RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSEDAlejandro vs. PepitoEnshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the requirement thatno person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. That requirementsimply requires that the procedure established by law shall be followed in order of trial in criminal cases,provides that "the plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial mustproceed in the following order:(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the charges.(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense. (c)The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance ofustice,permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. (d)!henthe introductionofevidence shallhave beenconcluded, unlessthe caseissubmitted to thecourt without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, andthe fiscal may conclude the same.That procedure observes the "mandate of reason and the guarantee of fairness with which due process isidentified". The procedure outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to bepresumed innocent until the contrary is proved.Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections"atas Pambansa "ilang #$ providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes beforea civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact",is herebydeclarednull andvoid, for beingviolativeof theconstitutional presumptionof innocenceguaranteed to an accused. % person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges havebeen filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crimewith the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to holdoffice during the term of the sentence. %lthough the filing of charges is considered as but prima facieevidence, andtherefore, mayberebutted, yet, thereis "clear andpresent danger" that becausethepro&imity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offeringcontrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.People vs. MingoaThe issue on !hether %rticle $'( of the )evised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a publicofficer tohave duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by anyduly authori*ed officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property topersonal use" does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until thecontrary is proved cannot be sustained. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference frm t!efact pr"ed, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. +urthermore thestatute establis!es nl# a prima facie presumptin, thus giving the accused an opportunity to presentevidence to rebut it.Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals!hether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can invo,e the right tobe presumed innocentThe penalt# in sei$ure cases is distinct and separate frm t!e criminal liabilit# that might be imposedagainst theindictedimporterorpossessorandboth,indsofpenaltiesmaybeimposed. Considering,therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since1they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty% prfbe#nd reasnable dubt is nt re&uired in rder t 'ustif# t!e frfeiture f t!e (ds. The de(ree fprf re&uired is merel# substantial e"idence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mindmightacceptasadequatetosupport aconclusion. +urther,acrprateentit#!asnpersnalit#tin")e t!e ri(!t t be presumed inncent *!ic! ri(!t is a"ailable nl# t an indi"idual *! is anaccused in a criminal case.E!IP"I#E $!LE%+!eret!ee"idencef t!epartiesincriminal caseise"enl#balanced% t!ecnstitutinalpresumptin f inncence s!uld tilt t!e scales in fa"r f t!e accused, T!ere I n e&uipise if t!ee"idence is nt e"enl# balanced, It cannt be in")e if t!e e"idence f t!e prsecutin is"er*!elmin(, People vs &olgado-n criminal cases there can be n fair !earin( unless t!e accused be (i"en an pprtunit# t be !eardb# cunsel. -t is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprisean accused of his ri(!t t !a"e an attrne#, it is nt enu(! t as) !im *!et!er !e desires t!e aid fan attrne#, but it is essential t!at t!e curt s!uld assi(n ne de fici for him if he so desires and heis poor or (rant !im a reasnable time t prcure an attrne# f !is *n. The right to be heard wouldbeoflittleavail ifit doesnotincludetheright tobeheardbycounsel. Eventhemost intelligent oreducated man may have no s,ill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,without counsel,he may be convictednotbecauseheis guiltybutbecausehe doesnot,nowhow toestablish his innocence. %nd this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.People vs. 'alu(otThe Court has uniformly stressed the importance of the trial court.s receiving evidence notwithstandingthe plea of guilty in order that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpabilityof the accused. The Court has time and time again reminded udges that they are duty bound to be e&trasolicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his pleaand the import of inevitable conviction.Theappointmentofcounsel deofficciofortheaccusedwhohasnocounsel ofchoiceanddesirestoemploy the services of one mandatr# nl# at t!e time f arrai(nment, /o such duty e&ists where theaccused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Amion vs )udge C*iongsonThe preference in the c!ice f cunsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a persn underIn"esti(atin rather than none who is accused in a criminal prosecution.'orja vs. Mendo+aConstitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indictedand what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyondreasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. 0oreover, the sentence to beimposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. 1ue process is where the accused is "heardin a court of competent urisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and onlypunishedafterinquiryandinvestigation, uponnoticetohim, withanopportunitytobeheard, anda2udgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law." %narrai(nment t!us becmesindispensable as t!e means -fr brin(in( t!e accused int curt and ntif#in( !im f t!e cause !e isre&uired t meet,-People vs. Alcalde2ettled is the rule that when a udge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a presentcondition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. -f it be found that byreason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, ma,e a proper defense, it is theduty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention untilhis faculties are recovered. 0oreover, the aforementioned2ection'$3a4 of )ule ''5mandates thesuspensin f t!e arrai(nment and the mental e&amination of the accused should it appear that he is ofunsound mind.%t the time, what was applicable was 2ection '$3a4 of )ule ''5 of the '67# )ules on CriminalProcedure, whichreads"Thearraignment shall besuspended, ifat thetimethereof: 3a4Theaccusedappears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fullyunderstand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.People vs. D(Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. -ndeed,the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of 8not guilty9 in theirbehalf. :owever, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informedof the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by theirrefusal to the reading of the complaint or information.People ,s #adiosaThe information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and theacts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. :owever, there is no need to specify or referto the particular section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. /o law requires thatin order that an accused may be convicted, the specific provision penali*ing the act charged should bementioned in the information.!hat identifies the chargeis the actual recital ofthefactsandnot thatdesignatedbythefiscal inthepreamblethereof. -t is not evennecessaryfor theprotectionof thesubstantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that the accused be informedof the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. :e must loo, to the facts alleged.#oriano vs. #andigan-a(anThedescriptinandnt t!edesi(natinof theoffenseis controlling. Evenif thereis erroneousdesignation ;e.g 2ec. raft ?aw@ the accused ma# still be cn"ictedof bribery if t!einfrmatin prperl# describes t!e ffense. The real nature of crime charged is determined frm t!erecital f facts n t!e infrmatin. -t is neither determined based on the caption or preamble thereof norfrom the specification of the law allegedly violated.People vs $amire+% person charged with rape ocf which he was absolved cannot be convicted of qualified seduction, whichwas not included in the information. People vs A-ino3Conviction of the accused of )ape by -ntimidation under the information charging him with raping hisdaughter while she was asleep and unconscious would violate his constitutional right to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation charged against him. Teves vs #andigan-a(anAnder the variance doctrine, in spite of the difference between the crime charged and that which waseventually proved, the accused may still be convicted of whatever offense that was proved even if notspecifically set out in the information providedit is necessarily included in the crime charged.People vs. La+anoAlthough the prosecution's evidence tended to prove that Lozano had carnal knowledge of the victim at least twice,hecannot beheldliablefor twocountsofrape,becausetheInformationcharged him with only onecount.Anaccused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. o convict himof an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutionalright.People vs. Lumilan!ec. ", #ule $%& of the #evised #ules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an offense otherthan that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both established by evidenceandis includedintheoffensechargedintheInformation. !incemurder or homicideneither includes or isnecessarily included in 'ualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, the trial court may notvalidly convict an accused for the former crime under an Information charging the latter offense. Conversely, anaccused charged in the Information with homicide or murder may not be convicted of 'ualified illegal possession offirearms used in murder or homicide, for the latter is not included in the former. (ursuant to the amendments to!ection $ of () $*++, however, where an accused uses an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, hemay no longer be charged with what used to be the two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the #evised(enal Code and 'ualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under () $*++. As amended by#A *%,", () $*++ now mandates that the accused will be prosecuted only for the crime of homicide or murder withthe fact of illegal possession of firearms being relegated to a mere special aggravating circumstance. o obviate anydoubt, #A *%," e-pressly restricts the filing of an information for illegal possession of firearms to cases where noother crime is committed.People vs Ostiahe trial court is re'uired to probe thoroughly into the reasons as well as the facts and circumstances for the changeof plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea. e-plain to him the elements of the crime for which he ischargedas well as thenatureandeffect of 'ualifyingcircumstances, genericaggravatingcircumstances andmitigatingcircumstances inthecommissionthereof. andinformhimof theimposablepenaltyandhis civilliabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to. he trial court failed to e-plain such to the accused, itdidnot even bother in'uiringfrom/stiawhether hesought theadviceofhiscounsel before pleadingguiltytomurderandwhetherhewantedtoadduceevidenceinhisbehalftoproveanymitigatingcircumstancesinthecommission of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.People vs. Flores he issue on whether the informations violates the constitutional right of (edro 0lores to be informed of the natureand cause of the accusation against him. was denied the constitutional right to be informed ofthe nature and cause of the accusation against him. his right has the following ob1ectives2 3$4 o furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make thedefense. 3%4 3%4 o avail himself of his conviction or ac'uittal for protection against further prosecution for the samecause. 4354 354 oinformthecourt ofthefactsalleged, sothat it maydecidewhethertheyaresufficient inlawtosupport aconviction if one should be had. he right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. 6ence, it is imperativethat thecomplaint or informationfiledagainst theaccusedbecompletetomeet itsob1ectives.As such, anindictment must fullystatetheelementsof thespecificoffenseallegedtohavebeencommitted. 0or an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarilyincluded in the complaint or information.Acebedo vs. Sarmienta he right to a speedy trial means one free from ve-atious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary ob1ectivebeingtoassurethat aninnocent personmaybefreefromthean-ietyande-penseofacourt litigationor, ifotherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation andconsideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-observance ofthis right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, ormandamus for the final dismissal of the case. he right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not onlywhen unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause orjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried. An accused person isentitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. 6e cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for anunreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It isnot tobesupposed, of course, that theConstitutionintendstoremovefromtheprosecutioneveryreasonableopportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be e-pected or e-traordinary efforts re'uired on the part ofthe prosecutor or the court. he Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of onlywhere the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not e-clude from its operationcasescommencedbyprivateindividuals.Whereonceapersonisprosecutedcriminally, heisentitledtoaspeedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense orthe manner inwhichit is authorizedtobecommenced. 7ore specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the view thata dismissal based on the denialoftherighttoaspeedytrial amountstoanacquittal. 8ecessarily, anyfurtherattemptatcontinuingtheprosecutionorstartinganewonewouldfallwithintheprohibitionagainstanaccusedbeingtwiceputinjeopardy.Dacanay vs Paople!ection *, #ule $$, of the $,*9 #ules on Criminal (rocedure e-plicitly states2 :;hen two or more accused are1ointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried 1ointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of thefiscal or any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused.: he resultinginconvenienceande-penseonthepart oftheaccused, who are under arrest,be entitled to a separate trial. A separate trial is I !"#"$!% with the right of an accused to a speedytrialas guaranteed to him by the $,*? Constitution, more specifically under !ection $"3%4 of Article III thereof.6erein, it has been * years since the information against )acanay was filed, but the case against him has yet to betried. he long delay has clearly pre1udiced )acanay, who is now more than ?5 years of age.People vs Rivera;hile the Constitution recognizes the accused's right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, hisoption to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. 0or considering the !tate's and the offended party'sright to speedy and ade'uate 1ustice, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain a private counsel if theaccused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorneydeclines to represent the accused for a valid reason. the Courts are not re'uired to wait indefinitely the pleasure andconvenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of 1ustice.58or should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy re'uires that the trialcontinue as scheduled, considering that appellant was ade'uately represented by counsels who were not shown to benegligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him. Garcia vs Domingohetrial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interestedin observing the manner a 1udgeconductstheproceedingsinhiscourtroommaydoso.hereistobenobanonsuchattendance. 6isbeingastranger to the litigants is of no moment. 8o relationship to the parties need be shown. he thought that liesbehind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to beconducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is understandable why such a right is deemedembraced in procedural due process. ;here a trial takes place, as is 'uite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar ofwhat cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous ofbeing present are free to do so. here is the well recognized e&ceptionthough that warrants the e-clusion of thepublic where the evidence may be characterized as 'offensive to decency or public morals.: !till, herein, when the trial was held on #aturdays and in the air conditioned chambers of the !ity(udge for the convenience of the parties and of the (udge, the proceedings were "T violative of theright topublic trial. here is no showing that the public was thereby e-cluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the roomallotted the @udge would reduce the number of those who could be present. !uch a fact though is not indicative ofany transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. !ome are smaller than others. It sufficesto satisfy the re'uirement of a trial being public if the accused could :have his friends, relatives and counsel present,no matter with what offense he may be charged.:Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada)ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is notlifted above its individual settings nor made an ob1ect of public's attention and where the conclusions reached areinduced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fittingdignity and calm ambiance is demanded. hus, an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs tohim, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensurethat he is fairly dealt with and would not be un1ustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secreteconclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. it only implies that the court doorsmust be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observethe trial process. United States vs. JavierIssueonwhether the sworn statement, which was e-ecuted by a person now deceased, is inadmissibleinasmuch as the accused is not given the opportunity to cross>e-amine the author thereof.he (hilippine Aill of #ights provides :hat in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall en1oy theright to meet the witnesses face to face,: and the provision of the Code of Criminal (rocedure, section $9 394, statestaht :Inall criminal prosecutionsthedefendant shall beentitled2 tobeconfrontedat thetrial byandtocross>e-amine the witnesses against him.: ;ith reference to the clause of the Aill of #ights, it :intends to secure theaccused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meethim face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity ofcross>e-amination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or e- parte affidavits,and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the e-ercise of the rightof cross>e-amination.: In other words, confrontation is essential because cross>e-amination is essential. A secondreason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness whiletestifying.PEOPLE VS SANDAL !andal, et.al. assigned as an error the fact that the trial court failed to re'uire the fiscal to e-hibit the testimonygiven bythewitnessesduringthepreliminary investigation conductedby the 1ustice of the peace.Auttheonly6effect of thisfailurewastoentitlethedefensetoadducesecondaryevidencetouchingthetestimonyof saidwitnesses, for the purpose of attacking their veracity, should they have been presented as witnesses during the trial.People vs De Lunahe essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a fullknowledge of the conse'uences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of thecrime charged in the complaint or information. In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt) It must be of such nature as toforeclose the defendant*s right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but toimpose the penalty fi&ed by law. =nder the circumstances of the case, de Luna's 'ualified plea of guilty is not avalid plea of guilty. ;hile the Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an accused to enter a pleaof guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances, considering, however, thegravity of the offense charged, the more prudent course for the trial court to follow is to re1ect the plea made by deLuna and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence. ;hen an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,the court shall conduct a searching in'uiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the conse'uences of hispleaandre'uiretheprosecutiontoprovehisguiltandtheprecisedegreeofculpability.heaccusedmayalsopresent evidence in his behalf. hus, after a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial courtre'uires the presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation andthe degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.7