JULY 2014

Responding to Insecurityin the Gulf of Guinea

PATRICE SARTRE

Cover Photo: The overcrowded port ofElmina in Ghana, August 20, 2012.iStockphoto.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in thispaper represent those of the authorand not necessarily those of IPI. IPIwelcomes consideration of a widerange of perspectives in the pursuit ofa well-informed debate on criticalpolicies and issues in internationalaffairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Director of Publicationsand Senior Fellow

Marie O’Reilly, Associate Editor

Marisa McCrone, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Patrice Sartre, “Responding toInsecurity in the Gulf of Guinea,” NewYork: International Peace Institute, July2014.

© by International Peace Institute, 2014

All Rights Reserved

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PATRICE SARTRE is a retired Brigadier-General from the

French Marines. He served in peace operations in Africa

and the former Yugoslavia. He also worked as deputy

assistant director in the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the

French Ministry of Defense; military advisor to the

Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations;

defense advisor to the French Secretary-General for

National Defense; and lastly defense advisor to the Ministry

for Foreign Affairs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its many generous donors and

is particularly grateful to the donors to its Africa program,

whose support made this publication possible.

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Roots of Insecurity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CIVIL WARS AND A FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE

PIRACY AND CRIME

THREATS FROM THE SAHEL AND CENTRAL AFRICA

International, Regional, and National Responses . . . 3

EUROPE AND THE US: EVOLVING APPROACHES

THE UNITED NATIONS AS PEACEKEEPER

THE AFRICAN UNION: GROWING REGIONAL LEADER

ECOWAS: SOLUTIONS FOR STABILITY

NIGERIA’S REGIONAL POWER IN QUESTION

ECCAS, THE GGC, AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

AT SEA

Strategies in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

THE FAILED STRATEGY OF PREVENTION

A SUCCESSFUL, IF LIMITED, CRISIS MANAGEMENTSTRATEGY

A MIXED PICTURE FOR MARITIME SECURITY

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

FOUNDATIONS FOR SECURITY

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS AND BALANCES

TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION

1

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea has become notorious for itsviolent conflicts and political instability. Thisinsecurity has its origins in bad governance,corruption, and failures of social and economicdevelopment. Violent power struggles andcompetition for the control of economic assetsperiodically cause crises to flare up, and these tendto be persistent and widespread. The internationalcommunity has worked to move countries in theregion onto a stable trajectory. West Africa has alsomade efforts to develop a coordinated approach tothe region’s challenges through a common securityarchitecture. Such subregional initiatives mayultimately prove most conducive to long-termstability.

Geographically, the Gulf of Guinea extends fromLiberia to Gabon and includes the island territoriesof Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe.In policy discussions, it is common to add SierraLeone and the Guineas to the west and Congo-Brazzaville to the east. This report addresses thiswhole area but focuses in particular on the tencountries bordering the Atlantic from Guinea-Bissau to Cameroon, for two reasons: they areconnected to the persistent insecurity in the Sahelregion (a semi-arid geographic band below theSahara desert and above the southern savannas),and they are most afflicted by the piracy activitiesin the Gulf of Guinea itself.

The Roots of Insecurity

CIVIL WARS AND A FAILURE OFGOVERNANCE

The arbitrary division of territory by the colonialpowers in the Gulf of Guinea led to a number ofdisputes among the new African states followingtheir independence, such as those between Côted’Ivoire and Ghana; Benin and Burkina Faso;Guinea and Sierra Leone; and Niger, Nigeria, andCameroon. There has been no full-fledgedinterstate war in the Gulf of Guinea region in thepost-independence period, but internal instabilityhas produced civil wars that have caused betweenhalf a million and million deaths:• Nigeria experienced a civil war from 1967 to

1970, also known as the Biafran War.

• Liberia’s civil war took place in two phases, from1989 to 1996 and 1998 to 2003.

• The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to2000.

• Guinea-Bissau’s brief civil war in 1998 and 1999occurred after a war of liberation of a ferocitythat had not been known elsewhere in the region.

• The “War of 5 June” in the Republic of theCongo (Brazzaville) lasted from 1997 to 1999.

• Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war lasted from 2002 to 2007and was renewed in 2010 and 2011 followingdisputed elections. Cameroon, Benin, and Ghana have managed to

avoid violent conflict, the latter despite a veryunstable post-independence period. Liberia, SierraLeone, Togo, Guinea, and latterly Côte d’Ivoire aregradually becoming more stable. Nigeria is stillconfronted by a wide range of conflicts, some ofwhich relate to the Sahel and others to the Gulf ofGuinea. Guinea-Bissau recently descended intoconflict once more, in relation to a struggle forpolitical power and control of the drug trade.Fortunately, following the elections in Spring 2014,it seems that Bissau-Guineans have succeeded inbringing democracy to their country.

Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau provide valuableexamples of the longstanding interaction betweenthe Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. The Sahel hastraditionally provided the Gulf countries withcattle, manpower, and trade routes to the Arabicand European realms; the coast provided mineraland agricultural resources, connecting West Africato the rest of the world through its rivers and ports.

In the early post-independence years, Africanstates focused on creating a sense of nationhoodthrough strong power structures, which tended toresult in military regimes or one-party states; bothdevelopments were assisted by the static confronta-tion of the Cold War.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, some of thecountries in the Gulf of Guinea found themselvesstill dominated by authoritarian regimes derived,directly or indirectly, from the colonial powers(Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon). Others wereabout to fall into a state of near anarchy (Liberiaand Sierra Leone) or subject to a military govern-ment condemned by the international community(Nigeria).

2 Patrice Sartre

Apart from Ghana, no West African country hadsucceeded in moving toward democratization. Thestrong governments that had ruled them until thatpoint had not provided them with solid andautonomous administrations, capable of managingthe state competently and with integrity. Theabsence of any real countervailing judicial powersallowed a level of corruption to develop thatdrained the state of its very substance and causedthe populations to distrust their political leaders orbred contempt for the state itself. Even Benin andMali, which gained the confidence of the interna-tional community for a time, proved unable toavoid autocracy and corruption.

The Gulf of Guinea has a climate particularlyfavorable for agriculture, which helped to reducethe extent of undernourishment in the region. TheGulf should be self-sufficient in food production,but postcolonial wars and political instabilitycompleted the vicious circle of physical insecurityleading to food insecurity. Wars caused at least twofamines in one of the richest parts of Nigeria(Biafra) and in Sierra Leone and Liberia between1989 and 2001. Political and social instability alsocontributed to malnutrition for populations in theNiger Delta, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. PIRACY AND CRIME

Throughout the Gulf of Guinea, maritime banditrycoexists with other illicit activities at sea, includingarms trafficking, illegal immigration, and, increas-ingly, transshipment of drugs from South Americaen route to Europe via Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,Ghana, and now Nigeria. And the situation hasbeen deteriorating.

In 2013, there were 54 attacks against ships in theGulf of Guinea, of which 34 were successful,according to the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO). This compares with 64attacks in 2012 and 61 in 2011. In almost half of the2014 cases, the ship was alongside or at anchor. Nocrew members were killed nor wounded in thisperiod, but 93 were taken hostage, and 9 ships werehijacked. Ships and crews were subsequentlyreleased. All this amounts to 18 percent of the 298attacks at sea throughout the world, a decrease of12.6 percent over the figures of 2012.1

In the Niger Delta, where the most spectacularincidents have occurred, the most common activityis hostage taking of expatriates for ransom, usuallyfrom offshore oil installations, exploration vessels,tankers that are loading, and, in particular, servicevessels shuttling to and from the land.

All along the coast, but particularly in the NigerDelta, insecurity at sea is a consequence of poorgovernance on land and an extension of land-basedactivities, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and“bunkering”—the illegal siphoning of oil. In theNiger Delta, these crimes often have a politicalorigin: the revolt of local people against thedespoiling of their soil and water (especially bypollution), and against what they perceive as anunjust distribution of oil profits.

After the 2003 elections, parliamentarians fromthe Nigerian South-South geopolitical zone whowere unable to pay the militias who had“protected” their campaign allowed the militias tokeep their arms in return for a share in the profit oftheir illegal activities. These activities were partpolitical, part commercial: taking over from themilitant groups of the military dictatorship era,these new militants undertook to “protect” the oilfacilities and personnel. It rapidly became clear thatprotecting meant extorting the oil companies andpreying upon their staff. Not only did the localauthorities prove unable to counter these criminalactivities, they also appeared to abet the recovery ofransoms and seizure of booties. When the oilexploitation moved offshore, so did this “protec-tion.”THREATS FROM THE SAHEL ANDCENTRAL AFRICA

While dealing with internal problems afterindependence, the states in the Gulf of Guineararely posed a threat to each other. Oneexception—the dispute between Nigeria andCameroon over the Bakassi peninsula—wasultimately resolved in a deal brokered by the UNsystem. Neighboring countries in the Sahel regionalso tended not to interfere in conflicts in the Gulfof Guinea, with the exception of Burkina Faso. Theonly state directly affected by Islamic terrorism wasNigeria, through the unrest in its northern states,

1 International Maritime Organization, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2013,” MSC.4/Circ.208, April 2014, available athttps://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/circular-titles/msc4-201-400.htm .

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 3

2 This area exports 1.5 million barrels of oil per day to the USA, 1 million to Europe, 850,000 to China, and 330,000 to India. See International Crisis Group, “TheGulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone,” Africa Report N°195, December 12, 2012.

many of which form part of the Sahel’s geographicband. As in the rest of the Sahelian band, misman-agement was reinforced by a lack of resourcescombined with religious militancy in the form ofthe jihadist group Boko Haram.

Today, the spread of insecurity across the Sahel,from Sudan to Senegal, is partly fuelled by drugtrafficking from the Gulf of Guinea. This hasbecome a shared threat for the entire EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS),especially Mali, where the drug trade coming infrom the coast helped to erode the structures of thestate. Unable to deal with Tuareg unrest in thenorth and then overwhelmed by Islamic groupsafter the fall of Qaddafi in Libya, Mali is now acenter of insecurity that borders and also threatensthe Gulf of Guinea states. And in Central Africa,Cameroon now suffers from crises occurring inChad as well as those in northern Nigeria. Congo-Brazzaville suffers consequences of the crisis inSudan, through its metastases in Chad and theCentral African Republic.

International, Regional, andNational Responses

Confronted by this insecurity, the internationalcommunity has sought to put an end to crises andmove countries that have emerged from crisis ontoa stable trajectory. Subregional organizations andmore recently the African Union have also madeefforts to develop security frameworks foraddressing challenges to stability. These initiativesmay be less visible to the international community,but they are likely to be more promising in the longterm if the region is to achieve stability. EUROPE AND THE US: EVOLVINGAPPROACHES

Since 2005, West Africa has demanded theattention of the United States, which initiallyexpected to meet 25 percent of its hydrocarbonneeds from the wider Gulf of Guinea (includingAngola) by 2015.2 Together with its counterter-rorism goals and other concerns around the

4 Patrice Sartre

continent, this was one of the reasons why theUnited States established the US Africa Command,known as Africom, in 2008.3

However, in recent years this interest has wanedas the United States relies increasingly on shale gasto meet its energy needs and less on the Gulf ofGuinea’s hydrocarbons. This is reflected in theObama administration’s approach to the crisis inMali. Wary of engaging in another overseasmilitary campaign that was not connected to itswider foreign and security policy, the United Stateswas content for European countries, in closecoordination with regional and subregionalAfrican organizations, to lead the militaryintervention to counter the terrorist threat in Mali.

During the crises in Sierra Leone and Côted’Ivoire, Great Britain and France felt compelled toact, but their actions came across as politicallymotivated postcolonial interventions, so they werenot really supported by bilateral efforts of otherEuropean states.

In contrast, the European Union’s assistance tocountries in the Gulf of Guinea afflicted by armedconflict has been perceived as relatively generousand comparatively disinterested. The EU fundednational and international efforts in disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration of combatants(DDR); security sector reform; and statereconstruction. The EU also carried out a lesssuccessful civilian operation relating to securitysector reform in Guinea-Bissau in 2009 and 2010.So far, the EU has not considered launching amaritime operation to prevent or repress acts ofpiracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as it has withOperation Atlanta off the coast of Somalia.THE UNITED NATIONS ASPEACEKEEPER

In 1993, the United Nations established its firstpeacekeeping mission in the Gulf of Guinea: theUnited Nations Observer Mission in Liberiaoperated until 1997. It was followed by United

Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (1998–1999), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone(1999–2005), United Nations Mission in Liberia(2003–present), and United Nations Operation inCôte d’Ivoire (2004–present). These operationsserved as the main laboratories for the concept ofmultidimensional operations, particularly focusedon DDR, security sector reform, and statereconstruction.4

If the UN proved, through these operations, tobe efficient in crisis management, the internationalcommunity remained ineffective in its efforts toprevent crises, particularly crises at sea. In anattempt to solve these problems, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed special representa-tives in West Africa and then in Central Africa. In2006, the special representative of the secretary-general in West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,understood the plague that piracy was becoming inthe Gulf of Guinea. He ordered a study on the issueand recommended working closely with all actorsat sea, especially the US Naval Command inNaples, Italy, and its ships patrolling in the Gulf ofGuinea, as well as the British and French navalforces.5 However, it was only in 2011 that theSecurity Council considered the situation in theGulf; supported a regional meeting in Yaoundé,Cameroon, to develop a comprehensive strategy;and encouraged the Gulf states to develop andimplement national and regional maritime securitycoordination centers and joint patrols, under theauspices of the IMO.6

THE AFRICAN UNION: GROWINGREGIONAL LEADER

One of the main objectives of the AU is to“promote peace, security and stability on thecontinent.”7 The primary body charged withimplementing this objective is the Peace andSecurity Council through, among other means, itspeace support missions, sanctions in the case ofunconstitutional change of government, and“initiatives and action it deems appropriate” in

3 Africom is one of the nine strategic unified combatant commands of the US Armed Forces. Headquartered near Stuttgart, Germany, it is responsible for militaryoperations and relations with all African countries except Egypt.

4 Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should not be regarded as Gulf of Guinea operations, as they mainly address the crises in the Great Lakes.5 Patrice Sartre “Piraterie, brigandage et insécurité en mer de Douala à Nouakchott – Etude réalisée au profit du RRSG des Nations Unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest

(UNOWA)” [Piracy, Theft, and Insecurity at Sea from Douala to Nouakchott—Study Undertaken for the United Nations SRSG for West Africa (UNOWA)],Dakar, 2007.

6 UN Security Council Statement of August 30, 2011, on piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea; UN Security Council Resolution 2018 (October 31,2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2018; UN Security Council Resolution 2039 (February 29, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2039.

7 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé, 2000, Art. 3(f).

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 5

response to potential or actual conflicts.8 The Peaceand Security Council’s decisions are binding onmember states. The Constitutive Act recognizes theAfrican Union’s right to intervene in memberstates in circumstances of war crimes, genocide,and crimes against humanity.9

Since it first convened in 2004, the Peace andSecurity Council has been instrumental in thecrises of East and Central Africa: Darfur, Comoros,Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, andBurundi. The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and2011 presented an opportunity to intervene inWest African security matters. To support the workof the Peace and Security Council, the AfricanStandby Force—a permanent African peace -keeping force made up of five subregionalbrigades—was initially planned to be operational in2010; this is now scheduled for 2015.

All of these arrangements were made with aview to solving security problems on land. Theoutbreak of piracy on eastern and western Africancoasts led the African Union ministers in charge ofmaritime affairs to design and adopt in December2012 the “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM)Strategy” and a corresponding plan of action.ECOWAS: SOLUTIONS FOR STABILITY

Most of the states in the Gulf of Guinea aremembers of ECOWAS and hence committed to theMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security—possiblythe most successful stability mechanism on thecontinent.

Established by a 1999 protocol, the mechanismhas three objectives: the prevention, management,and resolution of conflicts.10 To achieve theseobjectives it promotes the strengthening of cooper-ation and the maintenance and consolidation ofpeace, security, and stability within thecommunity, as well as humanitarian institutionsand policies. Headed by the Conference of Heads ofState and Government of the member states, thismechanism is directed by the Mediation and

Security Council composed of nine member statesand assisted by the Department of Defence andSecurity,11 which is made up of civilian and militarytechnical experts on security, as well as by the Panelof the Wise.

The December 2001 supplementary protocol tothe mechanism seeks to establish a normativefoundation. It includes common constitutionalprinciples among member states (Article 1),democratic and civil control of forces (Articles 19and 20), rights of citizens in uniform (Article 21),and participation in regional peace supportoperations (Article 28).12 There are also varioustechnical documents, including a code of conductfor the security forces.

There has been significant criticism of theMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security for itstenuous understanding of the realities in WestAfrica, and this is not entirely unfair. However, it isless a theoretical construct whose practicalconsequences have not yet materialized and morethe institutionalization of mediation proceduresand of mechanisms such as the ECOWASMonitoring Group, which have been developed onan ad hoc basis in previous crises. To its credit, themechanism also involves West African govern-ments in a set of general proposals for a law-basedapproach to peace, bringing together supranation-ality, mutual assistance, and non-interference.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)was formed in haste in 1990, to deal with the firstwar in Liberia. It later intervened successfully in theconflict in Sierra Leone and subsequently inGuinea-Bissau, and it has since formed the core ofthe ECOWAS standby brigade, part of the AfricanUnion standby force.

The fact that the results of ECOMOG missionswere generally positive is largely to the credit of theNigerians, who have provided the framework andthe majority of the troops. The other countries ofthe subregion, especially Ghana and Guinea, have

8 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Durban, 2002, Art. 9(1).9 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé, 2000, Art. 4(h), repeated in Article 4(j) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council

of the African Union, Durban, 2002.10 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé, December 1999.11 This is also known as the Committee of Experts on Peace and Security, a rebranding that indicates an evolution from the vocabulary originally coming from

NATO and the EU toward a terminology more of the region, and “putting back in their correct place” the military and police chiefs who make up this body.12 ECOWAS, Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Dakar, December 2001.

6 Patrice Sartre

provided company-strength units, headquartersstaff, and sometimes the force commander. NIGERIA’S REGIONAL POWER INQUESTION

Nigeria has aspirations to become a permanentmember of the UN Security Council as a represen-tative of Africa. The country has been an essentialcontributor of troops to peacekeeping missionsaround the world, and especially in the Gulf ofGuinea, both in UN missions and in ECOMOGmissions, which Nigeria initiated and to which it isthe main contributor. In the 1990s, Nigeria showeditself to be an effective actor in the crises in the Gulfof Guinea, especially in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.In spite of the situation in the Niger Delta and itsnorthern areas, it remains an essential actor in theresolution of problems in the Sahel and the Gulf.

Unfortunately, Nigeria has been starting down aslippery slope which could at best reduce its positiveinfluence in the subregion and at worst cause itssecurity problems to spread to neighboringcountries. As demonstrated in the Mali crisis in2012 and 2013, Nigeria’s domestic challenges areundermining its leadership role in the subregion. Itwithdrew its forces from the UN mission in Mali(MINUSMA) to deal with Boko Haram. TheNigerian government remains unable to curbcorruption and, despite the abundant resourcesdrawn from oil, it appears unable to develop itstroubled northern states, even unable to develop thewealthy south. In addition, the country is becomingan avenue for a variety of transnational organizedcriminal networks, which threaten the stability ofthe broader region, the Maghreb, and Europe.

To address these two crises, the federal govern-ment has tried just two approaches: an attack onthe excessive corruption of the leaders of violence,in order to convince them that their personalinterest would be to lay down their arms, orexcessive repression, facilitating the rise of violentmovements such as Boko Haram. The Nigerianelite appears unable to establish a sustainabledialogue with the rest of the population, and it hasfallen increasingly under the influence of the policeand military establishment, whose authoritystrengthens with the increasing use of force.

ECCAS, THE GGC, AND REGIONALCOOPERATION AT SEA

Subregional organizations have strengthenedcooperation between their member states, but theycan also contribute to deepening the dividesbetween neighboring countries when the latter arepart of different organizations. This is indubitablythe situation in the Sahel, where nefarious nonstateactors exploit the states’ division among threedifferent subregional organizations—the Inter -governmental Authority on Development, theEconomic Community of Central African States(ECCAS), and ECOWAS. It is also the case in theGulf of Guinea, whose countries may be membersof two different subregional organizations,ECOWAS and ECCAS—if not three, when consid-ering the wider Gulf of Guinea, in which Angola isa member of the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) as well as ECCAS.

Taking over from the Customs and EconomicUnion of Central Africa (UDEAC) established in1964 and following the same shift as ECOWASfrom economic to security issues, ECCAS became“active” in 1985. Headquartered in Libreville,Gabon, ECCAS is made up of Angola, Burundi,Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo,Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon,Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, andChad.

In reality, ECCAS remained inactive for severalyears and it has not yet reached the level ofefficiency of ECOWAS or SADC, particularly insecurity matters. Financial difficulties, the overlapwith several regional organizations,13 and theconflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congoand the Great Lakes area were all obstacles to anefficient implementation. This left the door wideopen to external interventions: Libya and France inChad, and France in the Central African Republic,Gabon, and Congo. Learning from ECOWAS andSADC experiences, ECCAS finally established itsPeace and Security Protocol, which it is strugglingto implement. As was the case for the AfricanUnion and for ECOWAS, ECCAS frameworkswere established with a view to solving securityproblems on land.

13 Rwanda, which left ECCAS in 2007, was also a member of COMESA, as Angola, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to be. Rwanda istoday member of the East African Community and of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries.

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 7

14 There have been eight coups in Nigeria; five in Ghana; four in Guinea-Bissau; two in Liberia, Guinea, and Togo; and one in the Côte d’Ivoire.15 These started out as RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) for France, APTSP (African Peacekeeping Training Support

Programme) for the UK, and ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) for the US; ultimately these three programs changed their names, their size, and theirorganization.

The outbreak of piracy along the Gulf ofGuinea’s coastline forced its member states to seeksolutions to maritime insecurity. Could maritimecooperation be arranged between differentsubregional organizations? West African statesacknowledge that they cannot deal with insecurityat sea without cooperating with the other countriesbordering the Gulf. In fact, this cooperation is themain task of the Gulf of Guinea Commission(GGC). Founded in 1999, the GGC comprisesAngola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republicof the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria,and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Since 2011 ECOWAS and ECCAS have alsobeen cooperating to develop a joint maritimesecurity strategy and to counter threats to securityat sea. These efforts followed the UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions 2018 and 2039, which urgedthe West and Central African countries to counterarmed attacks at sea, advocating a common code ofconduct on the issue.

This cooperation on the situation at sea has yetto yield concrete results. Nigeria remains the mostactive state in the struggle against maritime insecu-rity. As part of both ECOWAS and the GGC, andbordering ECCAS states, Nigeria is playing apivotal role in transregional cooperation in theGulf of Guinea and increasingly in the Sahelianband.

Strategies in Perspective

THE FAILED STRATEGY OF PREVENTION

“Active” or “operational” prevention (to employECOWAS’s vocabulary), is supposed to prevent astate falling into crisis, but it has never workedeffectively in the Gulf of Guinea. In most of itscountries, with the approach of a crisis, the signalshave always been too weak or confused to justifythe kind of national or international action thatcould prevent it. Few experts saw the Ivoirian orMalian crises coming, and among those who did,even fewer dared to sound the alarm for fear ofigniting the fire.

Technical military assistance is among the best

managed of aid programs in the region, but it hasgenerally been unsuccessful and has often destabi-lized countries when it didn’t form part of acoherent strategy for security sector reform. Aboveall, it has produced unduly powerful militaries,which have carried out many coups d’état incountries with weak civilian governance. The tenECOWAS countries that border the Gulf of Guineahave experienced twenty-four coups sinceindependence.14 Four of these occurred in the1960s, six in the 1970s, six in the 1980s, four in the1990s, and four since the year 2000.

Poorly paid and without properly maintainedequipment, designed according to a Westernmodel that is not adapted to the actual securityproblems they confront, African armies have rarelysucceeded in controlling internal conflicts. Themost significant army in the region today showsitself powerless in the case of the Niger Delta. Morefrequently, these armies become weakened andthen ineffective, their units drifting away toreinforce armed groups challenging the centralpower (as in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and theNiger Delta), or alternatively, their best units turninto separatist groups, as in the Côte d’Ivoire.

In the final years of the 20th century, the UnitedKingdom, the United States, and France launchedloosely coordinated programs to strengthenAfrican peacekeeping capabilities, mainly focusedon ECOWAS.15 The objective behind these schemeswas that the Western powers should no longerintervene in African conflicts, instead providingtraining, equipment, and financing of Africanforces. If they have not had the effect that wasimmediately hoped for, they have helped Africanforces adapt to their mission of stabilizing thesubregion and contributed to cooperation amongits members.A SUCCESSFUL, IF LIMITED, CRISISMANAGEMENT STRATEGY

In the past decade there have been many efforts tobring peace to the Gulf of Guinea: the UN, throughits peacekeeping operations and its own agencies;ECOWAS through ECOMOG; the EuropeanUnion and Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) throughfinancial aid and a large number of small missionsinvolving police, support to elections, andreconstruction of the security sector; practicallyevery Western state, including the United States,the United Kingdom, and France; and a wholerange of NGOs—African and non-African,religious and secular.

In Sierra Leone, for example, although the UNmission UNAMSIL encountered major difficulties,it did finally manage to put an end to fighting anddisarm the combatants. These episodes reflectedimportant progress toward making peaceoperations more robust and improving commandeffectiveness. That said, success has always been afragile thing. If some crises ultimately gave way to alasting stability, like those in Liberia and SierraLeone, other conflicts have demonstrated anenduring nature, such as the one in Guinea.

Among the arsenal of tools employed, whethertraditional or freshly minted for the occasion (suchas individual sanctions, embargoes, arrest ofleaders, teams to provide support to governments,etc.), the most typical is the DDR process. Thedisarmament of combatants has usually succeeded,but it is estimated that only 10 percent of weaponshave been removed from circulation as a result.Demobilization of combatants has been largelyeffective in the short term, but it has become clearthat these combatants remain in contact for longperiods of time through the networks of theirformer armed groups. And there is virtually no caseof the successful permanent reintegration of signif-icant numbers of combatants, because of theabsence of the stability that rapid economicdevelopment would provide.A MIXED PICTURE FOR MARITIMESECURITY

Insecurity on land claimed millions of lives in Westand Central Africa during the last decade, whenonly a few deaths each year resulted from insecurityat sea in the Gulf of Guinea. But these mostly non-African victims (often Westerners) put the interna-tional maritime trade at risk—particularly the flowof oil and gas to the US and China. Piracy then

became a global problem capturing internationalattention. The Struggle Against Maritime andRiverine Threats

There are two main elements in the efforts aimed atcountering maritime insecurity in the Gulf ofGuinea: on the one hand, the security of ports andanchorages and, on the other, the protection ofoffshore oil installations and the maritime trafficthat supports them—especially in the Niger Delta.(A third aspect, unduly neglected at the momentbecause less likely to provoke a crisis, concernsfishing zones, which deserve more attention thanthe countries of the Gulf of Guinea currentlydevote to them.)

The security of ports and anchorages in the Gulfof Guinea has been the target of a number ofmeasures taken after the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, as part of the globalInternational Ship and Port Security Initiative.16

The major ports of the Gulf claim to have put thesemeasures in place, but most of them have notbrought their legislation up to date.17

Some of the most serious acts of violence in thiscontext are committed against installations andpersonnel of oil companies in the Niger Delta.Measures taken by these companies and by thegovernments of the Delta states have led to a greatreduction in these attacks. Those few attacks thatare successful are difficult to avoid, given theprotection that the Delta’s creeks afford to thefighters and the political protection they enjoyfrom certain locals in positions of authority.

In the Niger Delta in particular, maritimeinsecurity is essentially a continuation ofwidespread insecurity on land, and it has resistedthe military response undertaken by the Nigeriangovernment in the context of its Operation RestoreHope. In practice, the associated Nigerian militaryunits are made up of soldiers who often findthemselves disoriented in this amphibious contextand who are ill equipped for conventional combat,on land or water, with assets that are particularlyunsuited to asymmetric riverine warfare.

Since 2006, the Nigerian federal authority had

8 Patrice Sartre

16 See the International Ship and Port Security Code, adopted on December 12, 2002, as part of Resolution No. 2 of the Conference of States Parties to the 1974SOLAS Convention.

17 See particularly Alf Brodin, “Shipping and the Port Sector in Sub-Sahara Africa,” Swedish Maritime Administration, January 2010.

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 9

18 Elected vice-president in 2007, Goodluck Jonathan served as acting president in 2010 and was then elected president in 2011.19 Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Chad, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Togo.20 Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.21 Observers from Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States were also present, as well as from the

European Union, the IMO, the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa, Africom, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.22 Article 2.4.a. of the Yaoundé Declaration, 2013.

been convinced of the need to find a politicalsolution to the problems in the Niger Delta andpromoted the election of an Ijaw (one ethnic groupof the Delta) as vice-president of the federation,and then as president.18 It attempted a policy ofamnesty, as well as an increase of the oil resources“diverted” to the Delta states. Together with themost recent results of the military operation,rebranded as Pulo Shield in 2012, this new policyappears to be delivering better outcomes, althoughthis remains to be confirmed.Nascent Multilateral Cooperation: Afterthe Yaoundé Summit

Everywhere along the Gulf of Guinea, insecurity atsea has roots in poverty, development inequalities,and insecurity of food and livelihoods on land. Andeverywhere it requires solutions based on bettergovernance and improved development. However,this did not seem to be the approach favored byGulf of Guinea states at the Yaoundé summit onMaritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guineain 2013, which placed emphasis on prevention, andeven repression, at sea.

Heads of state and government of ECOWAS,ECCAS, and the GGC gathered on June 24 and 25,2013, in Yaoundé, Cameroon, to adopt strategicdocuments in response to illicit and illegal activitiesin the Gulf of Guinea. The presidents of thirteencountries19 and eleven vice-presidents or ministersfrom other countries in the region20 attended themeeting, as well as representatives from ECOWAS,ECCAS, the GGC, and the UN.21

The African Union’s commissioner foreconomic affairs stressed the complexity andinterconnectivity of maritime safety and securityissues—a situation that requires the design of“smart comprehensive and integrated strategies,like the 2050 AIM Strategy.” The representativefrom the International Maritime Organization alsopraised the AU’s 2050 AIM Strategy, appealing toAfrican states to translate it into reality as Africa’sdevelopment depends on the promotion of itsmaritime industry and “blue” economic growth. Itwas pointed out that the development of the

African maritime domain is now considered as ahigh priority on Africa’s agenda, especially withinthe framework of the 2050 AIM Strategy.

The summit decided on the creation of an inter-regional coordination center on maritime safetyand security for Central and West Africa,headquartered in Yaoundé, and the adoption of acode of conduct on the prevention and repressionof acts of piracy, armed robbery against vessels, andillicit activities in the West and Central Africanmaritime domain. It pressed each regional organi-zation and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to“elaborate and adopt a regional strategy in line withthe 2050 AIM Strategy.”22

As a follow-up to this summit, states andorganizations in the subregion and beyondlaunched several specific actions. A draft version ofthe ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy(EIMS) is due to be agreed by the heads of state in2014. ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the GGC areworking to set up an inter-regional working groupto implement the summit outcomes and determinethe role and structure of a regional coordinationcenter on maritime safety and security in Douala,Cameroon. Benin, Togo, and Nigeria have signed a“Zone E” Patrol Agreement under the EIMS. TheAfrican Union adopted its African IntegratedMaritime Security Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) inJanuary 2014. Individual countries in the Gulf havealso begun to increase resources and developstrategies in partnership to address organizedcrime both offshore and on land, such as the jointpatrols (Operation Prosperity) by Nigeria andBenin.

At the international level, the IMO isconducting table-top exercises aimed at promotingthe development of national maritime securitycommittees pursuant to the Yaoundé Code ofConduct. EU member states and many otheractors, including the USA, have increased theirsupport by implementing or reinforcing bilateraland regional programs. Their support is alreadysubstantial, notably with regard to capacitybuilding of key institutions and services.

10 Patrice Sartre

Conclusion

It will take time for lasting stability in the Gulf ofGuinea to come about, and then only if we cancount on African solutions.

The priority should be the establishment of asubregional security sector that is effective andeconomical, free from distinctions betweeninternal and external forces, clear of obstacleserected by regional boundaries, especially along thecoast. Each national security system should beorganized to cooperate with its counterparts inneighboring countries and with the justice systemof its own country. Its most important mission willbe the pursuit of the disarmament and demobiliza-tion of combatants, and preventing the establish-ment of criminal networks, particularly thoselinked to the movement of arms and armed groupsalong the coast and in the Sahel.

The national and subregional security sectorsshould also bear significant responsibility forsupporting the preparation and conduct of legiti-mate electoral processes, and the implementationof their results. This is a precondition for avoidinga relapse into disorder. After all, it is partly throughthis legitimacy that the state can maintain controlof the security sector, alongside an active executivethat is balanced by an independent judiciary withlegal powers to oversee the security forces (on landand at sea), and a legislature that acts as a guardianof minority rights.

Finally, lasting stability in the Gulf of Guinea alsodepends on robust economic and social develop-ment, as much to finance the security forces as toallow an equitable distribution of wealth in societythat can address legitimate grievances. In a regionoverflowing with a wealth of natural resources—from agriculture to oil—it is not acceptable to basethis development on international aid, which hasmade funds available for misappropriation bycriminals and from which many communities haveseen no benefit. On the other hand, the “bottomup” construction of a society capable of creatingvalue and enabling socioeconomic mobility willlimit criminal activity and constitutes the beststrategy for the prevention of crises. This is partic-ularly true in terms of discouraging youth frombasing their future on crime, whether on land or atsea.

Recommendations

There have been many studies of threats to thesecurity of West and Central Africa, and to the Gulfof Guinea in particular, and many proposals fortackling them. The best of these ideas have beentaken up by ECOWAS in its conflict preventionand resolution mechanisms, and some have alsobeen taken up by ECCAS. More recently, theAfrican Union initiated cooperation with ECCASand the GGC.

Consequently, the recommendations made hereare limited to those that are essential to avoidworst-case scenarios, prevent the situation fromdeteriorating further, and facilitate the provision ofwidespread and lasting security. They have beenarranged in three loose categories: (1) suggestionsfor bolstering the foundations of security in theGulf of Guinea, (2) recommendations for strength-ening legal and judicial checks and balances for thesecurity sector, and (3) steps for enhancingtransnational cooperation to ensure securitythroughout the subregion.FOUNDATIONS FOR SECURITY

1. Favor African solutionsStopping conflicts as soon as they start is a duty ofthe whole of the international community. But itshould not result in destabilizing interference.Creating conditions of lasting human security is along-term task that can only find its origin in thesubregion itself, supported by the rest of thecontinent where possible. As such, all relevantactors should consider the following recommenda-tions: • Look for African solutions in the areas of security

strategy, legal frameworks, and security policy,rather than trying to apply solutions from theWest. Take African traditions in the use of forceinto account, especially regarding the drafting ofcombatants and conflict management.

• Pursue the construction of integrated WestAfrican and Central African security sectorsthrough a system of political and economiccooperation that reconciles supranationality,mutual assistance, and non-interference.

• Pursue the creation or reinforcement of ad hocstructures across subregions in the Gulf ofGuinea and Sahel, enabling seamless cooperation

on security issues.• Pursue the search for a balancing of relations

between the subregions and Western and Asianpowers, reconciling solidarity, non-interference,and cooperation.

2. Reform and integrate national security sectorsThose working on security sector reform shouldkeep in mind that the distinction between defenseand security does not apply to the Gulf of Guinea(if it applies anywhere), and this is one reason whythe security sector is too costly and badly adaptedto its context. National security sectors thatintegrate defense and security activities on land andat sea are most likely to succeed. • Each country should adopt an integrated security

system, some units of which may have a militarystatus (particularly those with interventionmissions), and which would be organized intofour component parts:º A frontier control component directly coordi-

nated with that of neighboring countries andincluding efficient coast and riverine guards.

º An intelligence component covering the entirenational territory. This should be trustworthy,organized to provide information to theexecutive and to assist the judiciary, andconceived for the fair exchange of informationwith neighboring countries, either directly orthrough ECOWAS and ECCAS.

º A component responsible for maintaining thestate’s monopoly on the use of force. Thisshould be a robust but economical force,deployed across the entire territory (includingterritorial waters), respectful of human rights,under the control of the state, but also capableof acting on demand as an agent of the justicesystem—to provide it with information or toexecute judgments.

º A rapid and precise intervention capability thatcan act domestically and abroad (with theappropriate authorization), with provisions foraccountability to parliament.

• Security sector reform actors23 should keep inmind the need to limit the freedom of thesecurity sector to regulate itself. They shouldwork to define the status of the military,describing rights and duties corresponding to thereal needs of the country.These recommendations are not limited only to

ground forces. Air power should also contribute tothe control of frontiers, to intelligence (throughaerial surveillance), and to an interventioncapability (through helicopters). Sea power shouldalso contribute to the security of territorial waters,the Exclusive Economic Zone, and offshore islands.Given their cost, the use of both sea and air powerwill require a significant effort to share resources atthe subregional level or higher (see below). 3. Foster a culture of respect for citizens andstateAs is well understood among multilateral organiza-tions in West Africa, the importance of trainingsecurity sector personnel in human rights and inthe proportionate use of force cannot beunderstated. The following suggestions could helpto foster respect for the state among personnel andhelp them to earn the confidence of citizens. • State reconstruction actors24 should grant

security sector personnel a legal, financial, andsocial status that incentivizes their service of thestate and of their fellow citizens. This shouldinclude clear opportunities for career advance-ment and reasonable expectations of job security.Such a status should in turn be conditional onstrict respect for citizens and the state.

• States in the region should make a habit oforganizing public events that bring togethersecurity forces, state officials, local politicians,civil society groups, and local people to improvetheir confidence in each other.

• Gulf of Guinea states should also facilitate mediaaccess to security organizations, installations,and vessels to foster accountability as well astrust.

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 11

23 Security sector reform actors may refer to the political, military, and police staff of the country in question as well as those working in UN agencies, the AfricanUnion, subregional organizations, specialized NGOs and think tanks, the European Union, and bilateral aid agencies.

24 State reconstruction actors may refer to the political staff, judges, and elite of the country under reconstruction, as well as those working in UN agencies, theAfrican Union, subregional organizations, specialized NGOs and think tanks, the European Union, and bilateral aid agencies.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ANDBALANCES

1. Strengthen legal safeguards within the securitysystem The security sector and its personnel should beobliged to obey the law. Unfortunately, in the Gulfof Guinea, this is not always the case. This is partlythe failure of individual leadership and partly afailure of the system. In light of the nature of thethreats they face, the security systems of the Gulfcountries should prioritize bringing malefactorsbefore national or, if necessary, international courts. • Security sector reform actors should seek to

ensure that the leadership and officersthroughout the security system receive a solidgrounding in law, especially in the responsibili-ties of the commanders and navy captains incriminal procedure, on land and at sea.

• Each component of the security sector should beorganized to provide information to the justicesector, to hand over malefactors to it, and tobring before the courts solid evidence of offencescommitted.

• The judicial system should deploy officersqualified to manage criminal procedure in everycomponent of the security sector, on land and atsea. This goal should be supported by all thoseworking to support the reconstruction of thestate.

• When a country sends elements of its securitysector to intervene elsewhere in the subregion, aspart of an international land or sea mission, theyshould be accompanied by officers who areaccredited by the justice system of the hostcountry, by the subregion, or if necessary by theAU.

2. Enhance legislative oversightIn general, the legislature’s oversight of theexecutive aims to guarantee fairness in the applica-tion of the law for every citizen. This is especiallyrelevant to the security sector. With this in mind,Gulf of Guinea states and state reconstructionactors should consider the following recommenda-tions: • Submit security and defense budgets to parlia-

mentary scrutiny, both when they areformulated, and also at the reporting stage.

• Give parliamentary committees the means to

collect information relating to security, especiallyon the ground, and without placing unjustifiedobstacles of secrecy in their way.

• Establish intercommittee activities, bringingtogether the parliamentary committees respon-sible for security and the budget, respectively.

• Organize parliamentary scrutiny of the securitysector with a view to protecting minorities,especially by ensuring that different parts of theopposition are able to participate.

• Grant the ECOWAS and ECCAS parliamentsoversight of subregional security questions. Thisoversight should be mandatory, even if theparliament’s views are not binding.

• Ensure that the provisions of the Arms TradeTreaty are included in national laws and in thelaws of ECOWAS and ECCAS.

3. Ensure Judicial OversightJudicial oversight of the security sector is similarlyessential. The personnel of the security sectorshould not be able to benefit from their capacity touse force, nor from their role as auxiliaries tojustice, to violate the rights of citizens or to defy thestate. As such, states in the Gulf of Guinea and statereconstruction actors should consider thefollowing recommendations: • Ensure that national criminal codes contain

provisions, which can be enforced by the civillegal system, to specifically investigate andpunish major crimes committed by securitysector personnel in the course of their duties, orwhen they make use of statutory powers andimmunities.

• When such major crimes occur, ensure thatinvestigators have specialized knowledge toinquire into infractions committed by membersof the security sector and to present their conclu-sions to the prosecuting authority.

• Ensure the unqualified adherence to interna-tional norms and standards for the behavior ofthe security forces and for the investigation andpunishment of alleged violations of these norms.

• Ensure that states’ domestic criminal law reflectsthese norms, to allow for trials in national courtsof individuals who have committed crimesdefined by the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court.

12 Patrice Sartre

• Ensure that maritime security divisions are ableto collect, protect, and provide evidence of piracyand other crimes at sea, sufficient to bring thecase to criminal courts.

TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION

1. Strengthen the subregional security systemSubregional organizations in the Gulf of Guinea arewell aware that their member states lack sufficientcapacity to ensure their security alone and that it isthe security of the subregion as a whole that needsto be guaranteed. ECOWAS is leading the world inthe conception and implementation of a regionalsecurity apparatus. And ECOMOG, now a StandbyBrigade, demonstrates West Africa’s early recogni-tion of the need to have collective security assetsthat can be employed temporarily in the service ofa country in difficulty. Yet subregional securityinitiatives still bear too many imprints fromWestern models, which is leading to a system thatis likely to be technically ill-adapted and unneces-sarily expensive. Against this backdrop, thefollowing recommendations suggest ways tobolster cooperation efficiently and effectively forgreater security in the region as a whole.• While each national security sector should retain

its own identity, states in the Gulf of Guineashould make their individual security sectorsinteroperable with those of other countries in thesubregion, especially neighboring countries.

• ECOWAS should continue with the conceptionand implementation of security sector reformthat it has already begun, and ECCAS shouldextend this kind of reform to its organization.

• ECOWAS and ECCAS should take steps to set upa system to coordinate regional security, withexchanges of personnel and mutual assistancebetween security systems.

• ECOWAS and ECCAS should also develop theircooperation with international security organiza-tions, especially the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, the AU Peace andSecurity Council, the UN Office on Drugs andCrime, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.

• To save costs and ensure effectiveness, ECOWASand ECCAS should develop systems for jointprocurement, maintenance, operationalplanning, and deployment of the following typesof equipment:

º armed helicopters, tactical transport helicop-ters, and units able to operate them, accordingto a common policy defined by the subregionalorganizations;

º aerial surveillance platforms (both drones andmanned aircraft) and their operators,including maritime surveillance assets,according to a common policy defined by thesubregional organizations and/or GGC.

2. Pursue disarmament and prevent trans -national organized crimeIn the Gulf of Guinea, as elsewhere at the end of acrisis, disarmament has only partly taken place,demobilization has been superficial, and the reinte-gration of combatants is taking place only as theythemselves get older. This situation presents therisk of a relapse into conflict. It can also lead to theconversion of networks of armed actors that arosein times of crisis into organized crime networks. Itis these criminal networks that are likely to be thedriving force behind significant deteriorations inthe security situation, and the security sectors ofthe states of the Gulf need to work together toprevent these networks from further expandingand cooperating with each other.• In application of the ECOWAS Convention on

the Proliferation of Light Weapons, DDR actorsshould track down the arms that are still incirculation, seize them or buy them back, anddestroy them publicly.

• As part of subregional cooperation, DDR actorsand African states should track down networkswhich have managed to survive demobilizationclandestinely, break them up, and prevent themturning to criminality or returning to armedstruggle.

• At the international level, and with the involve-ment of UNODC and the GGC, African statesshould monitor and prevent the movement ofarms and fighters along the Gulf coast—drugsmuggling and illegal immigration from south tonorth and arms smuggling from north to south.

3. Cooperate at sea as well as on landIn general, there are three types of maritimethreats. All require expensive efforts to counterthem, though these are different in each case.• With the help of the International Maritime

Organization and the Maritime Organisation for

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 13

West and Central Africa, states in the Gulf ofGuinea should make efforts to translate theprovisions of the International Ship and PortSecurity Code into national laws and apply themin a manner free from corruption in the portsand waters off the Gulf.

• Gulf of Guinea states should implement theYaoundé code of conduct in the regulation,planning process, and doctrine of the maritimeunits of all the countries bordering the Gulf.

• In line with the Yaoundé code of conduct,ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the GGC shouldconsider developing air and maritime patrolassets to protect the Exclusive Economic Zonesof member countries.

• Gulf of Guinea states, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and/orthe GGC should consider establishing specificriverine combat units, with the intention of usingthem for national and multinational operations.

14 Patrice Sartre

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