rights of the accuse - digest

7/29/2019 Rights of the Accuse - Digest

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RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSEDCASE DIGESTS

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio, GR 186652, October 6, 2010

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power)Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, hereinrespondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed

the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.

The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing itsResolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts onwhich the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered byany court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).

Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of theConstitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executivedepartments such as the DOJ.

Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial andadministrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Issue:1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.Held:

1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not aquasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt ofinnocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committedand whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courtsultimately, that pass judgment on the accused.

2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for reviewcannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of

the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
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Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)Facts:An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination oNinoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation ofGalman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the militaryreports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of

Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal tothe crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of

the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as plannedso that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation ofconstitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vitadocumentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecuteand prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no doublejeopardy since lega

jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a validplea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of

the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was notcompetent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect thefirst jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before thelower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second

jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered theSandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the

judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due processduring the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so thetrial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court andSandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decisionof acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
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Galman Vs. Sandiganbayan Case DigestGalman Vs. Sandiganbayan144 SCRA 43G.R. No.72670September 12, 1986

Facts:Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had juslanded at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of hishead by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino

(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was acommunist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined inthe ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidenceshows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase withSen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not acommunist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six privaterespondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minorityreport would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminacases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court alsogranted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayana three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to liftthe TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majoritydenied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandumfor the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground forsuch action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to dueprocess.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaringthem innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan'sverdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority deniedpetitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondentscommitted serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of theconstitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which shouldbe conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around)affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justicesand Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaangwanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. MalacaangConference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised bycategorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division


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would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady andPresidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back doorin going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hallwaiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanksto the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from MalacaangPalace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and

that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under thecompulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the finaloutcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. PresMarcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his militaryescorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would wantthe case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clearhis name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure wouldbe a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claimthe benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shallappear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses twoweeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they

said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that theassignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himselfThe custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring ofproceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayanbetrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not bedenied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias andpartiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignoredand disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and hisauthoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shal

address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within theexclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment ofthe cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months byJustice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. Thecourts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception andduplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitledto know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued withoutjurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it norights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration ofthe abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decisionhad been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's,comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not haveprecipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of theacts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction whichsubstantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with anunbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before animpartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.


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The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to filthe public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority norminority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only theConstitution and their own conscience and honor.


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US Vs. Tan Teng Case DigestUS Vs. Tan Teng23 Phil 145G.R. No. 7081September 7, 1912

Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house ofthe victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private partsover hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about

what had happened and reported it to the police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothingand was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took aportion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. Theresults showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendantherein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant allegedthat the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against selfincrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He wasneither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his bodywithout his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.

The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion toextort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would bethe same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence againsthim.

DIGESTED:Facts:

The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Tengwas gambling near the house of the victim and itwas alleged that he entered herhome and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers.Severaldays later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea.Pacomio told her sister about what hadhappened and reported it to the police.Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identifiedhim. Hewas then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He wasfound to have the samesymptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant andturned it over to theBureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering fromgonorrhea.Thelower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim hadacquired came from the defendant herein.Such disease was transferred by theunlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that thesaidevidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his rightagainst self-incrimination.Issue:Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of thedefendants rights against selfincrimination.

Held:The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not aviolation of the said right. He was neithercompelled to make any admissions or toanswer any questions. The substance was taken from his body withouhisobjection and was examined by competent medical authority.The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill ofRights is a prohibition of the useof physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and noanexclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the sameas if the offender apprehendedwas a thief and the object stolen by him may beused as evidence against him.


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VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subjectherself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crimeof adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense thasuch examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no personshall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsorytestimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accusedis permissible.
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Beltran Vs. Samson Case DigestBeltran Vs. Samson53 Phil 570G.R. No. 32025September 23, 1929

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as orderedby the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of hisconstitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence agains

him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnishevidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter'shandwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidenceagainst himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and foreverfrom compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter focomparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purelymechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writingmeans that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petitionof the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of

producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish aspecimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannotbe contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is notgranted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, itshould not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing itis impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reasonfor trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals maysucceed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of theprivilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
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Miranda v. Arizona

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Citation. 384 U.S. 436, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without priornotification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of their Fifth Amendmenconstitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest

Facts.The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases with issuesregarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogationsThe first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was animmigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hoursof investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to therobbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admissionto an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutionarights.The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover wasquestioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBIagents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover ofhis Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his family (althoughthere was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence thatMr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutionarights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants?Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specificallytheir right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right tocounsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything

admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court

Dissent.Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a needto apply a new rule as the majority finds hereThe second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses shouldapply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbidany and all pressures against self-incrimination.Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of theConstitution to include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with theirholding.

Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any

interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and thegovernment will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule.
http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-saltzburg/self-incrimination-and-confessions/miranda-v-arizona-3/http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&pub=asipahiohttp://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X2NTI1?jcsearch=384%2520U.S.%2520436#jcite&ORIGINATION_CODE=00344http://www.bloomberglaw.com/http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X2NTI1?jcsearch=384%2520U.S.%2520436#jcite&ORIGINATION_CODE=00344http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=250&pub=asipahiohttp://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-saltzburg/self-incrimination-and-confessions/miranda-v-arizona-3/http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-saltzburg/self-incrimination-and-confessions/miranda-v-arizona-3/http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-saltzburg/self-incrimination-and-confessions/miranda-v-arizona-3/

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