi alliance against the Soviet Union’s presence in the country was fully responsible for the creation

of the modern Jihadi movement that spread all over the world. This is on the Sunni side. However, the

American mismanagement of its ties with Iran created the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and its

mismanagement of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is responsible for the creation of the Islamic State (IS)

terrorist organization, and the current Shia terrorist organizations funded by Iran, and dominant in

Iraq and Syria. The American premature withdrawal from Iraq created a security and political

“vacuum”, filled by Iran. In fact, Iran became the main beneficiary of the American mismanaged

invasion of Iraq and its hasty withdrawal. Tehran extended its influence from Afghanistan to the

Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, the US in close coordination with Saudi Arabia,

Pakistan, Turkey, the UAE, Jordan and other members of its Arab-Islamic Coalition can bring peace to

Afghanistan and the Middle East, should the political will, the necessary resources, and efforts be in

place. Both China and Russia could be partners in the process.

Most recently, the renewal of the Saudi-American partnership in April 2017 and the signing of

agreements worth $460 billion to strengthen their bilateral cooperation, $100 of which in the defense

sector, will most certainly have a Spillover Effect on several fronts. The US needs Saudi support

through the Islamic coalition recently established by the kingdom to combat international terrorism.

While Saudi Arabia has been doing its utmost to combat terrorism originating in the Middle East, even

a Saudi-American security partnership will not be able to end the threat as long as Iran sponsors and

creates new terrorist organizations across the region, such as in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Iran’s

support of terrorism is undermining international efforts to wipe out terrorist organizations.

Therefore, if Iran’s threat is contained, and the threat of terrorism is reduced in Afghanistan, then we

should wittiness a return of the American oil corporations to the region. Ultimately, the geopolitics of

energy, rivalry, conflict, and accommodation in Central Asia will follow its natural course.

There will also be a question of how competing power interests will be managed in the region? Despite

Russian corporations’ hold on the oil and gas sectors in Central Asia for the period from 1991-2006,

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in cooperation with some international partners have

managed to break Gazprom and Rosneft’s monopoly. The process brought European, American,

Chinese, Turkish, Indian, and Malaysian oil corporations to the region seeking a stake in its oil wealth.

Breaking the Russian dominance was a challenging process of competing interests especially for

Chinese corporations. China managed to overcome the initial resistance to its corporations in Central

Asia, utilizing different principles in international relations such as linkage politics, interdependence,

complex interdependence, and accommodation. To meet the increasing demand for oil and gas,

consumers such as China, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, etc., competed over the region in a Gold Rush-

like scenario, because of the increasing demand for oil. The table below illustrates oil consumption of

major players in Central Asia from 1965 to 2015.



Table 7: Central Asian Republics’ Oil Consumption in Comparison with Some Regional Producers in

Thousands of Barrels/Daily from 1965 to 2015.

Year Russia China Turkey India Japan S. Korea US Iran KSA Malaysia Pakistan

2015 3113 11968 835 4159 4150 2575 19396 1947 3895 831 517

2014 3255 11201 743 3849 4531 2454 19106 2013 3732 803 460

2013 3145 10732 703 3727 4688 2455 18961 2048 3469 800 438

2012 3119 10229 680 3685 4441 2458 18490 1915 3462 755 411

2011 3074 9791 673 3488 4442 2394 18882 1904 3295 717 432

2010 2878 9436 694 3319 4389 2370 19180 1875 3218 690 427

2009 2775 8279 709 3237 4848 2339 18771 2008 2914 679 437

2008 2861 7941 686 3077 5014 2308 19490 1954 2622 672 401

2007 2780 7808 695 2941 5174 2399 20680 1879 2407 701 385

2006 2762 7432 681 2737 5354 2320 20687 1851 2274 660 354

2005 2647 6900 658 2606 5270 2312 20802 1699 2203 637 311

2004 2619 6755 662 2556 5418 2294 2073 1547 2056 633 324

2003 2653 5795 645 2485 5312 2337 20033 1506 1910 620 320

2002 2544 5205 655 2413 5329 2317 19761 1497 1810 588 358

2001 2628 4810 618 2285 5542 2263 19649 1484 1746 522 366

2000 2540 4697 667 2259 5637 2260 19701 1455 1627 495 372

1999 2568 4387 629 2138 5526 2197 19519 1412 1566 489 361

1998 2490 4239 630 1966 5756 2049 18917 1399 1509 445 348

1997 2630 4007 628 1829 5802 2388 18621 1413 1428 512 337

1996 2624 3660 632 1699 5771 2153 18309 1345 1401 445 326

1995 3058 3660 606 1579 5652 2017 17725 1313 1354 404 312

1994 3486 3342 540 1412 5367 1848 17719 1328 1403 385 288

1993 3928 3069 563 1312 5455 1682 17236 1287 1166 346 269

1992 4699 3013 490 1296 5328 1524 17033 1233 1155 309 247

1991 4917 2705 465 1233 5240 1257 16713 1146 1191 385 227

1990 5042 2491 476 1211 5017 1041 16988 1069 1136 236 216

1989 5111 2297 447 1164 4807 855 17325 1031 1069 219 207



1988 5001 2315 475 1069 4491 739 17283 929 1093 210 193

1987 5051 2203 444 974 4484 622 16665 892 1063 194 180

1986 5006 2048 391 944 4428 588 16281 843 1001 188 164

1985 4944 1925 359 896 4621 537 15726 918 993 195 152

1984 NA 1713 340 823 4406 501 15725 827 969 194 142

1983 NA 1654 343 765 4404 497 15235 772 870 197 132

1982 NA 1614 324 728 4656 471 15295 636 785 184 120

1981 NA 1625 304 697 4905 474 16060 585 709 175 109

1980 NA 1707 306 643 5491 476 17062 591 592 163 103

1979 NA 1827 338 634 5421 480 18438 674 708 145 99

1978 NA 1819 308 588 5083 426 18756 652 589 119 92

1977 NA 1625 308 542 371 18443 592 544 109 87

1976 NA 1534 270 503 4970 310 17461 506 471 96 82

1975 NA 1342 240 477 4788 277 16334 450 408 82 82

1974 NA 1217 216 464 5068 244 16631 383 526 82 79

1973 NA 1058 223 474 5265 235 17318 329 501 82 73

1972 NA 865 181 447 4571 191 16381 274 470 82 71

1971 NA 753 160 416 4285 183 15223 246 441 82 87

1970 NA 554 136 390 3876 162 14710 224 435 82 92

1969 NA 401 129 392 3284 130 14153 207 403 82 93

1968 NA 298 117 342 2765 95 13405 189 399 82 99

1967 NA 273 97 289 2388 65 12567 172 396 82 87

1966 NA 277 83 282 1945 37 12100 156 393 82 78

1965 NA* 215 69 252 1705 25 11522 143 390 46 76

Source: This table is constructed from data provided by British Petroleum Energy Outlook 2035, January 2017 at: http://www.bp.com/energyoutlook

* For Russia’s NA of data from 1965-1985, the USSR’s oil production was representative of Russia and other Socialist

Republics, see table 1, above.

Japan, China, and Central Asia

Japan’s strategic goals in Central Asia are defined in terms of energy, minerals, markets, trade, and

culture. Tokyo is less influenced by security considerations compared to rivals in the region such as

China or Russia. Nonetheless, it has similar frameworks of cooperation. Japan presents itself as a Silk



Road power, with in-depth cultural ties with the region. Tokyo’s main aim is to tap into the region’s

mineral wealth, gas and oil fields, and uranium deposits. Japanese corporations are making some

presence in the region. In July 2013 for example, the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation

(JOGMEC) signed an agreement with Uzbekistan’s Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Combine (NMMC),

“an agreement on the conduct of uranium exploration at prospective areas in the Navoi region.”10

The Japanese-Turkmenistan strategic partnership can be described as strong. Japanese corporations

such as Itochu, Marubeni, Sojitz, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries

are active in Turkmenistan and the region. Komatsu Ltd provides “heavy machinery necessary for the

construction and maintenance of gas pipelines in Turkmenistan for the period from 2002 to 2010, and

established a training center for capacity building. Similar to China, Japan has established financial

institutions to support its global agenda. For instance, “Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation

(JBIC) provides preferential loans for Turkmen government to fund Japanese corporations’ projects in

the country.”11 At the political level, Tokyo receives frequently senior officials from Central Asia to

strengthen bilateral ties, and dispatches senior Japanese officials to visit the region. Tokyo maintains

strong ties with the “Big Three” in the region, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Tokyo’s involvement in Central Asia can be better understood through the prism of its rivalry with

Beijing. On many occasions, Japan’s interventions in the region, in Africa, and the Middle East were

meant to undermine specifically China’s interests; although on a bilateral level, Japan is a close

business partner with China. Their annual bilateral trade volume reached $312,311.85 billion in 2014,

but declined in 2015 to $278,519.02 billion.12 Despite high trade volume, there have been unresolved

grievances, disputes, and claims since WWII. The brutal Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Taiwan

is engraved in the Chinese collective memory. In addition to the current territorial dispute over the

ownership of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and the navigation rights in the South and

East China Sea. Japan also competes with China in every part of the world to undermine Chinese

interests. The most striking example is in the Sudan where Chinese corporations developed the oil

sector with a network of pipelines constructed by China’s NPC, at a cost estimated at $8.0 billion for

over a decade of challenging work. When the country split in July 2011, most of the oil fields were

located in the newly independent Republic of South Sudan (RSS). The two countries, Sudan and South

Sudan have failed to reach an agreement on exporting oil via the Sudan Oil Pipeline (SOP). President

Hu Jintao personally intervened to resolve the impasse, while Japan proposed funding an alternative

pipeline, the South Sudan- Ethiopia- Djibouti Pipeline (SSED), with a cost of $4 billion dollars. Tokyo’s

main goal was clearly to undermine the delicate balance that Beijing was attempting to maintain

between Juba and Khartoum.

Japan offered Central Asia its Arc of Freedom and Prosperity Initiative (AFPI), which is similar to the

One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013. The

intention of the AFPI is to guide Tokyo’s foreign policy toward Central Asia, South East Asia, the Middle

East, Central European, ASEAN, and the Eurasian region. However, China’s OBOR is more successful in

constructing long-term frameworks of cooperation with partners in Central Asia, the Middle East, the

Far East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The OBOR, SCO, and CICA appeal the most to China’s

partners in Central Asia, the heart of the ancient and current Silk Road. China is saturating the region

with billions of dollars in direct investment in sectors such as oil, gas, construction, industrialization,

telecommunications and connectivity, transportation, railroads, banking, technology transfer, high



tech industries, and consumer goods and services. China’s massive investment in its OBOR is

unmatched.

Unlike the OBOR or the Russian Eurasian Customs Union, the difficulties that AFPI is confronting are

multifaceted. It lacks an intellectual framework that builds on commonalities and shared narrative. It

also lacks the ability to use basic principles of international relations such as linkage politics,

interdependence, or complex interdependence if compared with the Sino-Central Asian framework of

cooperation and the Sino-Russian strategic partnership do. Finally, Japan’s involvement is resented by

the two powers present in the region: Russia and China. Moscow views Tokyo as a representative of

American interest in the region, while China, Russia, and Central Asia are strategic partners, members

of the SCO, OBOR, CICA, etc. Their security cooperation with its Spillover Effects is much more valuable

to their national interests than the Japanese initiative. Upon examination, the AFPI entails the

potential of meddling in the internal affairs of the region, within the general framework of US policy

“in defense” of democracy and human rights.

China views with immense suspicion the Indian-Japanese partnership. It is perceived as an attempt to

contain China, encircle it and limit its rise. Above all, Beijing resents the militancy that Prime Minister

Abe has exhibited recently, and Japan’s reassertion of its military might. Most recently, on May 28,

2017, Tokyo launched the jewel of its naval power, Izumo, an aircraft carrier fully made in Japan to

tour the Asian waters for three months. Izumo is sailing through the Southeast Asia Sea in a show of

power that most certainly will provoke Beijing. However, Tokyo is careful to downplay Izumo’s mission

and its capabilities, describing it as a “helicopter carrier,” but the reality is Izumo was designed as an

aircraft carrier with strategic capabilities. It recently participated in joint maneuvers with the American

Navy, even though the exercise was not described as such to downplay Japan’s increasing militancy

under the Abe administration.

Turkey, China, and Central Asia

Turkey has the strongest ethnic and kinship ties with the peoples of Central Asia. The origins of the

current Turks originated in Xinjiang, or East Turkistan, China’s northwestern region. Turkey has similar

interests in Central Asia as other players in the region, defined in terms of energy, security, trade,

politics, and culture. Turkey was one of the very first countries to support the independence of Central

Asian republics in 1991. Ankara provided economic assistance, training on governance, and built

strong bridges with its fellow Turks in the region. It has also provided a better model of socio-economic

and political development if compared with Iran, which advocated an approach rooted in orthodox

Shi’i Islam.

Ankara articulated a host of bilateral and multilateral frameworks to strengthen its ties with the

region. Turkey established the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS), best known as

the Turkic Council (TC), to contribute to “the welfare of Turkic nations and the stability of the region...

enhancing all-round cooperation and tackle joint risks among the Council members.”13 Turkey is also

a founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) established in 1985 by Iran,

Pakistan, and Turkey. The ECO expanded its membership and admitted Afghanistan, Azerbaijan,

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.

Turkey has identical interests in Central Asia as China. It considers the region and some southern

European and Eurasian countries like Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Azerbaijan its strategic depth.



Constantinople was the Western center of the ancient Silk Road trade route, and today it hosts the

International Silk Road Congress. Furthermore, in 2013, China introduced the One Belt One Road

initiative that aims to reinvigorate the route; Turkey is an integral part of this initiative, given its

strategic importance to China’s national security and stability. At the bilateral level, Beijing needs

Ankara’s support in dealing with the Uyghur liberation organizations seeking a separate homeland in

Xinjiang, China’s main source of oil and natural gas. In addition to investing in economic development

in Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and its other northwestern regions predominantly Muslim, China seeks

the Turkish model of moderate Islam.

Where energy is concerned, Turkey imports 96% of its oil and natural gas needs from neighboring and

Central Asian countries. In exchange, it provides access to international markets via a proposed

network of oil and gas pipelines. Turkish Petroleum (TP) competes with its counterpart oil corporations

on concessions, exploration, and construction of pipelines in the region, especially in Turkmenistan

and Kazakhstan. Turkish construction corporations have established international legitimacy, despite

stiff Chinese competition. Turkey’s Economy Minister stated once that, “Turkey’s only rival in the

construction sector is China. … China came first in international contracting with 54 contracting firms

out of 250 firms, while Turkey came second with 38 firms. … Our goal is to leave China behind, but we

should cooperate in sectors such as tourism, real estate, and construction.”14 Sino-Turkish

competitiveness has motivated cooperation in joint ventures in construction, energy, and

transportation. Turkey and China are mindful of their core interests, and safeguard them in a

complementary outlook, rather than a “zero-sum” game. While China understands Turkish needs for

energy security, technology transfer, defense, and security, Turkey understands China’s need for

stability, economic growth, and prosperity.

Turkey and Russia also managed to articulate a formula of cooperation despite their differences on

major crises like the war in Syria. Both countries are part of the Geneva and the Astana Frameworks

that have failed to end the six-year war. In November 2015, Turkey downed a Russian jet fighter that

crossed its aerospace. This event escalated the situation between the two sides. Russia imposed

economic sanctions and travel restrictions on Turkey, knowing that its main sources of revenue are

agricultural exports to Russia and Russian tourism. Turkey also enjoys strong cultural and ethnic ties

with Muslims in Russia, and voices its concerns with Moscow’s treatment of its Muslim communities,

especially in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Similarly, Ankara has on many occasions criticized

China’s treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang in particular, and Beijing’s restrictions on religious practices

in the province.

Malaysia, China, and Central Asia

Like Central Asian societies, Malaysia is a multiethnic and a multicultural society with a relative

majority of Muslims. Culturally, Malaysia and Central Asian republics belong to the broader Islamic-

Middle Eastern culture. Central Asia views the Malayan process of state formation and economic

development model as applicable to its own stage of development. Malaysia’s senior leadership

makes frequent visits to Central Asia to strengthen bilateral ties and multilateral avenues of

cooperation with the region on energy and minerals, technology transfer, human development,

banking, halal food industry, training, education, construction, and industrialization. Petronas,

Malaysia’s fully integrated oil and gas multinational, competes on contracts, joins consortiums, and

engages in joint ventures in oil and gas in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Malaysia and



China are strategic partners; bilateral trade volume reached $160.0 billion. Both countries cooperate

and compete in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa being sensitive to each other’s core interests

defined in terms of security, energy security, and bilateral trade.

Iran, China, and Central Asia

Iran has an ambitious foreign policy agenda in Central Asia driven by theological and historical factors.

Tehran believes that it has a civilizational project to propagate worldwide based on Shi’a Islam and

Persian narrative. Iran shares borders with Central Asia and Eurasia. During the Cold War, Iran shared

borders with the former Soviet Union, deeply influenced by the USSR’s foreign policy, and became a

target for its expansionism. In post-Cold War, Iran was involved in Afghanistan’s affairs by supporting

the Northern Alliance and fighting the Taliban government based in Kandahar.

Iran repeatedly attempted to influence the socio-economic and political developments in Central Asia

with its own model of governance based on a theologically driven government that underlines the role

of Islam in politics. (Welayat al Faigh, or the role of the Supreme Guide). However, Central Asian

republics, which are secular in nature, resisted Iran’s model. In fact, the religious awakening in Central

Asia in the post-Soviet era did not materialize into mass conservative movements. Additionally, Russia,

China, and the Central Asian partners are not supportive of exporting the Iranian model of governance

to the region; rather, their governance is based on the separation of Mosque and state.

The demise of the Soviet Union brought about endless opportunities for Iran in Afghanistan and

Central Asia, however, it also ushered new challenges especially in the area of national security. Iran

found itself siting between two Sunni hostile regimes in Baghdad and Kabul: Saddam Hussein’s regime,

and Mullah Omar-Taliban government. Therefore, Tehran opted for close coordination with the

United States to remove both in the post-September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Iran provided strategic

support to the US mission in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime, just as it did to support toppling

the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in March 2003. The US removed Tehran’s archenemies from

power, and created the necessary conditions for Iran to expand its influence in Central Asia and the

Greater Middle East. Currently, Tehran believes that security threats continue to originate in

Afghanistan and Pakistan, so it ensured a strong foothold in Afghanistan through the Northern

Alliance. It has also built better mechanisms of cooperation with Pakistan and increased the wedge

between Islamabad and Riyadh, aiming at neutralizing the role of Saudi Arabia. Tehran provided

Pakistan with a wide range of incentives in the areas of oil, gas, and security cooperation.

On the Central Asian front, even though Iran is an oil and gas producing country, it imports 10 billion

cubic meters of natural gas annually, from Turkmenistan, through the Turkmenistan-Iran Gas Pipeline

(TIGP). This pipeline also provides Turkmenistan with access to international markets, with potential

of expanding it after the removal of economic sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear

program. The TIGP provides an opportunity for a re-entry of Western oil corporations to the Iranian

oil and gas sectors and by default to Central Asia through a network of transnational pipelines. In

November 2015, Total announced that, it had signed an agreement with Iran to participate in

developing the dubbed world largest gas field, the South Pars/North Dome field. Iran’s far reaching

goal is to expand the network of pipelines with Central Asia following China’s model, and encourage

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well to reach consumers through the TIGP. Tehran aims to use its Gulf

coast to export natural gas to world markets, and create interdependence with Central and Western



Asian countries. For example, Iran’s electricity network is connected with the electricity grids of

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.

China is Iran’s top trading partner, with an annual volume of trade that peaked at $51.8 billion in 2014.

Their bilateral cooperation includes energy, construction, security, politics, and culture. As far as

Central Asia is concerned, China welcomes Iran’s involvement in the region as long as it is confined to

energy and trade transactions, without ideological zeal. China resents any Iranian attempt to spread

Shiism in Central Asia or incite sectarian violence that might have a Spillover Effect in its most restless

province, Xinjiang. Beijing abandoned support for national liberation organizations and revolutionary

governments in 1976, in favor of stability and economic prosperity. Therefore, Iran’s ideological

expansion is not welcome in Central Asia.

Pakistan, China, and Central Asia

Pakistan is energy poor country that imports most of its oil and gas from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar. Currently, Islamabad aims to reduce reliance on the Arab Gulf countries

in favor of more cooperation with Iran, Central, and Eurasian countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In so doing, Pakistan meets its energy needs and conducts a somewhat

political and security realignment as in the case of the current Iranian-Pakistani rapprochement;

Tehran’s goal is specifically undermining the traditional Saudi-Pakistani strategic partnership built over

the past sixty years. In fact, Iran seems to be making substantial progress in this aspect. An early

indication of which is Pakistan’s refusal to participate in the Saudi led military operation in Yemen.

As far as energy is concerned, under the Taliban regime, Pakistan was party to the Turkmenistan-

Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline, known as the TAPAI project. The US Unocal was involved in the

project since early 1990s, and built a working relationship with the Taliban regime. Unocal organized

visits for some Taliban officials to visit the United States in mid-late 1990s to pave the way for the

construction of the pipeline. However, with the tragic terrorist attacks in 2001 hopes to build the

TAPAI dashed away. In post-Taliban, the Karzai and Ghani governments failed to establish order and

peace in the country, necessary conditions for the development of Afghanistan. To complete the

pipeline project, Afghanistan needs a comprehensive national reconciliation process, establishing

peace, order, and initiating a process of development. Additionally, the frequent rifts between India

and Pakistan over Kashmir, and other differences between the two countries threaten the TAPAI’s

potential revival, unless the two countries concentrate more on their common interests and exploit

their strategic location near major oil and gas producers. So far, the two countries have suffered

deeply due to insufficient domestic production of oil and gas. They have also failed to ensure their

energy security, or take advantage of the abundance of oil and gas in Central Asia, and other parts of

the Greater Middle East.

Pakistan, Iran, and India explored one alternative pipeline to the TAPAI since the mid-1990s: the Iran-

Pakistan-India Pipeline (IPIP). The aim was to bypass Afghanistan and accomplish the task, with full

pipeline functionality by the end of 2011. However, the project was aborted because Pakistan failed

to construct the section of pipeline runs through its territory, while Iran and India completed their

parts. The IPIP had several strategic goals. Iran aimed primarily at breaking the internationally imposed

sanctions because of its nuclear program, through energy cooperation with Pakistan and India. In

order to undermine a potential Iranian-Pakistani alignment, Saudi Arabia provided free shipments of



oil to Pakistan. Riyadh’s aim was to prevent the construction of the pipeline, and discouraged bilateral

cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Currently, India and Iran have explored an alternative route

to the IPIP, to bypass Pakistan through the Oman route. Given the strategic nature of Iranian-Omani-

Indian relations, India and Iran are exploring the construction of the Iran-Oman-India Pipeline (IOIP)

that begins in Iran, crosses the Gulf of Oman underwater, and continues toward India. Although this

pipeline is more expensive to construct than on land (estimated cost $5 billion), it is more appealing

than the Pakistani route.

In terms of security in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Islamabad is more involved in Afghanistan than

any other country. In fact, the US and China to some extent, subcontracted Pakistan to deal with the

Taliban threat. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the failure of Pakistan to

contain the threat from both the Taliban and Al Qaeda permitted the influence of other regional actors

like Iran to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The US dealt with the threat on its own by

direct invasion and occupation in 2001, and over the past decade by carrying out drone attacks even

in the Pakistani territory, at times. China expressed its dissatisfaction with Pakistan for the lack of

“sufficient” efforts to combat terrorist organizations. Beijing wants Islamabad to curb the activities of

Uyghur liberation organizations operating in Afghanistan because it deems them the symbol of the so-

called “Three Evils”: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. In addition to, curbing the activities of the

Uyghur community in Pakistan and drying up potential funding from the community to organizations

battling China over Xinjiang. The Uyghur community in Pakistan is an active class of merchants, who

also sends their children to madrasas for education. China deems that as a national security threat.

Regardless of Pakistan’s successes or failures, it must be noted that China and Pakistan do enjoy

strategic military partnership. They produce jointly the J21, J31, and J35 fighter jets.

China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner, carrying out massive investment projects worth $20 billion

dollars, especially in the Energy Corridor and the development of the Gwadar Port (GP). This port is

strategically located on Pakistan’s southern coast, overseeing the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the

Arab Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. The GP serves as a military base, a trading hub, oil

and gas storage, and is a gateway by land to Chinese territory. India views the Chinese-Pakistani

cooperation and China’s presence in Gwadar as a threat to its national interests. The GP can easily

threaten India’s energy supplies in any potential conflict between the two archenemies, India and

Pakistan. However, India’s needs are met through its growing partnership with Iran, and its strategic

partnerships with Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait.

Late King Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia was the guest of honor in India’s 57th Republic Day in

2015, while India’s Prime Minister Modi visited the Saudi capital in April 2016 for two days. Riyadh’s

strengthening bilateral ties with New Delhi must be understood as a step to free Arab-Indian relations

from the constraints of the “Pakistan Factor”, and to punish Pakistan for its lack of support to the

Saudi-UAE led campaign in Yemen, a decision that was influenced by Iran. The outcome seems to be

a realignment process, whereby India strengthens its ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf

countries, while Pakistan strengthens its ties with Iran. Therefore, Iran is potentially supplying

Pakistan’s oil and gas needs, and serving as passage to oil and gas coming from Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan toward Pakistan and other consumers.

As far as China is concerned, Beijing has been strengthening its economic, energy, military, and

security cooperation with both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to contain the Indian threat. In his, visit to



Pakistan in April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Initiative, a $46 billion investment in energy and transportation infrastructure. Simultaneously, India

is concerned about the massive presence of China in Pakistan, and its partnership with Sri Lanka

through One Belt On Road framework. Therefore, New Delhi has been strengthening its ties with

Bangladesh, Afghanistan and infiltrating Central Asian countries. Obviously, the Indian and Chinese

frameworks of cooperation in the Indian Ocean region and in Central Asia aims at keeping the other

in check. However, China is always ahead of the game. Beijing has supported the membership of both

India and Pakistan to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They two countries were inducted as

full members of the SCO on June 9, 2017. Beijing’s aim is to increase the potential avenues of strategic

partnership with both rivals, and lower the cost of cooperation with both, Islamabad and New Delhi.

Saudi Arabia, China, and Central Asia

Saudi Arabia attempted to influence the process of state formation and nation building in Central Asia.

Riyadh provided financial assistance to its partners in Central Asia, training in the areas of energy, oil

and gas, human development, and capacity building.15 It also provided its partners with membership

in Saudi led international organization and institutions such as the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation, the Islamic Alliance for Combatting International Terrorism, the Islamic Development

Bank, etc. Riyadh and Tehran are embroiled in a battle of influence in Central Asia, as in other parts of

the Greater Middle East. Similarly, Iran provides a wide range of incentives to Central Asian republics,

and it has recently gained stronger grounds if compared with Saudi Arabia. However, China resents

both ideologically driven approaches in fear of their potential impacts on its northwestern

predominantly Muslim provinces.

Saudi Arabia needs Central Asia’s support to bring about stability to oil markets and increase the price

of crude oil. At the end of April 2017, the Saudi Oil Minister toured the region for this very purpose.

Saudi Arabia also needs the support of its Central Asian friends and allies in the war on international

terrorism. Above all, Saudi Arabia needs the support of its partners, especially China, for its National

Transformation Plan and Vision 2030 to diversify its economy and reduce its reliance on oil revenue.

To mobilize support for the Vision 2030, Saudi King, Salman Ibn Abdulaziz initiated a one-month tour

of Asia in the spring of this year to seek joint investment projects with Asian partners. He visited China,

Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Maldives, and briefly Jordan.

Riyadh invited the heads of state of the Central Asian republics to participate in the American-Islamic

countries summit held late April 2017. Among the most noted guests was Nursultan Nazarbayev, the

president of Kazakhstan. His attendance was a testament to the rising role of Astana in international

relations, and the distinguished ties between Saudi Arabia, the US, and Kazakhstan. Iran was not

invited to the American-Islamic conference. On bilateral level, Saudi Arabia and China are

Comprehensive Strategic Partners. Their engagement in Central Asia have not influenced adversely

their bilateral massive and comprehensive cooperation in the areas of energy, infrastructure,

transportation, aviation, nuclear energy, trade, or culture.

India, China, and Central Asia

India’s framework of cooperation with Central Asia includes security, energy cooperation, trade, and

political and cultural ties. While India’s outlook is very ambitious, it is humbled by some geostrategic

considerations. India imports 75% of its oil needs, thus its energy interests in the region are crucial if



it seeks to produce enough electricity to light its rural areas. It also needs access to Turkmenistan,

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan’s natural gas, but the Pakistani hurdle, as previously discussed, is

insurmountable.

The second most important aspect of India’s cooperation with Central Asia is defense. In 2002, India

signed a defense agreement with Tajikistan to renovate the Ayni Air Base (AAB), strategically located

near Dushanbe, the capital. This base was widely used by the former Soviet Union in its war in

Afghanistan. However, “India's interest in Ayni went beyond renovation. It was keen to set up a base

there, where early reports suggested Delhi was considering deploying MiG-29 fighters. A base at Ayni

was seen to provide muscle to India's strategic ambitions in Central Asia.”16 Russia and, China viewed

such step as a strategic threat to their national security, and pressured their ally, Tajikistan, to end its

military cooperation with India. In fact, India’s attempt to rent the Ayni airbase came along with a

generous package of incentives to Tajikistan. Therefore, Moscow provided a counter package worth

$2 billion in military assistance, while Beijing provides Tajikistan with a comprehensive framework of

cooperation, including security, trade, energy, infrastructure, transportation, aviation, etc. Most

importantly, China and Russia realize the far-reaching consequences of India’s military presence in

Central Asia, and its impacts on disrupting the fragile balance of power between India and Pakistan.

Beijing views India’s military presence in Central Asia as a threat to its national security, contributing

to its encirclement. In response to its unsuccessful attempt to establish a military presence in Central

Asia, India strengthened its bilateral cooperation with Japan. The prime ministers and senior officials

of India and Japan exchange frequently visits, and coordinate closely on a wide range of issues, such

as security, trade, and energy. In his 2016 visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Modi gave a “bear hug” to his

Japanese counterpart, interpreted as anti-Chinese in nature.

As far as Russia is concerned, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi participated in the St.

Petersburg’s 2017 International Economic Forum, in early June 2017, while at the end of the month

he visited the White House. During his visit to Russia, the two countries signed several agreements in

the energy sector in particular. In addition to energy security, the goal of Modi’s visit was to bring

some certainty to international relations at a time the Trump Administration brings unprecedented

levels of ambiguity to world politics and to American global commitments and responsibilities. Europe,

the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America are very apprehensive about the unpredictable nature

of the Trump Administration. The warm Russian reception of the Indian delegation is an early

indication of improvement of Indian-Russian bilateral ties.

During the Cold War, India was on the side of the Soviet Union, while its menace, Pakistan was part of

the Western alliance, especially in the decade long war in Afghanistan. However, in the post-Cold War

era India realigned its foreign policy within the American-Western lines. Its strategic partnership with

the US was most apparent under the Obama Administration. Indian-American perspectives on the

War on Terror, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the “encirclement and containment” of China were nearly

identical.

As far as energy is concerned, the methods of delivery of oil and natural gas from both Russia and

Central Asia to India poses some difficulties, though provides endless opportunities. While India

considered two projects that involved Pakistan, the TAPI, and IPI, both of which are obsolete, there

are two potential routes: the Iran-Oman-India Pipeline, and the Russia-China-India (RCI) energy

cooperation. India understands very well that, China is a very reliable partner despite their differences



and sometimes conflict over border issues. Equally, India understands that bilateral cooperation with

Pakistan is nearly impossible because of the absence of the necessary conditions for such cooperation.

Their dispute over Kashmir is practically identical to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in fact, both

originated in the same period: post-WWII, in 1947. Therefore, India’s options are limited, but

promising.

India requires an innovative approach to its energy security, namely, to work with its foes and follow

the Chinese model of “strategic coexistence and interdependence” and Russian pragmatism.

Therefore, a Russia-China-India Pipeline (RCIP) is not an impossible scenario to imagine, rather one

that would resolve India’s oil and gas needs for decades to come. It will also create energy-

interdependence between the two countries that will lower the tension over drawing their borders. It

will also strengthen their bilateral trade, and connectivity, making India, as it has always been, an

integral part of the Silk Road, ancient and modern. It will also “soften” if not marginalizes the “Pakistan

Factor” in regional affairs. It is evident that, China and Pakistan are close allies, but on many occasions,

Beijing chastises Pakistan if it fails to carry out its share of the partnership, especially in security

matters. A Sino-Indian, Russian, and Central Asian cooperation, especially in the energy sector, would

diminish Pakistan’s strategic importance to China. It would introduce “linkage politics and

interdependence,” and increase the benefits and decrease the costs of Indian-Chinese bilateral

cooperation. A Russian-Indian and Chinese framework would transform international relations in

unprecedented manner, taking into account demographic, strategic location, productivity, labor,

defense, trade, and cultural considerations.

South Korea, China, and Central Asia

South Korea has an ambitious agenda in Central Asia. It includes energy (oil, gas, and nuclear energy),

trade, security, political, and socio-cultural relations. At the ethno-cultural level, Central Asia is the

home of a Korean community of 300,000 citizens who moved during WWII, when the Soviet Union

engineered demographic movement of minorities across its territory. Similar to rivals, South Korea

developed three frameworks: Global Korea (GK), the New Asia Initiative (NAI), and the Eurasian

Initiative (EI), which are identical to the Chinese OBOR initiative, the Japanese Arch of Freedom

Perspective (AFP), and the Russian Eurasian Customs Union (UCU). The GK, NAI, and EI aim to

strategically, strengthening bilateral and multilateral ties with the Eurasian and Central Asian

republics, especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, rich in oil, natural gas, and

uranium deposits. The EI clearly identifies connectivity as a crucial aspect of the success in bilateral

cooperation. It “calls for building more infrastructure and freeing up trade between Eurasian nations

to create what could become a large single market rivaling the European Union.”17 Seoul proposed a

network of highways and railroads to connect the Korean Peninsula with Central and Eurasian regions,

but the Korean initiative has not been as successful as the One Belt One Road framework. China

devoted substantial resources to the OBOR, with an initial fund of $120 billion dollars. Beijing has

already begun the mammoth project of connectivity, a network of highways crossing its northwestern

regions toward Central Asia, railroads that cross the region toward Western and Northern Europe, and

the construction of several inland ports. Beijing also increased aviation traffic with its neighbors.

Energy is Seoul’s main interest in Central Asia. Korean oil and gas corporations such as the Korea

National Oil Corporation (KNOC), run a major operation in Kazakhstan, and exploit several oil blocks

such as Ada, Zhamby, Arystan, Kulzhan, Akzhar, Karataikyz, and Alimbai.18 The KNOC usually



establishes and leads Korean consortiums to strengthen their biding and potential success in obtaining

oil and gas concessions, and industry-service contracts. For instance, KNOC formed a consortium

comprised of the “SK Corporation, LG International, Samsung, and Daesung Industrial.”19 The purpose

of the partnership is to bid for acquiring a substantial share in the Kakazk Zhambyl offshore oil block,

off the Caspian Sea. South Korean corporations are members of international oil coalitions that include

Petronas, PetroVietnam, UZbekistanneftGas, Lukoil, and CNPC, investing nearly $1.0 billion to develop

Uzbekistan’s oil-shale reserves. Clearly, South Korean corporations learned from their Chinese

counterparts to work with “rivals” to gain a foothold in Central Asia, an area subject to massive rivalry

among oil and gas giants such as CNPC, Sinopec, Gazprom, and Rosneft.

Seoul concluded large energy deals in Central Asia, in the areas of oil and natural gas. In 2011, South

Korea concluded $4.1 billion deals with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan during the visit of South Korean

President Lee Myung-bak to the two countries. His successor, Park Geun-hye, visited Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in June 2014. During her visit, she signed several agreements, especially

the construction of a coal-based power plant for $4.9 billion, and $4.0 billion investment in the

Uzbekistan’s Bukhara gas fields. Park also visited the Silk Road cities of Bukhara and Samarkand,

highlighting the importance of rejuvenating the road through a network of highways, railroads, and

aviation modeled on the Chinese initiative, the OBOR. Additionally, Park used the same reference to

South Korean expertise as Beijing and Tokyo to mark a beneficial cooperation that will enhance each

other’s economies: “you have energy resources, and we are experienced in economic development

and high-tech.”20

Central Asian republics warmly welcome the entry of South Korean corporations into their energy

markets, their bilateral trade, and cooperation for several reasons. The people of the region have no

historical grievances toward South Korea, unlike with China, Russia, or Iran. South Korea’s model of

development shares a similar process of subjugation to foreign rule and state formation. Moreover,

South Korea’s presence in Central Asia is not threatening to China or Russia, if compared with India

and Japan. In fact, China and South Korea share a similar narrative of WWII grievances against Japan’s

brutal occupation. Therefore, the two countries have more common interests and interdependence

than with Japan or other rivals. South Korea and China have substantial advantages: Beijing

understands South Korea’s need for energy security, therefore willing to contribute to its realization

through bilateral cooperation and coalition building among oil corporations. China is South Korea’s

solid strategic partner in bilateral trade, with a volume estimated at $264 billion; and Seoul needs

Beijing’s support to deal with the North Korean threat. In fact, “Chinese leaders showed considerable

skill in managing very difficult and often contradictory imperatives coming from North and South

Korea, endeavoring to sustain China’s position in Pyongyang and markedly advancing China’s relations

with Soul.”21 China will not hesitate to punish North Korea for its destabilizing behavior. In early June

2017, China sponsored a joint resolution with the United States (Resolution 1718) to impose more

sanctions on North Korea because of its continued testing of intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

Members of the Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution. President Xi Jinping reversed a

tradition in China’s foreign policy, visiting first North Korea, and the visiting South Korea. He visited

Seoul in July 2014 and has yet to visit North Korea. Beijing is exceptionally annoyed by Pyongyang’s

destabilizing behavior, such as firing ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, assassinating opponents

in Malaysia, pursuing an ambitious nuclear program, and creating sufficient conditions for a senseless

war. North Korea’s behavior contributed to growing militancy in Japan, and promoted the American



deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAD) system in South Korea. China views

the THAD system as a threat to its national security, and therefore, called for its removal.

Conclusion

Central Asia has become the center of world rivalry once again over the past two decades, as it was

during the Great Game of the 19th Century. However, instruments, aims, and methods of the New

Game are drastically different. Rivals seeks a stake in the region’s natural gas and oil, markets,

urbanization and industrialization, and mineral wealth. They now use a wide range of bilateral and

multilateral frameworks to strengthen their ties in the region, such as the OBOR, the Eurasian Customs

Union, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, and Global Korea. For global connectivity, instruments

range from mammoth construction of highways, to railroads, airports, inland ports, and maritime

trade. Rivals are reaching different outcomes, but the most undisputed winner is China, who has

devoted the necessary financial resources to advance its interests in Central Asia within the One Belt

One Road framework of infrastructure, banking and investment, security cooperation, strategic

political dialogue, and cultural ties. Russia is the second winner, given its historical ties with the region,

the interconnectedness of transportation and telecommunication systems, oil, and gas industry, and

cultural ties. Other players such as the US, Japan, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia

and Malaysia are making some grounds, but are far behind. Rivalry centers around Central Asia’s

energy resources, with a spillover effect on trade, security, politics, and cultural relations. Central

Asia’s strategic location, and abundance of wealth, will make it subject to Great Games for many

centuries to come.



References

1 Xinhua Press Agency, August 28, 2014. Spotlight: China-Turkmenistan Cooperation Consolidates Central Asian Energy Corridor at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/28/c_133594978.htm

2 For a detailed analysis of China’s historical depth of bilateral ties with Central Asia, see Olimat, Muhamad, 2015. China and Central Asia: A Bilateral Approach, Lexington: US, P. 1-25. Also, John Keay, 2009. A History of China, Basic Books: New York.

3 Svyatets, Ekaterina, 2016. Energy Security and Cooperation in Eurasia: Power, Profits and Politics, Routledge: UK, P. 180.

4 Xinhua Press Agency, September 1, 2014. China, Russia Start Construction of Gas Pipeline at: http://english.cntv.cn/2014/09/01/ARTI1409577619163270.shtml

5 Li, Rex, 2009. A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse, Routledge: UK, P. 155.

6 Barany, Zoltan, 2003. The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies, Cambridge University Press: UK, P. 14.

7 Text of President George W. Bush on September 11, 2001. The Guardian at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13

8 United States Department of State, 2003. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002. United States Department of State: Washington DC, P. 16.

9 Linden, Edward V. 2003. Focus On Terrorism, Nova Science Publishers, Inc.: New York, P. 126.

10 AzerNews, June 3, 2013 at https://www.azernews.az/region/56752.html

11 Olimat, Muhamad, 2015. China and Central Asia: A Bilateral Approach, Lexington: US, P. 65

12 China Statistical Year Book, 2016 at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm

13 Olimat, Muhamad, 2015. China and Central Asia: A Bilateral Approach, Lexington: US, P. 69

14 Hurriyet Daily New, September 13, 2013. Turkey Aims to Increase Exports to China to Cope with Trade Gap at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-aims-to-increase-exports-to-china-to-cope-with-trade-gap.aspx?pageID=238&nid=54360

15 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, 2002. From, From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, University of Exeter Press: UK, P. 97.

16 Sudha Ramachandran, December 1, 2010. India Air Base Grounded in Tajikistan, Asia Times, at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LL01Df02.html

17 South Korean Herald, Park Hoping to Forge Closer Central Asia Ties, June 16, 2014 at: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140616000997

18 The Korea National Oil Corporation, October 22, 2014. Operations-Kazakhstan at: http://www.knoc.co.kr/ENG/sub03/sub03_1_1_2.jsp

19 Laruelle, Marlene and Sebastien Peyrous, 2012. Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development. M.E. Sharpe: NY, P. 109.



20 Weitz, Richard. July 1, 2014. Park’s Central Asia Tour Reaffirms South Korea’s Eurasian Vision, World Politics Review at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13895/park-s-central-asia-tour-reaffirms-south-korea-s-eurasian-vision

21 Sutter, Robert G. 2010. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers INC: Plymouth-UK, P. 173.

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