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No. 70111-8-I

DIVISION I, COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO JP MORGAN CHASE

BANK NA AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II INC. BEAR STERNS ATL-A TRUST 2005-5, r::--

2 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-5,

Plaintiff/Respondent

v.

DAVID MURESAN, MARIA MURESAN, and All Occupants of the Premises located at 1496 South Crestview Drive, Camano Island, W A

98282,

Defendants/ Appellants

ON APPEAL FROM ISLAND COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AFFIRM ON THE MERITS

LANE POWELL PC

Ronald E. Beard, WSBA No. 24014 David C. Spellman, WSBA No. 15884 Abraham K. Lorber, WSBA No. 40668 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent The Bank ofNew York Mellon

1420 Fifth A venue, Suite 4200 Seattle, Washington 981 01-9402 Telephone: 206.223.7000 Facsimile: 206.223.7107

C' (()0

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I. IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTY

This motion is brought by Respondent The Bank of New York

Mellon (BONY). BONY was formerly known as The Bank of New York.

In this suit, BONY is acting as the successor in interest to JP Morgan Chase

Bank NA, which was the Trustee for Structured Asset Mortgage Investments

II Inc. Bear Sterns Atl-A Trust 2005-5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,

Series 2005-5.

II. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

BONY respectfully moves under RAP 18.14( e )(1) for the

affirmance on the merits of the order for writ of restitution because this

appeal is clearly without merit.

Appellants David and Maria Muresan's (Muresan) pro se appeal

stems from a post-foreclosure eviction that BONY (the trustee's sale

purchaser) brought against Muresan (the foreclosed borrower). Muresan

does not allege any error in the superior court's ruling on the eviction

itself. Rather, he alleges that the underlying foreclosure should not have

taken place. Muresan litigated and lost this claim in a related federal court

case because a lender has no duty to review a borrower for a loan

modification or grant such a modification. Further, no private right of

action accrues to a borrower under the federal Home Affordable

Modification Program (HAMP). Because these claims Muresan brought

I 05727.1442/5665817.2

were dismissed by the federal court,· the doctrines of claim and issue

preclusion barred Muresan from relitigating these claims in the unlawful

detainer action below.

Since Muresan's theories for reversal are clearly without legal

merit, RAP 18 .14( e )(1) provides for affirmance of the order granting the

writ of restitution.

III. COUNTERST ATEMENT OF ASSIGNED ERROR AND ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the trial court erroneously grant a writ of restitution against

Muresan and in favor of BONY?

The four issues listed below are controlled by settled law and are

matters of judicial discretion. Should the Court grant affirmance on the

merits under RAP 18.4(e)(1)?

Issue (1 ): The federal district court dismissed Muresan's claims

challenging the sale with prejudice, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the

dismissal, and the bankruptcy court granted BONY leave to pursue the

eviction remedy. Do these final decisions preclude Muresan from

relitigating the claims in the unlawful detainer action?

Issue (2): In the event there is no preclusion, has Muresan

established that the federal court committed a prejudicial error in applying

the law or abused its discretion?

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 2

. •,

Issue (3): Has Muresan raised a defect in the foreclosure sale

warranting a postsale avoidance of the sale?

Issue (4): Has Muresan raised an equitable claim that warrants

reversal ofthe writ?

IV. BACKGROUND~ROCEDURALPOSTURE

Muresan is the former owner of the real property on Camano

Island (the "Property"). 1 By December 2011, he was over $46,000 m

default on a $369,000 loan. 2 His monthly payments were $2,471.19.3

Muresan began falling behind on his mortgage in June 2010.4

Muresan applied several times for a loan modification under the HAMP

program but was denied. Appellant Br. at 2. In November 2011, the deed

of trust mortgage and note were formally assigned to BONY in a recorded

assignment. 5 Wells Fargo acted as the attorney in fact for BONY.6

Muresan received the first notice of trustee's sale, which was

scheduled for March 16, 2012.7 Seeking to postpone the sale, Muresan

filed suit against America's Servicing Company, a division of Wells Fargo

I CP 49-50; id. ~ 2. 2 CP 83-84. 3 CP 73. 4 CP 50~ 4. 5 CP 50-51~ 7. 6 CP 80 (Appointment of Successor Trustee). 7 CP 81-82 (declarations ofmailing).

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 3

Bank, N.A., the servicer of his loan. 8 Wells Fargo removed the suit, and

the federal court granted a 12(b )( 6) motion dismissing the suit with

prejudice on April25, 2012.9

Three weeks before the dismissal, the trustee's sale went forward

on April 6, 2012. 10 BONY purchased the Property. 11 Muresan requested

that the district court grant an order preventing the resale of the house and

remanding the case. 12 The district court, however, denied the renewed

. 13 M 1 d h d. . 1 14 motion. uresan appea e t e Ism1ssa .

While the federal appeal was pending, BONY served Muresan with

the unlawful detainer suit. 15 Muresan sent BONY an answer, stating he was

appealing the district court's dismissal and would soon file bankruptcy and

arguing that the prior suit should have prevented the trustee's sale. 16

8 CP 18-21 (federal court order); CP 18:20-24. 9 CP 18:24-21:1. 1° CP 52,~ 15. II CP 92-94. 12 CP 16 (Dkt. No. 12). 13 CP 18-21 (Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice (Apr. 24,

2012); CP 20:23-25 ("Plaintiffs motion to remand (Dkt. No. 12) IS DENIED. The case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE." Id.

14 CP 16 (Dkt. No. 15). 15 CP 39:5-6 (service on May 20, 2012). 16 CP 44 (Answer, May 21, 2012); CP 43 (Decl. of Service, May

21,2012).

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 4

Five weeks later, BONY filed the unlawful detainer suit. 17

Muresan filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in July 2012. 18 The

bankruptcy court granted BONY relief from the stay on September 17,

2012. 19 Eleven days later, Muresan moved for the superior court to vacate

the sale of the house, claiming that the sale had violated his rights under

RCW 61.24.130?0 Muresan, however, did not note the motion for

hearing.

Five months later, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the

dismissal on February 25, 2013.21 Within two weeks, BONY moved the

superior court to grant an order to show cause why the court should not

issue a writ of restitution.22 The show cause motion attached Muresan's

unfiled answer to the complaint and the bankruptcy court's earlier order

authorizing BONY to "proceed with its state law eviction remedies. "23

Muresan answered the motion for a writ of restitution, reiterating

his arguments that the trustee's sale violated his rights under RCW

17 CP 106 (Jun. 28, 2012). 18 CP 47-48 (Order Granting Relief from Stay, Bankr. No. 12-

17266-KAO). 19 CP 47-48. 2° CP 95-96(Sept. 28, 2012), CP 96:9-11 ("a violation of my right

given by ... [RCW] 61.24.130 ... "). 21 CP 22. 22 CP 38-40 (Mar. 5, 2013). 23 CP 44 (Answer); CP 47-48 (Order Granting Relief from Stay),

CP 48:4-6, Case 12-17266-KAO, Dkt. 22.

105727.1442/5665817.2 5

•,

61.24.130 and he should have received a loan modification?4 BONY

replied that Muresan had waived a postsale challenge as a result of his

failure to restrain the sale and as a result of the federal court's dismissal of

his claims with prejudice?5

Over Muresan's objections, the court issued a writ of restitution

restoring possession of the Property to BONY?6 Muresan appealed from

the issuance of the writ.

V. STATEMENT OF GROUNDS

A. The Standard of Review.

The construction of the unlawful detainer statute is a question of

law reviewed de novo. Hartson P'ship v. Goodwin, 99 Wn. App. 227,

231, 991 P .2d 1211 (2000). When the record consists entirely of written

material, an appellate court stands in the same position as the trial court

and reviews the record de novo. Housing Auth. of City of Pasco and

Franklin Cnty. v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382, 387, 109 P.3d 422 (2005)

(citing Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wn., 125 Wn.2d

243, 252, 884 P.2d 592 (1994)).

24 CP 29-31. 25 CP 23-38 (Pl.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Order Issuing Writ of

Restitution); CP 12-22 (Decl. ofValerie I. Holder in Supp. of Pl.'s Reply (attaching federal court docket, order of dismissal with prejudice, and appellate order affirming dismissal).

26 CP 5-7 (Mar. 25, 2013).

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 6

As a pro se litigant, Muresan is not entitled to "special favors"

from the court. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d

527 (1993). Pro se litigants are "bound by the same rules of procedure

and substantive law as attorneys." Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures

Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405,411,936 P.2d 1175 (1997). Reviewing courts will

not address issues raised in passing or unsupported by authority or

persuasive argument. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118

Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Therefore, the court may decline

to address the issues that Muresan raises on appeal; he has not developed

the arguments and claims. To discourage Muresan from filing more suits

and appeals, BONY will, nonetheless, respond to both the issues raised

below and the issues raised in this appeal.

B. RAP 18.4(e) Authorizes a Motion to Affirm When the Appeal Is Clearly Without Merit.

RAP 18.14 authorizes a motion on the merits. RAP 18.4( e )(1)

provides that:

A motion on the merits to affirm will be granted in whole or in part if the appeal or any part thereof is determined to be clearly without merit. In making these determinations, the judge or commissioner will consider all relevant factors including whether the issues on review (a) are clearly controlled by settled law, (b) are factual and supported by the evidence, or (c) are matters of judicial discretion and the decision was clearly within the discretion of the trial court or administrative agency.

"In essence, the rule seems to be designed to provide a way to deal

expeditiously with cases that cannot in fairness be called frivolous, but

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 7

that nevertheless can be resolved without full, traditional appellate

treatment." 3 Karl B. Tegland Wash. Practice., Rules Practice RAP 18.14

at 541-42 (7th ed. 2013).

As a pro se appellant, Muresan may be unaware that he cannot

relitigate the claims and issues he lost in federal court. Even if he could

collaterally attack the federal court judgment, the federal court did not

misapply the law or abuse its discretion. As demonstrated below,

Muresan did not establish a claim supporting either a presale or postsale

challenge to the trustee's sale. The grounds for reversal stated in his brief

are indeed "clearly without merit," and therefore the court should grant

RAP 18.4( e )(1) affirmance of the order for a writ of restitution.

1. The Final Federal Court Decision Precludes the Relitigation of Claims Challenging the Trustee's Sale in the Unlawful Detainer Action.

Res judicata and collateral estoppel (claim and issue preclusion)

bar Muresan from relitigating the claims he lost and the issues that the

federal court decided against him. BONY raised the doctrine of res

judicata below in response to the defenses that Muresan raised in response

to the unlawful detainer suit.27

27 CP 27:14-28:5. RP (Mar. 25, 2013) at 7:9-24 (arguing prior litigation barred claims).

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 8

The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) is to

avoid relitigation of a claim or cause of action. Deja Vu-Everett-Federal

Way, Inc. v. City Of Federal Way, 96 Wn. App. 255, 262, 979 P.2d 464

(1999). "A threshold requirement for the application of res judicata is a

valid and final judgment on the merits in a prior suit." Thompson v. King

Cnty., 163 Wn. App. 184, 190,259 P.3d 1138 (2011). The Ninth Circuit's

affirmance of the 12(b )( 6) dismissal satisfies this threshold requirement.

"Supreme Court precedent confirms that a dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 'judgment on the merits' to which res

judicata applies." Stewart v. US Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3,

101 S. Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981)). Judge Coughenour's order

expressly dismissed the case "WITH PREJUDICE."28

"The test for res judicata under federal law is similar to the

Washington test as it requires (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final

judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between the parties."

Thompson, 163 Wn. App. at 190 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 845, 850 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 914, 121 S.

Ct. 1247, 149 L.Ed.2d 154 (2001)). Because the result under either test

would be the same, the court may simply apply the Washington test.

28 CP 20.

105727.1442/5665817.2 9

..

Thompson, 163 Wn. App. at 190 (citing Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 120

n.5, 897 P.2d 365).

"Different defendants in separate suits are the same party for res

judicata purposes as long as they are in privity." Ensley v. Pitcher, 152

Wn. App. 891, 902, 222 P .3d 99 (2009). "The general rule is that a

judgment is res judicata, and is therefore binding on all parties to the

original litigation, plus all persons in privity with such parties." 14A

Wash. Practice: Civil Procedure § 35.27.

Wells Fargo and BONY are m privity. Wells Fargo was the

servicing agent for the mortgage loan. The notice of default was issued on

behalf of BONY and copied, America's Servicing Company, a division of

Wells Fargo. CP 72-75 (Notice of Default). Wells Fargo signed the

Appointment of Successor Trustee as attorney (agent) for BONY. CP 80.

"One is in privity with a party when he stands in a mutual or

successive relationship to the same rights of property." McKown v. Driver,

54 Wn.2d 46, 54, 337 P.2d 1068 (1959). BONY is in privity with Wells

Fargo, "stand[ing] in [both] a mutual and successive relationship to the same

rights of property"-namely the rights granted under the deed of trust

mortgage. The loan had been transferred to a mortgage backed security trust,

whose beneficiary was BONY. BONY later became the purchaser of the

Property at the trustee's sale. "A purchaser of property, before or after

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 10

judgment affecting it, is in privity with the vendor for the purposes of the

judgment, and is concluded thereby." Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 54 Wn.2d

779, 782, 345 P.2d 173 (1959). Here, the vendor was the trustee.

Muresan sued America's Servicing Company/Wells Fargo (in its

representative capacity as the servicer of the loan) claiming Wells Fargo

was required to modify the loan, the trustee's sale should be postponed,

and later that the sale should be unwound. 29 The federal district court

dismissed those claims on the merits.30 Muresan is reasserting the

identical claims for loan modification and unwinding the sale as defenses

to the unlawful detainer suit. 31 The trial court ruled that as to his claims

"it's already been taken care of in- in Federal District Court."32

"[R]es judicata occurs when a prior judgment has a concurrence of

identity in four respects with a subsequent action. There must be identity

of ( 1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and

( 4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made."

Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Group, LLC, --- Wn.2d ---, 297 P.3d 677,

684 (20 13) (citation omitted). Collateral estoppel requires: "(1) identical

issues; (2) a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the

29 CP 18 (Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice). 30 Id. 31 CP 29-30. 32 RP (Mar. 25, 2013) 9:4-9.

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 11

plea is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the

prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine must not work an

injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied." Id.

(citation omitted). In contrast to Schroeder where the preclusionary

defenses did not apply since the successive lawsuits involved two different

deeds of trust, this suit arises from the very same deed of trust.

Muresan as the plaintiff in the prior suit is bound by the judgment

dismissing with prejudice his claims. His motion for the Ninth Circuit to

reconsider its order does not alter the preclusive effect of its prior order.

"If a judgment is appealed, the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects

will not be suspended or denied during the pendency of the appeal." 14A

Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice, Civil Procedure § 35:23.

Similarly, "[w]hen an appeal is pending, a party is precluded by res

judicata from starting a new action ... in hopes of obtaining a contrary

result while the appeal is pending." Spokane Cnty. v. Miotke, 158 Wn.

App. 62, 67, 240 P.3d 811 (20 1 0) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. In the Event the Final Judgment Has No Preclusive Effect, the Federal Court Correctly Applied the Law and Acted Clearly Within its Discretion.

In this appeal, Muresan raises three "objective reasons" which are

his alleged errors relating to issuance of the writ of restitution. Appellant

Br. at 2:23-3:6. Each of the alleged errors is wholly without merit.

105727.1442/5665817.2 12

The first alleged error is that BONY/Wells Fargo was required to

grant him a loan modification. Appellant Br. at 2:24-27. But the law does

not compel a lender to grant a loan modification. The Washington Supreme

Court has held that a lender is not obligated to review a borrower for a loan

modification - the lender is entitled to "simply stand on it rights to require

performance of a contract according to its terms." Badgett v. Sec. State

Bank., 116 Wn.2d 563, 570, 807 P.3d 356 (1991). By December 2011,

Muresan was in default for $46,000, continuing to live payment free at the

property for another fifteen months while an additional $36,000 accrued.33

The court is not in a position to decide when and how a lender must modify a

loan, especially in this case where the default was growing over time.

Regarding the claim to compel a HAMP modification, the federal

court dismissed the claim, ruling:

Plaintiffs complaint rests on the notion that Defendant is required to modify his loan if he meets the requirements. However, as district courts around the country, including in this Circuit, have concluded, HAMP "does not provide borrowers with a private cause of action against lenders for failing to consider their application for loan modification, or even [for failing] to modify an eligible loan." Simon v. Bank of Am., N.A., Case No. C10-0300, 2010 WL 2609436, at *10 (D. Nev. June 23, 2010); see also Hoffman v. Bank of America, N.A., Case No. C10-2171, 2010 WL 2635773, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (finding that HAMP does not create enforceable rights to loan modification, even for qualified borrowers); Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., C09-1557, 2009 WL 4981618, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that HAMP does not require lenders to modify all mortgages that meet eligibility

33 CP 84 ($49,952 arrearage in December 2011), CP 73 ($2,589/m x 15 months= $38,335.)

l 05727.\442/56658\7.2 13

requirements). Therefore, because Plaintiff does not have a right to loan modification even if he is eligible for that modification, he does not have a right to stop a trustee's sale of his property on the basis that his loan modification request was improperly denied.34

The well-settled law is that Muresan has no right to a loan modification.

Wells Fargo's refusal to grant a modification is not a valid basis for

reversing the writ of restitution.

The second alleged error is that the removal of the case prevented

Muresan from objecting to the sale and "forced the sale to be non-judicial

instead of judicial ... " Appellant Br. at 3:1-2 (Item 2, "moved my case ...

to prevent the Appellant to object to the sale" and "forced the sale to be

nonjudicial instead of judicial ... "). But the record is that Muresan

34 CP 20:5-17. See Williams v. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, *7 (noting "the statute provides that loans may be modified 'where appropriate' - a phrase that limits the [Treasury] Secretary's obligation and evinces a Congressional intent to afford discretion in the decision whether to modify loans in certain circumstances .... Congress did not intend to mandate loan modifications."); Chapel v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., C10-1345BHS, 2010 WL 4622526, *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2010) (dismissing claims that defendants violated T ARP by failing to modify the loan as no private right of action exists under TARP against private lenders); Aleem v. Bank of Am., No. EDCV 09-01812-VAP, 2010 WL 532330, *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 201 0) ("There is no express or implied right to sue fund recipients ... under TARP or HAMP."); Gonzales v. First Franklin Loan Servs., No. 1:09-CV-00941, 2010 WL 144862, *18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (no private right of action under either EESA or TARP); Mangosing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-09-0601, 2009 WL 1456783 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009) (no private right of action under EESA); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:10--cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 21, 201 0) ("Plaintiff is precluded from asserting a private cause of action under HAMP, even disguised as a breach of contract claim ... ").

105727.1442/5665817.2 14

objected to the sale in federal court and he used the judicial system to

stave off the trustee's sale and later the unlawful detainer. 35

The federal court denied his motion for a remand.36 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332 provides for removal of state cases on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction, and the federal court properly accepted removal of the lawsuit

on that basis.37 Muresan has failed to establish the removal was erroneous

and prejudiced the outcome ofthis suit for unlawful detainer.

The third alleged error relates to the dismissal order by the federal

court and presents three issues: (a) whether the federal court prematurely

decided the dismissal motion on April 24 instead of on May 8, 2012,

(b) whether he had a right to appear in person, and (c) the effect of the

reconsideration motion pending before the Ninth Circuit. Appellant Br. at

3:3-6.

Regarding Muresan's Issue (a) the timing of the dismissal order,

the dismissal was not premature. Appellant Br. at 3:3-6. The dismissal

motion was noted for hearing on March 16, 2012.38 Five weeks later, the

35 CP 83 (Notice of Trustee's Sale, Dec. 14, 2011), CP 92 (Trustee's Deed, Apr. 16, 2012), CP 18-21 (order dismissing case, Apr. 25, 2012), CP 5-7 (writ of restitution, Mar. 25, 2013).

36 CP 16 (Dkt. No. 12, Mot. to Remand), CP 20:23-2 (denying remand).

37 CP18-21. 38 CP 16 (Dkt. No. 8).

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 15

court granted the April 24, 2012 dismissal order.39 The order was not

premature. The dismissal order denied the renewed motion for remand

that Muresan filed on April 20, 2012.40

Regarding Muresan's Issue (b) whether he had a right to appear in

person, he had no right to appear in person. The Western District of

Washington Local Rules provides that all motions will be decided without

oral argument unless the court orders otherwise. LCR 7(b)(4). The Ninth

Circuit has held that a district court's decision to deny oral argument is

within the discretion of the district court. Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt.

Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (1991) (affirming order granting Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal without benefit of oral argument). As in Spradlin,

Muresan's pleadings did not "offer the district court any insight into what

allegations or evidence he would add, ... and, even on appeal, he offers no

specific factual allegations which support his arguments." ld. "Argument

... serves only to elucidate the legal principles and their application to the

facts at hand; it cannot create the factual predicate." I d. Muresan has not

established tha~ the federal court abused its discretion.

39 CP 18-21. 4° CP 19:15 ("Plaintiff renewed his request for remand in a motion

filed on April 20, 2012."); CP 20:18-21 (ruling "the failure to approve his loan modification application ... is not an actionable claim ... -- the Court denies as futile Plaintiffs request to remand the case to the Island County Superior Court.").

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 16

Regarding Muresan's Issue (c) (the effect of the reconsideration

motion pending before the Ninth Circuit), the pending motion has no

immediate effect on the finality of the prior decision. The reconsideration

motion requests the case to be remanded to the superior court, for an order

vacating the sale, and requiring the sale of the house to him. Case No. 12-

35368 Dkt. No. 16. If the court denies the motion, the dismissal remains a

final order.

In summary, these "legal reasons" that Muresan offers for reversal

clearly have no merit. The settled law controls the legal issues, and the

federal court acted well within its judicial discretion. Therefore, the court

should grant an order affirming on the merits the order for writ of restitution.

3. Muresan Failed to Establish a Defect in the Foreclosure Sale Warranting the Postsale Avoidance of the Sale.

Muresan argues that the Order for Writ of Restitution should be

reversed on equitable Grounds - Muresan claims he paid his mortgage for

10 years and that he will suffer harm if he loses his house. Br. of

Appellant 3. BONY does not make light of the harm that Muresan is

likely to suffer when he is evicted; however, the threat of harm is not

sufficient to reverse the Superior Court's order.

RCW 61.24.060(1) grants the purchaser at the trustee's sale "a

right to the summary proceedings to obtain possession of real property

provided in chapter 59.12 RCW." The initial questions before the court in

105727.1442/5665817.2 17

an unlawful detainer action brought by a purchaser are ( 1) did the trustee's

sale occur, (2) have the requisite 20 days since the sale elapsed, and

(3) has the plaintiff complied with the other procedural requirements of

the unlawful detainer statute? See RCW 61.24.040(7) (stating the effect

of the trustee's deed); RCW 61.24.060(1) (requiring 20 days' notice

following the sale to the borrower to commence an unlawful detainer suit);

Laffranchi v. Lim, 146 Wn. App. 376, 383, 190 P.3d 97 (2008) ("To take

advantage of these summary proceedings, the purchaser must comply with

all statutory requirements.").

In an unlawful detainer action, plaintiff bears the burden to prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, the right to possession of the

premises. Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wn.2d 129, 135, 323 P.2d 903 (1958).

BONY's evidence was the trustee's deed, the affidavit of the foreclosing

trustee, the bankruptcy court's order authorizing the eviction, the federal

district court's dismissal order, and the order dismissing the appeal. 41

The affidavit and trustee's deed are evidence of a properly

conducted sale. RCW 61.24.040(7) (providing a trustee's deed "shall

recite the facts showing that the sale was conducted in compliance with all

of the requirements of this chapter and of the deed of trust, which recital

shall be prima facie evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence

41 CP 12-22, CP 49-94.

105727.1442/5665817.2 18

thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value .... ").

Muresan has not alleged that the recitals are inaccurate and does not allege

that the trustee violated the requirements of the Deed of Trust Act.

Muresan waived any postsale challenge by failing to pursue a

presale injunction. "[W]aiver is an equitable doctrine, and 'we apply

waiver only where it is equitable under the circumstances and where it

serves the goals of the act."' Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, --- Wn.2d ---, 295

P.3d 1179, 1185 n.6 (2013) (quoting Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of

Wash., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 560, 569, 276 P.3d 1277 (2012)). "Where the

interest-holder believes noncompliance results in prejudice, an injunction

should be sought." Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 581 n.4 (Stevens, J.,

concurring). "The same standard applies to defects occurring at or after

the time of the sale-absent actual prejudice from the error, a claim is

waived if no action is taken to set aside the sale." I d.

There are three requirements for the waiver of defects in a trustee's

sale. "[W]aiver of any postsale challenge occurs where a party (1) received

notice of the right to enjoin the sale, (2) had actual or constructive

knowledge of a defense to foreclosure prior to the sale, and (3) failed to

bring an action to obtain a court order enjoining the sale." Albice, 174

Wn.2d at 569 (2012) (citing Plein v. Lackey, 149 Wn.2d 214, 227, 67 P.3d

1061 (2003)). The record establishes those three requirements.

105727.1442/5665817.2 19

First, Muresan concedes he received the notice of trustee's sale.

"Notice of sale was given to me on Dec. 16, 20 11."42 The notice of

trustee's sale in§ IX warned:

Anyone having any objection to the sale on any grounds whatsoever will be afforded an opportunity to be heard as to those objections if they bring a lawsuit to restrain the sale pursuant to RCW 61.24.130. Failure to bring such as lawsuit may result in a waiver of any proper grounds for invalidating the Trustee's sale.43

Second, Muresan "had actual or constructive knowledge of a

defense to foreclosure prior to the sale ... " Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 569. He

asserted in his HAMP claim in federal court.

Third, he lost in his efforts to stop the sale and to make a postsale

challenge in federal district court, the court of appeals, and bankruptcy

court.44

Some post-sale challenges to a trustee's sale may be raised in

response to an unlawful detainer suit. See Schroeder v. Excelsior Mortg.

Group, LLC, --- Wn.2d ---, 297 P.3d 677 (Wash. Feb. 28, 2013). Id. ~~ 16-

17 (ruling the non-agricultural status of the property was a requirement of

the Deed of Trust Act and not a waivable right of the debtor). I d. ~~ 23-29

(ruling failure to enjoin sale did not support dismissal of injunction claim

42 CP 29:18. 43 CP 85. 44 CP18-22, CP 47-48 (Order Granting Relief from Stay, Bankr.

No. 12-17266-KAO).

105727.1442/5665817.2 20

based on failure to comply with the statutory requirements). See Albice,

174 Wn.2d at 569, 571-73 (grantor did not know a presale remedy was even

necessary when the grantor had a forbearance agreement, was tendering

each monthly payment, and promptly filed suit two months after the sale).

In stark contrast, Muresan lost a federal suit to enjoin the sale.

Below, Muresan claimed that the sale violated his rights under RCW

61.24.130. RCW 61.24.130 grants interested parties a right to seek a

presale injunction preventing a trustee's sale. RCW 61.24.130(1) states:

Nothing contained in this chapter shall prejudice the right of the borrower, grantor, any guarantor, or any person who has an interest in, lien, or claim of lien against the property or some part thereof, to restrain, on any proper legal or equitable ground, a trustee's sale. The court shall require as a condition of granting the restraining order or injunction that the applicant pay to the clerk of the court the sums that would be due on the obligation secured by the deed of trust if the deed of trust was not being foreclosed: ... (Emphasis added.)

Muresan mistakenly believes that filing the prior suit satisfied the

requirement for a "restraining order or injunction." RCW 61.24.130(1 ).

The well-settled law is that one must move for a TRO or injunction or one

loses the temporary statutory remedy to enjoin the sale.

The federal court never reached the issue of an interim injunction

pending trial, since the court granted summary judgment dismissal of the

claims with prejudice. Also, the presale remedy became moot, when the

trustee's sale went ahead, and the federal court dismissed with prejudice

his substantive claims.

I 05727.1442/5665817.2 21

·.

In the event that Muresan had moved for a presale injunction, he

could not satisfy the requirements for a RCW 61.24.130 injunction -

namely "pay[ing] to the clerk of the court the sums that would be due on

the obligation secured by the deed of trust if the deed of trust was not

being foreclosed." RCW 61.24.130. The issue of whether BONY should

be permitted to go forward with the sale was also litigated in his

bankruptcy case. The issue was also litigated in the federal court case.

Muresan raises equitable grounds to reverse the order authorizing

the writ of restitution. Identical and similar equitable reasons were raised

and rejected in the federal suit. The standard for setting aside a prior

judgment is extraordinarily stringent. See Civil Rule 60. Even ifMuresan

moved in federal court to vacate the judgment, he would lose under the

doctrines of claim and issue preclusion.

None of the equitable reasons for reversal set forth in Muresan's

Opening Brief have merit. Accordingly, RAP 18.14( e )(1) affirmation of

the Superior Court's Order for Writ of Restitution is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion bar Muresan from

relitigating the claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the

federal court case. He has failed to establish a bona fide defense to the

unlawful detainer action. Each of his legal and equitable reasons for

105727.1442/5665817.2 22

-..

reversal of the writ of restitution is clearly without merit. Therefore,

BONY respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Superior Court

pursuant to RAP 18.14(e)(1).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of June, 2013.

105727.1442/5665817.2

LANE POWELL PC

By--"-"'-@c_4Jvz--__ Ronald E. Beard, WSBA No. 24014 David C. Spellman, WSBA No. 15884 Abraham K. Lorber, WSBA No. 40668

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent The Bank of New York Mellon

23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury and the laws of the United

States and the State of Washington that on June 20, 2013, I caused to be

served a copy of the foregoing document on the following person(s) in the

manner indicated below at the following address(es):

David Muresan Maria Muresan 1496 South Crestview Drive Camano Island, W A 98282

I 05727.1442/5665817.2

D D D 0 D D

byCMIECF by Electronic Mail by Facsimile Transmission by First Class Mail by Hand Delivery by Overnight Delivery

c Debi Wollin

24