restricted witness statement · 2019-02-12 · restricted statement of: real, debbie form mg11(t)...

RESTRICTEDStatement of: REAL, DEBBIE Form MG11(T)

of 7

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: REAL, DEBBIE

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: CONTROL STAFF

This statement (consisting of page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and beliefand I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfullystated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: Date: 23/10/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded El (supply witness details on rear)

This statement relates to the night of the Grenfell Tower Fire on Tuesday 13th June and Wednesday 14th

June 2017.

I will use terminology throughout this statement that relates to my role within the Fire Service I will

explain the terminology I will be using when I make reference to it in my statement.

I currently perform the role of an Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) within the London Fire Brigade

Control Room. The AOM has to support the Operations Manager (OM) with the running of the control

room and also support the Control Room Officer's (CRO's) with their call taking. The AOM's also liaise

with the Senior Officers by paging or talking them during incidents. The AOM's duties also includes

mobilising appliances and maintain fire cover for the area of London. The AOM has other admin duties

such as dealing with staff leave, sickness, and answering emails.

An 'appliance' is a general term for a fire engine. This includes a pump ladder, pump, fire rescue unit and

aerial appliance. A pump ladder is an appliance with a 135 ladder. A pump has a nine metre ladder. A

Fire Rescue Unit has cutting equipment, as well as other equipment. There are three types of aerial

appliance. The fire fighters are also known as a 'crew' and they travel in the appliances. Within each

'crew' there will be a crew manager or watch manager travelling in the lead appliance.

Signature:2017

Signature witnessed by:

RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0001


of 7I will now describe the make-up of a shift or watch as they are referred to. Each watch requires a

minimum of eleven officers, there are three supervisors and they consist of one Operation Manager (OM)

who is in charge of the control room, and two Assistant Operations Managers (AOM). There are also

eight Control Room Officers (CRO) whose primary role is to deal with 999 emergency calls that come

into a control room. The AOM's sometimes assist with the 999 calls if the control room is busy. An AOM

can also act up and perform the role of the OM when sickness/annual leave is taken and I have performed

the role of an OM on more than one occasion.

I joined the London Fire Brigade in 1991 in fire safety as a temporary admin officer. In 1992 I applied for

the permanent role and was successful. In 1998 I was posted to the role of Control Room Officer based in

Lambeth, then I moved to Docklands and eventually moved to Merton in 2012.

I will now explain my role within the control room. My desk is situated towards the back of the room

with the other Supervisors, and my main role is to look after the CRO' s who deal with the 999 emergency

calls. On occasions the CRO's hold their hand up to ask for advice. As an AOM I would walk over and

speak to them, or the CRO may approach the Supervisors desk for advice.

Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) call is a 999 emergency call and the caller has informed the CRO that they

are unable to leave or escape the property due to smoke or fire. The CRO then accesses the ̀ RIF'

Reference Information File on the system. This brings up a list of questions the CRO can ask the caller

and also provide them with survival advice such as opening widows, placing towels by the doors,

dangling items out of the window and moving to a room furthest away from the fire as possible. A CRO

will also try and stay on the line as long as possible to reassure the person calling. If the control room is

busy the CRO will provide survival advice and terminate the call. This information is then passed onto

the crews attending the scene that an FSG call has been conducted. FSG calls are not frequent. When I

take an FSG call I would exchange names with the caller, which is something that I personally choose to

do.

1 am part of a Watch and currently attached to 2 watch. We work shifts. Day one is a twelve (12) hour

shift Sam-8pm, day two is a split shift, where the team covers from 8am-4pm or 2pm-lOpm. Day three is

the night shift, working 8pm-8am. This is then followed by three days off.

When I joined the London Fire Brigade as a CRO, there was an eight week training course at Lambeth.

Based on my previous roles, I had an understanding of the London Fire Brigade. We learnt about the

Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0002


of 7officers, rank structure, organisational structure and the process of how to deal with 999 emergency calls.

When we were posted on watches we were shadowed by another more experienced member of the watch

for approximately twelve shifts and was assisted where necessary. The system that we now use is called

'VISION'. It is about 2 years old and I have received training in using the system. We received very little

refresher training. There are occasional glitches when the system 'VISION' doesn't recognise the address

given by the caller. This makes it difficult for the CRO's to allocate resources to the incident. In situations

like this the caller will be asked to provide more information about the address. The previous system (pro-

cad) was street based and used to link the address to a main road or the junction of a main road. The local

authorities enter their addresses onto their system which we then use, but this can make it difficult for

CRO' s when searching for an address.

In 2005/2006 I was promoted from a CRO to an Assistant Operations Manager (AOM). The promotion

process involved a one day assessment at Stratford. I had to give a presentation to a panel of senior

officers and they in turn asked me questions about my presentation. I was asked to watch a video and

identify any errors from the video (scenario based). This was followed by an interview with the panel and

you were then told whether you had been successful.

I have acted up in the role of Operation Manager on several occasions. On a Watch the OM is the person

who is in charge of the control room. During daytime working hours at Merton our Principal Operations

Manager (POM) Scott Hayward and two Senior Operations Managers (SOM) Joanne Smith / Adam

Crinion are on duty. There is always one senior manager on call outside of office hours and they cover a

24 hour period.

There are occasions when callers are unable to get out of a building due to fire or smoke. When this

happens, Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) is given to the caller. The standard guidance given to callers who

are inside a high rise building is to 'stay put' if they are not affected by the fire. This would be followed

by advice to block any smoke coming into a flat, close windows and other advice. A change in the

guidance can only be made by a Senior Manager in the control room or by a senior officer at the scene.

This decision is not made by an OM or AOM in the control room. When a 999 emergency call is received

a CRO will obtain information and assign appliances to an incident. If more than 12 pumps are assigned

to a particular incident the on- call Senior Manager is paged by the Control Room and informed of the

Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0003


of 7incident. They will make their way to the control room centre. On the 14th June 2017 the Control was

based at Stratford and our Senior Operations Manager Joanne Smith was on call. Our other SOM Adam

Crinion was shadowing Joanne Smith, and he also came into Control.

The control room in Merton has two large TV screens on the wall and one smaller TV in the middle of the

supervisor's desk. The 24 hour news channels are normally on during a shift. CRO's can see the TV

while they sit at their desks at Merton. Mobile phones are allowed in the control room but constant use of

you mobile phone is not allowed. The fall back control room at Stratford is normally only used a few

times a year when Merton is being refurbished or there are maintenance works. The layout at Stratford is

similar to the control at Merton but smaller. I find it easier to communicate with the CRO's and the rest of

the watch, and I can listen to the calls that the CRO' s receive and it is a better working environment in my

opinion.

I will now tell you about events that took place on Tuesday 13th June and Wednesday 14th June 2017.

Watch 2 was on a night shift starting at 8pm, and we were based at our fall back Control Room at

Stratford.

On a watch the CRO' s are given different roles which includes answering emergency calls, admin calls

and monitoring the radios. At Stratford Control there is a TV in the room behind the supervisor's desk but

I'm not sure if it was working that night. The OM on duty that night was Alexandra Norman and the

AOM's were myself and Peter May.

The first call in reference to Grenfell Tower came in at 00:55 hours and was received by CRO Pam Jones.

The caller said that there was a fire on the 4th floor of Grenfell Tower. The incident was recorded on the

system. Every incident has an Incident Type Code (ITC) which creates a Pre-Determined Attendance for

Appliances and resources. In this instance the information received was that there was a fire on the 4th

floor so 'Al' Incident Type Code was used with three pump appliances mobilised. I saw the call on my

screen but thought nothing of it, and is the sort of call we receive regularly.

I took a phone call at 00:59 hours from a member of public who was stood outside Grenfell Tower

informing me of a fire. I told the caller that the brigade had been mobilised and would be on scene very

shortly, or used similar words to this. Each emergency call that is received is logged onto the system and

is given an incident number. The first call is known as the parent call and if repeat calls come in from the

same address they are all linked to that parent call, but each call is given its own incident number.

Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0004


of 7I was aware that the other AOM Peter May had decided to google the address on his computer and

became aware that Grenfell Tower was a high rise building 6+ floors. A new ITC code 'AMR' was

inputted by Peter May and mobilised the balance of attendance. I completed a Pre-Determined

Attendance (PDA) query form. These are used when the addresses incorrect, not on the VISION system,

or the attendances are not correct. I sent this query form to our PDA department who receive the form and

amend the address if necessary. The PDA department only works office hours during the daytime. I have

printed this PDA query form that was sent, exhibiting it as DR/2.

Once the first crews arrive to a scene, the officer in charge will take charge of the incident.

At 01:13 hours the incident was upgraded to a 6 pump fire. An action plan was generated on the VISION

system which included informing Police, London Ambulance Service, the water board and notifying

Senior Managers. Shortly after, it was made up to an 8 pump fire, then 10, 15, 20, 25, 40 pumps. This was

all within 30-45 minutes. I made the decision to deal with all the make ups, carrying out mobilising and

action plans. At some point I remember speaking to Joanne Smith who told me she was on her way in to

the Control Room. She asked me how many FSG calls we were receiving.

By this time it was extremely busy but calm in the Control Room. I checked on some of the CRO's who

were dealing with calls, ensuring they were Ok.

I was aware of the large number of FSG calls that were being taken by the CRO' s and at one point the

OM Alexandra Norman took 2 to 3 calls and I could hear her talking as she was sat close to me. I was

also aware that CRO Pam Jones was taking an FSG call and had spent a long time talking to the caller, so

I went over to her and asked if she was Ok herself.

During the morning I also answered the critical phone from other fire services and BT. They were passing

me details of FSG calls that they were taking. I took the details of the calls and passed the information

onto the Officer of the Day. I also answered the ES5 radio channel where the police helicopter was

passing information on to us.

At some point in the morning possibly between Sam and 6am the calls stopped and the control room was

very quiet. This was after being very busy for 2-3 hours dealing with call after call. A significant number

of the calls in that period were FSG calls.

Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0005


of 7At some point in the morning the decision was made to change the 'stay put' advice that we were giving

to callers. It changed to telling callers to escape. I believe this decision to 'escape' was made by SOM

Joanne Smith along with the duty DAC Adrian Fenton and the OIC on the incident ground. Joanne

informed Alexandra Norman of this decision first and she in turn informed both myself and Peter May. I

then made sure that all the CRO' s were made aware of this decision. The callers were told to 'get out' of

the tower, by holding hands, assist one another and to make a run for it. My feeling about this decision

was that it should have been made sooner.

I have had previous experiences of fires in high rise buildings such as the Lakanal fire in 2009. On the

day of Lakanal I was an AOM and went over to a CRO who was taking an FSG call, which I listened to

as the AOM. The caller sadly passed away whilst on the phone.

The first time I saw a picture of Grenfell tower was sometime later in the morning when I was shown a

picture on a mobile phone. I think it was a photo on Twitter.

I remember taking a call from a lady that lived in flat 82. She told me her name was Natasha and she was

in her flat with her partner and 6 year old daughter. I told her that they needed to hold hands, put towels

over their heads and get out.

It was a very traumatic shift. At around 6.30am I was told to go for a break. I went out of the control

room and spoke to my husband on the phone. I broke down while I was talking to him.

The support provided to me by the LFB since that night shift has been brilliant. I was aware that a

counsellor had been called in and the watch were encouraged by Joanne Smith to speak to them before

leaving the building. I was on a period of leave after the 14th and I received a number of calls and text

messages from the watch offering their support.

A number of weeks after Grenfell tower there was a de-brief meeting, from events that took place on

Wednesday 14th June 2017 between senior officers and the control room managers.

After the incident I made a record of the actions that I took during the course of my shift on Wednesday

14th June 2017 and now exhibit this as 'Timeline for Grenfell Tower INC 076029 14/06/17' as my

exhibit DR/1

Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

MET00007696_0006


Signature:2017


RESTRICTED

of 7

MET00007696_0007

restricted witness statement · 2019-02-12 · restricted statement of: real, debbie form mg11(t)...

Documents