review and analysis of the medicaid and public assistance fraud oversight task force
TRANSCRIPT
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Special ReportDecember 2006
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF
THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE FRAUD
OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE
CAROL E KE E T ON ST RAY HORN
Te x a s Co m p t r o l l e r
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December 14, 2006
Members of the Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance
Fraud Oversight Task Force
Fellow Members:
Since the passage of House Bill (H.B.) 2292 in 2003, the Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight
Task Force has operated in a signicantly different environment than it had prior to the bill. H.B. 2292
consolidated twelve autonomous health and human service agencies into ve interconnected agencies. The
administrative and policy making infrastructure for these 12 agencies were collapsed into the Health and
Human Services Commission. In addition, the fraud prevention efforts across the entire health and human
service enterprise were consolidated into a single entity of the Ofce of Inspector General (OIG), which is
under the HHSC executive commissioner.
This dramatic change to the HHSC organization necessitated a review of the structure and mission of the
Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force. This report offers recommendations that willimprove the effectiveness of the Task Force as well as the overall fraud and abuse prevention efforts of
the states. Most notably, this report recommends that the OIG currently under the purview of the HHSC
executive commissioner be made an independent entity solely reporting to the Governor.
I am pleased to present to the Task Force the review and analysis of the Medicaid and Public Assistance
Fraud Oversight Task Force. The review analyzes the enabling legislation, current membership and
organizational structure. It provides concrete recommendations to improve and strengthen the Task Force.
If you have questions or comments, please feel free to contact my staff, Will Counihan, by e-mail at
[email protected] or by phone at 1-800-531-5441, extension 6-0758.
Sincerely,
Carole Keeton Strayhorn
Texas Comptroller
Chairman, Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force
Carole Keeton StrayhornTexas Comptroller of Public Accounts
512/463-4000
FAX: 512/463-4965
P.O. BOX 13528
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3528
512/463-4000
FAX: 512/463-4965
P.O. BOX 13528
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3528
OFFICE
OFTHECOMP
TROLLE
R
TEXAS
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Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force
Special ReportSpecialMed ica id and Pub l i c Ass i s tance F raud Ove rs i gh t Task Fo rce
ReportDecember 2006
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE
MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE
the Office of Attorney General (OAG) gained sig-nificant resources for fighting fraud. The OAGs
Criminal Law Enforcement Division includes
the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU), Cyber
Crime Unit, Money Laundering and White Collar
Crime Units. According to the director of MFCU,
the unit has grown from just under 40 staff to
200 staff since September , 2003. MFCU has 200
employees, 50 of whom are commissioned Texas
peace officers.2 HHSC-OIG has more than 500
employees dedicated to the investigation and pre-
vention of Medicaid fraud and sends MFCU leads
on Medicaid provider fraud issues.
The consolidation drastically changed the envi-
ronment in which the Task Force operates and
necessitated a thorough review of its structure
and mission. To ensure the appropriateness and
timeliness of this review, the Texas Comptroller
of Public Accounts, as chair of the Task Force,
contacted the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (ACFE). ACFE recommended an
independent and certified fraud examiner, to con-
duct the review.
The independent and certified fraud examiners
review included analysis of enabling legislation,
current membership, organizational structure
and recommendations for improvement. The
review also included interviews of Task Force
members, experts and stakeholders with knowl-
BACKGROUND:
Senate Bill 30, passed in 997 by the 75th Texas
Legislature, established the Texas Medicaid and
Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force
(Task Force). The Legislature created the Task
Force to help the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (HHSC) combat fraud in
public assistance programs. Section 53.07 of
the Texas Government Code delineates the Task
Forces responsibilities, membership and pow-
ers. The Task Force meets on a quarterly basis
to provide a forum for members to discuss the
recent fraud prevention, detection and prosecu-
tion efforts of their agencies, retailer and pro-
vider concerns and the latest developments in
technology.
In 2003, the 78th Texas Legislature passed House
Bill (H.B.) 2292, which consolidated 2 autono-
mous health and human service agencies into five
interconnected agencies. The administrative and
policy making infrastructure for these 2 agen-
cies was collapsed into HHSC. In addition, thefraud prevention efforts were consolidated into
a single entity, the Office of Inspector General
(OIG), which is under the HHSC executive com-
missioner.
In addition to the health and human service con-
solidation brought on by H.B. 2292, both OIG and
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Special Report: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAID AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD OVERSIGHT TASK FORCE
edge of the public assistance process, the cre-
ators of the Task Force and regular attendees of
the Task Force public meetings.3
TheHealth Care Fraud and Abuse Compliance
Manual4
and the ACFE publicationRed Flagsof Insurance Fraud5 were used for this review.
Information from the public testimony of the
Comptroller General David Walker and Leslie G.
Aronovitz of the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO)6 and HHSC Inspector General Brian
Flood7 was also included in this review.
The report that follows represents the informa-
tion and recommendations of the Task Force
members, appropriate shareholders and the certi-
fied fraud examiner engaged for this review tomake the Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance
Fraud Oversight Task Force a more efficient and
effective tool in the fight against public assis-
tance fraud and abuse.
FINDINGS:
Overall, members of the Texas Medicaid and Pub-
lic Assistance Fraud Oversight (MPAFO) Task
Force view the organization as an effective com-
munication forum rather than an effective fraud
solution. The following findings support this
theory.
The Task Force Organizational Structure
Has Not Changed Since Its Inception
The 997 legislation creating the Task Force was
focused on the coordination of fraud prevention
efforts among the Health and Human Service
agencies. With the passage of HB 2292 in 2003,
many of these agencies that were once on theTask Force no longer exist and their functions
were merged into one of the five new agencies.
The organizational structure of the Task Force
has not kept up with the HHSC consolidation.
The new environment at HHSC changed fraud
detection and prevention operations by combin-
ing the investigative and audit responsibilities
of the original 2 agencies. The only change to
the original membership was when the Bureau
of Vital Statistics (BVS) was added in 2003. The
fraud prevention function for vital statistics once
done at BVS is now performed by OIG, making
the BVS membership on the Task Force no longerrelevant.
Although there are state agencies on the Task
Force that are not in the HHSC enterprise, the
current membership does not include all state
agencies and organizations that could benefit
from the collective experience of the Task
Force.
The Task Force Does not have Guiding
Principles in Place
The Task Force does not have established vision
and mission statements to guide them. This
dilutes the effectiveness of the organization and
supports the overall finding that the Task Force
is more of a communication forum rather than an
effective fraud solution for the state.
The Task Force Cannot Share Confidential
Information
The current organizational structure and statu-tory rules of the Task Force foster the sharing of
information between government agencies and
the private sector. However, this structure and
the rules prevent confidential information shar-
ing between governmental agencies on criminal
investigations and broader efforts to target and
reduce fraud in Texas.
Texas Government Code Section 55 indicates
specific statutory authorizations for closed (exec-
utive) sessions as: 551.071 Consultation with Attorney to
seek advice of your attorney about pending
or contemplated litigation or a settlement
offer;
551.076 Deliberation Regarding Security
Device to deliberate the deployment, or
specific implementation, of security person-
nel or devices;
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551.084 Exclusion of Witness during
investigation hearing a governmen-
tal body that is investigating a matter may
exclude a witness from hearing during the
examination of another witness in the investi-
gation; and 551.074 Personnel Matters Governmen-
tal bodies can meet in closed session to hear
a complaint or charge against an officer or
employee.
Many Task Force members are concerned about
sharing confidential information in meetings
because they are open to the public. While open
public meetings help ensure public awareness
and participation, they keep Task Force members
from openly discussing fraud or abuse cases.The absence of a government only forum limits
the Task Force to a quarterly meeting process in
which agencies simply report program statistics.
There is No Coordinated Approach
to Fighting Fraud
There is no coordinated standards-setting group
for state efforts in fighting fraud. Many entities
exist that investigate, prevent, detect and pros-
ecute fraud, such as the investigative or audit
groups at state agencies. However, there is no
current provision for these efforts to be coordi-
nated statewide, outside of the health and human
services enterprise, often there is only informal
communications between agencies.
The intent of the 997 legislation that authorized
the Task Force was for the member agencies to
coordinate fraud prevention and detection. Now
that the government landscape has changed in
the last nine years, the approach to fighting fraud
will need to change along with it.
The Office of the Inspector General
is Not Independent
The HHSC Inspector General (IG) reports to the
HHSC Commissioner and to the Governor.
An IG, by definition, is created to be independent
of management to ensure agency compliance.
For example, the IG of the U.S. Postal Service is
appointed by and reports directly to the gover-
nors of the Postal Service and is independent of
postal management. OIG primarily investigatesand evaluates programs and operations of the
Postal Service to ensure the efficiency and integ-
rity of the postal system.8
Because the Texas IG is not independent, he or
she must carry out the directives of the manage-
ment the IG must investigate. This influence, and
sometimes conflict of interest, affects the overall
quality and effectiveness of the Texas fraud pro-
gram.
There are 57 autonomous federal OIGs. While
these OIGs operate independently, their efforts
to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse and
mismanagement of government programs and
operations of their parent organizations, they
share information and coordinate their efforts
through the Presidents Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE).9
The Appointment Term of the Inspector
General is Too Short
The Governor appoints the Inspector General
and approves the term yearly. An appointment
term of one year is too short for optimum conti-
nuity, effectiveness and efficiency.
The Office of the Inspector General Does
Not Employ Commissioned Texas Peace
Officers
Investigators at HHSC are not eligible to be com-missioned as Texas peace officers limiting their
ability to effectively prevent, detect and combat
fraud. More than a dozen other state agencies
have investigators that are commissioned Texas
peace officers, including the Office of the Attor-
ney General Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
Expand the scope of the Task Force and
update the Task Force membership.
Most state agencies operate in a pay and chaseenvironment where they have little time or
resources to implement methods to prevent
fraud. There are also organizations that have
fraud issues but have limited or no resources to
address them. A state task force that focuses on
fraud prevention in all state agency programs
would be more effective at preventing fraud than
focusing on fraud prevention in only the govern-
ment assistance programs.
A change of the name of the Texas Medicaid andPublic Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force
to the Texas Fraud Task Force would open the
scope of the Task Force.
By expanding the scope of the Task Force, the
members would provide guidance for all state
agencies and their fraud investigators. They
would develop more uniform standards and pro-
active programs targeting fraud investigation and
prevention.
The current membership of the Task Force is
governed by Section 53.07 (b) of the Texas
Government Code. Section 53.07 (b) specifi-
cally appoints one member from each of the fol-
lowing state agencies to serve on the task force:
Attorney generals office;
Comptrollers office;
Texas Department of Public Safety;
State Auditors office;
Texas Health and Human Services
Commission;
Texas Health Departments Bureau of VitalStatistics;
Texas Department of Human Services; and
Texas Department of Insurance.
In order to accomplish a broader state effort to
prevent and combat fraud, the statute should be
changed to allow the membership of the Task
Force to include representatives from:
the Texas Workforce Commission;
the State Agency Internal Audit Forum;
the Texas Department of Information
Resources; the Employee Retirement System;
institutions of higher learning in Texas that
specialize in criminal justice programs;
the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy;
the Texas Board of Medical Examiners;
the Texas Medical Association; and
the Texas Hospital and Dental Associations.
Create clear guiding principles for the
Texas Medicaid and Public Assistance Fraud
Oversight Task Force.
The Task Force should be the States leading
experts in fraud prevention, detection, investiga-
tion and prosecution. The organization will oper-
ate more effectively with clear vision and mis-
sion statements that guide them and focus their
efforts.
The vision of the Task Force should be Elimi-
nate fraud in Texas government through innova-
tive solutions.
The mission of the task force should be The
Task Force coordinates the expertise and
resources of the public and private sectors to
analyze state practices and eliminate opportuni-
ties for fraud.
Rename the Medicaid and Public Assistance
Fraud Oversight Task Force to the Texas
Fraud Oversight Task Force.
The Task Forces name should reflect its expand-ed responsibilities and membership.
Enact legislation that allows the Task Force
to have closed executive sessions.
Holding executive sessions would allow the gov-
ernment members of the Task Force to discuss
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ongoing fraud investigations and sensitive fraud
prevention strategies. These meetings would
allow the state to work in unison to combat
fraud. It would allow them to stay one step ahead
of would-be criminals instead of one step behind.
Coordinate the states fraud prevention
efforts.
The approach to fighting fraud is constantly
changing. When a fraud prevention or detec-
tion measure is put into place, the criminals find
another way around them. With increased pres-
sure on the State to do more with less, the fraud
prevention measures become even more impor-
tant in assuring the protection of state assets
and tax dollars. Coordination among agencies toprevent, detect, investigate and prosecute fraud
is essential.
There are several steps to coordinating the
efforts of the multiple state agencies. The initial
step is in the first recommendation of the Special
Report Expand the scope of the Task Force
and update the Task Force membership. Other
opportunities exist for the state to improve their
fraud prevention efforts.
Pool the expertise across agencies and
create subcommittees within the Task
Force.A separate subcommittee should
exist for prevention, investigation, detec-
tion and prosecution. There are a multitude
of professional support organizations in the
fraud prevention, and the Task Force is not
taking advantage of them because it has no
formal program for reviewing or sharing the
benefits these groups provide. Many Task
Force members are involved in or are mem-
bers of these organizations, and they have astrong working knowledge of the support the
specific organization could provide, such as
fraud prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution programs, statistical-based stud-
ies and other fraud-related best practices. By
establishing these subcommittees, each one
would define best practices and be a resource
to the Task Force members as experts in their
respective fields.
Ensure the Task Force members belong
to national fraud organizations. Mem-
bers of the Task Force should learn fromprofessionals in their field by joining national
associations that are a repository of experi-
ence and knowledge. Membership in these
associations would enable the Task Force to
engage in national fraud efforts and lead the
nation in fraud prevention. At a minimum, the
Task Force members should join the:
National White Collar Crime Center;
Regional Organized Crime Center; and the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE).
These groups would provide specific informa-
tion to help Texas reduce fraud in their many
programs.
Grant the Task Force the authority to
serve as the fraud standards-setting
organization for state agencies. The Task
Force should be the states fraud direction
and standards-setting group.
The Task Force would look for the best fraud
prevention strategies and establish best
practices and standards. For example, the
recently released Comprehensive Medicaid
Integrity Plan, from the Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS), is a new
national strategy for detecting and preventing
fraud and abuse in these programs. The Task
Force would review this plan once the federal
government finalizes it and determines how it
could benefit specific Texas state agencies.
The Texas OIG has played an important role
in the recently released CMS integrity plan
and has testified before Congress on fraud
prevention efforts in Texas. OIG has placed
Texas in the national spotlight for its progres-
sive techniques for fraud detection. Utilizing
existing OIG resources and expertise, the
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Task Force could improve the States anti-
fraud efforts by establishing standards and
moving forward to prevention and deterrence
while maintaining successful detection and
prosecution practices.
Change Texas statute to make the Office of
Inspector General an independent entity
reporting solely to the Governor.
TheAssociation of Inspector Generals states the
Inspector Generals (IG) independence should
be protected. The report indicates that the
best way to protect the independence of the IG
is to limit its direct report responsibility to one
person. The Office of Inspector General should
therefore report only to the governor.
A model for this reporting structure was estab-
lished by legislation in the state of New York,
which adopted an independent office of Medicaid
inspector general, reporting directly to the secre-
tary for the governor for a five-year term. Numer-
ous Medicaid-related audit responsibilities were
also transferred to this new Medicaid inspector
general.
This recommendation is important because the
IG is a key member of the Task Force. At a mini-
mum, the IG should be independent of the HHSC
commissioner.
Lengthen the term of the IG.
The term of the IG should be lengthened from
one year to between five and seven years as rec-
ommended by the Association of Inspector Gen-
erals. According to the Association of Inspector
Generals, the term of Inspector Generals should
be long enough to make them immune to politicalpressure and to provide consistency and stability
to the fraud detection, investigation and pros-
ecution process. The Association of Inspector
Generals recommends appointment terms of five
to seven years, for optimum efficiency and effec-
tiveness.0 It is not unusual for investigations to
take several years and leadership continuity is
important in preventing fraud.
Commission investigators at the Texas
Health and Human Services Commission as
Texas peace officers.
Investigators at HHSC are not eligible to be com-
missioned as Texas peace officers. More thana dozen other state agencies have investigators
that are commissioned Texas peace officers,
including MFCU at the OAG.
By commissioning HHSC investigators as Texas
peace officers they would have:
the authorization to draft criminal subpoena
requests for judicial approval to gain informa-
tion;
extensive training in de-escalation of poten-
tially violent situations; access to more criminal data bases such as
the FBIs National Crime Information Center
and the financial crimes data base hosted by
the OAG;
better standing in the law enforcement com-
munity, which could lead to more assistance
and support during investigations and put
them on par with the commissioned investi-
gators at the other state agencies;
more and better training opportunities,
including cultural diversity, special investiga-
tions and crisis intervention training; and
access to other states law enforcement
groups and national law enforcement associa-
tions, for example the Regional Organized
Crime Information Center, which provides
extensive investigation and litigation support
for investigators.
Investigators commissioned as Texas peace offi-
cers will have to maintain the standards of the
Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officers
Standards and Education.
The recommendations in this Special Report are
designed to improve the current Task Force and
bring overall enhancement to the States fraud
prevention efforts.
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END NOTES
Texas Government Code 53.07Medicaid and Public
Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force, 997.
2
See attached list of people interviewed for this study.3 Fleps, Christina W., (2005)Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Compliance Manual New York, New York: Aspen Publishers.
4 Morehead, Juliana, (2006, April) Red Flags of Insurance Fraud.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Retrieved April 6,
2006 from .
5 Testimony by Leslie G. Aronovitz, Director, Health Care,
United States Government Accountability Office, for the
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, and International Security, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
March 28, 2006.
6 Testimony by Brian Flood, Inspector General, Texas Health
and Human Services Commission, for the Subcommittee on
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and
International Security, Committee on Homeland Security andGovernmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2006.
7 Association of Inspector Generals,Principals and Standards
for Office of Inspector General May 6, 200. Available at
.
8 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2004)Report to the
Nation, available at .
9 Attached copy of letter dated October 28, 2005, provided by
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
0 Pennsylvania Association of Certified Public Accountants,
January 2003, Fraud Detection: SAS 99 Increases Auditors
Responsibilities.
Morehead, Juliana, (2006, April) Red Flags of Insurance Fraud.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Retrieved April 6,2006 from .
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This publication is not copyrighted and
may be reproduced. The Comptroller of
Public Accounts would appreciate credit
for material used and a copy of the reprint.
Special Reports
Carole Keeton Strayhorn
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
P.O. Box 13528
Austin, TX 78711-3528
For more information, call -800-53-544.This publication is also available on
the World Wide Web by accessing
the Comptrollers Window on State
Government Web site at
.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
publication #96-239, December 2006.
Special ReportMedicaid and Public Assistance Fraud Oversight Task Force