reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the ...tion and marginalization” in bergen, the...
TRANSCRIPT
-
REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: GEOGRAPHY ANDINSTITUTIONS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION*
DARON ACEMOGLUSIMON JOHNSON
JAMES A. ROBINSON
Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years,those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document thisreversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, weargue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view thatlinks economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that thereversal reects changes in the institutions resulting from European colonialism.The European intervention appears to have created an “institutional reversal”among these societies, meaning that Europeans were more likely to introduceinstitutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. Thisinstitutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We providefurther support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomestook place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and resultedfrom societies with good institutions taking advantage of the opportunity toindustrialize.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper documents a reversal in relative incomes amongthe former European colonies. For example, the Mughals in Indiaand the Aztecs and Incas in the Americas were among the richestcivilizations in 1500, while the civilizations in North America,New Zealand, and Australia were less developed. Today theUnited States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are an orderof magnitude richer than the countries now occupying the terri-tories of the Mughal, Aztec, and Inca Empires.
* We thank Joshua Angrist, Abhijit Banerjee, Olivier Blanchard, AlessandraCassella, Jan de Vries, Ronald Findlay, Jeffry Frieden, Edward Glaeser, HerschelGrossman, Lawrence Katz, Peter Lange, Jeffrey Sachs, Andrei Shleifer, FabrizioZilibotti, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the All-Univer-sities of California History Conference at Berkeley, the conference on “Globaliza-tion and Marginalization” in Bergen, The Canadian Institute of Advanced Re-search, Brown University, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, theUniversity of Houston, Indiana University, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-ogy, National Bureau of Economic Research summer institute, Stanford Univer-sity, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale Universityfor useful comments. Acemoglu gratefully acknowledges nancial help from TheCanadian Institute for Advanced Research and the National Science FoundationGrant SES-0095253. Johnson thanks the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyEntrepreneurship Center for support.
© 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2002
1231
-
Our main measure of economic prosperity in 1500 is urban-ization. Bairoch [1988, Ch. 1] and de Vries [1976, p. 164] arguethat only areas with high agricultural productivity and a devel-oped transportation network can support large urban popula-tions. In addition, we present evidence that both in the timeseries and the cross section there is a close association betweenurbanization and income per capita.1 As an additional proxy forprosperity we use population density, for which there are rela-tively more extensive data. Although the theoretical relationshipbetween population density and prosperity is more complex, itseems clear that during preindustrial periods only relativelyprosperous areas could support dense populations.
With either measure, there is a negative association betweeneconomic prosperity in 1500 and today. Figure I shows a negativerelationship between the percent of the population living in townswith more than 5000 inhabitants in 1500 and income per capitatoday. Figure II shows the same negative relationship betweenlog population density (number of inhabitants per square kilome-ter) in 1500 and income per capita today. The relationships shownin Figures I and II are robust—they are unchanged when wecontrol for continent dummies, the identity of the colonial power,religion, distance from the equator, temperature, humidity, re-sources, and whether the country is landlocked, and when weexclude the “neo-Europes” (the United States, Canada, New Zea-land, and Australia) from the sample.
This pattern is interesting, in part, because it provides anopportunity to distinguish between a number of competing theo-ries of the determinants of long-run development. One of the mostpopular theories, which we refer to as the “geography hypothe-sis,” explains most of the differences in economic prosperity bygeographic, climatic, or ecological differences across countries.The list of scholars who have emphasized the importance ofgeographic factors includes, inter alia, Machiavelli [1519], Mon-
1. By economic prosperity or income per capita in 1500, we do not refer to theeconomic or social conditions or the welfare of the masses, but to a measure oftotal production in the economy relative to the number of inhabitants. Althoughurbanization is likely to have been associated with relatively high output percapita, the majority of urban dwellers lived in poverty and died young because ofpoor sanitary conditions (see, for example, Bairoch [1988, Ch. 12]).
It is also important to note that the Reversal of Fortune refers to changes inrelative incomes across different areas, and does not imply that the initial in-habitants of, for example, New Zealand or North America themselves becamerelatively rich. In fact, much of the native population of these areas did notsurvive European colonialism.
1232 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
tesquieu [1748], Toynbee [1934 –1961], Marshall [1890], andMyrdal [1968], and more recently, Diamond [1997] and Sachs[2000, 2001]. The simplest version of the geography hypothesisemphasizes the time-invariant effects of geographic variables,such as climate and disease, on work effort and productivity, andtherefore predicts that nations and areas that were relatively richin 1500 should also be relatively prosperous today. The reversalin relative incomes weighs against this simple version of thegeography hypothesis.
More sophisticated versions of this hypothesis focus on thetime-varying effects of geography. Certain geographic character-istics that were not useful, or even harmful, for successful eco-nomic performance in 1500 may turn out to be benecial later on.A possible example, which we call “the temperate drift hypothe-sis,” argues that areas in the tropics had an early advantage, butlater agricultural technologies, such as the heavy plow, croprotation systems, domesticated animals, and high-yield crops,have favored countries in the temperate areas (see Bloch [1966],Lewis [1978], and White [1962]; also see Sachs [2001]). Althoughplausible, the temperate drift hypothesis cannot account for the
FIGURE ILog GDP per Capita (PPP) in 1995 against Urbanization Rate in 1500
Note. GDP per capita is from the World Bank [1999]; urbanization in 1500 ispeople living in towns with more than 5000 inhabitants divided by total popu-lation, from Bairoch [1988] and Eggimann [1999]. Details are in Appendices 1and 2.
1233REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
reversal. First, the reversal in relative incomes seems to be re-lated to population density and prosperity before Europeans ar-rived, not to any inherent geographic characteristics of the area.Furthermore, according to the temperate drift hypothesis, thereversal should have occurred when European agricultural tech-nology spread to the colonies. Yet, while the introduction of Eu-ropean agricultural techniques, at least in North America, tookplace earlier, the reversal occurred during the late eighteenth andearly nineteenth centuries, and is closely related to industrializa-tion. Another version of the sophisticated geography hypothesiscould be that certain geographic characteristics, such as the pres-ence of coal reserves or easy access to the sea, facilitated indus-trialization (e.g., Pomeranz [2000] and Wrigley [1988]). But we donot nd any evidence that these geographic factors caused indus-trialization. Our reading of the evidence therefore provides littlesupport to various sophisticated geography hypotheses either.
An alternative view, which we believe provides the best ex-planation for the patterns we document, is the “institutions hy-pothesis,” relating differences in economic performance to theorganization of society. Societies that provide incentives and op-portunities for investment will be richer than those that fail to doso (e.g., North and Thomas [1973], North and Weingast [1989],
FIGURE IILog GDP per Capita (PPP) against Log Population Density in 1500
Note. GDP per capita from the World Bank [1999]; log population density in1500 from McEvedy and Jones [1978]. Details are in Appendix 2.
1234 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
and Olson [2000]). As we discuss in more detail below, we hy-pothesize that a cluster of institutions ensuring secure propertyrights for a broad cross section of society, which we refer to asinstitutions of private property, are essential for investment in-centives and successful economic performance. In contrast, ex-tractive institutions, which concentrate power in the hands of asmall elite and create a high risk of expropriation for the majorityof the population, are likely to discourage investment and eco-nomic development. Extractive institutions, despite their adverseeffects on aggregate performance, may emerge as equilibriuminstitutions because they increase the rents captured by thegroups that hold political power.
How does the institutions hypothesis explain the reversal inrelative incomes among the former colonies? The basic idea isthat the expansion of European overseas empires starting at theend of the fteenth century caused major changes in the organi-zation of many of these societies. In fact, historical and econo-metric evidence suggests that European colonialism caused an“institutional reversal”: European colonialism led to the develop-ment of institutions of private property in previously poor areas,while introducing extractive institutions or maintaining existingextractive institutions in previously prosperous places.2 Themain reason for the institutional reversal is that relatively poorregions were sparsely populated, and this enabled or inducedEuropeans to settle in large numbers and develop institutionsencouraging investment. In contrast, a large population and rela-tive prosperity made extractive institutions more protable forthe colonizers; for example, the native population could be forcedto work in mines and plantations, or taxed by taking over existingtax and tribute systems. The expansion of European overseasempires, combined with the institutional reversal, is consistentwith the reversal in relative incomes since 1500.
Is the reversal related to institutions? We document that thereversal in relative incomes from 1500 to today can be explained,
2. By the term “institutional reversal,” we do not imply that it was societieswith good institutions that ended up with extractive institutions after Europeancolonialism. First, there is no presumption that relatively prosperous societies in1500 had anything resembling institutions of private property. In fact, theirrelative prosperity most likely reected other factors, and even perhaps geo-graphic factors. Second, the institutional reversal may have resulted more fromthe emergence of institutions of private property in previously poor areas thanfrom a deterioration in the institutions of previously rich areas.
1235REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
at least statistically, by differences in institutions across coun-tries. The institutions hypothesis also suggests that institutionaldifferences should matter more when new technologies that re-quire investments from a broad cross section of the society be-come available. We therefore expect societies with good institu-tions to take advantage of the opportunity to industrialize, whilesocieties with extractive institutions fail to do so. The data sup-port this prediction.
We are unaware of any other work that has noticed or docu-mented this change in the distribution of economic prosperity.Nevertheless, many historians emphasize that in 1500 the Mu-ghal, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires were highly prosperous, butgrew slowly during the next 500 years (see the discussion andreferences in Section III).
Our overall interpretation of comparative development in theformer colonies is closely related to Coatsworth [1993] and En-german and Sokoloff [1997, 2000], who emphasize the adverseeffects of the plantation complex in the Caribbean and CentralAmerica working through political and economic inequality,3 andto our previous paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001a].In that paper we proposed the disease environment at the timeEuropeans arrived as an instrument for European settlementsand the subsequent institutional development of the former col-onies, and used this to estimate the causal effect of institutionaldifferences on economic performance. Our thesis in the currentpaper is related, but emphasizes the inuence of population den-sity and prosperity on the policies pursued by the Europeans (seealso Engerman and Sokoloff [1997]). In addition, here we docu-ment the reversal in relative incomes among the former colonies,show that it was related to industrialization, and provide evi-dence that the interaction between institutions and the opportu-nity to industrialize during the nineteenth century played a cen-tral role in the long-run development of the former colonies.4
3. In this context, see also Frank [1978], Rodney [1972], Wallerstein [1974–1980], and Williams [1944].
4. Our results are also relevant to the literature on the relationship betweenpopulation and growth. The recent consensus is that population density encour-ages the discovery and exchange of ideas, and contributes to growth (e.g., Boserup[1965], Jones [1997], Kremer [1993], Kuznets [1968], Romer [1986], and Simon[1977]). Our evidence points to a major historical episode of 500 years where highpopulation density was detrimental to economic development, and therefore shedsdoubt on the general applicability of this recent consensus.
1236 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next sectiondiscusses the construction of urbanization and population densitydata, and provides evidence that these are good proxies for eco-nomic prosperity. Section III documents the “Reversal of For-tune”—the negative relationship between economic prosperity in1500 and income per capita today among the former colonies.Section IV discusses why the simple and sophisticated geographyhypotheses cannot explain this pattern, and how the institutionshypothesis explains the reversal. Section V documents that thereversal in relative incomes reects the institutional reversalcaused by European colonialism, and that institutions startedplaying a more important role during the age of industry. SectionVI concludes.
II. URBANIZATION AND POPULATION DENSITY
II.A. Data on Urbanization
Bairoch [1988] provides the best single collection and assess-ment of urbanization estimates. Our base data for 1500 consist ofBairoch’s [1988] urbanization estimates augmented by the workof Eggimann [1999]. Merging the Eggimann and Bairoch seriesrequires us to convert Eggimann’s estimates, which are based ona minimum population threshold of 20,000, into Bairoch-equiva-lent urbanization estimates, which use a minimum populationthreshold of 5000. We use a number of different methods toconvert between the two sets of estimates, all with similar re-sults. Appendix 1 provides details about data sources and con-struction. Briey, for our base estimates, we run a regression ofBairoch estimates on Eggimann estimates for all countries wherethey overlap in 1900 (the year for which we have most Bairochestimates for non-European countries). This regression yields aconstant of 6.6 and a coefcient of 0.67, which we use to generateBairoch-equivalent urbanization estimates from Eggimann’sestimates.
Alternatively, we converted the Eggimann’s numbers using auniform conversion rate of 2 as suggested by Davis’ and Zipf ’sLaws (see Appendix 1 and Bairoch [1988, Ch. 9]), and also testedthe robustness of the estimates using conversion ratios at theregional level based on Bairoch’s analysis. Finally, we con-structed three alternative series without combining estimatesfrom different sources. One of these is based on Bairoch, the
1237REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
second on Eggimann, and the third on Chandler [1987]. All fouralternative series are reported in Appendix 3, and results usingthese measures are reported in Table IV.
While the data on sub-Saharan Africa are worse than for anyother region, it is clear that urbanization in sub-Saharan Africabefore 1500 was at a higher level than in North America orAustralia. Bairoch, for example, argues that by 1500 urbaniza-tion was “well-established” in sub-Saharan Africa.5 Becausethere are no detailed urbanization data for sub-Saharan Africa,we leave this region out of the regression analysis when we useurbanization data, although African countries are included in ourregressions using population density.
Table I gives descriptive statistics for the key variables ofinterest, separately for the whole world, for the sample of ex-colonies for which we have urbanization data in 1500, and for thesample of ex-colonies for which we have population density datain 1500. Appendix 2 gives detailed denitions and sources for thevariables used in this study.
II.B. Urbanization and Income
There are good reasons to presume that urbanization andincome are positively related. Kuznets [1968, p. 1] opens his bookon economic growth by stating: “we identify the economic growthof nations as a sustained increase in per-capita or per-workerproduct, most often accompanied by an increase in populationand usually by sweeping structural changes. . . . in the distribu-tion of population between the countryside and the cities, theprocess of urbanization.”
Bairoch [1988] points out that during preindustrial periods alarge fraction of the agricultural surplus was likely to be spent ontransportation, so both a relatively high agricultural surplus anda developed transport system were necessary for large urbanpopulations (see Bairoch [1988, Ch. 1]). He argues “the existenceof true urban centers presupposes not only a surplus of agricul-
5. Sahelian trading cities such as Timbuktu, Gao, and Djenne (all in modernMali) were very large in the middle ages with populations as high as 80,000. Kano(in modern Nigeria) had a population of 30,000 in the early nineteenth century,and Yorubaland (also in Nigeria) was highly urbanized with a dozen towns withpopulations of over 20,000 while its capital Ibadan possibly had 70,000 inhabit-ants. For these numbers and more detail, see Hopkins [1973, Ch. 2].
1238 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
TA
BL
EI
DE
SC
RIP
TIV
ES
TA
TIS
TIC
S
Who
lew
orld
(1)
Bas
esa
mpl
efo
rur
ban
izat
ion
(2)
Bas
esa
mpl
efo
rpo
pula
tion
dens
ity
(3)
Bel
owm
edia
nu
rban
izat
ion
in15
00(4
)
Abo
vem
edia
nur
bani
zati
onin
1500
(5)
Bel
owm
edia
npo
pula
tion
dens
ity
in15
00(6
)
Abo
vem
edia
npo
pula
tion
den
sity
in15
00(7
)
Log
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
(PP
P)
in19
958.
38.
57.
98.
88.
18.
37.
5(1
.1)
(0.9
)(1
.0)
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1995
53.0
57.5
45.4
64.9
49.7
53.5
36.7
(23.
8)(2
2.4)
(22.
2)U
rban
izat
ion
in15
007.
36.
46.
42.
410
.52.
39.
5(5
.0)
(5.0
)(5
.0)
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsit
yin
1500
1.0
0.2
0.5
20.
91.
42
0.6
1.6
(1.6
)(1
.9)
(1.5
)P
opul
atio
nde
nsi
tyin
1500
9.2
6.3
4.8
1.2
11.7
0.8
9.1
(24.
3)(1
6.4)
(11.
7)L
ogpo
pula
tion
dens
ity
in10
000.
60.
110.
082
1.20
1.22
20.
941.
04(1
.5)
(2.0
)(1
.5)
Ave
rage
prot
ecti
onag
ain
stex
prop
riat
ion,
1985
–199
57.
16.
96.
57.
56.
36.
86.
2(1
.8)
(1.5
)(1
.4)
Con
stra
int
onth
eex
ecut
ive
in19
903.
64.
93.
75.
14.
64.
03.
5(2
.3)
(2.1
)(2
.3)
Con
stra
int
onth
eex
ecut
ive
inr
stye
arof
inde
pen
den
ce
3.6
3.3
3.4
3.8
2.8
3.6
3.3
(2.4
)(2
.5)
(2.3
)
Eur
opea
nse
ttle
men
tsin
1900
29.6
23.2
12.5
30.5
6.0
18.7
4.7
(41.
7)(2
8.7)
(22.
1)N
umbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
s16
241
9121
2047
44
Sta
ndar
dde
viat
ions
are
inpa
rent
hese
s.N
umbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
sva
ries
acro
ssro
ws
due
tom
issi
ngda
ta.
The
rst
thre
eco
lum
ns
repo
rtm
ean
valu
esfo
rth
esa
mpl
ein
dica
ted
atth
ehe
adof
the
colu
mn.
The
last
four
colu
mn
sre
port
mea
nva
lues
for
form
erco
lon
ies
belo
wan
dab
ove
the
med
ian,
sepa
rate
lyfo
rth
eba
seur
bani
zati
onan
dpo
pula
tion
den
sity
sam
ples
.F
orde
tail
edso
urce
san
dde
scri
ptio
ns
see
App
endi
x2.
1239REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
tural produce, but also the possibility of using this surplus intrade” [p. 11].6 See de Vries [1976, p. 164] for a similar argument.
We supplement this argument by empirically investigatingthe link between urbanization and income in Table II. Columns(1)–(6) present cross-sectional regressions. Column (1) is for 1900,the earliest date for which we have data on urbanization andincome per capita for a large number of countries. The regressioncoefcient, 0.038, is highly signicant, with a standard error of0.006. It implies that a country with 10 percentage points higherurbanization has, on average, 46 percent (38 log points) greaterincome per capita (throughout the paper, all urbanization ratesare expressed in percentage points, e.g., 10 rather than 0.1—seeTable I). Column (2) reports a similar result using data for 1950.Column (3) uses current data and shows that even today there isa strong relationship between income per capita and urbanizationfor a large sample of countries. The coefcient is similar, 0.036,and precisely estimated, with a standard error of 0.002. Thisrelationship is shown diagrammatically in Figure III.
Below, we draw a distinction between countries colonized byEuropeans and those never colonized (i.e., Europe and non-Euro-pean countries not colonized by Western Europe). Columns (4) and(5) report the same regression separately for these two samples. Theestimates are very similar: 0.037 for the former colonies sample, and0.033 for the rest of the countries. Finally, in column (6) we addcontinent dummies to the same regression. This leads to only aslightly smaller coefcient of 0.030, with a standard error of 0.002.
Finally, we use estimates from Bairoch [1978, 1988] to con-struct a small unbalanced panel data set of urbanization andincome per capita from 1750 to 1913. Column (7) reports a re-
6. The view that urbanization and income (productivity) are closely related isshared by many other scholars. See Ades and Glaeser [1999], De Long andShleifer [1993], Tilly and Blockmans [1994], and Tilly [1990]. De Long andShleifer, for example, write “The larger preindustrial cities were nodes of infor-mation, industry, and exchange in areas where the growth of agricultural pro-ductivity and economic specialization had advanced far enough to support them.They could not exist without a productive countryside and a ourishing tradenetwork. The population of Europe’s preindustrial cities is a rough indicator ofeconomic prosperity” [p. 675].
A large history literature also documents how urbanization accelerated inEurope during periods of economic expansion (e.g., Duby [1974], Pirenne [1956],and Postan and Rich [1966]). For example, the period between the beginning ofthe eleventh and mid-fourteenth centuries is an era of rapid increase in agricul-tural productivity and industrial output. The same period also witnessed a pro-liferation of cities. Bairoch [1988], for example, estimates that the number of citieswith more than 20,000 inhabitants increased from around 43 in 1000 to 107 in1500 [Table 10.2, p. 159].
1240 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
TA
BL
EII
UR
BA
NIZ
AT
ION
AN
DP
ER
CA
PIT
AIN
CO
ME
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1913
,al
lco
un
trie
s(1
)
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1950
,al
lco
un
trie
s(2
)
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1995
,al
lco
untr
ies
(3)
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1995
,on
lyfo
rex
-col
onie
s(4
)
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1995
,n
ever
colo
niz
edco
untr
ies
only
(5)
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
regr
essi
onin
1995
,al
lco
un
trie
s,w
ith
cont
inen
tdu
mm
ies
(6)
Pan
elda
tase
tth
rou
gh19
13(7
)
Dep
end
ent
vari
able
islo
gG
DP
per
capi
ta
Urb
aniz
atio
n0.
038
0.02
60.
036
0.03
70.
033
0.03
00.
026
(0.0
06)
(0.0
02)
(0.0
02)
(0.0
03)
(0.0
07)
(0.0
02)
(0.0
04)
R2
0.69
0.57
0.63
0.69
0.34
0.68
0.93
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
s22
128
162
9351
162
55
Sta
ndar
der
rors
are
inpa
rent
hese
s.L
ogG
DP
per
capi
tath
roug
h19
13is
from
Bai
roch
[197
8].U
rban
izat
ion
ispe
rcen
tof
popu
lati
onliv
ing
into
wns
wit
hat
leas
t50
00pe
ople
,fr
omB
airo
ch[1
988]
thro
ugh
1900
wit
hsu
pple
men
tary
sour
ces
asde
scri
bed
inA
ppen
dix
1.L
ogG
DP
per
capi
tain
1950
isfr
omM
addi
son
[199
5];t
his
regr
essi
onus
esur
bani
zati
onin
1960
from
the
Wor
ldB
ank’
sW
orld
Dev
elop
men
tIn
dica
tors
[199
9].
Log
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
(PP
P)
and
Urb
aniz
atio
nda
tafo
r19
95ar
efr
omth
eW
orld
Ban
k’s
Wor
ldD
evel
opm
ent
Indi
cato
rs[1
999]
.Pop
ulat
ion
den
sity
isto
tal
popu
lati
ondi
vide
dby
arab
lela
nd
area
,bot
hfr
omM
cEve
dyan
dJo
nes
[197
8].F
orde
tail
edso
urc
esan
dde
scri
ptio
nsse
eA
ppen
dix
2.T
heco
unt
ries
and
appr
oxim
ate
year
sfo
rw
hic
hw
eha
veda
ta(u
sed
inth
eu
nbal
ance
dpa
nelr
egre
ssio
nin
colu
mn
(7))
are
Aus
tral
ia(1
830,
1860
,and
1913
),A
ust
ria
(183
0,18
60,
1913
),B
elgi
um(1
830,
1860
,19
13),
Bri
tain
(175
0,18
30,
1860
,19
13),
Bul
gari
a(1
860,
1913
),C
anad
a(1
830,
1860
,19
13),
Chi
na
(183
0,18
60),
Den
mar
k(1
830,
1860
,19
13),
Fin
lan
d(1
830,
1860
,191
3),F
ranc
e(1
750,
1830
,186
0,19
13),
Ger
man
y(1
830,
1860
,191
3),G
reec
e(1
860,
1913
),In
dia
(183
0,19
13),
Ital
y(1
830,
1860
,191
3),J
amai
ca(1
830,
1913
),Ja
pan
(175
0,18
30,1
913)
,Net
herl
ands
(183
0,18
60,1
913)
,Nor
way
(183
0,18
60,1
913)
,Por
tuga
l(18
30,1
860,
1913
),R
oman
ia(1
830,
1860
,191
3),R
ussi
a(1
750,
1830
,186
0,19
13),
Spa
in(1
830,
1860
,19
13),
Swed
en(1
830,
1860
,191
3),S
wit
zerl
and
(183
0,18
60,1
913)
,U
nite
dS
tate
s(1
750,
1830
,186
0,19
13),
and
Yug
osla
via
(183
0,18
60,1
913)
.
1241REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
gression of income per capita on urbanization using this paneldata set and controlling for country and period dummies. Theestimate is again similar: 0.026 (s.e. 5 0.004). Overall, we con-clude that urbanization is a good proxy for income.
II.C. Population Density and Income
The most comprehensive data on population since 1 A.D.come from McEvedy and Jones [1978]. They provide estimatesbased on censuses and published secondary sources. Whilesome individual country numbers have since been revised andothers remain contentious (particularly for pre-Columbian Meso-America), their estimates are consistent with more recent re-search (see, for example, the recent assessment by the Bureauof the Census, www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html). We useMcEvedy and Jones [1978] for our baseline estimates, and testthe effect of using alternative assumptions (e.g., lower or higherpopulation estimates for Mexico and its neighbors before thearrival of Cortes).
FIGURE IIILog GDP per Capita (PPP) in 1995 against the Urbanization Rate in 1995
Note. GDP per capita and urbanization are from the World Bank [1999]. Ur-banization is percent of population living in urban areas. The denition of urbanareas differs between countries, but the usual minimum size is 2000–5000 inhabi-tants. For details of denitions and sources for urban population in 1995, see theUnited Nations [1998].
1242 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html
-
We calculate population density by dividing total populationby arable land (also estimated by McEvedy and Jones). Thisexcludes primarily desert, inland water, and tundra. As much aspossible, we use the land area of a country at the date we areconsidering.
The theoretical relationship between population density andincome is more nuanced than that between urbanization andincome. With a similar reasoning, it seems natural to think thatonly relatively rich areas could afford dense populations (seeBairoch [1988, Ch. 1]). This is also in line with Malthus’ classicwork. Malthus [1798] argued that high productivity increasespopulation by raising birthrates and lowering death rates. How-ever, the main thrust of Malthus’ work was how a higher thanequilibrium level of population increases death rates and reducesbirthrates to correct itself.7 A high population could therefore bereecting an “excess” of population, causing low income per cap-ita. So caution is required in interpreting population density as aproxy for income per capita.
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship betweenpopulation density and income is also less clear-cut than therelationship between urbanization and income. In Acemoglu,Johnson, and Robinson [2001b] we documented that populationdensity and income per capita increased concurrently in manyinstances. Nevertheless, there is no similar cross-sectional rela-tionship in recent data, most likely because of the demographictransition—it is no longer true that high population density isassociated with high income per capita because the relationshipbetween income and the number of children has changed (e.g.,Notestein [1945] or Livi-Bacci [2001]).
Despite these reservations, we present results using popula-tion density, as well as urbanization, as a proxy for income percapita. This is motivated by three considerations. First, popula-tion density data are more extensive, so the use of populationdensity data is a useful check on our results using urbanizationdata. Second, as argued by Bairoch, population density is closely
7. A common interpretation of Malthus’ argument is that these populationdynamics will force all countries down to the subsistence level of income. In thatcase, population density would be a measure of total income, but not necessarilyof income per capita, and in fact, there would be no systematic (long-run) differ-ences in income per capita across countries. We view this interpretation asextreme, and existing historical evidence suggests that there were systematicdifferences in income per capita between different regions even before the modernperiod (see the references below).
1243REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
related to urbanization, and in fact, our measures are highlycorrelated. Third, variation in population density will play animportant role not only in documenting the reversal, but also inexplaining it.
III. THE REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
III.A. Results with Urbanization
This section presents our main results. Figure I in the intro-duction depicts the relationship between urbanization 1500 andincome per capita today. Table III reports regressions document-ing the same relationship. Column (1) is our most parsimoniousspecication, regressing log income per capita in 1995 (PPP basis)on urbanization rates in 1500 for our sample of former colonies.The coefcient is 20.078 with a standard error of 0.026.8 Thiscoefcient implies that a 10 percentage point lower urbanizationin 1500 is associated with approximately twice as high GDP percapita today (78 log points 108 percent). It is important to notethat this is not simply mean reversion—i.e., richer than averagecountries reverting back to the mean. It is a reversal. To illustratethis, let us compare Uruguay and Guatemala. The native popu-lation in Uruguay had no urbanization, while, according to ourbaseline estimates Guatemala had an urbanization rate of 9.2percent. The estimate in column (1) of Table II, 0.038, for therelationship between income and urbanization implies that Gua-temala at the time was approximately 42 percent richer thanUruguay (exp (0.038 3 9.2) 2 1 0.42). According to our estimatein column (1) of Table III, we expect Uruguay today to be 105percent richer than Guatemala (exp (0.078 3 9.2) 2 1 1.05),which is approximately the current difference in income per cap-ita between these two countries.9
The second column of Table III excludes North African coun-tries for which data quality may be lower. The result is un-
8. Because China was never a formal colony, we do not include it in oursample of ex-colonies. Adding China does not affect our results. For example, withChina, the baseline estimate changes from 20.078 (s.e. 5 0.026) to 20.079 (s.e. 50.025). Furthermore, our sample excludes countries that were colonized by Euro-pean powers briey during the twentieth century, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, andSyria. If we include these observations, the results are essentially unchanged. Forexample, the baseline estimate changes to 20.072 (s.e. 5 0.024).
9. Interestingly, these calculations suggest that not only have relative rank-ings reversed since 1500, but income differences are now much larger than in1500.
1244 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
changed, with a coefcient of 20.101 and standard error of 0.032.Column (3) drops the Americas, which increases both the coef-cient and the standard error, but the estimate remains highlysignicant. Column (4) reports the results just for the Americas,where the relationship is somewhat weaker but still signicant atthe 8 percent level. Column (5) adds continent dummies to checkwhether the relationship is being driven by differences acrosscontinents. Although continent dummies are jointly signicant,the coefcient on urbanization in 1500 is unaffected—it is 20.083with a standard error of 0.030.
One might also be concerned that the relationship is beingdriven mainly by the neo-Europes: United States, Canada, NewZealand, and Australia. These countries are settler colonies builton lands that were inhabited by relatively undeveloped civiliza-tions. Although the contrast between the development experi-ences of these areas and the relatively advanced civilizations ofIndia or Central America is of central importance to the reversal andto our story, one would like to know whether there is anything morethan this contrast in the results of Table III. In column (6) we dropthese observations. The relationship is now weaker, but still nega-tive and statistically signicant at the 7 percent level.
In column (7) we control for distance from the equator (theabsolute value of latitude), which does not affect the pattern ofthe reversal—the coefcient on urbanization in 1500 is now20.072 instead of 20.078 in our baseline specication. Distancefrom the equator is itself insignicant. Column (8), in turn, con-trols for a variety of geography variables that represent the effectof climate, such as measures of temperature, humidity, and soiltype, with little effect on the relationship between urbanization in1500 and income per capita today. The R2 of the regressionincreases substantially, but this simply reects the addition ofsixteen new variables to this regression (the adjusted R2 in-creases only slightly, to 0.27).
In column (9) we control for a variety of “resources” whichmay have been important for post-1500 development. These in-clude dummies for being an island, for being landlocked, and forhaving coal reserves and a variety of other natural resources (seeAppendix 2 for detailed denitions and sources). Access to the seamay have become more important with the rise of trade, andavailability of coal or other natural resources may have differenteffects at different points in time. Once again, the addition ofthese variables has no effect on the pattern of the reversal.
1245REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
TA
BL
EII
IU
RB
AN
IZA
TIO
NIN
1500
AN
DG
DP
PE
RC
AP
ITA
IN19
95F
OR
FO
RM
ER
EU
RO
PE
AN
CO
LO
NIE
S
Dep
ende
nt
vari
able
islo
gG
DP
per
capi
ta(P
PP
)in
1995
Bas
esa
mpl
e(1
)
Wit
hou
tN
orth
Afr
ica
(2)
Wit
hou
tth
eA
mer
icas
(3)
Just
the
Am
eric
as(4
)
Wit
hco
nti
nen
tdu
mm
ies
(5)
Wit
hou
tne
o-E
uro
pes
(6)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rla
titu
de(7
)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rcl
imat
e(8
)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rre
sou
rces
(9)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rco
lon
ial
orig
in(1
0)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rre
ligi
on(1
1)
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1500
20.
078
20.
101
20.
115
20.
053
20.
083
20.
046
20.
072
20.
088
20.
058
20.
071
20.
060
(0.0
26)
(0.0
32)
(0.0
51)
(0.0
29)
(0.0
30)
(0.0
26)
(0.0
25)
(0.0
30)
(0.0
29)
(0.0
28)
(0.0
33)
Asi
adu
mm
y2
1.33
(0.6
1)A
fric
adu
mm
y2
0.53
(0.7
7)A
mer
ica
dum
my
20.
96(0
.57)
Lat
itu
de1.
42(0
.92)
P-v
alu
efo
rte
mpe
ratu
re[0
.51]
P-v
alu
efo
rhu
mid
ity
[0.4
0]
P-v
alu
efo
rso
ilqu
alit
y[0
.96]
P-v
alu
efo
rre
sou
rces
[0.1
6]
1246 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
Lan
dloc
ked
20.
54(0
.48)
Isla
nd
0.27
(0.3
3)C
oal
0.11
(0.2
8)F
orm
erF
renc
hco
lon
y2
0.59
(0.3
9)F
orm
erS
pan
ish
colo
ny
0.06
(0.2
9)P
-val
ue
for
reli
gion
[0.4
7]
R2
0.19
0.22
0.26
0.13
0.32
0.09
0.24
0.53
0.45
0.27
0.25
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ions
4137
1724
4137
4141
4141
41
Sta
ndar
der
rors
are
inpa
ren
thes
es.P
-val
ues
from
F-t
ests
for
join
tsi
gni
can
cear
ein
squ
are
brac
kets
.Dep
ende
ntva
riab
leis
log
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
(PP
P)
in19
95.
Bas
esa
mpl
eis
allf
orm
erco
loni
esfo
rw
hic
hw
eha
veda
ta.U
rban
izat
ion
in15
00is
perc
ent
ofth
epo
pula
tion
livi
ng
into
wns
wit
h50
00or
mor
ein
habi
tant
s.T
he
regr
essi
onth
atin
clud
esco
ntin
ent
dum
mie
sha
sO
cean
iaas
the
base
cate
gory
.The
neo-
Eu
rope
sar
eth
eU
nite
dS
tate
s,C
anad
a,A
ust
rali
a,an
dN
ewZe
alan
d.In
the
“cli
mat
e”re
gres
sion
we
incl
ude
ve
mea
sure
sof
tem
pera
ture
,fo
urm
easu
res
ofhu
mid
ity,
and
seve
nm
easu
res
ofso
ilqu
alit
y.In
the
“res
ourc
es”
regr
essi
onw
ein
clud
ere
serv
esof
gold
,iro
n,zi
nc,
silv
er,a
ndoi
l.C
oali
sa
dum
my
for
the
pres
ence
ofco
al,l
andl
ocke
dis
adu
mm
yfo
rno
tha
ving
acce
ssto
the
sea,
and
isla
ndis
adu
mm
yfo
rbe
ing
anis
lan
d.T
here
gres
sion
that
cont
rols
for
colo
nial
orig
inin
clud
esdu
mm
ies
for
form
erF
renc
hco
lony
,Spa
nis
hco
lon
y,P
ortu
gues
eco
lony
,Bel
gian
colo
ny,
Ital
ian
colo
ny,G
erm
anco
lony
,and
Dut
chco
lony
.B
riti
shco
loni
esar
eth
eba
seca
tego
ry.
The
reli
gion
vari
able
sar
epe
rcen
tof
the
popu
lati
onw
hoar
eM
uslim
,C
atho
lic,
and
“oth
er”;
perc
ent
Pro
test
ant
isth
eba
seca
tego
ry.F
orde
taile
dso
urc
esan
dde
scri
ptio
nsse
eA
ppen
dix
2.
1247REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
Finally, in columns (10) and (11) we add the identity of thecolonial power and religion, which also have little effect on ourestimate, and are themselves insignicant.
The urbanization variable used in Table III relies on work byBairoch and Eggimann. In Table IV we use data from Bairoch andEggimann separately, as well as data from Chandler, who pro-vided the starting point for Bairoch’s data. We report a subset ofthe regressions from Table III using these three different seriesand an alternative series using the Davis-Zipf adjustment toconvert Eggimann’s estimates into Bairoch-equivalent numbers(explained in Appendix 1). The results are very similar to thebaseline estimates reported in Table III: in all cases, there is anegative relationship between urbanization in 1500 and incomeper capita today, and in almost all cases, this relationship isstatistically signicant at the 5 percent level (the full set ofresults are reported in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001b]).
III.B. Results with Population Density
In Panel A of Table V we regress income per capita today onlog population density in 1500, and also include data for sub-Saharan Africa. The results are similar to those in Table IV (alsosee Figure II). In all specications we nd that countries withhigher population density in 1500 are substantially poorer today.The coefcient of 20.38 in column (1) implies that a 10 percenthigher population density in 1500 is associated with a 4 percentlower income per capita today. For example, the area now corre-sponding to Bolivia was seven times more densely settled thanthe area corresponding to Argentina; so on the basis of thisregression, we expect Argentina to be three times as rich asBolivia, which is more or less the current gap in income betweenthese countries.10
The remaining columns perform robustness checks, andshow that including a variety of controls for geography and re-sources, the identity of the colonial power, religion variables, ordropping the Americas, the neo-Europes, or North Africa has very
10. The magnitudes implied by the estimates in this table are similar to thoseimplied by the estimates in Table III. For example, the difference in the urban-ization rate between an average high and low urbanization country in 1500 is 8.1(see columns (4) and (5) in Table I), which using the coefcient of 20.078 fromTable III translates into a 0.078 3 8.1 0.63 log points difference in current GDP.The difference in log population density between an average high-density andlow-density country in 1500 is 2.2 (see columns (6) and (7) in Table I), whichtranslates into a 0.38 3 2.2 0.84 log points difference in current GDP.
1248 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
little effect on the results. In all cases, log population density in1500 is signicant at the 1 percent level (although now some ofthe controls, such as the humidity dummies, are also signicant).
TABLE IVALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF URBANIZATION
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995
Basesample
(1)
With continentdummies
(2)
Withoutneo-Europes
(3)
Controllingfor latitude
(4)
Controllingfor resources
(5)
Panel A: Using our base sample measure of urbanization
Urbanization in 1500 20.078 20.083 20.046 20.072 20.058(0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
R2 0.19 0.32 0.09 0.24 0.45Number of observations 41 41 37 41 41
Panel B: Using only Bairoch’s estimates
Urbanization in 1500 20.126 20.107 20.089 20.116 20.092(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037)
R2 0.30 0.37 0.19 0.31 0.49Number of observations 37 37 33 37 37
Panel C: Using only Eggimann’s estimates
Urbanization in 1500 20.041 20.043 20.022 20.036 20.022(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023)
R2 0.10 0.28 0.04 0.16 0.39Number of observations 41 41 37 41 41
Panel D: Using only Chandler’s estimates
Urbanization in 1500 20.057 20.072 20.040 20.054 20.049(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
R2 0.27 0.43 0.17 0.34 0.66Number of observations 26 26 23 26 26
Panel E: Using Davis-Zipf Adjustment for Eggimann’s series
Urbanization in 1500 20.039 20.048 20.024 20.040 20.031(0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
R2 0.14 0.30 0.08 0.23 0.44Number of observations 41 41 37 41 41
Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995. Basesample is all former colonies for which we have data. Urbanization in 1500 is percent of the population livingin towns with 5000 or more people. In Panels B, C, D, and E, we use, respectively, Bairoch’s estimates,Eggimann’s estimates, Chandler’s estimates, and a conversion of Eggimann’s estimates into Bairoch-equiva-lent numbers using the Davis-Zipf adjustment. Eggimann’s estimates (Panel C) and Chandler’s estimates(Panel D) are not converted to Bairoch-equivalent units. The continent dummies, neo-Europes,and resourcesmeasures are as described in the note to Table III. For detailed sources and descriptions see Appendix 2. Thealternative urbanization series are shown in Appendix 3.
1249REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
TA
BL
EV
PO
PU
LA
TIO
ND
EN
SIT
YA
ND
GD
PP
ER
CA
PIT
AIN
FO
RM
ER
EU
RO
PE
AN
CO
LO
NIE
S
Dep
ende
nt
vari
able
islo
gG
DP
per
capi
ta(P
PP
)in
1995
Bas
esa
mpl
e(1
)
Wit
hou
tA
fric
a(2
)
Wit
hou
tth
eA
mer
icas
(3)
Just
the
Am
eric
as(4
)
Wit
hco
nti
nen
tdu
mm
ies
(5)
Wit
hou
tn
eo-
Eu
rope
s(6
)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rla
titu
de(7
)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rcl
imat
e(8
)
Con
trol
ling
for
reso
urc
es(9
)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rco
lon
ial
orig
in(1
0)
Con
trol
lin
gfo
rre
ligi
on(1
1)
Pan
elA
:L
ogpo
pula
tion
den
sity
in15
00as
ind
epen
den
tva
riab
le
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
20.
382
0.40
20.
322
0.25
20.
262
0.32
20.
332
0.31
20.
302
0.32
20.
37(0
.06)
(0.0
5)(0
.07)
(0.0
9)(0
.05)
(0.0
6)(0
.06)
(0.0
6)(0
.06)
(0.0
6)(0
.07)
Asi
adu
mm
y2
0.91
(0.5
5)A
fric
adu
mm
y2
1.67
(0.5
2)A
mer
ica
dum
my
20.
69(0
.51)
Lat
itu
de2.
09(0
.74)
P-v
alu
efo
rte
mpe
ratu
re[0
.18]
P-v
alu
efo
rh
um
idit
y[0
.00]
P-v
alu
efo
rso
ilqu
alit
y[0
.10]
P-v
alu
efo
rn
atur
alre
sou
rces
[0.3
4]
Lan
dloc
ked
20.
58(0
.23)
Isla
nd
0.62
(0.2
3)
1250 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
Coa
l0.
01(0
.19)
For
mer
Fre
nch
colo
ny
20.
48(0
.20)
For
mer
Spa
nis
hco
lon
y0.
25(0
.22)
P-v
alu
efo
rre
ligi
on[0
.73]
R2
0.34
0.55
0.27
0.22
0.56
0.24
0.40
0.59
0.54
0.48
0.36
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
s91
4758
3391
8791
9085
9185
Pan
elB
:L
ogpo
pula
tion
and
log
lan
din
1500
asse
para
tein
dep
end
ent
vari
able
s
Log
popu
lati
onin
1500
20.
342
0.30
20.
322
0.13
20.
232
0.27
20.
292
0.27
20.
272
0.28
20.
31(0
.05)
(0.0
5)(0
.07)
(0.0
7)(0
.05)
(0.0
5)(0
.05)
(0.0
5)(0
.05)
(0.0
5)(0
.06)
Log
arab
lela
nd
in15
000.
260.
270.
210.
160.
180.
150.
200.
200.
080.
210.
24(0
.06)
(0.0
6)(0
.09)
(0.0
6)(0
.05)
(0.0
6)(0
.06)
(0.0
6)(0
.07)
(0.0
6)(0
.07)
R2
0.35
0.45
0.31
0.17
0.55
0.31
0.41
0.59
0.55
0.47
0.36
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
s91
4758
3391
8791
9085
9185
Pan
elC
:U
sin
gpo
pula
tion
den
sity
in10
00A
.D.
asan
inst
rum
ent
for
popu
lati
ond
ensi
tyin
1500
A.D
.
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
20.
312
0.4
20.
152
0.38
20.
182
0.22
20.
272
0.26
20.
222
0.26
20.
25(0
.06)
(0.0
6)(0
.08)
(0.1
1)(0
.07)
(0.0
8)(0
.06)
(0.0
7)(0
.07)
(0.0
6)(0
.08)
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ion
s83
4351
3283
8083
8378
8377
Sta
ndar
der
rors
are
inpa
ren
thes
es.P
-val
ues
from
F-t
ests
for
join
tsi
gni
can
cear
ein
squ
are
brac
kets
.Dep
ende
ntva
riab
leis
log
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
(PP
P)
in19
95.
Bas
esa
mpl
eis
allf
orm
erco
lon
ies
for
whi
chw
eha
veda
ta.P
opu
lati
onde
nsit
yin
1500
isto
talp
opul
atio
ndi
vide
dby
arab
lela
ndar
ea.S
eeT
able
III
for
anex
plan
atio
nof
the
sam
ple
and
cova
riat
esin
each
colu
mn.
For
deta
iled
sour
ces
and
desc
ript
ion
sse
eA
ppen
dix
2.
1251REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
The estimates in the top panel of Table V use variation inpopulation density, which reects two components: differences inpopulation and differences in arable land area. In Panel B weseparate the effects of these two components and nd that theycome in with equal and opposite signs, showing that the speci-cation with population density is appropriate. In Panel C we usepopulation density in 1000 as an instrument for population den-sity in 1500. This is useful since, as discussed in subsection II.C,differences in long-run population density are likely to be betterproxies for income per capita. Instrumenting for population den-sity in 1500 with population density in 1000 isolates the long-runcomponent of population density differences across countries (i.e.,the component of population density in 1500 that is correlatedwith population density in 1000). The Two-Stage Least Squares(2SLS) results in Panel C using this instrumental variables strat-egy are very similar to the OLS results in Panel A.
III.C. Further Results, Robustness Checks, and Discussion
Caution is required in interpreting the results presented inTables III, IV, and V. Estimates of urbanization and population in1500 are likely to be error-ridden. Nevertheless, the rst effect ofmeasurement error would be to create an attenuation bias toward0. Therefore, one might think that the negative coefcients inTables III, IV, and V are, if anything, underestimates. A moreserious problem would be if errors in the urbanization and popu-lation density estimates were not random, but correlated withcurrent income in some systematic way. We investigate this issuefurther in Table VI, using a variety of different estimates forurbanization and population density. Columns (1)–(5), for exam-ple, show that the results are robust to a variety of modicationsto the urbanization data.
Much of the variation in urbanization and population densityin 1500 was not at the level of these countries, but at the level of“civilizations.” For example, in 1500 there were fewer separatecivilizations in the Americas, and even arguably in Asia, thanthere are countries today. For this reason, in column (6) we repeatour key regressions using variation in urbanization and popula-tion density only among fourteen civilizations (based on Toynbee[1934 –1961] and McNeill [1999]—see the note to Table VI). Theresults conrm our basic ndings, and show a statistically signi-cant negative relationship between prosperity in 1500 and today.Columns (7) and (8) report robustness checks using variants of
1252 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
the population density data constructed under different assump-tions, again with very similar results.
Is there a similar reversal among the noncolonies? Column(9) reports a regression of log GDP per capita in 1995 on urban-ization in 1500 for all noncolonies (including Europe), and column(10) reports the same regression for Europe (including EasternEurope). In both cases, there is a positive relationship betweenurbanization in 1500 and income today.11 This suggests that thereversal reects an unusual event, and is likely to be related tothe effect of European colonialism on these societies.
Panel B of Table VI reports results weighted by population in1500, with very similar results. In Panel C we include urbaniza-tion and population density simultaneously in these regressions.In all cases, population density is negative and highly signicant,while urbanization is insignicant. This is consistent with thenotion, discussed below, that differences in population densityplayed a key role in the reversal in relative incomes among thecolonies (although it may also reect measurement error in theurbanization estimates).
As a nal strategy to deal with the measurement error inurbanization, we use log population density as an instrument forurbanization rates in 1500. When both of these are valid proxiesfor economic prosperity in 1500 and the measurement error isclassical, this procedure corrects for the measurement error prob-lem. Not surprisingly, these instrumental-variables estimatesreported in the bottom panel of Table VI are considerably largerthan the OLS estimates in Table III. For example, the baselineestimate is now 20.18 instead of 20.08 in Table III. The generalpattern of reversal in relative incomes is unchanged, however.
Is the reversal shown in Figures I and II and Tables III, IV,and V consistent with other evidence? The literature on thehistory of civilizations documents that 500 years ago many partsof Asia were highly prosperous (perhaps as prosperous as West-ern Europe), and civilizations in Meso-America and North Africawere relatively developed (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod [1989], Braudel[1992], Chaudhuri [1990], Hodgson [1993], McNeill [1999], Po-meranz [2000], Reid [1988, 1993], and Townsend [2000]). In con-
11. In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001b] we also provided evidencethat urbanization and population density in 1000 are positively correlated withurbanization and population density in 1500, suggesting that before 1500 therewas considerable persistence in prosperity both where the Europeans later colo-nized and where they never colonized.
1253REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
TA
BL
EV
IR
OB
US
TN
ES
SC
HE
CK
SF
OR
UR
BA
NIZ
AT
ION
AN
DL
OG
PO
PU
LA
TIO
ND
EN
SIT
Y
Dep
ende
ntva
riab
leis
log
GD
Ppe
rca
pita
(PP
P)
in19
95
Bas
esa
mpl
e(1
)
Ass
um
ing
low
eru
rban
izat
ion
inth
eA
mer
icas
(2)
Ass
um
ing
low
eru
rban
izat
ion
inN
orth
Afr
ica
(3)
Ass
umin
glo
wer
urb
aniz
atio
nin
Indi
ansu
bcon
tin
ent
(4)
Usi
ng
leas
tfa
vora
ble
com
bin
atio
nof
assu
mpt
ion
s(5
)
Usi
ng
augm
ente
dT
oyn
bee
de
nit
ion
ofci
vili
zati
on(6
)
Usi
ng
land
area
in19
95fo
rpo
pula
tion
den
sity
(7)
Alt
ern
ativ
eas
sum
ptio
nsfo
rlo
gpo
pula
tion
den
sity
(8)
All
cou
ntr
ies
nev
erco
lon
ized
byE
uro
pe(9
)
Eu
rope
(in
clu
din
gE
aste
rnE
uro
pe)
(10)
For
mer
colo
nie
sN
ever
colo
niz
ed
Pan
elA
:U
nw
eigh
ted
regr
essi
ons
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1500
20.
078
20.
089
20.
102
20.
073
20.
105
20.
117
0.06
80.
077
(0.0
26)
(0.0
27)
(0.0
29)
(0.0
27)
(0.0
32)
(0.0
52)
(0.0
23)
(0.0
23)
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
20.
412
0.32
(0.0
6)(0
.07)
R2
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.16
0.21
0.30
0.35
0.21
0.18
0.27
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ions
4141
4141
4114
9191
4332
Pan
elB
:R
egre
ssio
ns
wei
ghte
du
sing
log
popu
lati
onin
1500
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1500
20.
072
20.
084
20.
097
20.
064
20.
099
20.
118
20.
064
20.
073
(0.0
25)
(0.0
26)
(0.0
29)
(0.0
26)
(0.0
32)
(0.0
53)
(0.0
23)
(0.0
22)
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
20.
392
0.29
(0.0
6)(0
.07)
R2
0.18
0.22
0.23
0.14
0.20
0.29
0.32
0.19
0.17
0.24
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ions
4141
4141
4114
9191
4332
1254 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
Pan
elC
:In
clu
din
gbo
thu
rban
izat
ion
and
log
popu
lati
ond
ensi
tyas
ind
epen
den
tva
riab
les
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1500
0.03
80.
039
0.01
70.
037
0.02
00.
072
0.01
70.
003
0.02
80.
032
(0.0
28)
(0.0
31)
(0.0
33)
(0.0
27)
(0.0
35)
(0.0
47)
(0.0
23)
(0.0
22)
(0.0
20)
(0.0
21)
Log
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
20.
412
0.41
20.
362
0.40
20.
372
0.48
20.
432
0.41
0.34
0.37
(0.0
7)(0
.08)
(0.0
7)(0
.07)
(0.0
7)(0
.09)
(0.0
7)(0
.07)
(0.0
7)(0
.08)
R2
0.56
0.56
0.54
0.56
0.54
0.79
0.61
0.60
0.48
0.57
Nu
mbe
rof
obse
rvat
ions
4141
4141
4114
4141
4332
Pan
elD
:In
stru
men
tin
gfo
ru
rban
izat
ion
in15
00u
sin
glo
gpo
pula
tion
den
sity
in15
00
Urb
aniz
atio
nin
1500
20.
178
20.
181
20.
215
20.
194
20.
242
20.
237
20.
217
20.
239
0.25
90.
226
(0.0
4)(0
.040
)(0
.048
)(0
.048
)(0
.057
)(0
.080
)(0
.053
)(0
.063
)(0
.090
)(0
.074
)N
um
ber
ofob
serv
atio
ns
4141
4141
4114
4141
4332
Sta
ndar
der
rors
are
inpa
rent
hese
s.D
epen
dent
vari
able
islo
gG
DP
per
capi
ta(P
PP
)in
1995
.Bas
esa
mpl
eis
all
form
erco
loni
esfo
rw
hic
hw
eha
veda
ta.I
nou
rba
sesa
mpl
e,u
rban
izat
ion
in15
00is
perc
ent
ofth
epo
pula
tion
livi
ngin
tow
ns
wit
h50
00or
mor
epe
ople
.Col
umn
(2)
assu
mes
9pe
rcen
tur
bani
zati
onin
the
And
esan
dC
entr
alA
mer
ica.
Col
um
n(3
)as
sum
es10
perc
ent
urba
niz
atio
nin
Nor
thA
fric
a.C
olum
n(4
)as
sum
es6
perc
ent
urba
niza
tion
inth
eIn
dian
subc
onti
nent
.Col
umn
(5)
com
bine
sth
eas
sum
ptio
nsof
colu
mn
s(2
),(3
),(4
),an
d(5
)to
crea
teth
ele
ast
favo
rabl
eco
mbi
nati
onof
assu
mpt
ions
for
our
hyp
othe
sis.
Col
umn
(6)
ison
lyci
vili
zati
ons
info
rmer
Eur
opea
nco
loni
es.T
heau
gmen
ted
Toy
nbee
civi
liza
tion
s,u
sed
inco
lum
n(6
),in
clud
eA
ndea
n,M
exic
,Y
uca
tec,
Ara
bic
(Nor
thA
fric
a),
Hin
du,
Pol
ynes
ian,
Esk
imo
(Can
ada)
Nor
thA
mer
ican
Indi
an,
Sou
thA
mer
ican
Indi
an(B
razi
l/Arg
enti
na/C
hile
),A
ustr
alia
nA
bori
gine
,M
alay
(Mal
aysi
aan
dIn
done
sia)
,P
hili
ppin
es,
Vie
tnam
/Cam
bodi
a,an
dB
urm
a.In
colu
mn
(7)
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyin
1500
isto
tal
popu
lati
ondi
vide
dby
arab
lela
nd
area
in19
95.C
olum
n(8
)ha
lves
the
popu
lati
onde
nsi
tyes
tim
ates
for
Afr
ica.
For
deta
iled
sou
rces
and
desc
ript
ions
see
App
endi
x2.
1255REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
trast, there was little agriculture in most of North America andAustralia, at most consistent with a population density of 0.1people per square kilometer. McEvedy and Jones [1978, p. 322]describe the state of Australia at this time as “an unchangingpalaeolithic backwater.” In fact, because of the relative backward-ness of these areas, European powers did not view them asvaluable colonies. Voltaire is often quoted as referring to Canadaas a “few acres of snow,” and the European powers at the timepaid little attention to Canada relative to the colonies in the WestIndies. In a few parts of North America, along the East Coast andin the Southwest, there was settled agriculture, supporting apopulation density of approximately 0.4 people per square kilo-meter, but this was certainly much less than that in the Aztec andInca Empires, which had fully developed agriculture with a popu-lation density of between 1 and 3 people (or even higher) persquare kilometer, and also much less than the correspondingnumbers in Asia and Africa [McEvedy and Jones 1978, p. 273].The recent work by Maddison [2001] also conrms our interpre-tation. He estimates that India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexicowere richer than the United States in 1500 and 1700 (see, forexample, his Table 2-22a).
III.D. The Timing and Nature of the Reversal
The evidence presented so far documents the reversal inrelative incomes among the former colonies from 1500 to today.When did this reversal take place? This question is relevant inthinking about the causes of the reversal. For example, if thereversal is related to the extraction of resources from, and the“plunder” of, the former colonies, or to the direct effect of thediseases Europeans brought to the New World, it should havetaken place shortly after colonization.
Figure IV shows that the reversal is mostly a late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century phenomenon, and is closely relatedto industrialization. Figure IVa compares the evolution of urban-ization among two groups of New World ex-colonies, those withlow urbanization in 1500 versus those with high urbanization in1500.12 We focus on New World colonies since the societies came
12. The initially high urbanization countries for which we have data and areincluded in the gure are Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and all of Central America, whilethe initially low urbanization countries are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, andthe United States.
1256 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
under European dominance very early on. The averages plottedin the gure are weighted by population in 1500. In addition, inthe same gure we plot India and the United States separately(as well as including it in the initially low urbanization group).The gure shows that the initially low urbanization group as awhole and the United States by itself overtake India and the ini-tially high urbanization countries sometime between 1750 and 1850.
Figure IVb depicts per capita industrial production for theUnited States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil, Mexico,and India using data from Bairoch [1982]. This gure shows thetakeoff in industrial production in the United States, Australia,Canada, and New Zealand relative to Brazil, Mexico, and India.Although the scale makes it difcult to see in the gure, percapita industrial production in 1750 was in fact higher in India, 7,than in the United States, 4 (with U. K. industrial production percapita in 1900 normalized to 100). Bairoch [1982] also reportsthat in 1750 China had industrial production per capita twice the
FIGURE IVaUrbanization Rate in India, the United States, and New World Countries
with Low and High Urbanization, 800–1920Note. Urbanization is population living in urban areas divided by total popula-
tion. Urban areas have a minimum threshold of 20,000 inhabitants, from Chan-dler [1987], and Mitchell [1993, 1995]. Low urbanization in 1500 countries areArgentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and the United States. High urbanization in1500 countries are Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and all of Central America. Fordetails see Appendix 1.
1257REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
level of the United States. Yet, as Figure IVb shows, over the next200 years there was a much larger increase in industrial produc-tion in the United States than in India (and also than in China).
This general interpretation, that the reversal in relative in-comes took place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenthcenturies and was linked to industrialization, is also consistent withthe fragmentary evidence we have on other measures of income percapita and industrialization. Coatsworth [1993], Eltis [1995], Enger-man [1981], and Engerman and Sokoloff [1997] provide evidencethat much of Spanish America and the Caribbean were more pros-perous (had higher per capita income) than British North Americauntil the eighteenth century. The future United States rose in percapita income during the 1700s relative to the Caribbean and SouthAmerica, but only really pulled ahead during the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries. Maddison’s [2001] numbers alsoshow that India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico were richer than theUnited States in 1700, but had fallen behind by 1820.
U. S. growth during this period also appears to be an indus-try-based phenomenon. McCusker and Menard [1985] and Galen-son [1996] both emphasize that productivity and income growthin North America before the eighteenth century was limited.During the critical period of growth in the United States, between
FIGURE IVbIndustrial Production per Capita, 1750–1953
Note. Index of industrial production with U. K. per capita industrialization in1900 is equal to 100, from Bairoch [1982].
1258 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
1840 and 1900, there was modest growth in agricultural outputper capita, and very rapid growth in industrial output per capita;the numbers reported by Gallman [2000] imply that between1840 and 1900 agricultural product per capita increased by about30 percent, a very small increase relative to the growth in manu-facturing output per capita, which increased more than fourfold.
IV. HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS
IV.A. The Geography Hypothesis
The geography hypothesis claims that differences in eco-nomic performance reect differences in geographic, climatic, andecological characteristics across countries. There are many differ-ent versions of this hypothesis. Perhaps the most common is theview that climate has a direct effect on income through its inu-ence on work effort. This idea dates back to Machiavelli [1519]and Montesquieu [1748]. Both Toynbee [1934, Vol. 1] and Mar-shall [1890, p. 195] similarly emphasized the importance of cli-mate, both on work effort and productivity. One of the pioneers ofdevelopment economics, Myrdal [1968], also placed considerableemphasis on the effect of geography on agricultural productivity.He argued: “serious study of the problems of underdevelop-ment . . . should take into account the climate and its impacts onsoil, vegetation, animals, humans and physical assets—in short,on living conditions in economic development” [Vol. 3, p. 2121].
More recently, Diamond [1997] and Sachs [2000, 2001] haveespoused different versions of the geography view. Diamond, forexample, argues that the timing of the Neolithic revolution hashad a long-lasting effect on economic and social development.Sachs, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of geogra-phy through its effect on the disease environment, transportcosts, and technology. He writes: “Certain parts of the world aregeographically favored. Geographical advantages might includeaccess to key natural resources, access to the coastline and sea—navigable rivers, proximity to other successful economies, advan-tageous conditions for agriculture, advantageous conditions forhuman health” [2000, p. 30]. Also see Myrdal [1968, Vol. 1, pp.691–695].
This simple version of the geography hypothesis predictspersistence in economic outcomes, since the geographic factorsthat are the rst-order determinants of prosperity are time-in-
1259REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
variant. The evidence presented so far therefore weighs againstthe simple geography hypothesis: whatever factors are importantin making former colonies rich today are very different from thosecontributing to prosperity in 1500.
IV.B. The Sophisticated Geography Hypotheses
The reversal in relative incomes does not necessarily reject amore sophisticated geography hypothesis, however. Certain geo-graphic characteristics that were not useful, or that were evenharmful, for successful economic performance in 1500 may turnout to be benecial later on. In this subsection we briey discussa number of sophisticated geography hypotheses emphasizing theimportance of such time-varying effects of geography.13
The rst is the “temperate drift hypothesis,” emphasizing thetemperate (or away from the equator) shift in the center of eco-nomic gravity over time. According to this view, geography be-comes important when it interacts with the presence of certaintechnologies. For example, one can argue that tropical areasprovided the best environment for early civilizations—after all,humans evolved in the tropics, and the required calorie intake islower in warmer areas. But with the arrival of “appropriate”technologies, temperate areas became more productive. The tech-nologies that were crucial for progress in temperate areas includethe heavy plow, systems of crop rotation, domesticated animalssuch as cattle and sheep, and some of the high productivityEuropean crops, including wheat and barley. Despite the key roleof these technologies for temperate areas, they have had muchless of an effect on tropical zones [Lewis 1978]. Sachs [2001, p. 12]also implies this view in his recent paper when he adapts Dia-mond’s argument about the geography of technological diffusion:“Since technologies in the critical areas of agriculture, health, andrelated areas could diffuse within ecological zones, but not acrossecological zones, economic development spread through the tem-
13. Put differently, in the simplegeography hypothesis,geography has a main effecton economic performance, which can be expressed as Yit 5 0 1 1 z Gi 1 t 1 it,where Yit is a measure of economic performance in country i at time t, Gi is a measureof geographic characteristics, t is a time effect, and it measures other country-time-specic factors. In contrast, in the sophisticated geography view, the relationshipbetween income and geography would be Yit 5 0 1 1 z Git 1 2 z Tt z Git 1 t 1 it,where Tt is a time-varying characteristic of the world as a whole or of the state oftechnology. According to this view, the major role that geography plays in history isnot through 1, but through 2.
1260 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
perate zones but not through the tropical regions” (italics in theoriginal; also see Myrdal [1968], Ch. 14).
The evidence is not favorable to the view that the reversalreects the emergence of agricultural technologies favorable totemperate areas, however. First, the regressions in Tables III, IV,and V show little evidence that the reversal was related to geo-graphic characteristics. Second, the temperate drift hypothesissuggests that the reversal should be associated with the spread ofEuropean agricultural technologies. Yet in practice, while Euro-pean agricultural technology spread to the colonies between thesixteenth and eighteenth centuries (e.g., McCusker and Menard[1985], Ch. 3 for North America), the reversal in relative incomesis largely a late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century, andindustry-based phenomenon.
In light of the result that the reversal is related to industri-alization, another sophisticated geography hypothesis would bethat certain geographic characteristics facilitate or enable indus-trialization. First, one can imagine that there is more room forspecialization in industry, but such specialization requires trade.If countries differ according to their transport costs, it might bethose with low transport costs that take off during the age ofindustry. This argument is not entirely convincing, however,again because there is little evidence that the reversal was re-lated to geographic characteristics (see Tables III, IV, and V).Moreover, many of the previously prosperous colonies that failedto industrialize include islands such as the Caribbean, or coun-tries with natural ports such as those in Central America, India,or Indonesia. Moreover, transport costs appear to have beenrelatively low in some of the areas that failed to industrialize(e.g., Pomeranz [2000], Appendix A).
Second, countries may lack certain resource endowments,most notably coal, which may have been necessary for industri-alization (e.g., Pomeranz [2000] and Wrigley [1988]). But coal isone of the world’s most common resources, with proven reservesin 100 countries and production in over 50 countries [World CoalInstitute 2000], and our results in Table III and V offer littleevidence that either coal or the absence of any other resource wasresponsible for the reversal. So there appears to be little supportfor these types of sophisticated geography hypotheses either.14
14. Two other related hypotheses are worth mentioning. First, it could beargued that people work less hard in warmer climates and that this matters more
1261REVERSAL OF FORTUNE
-
IV.C. The Institutions Hypothesis
According to the institutions hypothesis, societies with asocial organization that provides encouragement for investmentwill prosper. Locke [1980], Smith [1778], and Hayek [1960],among many others, emphasized the importance of propertyrights for the success of nations. More recently, economists andhistorians have emphasized the importance of institutions thatguarantee property rights. For example, Douglass North startshis 1990 book by stating [p. 3]: “That institutions affect theperformance of economies is hardly controversial,” and identieseffective protection of property rights as important for the orga-nization of society (see also North and Thomas [1973] and Olson[2000]).
In this context we take a good organization of society tocorrespond to a cluster of (political, economic, and social) institu-tions ensuring that a broad cross section of society has effectiveproperty rights. We refer to this cluster as institutions of privateproperty, and contrast them with extractive institutions, wherethe majority of the population faces a high risk of expropriationand holdup by the government, the ruling elite, or other agents.Two requirements are implicit in this denition of institutions ofprivate property. First, institutions should provide secure prop-erty rights, so that those with productive opportunities expect toreceive returns from their investments, and are encouraged toundertake such investments. The second requirement is embed-ded in the emphasis on “a broad cross section of the society.” Asociety in which a very small fraction of the population, forexample, a class of landowners, holds all the wealth and politicalpower may not be the ideal environment for investment, even if
for industry than for agriculture, thus explaining the reversal. However, there isno evidence either for the hypothesis that work effort matters more for industryor for the assertion that human energy output depends systematically on tempera-ture (see, e.g., Collins and Roberts [1988]). Moreover, the available evidence onhours worked indicates that people work harder in poorer/warmer countries (e.g.,ILO [1995, pp. 36–37]), though of course these high working hours could reectother factors.
Second, it can be argued that different paths of devel