risk society beck

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Risk Society (Ulrich Beck)

The concept of risk, long associated with the language of maritime trade and insurance, has

become a key term for characterizing contemporary Western societies. Important early

contributions to the development of this analysis were the work of Patrick Lagadec (1981),who coined the term risk civilization, and that of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982).

However, Ulrich Beck's Risk Society(1992), originally published in German in 1986, was the

decisive contribution to a new theory of society. Beck's conceptualization has inspired

research that focuses on the implications of science and technology for the social and

natural environment and on the increasing use of risk analysis in discussions of public

policies related to science and technology, and which involve ethical questions.

Reflexive Modernity

Beck's theory represents a continuation of the German tradition of an ethical questioning ofmodernity, including science and technology, that runs from Max Weber (18641929)

through Jrgen Habermas (b. 1929). In contrast to postmodern theories that present late

twentieth-century social transformations as going beyond modernism, Beck argues that

modernity is going through an unintended and unseen phase that is forcing it to confront

the premises and limits of its own model. Modernization has become, in his words,

"reflexive." The concept of reflexive modernization, which was introduced by Beck and

developed in a subsequent work with Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (Beck, Giddens, and

Lash 1994), propounds a "radicalization" of modernity in which the dynamics of

individualization, globalization, gender revolution, underemployment, and global risks

undermine the foundations of classical industrial modernity and make old concepts

obsolete. The internal dynamism of modernity brings it up against the previously unknown

possibility of global self-destruction as a result of the risks generated by certain

technologies.

Beck thus depicts the risk society as coextensive with reflexive modernity. In the same way

that "simple modernity" produced goods and services that presented challenges involving

just distribution, reflexive modernity is producing risks that must be distributed justly.

An Expanded Concept of Risk

Many theoretical works in other disciplines had previously analyzed the risk concept,

although more narrowly: economics, behavioral theory (in particular decision making and

game theory), anthropology, and technology assessment.

In economics, where the concept has always been fundamental, prevailing interpretations

make a clear distinction between risk and uncertainty. Whereas risk can be assessed and

calculated in terms of its numerical probabilities, uncertainty cannot be treated in that

manner. Introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century by Frank Knight (18851972)

and John Maynard Keynes (18831946), this distinction made possible the recognition of

the ontologically contingent nature of economic behavior and its aggregate outcomes. An

economic agent cannot avoid wide margins of uncertainty or eliminate it by means of theapplication of more information or scientific knowledge.


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The anthropological work of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) diverges from this classical

approach in emphasizing the subjective aspect of risk and the ways in which risk is assessed

and perceived by individuals. Their work helped significantly to shift attention away from a

probabilistic approach to the cultural framework of risk perception. Variations in the

understandings and perceptions of risk in different societies demonstrate the cultural

relativism involved in judgments of risk.

Beck's main contribution was to build risk systematically into a theory of modern society

and its dilemmas. Risk is seen as a defining feature of society itself, forming the dark side of

industrial successes, technical and scientific progress, and economic growth. It has

stimulated changes in social relations, family structure, political and cultural organization,

and even the self.

Unlike the threats of early industrialization, the risks of "late modernity" (nuclear, chemical,

genetic, ecological, etc.) are generated by techno-economic decisions and considerations of

utility. The novel aspect of contemporary risk society is that people's decisions as acivilization lead to problems and dangers that radically contradict the established language

of control and conventional techniques of calculation. Current risks are not socially,

spatially, or temporally demarcated; there are no clear-cut solutions; and it is difficult to

trace responsibility or assess compensation for those who are affected. In addition, human

perception fails to notice many of the risks: they become visible only through scientific

interpretation (as in the case of stratospheric ozone depletion), which in turn increases

dependence on experts.

Beck focuses above all on environmental and health risks, especially genetic technology. He

later extended the concept of risk to global financial crises and transnational terroristnetworks (Beck 2002). Bringing together such disparate phenomena enables him to identify

relevant trends in modern societies but has the drawback of implying a less fragmented

world than that which Beck perceives.

Niklas Luhmann (1993 [1991]) has enriched "risk society" analysis with his theory of

autopoietic systems. Here risk is a specific form of dealing with the future that has to be

decided in the context of probability and improbability. The uncertain and unforeseeable

nature of the future arises not only from complexity and people's cognitive limitations but

also from the decision-making process itself. There is a long hiatus between when a decision

is made and when its consequences are felt, with random factors affecting them. To talk ofrisks is to see future losses as the consequence of a decision that has been made. For

Luhmann this is where "risk" differs from "danger," with danger being attributable to

external causes and corresponding to those "affected" by decisions. Although the distinction

is slight because "one person's risk is another person's danger," it points to the key issue of

acceptance of risk decisions.

Developments and Implications

Beck's message on the relationship between science, technology, politics, and ethics in late

modernity is that our language does not inform future generations of the dangers people

create when they use certain technologies. As it develops technologically, society


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encounters the difference between two worlds: the language of quantifiable risk, in which

people think and act, and that of nonquantifiable insecurity, which people also are creating.

As risks become more complex and the need for precise calculations increases, there is

growing doubt about the ability of science to control and foresee those risks. This situation

has shaken the belief that technological and social progress go together and has forced

science to acknowledge both its collateral effects and its inherent epistemological

limitations. The concept of "world risk society" (Beck 1999) draws attention precisely to the

limited controllability of globalized and artificially produced risks.

In these circumstances human responsibility for technological advancement is an ethical

issue that is both relevant and complex. For Beck the processes and techniques of risk

management block out responsibility. Modern society operates as a "laboratory" in which

no one in particular must answer for the negative effects of technological experimentation.

The institutions of modern society recognize the existence of risk but permit an "organized

irresponsibility" (Beck 1995 [1988]). Pollution, along with its increasingly global impact in

the form of climate change, graphically illustrates this paradox. The greater theenvironmental degradation is, the more laws and environmental regulations there are, but

at the same time no institution seems to be specifically responsible.

Technologically induced risks lead to calls for the demonopolization of scientific expertise,

its subjection to social scrutiny, and extension of democratic accountability to science,

technology, economics, and government. For this to be achieved politics must "(re)-invent"

itself and focus on issues previously regarded as apolitical. What once was the exclusive

province of science has become the subject of intense political debate, as in the case of

biotechnology. In this context individual citizens, movements, and interest groups

participate and influence political decisions in the field that Beck describes as "sub-politics,"which is located beyond the formal representative institutions of the political system.

Because the concept of risk is probabilistic in nature, it tends to deny inherent uncertainties

and place greater emphasis on scientific control over randomness, contingencies, and

chance. In the vast literature on risk there are authors who argue, however, that the

language of uncertainty would be more appropriate for a better understanding of the

current world, full of indeterminacies and contingencies, whether inherent in the world or

epistemic. Underlying this argument would be lack of knowledge of the statistical

probability of many of the possible outcomes, public distrust of the estimates produced by

experts, potential margins of error, and the random unpredictability of nature and humanbehavior (Martins 1998). This approach has affinities with the work of authors who

underline the ontological nature of uncertainty that is inherent in the natural and social

worlds and focus on "ignorance," "catastrophes," and "accidents" (see, for example, Perrow

1984). It differs from the work of those who stress above all the social perception of risks

(such as Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

Beck often is said to alternate between the realist and the constructivist approaches and to

absorb uncertainty into the general category of risk. However, he cannot be said to limit risk

to the perceptual aspect or to avoid a strong emphasis on uncertainty. There are several

studies of practical situations in which risk is not limited to perceptions, such as the

subpolitics of medicine. At the same time, in light of the emphasis Beck places on


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deregulation, uncertainty, and contingency, his "risk society" cannot properly be understood

according to the probability model. In introducing the notions of "unintended consequences

and unawareness" into his theory of reflexive modernity instead of emphasizing the

"knowledge," as Giddens and Lash do, Beck recognizes that there are areas of

unknowability, contingency, and ignorance. For this reason his theoretical approach lends

itself to multiple interpretations that lie between the concepts of risk and uncertainty.

These issues are relevant because a decision based on risk or uncertainty is not neutral in its

political consequences. Risk is associated with prevention, whereas uncertainty is associated

with precaution (Godard et al. 2002). Risk may lead to a process of risk-mitigating

negotiation and agreement, whereas uncertainty may lead to risk-avoiding prudence. The

possibility of rejecting certain techno-economic decisions and actions has provoked a lively

ongoing debate about the advisability of the "precautionary principle" at a time of rapid

technological change.

Bibliography

Beck, Ulrich. (1992 [1986]). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter. London: Sage.

Beck, Ulrich. (1995 [1988]). Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, trans. Amos Weisz. Cambridge, UK: Polity

Press.

Beck, Ulrich. (1999). World Risk Society. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich. (2002). "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited." Theory, Culture & Society19(4): 39

55.

Beck, Ulrich; Anthony Giddens; and Scott Lash. (1994). Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and

Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. (1982). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and

Environmental Dangers. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.

Godard, Olivier; Claude Henry; Patrick Lagadec; and Erwann Michel-Kerjan. (2002). Trait des Nouveaux

Risques: Prcaution, Crise, Assurance. Paris: Gallimard.

Keynes, John Maynard. (1921).A Treatise of Probability. London: Macmillan.

Knight, Frank H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Lagadec, Patrick. (1981). La Civilisation du Risque: Catastrophes Technologiques et Responsabilit Sociale. Paris:

Seuil.

Luhmann, Niklas. (1993 [1991]). Risk: A Sociological Theory, trans. Rhodes Barrett. Berlin and New York: Walter

de Gruyter.

Martins, Hermnio. (1998). "Risco, Incerteza e Escatologia: Reflexoes sobre o Experimentum Mundi

Tecnolgico em Curso" [Risk, uncertainty and eschatology: Reflections on the ongoing experimentum mundi].

Episteme 2: 4175.

Perrow, Charles. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.

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