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  • 7/31/2019 Review and Analysis of the Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force

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    Special ReportDecember 2006

    REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF

    THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC

    ASSISTANCE FRAUD

    OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE

    CAROL E KE E T ON ST RAY HORN

    Te x a s Co m p t r o l l e r

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    December 14, 2006

    Members of the Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance

    Fraud Oversight Task Force

    Fellow Members:

    Since the passage of House Bill (H.B.) 2292 in 2003, the Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight

    Task Force has operated in a signicantly different environment than it had prior to the bill. H.B. 2292

    consolidated twelve autonomous health and human service agencies into ve interconnected agencies. The

    administrative and policy making infrastructure for these 12 agencies were collapsed into the Health and

    Human Services Commission. In addition, the fraud prevention efforts across the entire health and human

    service enterprise were consolidated into a single entity of the Ofce of Inspector General (OIG), which is

    under the HHSC executive commissioner.

    This dramatic change to the HHSC organization necessitated a review of the structure and mission of the

    Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force. This report offers recommendations that willimprove the effectiveness of the Task Force as well as the overall fraud and abuse prevention efforts of

    the states. Most notably, this report recommends that the OIG currently under the purview of the HHSC

    executive commissioner be made an independent entity solely reporting to the Governor.

    I am pleased to present to the Task Force the review and analysis of the Medicaid and Public Assistance

    Fraud Oversight Task Force. The review analyzes the enabling legislation, current membership and

    organizational structure. It provides concrete recommendations to improve and strengthen the Task Force.

    If you have questions or comments, please feel free to contact my staff, Will Counihan, by e-mail at

    [email protected] or by phone at 1-800-531-5441, extension 6-0758.

    Sincerely,

    Carole Keeton Strayhorn

    Texas Comptroller

    Chairman, Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force

    Carole Keeton StrayhornTexas Comptroller of Public Accounts

    512/463-4000

    FAX: 512/463-4965

    P.O. BOX 13528

    AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3528

    512/463-4000

    FAX: 512/463-4965

    P.O. BOX 13528

    AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3528

    OFFICE

    OFTHECOMP

    TROLLE

    R

    TEXAS

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    Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force

    Special ReportSpecialMed ica id and Pub l i c Ass i s tance F raud Ove rs i gh t Task Fo rce

    ReportDecember 2006

    REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE

    MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

    FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE

    the Office of Attorney General (OAG) gained sig-nificant resources for fighting fraud. The OAGs

    Criminal Law Enforcement Division includes

    the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU), Cyber

    Crime Unit, Money Laundering and White Collar

    Crime Units. According to the director of MFCU,

    the unit has grown from just under 40 staff to

    200 staff since September , 2003. MFCU has 200

    employees, 50 of whom are commissioned Texas

    peace officers.2 HHSC-OIG has more than 500

    employees dedicated to the investigation and pre-

    vention of Medicaid fraud and sends MFCU leads

    on Medicaid provider fraud issues.

    The consolidation drastically changed the envi-

    ronment in which the Task Force operates and

    necessitated a thorough review of its structure

    and mission. To ensure the appropriateness and

    timeliness of this review, the Texas Comptroller

    of Public Accounts, as chair of the Task Force,

    contacted the Association of Certified Fraud

    Examiners (ACFE). ACFE recommended an

    independent and certified fraud examiner, to con-

    duct the review.

    The independent and certified fraud examiners

    review included analysis of enabling legislation,

    current membership, organizational structure

    and recommendations for improvement. The

    review also included interviews of Task Force

    members, experts and stakeholders with knowl-

    BACKGROUND:

    Senate Bill 30, passed in 997 by the 75th Texas

    Legislature, established the Texas Medicaid and

    Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force

    (Task Force). The Legislature created the Task

    Force to help the Texas Health and Human

    Services Commission (HHSC) combat fraud in

    public assistance programs. Section 53.07 of

    the Texas Government Code delineates the Task

    Forces responsibilities, membership and pow-

    ers. The Task Force meets on a quarterly basis

    to provide a forum for members to discuss the

    recent fraud prevention, detection and prosecu-

    tion efforts of their agencies, retailer and pro-

    vider concerns and the latest developments in

    technology.

    In 2003, the 78th Texas Legislature passed House

    Bill (H.B.) 2292, which consolidated 2 autono-

    mous health and human service agencies into five

    interconnected agencies. The administrative and

    policy making infrastructure for these 2 agen-

    cies was collapsed into HHSC. In addition, thefraud prevention efforts were consolidated into

    a single entity, the Office of Inspector General

    (OIG), which is under the HHSC executive com-

    missioner.

    In addition to the health and human service con-

    solidation brought on by H.B. 2292, both OIG and

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    2 Special Report: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE December 2006

    Special Report: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE

    edge of the public assistance process, the cre-

    ators of the Task Force and regular attendees of

    the Task Force public meetings.3

    TheHealth Care Fraud and Abuse Compliance

    Manual4

    and the ACFE publicationRed Flagsof Insurance Fraud5 were used for this review.

    Information from the public testimony of the

    Comptroller General David Walker and Leslie G.

    Aronovitz of the U.S. Government Accountability

    Office (GAO)6 and HHSC Inspector General Brian

    Flood7 was also included in this review.

    The report that follows represents the informa-

    tion and recommendations of the Task Force

    members, appropriate shareholders and the certi-

    fied fraud examiner engaged for this review tomake the Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance

    Fraud Oversight Task Force a more efficient and

    effective tool in the fight against public assis-

    tance fraud and abuse.

    FINDINGS:

    Overall, members of the Texas Medicaid and Pub-

    lic Assistance Fraud Oversight (MPAFO) Task

    Force view the organization as an effective com-

    munication forum rather than an effective fraud

    solution. The following findings support this

    theory.

    The Task Force Organizational Structure

    Has Not Changed Since Its Inception

    The 997 legislation creating the Task Force was

    focused on the coordination of fraud prevention

    efforts among the Health and Human Service

    agencies. With the passage of HB 2292 in 2003,

    many of these agencies that were once on theTask Force no longer exist and their functions

    were merged into one of the five new agencies.

    The organizational structure of the Task Force

    has not kept up with the HHSC consolidation.

    The new environment at HHSC changed fraud

    detection and prevention operations by combin-

    ing the investigative and audit responsibilities

    of the original 2 agencies. The only change to

    the original membership was when the Bureau

    of Vital Statistics (BVS) was added in 2003. The

    fraud prevention function for vital statistics once

    done at BVS is now performed by OIG, making

    the BVS membership on the Task Force no longerrelevant.

    Although there are state agencies on the Task

    Force that are not in the HHSC enterprise, the

    current membership does not include all state

    agencies and organizations that could benefit

    from the collective experience of the Task

    Force.

    The Task Force Does not have Guiding

    Principles in Place

    The Task Force does not have established vision

    and mission statements to guide them. This

    dilutes the effectiveness of the organization and

    supports the overall finding that the Task Force

    is more of a communication forum rather than an

    effective fraud solution for the state.

    The Task Force Cannot Share Confidential

    Information

    The current organizational structure and statu-tory rules of the Task Force foster the sharing of

    information between government agencies and

    the private sector. However, this structure and

    the rules prevent confidential information shar-

    ing between governmental agencies on criminal

    investigations and broader efforts to target and

    reduce fraud in Texas.

    Texas Government Code Section 55 indicates

    specific statutory authorizations for closed (exec-

    utive) sessions as: 551.071 Consultation with Attorney to

    seek advice of your attorney about pending

    or contemplated litigation or a settlement

    offer;

    551.076 Deliberation Regarding Security

    Device to deliberate the deployment, or

    specific implementation, of security person-

    nel or devices;

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    Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force 3

    Special Report: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE

    551.084 Exclusion of Witness during

    investigation hearing a governmen-

    tal body that is investigating a matter may

    exclude a witness from hearing during the

    examination of another witness in the investi-

    gation; and 551.074 Personnel Matters Governmen-

    tal bodies can meet in closed session to hear

    a complaint or charge against an officer or

    employee.

    Many Task Force members are concerned about

    sharing confidential information in meetings

    because they are open to the public. While open

    public meetings help ensure public awareness

    and participation, they keep Task Force members

    from openly discussing fraud or abuse cases.The absence of a government only forum limits

    the Task Force to a quarterly meeting process in

    which agencies simply report program statistics.

    There is No Coordinated Approach

    to Fighting Fraud

    There is no coordinated standards-setting group

    for state efforts in fighting fraud. Many entities

    exist that investigate, prevent, detect and pros-

    ecute fraud, such as the investigative or audit

    groups at state agencies. However, there is no

    current provision for these efforts to be coordi-

    nated statewide, outside of the health and human

    services enterprise, often there is only informal

    communications between agencies.

    The intent of the 997 legislation that authorized

    the Task Force was for the member agencies to

    coordinate fraud prevention and detection. Now

    that the government landscape has changed in

    the last nine years, the approach to fighting fraud

    will need to change along with it.

    The Office of the Inspector General

    is Not Independent

    The HHSC Inspector General (IG) reports to the

    HHSC Commissioner and to the Governor.

    An IG, by definition, is created to be independent

    of management to ensure agency compliance.

    For example, the IG of the U.S. Postal Service is

    appointed by and reports directly to the gover-

    nors of the Postal Service and is independent of

    postal management. OIG primarily investigatesand evaluates programs and operations of the

    Postal Service to ensure the efficiency and integ-

    rity of the postal system.8

    Because the Texas IG is not independent, he or

    she must carry out the directives of the manage-

    ment the IG must investigate. This influence, and

    sometimes conflict of interest, affects the overall

    quality and effectiveness of the Texas fraud pro-

    gram.

    There are 57 autonomous federal OIGs. While

    these OIGs operate independently, their efforts

    to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse and

    mismanagement of government programs and

    operations of their parent organizations, they

    share information and coordinate their efforts

    through the Presidents Council on Integrity and

    Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on

    Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE).9

    The Appointment Term of the Inspector

    General is Too Short

    The Governor appoints the Inspector General

    and approves the term yearly. An appointment

    term of one year is too short for optimum conti-

    nuity, effectiveness and efficiency.

    The Office of the Inspector General Does

    Not Employ Commissioned Texas Peace

    Officers

    Investigators at HHSC are not eligible to be com-missioned as Texas peace officers limiting their

    ability to effectively prevent, detect and combat

    fraud. More than a dozen other state agencies

    have investigators that are commissioned Texas

    peace officers, including the Office of the Attor-

    ney General Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.

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    RECOMMENDATIONS:

    Expand the scope of the Task Force and

    update the Task Force membership.

    Most state agencies operate in a pay and chaseenvironment where they have little time or

    resources to implement methods to prevent

    fraud. There are also organizations that have

    fraud issues but have limited or no resources to

    address them. A state task force that focuses on

    fraud prevention in all state agency programs

    would be more effective at preventing fraud than

    focusing on fraud prevention in only the govern-

    ment assistance programs.

    A change of the name of the Texas Medicaid andPublic Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force

    to the Texas Fraud Task Force would open the

    scope of the Task Force.

    By expanding the scope of the Task Force, the

    members would provide guidance for all state

    agencies and their fraud investigators. They

    would develop more uniform standards and pro-

    active programs targeting fraud investigation and

    prevention.

    The current membership of the Task Force is

    governed by Section 53.07 (b) of the Texas

    Government Code. Section 53.07 (b) specifi-

    cally appoints one member from each of the fol-

    lowing state agencies to serve on the task force:

    Attorney generals office;

    Comptrollers office;

    Texas Department of Public Safety;

    State Auditors office;

    Texas Health and Human Services

    Commission;

    Texas Health Departments Bureau of VitalStatistics;

    Texas Department of Human Services; and

    Texas Department of Insurance.

    In order to accomplish a broader state effort to

    prevent and combat fraud, the statute should be

    changed to allow the membership of the Task

    Force to include representatives from:

    the Texas Workforce Commission;

    the State Agency Internal Audit Forum;

    the Texas Department of Information

    Resources; the Employee Retirement System;

    institutions of higher learning in Texas that

    specialize in criminal justice programs;

    the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy;

    the Texas Board of Medical Examiners;

    the Texas Medical Association; and

    the Texas Hospital and Dental Associations.

    Create clear guiding principles for the

    Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud

    Oversight Task Force.

    The Task Force should be the States leading

    experts in fraud prevention, detection, investiga-

    tion and prosecution. The organization will oper-

    ate more effectively with clear vision and mis-

    sion statements that guide them and focus their

    efforts.

    The vision of the Task Force should be Elimi-

    nate fraud in Texas government through innova-

    tive solutions.

    The mission of the task force should be The

    Task Force coordinates the expertise and

    resources of the public and private sectors to

    analyze state practices and eliminate opportuni-

    ties for fraud.

    Rename the Medicaid and Public Assistance

    Fraud Oversight Task Force to the Texas

    Fraud Oversight Task Force.

    The Task Forces name should reflect its expand-ed responsibilities and membership.

    Enact legislation that allows the Task Force

    to have closed executive sessions.

    Holding executive sessions would allow the gov-

    ernment members of the Task Force to discuss

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    Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force 5

    Special Report: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE

    ongoing fraud investigations and sensitive fraud

    prevention strategies. These meetings would

    allow the state to work in unison to combat

    fraud. It would allow them to stay one step ahead

    of would-be criminals instead of one step behind.

    Coordinate the states fraud prevention

    efforts.

    The approach to fighting fraud is constantly

    changing. When a fraud prevention or detec-

    tion measure is put into place, the criminals find

    another way around them. With increased pres-

    sure on the State to do more with less, the fraud

    prevention measures become even more impor-

    tant in assuring the protection of state assets

    and tax dollars. Coordination among agencies toprevent, detect, investigate and prosecute fraud

    is essential.

    There are several steps to coordinating the

    efforts of the multiple state agencies. The initial

    step is in the first recommendation of the Special

    Report Expand the scope of the Task Force

    and update the Task Force membership. Other

    opportunities exist for the state to improve their

    fraud prevention efforts.

    Pool the expertise across agencies and

    create subcommittees within the Task

    Force.A separate subcommittee should

    exist for prevention, investigation, detec-

    tion and prosecution. There are a multitude

    of professional support organizations in the

    fraud prevention, and the Task Force is not

    taking advantage of them because it has no

    formal program for reviewing or sharing the

    benefits these groups provide. Many Task

    Force members are involved in or are mem-

    bers of these organizations, and they have astrong working knowledge of the support the

    specific organization could provide, such as

    fraud prevention, investigation, detection and

    prosecution programs, statistical-based stud-

    ies and other fraud-related best practices. By

    establishing these subcommittees, each one

    would define best practices and be a resource

    to the Task Force members as experts in their

    respective fields.

    Ensure the Task Force members belong

    to national fraud organizations. Mem-

    bers of the Task Force should learn fromprofessionals in their field by joining national

    associations that are a repository of experi-

    ence and knowledge. Membership in these

    associations would enable the Task Force to

    engage in national fraud efforts and lead the

    nation in fraud prevention. At a minimum, the

    Task Force members should join the:

    National White Collar Crime Center;

    Regional Organized Crime Center; and the

    Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

    (ACFE).

    These groups would provide specific informa-

    tion to help Texas reduce fraud in their many

    programs.

    Grant the Task Force the authority to

    serve as the fraud standards-setting

    organization for state agencies. The Task

    Force should be the states fraud direction

    and standards-setting group.

    The Task Force would look for the best fraud

    prevention strategies and establish best

    practices and standards. For example, the

    recently released Comprehensive Medicaid

    Integrity Plan, from the Center for Medi-

    care and Medicaid Services (CMS), is a new

    national strategy for detecting and preventing

    fraud and abuse in these programs. The Task

    Force would review this plan once the federal

    government finalizes it and determines how it

    could benefit specific Texas state agencies.

    The Texas OIG has played an important role

    in the recently released CMS integrity plan

    and has testified before Congress on fraud

    prevention efforts in Texas. OIG has placed

    Texas in the national spotlight for its progres-

    sive techniques for fraud detection. Utilizing

    existing OIG resources and expertise, the

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    Task Force could improve the States anti-

    fraud efforts by establishing standards and

    moving forward to prevention and deterrence

    while maintaining successful detection and

    prosecution practices.

    Change Texas statute to make the Office of

    Inspector General an independent entity

    reporting solely to the Governor.

    TheAssociation of Inspector Generals states the

    Inspector Generals (IG) independence should

    be protected. The report indicates that the

    best way to protect the independence of the IG

    is to limit its direct report responsibility to one

    person. The Office of Inspector General should

    therefore report only to the governor.

    A model for this reporting structure was estab-

    lished by legislation in the state of New York,

    which adopted an independent office of Medicaid

    inspector general, reporting directly to the secre-

    tary for the governor for a five-year term. Numer-

    ous Medicaid-related audit responsibilities were

    also transferred to this new Medicaid inspector

    general.

    This recommendation is important because the

    IG is a key member of the Task Force. At a mini-

    mum, the IG should be independent of the HHSC

    commissioner.

    Lengthen the term of the IG.

    The term of the IG should be lengthened from

    one year to between five and seven years as rec-

    ommended by the Association of Inspector Gen-

    erals. According to the Association of Inspector

    Generals, the term of Inspector Generals should

    be long enough to make them immune to politicalpressure and to provide consistency and stability

    to the fraud detection, investigation and pros-

    ecution process. The Association of Inspector

    Generals recommends appointment terms of five

    to seven years, for optimum efficiency and effec-

    tiveness.0 It is not unusual for investigations to

    take several years and leadership continuity is

    important in preventing fraud.

    Commission investigators at the Texas

    Health and Human Services Commission as

    Texas peace officers.

    Investigators at HHSC are not eligible to be com-

    missioned as Texas peace officers. More thana dozen other state agencies have investigators

    that are commissioned Texas peace officers,

    including MFCU at the OAG.

    By commissioning HHSC investigators as Texas

    peace officers they would have:

    the authorization to draft criminal subpoena

    requests for judicial approval to gain informa-

    tion;

    extensive training in de-escalation of poten-

    tially violent situations; access to more criminal data bases such as

    the FBIs National Crime Information Center

    and the financial crimes data base hosted by

    the OAG;

    better standing in the law enforcement com-

    munity, which could lead to more assistance

    and support during investigations and put

    them on par with the commissioned investi-

    gators at the other state agencies;

    more and better training opportunities,

    including cultural diversity, special investiga-

    tions and crisis intervention training; and

    access to other states law enforcement

    groups and national law enforcement associa-

    tions, for example the Regional Organized

    Crime Information Center, which provides

    extensive investigation and litigation support

    for investigators.

    Investigators commissioned as Texas peace offi-

    cers will have to maintain the standards of the

    Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officers

    Standards and Education.

    The recommendations in this Special Report are

    designed to improve the current Task Force and

    bring overall enhancement to the States fraud

    prevention efforts.

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    Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force 7

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    END NOTES

    Texas Government Code 53.07Medicaid and Public

    Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force, 997.

    2

    See attached list of people interviewed for this study.3 Fleps, Christina W., (2005)Health Care Fraud and Abuse

    Compliance Manual New York, New York: Aspen Publishers.

    4 Morehead, Juliana, (2006, April) Red Flags of Insurance Fraud.

    Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Retrieved April 6,

    2006 from .

    5 Testimony by Leslie G. Aronovitz, Director, Health Care,

    United States Government Accountability Office, for the

    Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government

    Information, and International Security, Committee on

    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,

    March 28, 2006.

    6 Testimony by Brian Flood, Inspector General, Texas Health

    and Human Services Commission, for the Subcommittee on

    Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and

    International Security, Committee on Homeland Security andGovernmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2006.

    7 Association of Inspector Generals,Principals and Standards

    for Office of Inspector General May 6, 200. Available at

    .

    8 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2004)Report to the

    Nation, available at .

    9 Attached copy of letter dated October 28, 2005, provided by

    Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.

    0 Pennsylvania Association of Certified Public Accountants,

    January 2003, Fraud Detection: SAS 99 Increases Auditors

    Responsibilities.

    Morehead, Juliana, (2006, April) Red Flags of Insurance Fraud.

    Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Retrieved April 6,2006 from .

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    This publication is not copyrighted and

    may be reproduced. The Comptroller of

    Public Accounts would appreciate credit

    for material used and a copy of the reprint.

    Special Reports

    Carole Keeton Strayhorn

    Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts

    P.O. Box 13528

    Austin, TX 78711-3528

    For more information, call -800-53-544.This publication is also available on

    the World Wide Web by accessing

    the Comptrollers Window on State

    Government Web site at

    .

    Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts

    publication #96-239, December 2006.

    Special ReportMedicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force