LABOR RELATIONSVIII. RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION

CASE NO. 93

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA (OWNED AND OPERATED BY GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION) Petitioner,vs.PINAG-ISANG GALING AT LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HERITAGE MANILA (PIGLAS-HERITAGE), Respondent

This case is about a companys objections to the registration of its rank and file union for non-compliance with the requirements of its registration.

FACTS: Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila (petitioner company) formed the "Heritage Hotel Employees Union" (the HHE union). The Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this union. Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company opposed alleging that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) and the company also filed a petition for the cancellation of the HHE unions registration certificate.

The Med-Arbiter granted the HHE unions petition for certification election. Petitioner company appealed it and filed a motion for reconsideration which was both denied respectively, prompting it to file a petitioin for certiorari with the CA.On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of the HHE unions certification election, effective until the petition for cancellation of that unions registration shall have been resolved with finality. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final when the HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this Court.

On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of petitioner company held a meeting and formed another union, the respondent Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (the PIGLAS union). This union applied for registration with the DOLE-NCR and got its registration certificate on February 9, 2004. Two months later, the members of the first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for cancellation of its union registration.

On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company also opposed, alleging that the new unions officers and members were also those who comprised the old union. According to the company, the employees involved formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals injunction against the holding of the certification election sought by the former union. Despite the companys opposition, however, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election.

On December 6, 2004, petitioner Company filed a petition to cancel the union registration of respondent PIGLAS union. The company claimed that the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union registration and committed dual unionism" which is a ground for canceling a unions registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new Union can have a valid certification election?

RULING: The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny. Once such charge is proved, the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered organizations. Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or employees stated in the various supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union submitted to labor authorities can be explained. While it appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003 organizational meeting that only 90 employees responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected on the signature sheet for attendance. There is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the fact that only 127 members ratified the unions constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed that all those who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws. Any member had the right to hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the process.

At any rate, the Labor Code and its implementing rules do not require that the number of members appearing on the documents in question should completely dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration requirements.

Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was required to submit the names of all its members comprising at least 20 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding that the signature and attendance sheets reflected a membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the company, amounted to material misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of the unions registration.

But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is immaterial. A comparison of the documents shows that, except for six members, the names found in the subject list are also in the attendance and signature sheets. Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS union sought to represent consisted of 250 employees. Only 20 percent of this number or 50 employees were required to unionize. Here, the union more than complied with such requirement. And last, the fact that some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new unions registration. The right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join another one.

CASE NO. 95

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP., petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.G.R. No. 162355

FACTS: Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corp. and its Affiliates. Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union then reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. CLUP-SLECCWA then filed the instant petition. It alleged that SLECC employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. CLUP-SLECCWA claimed that no certification election has been held among them within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered covering the same employees, namely SMSLEC, it has not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of SLECCs employees. Subsequently, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. Then a CBA between SMSLEC and SLECC was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE.

ISSUE: Whether or not certification election must be conducted in the SLECC?

HELD: Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration. The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.[footnoteRef:1][10] Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its affiliates workers union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-SLECC and its affiliates workers union and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC. [1: ]

WHEREFORE, petition is denied.

CASE NO. 96

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner, vs.SAMMA CORPORATION, Respondent.G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner SAMMA-LIKHA filed a petition for certification election in the DOLE. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition. Med-arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco ordered the dismissal of the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioners union registration in the DOLE. Crispin D. Dannug, Jr., Officer-in-Charge/Regional Director of DOLE, issued a resolution revoking the charter certificate of petitioner as local chapter of LIKHA Federation.

Going back to the case, Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson, treating the motion for reconsideration as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter. Thus, he directed the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of respondent. Respondent then filed its comment on the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, asserting that the order of the med-arbiter could only be reviewed by way of appeal and not by a motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which was reversed by the latter as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election?; (2) whether or not petitioners motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal should not have been given due course for failure to attach proof of service on respondent?; and (3) whether or not petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election?

HELD: 1) NO. On the first issue, the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. Therefore, there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping in a petition for certification election.

2) On the second issue, according to the implementing rules as amended by D.O. No. 9, the appeal shall be under oath and shall consist of a memorandum of appeal specifically stating the grounds relied upon by the appellant with the supporting arguments and evidence. The appeal shall be deemed not filed unless accompanied by proof of service thereof to appellee. The motion for reconsideration was properly treated as an appeal because it substantially complied with the formal requisites of the latter. The lack of proof of service was not fatal as respondent had actually received a copy of the motion.

3) On the third issue, LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-1015-032-11638-FED-LC. Subsequently, petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter certificate no. 2-01. With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal personality as legitimate labor organizations. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration. Even though the petitioners charter certificate was initially revoked by the DOLE, the Petitioner still moved for the reconsideration and the resolution does not attained finality yet. Thus, Petitioner still has its legal personality.

It was ruled that the employer, as a mere bystander, has no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related thereto.

CASE NO. 97

PICOP RESOURCES, INC vs TAECA, ET ALG.R. NO. 160828, AUGUST 9,2010

FACTSRespondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI andbona fidemembers ofNagkahiusang Mamumuo saPRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000 which contained the following union security provisions:Article II- Union Security and Check-OffSection 6.Maintenance of membership.6.1All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of this AGREEMENT.6.2Any employee who may hereinafter be employed to occupy a position covered by the bargaining unit shall be advised by the COMPANY that they are required to file an application for membership with the UNION within thirty (30) days from the date his appointment shall have been made regular.6.3The COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNIONand after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of termination of services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article

On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes) sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Fee Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA.NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause. Atty. Romero A. Boniel issued a memorandum addressed to theconcerned employees to explain in writing within 72 hours why their employment should not be terminated due to acts of disloyalty as alleged by their Union. Letters of explanation were evaluated by Atty. Fuentes but found the member's explanations to be unsatisfactory and reiterated the demand for termination. On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of acts of disloyalty committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the freedom period during the effectivity of the CBA.A Notice dated October 21, 2000 was also served on the Department of Labor and Employment Office (DOLE), Caraga Region.

ISSUE: Whether or not an existing CBA can be given its full force and effect in all its terms and condition including its union security clause, even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been entered into.

RULINGNO. Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced. The provision of Article 256 of the Labor Code is particularly enlightening. It reads: Article 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. - In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, That the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty per cent (50%) of the number of votes cast.

At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed. Applying the same provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them.In the instant case, four (4) petitions were filed as early as May 12, 2000. In fact, a petition for certification election was already ordered by the Med-Arbiter of DOLE Caraga Region on August 23, 2000. Therefore, following Article 256, at the expiration of the freedom period, PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold true when petitions for certification election were filed, as in this case.Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or compromised.

CASE NO. 98

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION,G.R. No. 159553 December 10, 2007

FACTS:On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiters order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) Yokohama Employees Union and (2) No Union as choices.[3] The election held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following result:

YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION - 131NO UNION - 117 SPOILED- 2 ----- 250VOTES CHALLENGED BY [YOKOHAMA] - 78 VOTES CHALLENGED BY [UNION] - 73 ------TOTAL CHALLENGED VOTES - 151TOTAL VOTES CAST - 401[4]

Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other hand, the Union challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes by aalleged supervisor-trainees. On January 21, 2002, the Med-Arbiter resolved the parties protests, decreeing as follows:2. The appreciation of the votes of the sixty-five (65) dismissed employees who contested their dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission shall be suspended until the final disposition of their complaint for illegal dismissal. . . .3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) so-called newly-regularized rank-and-file employees shall be appreciated in the final tabulation.On May 22, 2002, the DOLE Acting Secretary disposed of the appeals as follows:2. The votes of dismissed employees who contested their dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall be appreciated in the final tabulation of the certification election results.3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) newly regularized rank-and-file employees shall be excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary. Yokohama appealed. Thus, the present case. ISSUE: Whether or not THE VOTES OF ALL OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND ABANDONMENT OF WORK WHICH ARE CAUSES UNRELATED TO THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION BE APPRECIATED.

RULING:Section 2, Rule XII[16] of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code allows a dismissed employee to vote in the certification election if the case contesting the dismissal is still pending.Section 2, Rule XII, the rule in force during the November 23, 2001 certification election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to vote during the certification election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election.

Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although their cases were still pending at the time of the certification election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June 27, 2001[18] and the appeal of the Labor Arbiters February 28, 2003 Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.[19]Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters.

RULE IXCONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTIONSection 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. . . . An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.

CASE NO. 99

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-MPHC), Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU) AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondents.G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009

FACTS: A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. In view of the significant number of segregated votes, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC and HIMPHLU, referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the CA. 6 other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still 5 other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing CBA, such employees cannot vote.

ISSUES: 1) Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote? 2) Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent?

RULING: 1) In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

2) It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. Prescinding from the Courts ruling that all the probationary employees votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170. HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CASE NO. 100

Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramics Employees AssociationG.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., a corporation primarily in the business of manufacture, makes, buy and sell, on whole sale basis, tiles, marbles, mosaics and other similar products. Respondent Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the establishment of petitioner.

In 1998, petitioner gave P3, 000.00 as bonus to its employees, members of the respondent Association. Subsequently, in September 1999, petitioner and respondent Association entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides for, among others, the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to the members of the respondent Association.

In the succeeding years, 1999, 2000, 2001, petitioner gave bonuses in a form of a certificate which is equivalent to P3, 000.00. However, in 2002, petitioner gave only P600.00 as cash benefit. Respondent Association objected to the P600.00 cash benefit and argued that it was in violation of the CBA. Petitioner averred that the giving of extra compensation was based on the companys available resources for a given year and the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the company does not make profits. Unable to amicably settle the dispute, the case was referred to the Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision, declaring that petitioner is bound to grant each of its workers a Christmas bonus of P3,000.00 for the reason that the bonus was given prior to the effectivity of the CBA between the parties and that the financial losses of the company is not a sufficient reason to exempt it from granting the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

Issue:

Is petitioner obliged to give a Christmas bonus to respondent Association?

Ruling:

Yes. Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.

A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. The said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioners financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that the P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.

All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.

CASE NO. 101

FVC Labor Union-PTGWO vs SANAMA-FVC-SIGLOG.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009Facts:

On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement with the company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBAs duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA provides that this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003 thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months. On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.

Issue:

Was the certification election filed within the freedom period?

Ruling:

Yes. While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.

In the present case, the CBA was originally signed for a period of five years, i.e., from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003, with a provision for the renegotiation of the CBAs other provisions at the end of the 3rd year of the five-year CBA term. Thus, prior to January 30, 2001 the workplace parties sat down for renegotiation but instead of confining themselves to the economic and non-economic CBA provisions, also extended the life of the CBA for another four months, i.e., from the original expiry date on January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.

This negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining status, was seasonably filed.

CASE NO. 102

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. CONFESORG.R. No. 114974June 16, 2004

FOR: SURFACE BARGAINING AND BLUE-SKY BARGAINING

Facts:Standard Chartered Bank is foreign Banking Corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union.

In August 1990, the bank and the union signed a five year CBA and renegotiate after 3 years. Prior to the expiration of the three year period and before the 60 day freedom period, the union initiated the negotiations. The bank gave a counter-proposal. The parties agreed to settle the differences in a meeting. The non-economic provisions were noted as deferred however it was manifested that it should be changed to deadlock to indicate that it is not yet resolved. The negotiations of the economic provisions were commenced. Umali, the president of the Union, said that the means on how the Union got what it wanted during the first negotiation of the 1987 will be applied again if needed in order to get what it wanted.The Union insisted the economic provisions. However, the union proposed that the Bank make a revision of itemized proposal. On June 15, 1993 the union said that it would be best if they seek third party assistance if the counter proposal was not revised. Afterwards, the Bank presented a counter-proposal.The Union then declared a deadlock and filed a notice of strike before NCMB. The Bank filed a complaint for ULP alleging that the union did not bargain in good faith, violated the no strike-no lockout clause, and that the bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate and hire the services of a lawyer.The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions: CBA shall be retroactive to April 1, 1993; effective for two years; the provisions which are not expressly repealed or modified are retained and without prejudice to the agreements as the parties may arrive at in the meantime. The banks complaint for ULP was dismissed for lack of merit. Both parties filed for MR to no avail.

Issues:1. Whether or not the Bank violated its duty to bargain by committing Surface Bargaining and therefore committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining.2. Whether or not the Union committed ULP through Blue Sky Bargaining.

Ruling:

1. No. It was held that the Union failed to show that the Bank committed such acts. Surface bargaining is the going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The resolution of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged partys conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the Bank had any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. Records show that after the Union sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter replied with a list of its counter-proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings were set for the settlement of their differences. The minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged economic and non-economic proposals and counter-proposals.The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.

2. No. The Union did not engage in blue sky bargaining. The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.In sum, we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and resolutions. While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank, we find the latter did not engage in ULP. We, likewise, hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP.

CASE NO. 103

San Miguel Corporation Employees UNION-PTGWO, represented by its President Raymundo Hipolito, Jr.,petitioner,vs.Hon. Ma. Nieves D. ConfesorG.R. No. 111262 September 19, 1996

Facts:Petitioner UNION-PTGWO entered into a CBA with private respondent San Miguel Corp. to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989.SMC management in a letter, informed its employees of its intention for restructuring. SMC was composed of four operating divisions namely: (1) Beer, (2) Packaging, (3) Feeds and Livestocks, (4) Magnolia and Agri-business. Thereafter, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun off and became two separate and distinct corporations (Magnolia and SMFI). However, the CBA remained in effect.CBA was renegotiated. PTGWO insisted that the SMCs bargaining unit should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years. SMC contended that the members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the Labor Code. Subsequently unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock and filed a notice of strike.

Issue: Whether or not employees of the spun off corporations were still considered as part of the appropriate bargaining unit.

Ruling: NO. SC held that, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed.Considering the spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their respective and distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce differ. The different companies may have different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such reason, the employees of the different companies see the need to group themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive and different groups. It would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their own working conditions.

CASE NO. 104

Tabigue, et. al. vs International Copra Export Corp., G.R. 183335, December 23, 2009

FACTS:Petitioners filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the DOLE-NCMB against the respondent for violation of the CBA and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting. For failure to reach a settlement, petitioners elevated the case to voluntary arbitration. Respondent presented a letter of Tan, president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union (the union) of which petitioners are members, addressed to respondents plant manager Tangente, stating that petitioners are not duly authorized by the board or the officers to represent the union. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. The NCMB Director dismissed the complaint due to lack of willingness of the parties to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and that the union had not authorized the petitioners to represent it. The NCMB Director subsequently dismissed the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner on the ground that the NCMB has no rule-making power to decide on issues as it only facilitates settlement among the parties to labor disputes. The CA as well dismissed the petition for review for the reason that the NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency but merely a conciliatory body and its decisions cannot be appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NCMB, when exercising adjudicative powers, act as a quasi-judicial agency and, thus, its decision are appealable by petition for review to the CA.

RULING:No. The NCMBs following functions, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and Employment) are,viz:(a)Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor disputes;(b)Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions;(c)Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and other government authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;(d)Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and non-adversarial schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement;(e)Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and decisions;(f)Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreements;(g)Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices; and(h)Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Minister

Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union.InAtlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,viz:x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA.Consequentlyonly disputes involving the unionand the companyshall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

CASE NO. 105

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of respondent Union filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. ISSUE: Whether or not the CBA is clear and unambiguous so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied such that only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality?

HELD: As identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are same with the above elements with additional element of presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death.

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. As such, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. A dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Additionally, the CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent. Therefore, child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb. The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. The children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. Hortillano was also able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA or the presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child. Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

CASE NO. 106

CASIANO NAVARRO vs DAMASCO & BUSCO SUGAR MILLING COG.R. No. 101875. July 14, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Navarro, a typist of BUSCO SUGAR MILLING CO, went to visit Mercie Baylas, whom he was courting, in the companys ladies dormitory. Upon seeing him, Baylas ran towards her room but lost her balance; petitioner overcame her, embraced her, put himself on top of her and started kissing her until other employees responded to Baylas' flee for help. The company put Navarro under preventive suspension because of the incident and he was meted out the penalty of dismissal upon the recommendation of the investigator for violating the company's Code of Conduct against acts of immorality and gross discourtesy to a co-employee inside company premises.The President of the Mindanao Sugar Workers Union, for and in behalf of petitioner, and the Personnel Officer of the company agreed to submit the case of petitioner to voluntary arbitration. Counsel for petitioner, during the initial conference with the Voluntary Arbitrator, questioned whether the grievance procedure in the CBA before bringing the case before the Voluntary Arbitrator had been followed. The parties, however, also agreed to submit the case for decision based on their position papers. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision dismissing petitioner from employment and holding that the company did not violate the provisions of the grievance procedure under the CBA.Petitioner contends that the grievance procedure provided for in the CBA was not followed; hence, the Voluntary Arbitrator exceeded his authority when he took cognizance of the labor case. Petitioner also claims that he was denied due process of law because no hearing was held and he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

ISSUES: 1. WON the case of petitioner should have been brought to the companys grievance machinery prior to the Voluntary Arbitrator.2. WON petitioner was denied due process.

RULING:1. It is the policy of the State to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes. The instant case is not a grievance that must be submitted to the grievance machinery. What are subject of the grievance procedure for adjustment and resolution are grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. The acts of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of Employee Discipline, particularly the provision penalizing the immoral conduct of employees. Consequently, there was no justification for petitioner to invoke the grievance machinery provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.Also, the case of petitioner was submitted to voluntary arbitration by agreement of the president of the labor union to which petitioner belongs, and his employer, through its personnel officer. Petitioner himself voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator when he, through his counsel, filed his position paper with the Voluntary Arbitrator and even submitted additional documentary evidence.

2. Petitioner was not denied due process. Due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.Concerning the allegation that petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, the record shows that the parties had agreed not to cross-examine their witnesses anymore.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator is AFFIRMED.

CASE NO. 107 SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU vs. CANIZARESG.R. No. 101619 July 8, 1992

FACTS:PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo. The CBA contained a union security clause. PSSLU wrote Sanyo that the private respondents/employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercionand intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union calledKAMAO. In accordance with the security clause ofthe CBA, Sanyo dismissed the employees. The dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Named respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo. PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article 217(c) of the Labor Code which provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. Nevertheless, the Labor Arbiter assumed jurisdiction.Public respondent through the Sol Gen, arguedthat the case at bar doesnot involve an "interpretation or implementation" of a collective bargaining agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company policies but involves a "termination." Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:The Court held that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, the Court is in the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within thejurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

CASE NO. 109

PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION vs.PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS and PHILCOM CORPORATIONG.R. No. 144315 July 17, 2006

Facts:Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU)and private respondent Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (Philcom) on June 30, 1997, the parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed on October 21, NCMB National Capital Region, a Notice of Strike perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file on November 4, 1997 another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock.On November 11, 1997, at a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings.On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.On November 19, 1997, then Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary's Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. On November 27, 1997, the union filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute but was denied.As directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company. The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union.In opposition to PEU's Manifestation/Motion, the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union on November 17, 1997 that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike.On October 2, 1998, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ("Secretary") rendered judgement:The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Implead Philcom Corporation is hereby granted. The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of and Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper is hereby denied for lack of merit.The Union's charges of unfair labor practice against the Company are hereby dismissed.Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard, all the striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation.Philcom Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration while PEU filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.The Secretary denied both motions for reconsideration of Philcom and PEU.PEU filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Secretary's Orders of October 2, 1998 and November 27, 1998. On July 31 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

Issues:1. WON the Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction over the issue of illegal strike out.2. WON the company has committed several unfair labor practices.3. WON the strike was illegal.

HELD:1. YES.The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, since the very reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction was PEU's declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself.Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order x x x x.In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest. As noted by the Secretary:The Company has been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. It is particularly noted for its expertise and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. Thus, it performs a vital role in providing critical services indispensable to the national interest. It is for this very reason that this Office strongly opines that any concerted action, particularly a prolonged work stoppage is fraught with dire consequences. The operational viability of the company is likewise adversely affected, especially its expansion program for which it has incurred debts in the approximate amount of P2 Billion. Any prolonged work stoppage will also bring about substantial losses in terms of lost tax revenue for the government and would surely pose a serious set back in the company's modernization program.The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute.2. No.A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure.A reading of private respondent's justification for the acts complained of would reveal that they were actually legitimate reasons and not in anyway related to union busting. Hence, as to compelling employees to render flexible labor and additional work without additional compensation, it is the company's explanation that the employees themselves voluntarily took on work pertaining to other assignments but closely related to their job description when there was slack in the business which caused them to be idle.Moreover, the Court has always respected a company's exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Thus, the management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work. This is so because the law on unfair labor practices is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and profitable operation of their business.Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices.3. Yes.The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons:1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry (communication) protected by Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 849, from strikes and lockouts. PD 823, as amended, provides:Sec. 1. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore, all forms of strikes, picketings and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries, such as in public utilities, including transportation and communications, x x x.2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike.Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking employees should have ceased or desisted from all acts that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. They could not defy the return-to-work orders by citing Philcom's alleged unfair labor practices to justify such defiance.PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity.3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods.Even if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se, the strike activities that PEU had undertaken, especially the establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises and the use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises, were definitely illegal. 4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB.On 17 November 1997, while a conciliation meeting was being held at the NCMB, PEU went on strike. It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997, both Philcom and PEU were even "advised to maintain the status quo." Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings. 5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA.PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.

CASE NO. 112GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs CAG.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004

FACTSIn its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers who were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a CBA which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years which would November 30, 1991. A day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences.Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso.The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. However, GMC refused to negotiate referring to their letter dated December 16, 1991. Thus, the union filed a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City alleging unfair labor practice but the labor arbiter dismissed the case and recommended that a petition for certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the workers.ISSUEWhether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.

RULINGThe law mandates (Art. 253-A) that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.Under Article 252, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252.What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code [Art.250 (a)] is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.The Supreme Court considered the act of presenting the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees.The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. The ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization. Thus, it is guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.

CASE NO. 113HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE, respondents.D E C I S I O NG.R. No. 149440. January 28, 2003

Facts:The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent employees have formed a union. When the union became the collective bargaining representative in the certification election, the petitioner refused to sit down to negotiate a CBA. Moreover, the respondents were not given work for a month amounting to unjustified dismissal. As a result, the complainants staged a strike to protest but was settled through a memorandum of agreement which contained a list of those considered as regular employees for the payroll.The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure. The appellate court found neither rhyme nor reason in petitioners argument that it was the workers themselves who refused to or were choosy in their work. As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is replete with complainants persistence and dogged determination in going back to work.The CA likewise concurred with the NLRCs finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice.

Issue: W/N the employees are regular workers

RULING: Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them to be excluded as regulars, it is not enough that they perform work that is seasonal in nature but they also are employed for the duration of one season. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.On the other hand, herein respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years, are considered the latters regular employees for their respective tasks. Petitioners eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available -- and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter.The ruling in Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in that case, the workers were merely required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which, their services are available to other employers. The management's sudden change of assignment reeks of bad faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization.Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages.CASE NO. 115

ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC.,petitioner,vs.ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION,respondent.G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the St. Johns Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union).Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the parties agreed to refer the 1997 CBA deadlock to the SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction under Article 263 of the Labor Code. As a result, the strike ended and classes resumed. After the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, it required the parties to submit their respective position papers. However, instead of filing its position paper, SJCI closed its high school, allegedly because of the "irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academys Union particularly the safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations." Thereafter, SJCI moved to dismiss the pending labor dispute with the SOLE contending that it had become moot because of the closure. Nevertheless, a year after said closure, SJCI reopened its high school and did not rehire the previously terminated employees. The 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC . The Union members alleged that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.

ISSUES:

1) whether or not the SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal when it closed down the high school 2) whether or not the Union is liable for illegal strike due to the protest actions which its 25 members undertook within the high schools perimeter

RULING:

1) Yes. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must concur for a valid closure of the business: (1) serving a written notice on the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof; (2) serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect of the closure; (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as a whole year; and (4) cessation of the operation must bebona fide.12It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of the herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation package. The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth requisite,i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith. Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review oncertiorarisave for exceptional circumstances. In fine, the finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is, thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management, specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union.This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Unions right to collective bargaining.

2) No. The findings of the NLRC and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.

CASE NO. 116

Purefoods Corp. vs Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa ng PurefoodsGR No. 150896 August 28, 2008

FACTS: Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa Ng Purefoods Rank-And-File(NAGSAMA-Purefoods), St. Thomas Free Workers Union (STFWU), and Purefoods Grandparent Farm Workers Union (PGFWU) are the labor organizations respondent in this case. These organizations were affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO). NAGSAMA-Purefoods manifested to petitioner corporation its desire to re-negotiate the CBA. Together with its demands and proposal, the organization submitted to the company its unions affiliation with PULO. Purefoods acknowledged receipt of the unions proposals, but it refused to recognize PULO. The negotiation of the terms of the CBA resulted in a deadlock. A notice of strike was filed by NAGSAMA-Purefoods and in the subsequent conciliation conference, the deadlock issues were settled except the companys recognition of the unions affiliation with PULO.STFWU and PGFWU also submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership resolutions including affirmation of the two organizations affiliation with PULO. Again, Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas. Five days thereafter, company employees facilitated the transfer of chickens from the Sto. Tomas farm poultry farm where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent to that in Malvar. The following day, the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises and 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment. The workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ. Thus, the four respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal lockout/dismissal and damages.The LA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring that the company neither committed ULP nor illegally dismissed the employees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. The petitioner companys refusal to recognize the labor organizations affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations. The CA dismissed outright the companys petition forcertiorarion the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer committed unfair labor practice and illegally dismissed the concerned union members.

RULING:

The closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWUs and the other unions affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farms lease agreement was pre-terminated. The closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor organizations right to collective bargaining and violated the members right to security of tenure. The sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.Thus, the petitioner company is liable for the payment of the moral and exemplary damages.As to the order of reinstatement, if it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the employees have been out of petitioners employ, the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation pay.

CASE NO. 117

ISAGANI ECAL, et.al. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 92777-78 March 13, 1991

FOR: LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING

FACTS:This case traces its origin from two consolidated complaints for illegal dismissal and money claims filed by petitioners Isagani Ecal, Crisologo Ecal, Nelson Buenaobra, Narding Bandogelio, Wilmer Echague, Rogelio Castillo, Alfredo Fernando, Oligario Bigata, Roberto Ferrer and Honesto Tanael against private respondents Hi-Line Timber, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Hi-Line) and Jimmy Matchuka, the company foreman, with the Department of Labor and Employment. n their complaints/position papers, petitioners alleged, among others, that they have been employed by Hi-Line as follows: Isagani Ecal, from February, 1986; Crisologo Ecal, Buenaobra, Bandogelio, Fernando, Bigata, Ferrer and Tanael, from March 3, 1986; and Castillo and Echague, from May 1, 1986; that except for Isagani Ecal, they were all receiving a salary of P 35.00 a day; that they were required to report for work 7 days a week including rest days, legal holidays, except Christmas and Good Friday from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M.; that they were not given living allowance, overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and legal holidays, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay; and, that on June 6, 1987, they were not allowed to work and instead were informed that their services were no longer needed.Private respondents, on the other hand, denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the company and the petitioners claiming that the latter are under the employ of an independent contractor, petitioner Isagani Ecal, an employee of the company until his resignation on February 4, 1987.

ISSUE:Is there an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and private respondent Hi-Line Timber, Inc. or merely an employer-independent contractor relationship between said private respondent and petitioner Isagani Ecal with the other petitioners being mere contract workers of Ecal? In the case of the latter, is Ecal engaged in "job" contracting or "labor-only" contracting? What then is the extent of the liability of private respondent?

RULING:Ecal is engaged in labor-only contracting. Petitioners were illegally dismissed.Under the provisions of Article 106, paragraphs 1 and 2, an employer who enters into a contract with a contractor for the performance of work for the employer does not thereby establish an employer-employee relationship between himself and the employees of the contractor. The law itself, however, creates such a relationship when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with the Labor Code, and only for this limited purpose, i.e. to ensure that the latter will be paid the wages due them. On the other hand, the legal effect of a finding that a contractor is merely a "labor only" contractor was explained in Philippine Bank of Communications vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,

. . . The "labor-only" contractor i.e., "the person or intermediary" is considered "merely as an agent of the employer." The employer is made by the statute responsible to the employees of the "labor only" contractor as if such employee had been directly employed by the employer. Thus, where "labor-only" contracting exists in a given case, the statute itself implies or establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer (the owner of the project) and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor, this time for a comprehensive purpose: "employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code." The law in effect holds both the employer and the 'labor-only' contractor responsible to the latter's employees for the more effective safeguarding of the employees' rights under the Labor Code.Sections 8 and 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code set forth the distinctions between "job" contracting and "labor-only" contracting

Sec. 8.Job contracting. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:(1)The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof, and(2)The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipments, machineries, work premises, and