results
DESCRIPTION
Results. Preference Parameter Estimates. Comparison to Pew Estimate. Implications for Emissions. Emissions Damage Estimates. Implications for Welfare. Implications for Welfare. Distributional Implications of ACESA Under Perfect Targeting. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Results
![Page 2: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Preference Parameter Estimates
![Page 3: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Comparison to Pew Estimate
![Page 4: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Implications for Emissions
![Page 5: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Emissions Damage Estimates
![Page 6: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Implications for Welfare
![Page 7: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Implications for Welfare
![Page 8: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Distributional Implications of ACESA Under Perfect Targeting
![Page 9: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Distributional Implications of ACESA Under Equal Targeting
![Page 10: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Efficiency Implications of Federal Policy Under Alternative Allocation
Rules
Change in Scientific Welfare under ACESA: $14.7; Under PT: $12.5
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Would ACESA Have Passed the US Senate?
• No, it would have secured 50 votes, but needed 60 for passage.
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Conclusions
• Average implied external damages per legislative district are $0.07 per ton CO2e.
• From the perspective of implied external costs, state policy (with offsets and trading) is less distortionary (welfare loss of $1.9 billion) than federal policy (welfare loss of $47.1 billion), although both lower welfare.
• Welfare for climate believers is unchanged under federal policy and declines under state policy strategically, climate believers should prefer federal action to address climate change.
• State policy that does not permit offsets or trading is likely to results in considerably
![Page 13: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Conclusions
• While implied preferences determine the policies that emerge in the model, in terms of the scientific external costs of climate change, both policies improve welfare, with federal policy leading to a welfare gain of $14.7 billion and state policy to a welfare gain of $4.4 billion.
• Imperfect targeting is critical for securing the passage of federal climate policy.
• IT allows for fence-sitting legislators to be brought on board, and since they are correlated to no voters, ensures that no voters receive a majority of permits and softens their welfare loss.
• Rules that equally allocate permits or carbon tax revenue are not likely to achieve electoral success.
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Conclusions
• Perfect targeting would lead to an optimal policy that achieves a far more stringent cap.
• This would be more considerably distortionary from the perspective of implied external costs, causing an implied welfare loss of $88.9 billion.
• This would even cause a small decline in the scientific welfare gains from $14.7 billion under imperfect targeting to $12.5 billion under the optimal cap with perfect targeting.
• This highlights the critical importance of accounting for how implied preferences determine policy choices, and how those critically impact the scientific welfare estimates of those policies.
![Page 15: Results](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062809/5681575c550346895dc505a3/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Thanks!