rise of the islamic fundamentalist state

8/3/2019 Rise of the Islamic Fundamentalist State

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Due to the downfall of Stalinism(the ideology

and policies adopted by Stalin, based on

centralization, totalitarianism, and thepursuit of communism)in the former-USSR

and the removal of the threat of coming to

power in the colonial and ex-colonial world,by the Soviet- backed regimes, Islamicfundamentalism has replaced 'communism'

in the demonology of imperialism.



Islamic fundamentalism is a growing trendthroughout strategic and economic regions forthe advanced capitalist countries.

The US decision to intervene in Somalia waspartly motivated by the fear that as the countrydisintegrated, Islamic fundamentalism couldprovide a UNITY for the population. They

thought that an Islamic regime in Somalia ,which is found at the opposite of the Arabianpeninsular, could become a direct threat to theinterests of imperialism.



But unexpectedly, the intervention of the USand the UN has served to better strengthen

Islamic fundamentalism. It is not surprisingthat the radical anti-imperialist rhetoric of theIslamic preachers finds receptive ears,whether in the Palestinian camps or in the

slums of Cairo. The idea that the US, and theWest in general, is at war with Islam isconfirmed in their eyes by the Gulf war andthe continued sanctions against Iraq.



The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is aconsequence of the dreadful living

conditions facing the people. Because of the incompetence of the weak nationalrulers to develop the economy and theexploitation brought by imperialism,

combined with the absence at the momentof any alternative movements whichappear capable of leading a struggle forchange.



The 1980s economic boom in the advancedcapitalist countries was in large part due to theirintensified exploitation of the colonial and ex-

colonial world. Because of their world tradedomination, the imperialist powers forced downthe price of raw materials exported by thesecountries, including oil price, thus depriving

them of essential revenue. When these countriesturned to the IMF and the World Bank, loanswere only granted on the basis of severeausterity measures.



It is not however determined that the conservativeclass elements in the leadership of the Islamicfundamentalist movement would prevail in the course

of a revolutionary process. In a situation like this,Islamic fundamentalist movements combine bothrevolution and counter-revolution. The knowledge of which will actually be dominant would just depend onthe balance of class forces in the society.

A

n existence of a Marxist organization with a clearprogram, capable of developing into a mass force,and able to lead the working class and poorpeasantry to power could help in resolving suchissue.



If there is no such organization existing to take chargeof the revolutionary developments to win the mass of the working class, then the basis would be laid for the

counter-revolutionary element within Islamicfundamentalism, based on the middle classes andlandlords, to secure triumph for reaction.

This is what happened in Iran where the revolution

of 1979 brought the mullahs to power. Even here,the ultimate triumph of the counter-revolution wasnot easily achieved and was only possible due tothe abject failure of forces such as the CommunistParty, known as the Tudeh.



The Tudeh party had in the past developed a massfollowing. In 1946, having led massive strikes, the CP werebrought into government, compromised and then thrownout. On the basis of revolutionary events in 1951, the

Tudeh party regained mass support. But it failed to utilizethis, instead backing the bourgeois democrat Mossadeq,and by 1953 the Shah had been reinstated by a CIA-backed coup.

In the revolution [in 1979] which toppled the Shah, theworking class, especially the oil workers, played thedecisive part. The Shah of Iran was a client of USimperialism, presiding over a repressive regime in whichopposition was prohibited. From October 1977,throughout the whole of 1978, there was an escalatingwave of demonstrations and strikes culminating in an

insurrectionary movement in February 1979.



Given the repression of the Shah's regime one of thefew places where dissent could be expressed was inthe mosque. Although in a distorted and immature

manner, the mullahs reflected the discontent of themasses. Their radical sermons were interpreted by themasses in their own way. The mullahs themselveswere opposed to the Shah because of the confiscationof church land, and due to their link with the bazaar

merchants who opposed the foreign domination of industry and trade. In the absence of any alternativeleadership, the mullahs were able to assume a keyposition in the fight against the Shah and ride topower upon the backs of the working class.



Had the working class been conscious of the power ithad in its hands and organized itself to defend thatpower, the beginnings of a socialist workers' republic

could have been established. An international appealto the workers and poor peasants throughout the Gulf region, the Middle East and beyond, appealing alsofor support from the working class in the advanced

capitalist countries, would have won an enthusiasticresponse and ensured the success of the revolution.Unfortunately, due to the absence of a genuineMarxist organization, the workers' movement at thecritical moments remained rudderless.



The Tudeh played little role in the events of 1979,simply tail-ending the actions of the Islamic clericsaround Khomeini. At no time did the Tudeh put

forward the need for soviets, or workers' councils, tobe set up to organize the revolution and to defend itsgains. Instead they declared that "the politicalprogramme of Ayatollah Khomeini... (was) in

accordance with the position it had itself adopted".(Morning Star , 27 January, 1979). In this way the Tudehreinforced the position of Khomeini rather thanexplain the reactionary nature of his program and theinterests which he represented.



Once in power there was an immediate conflict of interests, reflected within the clergy itself. The IslamicRepublican Party established by the clerics of the

newly-formed Revolutionary Council was connectedto the old petit bourgeois and the bazaar merchants,who stood for the protection of private property and agovernment based on their interests. While aiming to

represent the economic outlook of this conservativestrata, the clerics had to take account of the popularresentment of the masses to the merchants andlandlords and their demands for change.



Khomeini immediately tried to restrain the working class andcontain their aspirations to overthrow the economic system.However, in the initial period, faced with the enormous strength of the workers' movement, the new regime was forced to go much

further than it wanted. Within four months, banks, insurancecompanies and major sections of industry were nationalized withno resistance from their owners. Strikes and factory occupationsdeveloped despite the pleas for restraint from Khomeini. Wherethe bosses fled the workers started up production on their ownand demanded that the government nationalize the plants, which

it was obliged to do. The newly established Islamic governmenthad to tread very cautiously so as not to provoke the working classinto opposition. In March 1979, thousands demonstrated againstproposed laws enforcing women to wear the veil and the regimebacked down.



The class character of the new regime was clear fromthe beginning.On the day the insurance companieswere nationalized a bill was published setting up

courts with the power to impose ten-year prisonsentences for "disruptive tactics in factories or workeragitation". Gradually the regime was able toconsolidate itself. The Islamic Republican Guard wasused to suppress the left organizations. Clerics were

appointed to run the factories taken over by theworkers.By May 1983 the Tudeh, which had been theonly 'Marxist' party to be officially legalized by therevolutionary council, was banned and its leadersarrested.



The regime relied heavily on anti-imperialistrhetoric to win support, especially utilizing theAmerican hostages in November 1979. When

Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 the masses rallied todefend the revolution. The regime, given roomfor maneuver, was able to go onto the offensiveagainst the opposition. The veil was enforced in1981. By August 1982 all secular law was null andvoid and the Sharia was implemented. By 198240,000 teachers had been purged. Thousands of working class oppositionists were murdered.



The Iranian regime under Khomeini, and then Rafsanjani, beingunable to provide any solution to the economic problems of capitalism, entered crisis. Splits emerged within the regimebetween those such as Rafsanjani, who wanted to turn more

towards the western capitalist powers for trade and economicassistance, and those who reflected more the revolutionarytraditions of the mass of the population. The regime has to walk afine tightrope between trying to arrive at an understanding withimperialism and using anti- imperialist rhetoric to keep thesupport of the masses. This attempt to face both ways at once isencapsulated at the luxury Hotel Azadi in Teheran. In the lobbythere is a sign saying 'Down with the USA', but at the receptiondesk guests are told that bills can only be settled in US dollars.



The continuing anti-imperialist fervor of the masses wasshown by the demonstration of one million in Teheran atthe outbreak of the Gulf war, demanding joint actionalongside Iraq against the US. This was despite the eight-year long war with Iraq in which 400,000 Iranians died. If the regime does not take this attitude into account it couldunleash a movement which would cause it to fall.

Given the developing unrest and discontent with theregime it is only a matter of time before the working class

regroups and asserts itself more determinedly. With theabsence of an organized opposition it is possible that anew movement of the working class will manifest itself initially under the banner of a wing of Islam, couching itsdemands in Islamic terms.



The Iranian revolution, with the overthrow of a powerful pro-western monarch and its seeming ability to stand up toimperialism over the last fourteen years, has attracted many in theMiddle East to the banner of fundamentalism. As the opposition

to the Islamic dictatorship in Iran develops, the real nature of theregime will be seen not only within Iran but elsewhere in theregion and its power of attraction will diminish.

In Algeria, the FIS was originally formed in 1981 as a religiousorganization, sanctioned by the FLN government as an outlet forreligious sentiment to counter left-wing opposition and maintainstability. During food riots inOctober 1988 the FIS acted as arestraining influence. But in 1990, when the ban on politicalparties was lifted, the FIS transformed itself into a party, attackinggovernment corruption.



In the local elections of June 1990 the FIS won 54% of thevote, taking control of 32 of the 48 regional authorities. Inthe first round of the general election, held in December1991, the FIS won 47% of the vote, gaining 188 of the 231seats in which there was an overall winner, compared withonly 23% and 15 seats for the ruling FLN. Faced with theprospect of a fundamentalist victory, the militaryintervened to annul the election in January 1992 and, inMarch, banned the FIS. The FIS has since developed a

guerrilla organization capable of taking on thegovernment forces in two-day gun battles, with between10,000 and 15,000 armed activists. It has made inroadsinto the military itself.



Today there are only three Islamic

fundamentalist nations: Iran, Sudan, and

Pakistan.

rise of the islamic fundamentalist state

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