risk assessment study · prepared by m/s. stellar chemical laboratories pvt. ltd. page : 2 hse...

Prepared By M/s. Stellar Chemical Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.

Page : 1 HSE Department Rev. : 00

Survey No. 318 to 322, Kankar na Muvada

Village Derol, Taluka Kalol Panchmahal – 389 320, Gujarat

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY ( For Existing and Proposed Plan )

PREPARED BY

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS FF-11, Akshat Complex,

Nr. Reliance Petrol Pump, Hi-Tension Road, Subhanpura,

Vadodara-390 023 Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M)



CERTIFICATE

We are pleased to certify that this Risk Assessment study of Company has been conducted by us. This is the first Risk Assessment report of this company for new project and it has been carried out during the month of November - 2010. Risk Assessment is a legal requirement u/r 12-c & 68-O of the Gujarat Factories Rules. The recommendations are based on information supplied to us by the company and our plant visits. The Executive Summary is given in the beginning to highlight the important summary of our report and methodology of the risk assessment carried out. We are thankful to the Mr. Balchandra S. Kulkarni (Occupier), Mr. Chandra Singh Thapa (Factory Manager), Officers of the Company for their all co-operation to prepare this report. In particular we acknowledge the continuous help given to us by Mr. Chandra Singh Thapa for completion of this report. FOR VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANT

Authorized Signatory



CONTENTS

SECTION

NO.

CONTENTS

PAGE

NO

1 Executive Summary 5 2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of

Risk assessment 6

3 Introduction of the unit 8 3.1 Company Introduction 8 3.2 Details of Unit 8 3.3 Project setting 10 3.4 Organisational setup 13 3.5 List Of Existing and Proposed product 13 3.6 List of Raw Material 13 3.7 Details of storage of Hazardous Materials in

Bulk and control measures provided 15

3.8 Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals, Compatibilities And Special Hazard

17

3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

19

3.10 Brief Description of process plant 22 4 Hazard identification 23 4.1 Introduction 23 4.2 DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index 24 4.3 Failure Frequencies 25 4.4 Identification of Hazardous area 26

5 Risk Assessment 28 5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 28 5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas 29 5.3 Modes of Failure 30 5.4 Damage Criteria for heat radiation 31

6 Consequence Analysis 32 6.1 Consequence Analysis 32 6.2 Table of Consequences analysis results 47 6.3 Comments 49

7 Risk Reduction Measures 50 7.1 Design 50 7.2 Safety Devices 50 7.3 Operation and Maintenance 51



7.4 Recommendations 51 8 On site Off site emergency plan

(Disaster Management plan)53

8.1 On site emergency Plan (OSEP) 53 8.2 Scope of OSEP 54 8.3 Elements of OSEP 54 8.4 Methodology 54 8.5 Emergencies Identified 54 8.6 Others 54 8.7 Emergency Organisation 55 8.8 Emergency Facilities 55 8.9 Emergency Escapes 56 8.10 Assembly points 56 8.11 Wind sock 56 8.12 Emergency transportation 56 8.13 Emergency communication 57 8.14 Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency 57 8.15 Emergency responsibilities 57 8.16 Mutual Aids 57 8.17 Mock Drill 57



SECTION I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 Executive Summary

1.1 M/s. Stellar Chemical Laboratories Pvt. Ltd, retained the services of Vaibhu Safety

Consultants for carrying out Risk Assessment Studies for their Kalol plant.

1.2 Experts from Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 25/11/2010 for inspection of

existing facilities and proposed facilities to be erected and commissioned at site as per site

plan and the environs and for collection of relevant information about the installation and

the operations carried out in the plant. They also held detailed discussions on various

aspects including chemical handling facilities, process safety, finished product storage

godown, tank farm area, HSE management system procedures( SOP) and its

implementation, Emergency management plan, Emergency handling facilities, Emergency

organization and action plan etc., with the officers of the company.

1.3 Flammable solvents receive through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank

farm area as per petroleum Act and Rules.

1.4 Separate utility plant is provided for chilling cooling, Steam, Nitrogen and Air utilities.

1.5 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been

identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.

1.6 The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a)

Underground storage tank area, road truck unloading area. Various hazard scenarios have

been identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled. The results of the

analysis have been summarized in the table appended.

1.7 It will be observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any

possible spills / leaks or for catastrophic failure of road tanker and drum release scenarios

would be a Onsite emergency nature and required more attention on accident prevention

methodology.

1.8 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by

implementing the suggestions made in this report.

1.9 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be,

associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for

further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and

emergency preparedness plan.

1.10 Conclusion Based on the

1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems.

2) Discussions with company officials,



CHAPTER II

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Objective :

The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to major hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to assess safety level of the facility. The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of Organic chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site & off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.

2.2 PHILOSOPHY :

This report is limited to the following: Identification of major risk areas. Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases

o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases

o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to

maximum possible extent. Giving pointers for effective disaster management Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk

2.3 Methodology

The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined bellow: Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with SCLPL. Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic dispersion, pool fire or jet fire, ( Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over pressure ( Vapour cloud Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP. Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities. The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.



RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART

START

FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION

LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS

DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF HAZARDS

IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM

DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) & DETERMINE RELEASE RATES

SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING

PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING POPULATION

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL MEASURES

END



SECTION III

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT 3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION

M/s. Stellar Chemical Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., is operating a manufacturing unit of Bulk Drugs at Survey No. 318 to 322, Kankar Na Muvada, Village Derol, Taluka Kalol, Panchmahal – 389 320, Gujarat

Produce unit is a non Major Accident Hazards unit ( MAH Installation ) based on the storage of the listed hazardous chemicals less than specified threshold quantities.(Schedule 3 under Rule 68-J of the Gujarat Factories Rules-1963 (2004).

3.2 DETAILS OF UNITS

Sr. No.

Particulars

1. Full Name & Address of Unit

: M/s. Stellar Chemical Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. S. No-318 to 322, kankar Na Muvada, Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, Panchmahal – 389 320

2. Telephone No. : Factory : 02676-235223 Fax : 02676-236973

3. Registered office address with phone number

: M/s. Stellar Chemical Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. S. No-318 to 322, kankar na Muvada, Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, Panchmahal – 389 320

Telephone No. : Factory : 02676-235223 Fax : 02676-236973

4. Full name & Address of the occupier

: Mr. Balchandra S. Kulkarni S. No-318 to 322, kankar na Muvada, Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, Panchmahal – 389 320 (M) : 09820658111

5. Full name & Address of the Factory manager

: Mr. Chandra Singh Thapa (D.G.M. Technical) S. No-318 to 322, kankar na Muvada, Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, Panchmahal – 389 320 (M) :09898030468

6. Full name & Address of the Safety manager

Mr. Sudama Pardesi S. No-318 to 322, kankar na Muvada, Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, (M) : 09904075823

7. Man Power

: Total : 50 employees + 30 proposed including Staff, Company workers and contractor employees



8. No. Of shift & Shift timing : I shift : 07.00 to 15.00 Hrs II Shift : 15.00 to 23.00 Hrs III shift :23.00 to 07.00 Hrs General Shift : 09.00 to 17.00 Hrs.

9. Environs (Nearest Facilities) :

1. Railway Station – Derol : 1.5 km

2. Police Station – Kalol : 1 km

3. Fire Station - Kalol

: 1 km

4. Hospitals

: 1 km

10. Metrological Data

Latitude 220 37’22.32”N Longitude 730 27’16.82” E

Temperature

Maximum 45º C Minimum 12 º C

Relative Humadity :

Maximum 90 % Minimum 1 %

Annual Rain Fall :

Minimum 73.6 mm Maximum 1393 mm (1979)

Seasonal wind directions :

Jan- Feb N / NNW / ENE March – Sept SW / WSW Oct to Dec N / NNE

Wind Velocity :

Minimum 100 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) Maximum 132 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) Avg. Wind Speed 3 m/s

11. License & Approval:

A. Factory Inspectorate

Licence No. 002398 Valid up to 31.12.2013



B. Plan Approval Existing plans are approved from the Factory inspectorate office.

C. GPCB Consolidated consent is obtained. Consent no. - 30760 and valid up to 04/06/2013 for water, Air and Hazardous waste.

D. Stability Certificate Obtained on 08.12.2005

E. Solid waste Disposal

Member ship : NECL, Nandesari Baroda

F. Explosive licence No :

Particulars Licence no Validity Class A petroleum 40 KL in bulk Class A ,B & C in loose 10 KL

P/HQ/GJ/15/1446(P11064) 31.12.2012

3.3 PROJECT SETTING:

The company is located at 730 27’16.82” East longitude & 220 37’22.32” North latitude in Kankar Na Muwada Vill : Derol, Tal : Kalol, Dist : Panchmahal in Gujarat State. The area is classified as an approved Industrial area.

Kalol industrial area is located at a distance of 1.5 km from Kalol the N-E of Vadodara District, proposal site is shown as figure 1.1. Manufacturing site of the company is located on plan is shown in figure 1.2. In general, the area is approved industrial zone and. The rainfall is low (@ 1000 mm per year) occurring in the months of July – August. Summer temperatures are high; minimum temperature in the region of 26 – 270C & maximum of about 40 – 420C. Relative Humidity in summer season ranges form 30 – 80%.



Figure 1.1



Figure-2



3.4 HSE ORGANISATIONAL SET UP

Safety setup organisation chart

3.5 LIST OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED PRODUCTS

Table-3.1

Sr. no.

Product Quantity (MT/Month)

Storage At A Time in MT

Stored in MOC State of compound

1 Guaifenesin 50 10.0 Fibre Drums Fiber Drum Powder 2 Methocarbamol 20 2.0 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder 3 Camylofin

Dihydrochloride 1 0.50 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder

4 Prenoxdiazine Hydrochloride

0.1 0.05 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder

5 Leflunomide 5 0.50 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder 6 Fixofenadine 1 0.20 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder 7 Glimipride 2 0.10 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder 8 Clopidegrol 5 0.20 Fibre Drums Fibre Drum Powder

3.6 LIST OF RAW MATERIALS Sr. no.

Raw Material Quantity (MT/Month)

Storage At A Time in MT

Stored in MOC State of compound

1 Dimethyl Carbaonate

10.7 6.0 Drum MS Liquid

2 Epichlorohydrin 34 18.0 Drum MS Liquid 3 Guaiacol 39 16.0 Drum HDPE Liquid 4 Toluene 35.7 10.0 Drum MS Liquid

Advise Company of safety legislation & updates, safety awareness, carry out safety audits, update safety policy, provide training when required, to provide investigations and reports for any accidents.

Directors

Factory manager ( GM)

Safety Committee member

Safety Officer



5 Liquor Ammonia 15.7 8.0 Drum HDPE Liquid 6 Diethyl Amino

Ethylene Chloride. Hydrochloride

0.9 0.6 Fibre Drum Fibre drum powder

7 Phenyl Glycine Isoamyl Ester Hydrochloride


8 Acetone 7.5 3.0 Drum MS Liquid 9 Industrial Solvent 10.1 3.0 Drum MS Liquid 10 Iso-Propyl Alcohol 0.5 0.5 Drum MS Liquid 11 Diphnyl propionitrile

(DPPN) 0.4 0.05 Fibre Drum Fibre drum powder

12 Hydroxyl Amine Sulphate (HAS)


13 Guaifnesin 18 15.0 Fibre Drum Fibre drum powder 14 Ethyl Acetate 2.1 2.0 Drum MS Liquid 15 Amminum Sulohate 0.2 0.2 Fibre Drum Fibre drum powder 16 Sodium Methoxide 0.1 0.1 Fibre Drum Fibre drum powder 17 Tetra Butyl

Ammonium Hydrogen Sulphate


18 Caustic Flakes 17.7 6.0 Bag Woolen sack

Flakes

19 4-amino Benzotrifluride

3.85 1.5 Carbouy HDPE Liquid

20 5-Methylisoxazole Carboxylic Acid


21 Acetic Acid 0.6 0.3 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 22 Hydrchloric Acid 2.4 1.0 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 23 Phosphoric acid 0.2 0.20 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 24 Formaldehyde 1 0.80 Drum HDPE Liquid 25 Hexane 0.4 0.40 Drum MS Liquid 26 Iso-Propyl Alcohol

Hydrochloride 1 0.60 Carbouy HDPE Liquid

27 Methanol 2 1.2 Drum MS Liquid 28 Methyl Iso Butyl

Ketone 1 0.60 Drum MS Liquid

29 Methylene Chloride 0.4 0.40 Drum MS Liquid 30 Potassium Carbonate 2.7 0.60 Bag Woolen

sack powder

31 Potassium Bi Carbonate

1.8 0.60 Bag Woolen sack

powder

32 Sodium Carbonate 1.3 0.06 Bag Woolen sack

powder

33 Sulphuric Acid 1.3 0.06 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 34 Sodium Borohydride 0.11 0.06 Bag HDPE powder 35 Thionyl Chloride 4 0.60 Drum HDPE Liquid



36 Sodium Chloride 0.2 0.2 Bag Woolen sack

powder

37 2-[4-(-chlorobutyryl)-phenyl]-2 methyl propinoc acid ester ethyl ester

1.1 0.60 Drum Fibre drum powder

38 Triethyl Amine 3.1 0.06 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 39 2-Phenyl Ethyl

isocyante 1.2 0.06 Drum Fibre drum powder

40 3-ethyl-4-methyl 2 - oxo pyroline

0.8 0.50 Drum HDPE Liquid

41 Bromoester 6.3 0.60 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 42 Charcoal 0.05 0.03 Bag Woolen

sack powder

43 Chloro Sulphonic Acid


44 L-CSA 2.7 0.60 Carbouy HDPE Liquid 45 Trans 4 methyl

cyclohexyl isocyanate


46 Sodium Hydroxide 0.5 0.30 Bag Woolen sack

Flakes

3.7 Details of Storage of Hazardous Materials in Bulk

NAME OF

HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCE

MAX. STORAGE

CAP.[Qty.]

PLACE

OF IT’S

STORAGE

OPERATING

PRESSURE

AND TEMP.

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE PROVIDED

Toluene 30 KL X 1Nos Tank

Tank farm area U/G Licence premises

ATP Fire & Explosion

Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Dyke wall Tanker unloading procedure. SCBA sets available. Flame proof plant, pumping

transfer, close process, etc. Jumper clips on flanges Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking and

prohibited area. Tanker unloading procedure. Flame arrestor provided on

vent line of the tank

Toluene 4 KL (200 Lit Drum )

Drum storage area Licence premises

ATP Fire & Explosion



Thionyl Chloride

4 KL (200 Lit Drum )

Drum storage area

ATP Toxic & Corrosive

Safety Showers provided Labels and symbols provided on

drums. Proper ventilation Drum handling trolley Caution note provided Dyke wall provided Level gauge provided. Double drain valve provided Scrubber provided Required PPEs. provided to all

employees SCBA sets available. Fire extinguisher Provided. Separate and away from

flammable material drum



3.8 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES, SPECIAL HAZARD AND ANTIDOTES Table-3.3

SR. NAME OF CHEMICAL

HAZARD

FLASH POINT

0 C

BP 0 C

LEL %

UEL %

SP.GR. 20 0 C

VD SOLUBILITY WITH

WATER at 20 0 C

NFPA H F R

HAZARDOUS

COMBUSTION

PRODUCT

TLV PPM TWA

IDLH PPM

LC50 mg/m3

CARCINOGENIC CHARACTERIS

TIC

ANTIDOT

1. Toluene CAS # 108-88-3

F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

50 2000 400 ppm for 24Hr

Rat

No Diazem – 1 mg/Kg.(Intravenou

s), Epinephina, Efidrine

2. Methanol F/T 10 54 5.4 44 0.792 1.1 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

200 6000 LEL

64000 ppm for 4H rat

No 10 mg diazepam through injection

3. Acetone F - 20 56 2.15 13.0 0.791 2.00 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

750 25000 LEL

- No 10 mg diazepam through injection

4. Ethyl Acetate CAS # 141-78-6

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml water

1 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

- 400 200 gm/m3

rat

No Not available

5. Acetic Acid CAS No. 64-19-7

T / F 44.4 117.9 5.4 16.0 1.015 2.1 Soluble 2 2 1 Irritating Vapour

generated

10 ppm

50 5620 ppm/1H

No Water / Milk

6. Isopropyl alcohol F 18.5 82.3 2.3 12.7 0.785 2.1 Miscible 1 3 0 Acid smoke & fumes

400 ppm

2000 LEL

16000 mg/kg 8

hours [Rat

No 10 mg diazepam through injection

7. Hexane F -22 68.7 1.2 7.7 0.659 3 Insoluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapor

50 ppm

1100 - No Not specified

8. Ethylene Dye chloride F/T 13 83 6.2 15.9 1.253 3.4 0.87 % 2 3 1 HCL PHOSGEN

E

10 50 1414 Yes Not specified

9. Acetic acid T / F 44.4 117.9 5.4 16.0 1.015 -- Soluble 2 2 1 Irritating Vapour

10 50

10. Ethyl Acetate F -4.4 77 2.2 9.0 0.902 3.04 Insoluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

400 2000 LEL

11. Sulphuric Acid C -- 330 -- -- 1.39 -- Miscible 3 0 2 N.A. 0.2 4

12. Ammonia Liquor Toxic - 38 16 25 0.9 1.2 Miscible 3 1 0

Not combustible

25 300

13. Thionyl Chloride CAS # 771909-7

T - 76 1.64 4.6 - - Water reactive

4 0 2 sulfur dioxide,

1 ppm

Not determ

500 ppm for

No natural oil and one table spoon



sulfur chloride

ined 1 Hr Rat

sodium or magnesium

sulphate with one glass of water.

14. Hydrochloric Acid HCL

C/T NF 108 NF NF 1.12 -1.19

1.267 Soluble 3 0 1 N A 5 ppm

50 ppm

3124 ppm for 1h rat

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk,

Lime Juice, Milk of Megnesia

15. Formaldehyde T/F 60 96 7 73 1.08 1.03 Soluble 3 2 0 Toxic vapour

0.3 ppm

20 ppm

203 mg /M3

No Milk, Activated Charcoal or water

F = FIRE T = TOXIC E = Explosive R = REACTIVE BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY VD = VAPOUR DENSITY ER = EVAPORATION RATE H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS R = REACTIVE HAZARD BR = BURNING RATE TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE PPM = PARTS PER MILLION STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT NFPA = NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa C = Corrosive



3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

Following facilities and system will be installed / implemented.

3.9.1 Process Safety: 1. The reactions for the present & proposed products are at atmospheric pressure with

vents open to atmosphere through water cooled/ chilled water vapour condensers hence the pressure development in the reaction vessels does not arise.

2. The reaction carried by heating, here the heat energy is conducted vide steam through Jackets/Limpet Coils. Low Pressure Steam Line is connected to these vessels with jackets /Limpet coils appropriately insulated. The vessels are also fitted with safety valve to open at 3kg pressure and pressure indicator for visual periodic checks. The safety valves are examined, tested and certified vide form no 11 for relevant vessels.

3. Free Fall of any flammable material in the vessel is avoided. 4. Any reaction upsets will be confined to the reaction vessel itself as defined quantity

of charges of raw materials is issued to the reaction vessel/Day tank by metering pumps.

5. All emergency valves and switches are easily assessable. 6. All Distillations carried out are high vacuum fractionation distillations. Hence the

pressure development within the unit will not occur. However since the distillations are carried out well above the flash point of the mass, vacuum failure fail alarm are provided and non return valves are incorporated on the main vacuum lines to curb vacuum failure in the system.

7. Further all the vessels are examined periodically by a recognized competent person under the Gujarat Factory Rules 1963-Rule 61(1).

8. All the vessels and equipments are well earthed appropriately and well protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper earthing facilities have been provided.

9. Materials are transferred by pumping through pipeline or by vacuum from drums. 10. All reaction vents are connected to vapour condensers system. 11. All flammable material storage tanks away from the process plant and required

quantity of material will be charge in reactor by pump. 12. Flammable material drum is also charged by vacuum. 13. Temperature indicators are provided near all reactor and distillation systems. 14. Jumpers are provided on and will be provided on all solvent handling pipeline

flanges. 15. Caution note, safety posters, stickers, periodic training & Updating in safety and

emergency preparedness plan are displayed and conducted. 16. Flame proof light fittings are installed in the plant. 17. All the Plant Personnel are provided with Personal Protection Equipments to protect

against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash. PPE like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. are provided to the employees. All employees are given and updated in Safety aspects through periodic training in safety.

18. Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products are readily available that the shop floor. The same practice should be continued.



3.9.2 Transportation 19. Toluene received by road tankers and stored in storage tanks area. 20. Toluene unloading Standard procedure will be made and implemented for safe

unloading of road tanker. 21. Earthing provision has been made for tanker unloading. 22. Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from the road tanker. 23. Fixed pipelines with pumps are and will be provided for solvent transfer up to

reactors. 24. Double mechanical seal type pumps installed for solvents. 25. NRV provision made on all pump discharge line. 26. Most of chemicals are received at plant in drums by road truck and stored in a

separate drum store. 27. Drum handling trolleys are used for transportation of drums up to plant. 28. Chemical charged in reactor from drum through SS day tank by vacuum or barrel

pump or by gravity.

3.9.3 Storage area Safety 29. The Tank farm will be is isolated from the process area. With expansion the new

products, the underground storage tanks shall be used for storage of Toluene. The license procurement procedures with explosive department will be undertaken.

30. Flame Proof Pumps and Motor will be provided in the tank farm. 31. Underground tank will have natural earthing. 32. Tank will be surrounded by RCC dyke wall and collection pit with valve will be

provided. 33. The gap between tank and RCC wall will be filled with sand. 34. Tank farm location will be away from the all hot areas, process area, Boiler house

and other movement area. 35. This tank farm area will be fenced area with restriction on entry of unauthorized

person. 36. Level of the liquid will be taken on daily basis by dip/magnetic indicators. Once the

clearance is obtained, level Indicators will be installed. 37. Provision for flexible Tanker Earthing will also be provided. 38. Spark Arrestor/Muffler will be provided at the security gate to each vehicle which

comes in to the tank farm for unloading. 39. Non Sparking Tools to be used the tank farm area. 40. Appropriate Copper Flange Jumpers will be provided to prevent any accumulation of

Static Electricity during pumping or draining. All electrical, Mechanical equipments along with its accessories will be earthed.

41. Flame arrestor will be provided on methanol storage tanks. 42. Dyke wall will be provided to all above ground storage tanks,. 43. Level gauge and level measurement instruments will be installed on all hazardous

material storage tanks. 44. Lightening arrestor on all chimneys and building provided. 45. Storage tanks of hazardous material will be stored away from the plant and safe

distances will be maintained. 46. Fencing and caution notes and hazard identification boards will be displayed. 47. Safety permit for hazardous material loading unloading will be prepared and

implemented.



48. TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for transportation Emergency of Hazardous chemicals.

49. Safety Shower and eye wash will be installed at acid/ alkali handling and storage area.

50. Emergency handling equipments like SCBA sets, Fire extinguishers, Gas mask, PPEs.

51. Full fledge ETP plant made and it will take care of liquid effluent of the plant and final discharge parameter will be maintained as per GPCB norms.

52. Scrubbers provided on all process vents and air monitoring carried out and parameters will be maintained as per GPCB norms.

3.9.4 For Drum Storage area :

53. Proper ventilation provided in godown. 54. Only general shift material is being handled. 55. FLP type light fittings will be provided. 56. Proper label and identification board /stickers will be provided in the storage area. 57. Drum pallets will be provided. 58. Drum handling trolley will be for drum handling. 59. No dispensing provision in godown area. 60. Materials will be stored as Compatibility and separate area for flammable , corrosive

and toxic chemical drums in store. 61. No smoking area will be classified and no hot work will be allowed in store.

3.9.5 Safety Measures for Acid storage tank area:

62. Storage tank will be stored away from the process plant. 63. Tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented. 64. Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at unloading area

and trained all operators. 65. NFPA label will be provided. 66. Required PPEs like full body protection PVC apron, Hand gloves, gumboot,

Respiratory mask etc. will be provided to operator. 67. Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage. 68. Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage area. 69. Material will be handled in close condition in pipe line. 70. Dyke wall will be provided to all storage tanks, collection pit with valve provision. 71. Double drain valve will provided. 72. Level gauge will be provided on all storage tanks. 73. Safety permit for loading unloading of hazardous material will be prepared and

implemented. 74. TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for

transportation Emergency of Hazardous chemicals.



3.9.6 Fire fighting system 1. Sufficient numbers of Fire extinguishers installed in process and storage area.

Additional fire extinguishers will be provided in proposed new plant and storage area and warehouse as per fire load calculation and Rule -66 A requirements.

2. It is proposed to have a provision for separate Water storage tank for fire water as well as process water requirement.

3. D.G. Sets provided for emergency power. 4. Third Party Periodic Fire Hazard Analysis is carried out on annually.

3.9.7 Pipelines: The various pipelines used to transfer i.e. charging, draining etc. in the plant are periodically inspected for Support, Vibration, Corrosion conditions, Painting, and Colour Code. Pipelines and Flexible pipeline (SS 316/MS) are appropriately earthed to avoid accumulation of Static Electricity. Periodic Checkups of the pipelines are conducted to curb any chances of mishap due to leakages. Preventive Maintenance Schedules are in practice.

3.9.8 Emergency Planning:

1. Details are provided in On site-Off site Emergency Plan.

3.10 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS AND FLOW CHART Process Description Provided in EIA report



SECTION IV

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and storage of chemicals. In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour under process conditions, their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in identifying vulnerable areas within the complex. Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly classified as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the materials handled and their properties. It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon the degree of hazard they pose. In a Bulk Drugs manufacturing plant main hazard handling of hazardous chemicals like Flammable solvents, corrosive and toxic chemicals, the primary concern has always been fire and explosion prevention and control as these are the main hazard posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the lose of life, property and materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over the years. Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories and vulnerable practices /operations.

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and consequence analysis etc are employed.



4.2 Dow’s fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) 4.2.1 Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below : 4.2.2 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices.

TABLE- 4.1 Sr.No

Material Stored

Storage Qty.

Nh Nf Nr MF

GPH SPH FEI Degree of hazard

Radius of expo.

(ft.)

Th Ts TI Degree of Hazard

1. Toluene 30 Kl 2 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Moderate 106 12.5 50 11.5 Severe 2. Class A

solvent drums

10 MT 0 3 0 16 2.7 2.6 7.02 112.3 0 50 2.8 Light

3. Thionyl Chloride

200 ltr 4 0 2 1 2.9 3.3 9.57 Moderate 8 250 125

22.0 Severe

FEI= MF x GPH x SPH TI = Th + Ts x ( 1+ GPH tot + SPH tot ) ------------- 100

Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard Nr = NFPA Reactive rating FEI = Fire Explosion Index MF = Material Factor Th = Penalty Factor Ts = Penalty for Toxicity TI = Toxicity Index

Select Pertinent Process

Determine Material Factor

Calculate GHP(F1), General Process Hazards

Calculate SPH(F2), special process Hazards

Determine Hazard Factor F1 X F2 =F3

F3 x Material Factor =F & E Index

Determine Exposure area



4.3 Failure Frequencies 4.3.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories

I) Catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and II) Ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency. Leakage from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc fall into the first category.

4.3.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:-

TABLE-4.2

Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies

Atmospheric storage

Catastrophic failure Significant leak

10-9 /yr 10-5 /yr

Process Pipelines < = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak 8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr 8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr

> 50 mm <=150mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

2.6 x 10-7 /m.yr 5.3 x 10-6 /m.yr

< 150 mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

8.8 x 10-8 /m.yr 2.6 x 10-6 /m.yr

Hoses Rupture 3.5 x 10-2 /m.yr

TABLE-4.3



TABLE-4.4

4.4 Identification of Hazardous Areas:

A study of process for manufacturing as given in chapter 2 of the report indicates the following: Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, are used in continuous process & inventory are low at process plant. However some chemicals such as Toluene, Acetone, and Methanol are used / common in more than one process & therefore their inventory requirement is higher. Most of hazardous chemicals are stored in dedicated Explosive licence premises. List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Table-4.5 Following areas considered as a Hazardous area of the plant. (a) Class A petroleum storage tank farm (CCOE approved licenced premises) (b) Class A & B (CCOE approved licenced premises drum storage area) (c) Thionyl chloride Drum spillage in drum storage area.



4.4.1 Evaluation Of Hazards : 4.4.1.1 Major inventory of Hazardous chemicals within the factory premises are-

The materials were studied with respect to their flammability, reactivity and toxicity based on the criteria given by the NFPA (NFPA ratings). Material factor values were determined using these ratings. General process hazards and Special process hazards for all the materials stored were determined as per the guidelines given by DOW Chemicals Company in DOW Index. FEI values for all these materials were calculated form the above data. Value of material factor, General Process Hazard & Special Process Hazard as also FEI / TI values & degree of hazard are given in Table 4.1 It can be seen storage in tank farms is mostly in the Severe category due to storage handling of highly flammable chemicals. The radius of exposure for various tanks considering FEI Values is also calculated and presented in the Table.

4.4.1.2 Evaluation of Process Areas :

Production area will not warrant any detailed calculations as consequences due to any worst case scenario due to very quantity of material & damage is such a case is expected to be limited to within the factory premises.

Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on storage in bulk as per Table -3.2.



SECTION V

RISK ASSESSMENT 5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such damages.

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the outflow time (kg/s.). In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties viz. Pressure and temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid, liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or solids. Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system. In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.

Pool Fire

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool. The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following factors :

Distance from the fire The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high heat-absorbing

capacity) The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with respect to the

fire.



Jet Fire The escaping jet of Hydrogen gas from a pipe line or a pipeline if ignited causes a jet flame. The direction and tilt of this jet flame will depend on the prevailing wind direction and velocity. The damage in case of such type of jet fire is restricted within the plant boundary limit. However, the ignited jet may impinge on other nearby vessel / equipment / pipeline causing a domino effect.

Fire Ball This happens during the burning of Methanol vapour cloud, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e. above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as combustion is taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating diffusion flame). The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the ground, subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and the hazard is primarily thermal.

“UVCE” UVCE stands for unconfined vapour cloud explosion. The clouds of Hydrogen Gas mix with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 74 %) may cause propagating flames when ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe depending on the total mass of Gas in cloud and may cause secondary fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or blast effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion) and is most common cause of such industrial accident. BLEVE( Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion ) Is a physical explosion, which occurs when the vapour side of a storage tank is heated by fire e.g. a torch. As a result of the heat the vapour pressure will rise and the tank wall will weaken. At a given moment the weakened tank wall will no longer be able to withstand the increased internal pressure and will burst open. As a result of the expansion and flash-off, a pressure wave occurs. With flammable gases, a fireball will occur. SPILLS POOL EVAPRATION : Spills are liquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is flammable, then it can catch fire creating a pool fire also the vapours can cause explosion.

5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas :

Following areas considered as a High Risk area of the plant. (a) Class A petroleum storage tank farm (CCOE approved licenced premises) (b) Class A, B & Industrial solvent CCOE approved licenced premises drum storage area (c) Thionyl Chloride drum storage area.



5.3 Modes of Failure:

5.3.1 Following failure are considered for detailed analysis and safe distances computed:

Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker. Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /

valves etc. Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios. Gas release due to catastrophic failure of gas/ liquid outlet valve failure.

Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable failure cases:

TABLE-5.1 Event Causes Tank on Fire/ - Catastrophic failure of tank + Ignition availability Pool fire - Failure of liquid outlet line + Ignition availability Fire Ball/ - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank Flash Fire Vapour generation due to substrate and wind UVCE Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of

total vapour mass Above the UEL-LEL % Ignition availability Toxic release Drum spillage in Drum storage area

Considering the quantity of storages of Flammable storage, following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed : Catastrophic failure( 100 % failure of connecting hose ) of road tanker of Toluene and

presence of ignition source poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas. Spillage of flammable chemicals in drum storage area and presence of ignition source

poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas. Toxic release up to LC 50, IDLH & TLV due to Thionyl Chloride drum spillage in

drum storage area.

Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, but consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.



Table-5.2

Scenario No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1,2,3,4 Toluene Road tanker catastrophic failure

Unloading arm 100 % failure,

Tank on fire/ Un confined Pool Fire, Flash Fire, Ball Fire, UVCE(Over Pressure),

5 Toluene & Other industrial solvents drum storage area fire

Drum failure Unconfined Pool fore, BLEVE fire

6 Thionyl chloride drum

spillage Random failure Spill pool evaporation

dispersion and its LC 50, IDLH & TLV concentration

distances. 5.4 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:

Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting damages. The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed personnel, equipment, building etc. Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage facilities or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure.

All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant effect, to relate the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are used for Heat Radiation.

TABLE 5.3 DAMAGE CRITERIA – HEAT RADIATION

Heat Radiation Incident Flux KW/m2 Damage 38 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks 37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 25 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition 14 Damage to normal buildings 12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 12 Damage to vegetation 6 Burns (escape routes) 4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 3 1st degree burns possible (personnel only in emergency allowed) 2 Feeling of discomfort 1.5 No discomfort even after long exposure



CHAPTER VI

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6.1 Consequence analysis.

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study were considered for deciding acceptability of risks.

6.1.1 Weather Data :

Average wind speed : 3 m / sec. Average Ambient Temperature : 35 deg. c. Average Humidity : 70 % Atmospheric Stability : F

6.1.2 Assumption :

6.1.2.1 For Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure( Unloading arm 100 %

failure

Catastrophic failure is considered for 20 MT Toluene road tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of evaporated solvent vapour mass comes in the contact with ignition source pool fire, UVCE, Ball Fire and Flash Fire scenarios were considered for various situation.

6.1.2.2 Basic assumptions for drum storage area

Drum Fire if direct ignition on road tanker. Drum storage area fire due to heat effect and domino effect.

For Fire Modules : Heat Radiation Damage 37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 1.6 No discomfort even after long exposure



6.1.2.3 Basic assumptions for Thionyl chloride drum spillage

We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above mentioned scenarios.

Fatality ( LC-50 ) Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters)

6.3.8 Evaporation rate calculation :

TABLE-6.2

Material Name Total

capacity of

storage

Maximum

Spillage

Evapouration Rate

( Kg/Sec.)

Explosive mass

( MT) ( MT ) ER-1 ER-3

Toluene Road tanker catastrophic

failure

20 20 0.203Kg/Sec 184

Thionyl Chloride Drum spillage

200 Kgs 200 kgs 20 Gms/Sec -



Scenario –1 Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE –A Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE

Input Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 20 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 180 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 9.6 meter Pool liquid depth 0.01 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.59 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.34 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 791 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 58.82 Mims.

Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 13.5 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 15.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 22.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 39.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 61.6 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In the 22.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 39 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 61.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –2 Fire Ball simulation for Solvent road tanker unloading catastrophic failure

TABLE –B Fire Ball simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FIRE BALL In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Fire Ball radius 14.66 meter Mass of vapour Between LEL-UEL%

184 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat radiation

243 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 28500 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy release

658492 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 6 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release

3.9e +006 Kj

Liquid Density 791 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 5.98 sec.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 30 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 38 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant injury.

12.5 54 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .

4.0 94 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 180 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 94 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 180 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –3 Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE –C Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FLASH FIRE

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 20 KL Visible Flash Fire Height 34.38 meter Mass of Gas 184 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 17.19meter Heat of combustion 42267 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 5.99 sec. Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud

0.600 Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture 14.67 meter

Stochiometric Fuel-Air Mixture

0.133 Total energy release 2622000 Kj

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m from Flash Fire

162 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 1.29 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 30 100 % Fatal. Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 38 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).

12.5 54 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .

4.0 93 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 148 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 93 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 148 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker

TABLE – D Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker

Scenario : UVCE

In put Data Stored quantity 20 KL Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 405 lbm. TNT equivalent 7.8 Explosion efficiency 0.04 Wind speed 6.0 m/s

Radial Distance in Mtr.

Over pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung Rupture

% Eardrum rupture

%Structural damage

% Glass rupture

31.6 47.7 100 100 100 100

33.3 28.0 98.8 100 100 100

38.3 9.1 0.0 78.7 100 100

60 2.3 0.0 2.6 10.9 100

693.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3

Results

In case of UVCE up to 31.6 Mtr distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum

rupture radius. Up to 38.3 Mtr distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 60 Mtr distance

for 100 % glass damage area.



MCA Scenario –5 Unconfined pool Fire for Solvent drums storage area

TABLE –E Unconfined pool Fire for Solvent drums storage area

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 10 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 98.70 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 15(m) Flame centre height 14.51 meter Pool liquid depth 0.01 (m) Maximum Flame width 14.50 meter Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 4.86 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 810kg/m3 Flame burnout time 1.67 hrs.

Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground level

KW /m 2


Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 13.4 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 16.4 Min. to ignite wood (Without flame contact). 100 % fatal in 1 Insignificant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 23.2 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 41.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 64.8 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 13.4 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In 23.2 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute. In the 41.0meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 64.8 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario-6 Spill pool Evaporation for Thionyl Chloride

TABLE –F FOR THIONYL CHLORIDE Scenario : Spill pool Evaporation

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 200 Kgs Max. ground level conc. 107 ppm(SO2)

230 ppm (HCL) Rate of release 20 g/s Dist. of maxi. ground level

conc. 107 meter(SO2) 230 meter (HCL) Molecular weight 119

Wind speed 3.0 m/s Density ( Air) 1.64kg/m3

Hazard Level Concentration (PPM) F weather condition

(Meter) LC50( As HCL gas) 3940 -

IDLH ( As HCL gas) 50 233.96

TWA/ TLV ( As HCL gas) 5 1000

LC50( As SO2 gas) 5784 -

IDLH ( As SO2 gas) 100 85.70

TWA/ TLV ( As SO2 gas) 2 1205



6.2 Assessment of Consequence Modeling Results : Results of consequence analysis for the release of various flammable and toxic materials at the SCLPL are depicted in Table 6.3 & 6.4



TABLE - 6.3 Details regarding Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment table :-

Scenario Type of failure

considered Spill quantity consideration Max. Credible loss scenario in KL.

Evaporation vapor cloud mass Btn. LEL-UEL % for 15 mints release from the source.

Tank fire / pool fire damage radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Fire Ball damage radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Flash fire simulation radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Vapor cloud Explosion ( Unconfined vapor cloud explosion) UVCE peak over pressure in Mtr.

Heat Intensity KW/ M2 37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 100%

Fatality

100% Eardrum rupture

100% Structural Damage

100% Glass brk.

1,2,3,4 Unconfined Pool Fire, Fire Ball, Flash Fire & UVCE for Toluene road tanker catastrophic failure

20 184 kg

13.5 22.1 61.6 30 54 180 30 54 180 31.6 33.3 38.3 60

5 Unconfined pool Fire for Solvent drums storage area

10 - 13.4 23.2 64.8 - - - - - - - - - -



TABLE - 6.4

Type of failure considered Spill quantity consideration Max. Credible loss scenario

Evaporation Rate Grm/ Sec.

LC50 Distance in meter

IDLH Distance in meter

TLV Distance in meter

Scenario-6 Spill pool Evaporation for Thionyl Chloride (As HCL )

200 kgs 20 21.3 233 1000

Scenario-6 Spill pool Evaporation for Thionyl Chloride (As SO2 )

200 kgs 20 15.4 85 1205

6.3 Comments

The appended table 6.3 and 6.4 summarizes the consequences of the various hazards analyzed under this study. As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Risk Analysis study, the Fatality zone due to burn up to 30 meters in worst case scenario. First degree burn zone up to 54 meter. Due to explosion fatal distance is maximum 31.6 Mtr. structural damage zone is up to 38.3 Mtr for fire and explosion scenarios. In case of toxic gas release Fatal distance up to 21.3 meters and evacuation zone maximum up to 233 meter and company has to plan for evacuation accordingly. Company has to increase awareness programme in the surrounding vicinity and educate people for safe evacuation at the time of toxic release. On site emergency preparedness plan On site emergency preparedness plan is prepared but risk assessment study data needs to be studied and further prepared as per risk assessment findings. Emergency control facilities and resources to be plan and rehearsal / Mock- Drill needs to be conducted regularly to combat emergency in minimum time. Emergency handling facilities and training: All employees should be well aware about possible emergencies and its consequences, emergency control equipments and practices to control such hazardous condition within premises.



SECTION VII

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

Some of the safeties and risk reduction measures adopted and recommended for the safety of the plant are as follows:- 7.1 Design 7.1.1 During the design stage itself adequate care has been taken for design, selection,

fabrication, erection and commissioning of Flammable and toxic liquid / gas handling facilities and other equipment, piping, pipe fittings, electrical equipment etc. relevant and prevalent international and Indian standards has been followed for design, fabrication, inspection of the storage tanks and other equipment.

7.1.2 Civil foundations is suitably designed to take care of earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, flooding, collapse of structures etc.

7.1.3 Plant operator and staffs are selected well experience and qualified for chemical plant operation.

7.1.4 All key personals are trained for emergency handling procedures and regular Mock- Drills has been conducted on various scenarios.

7.2 Safety Devices

Following safety devices are provided to protect from any malfunctioning of plant equipments:

7.2.1 Storage tanks.

a) Nitrogen blanketing for flammable liquid/ gas storage tanks. b) Level gauges on storage tanks. c) Static bonding of pipeline flanges. d) Dyke wall provided surround above ground storage tanks. e) All pumps flameproof type and double mechanical seal type. f) All pipeline and tanks painted as per IS colour code. g) Jumpers and static earthing provision made on all flanges and tanks. h) Caution note and Material identification, capacity displayed on all storage tanks. i) Mayur curtain sprinkler will be provided for Acid storage tanks leakage spillage.

7.2.2 Pumps

a) Required out let valve and NRV provided on pump outlet. b) Modular fire extinguishers provided near of most of the pumps. c) FLP type and mechanical seal type pump installed for flammable chemicals.

7.2.3 Pipelines

a) Jumper connections on flanges to prevent build up of static electricity charge. b) Proper supports and clamping are provided c) Double earthing provided to all electrical motors. d) Colour code as Per IS maintained.



7.3 Operation and Maintenance

Operations and maintenance of the plant is being in accordance with the well-established safe practices. Some of the guidelines are as follows:-

a) Periodic testing of hoses for leakages and continuity. b) Earthing of all plant equipment and earthing of vehicles under unloading operations. c) Annual testing of all safety relief valves. d) Planned preventive maintenance of different equipment for their safety and reliable

operations. e) Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness

measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc. f) Comprehensive color code scheme to identify different medium pipes. g) Strict compliance of safety work permit system. h) Proper maintenance of earth pits. i) Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identify badges for outsides, gate

pass system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries etc. j) Strict enforcement of no smoking regime. k) Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety, fire fighting and first

aid. 7.4 Recommendations 7.4.1 From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks

are confined within the factory boundary walls in case of fire & explosion, except in the event of Toxic release it will create OFF site emergency situations and required more attention and emergency preparedness for combat such situations.. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios, following steps are recommended.

Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948. React with water and generate toxic fumes while contact with water caution note to be

displayed in Thionyl chloride drum storage area. Tanker unloading procedure needs to be displayed at tanker unloading area. Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock

Drills to be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to tackle any emergency.

Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time. Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling

process. Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year. Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done

once in a six month to protect from corrosion. Permit to work system to be implemented 100 % for hazardous work in the plant. Safety manual as per Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual as per 41 B & C be

prepared and distributed to all employees and nearby public. As per Spill pool Scenario for Thionyl chloride drum, it has been observed that IDLH

distance cover surrounding 233 meters distance. Hence, population evacuation plan up to 233 meters needs to be prepared for near by factories in wind direction in case of extreme accident scenario.



The details of emergency equipments are given in on site emergency Plan along with its quantity. As per our site visit, these was found in order & working condition and sufficient for existing production Activates.

Manual call points for fire location identification to be installed in plant premises. For proposed plant Fire & Safety organization setup to be preplanned for batter plant

process safety. All Acid vents to be connected with scrubber system. A HAZOP study to be carried out for all product wise. Induction safety course to be prepared and trained all new employees before starting

duties in plant.



SECTION VIII

DESASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

An onsite emergency in the industries involving hazardous processes or in hazardous installations is one situation that has potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption in the work area and usually, the effects are confined to factory or in several departments of factory, premise. An emergency begins when operator at the plant or in charge of storage cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may turn into an emergency. 8.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 8.1.1 OBJECTIVES OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

A quick and effective response at during an emergency can have tremendous significance on whether the situation is controlled with little loss or it turns into a major emergency. Therefore, purpose an emergency plan is to provide basic guidance to the personnel for effectively combating such situations to minimize loss of life, damage to property and loss of property. An objective of Emergency Planning is to maximize the resource utilisation and combined efforts towards emergency operations are as follows. :

8.1.2 DURING AN EMERGENCY.

To increase thinking accuracy and to reduce thinking time. To localize the emergency and if possible eliminates it. To minimize the effects of accident on people and property. To take correct remedial measures in the quickest time possible to contain the incident

and control it with minimum damage. To prevent spreading of the damage in the other sections. To mobilize the internal resources and utilize them in the most effective way To arrange rescue and treatment of causalities.

8.1.3 DURING NORMAL TIME.

To keep the required emergency equipment in stock at right places and ensure the

working condition. To keep the concerned personnel fully trained in the use of emergency equipment. To give immediate warning tooth surrounding localities in case of an emergency

situation arising. To mobilize transport and medical treatment of the injured. To get help from the local community and government officials to supplement

manpower and resources. To provide information to media & Government agencies, Preserving records, evidence

of situation for subsequent emergency etc.



8.2 SCOPE OF OSEP

This OSEP is prepared for industrial emergencies like fires, explosions, toxic releases, and asphyxia and does not cover natural calamities and societal disturbances related emergencies (like strikes, bomb threats, civil commission’s etc.)

8.3 ELEMENTS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

The important elements to be considered in plan are

Emergency organization Emergency Facilities. Roles and Responsibilities of Key Personnel and Essential Employee. Communications during Emergency Emergency Shutdown of Plant & Control of situation. Rescue Transport & Rehabilitation. Developing Important Information.

8.4 METHODOLOGY.

The consideration in preparing Emergency Plan will be included the following steps:

Identification and assessment of hazards and risks. Identifying, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities. Identification and equipping Emergency Control Centre. Identifying Assembly, Rescue points Medical Facilities. Formulation of plan and of emergency sources. Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation. Action on Site.

Earlier, a detailed Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment was carried out on hazards and their likely locations and consequences are estimated following the standard procedure. However the causing factors for above discussed end results may be different and causing factors are not discussed in this plan.

8.5 EMERGENCIES IDENTIFIED

Emergencies that may be likely at bulk fuel storage area, process plant, cylinder storage area, and drum storage shed, and autoclave reactor area. There are chances of fire and explosive only.

8.6 OTHERS

Other risks are earthquake, lightning, sabotage, bombing etc., which are usually, not in the purview of management control.



8.7 EMERGENCY ORGANISATION.

Plant organization is enclosed. Based on the plant organization, which includes shift organization, an Emergency Organization is constituted towards achieving objectives of this emergency plan. Plant Manager is designated as Overall in Charge and is the Site Controller. The following are designated as Incident Controllers for respective areas under their control. Shift in charge Engineer (Plant Operations) is designated at Incident Controller for all areas of plant.

8.8 EMERGENCY FACILITIES 8.8.1 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)

It is a location, where all key personnel like Site Controller, Incident Controller etc. can assemble in the event of onset of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them. Plant Manager’s Office is designated as Emergency Control Centre. It has P&T telephone as well as internal telephones, ECC is accessible from plant located considerably away from process plant, Storage’s and on evaluation of other locations, Plant Manager’s Room find merit from the distance point of view, communication etc.

8.8.2 FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE MAINTAINED AT EMERGENCY CONTROL

CENTRE (ECC)

The following facilities and information would be made available at the ECC

Latest copy of Onsite Emergency Plan and off sites Emergency Plan (as provided by District Emergency Authority).

Intercom Telephone. P&T Telephone. Telephone directories (Internal, P&T) Factory Layout, Site Plan Plans indicating locations of hazardous inventories, sources of safety equipment,

location of pump house, road plan, assembly points, vulnerable zones, escape routes. Hazard chart. Emergency shut-down procedures. Nominal roll of employees. List and address of key personnel List and address of Emergency coordinators. List and address of first aides, List and address of first aid fire fighting employees, List and address of qualified Trained persons.



8.8.3 FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES.

Portable extinguishers 8.8.4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

These systems are proposed to protect the plant by means of different fire protection facilities and consist of Portable extinguishers and hand appliances for extinguishing small fires in different

areas of the plant. Water cum foam monitor to be provided in bulk fuel storage area. Fire water pumps.

8.9 EMERGENCY ESCAPES

The objective of the emergency escape is to escape from the hazardous locations, to the nearest assembly point or the other safe zone, for rescue and evacuation.

8.10 ASSEMBLY POINT.

Assembly point is location, where, persons unconnected with emergency operations would proceed and await for rescue operation. Near Main Gate

8.11 WIND SOCK.

Wind socks for knowing wind direction indication would be provided at a suitable location to visible from many locations. It is proposed to install windsocks on Plant building so as to be visible from different locations in the plant.

8.12 EMERGENCY TRANSPORT.

Emergency Ambulance would be stationed at the Administration Office and round the clock-driver would be made available for emergency transportation of injured etc. However, the other vehicles of the company also would be available for emergency services.

8.13 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION.

There are two kinds of communication system provided.

(a) Regular P&T phones. (b) Mobile phone

8.14 WARNING/ALARM/COMMUNICATION OF EMERGENCY

The emergency would be communicated by operating electrical siren for continuously for five minutes with high and low pitch mode.

8.15 EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES:



Priority of Emergency Protection.

Life safety Preservation of property

Restoration of the normalcy 8.16 MUTUAL AID

While necessary facilities are available and are updated from time to time, sometimes, it may be necessary to seek external assistance; it may be from the neighboring factories or from the State Government as the case may be.

8.17 MOCK DRILL

Inspite of detailed training, it may be necessary to try out whether, the SCLPL works out and will there be any difficulties in execution of such plan. In order to evaluate the plan and see whether the plan meets the objectives of the SCLPL, occasional mock drills are contemplated. Before undertaking the drill, it would be very much necessary to give adequate training to all staff members and also information about possible mock drill. After few pre-informed mock drills, few UN-informed mock drills would be taken. All this is to familiarize the employees with the concept and procedures and to see their response. These scheduled and unscheduled mock drills would be conducted during shift change, public holidays, in night shift etc. To improve preparedness once in 6 months and performance is evaluated and Site Controller maintains the record. Incident Controller(IC) coordinates this activity.

risk assessment study · prepared by m/s. stellar chemical laboratories pvt. ltd. page : 2 hse...

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