rethinkinging the context of coping: an exploration of vulnerability to climate change in rural...

8/9/2019 Rethinkinging the context of coping: an exploration of vulnerability to climate change in rural Bangladesh

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Rethinking the context of coping: anexploration of vulnerability to climate

change in rural Bangladesh

Alison Wright

MSc International Development2008/2009


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Contents

1. Introduction......................................................................3

1.Introduction

This study is primarily motivated by the concern that climate change is

disproportionately affecting some of the worlds poorest communities,

exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones. Within

the development community, climate change is increasingly being

recognised both as a threat to progress on poverty reduction and the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Tanner & Mitchell,2008), and

as a violation of justice and rights (Adger & Paavola,2006).

Significantly, these concerns are also beginning to be acknowledged

by policy makers looking to address the issues resulting from a

changing climate.

Until recently, the pivotal issue within the climate change debate was

mitigation (Fussel & Klein,2006). While limiting greenhouse gas

emissions remains a priority, adaptation to climate change is

increasingly seen as an essential strand of policy at both national and

international levels (UNFCCC,2007). The acknowledgement that

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climate change impacts are already being felt, and that further

changes are now inevitable has moved adaptation from a long term

option of last resort to an urgent imperative (IISD,2003)

Initial adaptation attempts were dominated by top-down ex ante

strategies: solutions such as improving seed varieties and flood

defences reflected the early dominance of scientific framings of

climate change as a technical problem (OBrien et al, 2007) While

such approaches are still prevalent and undoubtedly necessary

(Prowse & Scott,2008), a greater diversity of perspectives has become

apparent as the debate has progressed.

The recent emergence of bottom-up approaches to adaptation is

evidence of this shift. Community Based Adaptation (CBA) strategies

aim to identify existing vulnerabilities and support individuals and

communities current coping strategies (Huq & Reid,2007). These

approaches are rooted in alternative discourses which frame the

problem of climate change in terms of human security

(OBrien,2006).

This widening of the climate change agenda thus presents an

opportunity for concerns about vulnerability to be addressed at a

policy level. In order that this opportunity be fully grasped, research

which contributes to a better understanding of vulnerability is

therefore of paramount importance. Such research has indeed

proliferated in recent years, led by authors such as Adger, OBrien and

Paavola. However, this growing research community, while

undoubtedly motivated by similar concerns to those of development

researchers have had limited engagement with work in the latter field

(Sabates-Wheeler et al,2008). This, I argue, not only represents a

missed opportunity, but has meant that many studies, when viewed

from a development perspective, display a number of weaknesses.

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vulnerability. Chapter 5 will consider the implications of these insights

and the shift in focus for vulnerability within a dynamic context.

Finally, I conclude by reflecting on how this studys approach and

resulting insights might contribute to research into social vulnerability

to climate change.

2. Conceptual literature review

The principal purpose of climate change adaptation is to reducevulnerability (Brooks,2003). As adaptation has grown in significance

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within policy circles, the concept of vulnerability has hence been

elevated within research communities concerned with climate change

(ibid). The conceptual focus of this work would thus seem to offer a

point of overlap with work within the development community, where

the notion of vulnerability is also used.

The first part of this chapter will explore this conceptual terrain, and

demonstrate that, while the potential for conceptual overlap does

exist, the use of the term vulnerability within the climate change

community needs to be treated with caution. In the second half of this

chapter, I argue that social vulnerability studies have a number of

weaknesses, which a greater engagement with livelihoods research

would help them to address.

Vulnerability as a point of overlap

Within the field of development, the concept of vulnerability has long

been used to refer to exposure to contingencies and stress, anddifficulty in coping with them (Chambers, 1989:1). Although often

conflated, vulnerability is thus understood to be distinct from poverty:

the concept has an external dimension, comprising risks, shocks and

stresses, and an internal dimension characterised as defencelessness

and a lack of means to cope with stress (ibid). Moreover, although the

poor are often the most vulnerable, the concept cuts across wealth

categories in complex ways.Similarly, within climate change research, the term is used to capture

the idea of susceptibility to harm (Adger,2006) and likewise is

understood to be composed of external and internal dimensions.

While the external dimension, in terms of exposure to increased

climatic extremes and variability provides the raison dtre for

research in this field, the internal dimensions, understood as sensitivity

and adaptive capacity are recognised as being essential fordetermining the magnitude of the external threat (Brooks,2003).

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Superficially therefore, the concept of vulnerability seems to offer a

bridge between the two areas of research.

While there is undoubtedly potential for conceptual congruence, the

use of the concept of vulnerability within the lexicon of climate change

does, however, require some exploration. The diversity of disciplines

working within the field interpret the term differently (OBrien et al,

2007), and have clouded its use with conceptual and semantic

ambiguities (Fussel & Klein, 2006:305). Broadly speaking, a

distinction can be discerned between vulnerability as an outcome,

contingent upon the impacts of a hazard, and vulnerability as an

inherent state of a system (Kelly & Adger,2000; Brooks,2003). As

OBrien et al (2000) highlight, it is important to recognise that these

interpretations are manifestations of different discourses on climate

change, which have implications research agendas, methodologies and

policy prescriptions.

Vulnerability as an outcome

Approaches to climate change research and adaptation which embody

scientific framings of the climate change problem (OBrien et al,2007)

conceptualise vulnerability as being dependent upon the physical

impacts of a changing climate (Fussel & Klein,2006). These

approaches are rooted in biophysical discourses of environmental

change (OBrien et al,2007) and accord primacy to future physicalexposure, and particularly to the results of General Circulation Models

(GCMs). In this formulation, the sensitivity and adaptive capacityof

social systems are considered only to the extent to which they amplify

or reduce the impacts of the external stressor (ibid).

This outcome or end-point approach and associated discourse have

undoubtedly been dominant in debates about adaptation; theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) approach is

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dominated by an outcome understanding of vulnerability (see

McCarthy et al 2001). Consequently, the adaptation policy

prescriptions which follow from this perspective have been similarly

dominant; technological adaptations have consumed the attention of

many policy makers (OBrien et al,2007; see MoEF,2008)

Vulnerability as a starting point

Despite this dominance, as debate within policy circles has progressed,

alternative interpretations of vulnerability have gained currency1.

Approaches which frame the problem of climate change as a threat to

human security (OBrien et al,2007) conceptualise vulnerability in

terms of the inherent properties of a social system, which make it

susceptible to harm (Brooks,2003); for conceptual clarity some authors

therefore prefer the term social vulnerability (Brooks,2000; Kelly &

Adger,2000). Kelly & Adger (2000) use the analogy of the wounded

soldier to convey the notion that vulnerability results from existing

damage and inability to cope with external pressures. Vulnerabilityused in this sense therefore exists independentlyof the external

hazard.

Studies which use this understanding are therefore able to focus on

present characteristics of communities and societies to currentclimate

variability as a basis for understanding how vulnerability may change

in the future (OBrien et al,2007). Such studies commonly analyselivelihood and coping strategies, particularly concentrating on access

to resources (Berkes & Jolly,2001; Eriksen & Silva,2003; Eriksen et

al,2005; Paavola,2008).

The focus on the social in this interpretation of vulnerability draws the

analytical focus beyond the proximate causes of harm to consider the

contextin which such vulnerability is constructed (Blakie et al,1994;1 The IPCC TAR introduced a social conceptualisation of vulnerability alongside theoutcome definition (Brooks, 2003).

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Adger & Kelly;1999), leading some authors to use the term contextual

vulnerability (OBrien et al,2007). The institutional context is a

particularly important focus of study: many studies draw attention to

the role that institutional structures play in mediating access to

resources and in constraining and enabling individual agency

(Adger,1999; Eakin,2005). Approaches originating in critical

discourses draw particular attention to the structures and relations of

power in which vulnerable actors are embedded

(Pelling,2003;Cutter,1996; Hewitt,1997;). As the context which

constructs a state of vulnerability changes over time, the state itself is

understood to be dynamic (Leichenko & OBrien,2002; OBrien et

al,2007). The policy implications of a focus on social vulnerability are

therefore vastly different to those of biophysical studies;

recommendations concentrate instead on policies to reduce existing

vulnerabilities.

Research communities concerned with social vulnerability to climate

change are therefore operating in a field traditionally occupied by

development researchers: the emphasis on threats to human security;

the awareness that individual vulnerability is heavily dependent on

access to resources; that the institutional context is important in

mediating this access and that vulnerability is dynamic are all

discoveries that bring climate change literature into contact with

issues of poverty and livelihoods. However, despite this overlap, direct

engagement with livelihood literature has been limited (Adger,2006;

Adger & Winkels,2007). This, I argue, is a result of two factors: firstly,

the conceptual heritage of research in this field, and secondly the

focus of climate change vulnerability research on contributing to

adaptation policy.

Characteristics of social vulnerability studies

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They focus firstly on identifying the determinants of adaptive capacity

empirically from the community, and secondly on analysing the

processes of decision making at different levels Keskitalo,2004; Smit &

Wandel,2005): interviews with and documents from different levels of

government often form part of the methodology (Adger,1999;

Eakin,2005; Sutherland et al,2005, Osbahr,2008). The contribution of

these studies in terms of adaptation policy include both

recommendations designed to reduce individual dimensions of

vulnerability through poverty reduction and diversification of

livelihoods, and prescriptions designed to promote the strengthening

and adaptation of formal institutional structures (Kelly & Adger,2000;

OBrien et al,2007)

Despite the limited engagement with the development community, it

would therefore seem that social vulnerability researchers arrive at

similar conclusions; their prescriptions for reducing vulnerability and

increasing adaptive capacity superficially are broadly in line with those

advocated by mainstream development researchers and practitioners.

However closer examination, particularly from a more critical

perspective, reveals a number of shortcomings of social vulnerability

research; these in turn may limit the usefulness and applicability of

their finding, even on their own terms. These shortcomings, I suggest,

are again a result of both their conceptual heritage, and the

orientation of many studies.

Limitations of social vulnerability studies

Firstly, social vulnerability studies often lack a nuanced understanding

of differences between individuals and households; in many cases the

community is the unit of analysis and much rhetoric persists around

the undifferentiated poor (Tanner & Mitchell, 2008). Although there

is recognition both that households differ in their coping ability and inthe types of strategies they deploy, and that these differences are

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Given these criticisms, a more thorough engagement by climate

change vulnerability researchers with the livelihoods literature, and

particularly with its more critical voices would, I argue, offer

opportunities for these shortcomings to be addressed.

Livelihoods literature

The discourse of livelihoods has become increasingly widespread in

both research and policy responses to poverty as part of a more

general move towards people-centred, participatory approaches to

development (Wood,2005). While the analytical frameworks of

different authors working in the livelihoods field vary (Carney,1998;

Moser,1998; Scoones,1998; Ellis,2000) their common focus is on

individuals and households, the assets or resources they command,

and the processes by which they dynamically construct their

livelihoods. These livelihoods are understood to be contextually

rooted: institutions, social relations and organisations mediate accessto resources (Ellis,2000) and structure opportunities for livelihood

activities (Wood,2005), while trends, shocks and hazards impact on

livelihood assets and strategies (Ellis,2000).

Vulnerability in the livelihoods literature refers to the susceptibility to

circumstances of not being able to maintain a livelihood (Adger,2006).

The internal side of vulnerability that Chambers (1989) refers to interms of the inability to cope and adapt is understood to relate closely

to household assets (Elllis,2000), while the external dimension refers

to exposure to various categories of risk (Wood,2004). The related

concepts of sensitivity, understood as the magnitude of a livelihood

systems response to an external event, and resilience, meaning the

ability to bounce back from a stress or shock are also used within this

literature (Ellis,2000). Given this sphere of research, the overlaps withthe concerns of social vulnerability research are highly apparent, and,

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furthermore, offer opportunities to specifically address each of the

criticisms already raised.

Firstly, livelihoods approaches offer a more sophisticated and

systematically theorised understanding of household resources, both

material and non-material5. A particular contribution of the livelihoods

literature is its emphasis on the importance of social resources. While

many social vulnerability studies recognise personal social networks as

an important dimension of coping (Berkes & Jolly,2001; Osbahr et

al,2008), and social capital is beginning to be acknowledged as a key

research area (Adger, 2003), this dimension of households profile is

given particular analytical significance in the livelihoods literature. By

engaging with these debates, vulnerability studies can therefore

develop a more nuanced understanding of the differences between

households, which has implications for both vulnerability and adaptive

capacity.

Secondly, like studies of social vulnerability, livelihoods approaches

emphasise the importance of context. However, they also offer

opportunities for contextual understanding to be developed further. In

some cases, the theorisation of resources is extended to consider the

cultural dimension of resources; White and Ellison (2007) for example,

argue that the significance of resources is culturally and hence

contextually determined. More generally, a greater emphasis is given

in many of these approaches to the informal institutional context,which is, almost by definition, context specific.

Finally, more critical voices within the livelihoods school add an

additional dimension to contextual understanding; by considering the

politicised nature of the institutional context they address issues often

neglected by studies of social vulnerability.

5 Debate does surround the conceptualisation of these resources: for examplewhether households possess assets (Moser, 1998) capitals (Carney,1998), orresources (Lewis, 1993)

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Livelihood approaches are explicitly actor-oriented (Long, 2001); their

focus is on how individuals and households act strategically and

dynamically to construct their livelihoods over time within a complex

institutional landscape (Wood, 2005). While it has been acknowledged

that many studies of social vulnerability seemingly have a similar

focus, and take a bottom up approach (Smit and Wandel,2005), the

manner of their engagement with the institutional context reveal

different epistemological assumptions. Engaging with realities from an

actor-oriented perspective shifts the focus from technocratic and

potentially ineffective interventions, while being sensitive to

prescriptions which may unwittingly heighten vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that there is a significant conceptual

overlap between research into climate change vulnerability and work

on vulnerability in the development community. Although the use of

the concept within climate change research must be treated withcaution, the understanding of the term within studies of social

vulnerability is similar to its use within poverty research.

Nevertheless, it has been suggested that this potential not only

remains to be fully exploited, but offers opportunities for shortcomings

of climate change studies to be addressed.

There is therefore a strong rationale for this studys situation at theinterface of the two research communities. It shares both the raison

dtre of climate change research: concern that a changing climate will

exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and create new ones, and the

principle objective: to contribute to a better understanding of this

vulnerability and ultimately to its reduction. Methodologically it is in

line with many studies of social vulnerability: an analysis of coping

strategies after an extreme weather event will provide the empiricalbasis of the study. Moreover, it explicitly considers adaptive capacity

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as a parameter of vulnerability. However, in an effort to address what

are viewed as shortcomings of other such studies, the analysis will look

to the livelihoods tradition, and particularly to more its more critical

voices. These fresh insights, I will argue, have important implications

for our understanding of vulnerability and in turn for policy which aims

to reduce it.

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economic change, which has the potential to impact on both

dimensions of this paradox.

This chapter will begin by developing each of these themes. The

physical dimension of Bangladeshs vulnerability will firstly be

introduced, and the likely effects of climate change outlined.

Secondly, the socio-economic context will be described, along with

some of the key trends pertaining to the discussion in later chapters.

This chapter will conclude with a brief methodology.

Physical vulnerability

Even without the dynamics of a changing climate, Bangladesh remains

one of the most hazard-prone countries in the world (Ahmed, 2006).

Located at the convergence of three major rivers, most of its land area

is flat and deltaic; two third lies less than 5m above sea-level

(MoEF,2008). This topography and situation, combined with its

monsoon-governed climate mean that Bangladesh is susceptible to a

variety of natural hazards (Figure 2).

Floods in particular are an inescapable reality. Statistically, around a

quarter of the country is flooded in an average year (Hofer,1998),

although there is high inter-annual variability (Ahmed,2006): while

normal floods are essential for agriculture, abnormal floods are

much greater in their extent and magnitude and result in considerable

damage and loss of life (Ahmad et al,2000).

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Socio-economic context

In addition to its physical vulnerability, Bangladeshs socio-economic

conditions are characteristic of a country with generically high social

vulnerability. Despite broadly positive trends, 40% of the population

live below the national poverty line (World Bank,2005) and half of

these are categorised as the extreme poor (Rahman, R.2003).

Again, despite developments in health and education, Bangladeshs

latest HDI rank was 140 in the world (UNDP, 2008). Despite increasing

urbanisation, 73% of Bangladeshs population lives in rural areas

(World Bank, 2006) (Figure 2), and it remains one of the most densely

populated countries in the world.7

More significant, perhaps, than this aggregate picture, are the

dynamics which are rapidly changing peoples livelihood contexts. The

implications of these dynamics are discussed further in chapter 5.

Firstly, the role of agriculture in rural livelihoods is declining (Rahman,

H.,2003). The percentage of households involved in the farm sector

7 Population Density: 1218.19 people per sq. Km. (World Bank, 2007)

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Figure 2: Trends in urbanisation

Source: World Bank, 2009

Map: MoEF (2008)

Cyclones bring storm surges and tidal flooding


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declined from 73% to 51% between 1984 and 2008 (BBS,1986;2008).

This livelihood shift has been influenced by productivity growth and

technology uptake in crop agriculture (Sen 1996), while the availability

of cultivable land is declining predominantly as a result of population

pressure (Asaduzzaman,2003).

Paralleling the decline in agriculture has been an increase in the non-

farm sector in rural areas (Toufique & Turton,2003). Between 1984

and 1996 the proportion of non-farm households grew at rate of about

4% per annum (BBS,1986;1999), while the proportion of rural income

from non-agricultural sources increased from 37% in 1987 to 48% in

1994 (Hossain et al,1996).

The importance of migration of varying types and resulting

remittances has increased dramatically: the share of remittances in

household incomes rose from 3.7 percent in 1987-88 to 18.5 percent in

2000 (Hossain et al,2001). The overall result of these trends has been

a transformation of the rural labour market, leading increasingly

towards an employment hierarchy amongst the poor

(Rahman,R.,2003).

Methodology

The empirical basis of this study is an analysis of household coping

strategies during and after the floods of July 2004. Broadly speaking,

an analogy approach has been adopted, which uses a study of current

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vulnerability as a basis for extrapolating future trends (see

Glantz,1991). As chapter 2 highlighted, a study of present day

vulnerability is consistent with the conceptual approach to

vulnerability adopted here8. In addition, a focus on extreme climate

events has specific benefits. As Adger & Kelly (1999) argue, it is only

during times of crisis that latent and often fluid entitlements are

manifested and defined; after a flood therefore, the distribution of

entitlements can be observed, and their significance for vulnerability

better understood. As illustrated, extreme events are likely to

increase; an assumption inherent in the rationale for this approach is

that these entitlements are likely to increase in importance over time.

This approach has limitations: it provides only a snapshot, yet social

vulnerability is understood to be dynamic. While an understanding of

its determinants provides a basis for considering likely changes, such

projections require the introduction of future trends, with the

uncertainty that entails.

The particular focus on coping strategies is used to generate insights

about vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Following Davis (1993) and

Devereux (2001), coping is understood here to refer to short term

strategies employed during times of stress in order to maintain

consumption and meet basic household needs. As ability to cope is

understood as key dimension of vulnerability (Chambers, 1989),

8 This differs from outcome vulnerability studies where vulnerability is seen asdependenton climate change projections.

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patterns in the nature of and ability to cope in a particular context

relates directly to vulnerability.

The information yielded from coping strategies about adaptive

capacity is more speculative. Following the definition by Brooks (2003)

in chapter 2, adaptive capacity refers to the ability of households to

change and modify their livelihoods. As such, indicators of will be

sought firstly in evidence of households ability to switch and

substitute livelihood strategies. Secondly, consideration will be given

to households time horizons, revealed either directly or extrapolated

from evidence of livelihood1 security9: the assumption here is that

longer time horizons increases adaptive capacity by allowing ex ante

measures to be adopted at the household level. The specific approach

to studying coping strategies in this study is discussed below.

Context of research

The empirical material on which this study is based was collected in

the aftermath of the July 2004 floods. The floods resulted in 40% of

the country being inundated by floodwater; affecting one quarter of

the population and causing the deaths of over 800 people (ADB,2004).

The data was collected as part of a five year research programme by

the Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) Research Group at the

University of Bath. The programmes goal was to develop a framework

for understanding the social and cultural construction of wellbeing in

9 As Wood (2007) argues, greater security translates into longer time horizons.

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developing countries (Wed 2007)10. A core tenet of the conceptual

framework was a notion of resources which emphasised their social

and cultural dimensions.

Data used here has been drawn from two villages: Bichitropur and

Achingaon. Achingaon was waterlogged for a month while Bichitropur

was affected for a week. The two villages are contextually contrasting.

Bichitropur is the larger village with greater proximity to and better

communications with the district town of Manikganj (Figure 3)11.

Although it is beyond this studys scope to systematically analyse

these differences, drawing upon data from two sites does allow a wider

range of experiences to be incorporated.

Details of research

The data used was entirely qualitative and collected in the form of

flood diaries, analysed here for the first time. Households kept the

self-administered diaries for a year after the flood12, which allowed for

post-flood recovery to be analysed. As information was gathered from

(predominantly male) household heads, the data does lack intra-

household and gender dimensions.

The diaries were summarised by field researchers; the transcripts of

these diaries have been analysed and quoted in their original form. A

10 Details of WeD methodology:http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/toolbox-intro.htm

11 Details from community profiles: http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htm.12 Sample size: Bichitropur: 40 households, Achingaon: 20 households

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http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/toolbox-intro.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/toolbox-intro.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/toolbox-intro.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/toolbox-intro.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htmhttp://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-bangladesh.htm


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broadly inductive approach to coding and analysis was adopted13.

Again, limitations of the approach should be highlighted. Firstly, due

to the limited scope of this study, only open coding was conducted.

Moreover, due to the nature of the data and research constraints, no

additional data could be collected. The iterative element necessary for

grounded theory generation was therefore lacking.

Diaries were structured in accordance with the conceptual approach

used in the WeD research: questions were asked about the effects of

the flood on material, social and cultural resources. This structure

supports the approach to coping strategies used in this paper. As

highlighted in chapter 2, the analytical approach used draws from

livelihoods approaches; coping will therefore be viewed primarily in

terms of household resources, with a particular emphasis on social and

cultural resources.

Bichitropur: rural, close tourban centre

Achingaon: rural, remote

Size

(households)

488 310

Communications

Paved road runs throughhe village; easy access todistrict town

Poor road communicationwith district town. Allroads unpaved;submerged duringmonsoon.

Demographiccharacteristics

77% Muslim; 32% Hindu

74% nuclear households;20% extendedhouseholds; 6% joint

100% Muslim

63% nuclear households;38% extended households

13Nvivo software was used to manage the coding and analysis.

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Figure 3: Characteristics of sites


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householdsOccupationalstructure

Majority in non-farmactivities;

Some villagers havearable land and producecrops as a secondarylivelihood strategy.

Large number of migrantsto Dhaka

Greater dependence onfarm sector: 29% havefarming as primary

strategy.

Significant number ofmigrants; 75 people workin Dhaka; 34 villagershave migrated overseas

Key economicchangesidentified

Significant agriculturechanges:expansion of irrigation;

increased productivity;Increased commercialfarming.

Non-farm sectorsexpanded significantlyand include: rickshaw/vanpulling, vehicle driving,small trading

Communication improvedwith road to district town.

Agricultural changes haveincreased productivity

Large increase inmigration to take up non-farm occupations outsidethe village includingoverseas.

Key socialand politicalchangesidentified

Land owner ship hasbecome moreconcentrated in fewerhands

Increase in the number ofnuclear families.

Authority and power ofolder leaders curbed.Emergence of newgeneration of youngerleaders with politicalparty affiliations

Increase in politicallymotivated violence

Increase in the number ofnuclear families

Typical power structure

based on lineage ischanging; attributed tomigration

Opportunity to earncreates a gap betweengenerations

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4. Discussion of Findings

The focus of this chapter will be a discussion of household coping

strategies. I propose that differences in coping need to be understood

in two dimensions: firstly, households vary in terms of their need to

employ coping strategies, primarily as a function of livelihood

disruption; secondly, the resources drawn upon in order to cope in

times of stress vary. The first dimension has a relatively

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straightforward connection to vulnerability as it pertains directly to

households sensitivity and resilience, as discussed in chapter 2

(Ellis,2000). The implications of the second dimension for

vulnerability, as will be seen, are more complex.

After a brief overview of the mechanisms through which the flood

affected livelihoods, the first half of this chapter will provide an

analysis of two dimensions of coping, and illustrate how they can be

used to reveal more nuanced differences between households. The

second half of the discussion will explore further implications of these

findings; particular attention will be given to the institutional context of

the observed coping strategies. The use of both instrumental and

critical analytical lenses will allow additional insights to be generated,

which, I argue, are essential for a fuller understanding of vulnerability

and adaptive capacity.

Effects of the flood on livelihoods

The flood affected livelihoods through a number of mechanisms.

Firstly, it destroyed or damaged household resources, particularly

physical and natural assets; many households suffered damage to

houses, cultivable land and crops. In situations where the ability of

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household members to work was compromised by flood related illness

there was also an impact on human resources. Loss of resources had

immediate impacts, particularly when basic needs were threatened;

some households for example had to seek alternative shelter in the

aftermath of the flood. In the longer term, loss of assets affected the

speed of recovery; rebuilding the stock of physical assets forced

households to incur additional financial burdens.

Secondly, the flood directly affected households livelihood strategies

and disrupted income. Many people were unable to work during the

flood period as infrastructure was disrupted, workplaces closed and

fields flooded. Finally, as prices of basic goods rose during the flood,

maintaining levels of consumption became more expensive for all

households.

At least one of these mechanisms was evident in all households

surveyed, and therefore all livelihoods were disrupted to some extent.

However, their effects were differential; households displayed varying

levels of sensitivity and resilience. Suggestions in the diaries that

meeting the households basic food, health and shelter requirements

had become more difficult were taken as indicators of sensitivity. The

degree to which a household found it difficult to recover their pre-flood

assets and resume livelihood strategies was used to judge resilience,

albeit impressionistically.

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Differences in households need to cope

A households level of sensitivity and resilience determined the degree

to which they needed to employ coping strategies. In order to

understand these differences in vulnerability, it is necessary to

consider the varying characteristics of households livelihoods.

Samsuddin is a farmer and has three-bigha14 of cultivable land. He is

also a businessman, as he has started livestock feed-selling business

at Ghosher bazaar... They have three sons. The eldest son.... is

operating a business (grocery shop). ...the second son is a wholesaler

of cosmetics. This family is confident of their earnings as they are

hard workers and help each other overcome difficulties (Samsuddin

Mollik: Poor household15,Bichitropur my emphasis)

Samsuddins situation was typical of households who displayed lower

sensitivity to the flood: his households livelihood was characterised by

a diversity of strategies, including sources of income derived from

outside the immediate vicinity. Households such as this had greater

potential for substitution of activities (Ellis,2000) which allowed them

to spread risk and sustain household income (Rahman, R.,2003). The

ability to diversify is, of course, largely a function of households

productive resources (ibid): endowed with four adult male income

earners, Samsuddins households overall exchange entitlement (Sen

& Dreze, 1989), along with their potential for diversification were

greater.

14 1 Bigha=1/3 acre15 Households were self-categorised as poor, middle or rich.

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In the context of this discussion, another feature of livelihoods such as

Samsuddins is relevant: despite categorising themselves as poor,

many such households expressed greater confidence in their financial

security. As discussed in chapter 3, expressions of security are taken

as an indicator of longer time horizons and hence greater adaptive

capacity. Borrowing by this household was primarily for the purposes

of productive investment in the family livestock-feed business.

Bachchu Mollik is a rickshaw puller who pulls others rickshaws as he

does not have any of his own. He said that he was always very

concerned about his debts and repayments and was anxious about his

financial position. Yet he could not avoid borrowing money for the

maintenance of his familyand also for the treatment of their uncertain

health problems (Bachchu Mollik, poor household: Bichitropur, my

emphasis)

Banchchu Molliks situation exemplifies the converse position. With

only one income earner, this household was particularly sensitive to

livelihood disruption: unable to generate income through rickshaw

pulling during the flood, household income was completely suspended.

In both the immediate aftermath of the flood and in the context of

other hazards such as ill health, external support was sought in order

to maintain the households basic needs. In contrast to households

such as Samsuddins, Banchchu regularly expressed concern about the

insecurity of his households financial position. Again the implications

for time horizons were apparent: this household borrowed frequently in

order to maintain consumption in the short term.

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While in general, households positively endowed with assets and

resources therefore seem to have less need to cope as they are in a

better position to diversify, the relationship between household

resources and vulnerability is in reality more ambivalent. Households

who relied more heavily upon physical and natural assets often

suffered greater aggregate losses and took longer to recover their pre-

flood assets, a finding confirmed by Brouwer et al (2007). The

ownership of land in particular proved a mixed blessing:

...they did not need to buy the rice from the market as they used to produce

rice in their own land and during the flood it was in their store...they

mentioned that they did not suffer much (Nurul Haque: Middle household,

Achingaon)

...he has 10 Pakhis16of cultivable land and he faced a huge loss during flood.

He cultivated paddy and maize in his land and all the crops went under

water... (Shrish Chandra Shaha: Rich household, Bichitropur)

These quotes illustrate the need to avoid assuming that households

with more assets were always less vulnerable; instead, an awareness

of the type of resources relied upon and the potential for these

resources to be flood affected is important. Similarly, households in

the converse position of having few physical assets were not

universally more vulnerable; they often expressed that they were less

affected as they had nothing to lose.

16 Unit of land measurement

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Another important difference between households was in the type of

livelihood strategies pursued. While households reliant on insecure or

unreliable sources of income undoubtedly displayed high generic

vulnerability (Brooks, 2003), as with resources, flood specific

vulnerabilities also emerged. The case of Mostafizur Rahman Mollik, a

factory owner, illustrates that such vulnerabilities may apply to

seemingly more secure households.

During the flood... he had to keep his factory closed for twenty days... It was a

huge loss to stop production of bread and his income was reduced.

(Mostafizur Rahman Mollik: Middle household, Bichitropur)

A specific, and commonly used livelihood strategy which lowered

sensitivity in most cases was migration. Households with at least one

member working outside the immediate area were able to maintain an

income source through remittances, as in the case of Matier Rahman:

Matier Rahman worked in a printing press in Dhaka and used to earn

Tk.4500 per month as his salary. It was fixed and did not fluctuate in any

circumstances like flood or so on. So, during and after the flood ... it did not

create any food shortage [sic]. He could maintain the expenses anyhow

(Matier Rahman: Middle household, Bichitropur)

The first dimension of coping therefore refers to the extent to which a

households livelihood was disrupted, shown as need for coping on

figure 4. The characteristics of a livelihood in terms of its diversity

and degree to which its income sources and resources are flood

affected are therefore indicators of vulnerability; they determine the

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degree to which a household needs to cope. Moreover, inferences

can be made from these characteristics about adaptive capacity: by

allowing household to switch between activities, and by increasing

security and hence lengthening time horizons, a more diversified

livelihood may also be assumed to have greater adaptive capacity.

These findings broadly echo those of other studies of social

vulnerability (e.g. Adger, 1999; Paavola, 2008)

Differences in coping resources

The second dimension to emerge from the analysis is the mannerin

which households coped in the event of livelihood disruption. There

were broad similarities between households in terms of their priorities:

by definition, coping focused on the maintenance of consumption and

the meeting of basic household needs. However, there were crucial

differences in terms of the resources and assets they drew upon in

order to meet their needs. Broadly speaking, households varied

according to the degree to which they were able to cope

autonomously: this, unexpectedly, varied as a function of wealth.

The richer households commonly maintained their familys

consumption by drawing on their own financial resources as they often

had larger savings. Generic flood related expenses such as the

rising prices of food and additional transport costs therefore did not

present a challenge to these households. The following household,

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their social resources, which had implications for their coping ability.

The most productive social relationships for the poor were those with

people in positions of authority, particularly the Union Parishad (UP)17

chairman:

Samsuddin received fertiliser and seeds twice from the government through

the UP member in his village... There is good relationship between the UP

member and this family, and the UP member is also their relative (Samsuddin

Mollik: Poor household: Bichitropur).

While this household were self-categorised as poor, there were many

others in considerably worse positions who failed to access

government assistance. Without such connections, or access to

powerful patrons who might provide other sources of support, many of

the poorest households were dependent on reciprocal relationships

with the similarly poor. While these relationships were a source of

small scale transfers, often of basic household goods, they offered

little more in the way of resources to enable coping, as was the case

for Daradi Molliks household:

Daradi said that during the flood they eat only one meal a day instead of

three. But they did not take any loan because no one would give them loan,

as they are poor (Daradi Mollik: poor household: Bichitropur)

That formal as well as informal sources of support were dependent on

who you know was a common theme. Furthermore, it was evident

that social resources are a variable; relationships required

17 The lowest tier of local government

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maintenance or they could be subject to decline. The importance of

maintaining relationships and networks was greatest to the most

vulnerable, as Dorbesh Mias household illustrates:

Dorbesh Mia now always stays in the house as he cannot walk for a long time

and so he tries to avoid that... Day by day his social connections are

decreasing. He always tries to maintain a good relationship with the powerful

people of this village. They have managed an old-age allowance for him

(Dorbesh Mia: poor household, Achingaon).

Analysis of the manner of coping adds a second dimension in which

differences between households can be discerned, shown as coping

resources on figure 4. It is this dimension, I suggest, which offers the

potential to add new insights to the understanding of vulnerability and

adaptive capacity. However, unlike the first dimension, merely

observing differences between households is insufficient; in order to

understand the implications for vulnerability, it is necessary to look

beyond the observations outlined so far to the institutional context in

which they are embedded. A key finding from the preceding analysis

has been the importance of social resources for the poorest. The

second half of this chapter will therefore begin by reflecting on the

nature of these relationships in rural Bangladesh, and establishing a

conceptual lens through which they can be viewed. It will then move

on to consider the implications of a reliance on social relationships.

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DIMENSION 1: NEED FOR COPING

Undisrupted Livelihood: LESS VULNERABLEdi

di

di

dH

JH

K

Re

lia

nc

e

on

so

cia

l

re

so

ur

ce

s

R

e

l

i

a

n

c

e

o

n

F

i

n

a

n

c

i

a

l

R

38

Characterised by:

Narrow range oflivelihood strategies Generic and flood-

specificallyvulnerable strategiesand resources.

Weak base ofproductive assets

Increasing povertyDecreasing autonomy ofcopingDecreasing quality of socialresources

Increasing wealthIncreasing autonomy

Characterised by: Diversified livelihood Reliance on less flood-

affected strategies/resources

RemittancesMade possible by: Strong asset base,

particularlyhuman capital

Highly disrupted livelihood

Figure 4: Copingframework


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e

s

o

u

r

Conceptualising relationships

The observation that personal social resources are of critical

importance for enabling the poorest to cope is not an unexpected one:

anthropological scholarship has long emphasised the significance of

social relationships in situations where peoples material resources are

lacking (Scott,1976) and this has been a dominant theme in livelihoods

literature on South Asia in particular (Maloney,1988; Devine,1999).

The pattern and structure of such relationships are highly complex and

multidimensional (Wood,2005). Both horizontal and vertical ties are

underpinned by expectations, responsibilities and obligations

(Devine,1999).

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primary means of non-autonomous coping: loans and informal

transfers between households were common arrangements. However,

it was also suggested that access to formal sources of support, such

as the UP was also mediated by social relationships and therefore

subject to similar rules18.

This finding is again a well established one in the literature on

Bangladesh: Thornton (2003) also argues that social structures and

class relations directly influence the way in which formal structures

operate within the public and private spheres; Devine (2008)

specifically emphasises the role of non-elected political party leaders

as gatekeepers to government relief programmes. Such studies thus

lend support to the emphasis on the informal institutional domain.

Understood as a resource, and thus in an instrumental sense, social

relationships can therefore be conceptualised as the channels through

which extended entitlements, and in some cases more formal

entitlements operate; entitlements which are in turn underpinned by

informal institutions. In the context of the present argument, this

means that the reliance by households, particularly the poorest, on

their social resources in order to cope with the flood translates into a

dependence on these institutions. This, I suggest, means that a full

18 This overlap was also suggested by the RANQ data which found that households

with a close relative in a government position had higher levels of needs satisfaction(McGregor et al, 2007)

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understanding of vulnerability in rural Bangladesh necessitates that

these institutions be a key focus of study.

Implications of reliance on informal institutions

Viewed positively, these intermeshing relationships do undoubtedly

result in a material safety net and hence a degree of security. For

households for whom the opportunity costs of individual precautionary

methods are too high (Dreze & Sen,1989), and in situations where the

state is unable to provide universal support, this security is certainly

significant. Moreover, as Scott (1976) argued, the moral dimensions of

such arrangements ensure that wealthier members of the community

also hold a stake in their maintenance; to be seen as not conforming to

rules of duty and obligation is to be labelled uncaring and to incur a

loss of status (Wood, 2005). Conversely, generosity increases the

symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977) of the wealthy:

He worked mainly for those people who were very poor, were living in his

village, and went to him for help. ...During the flood his wife helped their

neighbours who were poor by giving rice. In this way he improved his social

acceptance. (Shrish Chandra Shaha: Rich household: Bichitropur)

As Wood (2005) argues, this social acceptance provides wealthier

households with their own source of insurance. This collective, albeit it

socially differentiated interest in these institutions undoubtedly

ensures their durability.

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Superficially therefore, it would seem that the argument made by

mainstream proponents of social capital that bonding capital is an

important guard against vulnerability (Woolcock,2000 ) would seem to

hold. However, a closer look at these institutions suggests not only

that the implications for vulnerability are more ambivalent but are also

possibly more far-reaching.

Firstly, it should be remembered that while social resources were more

significant to poor households, it was also observed that the quality

and quantity of these resources varied: in many cases social resources

were limited to reciprocal relationships amongst similarly poor

households. As Scott (1976) highlighted, the most reliable sources of

entitlement for poor people are often those in a similar position which

hence yield only limited resources. Moreover, in situations of

collective loss, the mutual insurance of reciprocity is of limited use

(Sen & Dreze,1989) and places relationships which may yield

resources under increased stress (Dirks,1980). These issues are

particularly pertinent to the present discussion and are explored in

more detail in chapter 5.

In addition to these generic resource constraints, the ability of

individuals to develop and maintain social resources and thus to

secure entitlements varies as a function of factors such gender, age

and status (Indra & Buchignana,1997). Numerous examples were

observed of individuals or households being excluded from social

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networks or relationships, for reasons as diverse as illness, infertility

and divorce.

From an instrumental perspective, the effectiveness of social

relationships and informal institutions in yielding material coping

resources and hence in reducing vulnerability amongst the poorest

therefore needs to be questioned. While these limitations are

undoubtedly significant, to fully appreciate the implications for

vulnerability and adaptive capacity I argue that a more critical

perspective needs to be adopted.

This perspective suggests that additional implications for poor actors

result from the characteristics of the institutions themselves. Authors

such as Wood argue that informal institutions must be seen as

embedded in the political economy and, as such, embody inequalities

of power. They are therefore seen as systematically discriminating

against and constraining the agency of poor actors (Wood,

2003;2005). By engaging in unequal relationships, actors reproduce

these institutions; a case of agency reinforcing structure

(Giddens,1986). This perspective raises a number of issues which

have direct relevance for vulnerability and adaptive capacity.

Firstly, the view of agency as strategic and based on household

resources should be problematised (Cleaver,2005). Instead, their

possibilities for exercising agency in order to reduce their own

vulnerability are institutionally constrained (ibid). An extension of this

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argument has more direct implications for adaptive capacity. Wood

(2003) argues that poor people dependent on hierarchical

relationships trade off long-term, autonomous security for dependent

security and thus become risk-averse: the Faustian Bargain. The

significance here is that these trade-offs constrain time horizons and

hence reduce adaptive capacity

These arguments should not be taken to suggest that poor actors are

incapable of exercising agency; an issue that will be returned to in

chapter 5. Instead, they serve firstly to highlight, from an actor

oriented perspective, the undoubted institutional constraints on the

exercise of strategic agency, particularly for the poorest. Secondly,

they sound a cautionary note to be mindful of the power dimension of

the institutions and relationships that underpin the coping strategies

observed. Moreover, they raise the possibility that the exercise of

these coping strategies may have wider implications in terms of

maintaining vulnerability. These issues will be returned to in chapter

5.

Conclusion

The first dimension of the coping framework proposed here certainly

supports the conclusions of many studies of social vulnerability to

climate change: more diversified livelihoods are less vulnerable, as

they are less likely to be disrupted in the event of a flood. They are

also likely to exhibit higher adaptive capacity: diversity affords them

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greater security, translating into longer time horizons. This dimension

also highlights that the type of resources relied on and strategies

pursued are important determinants of vulnerability in the case of a

flood.

The addition of the second dimension provides, I suggest, a basis for

contributing new insights to studies of vulnerability to climate change.

Firstly, this more nuanced view of coping resources and particularly

the relative significance of households social resources highlights that

social relationships and the entitlements attached to them need to be

a focus of attention. Secondly, this focus draws analytical attention to

the informal institutional domain which underpins these entitlements.

This in turn translates into a focus on the local and contextual ways in

which access to resources is defined.

The second half of this chapter has presented an exploratory

discussion of the complex and far-reaching implications of these

findings for vulnerability and adaptive capacity. These implications, I

will now suggest, are particularly important when the dynamic socio-

economic context is factored back into the analysis, against the

backdrop of a changing climate.

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5. Reflections on dynamics

The framework presented in chapter 4 offers, I suggest, a distinctive

way of approaching the study of vulnerability and adaptive capacity. I

have argued that this framework highlights not only the value of

diversified livelihoods, but also draws greater analytical attention to

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the influence of social resources and informal institutions on

vulnerability.

This chapter will build on these insights by factoring in the dynamic

context of rural Bangladesh. Considering each dimension in turn, I

highlight the socio-economic trends of most relevance and consider

the possible dynamics introduced by a changing climate, reflecting on

the potential impacts for vulnerability. The discussion which follows in

many respects continues to be speculative and exploratory in nature;

nevertheless, I argue that while precise policy recommendations would

be inappropriate, the insights and issues raised must be taken into

account.

Dimension 1

Impacts of trends

I have suggested that the first dimension of coping, the need to cope,

was primarily a function of livelihood diversification. The implication of

this is that opportunities for livelihood diversification are an important

part of vulnerability reduction, a finding which concurs with the

assumptions of the CBA literature (Sabates-Wheeler et al,2008). On

first consideration, trends in the rural economy therefore appears to be

broadly positive.

As discussed in chapter 3, the rural non-farm sector in Bangladesh has

experienced considerable growth; its percentage share of rural income

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(Hossain et al, 1996), and the proportion of households engaged in

non-farm activities have shown marked increases (BBS,2008) This

growth undeniably presents a greater range of opportunities for

livelihood diversification. This, at least in theory, should be particularly

beneficial for landless households (Saha, 2003); as alternative

opportunities proliferate, the importance of land has decreased

(Hossain, 2001). Moreover, as noted in chapter 4, in the context of a

changing climate, land dependent livelihoods may actually become

more vulnerable in some cases.

The growth of migration was also identified as an important trend;

statistically, migrants earn higher incomes and have improved life-

chances (Afsar,2003) via access to better employment opportunities

(Rahman, R., 2003); moreover, remittances from migrants are less

likely to be flood-affected and therefore, as noted in chapter 4, reduce

households vulnerability by limiting livelihood disruption.

Nevertheless, the potential for these trends to increase the security of

the most vulnerable must be questioned. The entry barriers to the

non-farm sector are often insurmountable for the poorest households

(Ellis,1998): limited access to financial capital and a lack of skills are

the most obvious mitigating factors (Rahman, H.,2003)

The benefits of migration are similarly differentiated: while the

moderate poor are most likely to migrate, the percentage of the

extreme poor who migrate is low (Afsar,2000). Overseas migration

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requires access to capital to fund the initial move and therefore those

who receive remittances are usually not the poorest (ibid). Likewise,

internal migration is more successful for people with access to

capital, human resources, and particularly social support networks

(Afsar,2003). The potential of migration for reducing the vulnerability

of the poorest is hence also limited; in some cases the day-to-day

insecurity of work for the poorest migrants may actually increase their

insecurity (ibid)

It should also be remembered that alongside these trends, income and

jobs in the farming sector have been lost (Saha, 2003). Invariably, the

poorest households, who rely on agricultural wage labour, have borne

the brunt of this loss (Rahman, R.2003). Moreover, while the central

importance of land may be decreasing, land ownership still provides a

basic element of security. Increases in functional landlessness,

however, are eroding this source of security and forcing poor people

into labour markets (Wood,2003).

Alongside the more obvious resource constraints, poorer households

access to non-farm opportunities is also constrained within the

institutional domain. The growth of the rural non-farm economy has

been paralleled, and in many respects is responsible for a rapidly

shifting institutional landscape. Thornton (2003) identifies the

following trends: the proliferation of formal institutional actors,

particularly relating to the private sector; market forces increasingly

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determining the rules of the game; a shift in influence from

traditional power bases to younger political leaders. All of these

changes were apparent to some extent in the study area19

.

These institutional changes have several implications for the ability of

the poorest to take advantage of new opportunities. Firstly, access

often requires direct interaction with emerging political, administrative

and trading systems (Rahman, R.,2003), yet poor households are often

unable to negotiate this new institutional landscape (Wood,2005).

Secondly, despite the shift away from traditional power-bases, access

to these formal institutions is still mediated by social relationships, an

issue raised in chapter 4 in relation to formal sources of post-flood

assistance. For poor actors, this means that, in many cases, their

ability to access new livelihood opportunities is again dependent on

their social resources. A final issue is that, by extension, the

functioning of new institutional forms is, in reality, still governed by

informal institutional rules and norms (Thornton, 2003). The issues

raised in the previous chapter about the power dimensions and

exclusionary potential of these institutions therefore also apply in this

context.

The agency of the poorest households is hence constrained on two

fronts: their limited resource endowments prevent their entry into new

areas of employment, while their access to, and the nature of the

mediating institutions further limit their room for manoeuvre. Both of

19 See summary of community profile in chapter 3.

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these factors mean that access to non-farm livelihood opportunities is

differentiated; factors which explain and perpetuate the trends

towards an occupational hierarchy within the non-farm sector

(Rahman, H.,2003). These trends are therefore leading to winners and

losers in terms of vulnerability. As Toufique & Turton (2003) argue,

the capacity to differentiate, switch and secure livelihoods is likely to

become the new dividing line amongst the poor.

Dimension 2

Implications of trends

The second dimension related to the manner in which households

coped with livelihood disruption. The poorer households, unable to

cope autonomously, relied on their social resources as a basis for

claiming both extended entitlements and more formal sources of

assistance. The implications for vulnerability related to both the

differential nature of poor peoples social resources and also, at a

deeper level, to the nature of the institutions underpinning these

entitlement claims. Consideration of how a changing context may

affect this dimension hence requires a focus on dynamics impacting on

the social relationships of the poorest, and particularly on the

institutional context which underpins them.

The dynamics of informal institutions, almost by definition, are far

more difficult to observe empirically than those in the formal domain

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(Helme & Levitsky,2004); the discussion that follows is therefore

acknowledged to be more speculative. It is also recognised that some

debate surrounds the question of these dynamics: while Wood (2005)

emphasises the persistence of the basic elements of the moral order,

most observers agree that trends such as marketisation, demographic

changes and a proliferation of institutional actors are having a

discernable effect at some level on the rules of the game and the

relationships which embody them (Devine,2008; Islam,2003).

Dynamics resulting from a changing society.

The penetration of macro politics and market forces into rural space,

already touched on in the preceding discussion, are viewed as being

important drivers of change in the rural institutional landscape

(Islam,2003), particularly through the resulting changes in power

relations (Toufique & Turton,2003). These trends were apparent in the

survey area: in both villages, traditional power structures were

observed to be in decline, attributed to higher incomes and migration

amongst the younger generation. These changes are observed to be

partially responsible for changes in patterns of patronage.

The decline of traditional patronage and the form of security it

provided has been an ongoing trend (Maloney,1988; Adnan,1990;

Islam,2003). This trend has been exacerbated, however, by the more

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recent decline of traditional leadership, while the increased mobility of

labour and growth of the non-farm sector have further loosened

patronage ties (Islam,2003). Nevertheless, as Rahman (1999)

observes, hierarchal relationships and the principles of patronage they

embody do persist, but have shifted towards political and employer

patronage. Other commentators highlight increasing individualism in

rural society as an important trend: increasing nuclearisation of

families and associated changes in perceptions of responsibility

towards the elderly are viewed as manifestations of this trend (Kabeer,

2002). As individualism increasingly conflicts with the sacrifice

required for reciprocity (Wood, 2005), and even reciprocal

relationships are increasingly politicised (Devine, 2008) kin-based

networks are seen as being on the decline (Rahman, 1999).

Dynamics resulting from a changing climate

Alongside these socio-economic dynamics must of course be factored

in the changing nature of the climate. A central assumption within the

rationale for this studys design was climate change is likely to result

in more regular, intense collective risk (Adger & Kelly,1999). This

suggests that sensitive households will be forced to cope with the

effects of abnormal floods more frequently. For the poorest

households, this means that they are likely to have to make increasing

claims on their extended entitlements. The questions must therefore

be posed: to what extent are these claims sustainable and to what

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extent can they continue to provide a safety net in the face of regular

collective loss?

Impacts on vulnerability

Given that the institutional changes suggested here are the subject of

some debate, and that the relationship between these institutions and

vulnerability was observed to be ambivalent, the following discussion

is unavoidably speculative. Moreover, the questions prioritised in

terms of vulnerability will differ depending on the perspective adopted,

and many of the conceptual and empirical issues remain under

researched in this context. The final part of this discussion is therefore

framed as an exploration of future research avenues and questions.

Changes in patterns of patronage raise a number of questions in terms

of vulnerability. From an instrumental perspective, the issues of

concern are whether emerging forms of patronage are as effective at

yielding resources for the poor. This is partly a question of their extent

and coverage, and partly about the norms which underpin political and

employer patronage. Potential issues surround the extent to which

these new relationships are as multi-dimensional as the traditional

forms of patronage they replaced; the multiple ties typically involved

in hierarchical relationships served to ensure their reliability

(Wood,2005).

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From a more critical perspective, new forms of hierarchical

relationships are still viewed as embodying power imbalances.

Nevertheless, these changes raise two key issues in terms of

vulnerability. Firstly, the implications of new forms of patronage for

the agencyof poor people should be questioned: to what extent do

they replicate the constraints of the traditional patronage structures

they replaced? Secondly, the degree to which these changes allow

greater exploitation of the poor must be considered. This relates

particularly to a reduction in the moral dimension of relationships,

which, as Wood (2005) argues, has traditionally acted as a constraint

on excessive exploitation by the powerful.

The implications of the second trend, the decline of reciprocal ties,

initially appear more straightforward: an erosion of the informal safety-

net (Rahman, 1999) might be assumed to automatically increase

vulnerability. When this trend is combined with the likelihood of

increased stress on social resources and more regular collective loss in

the context of a changing climate, this conclusion seems unavoidable.

While certainly logical, this conclusion neglects the possibility that

informal institutions may evolve and adapt in ways which continue to

provide a buffer against vulnerability. It is also guilty of making

assumptions about the way in which these institutions behave under

stress. While both of these issues remain under-researched, the

available literature does provide some pointers. On the first point,

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6. Conclusions

This paper began with the recognition that many climate change

researchers share a common concern with the development

community: that climate change is having a disproportionate effect on

many of the worlds poorest people. It also suggested that

engagement across the two communities has to date, nevertheless

been limited. I suggested that from the perspective of the

development community, this has meant that research into social

vulnerability to climate change is characterised by a number of

weaknesses. In particular, I pointed to their restricted view of

differences between households and unrealistic assumptions about the

relevance and operation of formal institutions. These weaknesses in

turn, I suggested, may limit the relevance and success of their policy

prescriptions.

In this paper I have sought to address these limitations by adopting an

analytical approach which draws more heavily on the livelihoods

tradition. By focusing on coping strategies after a flood I adopted a

similar logic to many studies of social vulnerability. However, by

explicitly bringing household resources to the forefront of the analysis

and by adopting an understanding of these resources which

emphasised their social and cultural dimensions, a more nuanced view

of differences in coping between households emerged.

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This approach revealed that it is necessary to look beyond differences

in households sensitivity and resilience, influenced primarily by

livelihood diversity and differences in material and human resources;

these factors essentially determine households need to cope in a

given situation It is also essential to consider the mannerin which

households cope, and particularly the resources in their portfolio on

which they rely. A focus on this second dimension of coping revealed

that, for the poorest households, social resources are of paramount

importance. Moreover, I demonstrated that households social

resources are essential for securing not only informal extended

entitlements, but also assistance from supposedly formal channels.

This in itself is an important observation, as it reveals a different way

of looking at differences in coping between households. However,

more importantly, this observation shifts the analytical focus to the

informal institutional domain; it is here that the rights which underpin

entitlements, and hence determine access to resources reside. The

necessity of this shift in focus lends support to the claim made at the

outset: the assumption that the formal institutional domain is the most

relevant focus of study is misplaced. Moreover, the observation that

social resources are also important for accessing formal institutions

seem to confirm that assumptions about the unproblematic,

depoliticised operation of formal institutions are also flawed.

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The translation of these findings is that studies of social vulnerability

to climate change need to be much more sensitive to the informal,

locally defined dimensions of coping; while they correctly assume that

access to material resources in times of stress is essential for

households to cope, what they often lack is an awareness of the way in

which this access is defined. I have suggested that this is inherently

contextual and embedded in the nature of locally specific informal

institutions. Moreover, studies need to be more circumspect in their

view of formal institutions in terms of both their relevance and

operation.

This change in focus, I argue, necessitates that questions about

vulnerability and adaptive capacity be redefined; an emphasis on the

informal domain raises a set of issues which studies of social

vulnerability often neglect. Questions about the extent and reliability

of informal institutional arrangements for poor households come to the

fore, while at a deeper level, issues of power and constraints on

agency need to be considered.

Factoring in a dynamic socio-economic context and a changing climate

raises further issues and questions. When considering the potential for

economic changes to reduce vulnerability, the more obvious issues

surround the inability of poor households to access new opportunities

due to their lack of physical and human resources. While these issues

are undoubtedly important, I argue that it is essential to look beyond

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them. An awareness of the actual functioning of formal institutions

reveals that for some households, institutional exclusion, a result

partly of their lack of the right social connections, may also limit their

access to employment opportunities. This illustrates the wider

applicability of a focus on informal institutions; their rules also help to

determine households room to manoeuvre, and hence their ability to

act to reduce their need to cope.

Finally, another set of questions arises about the implications of

dynamics on the institutions themselves. While these changes are

perhaps more speculative, it seems likely that rules about both

reciprocity and patronage are undergoing significant change. The shift

in focus called for here necessitates that this under-researched area

becomes a priority: the implication of informal institutional change for

vulnerability, and the possibilities for institutional adaptation should be

key research areas.

So what does this mean for adaptation research and policy? If the

debate within policy circles continues on its current trajectory, the

potential for social vulnerability research to make an impact on

adaptation policy seems likely to expand. This therefore represents an

opportunity for action to reduce vulnerability. To make the most of

this opportunity, I suggest that more rigorous engagement with the

development community is required.

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This paper provides support for this call to engagement; by adopting

an alternative analytical perspective, it has demonstrated the potential

for fresh insights about vulnerability to be generated. More

specifically, it has called for a change in focus towards the local,

informal and contextual dimensions of coping and hence vulnerability.

While these dimensions may seem less amenable to policy, there are

three important reasons why they must not be neglected.

Firstly, greater attention to the informal dimension of coping and how

it may be changing is essential for identifying trends in social

vulnerability

rethinkinging the context of coping: an exploration of vulnerability to climate change in rural...

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