rising to the challenge: addressing climate and …
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RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CLIMATECOUNCIL.ORG.AU
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Authors: Cheryl Durrant, Dr Simon Bradshaw and Alix Pearce.
— Cover image: (Top) View from HMAS Adelaide arriving in Eden, 5 January 2020. Mike Gordon. Twitter @guggajugs. (Bottom left) Brisbane River flood January 2011 - Aerial view of a residential area in the suburbs of Milton during the great Brisbane flood of 2011. By Brisbane. Shutterstock. (Bottom right) Abaiang atoll, Kiribati. Simon Bradshaw.
This report is printed on 100% recycled paper.
Dr Simon BradshawActing Head of Research
Alix PearceCampaigns Director
Cheryl DurrantClimate Councillor
ContentsKey findings ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 6
2. Climate change as a driver of insecurity ...................................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Lessons from history 11
2.2 Insights from data 13
2.3 Understanding the relationship between security risks and cascading and compounding risks 15
3. Climate and security risks in our region ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Regional overview 19
3.2 Scenario 1: Loss of geopolitical influence 23
3.3 Scenario 2: Water insecurity and war 25
4. Out of step and out of time ................................................................................................................................................28
5. Rising to the security challenge........................................................................................................................................31
6. Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................... 38
References ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
Image credits ..................................................................................................................................................................................41
1CLIMATE COUNCIL
2
Key findings
1Climate change increases the risk of conflict and Australia will not find lasting national security without adequately addressing it.
› Australia faces substantial climate and security
risks on its doorstep and without urgent action,
climate change will reduce security in our region.
› Failure to rise to the challenge of climate and
security is already leading to a loss of geopolitical
influence for Australia, particularly in the Pacific.
› Water has long been a contested resource in Asia
and climate change is worsening the situation.
Any conflict over water in our region could have
profound consequences for Australia.
› Pacific Island Countries as well as Bangladesh,
China, Vietnam, India and Indonesia face
significant threats from sea level rise, which
is likely to increase displacement and forced
migration.
2The federal government’s financial support of the fossil fuel industry is actively undermining Australia’s national security.
› Australia is spending public money in ways that
exacerbate climate change, including handing out
billions of dollars in fossil fuel subsides.
› Australia failed to use COVID-19 to invest in a
renewables-led recovery, spending less than two
percent of its economic stimulus money on climate
solutions. By comparison, Canada spent 74.5
percent and the UK spent more than 20 percent.
2 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
KEY FINDINGS 3
3Australia has fallen well behind the US, UK, Japan, New Zealand and other peers in analysis of climate and security risks.
› Climate change needs to figure prominently in
Australia’s security thinking and investment, but
this is not yet the case.
› In 2018, a Senate Inquiry called for a national
climate and security threat assessment but this
has not occurred, and climate change remains on
the margins of Australia’s defence, foreign affairs
and trade strategies.
› Other nations and international organisations are
rapidly broadening traditional notions of national
security in order to address climate security risks.
4Australia must act rapidly and decisively on climate change in order to maintain the collective security of our region.
› To address the root cause of climate-fuelled
insecurity, the science is clear that Australia
should reduce its emissions by 75% (below 2005
levels) by 2030 and achieve net zero by 2035.
As a first step, Australia must at least match
the updated commitments from our key allies,
and pledge before Glasgow to at least half our
emissions (below 2005 levels) by 2030.
› Australia can help accelerate decarbonisation
in our region by shifting from fossil fuel
exports to clean exports and making smart use
of development assistance.
› As part of the 2022-23 Federal Budget papers,
the federal government should publish a
statement on how the budget as a whole
addresses the climate security challenge.
› The Federal Government should urgently
complete an Integrated Climate and Security
Risk Assessment.
3
climatecouncil.org.au
4
Foreword
The Climate Council has written a ground-breaking report documenting in vivid detail the devastating climate risks facing Australia, from persistent wildfires to unsparing heat and rising temperatures, to life-changing water insecurity in Australia’s near region. All Australians, and citizens around the world, should take heed of the impending climate disasters awaiting Australia.
Yet it is not too late for responsible action by Australian leaders. This report
provides actionable recommendations that can immediately begin to address
Australia’s climate threats, starting with a commitment to more than half
emissions this decade, in line with the new 2030 emissions reduction target from
the US Government. Australia should conduct a Climate Security Risk Assessment,
called for in the 2018 Senate Inquiry, and comparable to climate risk assessments
being conducted by the US, UK and New Zealand. Most importantly, Australia
needs to mobilize a “whole of nation” approach and to work closely with its Asia-
Pacific allies, from small and climate vulnerable island nations, to the US.
Australia’s global leadership will be measured by its ability to transition its
economy to a lower carbon future and ensure a climate resilient and prosperous
future. The ingenuity and innovation that has been Australia’s trademark can be
mobilized to create a climate-secure future. Australia should act with alacrity to
address its most pressing climate security risks, both for the sake of its citizens,
the Asia-Pacific region, and the future of the world.
Sherri Goodman
Secretary General, International Military Council on Climate & Security
Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security)
4 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
FOREWORD 5
The ingenuity and innovation that has been Australia’s trademark can be mobilized to create a climate-secure future.
Figure 1: Bushfire smoke from the 2019-20 Black Summer fires smother Sydney.
5
1. Introduction
Security at its most basic level is about freedom from harm or freedom from fear of harm. In the face of security risks or challenges, governments must prioritise investment to mitigate harm. As we are experiencing with COVID-19, this choice is made more complicated by competing frames of security – such as health and economics – and competing scales of security: local, national, regional or global. As pressures on resources grow, choices on where to get best value for the security dollar must be made. So where do the biggest risks lie?
In the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Global
Risks Report, the top 3 identified risk by
hazard are categorised as environmental
for the medium and long term (WEF 2021).
United Nations Secretary General Antonio
Guterres described climate change as an
existential risk in 2018. While this year the
United States Secretary of Defence Lloyd J
Austin III and naturalist David Attenborough
are also among the many voices calling out
climate change as our pre-eminent risk
(Austin 2021; UN 2021). Unsurprisingly it is
one of four main research areas at the Centre
for the Study of Existential Risk in Oxford.
This convergence of agreement from
science, political and security leaders
demands our attention. An existential threat
means that climate change threatens the
very survival of humanity. Nothing is bigger
or more urgent. Without far stronger action
to curb greenhouse gas emissions, climate
change may reach tipping points (Steffen
et al. 2018). But even if we act fast enough
to avoid this worst-case scenario, there is
now emerging evidence that climate change
amplifies other security risks – including the
risk of conflict or war (IMCCS 2021).
“ None of the world’s challenges loom as large as climate change.”Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, 15 May 2018
6 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 01 INTRODUCTION
Environmental risks now regularly appear in
security and geopolitical assessments and
are becoming a strategic priority for many
nations. Protecting access to key resources
has always been at the centre of geopolitics,
but now the definition of ‘resources’ has
expanded to include a safe planetary
environment, leading to expanding and
converging concepts of planetary and
ecological security (Schoonover et al. 2021).
Figure 2: View from HMAS Adelaide arriving in Eden, 5 January 2020.
“ Today, no nation can find lasting security without addressing the climate crisis. We face all kinds of threats in our line of work, but few of them truly deserve to be called existential. The climate crisis does.”Lloyd Austin, US Secretary of Defense, 22 April 2021
In Australia these risks are evident not
only in worsening bushfires, droughts,
floods and sea level rise but also in system
vulnerabilities, where natural hazards made
worse by climate change intersect with a
society which is exposed and vulnerable
(CSIRO 2018). Australia is one of the nations
most exposed to economic, health and
other risks from climate change and is
situated in the most vulnerable region.
7
The Working Group I contribution to the
IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report – the most
comprehensive overview of the physical
science of climate change for almost a
decade – outlined a narrow path to avoiding
climate catastrophe, but only through
immediate, deep and sustained emissions
reductions (IPCC 2021).
Given that climate change is both an
existential risk, as well as a risk amplifier,
you would expect it to figure prominently
in our security thinking and investment.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. In 2018,
the final report of the Senate Inquiry into
the Implications of Climate Change for
Australia’s National Security identified
climate change as an existential threat and
called for a national climate and security
threat assessment. Four years later this first
step is yet to occur and climate change
remains in the margins of our defence
and foreign affairs and trade strategies.
Climate-related activities receive very little
government spending relative to many
other investments. Our spending is out of
step with key allies such as the US, United
Kingdom, Japan and New Zealand.
Figure 3: A girl plays in bushfire smoke that blanketed Sydney during the 2019-20 fires.
8 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 01 INTRODUCTION
Figure 4: Drought in Kerry, Queensland.
This report outlines what the research tells
us about the relationship between climate
and security. It highlights significant risks
within our region that could be realised in
the future. Taken alone, any one of these
risks might provide cause for concern and
increased investment. However, as the
report outlines, we are out of step with
key allies and international thinking on
climate and security. Australia has better
options to address these risks, and they are
eminently affordable in the context of overall
government spending. Moreover, there
are many examples of how public funds,
including fossil fuels subsidies, are actively
undermining our security by fuelling
climate change. Australia must make smarter
choices, based on a pragmatic assessment
of climate and security risks and the range
of possible interventions. Left unaddressed,
these risks threaten our security as a nation.
9
2. Climate change as a driver of insecurity
10 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
2.1 Lessons from history
Climate and security have a long
relationship. Writing over 2,000 years ago,
the preeminent Chinese strategist Sun Tzu
places the environment, climate and weather
among his five initial estimations of national
power. More recently, in a comprehensive
longitudinal study, the historian David
Zhang mapped the rise and fall of Chinese
dynasties (Zhang et al 2006). Combining
scientific data with military records, his
mapping shows a strong correlation between
temperature variations (both hot and cold)
and conflict, stretching back 4,000 years.
The long-run effects of climate on conflict
in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East
during the Little Ice Age 1400-1900 CE
have also been examined using a similar
approach. This work has shown that the
cooler regional climate during this period
was associated with increased conflict.
The study also concluded that the adverse
effect of climate change intensifies with its
duration (Iyigun et al. 2017). While this work
looked at the relationship between climate
and conflict during a cooling period, it
identified a nexus between climate change,
food security and conflict.
This nexus is at the centre of other historical
research into societal collapse. Climate
change has been proposed as a factor in the
collapse of several civilisations. This includes
the Western Roman Empire in Europe
(Harper 2017), the Anasazi in North America,
the Maya in Central America (Diamond 2004)
and the Harappan civilisation of the Indus
valley (Clift 2009). It is sobering to think that
these outcomes were the result of natural
climate variations, which were smaller and
less rapid than the current anthropogenic
climate change we are experiencing.
While causal relationships are complex,
history helps us identify a recurring pattern.
Where changes in climate stress natural
systems, this leads to changes in food and
water availability. When these changes
combine with vulnerable societies, this
creates further compound risks to human
health, resources and livelihoods. These
risks can in turn lead to further national
or international security threats such as
forced migration or war. Conflict is not the
inevitable outcome, but history does provide
a warning of what might occur if our current
global warming trend is not addressed.
“ Ask yourself who has gained the advantages of heaven and earth?” Sun Tzu, The Art of War
11CHAPTER 02 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A DRIVER OF INSECURITY
BOX 1: CLASSIC MAYA COLLAPSE
The ninth century collapse and abandonment
of the Central Maya Lowlands in the Yucatán
peninsular region is perhaps the best-known
historical example of climate-related collapse.
The ancient Maya confronted long-term climatic
aridification, experienced as century-level or
longer dry periods. At the same time, large-
scale Maya landscape alterations and demands
placed on resources and ecosystem services
generated fragile environmental conditions
that were compounded by increasing climatic
aridity. These changing socioeconomic and
environmental conditions generated increasing
societal conflicts, diminished control by the Maya
elite, and led to decisions to move elsewhere in
the peninsular region rather than incur the high
costs of remaining in place.
Figure 5: Temple of the Warriors, Yucatán.
12 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
2.2 Insights from data
Several modern studies have built on
historical understandings by using big data
analytics. These studies now map the role
of climate change in recent conflicts in
great detail and conclude that there is ample
evidence that links climate change to risks of
fragility and conflict (Detges et al. 2020). This
work has led to new models of climate and
security that help us identify and address the
root causes of security risk.
By using approaches which combine
environmental, disaster, food, water, human,
financial, infrastructure, information,
Primary E�ects
Disasters/Extreme
Weather Events
Change in
Vegetation
Coastal
Degradation
Salination
Loss of Pollinators
Change in Marine
Resource
Distribution
(Fish Stocks)
Change in Range
of Diseases/
Disease Vectors
Biodiversity Loss
Infrastructure
Damage
Climate Stressors
Heat
Storms
Floods
Droughts
Fires
Sea Level Rise
Vulnerable Societies
Weak Governance
Low Social
Cohesion
Low Economic
Reserves
Poor Resource
Management
Practice
Limited Capacity
to Innovate
Unresolved
Transboundary
Disputes
Compound Risks
Loss of
Livelihoods
Ine�ective or
Mal-adapted
Response
Famine
Internal
Displacement,
Competition or
Conflict
Supply Chain
Disruption
Changed Mobility/
Transportation
Patterns
Low Trust in
Government
National, International or Planetary Security Risks
Transboundary
Disputes
Loss of Geopolitical
Influence
Interstate
Conflict/War
International
Crime/Terrorism
Collapse
Figure 6: An Integrated Risk Model.
13CHAPTER 02 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A DRIVER OF INSECURITY
economic, political, military, national
and international security dimensions,
a comprehensive systems picture can be
generated.1 For example, the Weathering
Risk Methodology (Rüttinger et al. 2021)
developed by the Potsdam Institute and
Adelphi in support of the United Nations
identifies pathways that show how climate
change can affect peace and security
and what concrete actions can be taken
to prevent and reduce these climate-
related security risks. These pathways
1 This list is not exhaustive. While the integrating concept is the same, different countries use different sets of security risks. China for example included: political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, societal, science and technology, information, ecological, resource and nuclear aspects in its 2014 Holistic Security Strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021). The UK in its recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy covers, military, diplomacy, development, economics, technology, information, cyber and environmental security dimensions (HM Government 2021).
By using approaches which combine security risks from multiple sectors, a comprehensive systems picture can be generated.
link climate stressors to primary effects
which further cascade through vulnerable
societies, creating compound risks or
ultimately traditional security risks. This
comprehensive, linked-up pathway enables
us to identify the best ways to intervene
in order to prevent the most undesirable
outcomes. In the military this is described as
“getting the best bang for your buck”.
14 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
2.3 Understanding the relationship between security risks and cascading and compounding risks
The type of security risks that arise from
climate change are called compounding
or cascading risks. These types of risk
are challenging to manage. There are
often multiple factors involved in the final
outcome. And while the general trajectory
of climate and security risks is now well
understood, how these risks play out in any
given circumstance will be influenced by
our capacity to understand and prepare for
them as well as in our adaptive capacity
and the strength of our governance and
resilience mechanisms.
Figure 7: Legazpt, Philippines, 2016. Armed Forces Philippines, US Navy Seabees, Marines, Air Force and Army engineers working together to build a new school for local children.
15CHAPTER 02 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A DRIVER OF INSECURITY
BOX 2: VIETNAM
Vietnam’s national interests are closely tied
to the sea, and it is highly exposed to climate-
related changes to the surrounding ocean. The
nation’s biggest climate challenge is the impact
on its fisheries and aquaculture. Vietnam’s
aquaculture production is concentrated in
the Mekong River Delta where sea level rise
is causing saline intrusion into brackish and
freshwater hatcheries, depleting yields. At the
same time, riverine flooding is forcing more
farmers to turn towards fishing.
A comprehensive study of the importance of
fisheries to national economic and food security
ranks Vietnam as the most sensitive country in
the world.
Migration of economically vital fish stocks
into more northern waters claimed by China
is an emerging security concern. Southeast
Asia’s open sea fisheries are located amidst
a complex security environment featuring
several overlapping maritime territorial claims.
Vietnamese fishing vessels following the
northward fish migration or reacting to fisheries
depletion within their Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) risk confrontation with Chinese patrol
vessels, inflaming existing maritime territorial
disputes. Escalating confrontation over fisheries
in the South China Sea has led to violence in
the past and risks a wider regional security
conflagration potentially involving the United
States and others.
Adapated from IMCCS 2021.
Figure 8: Fisherman hauling a net on the Mekong River.
16 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
It therefore makes sense to intervene before
climate-related risks cascade or compound
into significant security issues. This is
even more important now than in the past.
Security threats now have the potential to
escalate to nuclear warfare – which also
poses an existential risk to global civilisation.
Using a term coined in the US Department
of Defense in 2007, security planners
often describe climate change as a “threat
multiplier” – it has the potential to amplify
other drivers of insecurity (Goodman 2007).
In the following section of the report, we look
at how climate change is driving security
concerns in Australia’s region through two
scenarios. In the first (or most likely) scenario
we look at how failure to rise to the challenge
of climate and security is already leading to a
loss of geopolitical influence for Australia. In
the second (or most dangerous) scenario we
look at one of the more serious and pressing
concerns – the potential for regional conflict.
In cascading risks, the impact of a physical
event generates a sequence of events that
result in a pathway or flow of physical, social,
economic, political or military disruption.
Thus, a single initial impact can trigger
multiple flow-on risks. Cascading effects are
complex and multi-dimensional and evolve
constantly over time. For example, in Vietnam
impacts to natural systems affect agriculture
and aquaculture, which in turn affects
livelihoods, forcing changes to the places
where fishing activities occur, and potential
for transboundary conflicts. Cascading risks
can be thought of as “risk multipliers”.
In compounding risks, the risk impact in one
sector adds to or amplifies risks in another
sector. For example, in Vietnam existing
transboundary disputes and great power
dynamics amplify the risk of fishing disputes.
The bottom line is that without appropriate
action, climate change will mean more
social fragility, less peace and less security.
Salination
Loss of Agricultural Land
Changes in Fish Stock Distribution
Sea Level Rise
Floods
Unresolved Transboundary Disputes
Low Economic Reserves
Loss of Livelihoods
Internal Displacement
EscalatingTransboundary Disputes
Figure 9: Example of cascading risks.
17CHAPTER 02 CLIMATE CHANGE AS A DRIVER OF INSECURITY
3. Climate and security risks in our region
18 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
3.1 Regional overview
The Asia-Pacific region is among the most
vulnerable to water insecurity due in part to
changes in the hydrological cycle brought
on by climate change. Asia’s 10 major rivers,
including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra,
Irrawaddy, Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow,
are fed by glaciers on the Tibetan Plateau.
These rivers flow for thousands of kilometres
through some of the most populous regions
on Earth, and form an immense arc of
coastal river deltas. The Indus, which flows
along the length of Pakistan and into the
Arabian sea, may be the world’s most at risk
mountain water source (Immerzeel 2019).
Figure 10 (left): Waiting for assistance in the floods, Assam, India. Figure 11 (right): Displaced people fleeing Sindh in 2010 streamed into Balochistan in Pakistan.
Melting glaciers, shifting rainfall patterns
and more erratic river flows are creating
greater risks of riverine flooding, water
shortages, and transboundary disputes. This
region supports almost two billion people
and is home to three nuclear armed powers
in Pakistan, India and China.
With rising temperatures and shifting
rainfall patterns comes increased risk of
extreme weather events and the Asia-Pacific
region is one of the most exposed to these
climate stressors. From 2000 to 2019 the
list of countries most effected by natural
19CHAPTER 03 CLIMATE AND SECURITY RISKS IN OUR REGION
disasters includes Myanmar, the Philippines,
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Thailand (Eckstein
2021). Heat also directly effects humans,
impacting health and productivity. Pakistan
and India are currently most exposed
to this risk - but at a 1.5 degree increase
in temperature, Australia, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, and Thailand also face exposure
to extreme risks (Andrews 2018).
Collectively these primary climate stressors
are already causing risks that cascade
into food and livelihood security. Ocean
resources such as coral reefs and fisheries,
which are the backbone of many national
economies and vital for sustaining
traditional livelihoods, are under threat,
driving up food insecurity. Rising heat
also affects agricultural productivity and
marine based industries with regional
countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and
the Philippines facing substantial risks
(Glasser 2021).
These risks also lead to economic damage
at the national scale. Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines are assessed in
the most at-risk bracket for negative change
in GDP related to climate change (Freitas
et al. 2019). China, Indonesia, India, Papua
New Guinea, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines
and Bangladesh are exposed to increases
in sovereign credit risk related to climate
change (Bloomberg 2021).
Not surprisingly, a range of compound risks
are emerging in the Asia-Pacific region.
Water insecurity is perhaps of greatest
concern, aligning as it does with existing
major power tensions between India,
Pakistan and China. Increased displacement
and forced migration due to sea level rise
and reduced productivity of marine and land
resources are also forecast. Many countries,
including all Small Island Developing States
are at risk of losing land and thus resources,
Figure 12 (left): A farmer works the land during drought conditions. Figure 13 (right): Flooding hits a community in the Phillipines.
while the low-lying atolls are at risk of
complete inundation. The impacts of climate
change on economic and food security in
South and Southeast Asia, both in the form
of slow-onset deterioration and intensifying
disasters, also risk aggravating existing anti-
state grievances and thus spurring protests
and riots (Jayaram 2019).
These compound risks intersect with
existing international relationships or
disputes creating flow on transnational or
national security risks. Among regional
nations, Malaysia, Thailand, India,
Pakistan, New Zealand and Australia rate as
particularly exposed to transnational climate
risks (SEI TCI Index 2016).
In the following case studies, we look at two
scenarios from an Australian perspective. The
first scenario – loss of geopolitical influence
– is being realised now. The second – risk of
regional war is more uncertain but also more
dangerous.
Figure 14: Bleached coral in the Maldives, 2016.
Indu
s
Brahmaputra
Ganges
Godavari
Irra
wad
dyS
alw
een Red River
Mekong
Pearl River Dong
Bei
Yangtze
Yellow River
TIBETANPLATEAU
MAJOR RIVERS AND RIVER BASINS OF SOUTH, EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Figure 15: A very large proportion of people in the Asia-Pacific region depend on water from rivers that all have their source on the Tibetan Plateau. The melting of glaciers and shifting rainfall patterns are significantly affecting the flow in these rivers, raising the risks of riverine flooding, water shortages, and transboundary disputes.
22 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
3.2 Scenario 1: Loss of geopolitical influence
Australia’s failure to take stronger action in
the face of mounting security risks from
climate change is already coming at a
significant cost to our international standing
and influence. This is most obvious in terms
of Australia’s relationship with Pacific Island
Countries, although climate change has also
recently emerged as a significant point of
contention between Australia and its closest
allies including the US and UK.
Pacific Island Countries have long
recognised climate change as the “the
single greatest threat to the livelihoods,
security and wellbeing of the peoples of the
Pacific”. This was reaffirmed in the 2018 Boe
Decleration on Regional Security, to which
Australia is also a signatory. Over the years
Pacific Island Countries have made many
attempts to encourage Australia to adopt
stronger emissions reduction targets and
more specifically to encourage Australia
to hasten its transition beyond fossil fuels.
Australia’s rebuffing of these entreaties has
been met with growing impatience. For
example, at the 2019 Pacific Island Forum
leaders’ meeting in Tuvalu, Australia drew
fierce criticism from many Pacific Island
Leaders including Frank Bainimarama, Prime
Minister of Fiji and Enele Sopoaga, then
Prime Minister of Tuvalu and Chair of the
Pacific Islands Forum.
Figure 16: The Australian Government’s inaction on climate change is harming Australia’s standing in the Pacific.
23CHAPTER 03 CLIMATE AND SECURITY RISKS IN OUR REGION
In the past, Pacific Island Countries have
had to rely mostly on their moral authority
and acts of creative diplomacy to try to
nudge Australia and other big emitters to
take stronger action on climate change.
However, today Pacific Island Countries
find themselves once again caught in the
centre of geopolitical powerplays, as the
west including the US, Europeans, and
Australians, look to achieve favourable
outcomes in the face of an ever more
powerful China (Morgan 2018). With this
return of great power competition, Pacific
Island Countries have greater leverage
to push Australia to step up its efforts to
confront the climate crisis. If Australia
wishes to remain a trusted and valued
member of the Pacific family, it will need
to demonstrate that it is taking the region’s
number one security concern seriously
(Bradshaw 2019). With other countries
including China, UK, France, and Japan all
keen to grow their presence and influence
in the region, Pacific Island Countries
have more choices when it comes to
development and security partners, and
Australia should not assume it will be at
the top of that list (Wallis 2021). Australia’s
strained relationships in the Pacific are
made even more stark in contrast to our
New Zealand neighbours who continue
to strengthen longstanding ties with the
Pacific Island Countries.
While tension between Australia and the
Pacific over climate change is not new, in
more recent times Australia has found itself
facing mounting diplomatic pressure from
more powerful actors. Through the Trump
years, Australia faced no pressure from the
US to step up its commitments on climate
change. On the contrary, Australia was able
to hide behind the failings of the US. That
changed dramatically with the election of
President Biden, who has placed climate
change at the centre of US foreign policy
and mounted a major diplomatic effort to
encourage all countries, including Australia,
to strengthen their commitments. The UK,
President of COP26, along with EU states,
are also working to accelerate their own
actions and to catalyse stronger action
globally. The US and UK now treat action
on climate change not only as a paramount
security threat, but as an economic and
geopolitical opportunity, which can reaffirm
their place in the world at a time when their
influence is declining.
Figure 17: The burning of coal oil and gas is driving climate change.
3.3 Scenario 2: Water insecurity and war
Asia has achieved impressive growth in
economic and social welfare during the
last decades and many of its economies are
key trade partners for Australia. Good water
management and human capital development
remain vital to support economic growth and
increase overall social wellbeing, especially
after the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these
achievements, in the Asia-Pacific (home
to 60% of the world’s population), 1.5 billion
people living in rural areas and 0.6 billion in
urban areas still lack adequate water supply
and sanitation. Of the 49 Asian Development
Bank (ADB) members from Asia and the
Pacific, 27 face serious water constraints
on economic development, and 8 are yet to
sufficiently protect their inhabitants against
water-related disasters (ADB 2020).
Strengthening national water security is a
must for improving the quality of life of all
people in the Asia-Pacific region. Recovering
from the setback caused by COVID-19 and
adapting to climate change require that all
countries put water security at the top of their
agendas. Water security enables economic
growth and provides the conditions for a
healthy and prosperous population.
Figure 18: A farmer works through difficult drought conditions.
25CHAPTER 03 CLIMATE AND SECURITY RISKS IN OUR REGION
New ZealandJapan
AustraliaKorea, Republic ofHong Kong, China
Taipei, ChinaSingapore
Brunei DarussalamMalaysia
KazakhstanPalau
China, People’s Republic ofKyrgyz Republic
Cook IslandsArmenia
PhilippinesTurkmenistan
AzerbaijanGeorgia
MaldivesSamoa
BhutanUzbekistan
TongaMongoliaIndonesia
NiueSri LankaVietnam
FijiThailand
NauruTajikistan
CambodiaLao People’s Democratic Republic
TuvaluBangladesh
NepalTimor-Leste
VanuatuSolomon IslandsMarshall Islands
MyanmarKiribati
IndiaPapua New Guinea
PakistanMicronesia, Federated States of
Afghanistan
Nascent
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
NATIONAL WATER SECURITY INDEX
Key Dimension 1 Rural Household
Key Dimension 4 Environment
Key Dimension 2 Economic
Key Dimension 5 Water-Related Disaster
Key Dimension 3 Urban
1 Engaged2 Capable3 E�ective4 Model5
Figure 19: The national water security index shows the five dimensions by which to measure water security in each nation. Source: ADB 2020.
26 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
Water is also among the most contested
resources in South Asia. Climate impacts
on the hydrological cycle (for example,
shifting rainfall patterns, droughts, and
glacial recession) will put additional pressure
on already strained water resources. A case
in point is the contentious relationship
between India and Pakistan regarding
the water resources of the Indus River (the
world’s most vulnerable water tower). As
populations and agricultural demands
increase, per capita water availability in both
countries has declined and risks declining
further. This threatens to further increase
tensions between India and Pakistan.
The potential for any of these transboundary
water tensions to escalate into conflict would
have profound consequences for Australia.
The Asia-Pacific region is the engine room of
global manufacturing. Any major disruption
to this region threatens supply of critical
global resources. Australia, as one of the
most trade-exposed OECD nations, could
experience critical shortages across multiple
sectors (Productivity Commission 2021). This
in turn creates risk to our livelihoods and
social cohesion.
And while most water disputes fuel internal
rather than international conflict, the
potential for war cannot be discounted
(Pacific Institute 2019; CNA 2017). A worst
case might see conflict involving India and
Pakistan drawing in the US or China. Any
US-China conflict could escalate into a major
war, which Australia could also be drawn into
through its alliance mechanisms with the US
or India. Secondly, even if great power conflict
is avoided, both China and India are major
trading partners for Australia, and greater
internal instability in either country would
also create economic shocks for Australia.
Figure 20: Indus River, Leh Ladakh.
27CHAPTER 03 CLIMATE AND SECURITY RISKS IN OUR REGION
4. Out of step and out of time
28 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 04 OUT OF STEP AND OUT OF TIME
With substantial climate and security risks on our doorstep, Australia is falling behind. Other international organisations and nations are rapidly broadening traditional notions of national security and getting a grip on where priority action needs to occur.
The UN launched its Climate Security
Mechanism (CSM) in 2018 in order to raise
awareness about climate security within
the UN system. This is supported by the
Climate Security Expert Network. Within
the European Union, a more integrated
approach involving climate in the context
of peace and security is well underway, via a
roadmap detailing the integration of climate
change into the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy. Moreover, senior mediators
based in EU delegations receive training
specifically focused on introducing climate
change in their work. This will enhance the
understanding of the links between climate
change and conflict and may better enable
mediation efforts to address the root causes
of conflict (Zhou 2017). More recently, in June
this year, NATO released its first Climate
Change and Security Action Plan. In addition
to military action on climate change risk
awareness, mitigation and adaption, it called
for increased dialogue with civil society,
academia and industry on climate change
and security issues (NATO 2021).
The US has long been a leader on the
military aspects of climate security but
has recently adopted a more integrated
approach. Biden Executive Order of 27
Jan 2021, on Tackling the Climate Crises
at Home and Abroad (Biden 2021) states:
“domestic action must go hand in hand
with United States international leadership,
aimed at significantly enhancing global
action.” Recognising the integrated nature
of climate and security risks, the Executive
Order takes a government-wide approach to
the climate crisis and establishes a climate
task force under the chairmanship of John
Kerry, the Special Presidential Envoy for
Climate. The task force includes the heads of
Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labour, Health and Human Services, the
Interior, Transportation, Energy, Housing
and Urban Development, Homeland Security,
Environment, Science and Technology and
the US Attorney General.
29
Among western nations, the UK has gone
furthest, legislating an annual Independent
Assessment of UK Climate Risk. The latest
iteration, released in June 2021, assesses
climate risks in the UK across natural
environment, infrastructure, health,
communities and built environment,
business, and international dimensions
(Climate Change Committee 2021). The report
assesses that “extreme weather events in the
UK and globally can create cascading risks
that spread across sectors and countries, with
impacts an order of magnitude higher than
impacts that occur within a single sector”. Like
the US, the UK too sees the need to integrate
across security, defence, development and
foreign policy sectors. Its most recent review,
released in May this year, looks beyond the
traditional scope of security with climate
change, soft-power and technological
innovation being cast as some of its key
pillars (McLaughlin 2021; HM Government
2021). The Integrated Review recognises that
tackling climate change requires a global
response. However, it also recognises that the
climate crisis provides the UK with a unique
opportunity to engineer integrated solutions.
In 2021 and beyond, the British Government
will make tackling climate change and
biodiversity loss its number one international
and security priority. The UK Ministry
of Defence has just issued a new climate
change and defence strategy.
Both Germany and the EU have issued new
strategies and guidelines for the Indo-Pacific
that identify climate risk as a priority for
regional engagement. In March 2021, the
Quad leaders highlighted climate change as
a shared priority and established a climate
working group to develop options for
regional collaboration.
New Zealand’s Strategic Policy Statement
2018 recognised climate change for the first
time as a major driver of military operations
(Ministry of Defence 2018a).
The policy statement also took a holistic view
of security recognising the role Defence
plays in promoting the overall wellbeing and
resilience of New Zealand communities and
the environment. New Zealand then moved
to implement policy, producing a follow-
on defence readiness assessment in 2018,
which linked climate effects, environmental
impacts, social impacts and security
implications (Ministry of Defence 2018b). An
implementation plan – Responding to the
Climate Crises – followed in 2019 (Ministry
of Defence 2019).
Pacific Island Countries have worked for
many years to bump the issue of climate and
security up the agenda of the UN Security
Council, including championing the
appointment of a new Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on Climate and
Security. The Boe Declaration on Regional
Security takes a holistic, human-centred
approach to security. It reaffirms climate
change as the “single greatest threat to the
livelihood, security and wellbeing of the
peoples of the Pacific.”
China too adopts a holistic view of climate
and security. In November 2019, China’s
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate
Change 2019 was published. The document
quoted Xi Jinping’s earlier instruction that
“addressing climate change…is not only
the internal need to achieve sustainable
development but also the due responsiblity to
promote the development of the community
with a shared future for mankind.”
Climate change is also becoming more
central to the Australia-US alliance and
to regional engagement. And right now,
Australia is looking for security in all the
wrong places. We are not in the race to de-
amplify risks; we are not even at the starting
line. Our inaction on climate change is
nothing less than a failure to pull our weight
towards collective security in our region.
30 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 05 RISING TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
5. Rising to the security challenge
31
With emerging international consensus on the security risks of climate change, Australia can and must respond to these risks. This is not just a Defence problem - it extends to all aspects of Australian security and foreign policy including policy responses on energy transformation, on how we build resilience to disasters and how we invest in the economy as we recover from COVID-19.
The 2021-22 Federal Budget does address
some of these risks. Building Disaster
Resilience is a headline budget initiative
with the establishment of the National
Recovery and Resilience Agency (NRRA) and
enhancements to Emergency Management
Australia. An allocation of $1.5 billion over
five years from 2020-21 to improve Australia’s
capability to better prepare for, respond to,
and recover from natural disasters. This is on
top of the approximately $2 billion dedicated
to the National Bushfire Recovery Fund
in response to the Royal Commission into
National and Natural Disaster Arrangements.
A further $209.7 Million has been allocated to
build an Australian Climate Service (Budget
2021-22 Securing Australia’s Recovery
Overview). The Drought Response, Resilience
and Preparedness Plan is allocated an
additional $212.0 million over four years. A
further $1.5 billion over four years is allocated
to the Murray Darling Basin (Australian
Government 2019; Commonwealth of
Australia 2021a; 2021b; 2021c). Overall,
significant funding, approximately $10
billion, has been allocated to build resilience;
spread out across multiple Departments and
across multiple years.
When it comes to addressing the root
causes of climate-related risks by reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, investment is
more patchy or harder to discern given the
lack of a comprehensive climate funding
statement. Though it is almost certainly less
than the amounts spent on adapting to the
impacts. Futhermore, modest investments in
government policies such as the Technology
Investment Roadmap and Emissions
Reduction Fund are more than offset by
continuing fossil fuel subsidies, which in
2020-21 were estimated at $10.3 billion (The
Australia Institute 2021).
Figure 21: Looking at forecast Australian Federal Government spending, it is clear that we are spending vastly more on dealing with the problems driven by climate change, rather than addressing the causes. In this figure, spending increases by factors of 10 as we move further to the right of the Integrated Risk Model.
Primary E�ects
Climate Stressors
Vulnerable Societies
* Not factoring in fossil fuel subsidies.
Compound Risks
Defence
$1BN +* $10BN + $100BN +
32 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 05 RISING TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
In contrast, Defence is one area where
there is significant investment to mitigate
risk in general. Australia will spend over 2%
of GDP on the Defence budget and this is
forecast to increase over the next decade.
This equated to a consolidated annual
defence funding line including both the
Department of Defence and the Australian
Signals Directorate of approximately $AU45
billion (Commonwealth of Australia 2021d,
Hellyer 2021). This means that just looking
at Defence alone the Government is forecast
to spend much more (approximately $100
billion) on traditional security threats as it
does on resilience to climate change.
Looking at current funding across the
integrated risk spectrum, spending increases
by factors of 10 as we move further to the
right of the Integrated Risk Model, from
addressing the causes to dealing with the
fallout (see Figure 21).
In a year dominated by COVID-19, another
way of looking at Australia’s funding
commitments is to benchmark our
commitments against other nation’s
COVID-19 recovery initiatives. Here too,
Australia has missed the opportunity
to address climate change with only an
estimated 1.95% of recovery spending assed
as “green”. Compared with Canada (74.5%);
Japan (26.54%); UK (20.25%); China (11.93%);
EU (9.94%); US (8.77%) and India (4.77%)
(OECD 2021).
Despite the sums being spent, security
outcomes are declining for Australia and the
globe. The latest Defence Strategic Update
notes that regional and global security
are worsening - a view shared by many
western nations. Looking at security from
another angle, the World Peace Report Index
reports a deterioration in peace (Institute for
Economics and Peace 2021). Water and food
insecurity are growing (Worldbank water
security diagnostic initiative; FAO 2021).
Democracy is in decline (The Economist
Intelligence Unit 2020). Environmental and
ecological security is perilously close to a
point of no return (IPCC 2021).
Overall, Australia’s current balance of
investment does not appear to be working to
mitigate or reduce risk. Other countries are
prioritising investments differently, setting
significantly stronger emissions reduction
targets for 2030, stepping up support for
climate action beyond their shores, and
investing heavily in renewable energy
as they work to rebuild their economies
from COVID-19. All G7 countries are
now committed to roughly halving their
emissions by the end of the decade.
Such steps are not only contributing to
collective security outcomes by treating
the root cause of the problem, but also
come with both economic and geopolitical
opportunities. Australia has almost
unrivalled potential for renewable energy: It
is one of the sunniest and windiest countries
on Earth and is also sitting on substantial
reserves of minerals needed for the global
energy transition, including lithium and rare
earth metals. Using this natural advantage
would both advance Australia’s future
prosperity and increase its geopolitical
influence. Conversely, failure to step up
our domestic emissions reductions could
see Australia facing increasing economic
pressure in the form of carbon border
adjustments and other measures.
33
BOX 3: ENERGY SECURITY: CHINA TAKES ITS OPPORTUNITIES
The International Renewable Energy Agency
has identified 3 factors required for a secure
renewable energy system: (1) a large renewable
energy capacity, (2) adequate sources of rare
earths and minerals, and (3) technological
innovation (IRENA 2019). Australia has these
advantages but is failing to take them.
In constrast, China is solidifying control over
the critical minerals of lithium, graphite, cobalt,
and nickel. Chinese firms account for about
80 percent of the total global output for raw
materials for advanced batteries. China also
has the largest minerals processing industry in
the world, controlling the processing of almost
60 percent of lithium, 65 percent of nickel, and
more than 80 percent of cobalt. China also
refines 100 percent of spherical graphite.
Further along the supply chain, China also
leads in battery assembly gigafactories that turn
processed minerals into battery packs. Over 130
of the more than 180 gigafactories planned or
operational in the world are or will be in China.
Completing the loop and demonstrating it
takes sustainability seriously, China dominates
battery recycling because it has built up critical
infrastructure to recycle lithium ion batteries
from consumer electronics. About 70 percent
of the lithium ion batteries in the world are
recycled in China and South Korea. In less than
one decade, 11 million metric tons of lithium ion
batteries will reach the end of their service lives
(Schadlow 2021).
Indeed, the dominance of China across this
supply chain should come as no surprise. China’s
holistic approach to security allows it see and
take opportunities. China has been strong at
identifying and controlling some foundational
technology sectors and platforms. Like financial
technology or broadband cellular networks,
advanced energy technology will be the critical
platform. China has a global plan that includes
“new energy” as a key area of focus and will not
easily watch its advantages melt away.
The dominance of China across this supply chain should come as no surprise. China’s holistic approach to security allows it see and take opportunities.
34 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 05 RISING TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
A decade ago, the world’s developed countries
agreed under the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change to provide US$100bn annually
by 2020 to support developing countries with
responding to climate change.
Known as climate finance, such support is
vital to enabling vulnerable countries to adapt
and build resilience to the impacts of climate
change. It is also essential to reducing global
emissions by assisting less developed countries
with transitioning to clean energy and getting
on a path to net zero.
Australia’s contribution to climate finance has
been mixed. On the positive side, a majority
of Australia’s contribution has gone towards
supporting climate change adaptation in
some of the most vulnerable countries. A high
proportion has been allocated to the Pacific, and
all has been in the form of grants.2
On the negative side, the scale of Australia’s
overall contribution has been small –
constituting only around 0.3% of global climate
finance flows – and has grown only marginally
over the past decade. It has also been drawn
from a heavily diminished aid program,
arguably diverting funding from other priorities.
Australia also withdrew from the Green Climate
Fund – the most important global fund for
supporting climate action worldwide. In earlier
years, Australia had played an important
leadership role in the Green Climate Fund,
including serving as co-chair of its board.
Climate finance is not a zero-sum investment
especially for a country like Australia that is
surrounded by some of the most vulnerable
countries on Earth to climate change, and which
itself is facing severe threats to its communities
and ecosystems. Our own security and prosperity
are tied to that of the countries around us and our
future depends on all countries moving beyond
fossil fuels.
Experience has shown how relatively small
investments in climate change adaptation can
have an important security dividend. This
is particularly true for local community-led
adaptation initiatives. When local communities
have access to information on climate change
risks, and are empowered to develop solutions
that fit their priorities and build on their existing
strengths and resources, they are able to reduce
their long-term vulnerability to climate change
through a range of measures from diversifying
their livelihoods to better disaster preparedness
(McNamara et al. 2020, Clissold et al. 2018).
Climate finance can also be used to help
communities gain access to electricity through
renewable energy. Of the hundreds of millions of
people worldwide who still live without electricity,
a majority live beyond the reach of traditional
energy grids. Local renewable schemes therefore
provide the quickest and least cost means of
accessing electricity for lighting, refrigeration,
and other needs (Oxfam 2017).
2 By contrast, much climate finance globally has consisted of loans to countries that are already struggling with debt, and only a small portion has supported adaptation compared to mitigation (reducing emissions). As the world’s least developed countries have a very low level of emissions yet face very severe impacts from climate change, adaptation to the impacts of climate change is often a more immediate priority than mitigation. However, as mitigation activities, and in particular renewable energy, are often able to offer a faster return on investment, it has generally been easier to attract funding for mitigation, leaving a large and growing funding gap globally for adaptation.
BOX 4: THE ROLE OF CLIMATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING REGIONAL SECURITY
35
Access to affordable and reliable electricity
through locally-owned renewable energy
supports jobs, local economic development,
and the ability of a community to adapt to new
challenges. It is an example of how investing
in climate solutions can leave communities
stronger and more resilient while also avoiding
greenhouse gas emissions. The benefits of
renewable energy are no clearer than in the
Pacific, where renewable energy is freeing
communities from expensive diesel imports,
increasing rates of electricity access in remote
communities, and enabling countries to be
more energy-independent and thereby less
exposed to volatile fossil fuels markets.
At around AU$300 million a year, Australia’s
current contribution to international climate
finance is dwarfed by other spending, including
continued support for the fossil fuel industry.
It is also well short of what can reasonably be
deemed a fair share towards internationally
agreed climate finance goals. While it can be
no substitute for far stronger efforts to reduce
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, scaling up
Australia’s financial support for climate change
adaptation and mitigation in our region is an
essential component of building security in the
face of climate change.
BOX 4: CONTINUED
At around AU$300 million a year, Australia’s current contribution to international climate finance is dwarfed by other spending, including continued support for the fossil fuel industry.
36 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
CHAPTER 05 RISING TO THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
A PATHWAY TO ACTION
It is clear that there is emerging international
consensus on the security risks of climate
change, that Australia can and must respond
to these risks and that there are a number
of opportunities to mitigate these risks. So
what are the steps Australia must take to
tackle the climate security risk? The first
step is to understand risk from an integrated
perspective, something that is well advanced
among key allies such as the US, UK and NZ
and which has been called for in Australia by
the former military leaders in the Australian
Security Leaders Climate Group.
The second step is to look at where we can
intervene to address risk. Australia must
prioritise investment that addresses the root
cause of climate risk. This means ensuring
the rapid de-carbonisation of the Australian
economy, while also working to support
decarbonisation beyond our shores.
The solutions to the challenges of climate
and security won’t come from any one sector
as risks cascade and compound across
sectors. A whole of nation approach, drawing
on values and ideas from communities,
businesses, cities, academic and not-
for-profit sectors as well as all levels of
government is needed. Luckily, with modern
ICT and collaborative approaches such as
citizen assemblies we have the collaboration
technologies to make this happen.
Understanding the full nature of the climate
and security challenge and the potential
range of solutions gives us a better idea of
priorities for action. While the challenge is
complex and messy, this is situation normal
for security planners who almost always
make decisions under some degree of
uncertainty. There are tools for this too. The
Australian Department of Defence already
uses complex problem-solving methodology
such as multi-criteria decision analysis, but
only within a narrowly defined “military
security” perspective.
This method of analysis allows a large
problem to be broken into manageable
pieces while enabling comparisons between
“apples and oranges”. Going forward, Federal
Government spending should be based on
such an approach, in which all investments
are assessed according to how they
contribute to addressing the challenges of
climate and security.
Figure 22: Emissions from the fossil fuel sector, including the gas sector, are driving the climate impacts being seen today.
37
6. Recommendations
1.To address the root causes of climate-fuelled insecurity, Australia should:
› Reduce its emissions by 75% below 2005
levels by 2030 and achieve net zero by
2035. As a first step, Australia must at least
match the updated commitments from
our key allies, and pledge before COP26
in Glasgow to at least half our emissions
(below 2005 levels) by 2030.
› Help accelerate decarbonisation in our
region and globally by shifting from fossil
fuel exports to clean exports; working
with the private sector to help repower the
region’s economies; and ending all support
for fossil fuels.
2.To support the resilience of countries and communities in our region, Australia should:
› Increase support for climate change
adaptation through Australia’s
development assistance program.
› Increase investment in research in climate
change adaptation, including areas such as
climate-resilient food systems.
› Support regional and global initiatives for
the effective governance of water resources
in the face of climate change.
3.To ensure an integrated, whole-of-nation approach to climate change and security, Australia should:
› Undertake an Integrated Climate and
Security Risk Assessment, including all
security sectors.
› Develop a whole-of-government decision-
making process for the Federal Budget.
› As part of the 2022-23 Federal Budget
papers, publish a statement on how the
budget as a whole addresses the climate
and security challenge.
› Ensure a process for engaging the whole
of the nation, including communities,
businesses, cities, academics, the not-for-
profit sector and all levels of government in
developing solutions to the challenges of
climate change and security.
38 RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN OUR REGION
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Image creditsCover image: (Top) View from HMAS Adelaide arriving in Eden, 5 January 2020. Mike Gordon. Twitter @guggajugs. (Bottom left) Brisbane River flood January 2011 - Aerial view of a residential area in the suburbs of Milton during the great Brisbane flood of 2011. By Brisbane. Shutterstock. (Bottom right) Abaiang atoll, Kiribati. Simon Bradshaw.
Page 5 - Figure 1: Sydney Australia, 10 December 2019. Ferry heading to Sydney’s Circular Quay in thick bushfire smoke. MW Hunt. Shutterstock.
Page 7 - Figure 2: View from HMAS Adelaide arriving in Eden, 5 January 2020. Mike Gordon. Twitter @guggajugs.
Page 8 - Figure 3: Junee, NSW Australia, 5 January 2020: Australian Flag flies in a smoke filled sky as the nearby Dunn’s Road Fire burns. Greg Stonham. Shutterstock.
Page 9 - Figure 4: Cattle during a drought, Kerry Queensland. Josh Withers. Unsplash.
Page 10 - Chapter image: Micaela Parente. Unsplash.
Page 12 - Figure 5: Ball Court - Copan Ruinas, Honduras. Simon Burchell. Wikiemedia commons. Licensed under CC-by-2.0.
Page 15 - Figure 7: Pacific Fleet assist. By Flickr user Michael D. Cole/U.S Pacific Fleet. Licensed under CC-by-2.0.
Page 16 - Figure 8: Fisherman in Vietnam. By Flickr user Stung Treng/WorldFish. Licensed under CC-by-NC-ND 2.0.
Page 18 - Chapter image: Brisbane River flood January 2011 - Aerial view of a residential area in the suburbs of Milton during the great Brisbane flood of 2011. By Brisbane. Shutterstock.
Page 19 - Figure 10: Waiting for assistance in floods, India. By Flickr user Oxfam International. Licensed under CC-by-NC-ND 2.0.
Page 19 - Figure 11: Displaced people fleeing Sindh in 2010 streamed into Balochistan in Pakistan. By Flickr User Abdul Majeed Goray. Licensed under CC-by-NC-ND 2.0.
Page 20 - Figure 12: Dry Fields, Drought in Bogor Regency. By Flickr user Danumurthi Mahendra. Licensed under CC-by-2.0.
Page 20 - Figure 13: Philippines flooding hits Manilla. Cheryl Ramalho. Shutterstock.
Page 21 - Figure 14: Bleached coral in the Maldives. The Ocean Agency.
Page 23 - Figure 16: Abaiang atoll, Kiribati. Simon Bradshaw.
Page 24 - Figure 17: Alexander Tsang. Unsplash
Page 25 - Figure 18: Young asian man battles climate change and drought. Piyaset. Shutterstock.
Page 27 - Figure 20: Pixabay. User: narumi31.
Page 28 - Chapter image: Unknown Author. Wikimedia commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA.
Page 31 - Chapter image: American Public Power Association. Unsplash.
Page 37 - Figure 22: Pixabay.
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