rethinking european security – irregular migration through the prism of national security (pop)

RETHINKING EUROPEAN SECURITY – IRREGULAR

MIGRATION THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL

SECURITY1

Matija Černe

Officer Candidates School, Slovenian Armed Forces

BSc Political Science, currently employed in the Slovenian Armed forces as officer candidate

AbstractIrregular immigration in the European Union is increasingly becoming a hot topic in political

debates all around the continent. Concerns over its impact on national security, however,

tend to be influenced mainly by cultural stereotypes and politically construed arguments, than

by empirical evidence. This article looks at contemporary developments in national security

studies, particularly at analyses on the securitizing of immigration and the emergence of new

concepts of soft security. Parallel to this trend, policy shifts and new approaches at tackling

irregular immigration are observed in the EU’s common policy strategies. They acknowledge

the need for a comprehensive approach that must address the root causes of immigration and

tacitly distance themselves from the securitization logic. Country-specific data and

challenges, posed by irregular migration, presented on the case of Slovenia, also confirm

these findings.

Keywords: immigration, irregular migration, national security, securitization, European

Union, Slovenia

1. Introduction

International migrations, particularly immigration to the European Union (EU), have been

extensively thematised, both through an “enemy at the gates” and a “lifeline for development”

1 Parts of this study were presented at the Central European Forum on Military Education Students Scientific Conference “Conflicts of the 21st Century - Central European Perspective” at the National Defence University in Warsaw, Poland in May 2015.

paradigms. It is no news that many a European country has long been jealously protecting its

borders and attentively controlling whom to concede its welfare means. Almost at the same

time, economists and sociologists alike, admittedly emphasised the need for young and fresh

forces to be allowed into national economies in order to provide the much-needed workforce

and to counter the worrying ageing rate of old European populations. The confrontation

between the two views has been obviously reproduced through national and common policies

on immigration, with the latter gaining momentum as human rights activist groups and

general social awareness increasingly raised their voices in view of recent refugee crises on

the doorsteps of Europe.

This article aims at showing just how this shift came about and what are the forces

operating behind the paradigm, which links irregular immigration with national security

concerns. It first starts with presenting the available data on irregular immigration to the EU.

Next, it summarizes the mechanisms and impacts of irregular immigration from the point of

view of receiving countries. Those are then analysed in national security terms with regard to

pertinent security theories and, towards the end, recent developments of EU’s policies on the

subject are presented. Finally, attention is given to the impact of irregular immigration, looked

at from a security perspective, on the case of Slovenia.

2. Telling numbers?

As a staple accompanying element of demographic change, international migrations are

substantially contributing to the (re)production and evolution of national politico-economic

environments. Besides providing for a constant influx of much-needed and inexpensive labour

force and countering the preoccupying trends in population ageing, unsolicited immigration

fosters various clusters of undesired phenomena as well.

A substantive portion of the migrating populace is in fact comprised of irregular

migrants. These are subjects who migrate to, and then stay and/or work in a country, without

the necessary permits or authorization. The scale or proportion of such irregular migrations is

particularly hard to comprehend for self-evident reasons. The data collected, therefore, rests

primarily on various security agencies’ reports and on the work of dedicated scientific and

humanitarian groups. The values produced this way can ultimately be only more or less rough

estimates, depending heavily on the efficacy and will power of border control and other

security institutions.2

In trying to summarize the reports and empirical data on the subject of immigration

to the EU, no univocal conclusion can be drawn. Data on legal immigrants residing in the EU

show hardly any change, while values concerning populations of asylum seekers, as well as

estimates on irregular immigrants diverge greatly (cf. Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2). At a more

in-depth look, however, the picture becomes even more complex.

Table 1: Numbers of non-EU nationals migrating to and residing in the EU3

[Insert Table 1 here]

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Figure 1: Detected numbers of irregular immigrants within the EU-274

Firstly, one of the biggest and already mentioned problems pertains to the sole act

of data collection, especially concerning the numbers of irregular immigrants. Although there

are various institutions dealing with and analysing the matter, they still rely largely on figures,

fed by individual national security bodies which carry out the work in situ. To illustrate this-

estimate numbers of irregular immigrants residing inside the EU spanned between 1,9 and

3,8 million and all the way up to 4,5 - 8 million, according to different sources.5 There have

been steps taken toward a uniform and regulated data collection system, however, which

would make data analysis and comparison easier and more transparent, chiefly through the

adoption of the Regulation (EC) 862/2007.6


2 Kovacheva, V. Security Challenges and the Composition of Irregular Resident Populations in Europe: Overestimating the Young Men? “Database On Irregular Migration”, Working Paper No.8/2010. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net.3 Data source: European Commission. Immigration in the EU Infographic. Accessed April 10, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/infographics/immigration/migration-in-eu-infographic_en.pdf.4 Data source: Eurostat. Database. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/ database.5 CLANDESTINO. CLANDESTINO Project Final Report. Athens, 23 November 2009, p. 105. Accessed April 3, 2015. http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/clandestino-final-report_-november-2009.pdf.6 Eurostat. Asylum statistics. Last modified 23 March, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.

Figure 2: Aggregate estimates of irregular resident populations7

Secondly, figures on asylum seeking immigrants and refugees have shown

considerable fluctuations in numbers in the past decades. The last rise in asylum applications

lodged was in 2014, when in Italy it reached an increment of 124% (!) compared to the year

before.8 Besides, recent events have shown that flows of asylum seekers and other irregular

immigrants, particularly those coming from North Africa, tend to be rather unstable and

adaptive to current shifts in the political-economic atmosphere. This means that in the case of

a worsening of the socio-economic situation in countries of transition and especially in the

immigrants’ home countries, the migration flow would increase. Conversely, immigration

fluxes tend to decrease when the situation in the country of destination deteriorates, be it in

economic terms or through the adoption of more strict border control policies. Examples of

such surges in immigration flows could be observed during the crises in Libya and Tunisia

and, more recently, from Kosovo, where economic instability and political speculation

boosted emigration to the West.9

3. Irregular migration in a security perspective

3.1. Destination: Europe

Europe, or better, the idea of Europe has been throughout its turbulent history always defined

by its limits. More precisely, it was defined by what, or whom, stood outside its borders. This

was the case for the Romans and for the Holy Roman Empire, later for the awaking nation-

states of 19th century and lastly, persisting to this day, in some form or another, for the

shaping of the European community. The part of the great unifying feature - the common

enemy, was in turn imposed upon various barbaric tribes, the Turks, the Moors and many

others, for whom the Lacanian term Other may be applied. This certainly does little good to

the ones being excluded from the “Fortress Europe”. It does nonetheless bring together – at

least symbolically – the populace already part of the so called Europe. Although this may

rather seem a worn out political rhetoric than a contemporary policy foundation, it does have

7 Data source: CLANDESTINO, op.cit.8 Eurostat, Asylum statistics, op. cit.9 See: Morehouse, C. and M. Blomfield. Irregular Migration in Europe. Washington, DC, 2011. Accessed on April 3, 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-irregular-migration-europe and Frontex. FRAN Quarterly October–December 2014. Accessed 24 April, 2015. doi: 3864/2015.

pertinence in analysing actual political cooperation. Practical examples of the synergetic

effects a common border can have on internal cooperation comprise all EU enterprises in the

field of security, for which a certain degree of national sovereignty had to be waived by

individual states. This shows, rather explicitly, the extent to which states are willing to go in

order to enforce control over their borders.

Nevertheless, various reasons persist for a person to willingly embark on the illegal

and dangerous journey to a country inside the Schengen area. Potential immigrants are usually

driven from their homes by dire social and economic conditions, hostile political climate,

threat of potential or ongoing armed conflicts and similar causes. Without applying any

apologetic presumptions, it is safe to induce that considerable numbers of the immigrant

populace bear no inherent affinity to criminal undergrounds. Even more, the presence of

various paths into irregularity means that regularly entered and working immigrants can often

slip into irregularity for reasons of over-complicated bureaucratic procedures or other similar

red-tape loopholes.10

Another perspective, however, reveals that political, economic and social conditions

of EU’s member states – which much faith and hope is often put into by the populace of third

countries – are only reproduced through the workings of specific social equilibria. The latters’

strength (or better – fragility) was widely exposed with the recent economic crisis. Tens, even

hundreds of thousands of irregular and unscreened immigrants pouring in and consequently

affecting local and national economies in various ways are hence met with mixed feelings.

Examples of institutionalized standpoints on the matter are all but hard to find. A

communication of the European Commission regarding the fight against irregular

immigration for example reads: “Illegal entry, transit and stay of third-country nationals who

are not in need of international protection undermine the credibility of the common

immigration policy. Without reinforced Community action, the crisis as already seen and

perceived today would increase both in qualitative and quantitative terms.”11 But even from a

more general standpoint: “Irregular migration is perceived as a threat to the European Union,

and security concerns are almost automatically attributed to it.”12 But exactly which are the

10 CLANDESTINO Project. Op. cit., p. 118.11 European Commission in Niemann, A. and N. Schmidthäussler. The Logic of EU Policy-Making on (Irregular) Migration: Securitisation or Risk?. Paper given at the UACES conference: “Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2012: Old Borders – New Frontiers”, 3-5 September 2012, Passau, Germany, p. 23. Accessed April 3, 2015. http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1201/niemann.pdf.12 Kovacheva, op. cit., p. 4.

direct and subsequent effects of irregular immigration on the receiving societies, that produce

such standpoints?

3.2. Defining the threat

One of the possible answers lies directly in the first of the above quotations, that is –

uncontrolled immigration has a potential for damaging the credibility of EU’s policies on the

common immigration policy. It sure sounds reasonable but it hardly nests within the

sentiments of the larger populace and in national political agendas. The arguments used to

stress the threat of irregular immigrants to national security and stability, both real and

perceived, are to be found in their idiosyncratic modes and mechanisms of socio-economical

inclusion.13 In other terms:

Unauthorized migrants are often perceived as criminals, violating not only immigration rules but disrespecting laws in general; irregularly working migrants are perceived as a menace to the labour markets taking jobs away from the native and the regular migrant population; asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are perceived as illegitimate users of the welfare system, living in publicly financed shelters and using services such as emergency health care while working in the shadow economy.14

What is important to stress at this point is, however obvious it may seem, that the above

mentioned broadly-shared views are essentially what they are said to be – perceptions.

“Commonly, irregular migrants or attempts of third country nationals to enter the territory of

the Union are presented to be undesired for no specified reason, but seemingly for the mere

fact of being identified as ‘illegal’.”15 Empirical evidence in fact falls surprisingly short of

statistics that would support those claims, at least in a generalizing sort of manner in which

they are given. Again, acquiring tangible data on the scale and spread of black economy and

related figures is a challenging task in its own right. Applying and comparing the findings

with another elusive measure, like the extent and structure of the irregular immigrant

population, makes it then all the more daunting.

13 See, for example, Pinyol-Jiménez G. The Migration – Security Nexus in Short: Instruments and Actions in the European Union. “Amsterdam Law Forum Journal” Vol 4, No 1 (2012). Accessed April 10, 2015. http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/255/442.14 Kovacheva, op. cit., p. 4.15 Niemann and Schmidthäussler, op. cit., p. 20.

Nevertheless, analysing the specific points presented in the quotation above, some

founded objections do present themselves. Firstly, informal work arrangements are evidently

the only option for an immigrant without the proper permits to seek subsistence. The majority

of immigrants being young and with little or no proper education, the jobs available for them

are usually those that require low-skilled, often manual labour force (e.g. in construction,

agriculture, tourism and other low-paying and unpopular sectors). To some extent the

population of (il)legal immigrants provides the niche workforce for certain segments of the

economy that would otherwise hardly operate.16 Secondly, while looking at empirical data

comparing crime rates and foreign minorities, the correlation between the two is hard to miss.

So far, statistical evidence shows that among immigrant populations, crime rates rise

considerably.17 Thirdly, in regard to the claim that irregular immigrants usurp the mechanism

of the welfare state while at the same time contributing to the shadow economy, a swift revisit

of the above mentioned entwinement between social dependency and informal economy

shows this to be a self-perpetuating problem.18 Apart from the more straightforward fears and

preconceptions about public safety and rising unemployment which the presence of an

irregular immigrant population on a territory provokes in the native population, national

governments’ concerns and discourse target wider economic and political implications of an

informal populace and the workings of the shadow economy.

Mainly, the most frequent and debated concerns over national security which arise

out of the irregular immigration phenomenon deal with:

- undermining of states’ sovereignty and control over their territories,- contribution to the spread and scale of shadow economies,- erosion of the welfare state’s social mechanisms,- crumbling of national identities,- proliferation of organised crime dealing with illegal border crossing and

trafficking,

16 CLANDESTINO, op. cit., pp 128-131 and Boswell, C. Migration in Europe. A paper prepared for the “Policy Analysis and Research Programme” of the Global Commission on International Migration, September 2005. Accessed April 11, 2015. http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Organisationer/FN/GCMI/Migration%20In%20Europe.pdf. 17 See Killias, M. EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/19 Immigration and Crime: The European Experience. San Domenico di Fiesole, 2011. Accessed April 10, 2015. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/18960/EU-US%20Immigration%20Systems%202011_19.pdf?sequence=1 and Aebi M. et al. European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2014. Helsinki, 2014. Accessed April 11, 2015. http://www.heuni.fi/en/index/publications/heunireports.html.18 For a detailed analisys on the subject see De la Rica, S., A. Glitz and F. Ortega. Immigration in Europe: Trends, Policies and Empirical Evidence. “IZA Discussion Paper” No. 7778. Accessed April 10, 2015. http://ftp.iza.org/dp7778.pdf.

- danger of terrorist infiltration,- potentially uncontrolled spread of infectious diseases and viruses.19

4. Rising up to the challenge – institutional responses to the

problematic of irregular migration

4.1. Reshaping the (inter)national security paradigm

The concept of national security has been thoroughly re-dimensioned in the academic and

political discourses since the end of the Cold War. Within the changing international

environment encompassing globalising economies, empowering supranational institutions and

arising politico-economic pressure groups, the notion of national security lost its traditional

theoretical anchorage. It has thus been extended along different dimensions to embrace non-

military domains affected by the security logic, and to include non-state actors that directly

partake in the shaping of the security environment.20 In this sense, a trend of de-militarization

of security has been observed, which has produced various alternative concepts, generally

labelled as “soft security”.21

Re-evaluating classic concepts within a contemporary analytical framework is to

actualize them and is one of the main motifs of reproducing scientific discourses. On the other

hand, uncritically adding new elements under the security umbrella poses the risk of including

within it the whole society, thus emptying the concept out of its meaning. Additionally,

regarding the linguistics of scientific and political discourse on security, Wӕver argues, that

various notions of security all conceptually stem out of the national security paradigm,

making other securities mere semantic derivatives, rather than analytical concepts in their

own right.22 Nevertheless, societies, states and international relations are evolving and so are

19 Adapted from: Kraler, A. and M. Rogoz. Irregular Migration in the European Union Since the Turn of the Millennium – Development, Economic Background and Discussion. “Database on Irregular Migration”, Working paper 11/2011, p. 22. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://irregular-migration.net; Niemann and Schmidthäussler, op. cit. and Zbytniewska, K. and K. Kokoszczyński. Italian ambassador: ‘Illegal Immigration Poses Security Threat to Europe’. “Euractiv.com”, February 9, 2015. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/italian-ambassador-illegal-immigration-poses-security-threat-europe and Cottey, A, Security in the New Europe. Hampshire, 2007.20 Rotcshild, E. What is Security? in Buzan, B. and L. Hansen (ed.), “International Security” Vol. 3. London, 2007.21 Cottey, op. cit., p. 192.22 Wӕver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization, in Buzan and Hansen, op. cit., p. 68: “The problem is that, as concepts, neither individual security nor international security exist./…/There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of “security” in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and

threats and challenges that are being put forward in political debates. New concepts, such as

collective, environmental and societal security, are thus necessarily invoked in order to

address salient new phenomena; a critical approach is however needed in order to avoid

succumbing into analytical vagueness or inflation of the concepts.

Very close to the problem of defining security, as presented above, and naming the

related threats, lays the praxis of securitization. Namely, labelling certain groups or

phenomena as threats to national security, provoking hostile attitudes and consequently

pushing forward policies to counter the envisaged threat – securitization comes as a powerful

instrument at the disposal of the ruling actors of state. More specifically however, as Wӕver

famously puts it, securitization can be seen as a speech act. This is to say that security per se

does not positively refer to any particular state or order of things out there, but is construed

through the act of speaking about it. In other terms: “By uttering “security,” a state-

representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a

special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” 23 Realizing this, it is easy to

foresee the potential for manipulative practices in such politically constructed- securitized

realities.

Nonetheless, new and topical concepts on security are being developed, primarily

through the endeavour to exposing pressing issues in fields, other than national security. Not

only that, but with the reshaping of the security environment as a whole, radical new

conceptions of various securities’ (and their ends) were presented as well.24 The already

mentioned notion of societal security is one such example. Based on the same national

security logic, analysing the crucial points and workings of a community/state to survive, it

develops from the state-sovereignty dyad, a society-identity nexus.25 Shifting the referent

object from sovereignty to identity, a whole new dimension of possible threats is

consequently developed. From observing the phenomenon of deterritorialization of states’

sovereignty as resulting from different mechanics of globalization, key national identity issues

are prone to gaining momentum in contemporary political discourse. The concept of identity,

practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning.” (emphasis in original).23 Ibid., p. 73.24 The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: “/…/security should be thought of in terms of economic and political, as well as military objectives; that military security is a means, while the economic security of individuals, or the social security of citizens “to chart futures in a manner of their own choosing,” or the political security that follows when “the international system [is] capable of peaceful and orderly change” were ends in themselves.” (brackets in original), cited in Rotcshild, op. cit., p. 3.25 Ibid., p. 83.

moreover, falls naturally into the politicizing context of the possible impacts of immigration

on native societies.

It is obvious, then, that from whichever standpoint one analyses the shaping and

grounding of a certain approach to security issues, this ultimately resolves itself into a

question of political agendas. The efficacy of security strategies, particularly within an

international framework, being defined by a long-term approach and consensus on key issues,

is then that more vulnerable to the volatile orientations of everyday politics.

4.2. Between policing and promoting development: EU’s take on irregular immigration

The problems, or rather the various consequences of immigration to European countries, have

been constantly (re)surfacing in the political mainstream, particularly from the end of the

Cold War on. Traditional migration trends from East to West and from South to North were

accentuated during critical periods, especially by political transformations and regional crises

(e.g. the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, several EU enlargements, the Balkan Wars etc.).

Being closely linked to the cardinal concept of territorial sovereignty, however, the

administering and management of border control and the related immigration policies, were

all held in the exclusive domain of national governments. Eventually, following the

implementation of the Schengen area, policies and mechanisms regulating populational

movements were gradually delegated to supranational-EU levels.

Primarily, security concerns were focused on internal threats, mainly: organised

crime and terrorism; which were addressed within the framework of cooperation on Justice

and Home Affairs (JHA), later incorporated into the concept of Area of Freedom, Security

and Justice (ASFJ). Following the enlargements and the progressive empowerment of

institutions of the Union, different agencies and programmes were founded to tackle rising

issues. In this way, Europol, Frontex, the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Common

European Asylum System and many others were formed. The two main institutions currently

operating in these fields are the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG

HOME) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).26

Irregular immigration per se has not been dealt with through a holistic approach.

Instead, great effort was put into combating its symptoms. That is, strengthening border

26 See: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm and http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm.

control, cracking down on smugglers and traffickers and facilitating the return of

undocumented immigrants to the countries of origin or transit. Some of the praxes invoked

were met with loud disapproval from both- non-governmental organisations and the wider

public. The most infamous being the plan to employ military units from within the Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to track down and destroy ships and vessels that could

be potentially used for trafficking immigrants.27 Less discussed, although not much less

intrusive- the bi-lateral agreements on the returning of detected irregular migrants (including

failed asylum seekers) which, coupled with pressures to enforce control over the transit of

migrants over their territories, were often imposed on countries in the process of negotiating

accession, and others on the receiving side of different kinds of aid.28

Besides moral and humanitarian reservations, the reach and efficacy of several

policies aimed at curbing irregular immigration have been put into question by researchers

and scholars alike. The already mentioned boosting of police and surveillance operations

focused on screening and data gathering is producing a singular paradox. By tightening

control over borders and increasing security checks over the movement of people, it is by-

producing impressions of insecurity and at the same time encroaching on the same virtues of

civil rights and liberties it is purported to protect. Not to mention the fact, that the vast

majority of irregular immigrants does not reach the EU by crossing land or sea borders, it is in

fact comprised of those who enter the territory legally and only later outstay their tourist

visas, and it accounts to “almost 75% of so-called unlawful migration flows.”.29

There were, however, positive steps being taken towards approaching the

immigration problematic in a more comprehensive manner. Already since 2005 the Global

Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has acknowledged that a crucial part of

remedying the problem of immigration currents lies in the partnership relations with the

countries of origin. More recently, a new European Agenda on Migration has been presented.

27 Cf. European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.5.2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf and Glazebrook, D. EU’s war on migrants will boost ISIS – but perhaps that is the point. “RT News”. Published time: May 18, 2015 17:15. http://rt.com/op-edge/259685-eu-migrants-africa-military-action.28 See: Marsh, S. and W. Rees, The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War. Oxon, 2012, pp. 23-26; Bigo, D. Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe. “International Review of the Red Cross”, Volume 91, Number 875, September 2009. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-875-bigo.pdf and Open Society Initiative for Europe, Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union. Last updated April 2015. http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-european-union.29 Bigo, op. cit., p. 586.

It stresses, among other, that: “To try to halt the human misery created by those who exploit

migrants, we need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root

causes of migration. Some of these are deep-seated but must be addressed.”.30 Indeed, the

medium to long term priorities of the agenda include prospects of furthered cooperation and

assistance to countries facing social and humanitarian crises. Some of those are directly

connected to the already implemented instruments of European Neighbourhood (ENI) and the

Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development’s (EuropeAid) policies.

Many of those policies, however, were firstly developed from notions of “moral obligation,

historical legacy and economic imperative”31, and are only recently being re-presented as

vectors of irregular-immigration-relief.

5. The peculiar case of Slovenia

Slovenia’s geographic position and her historical embeddedness on the junction of changing

political entities occasioned her to function as a transit country from antiquity to present

times. The Balkan route, one of the main smuggling avenues of immigrants and goods into the

EU, passes also across Slovenia’s territory. It is mostly used by criminal groups from

countries of Ex-Yugoslavia although it also acts as a hub for smuggling from farther eastern

regions. Interceptions of immigrant smuggling have revealed several organized channels for

transferring people, including Afghan and Iraqi citizens through Bulgaria, Turkish Kurds,

Indian citizens from Dubai via Serbia, Pakistanis and many others.32 A telling sign of the

importance and scale of the Balkan route is the yearly net worth of trafficked drugs – a past

estimate put it at USD 400 billion.33

Traditionally, Slovenia’s role in the smuggling of immigrants was primarily one of

a transit country. However, the largest numbers of irregular immigrants arriving on its

territory were recorded at the beginning of the 1990s, when they reached an estimated 70.000

and in 2000, when the number grew to over 35.000.34 The reported figures correspond

chronologically to the beginning and ending of the Yugoslav wars, thus explaining the

30 European Commission, A European Agenda… op. cit., p.2.31 Marsh and Reese, op. cit., p. 40.32 Prezelj, I. and M. Gaber. Smuggling as a Threat to National and International Security: Slovenia and the Balkan Route. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2005.33 Içduygu and Toktas in ibid., p. 24.34 Ibid., p. 24 and Lebar, J. The Effect of Illegal Migrations on the National Security of the Republic of Slovenia, Master’s Thesis. Koper, 2011, p. 21.

dramatic increase. After the last surge in 2000, the numbers of detected illegal border

crossings fluctuated slightly yet still presenting a steady decline as shown in the figure below.


Figure 4: Illegal border crossings detected35

Following the accession to the EU in 2004 the inclusion into the Schengen area in 2007

opened up Slovenia’s borders with Italy, Austria and Hungary, while at the same time

consolidating the border with Croatia, having it become EU’s outer border. Border control

activities have since been considerably increased, partly also due to intensified cooperation of

state institutions within the international framework, i.e. with institutions like the

aforementioned Frontex, SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at National Entry),

SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement Center) and others. Much of the irregular

immigration as well as smuggling on the Balkan route have thus diverted through Hungary.36

The total numbers of illegal border crossings detected on the West Balkan route, however,

increased dramatically – twofold since the previous year. Even more substantial is the

increase in the net number of Kosovo citizens detected. Values show a remarkable, tenfold

increase in only a few months span resulting in Kosovo citizens accounting for more than half

of all the detections.37

As mentioned earlier, the Balkan route encompasses channels for traffic of various

illegal goods. The illicit traffic of cannabis in the EU, for example, has shown a decrease in

the amounts imported from third countries, primarily because the increase in domestic

production made up for part of the demand. Exceptions to this trend are countries of southeast

Europe, including Slovenia, for which: “/…/mainly Albanian cannabis supplies the customer

demand.”38 It is noteworthy to stress that observations have already been made about the

steady strengthening of Albanian mafia and its potential security implications for the whole

region.39 Last but not least, one of the most infamous trades within transnational organised

crime is the trafficking of weapons. Closely linked to smuggling routes of other trafficker

35 Data source: Policija. Annual Report on the Work of the Police for the Year 2002, …2006, …2010, …2014 and Frontex, Annual risk analysis 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf.36 Policija. Annual Report on the Work of the Police for the Year 2014. Accessed April 29, 2015. http://www.policija.si/index.php/statistika/letna-poroila. 37 Frontex. Annual risk… op. cit., p. 22.38 Ibid., p. 34.39 Prezelj and Gaber, op. cit., p. 16.

groups, it played a prominent role throughout the battlefields of the recent Yugoslav wars. An

estimated 800.000 illegally civilian-owned weapons are deemed to be located in Bosnia and

Herzegovina alone.40 In view of the most recent terrorist attacks on European soil41 and seeing

them being performed ever more frequently, such numbers indeed provoke well-founded

concerns over many a security aspect.

Even though at first glance statistics on legal and irregular immigration to Slovenia

suggest a positive trend in terms of security, they certainly do not expose the whole picture.

There are in fact present instances that could potentially occasion for further spread of violent

and/or organised criminality, mainly the smuggling of drugs and weapons and the related

strengthening of organised criminal organisations, potentially leading even to occurrences of

terrorist attacks.42

The picture of the irregular migration problematic, framed in the security

perspective, can be viewed also in another way, if focused on the internal conditions. Both,

long-term internal stability and sustained management of human resources within the defence

sector are affected by the changing demographics, which are, in turn, directly and indirectly

linked to immigration. In instances like those, impacts and consequences, resulting from legal

immigration, can be anticipated for the irregular spectrum as well, albeit, to a varying extent.

In a publication on the findings of a 2009 research programme, titled Demographic, Ethnic

and Migration Dynamics in Slovenia and their Impact on the Slovenian Army43, the

researchers analysed the impacts of the changing demographic in relation to the effects it has

on the employability in the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). The conclusions mainly pointed

to two central problems. One surrounds social stigma and the resulting troubles with socio-

economic inclusion that first- and second-generation immigrants face, while the other deals

with SAF recruitment issues in the view of a growing non-national, or immigrant, population.

Specifically, researchers advanced concrete policy proposals to tackle said issues. An oft-

mentioned proposition calls for the loosening of enrolment restrictions for residents

possessing two citizenships. Generally speaking, however, an institutionalised, wholesome

approach to cultural and ethnic diversity and the promoting and safeguarding of an

40 Frontex. Annual risk… op. cit., p. 36.41 Note this year’s shooting at the offices of satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the more recent terrorist attack on the police station in Zvornik, Bosnia.42 Europol. European Union Terrorism Situation andTrend Report 2014, p. 13. Accesed April 24, 2015. doi: 10.2813/15346.43 Žitnik, J. S. (ed.) Demographic, Ethnic and Migration Dynamics in Slovenia and their Impact on the Slovenian Army. Ljubljana, 2009.

individual’s cultural and ethnic identity, specifically within SAF’s cadre, is deemed a crucial

starting point for further social and ethnic inclusion and for strengthening SAF’s political and

symbolic representation in Slovenian society as a whole.

Summing it all up, it is possible to identify two potential irregular-migration-related

security issues for the Slovenian state. One is only pertinent if viewed in relation to activities

of organised crime groups and the trafficking of other goods and is already been dealt with in

terms of cross-national police cooperation and border security controls. The other may more

exactly be termed a soft security issue, insofar as it covers long-term social and political

stability and social inclusion issues. This latter, however, can only be addressed through large

scale civil support and political dialogue, thus making it a matter to be dealt with more within

a “social dialogue” framework, rather than within a national security discourse.

6. Conclusion

As already shown in the second and the following chapters, exact figures on the inpour of

irregular immigrant populations and its repercussions are hardly attainable. The causes and its

symptoms of human distress, on the other hand, are clear and in plain sight. Locking up the

gates and increased policing, on their own, are not going the limit the struggles of the

immigrant population to reaching for a better prospect of living on European soil, or diminish

its numbers.

Along with the pushes for the abolition of internal European borders and improved

international cooperation, a postmodern (inter)national security environment has been taking

shape. Together with the process of deterritorialization of national sovereignty came new

threats for national security. Following the delegation of powers and decision-making to a

supranational, EU, level and a re-orienting of nation states’ efforts in the domain of national

security, a new common consciousness emerged, albeit with a delay of several years. One

which acknowledges that, together with perks of the evolved common market and security

policy, also came new responsibilities. None of the currently employable mechanisms alone,

be it interventions in crisis areas, humanitarian relief aids or development programmes,

should be viewed as a panacea for the problems of immigration. Instead, they make up a

toolbox to be used within a framework of a comprehensive strategy. Evidently, European

forces do not lack the means, neither the resources, to operate within large scale operations

abroad. Instead, the main challenge lies in the proverbial reluctance of nation states to waiver

decision making on foreign policies, in order to comply with a consistent strategy. Therefore,

the only viable path appears to be a persistent struggle, particularly in domestic political

arenas, for the recognition of the need for a more cosmopolitan political view on the issue of

irregular immigration as a whole.

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