risse. governance without a state
DESCRIPTION
Riise talks about the function and the organizatioon of the self governance based onthe Foucault's theoriesTRANSCRIPT
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7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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Urv;vl ,.:,iJ
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~ - - - - - - -
1
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1
Governance in Areas of Limited Stateboocl
Introduction nd OJ crPin 1
T -IO.MAS
RISSE
I
N T H E T W E N T Y - F I R S T C E N T U R Y IT
IS
BECOivl lNG
increasingly clear that conventional modes of political steering; by
nation-states ;u1d i n t : c r n a t i o n ~ l regulations are not effectively dealing
with global chaLlenges such as environmental problems, humanitarian
catastrophes, and new security tl1reats.
1
This is one of the reasons governance
h:ts become such a central topic of research within the social sciences,
focusing in particular on nonstate actors
that
parricipatc in rule ndcing
and implementation. There is wide agreement
thctt:
governance is supp('Sccl
to achieve certain st
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l ~ l u b a l norms and rules. Even t he discourse on failed, h i l i n ~ , and flagile sL1Lcs
: c ~ : ~ s s ~ ~ t < :
b t l j l d i
; : ; ~ ; - ; - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ) f(Jr c s ~ ~ l ; i i s ; i J ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ : l ~ i ~ ~ g ) ( J ~
litical and socd order
(sec, e.g.,
R o t b e r ~
200 i ;
Rothcrv
200+ Schncdcncr
--- --
- - - - -- -- -
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,Ji \''' ' '
U.
I
_ r < : . < . . l ( c l c ~ S t ~ ~ t e h c : : c c \ = {j i.Utl...\. bt) 1 \A. s - - f . t : ~ . . . ~ - t J.S l i ~
.
. 'Ovnvicw t o
ex:.err vv,o,.,o\ l.ol - 1
GU t \Th
;J
:
if
the modern , developed , and sovereign nati oll
SLlte turns om ro be a hi sto rical excep ti on in the context
of
this diversity'
of
:trC.lS
of limited sr;He
hood
? b-en in
Europe
, rhc
birthpla
ce or mo dern state-
12om, nation-states were o1Jy able to ful f)l establish the monopol y over
the
nor
c { W C'-(j \
but
1
o
l'c j
.
..
I
JJ SC
of
force in the nineteenth century
(Reinhard
2007)._And the gloh:lli,,ation , , r.
C'-
'-c r c ? I
ll cc rr.t
1
-
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Cc._l\, ~ ' d
fr
;vl t
en
. (:.,..,
\:i
o11
C;1
ll l
t E i i iJl
X lntrodll c
ti
on
J H.t
Overview
of sovere i
gn
statehood
as
the dominant featu re of.tl1e contemporary interna
t i o ; ~ ~ ; ; : ; i ~ ~ ~ ] ) ; - r o o k -
pl-a-ce_i
_
tl
1_c_I_9-:6-o-s,-a-s_
_l
_
s:-::ur.l,..,o,..,t""d,-e""
cotoillza:tlo i --
- y;: - I d
today,
;;,-a
n imer;1ational community
of
tates,
is
largely based
on
the
fiction that it is populated
by uUy
consolidated state
s.
Internat_onal
- - -
embodies
th
e idea of sovereign nation-state
s,
which the international com-
1 1 1 ~ ; ; ; ~ ; ; ~ ; ~ f ~ ~ c ~ i o n i n g s ~ a ~ ~ s t i ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ f f e c t i v ~ ~ u c l ~ ; J
(-
Jver
rhC rtcmt0;: es
ec
c h ~ i ; P C L ; d ~ v i g ~ ~ d R t ; d o l
The
~ n a J j , r o h i b on intcr\'cning
iu
the
interna
l affairs of sovcrc1gn
st:ltcs assumeS' hat
rh
c;e sta t
es
~ a v e tl1e full ~ p a c i t y to conduct l 1 ~ r
own
do
-:.
mc;;tic a f f a ~ Ironically, many developin g countries where limited statehood
~ ~ ~ i t
p a r t ~ daily
ex
per ience of he citizens firmly
in
sist on their full
rights as
sove
reign states and arc
ad
amantly opposed to any intervention in
tTicD-T;;tt;:
nal
affairs. Moreover,
~ ? 2 : < : t h _ : J _ c _ g _ ' : 0 ~ ~ < : : '
5 ~ f ~ r ~ ~ J 5 L
~
have
increasingly embedded stat
es
in a net ofkg ll ann
llows
cl osely t he
under
standi ng of governance that
is
widesp
re
ad within the social
sc
iences
(e.g., Mayntz
2004-,
20o8; Kohler
-K
och 998; Benz 200
4-a;
Sclmppert 20
0 5;
Schupp ert and Zi.irn 2008). Gove rn ance consists of both structu ral (" in st: i
tlltiona
li
ze
cl
")
an
d process dim ensions ("modes
of
social coo rdina
ti
on").
Accordingl
y,
governance covers steering by the state ("governance
_l1y g l , _
n r r
G ovPj
.
(\
1 Y ' ~
n
r
0
-
-
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I ( 1
l l
\
I
~ 1 t
I
ll
i
\
1
\ . .
'
ll n
,J
JlcJl7, 2oo+a; Czcmpicl and Rosenau
1992;
Cr,tndc and Pauly 2005; Z L'trn
Covcrn;liKC is supposed to provide colkcrivcly binding rules
as
well
as collective goods.
5
The
modern (VVestcrn) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance struc
wrc. First,
it
provides a strucrure of
rul
e
and
authority, a system
of
political
and social institutions
ro
generate and to irnplcmelll' aurhoril'ative political
decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the general ly ac
cepted norms of these institutions for atlthorirativc rule making. Second, the
We
ste
rn
nation-state h
as
the
task
to protect the internal
ami
c.xr
c
rml
scetl
rity of its c i t i ~ e c n s . The monopoly over the means or violence is suppose d to
d< ; just
th
~ l ; ; ; t i ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ 1 ;;;x;. .
['his chang;cs profoundly under c < : : 1 9 _ ~ t ~ 1 2 ~ Y J ' J i l _ l ] . i t ~ d .. t i l l c . Gov
crn;Wcm:if
cas-of r r ; - ; ; - ; i . c ~ r ~ r ~ r ~ T requires providing these very gover- "
'
.. .v \
n,m cc
~ C I ' I ' I C C S
3 ~ 1 s e n c c of a
f u l l y
f i . ~ t : t e ' s ~ x e : - ~ t : g lc,JSt .1 St .
1
n _ 1 2 : _
~ r a r c : Wit h the ab1ltry to enforce and unplcment dcctstons. d
This impli
es
that we will have to look for lilt tCti f
1\;j;t(i'\-governancc w ok place through colonial rulers ("states'' ), transnational
''public-private" _ < : _ ~ _ ~ ~ 1 i e s (e.g., the Hudson Bay Coni'pany in N.
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12 ln rrodunion ; d Ovcrvin v
(3uvcrnance also includes bargaining processes and ho
ri zo nt
al negotiation
as
we ll as nonmanipul ative communication, persuasion, and l
ea
rning. The ht
ter modes
of
gove
rn
an
ce
ai m
at ch
a
JJ
cng
in
g fixed interests and preferen ces so
. : ~ t ~ t o r arc induced 11 a soc 1ahzauon proce
ss to
mtc
rnali
ze
new rules
:111d
0
'p
(.
v
1 J i l
; - ; ;
s ~ 1 os t p ~ t h C S c c o n d p a ~ t o i ' i h i s book' Xj)lore' ti
;? '
barg.ai
,Jn
g -
;;t' . - -
f( e
0
1
.;;-esscs between Str . up in nriv:ll-c co
ff
e rs. At rhc same time, d1c militan t fslami st organization of
\... ..) J
L
Hanus prov
id
ed crucial gnvern
;l
nce services in the soc
ial
, education, :md
public health sectors vf the p,llc.st
ini
;m territo ri es. So, who go\'lTIJ
ed
P
alc
<
ti
nc at
rh
c.
tim
e? lf
wc usc the previously stared guvern;mce definition, 1
-Llm:l
s
is J
an us
-faced :
On th
e one hand, it is a.governance
Jct:o
r
pro
viding public
servic
es
in Palestine. O n th e od1cr h:md :
md
almost
ar
the same time, it is a
terrorist"
or
ga
ni
z.
arion that undermines govc
rn
a.
n
cl'
in
the scc
urit"
y realm. The
me h
eld tn1
c for the l\ilcst
ini
an Authority under Ar
af:
ll:
ft
s securit y agencies
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I
I I
J 1 ntroduc tion and \ c rvi
c\
words , they transfo rm
pub li
c goo r pri vate go od
s. ln
a
different way, emergence
of
's
h;1d
ow states" .
< ro
be consi
dered
here
too (Koehler J.n
'
urCJcr
2
00
4-; J
cr 2007)
.
On the on e h
aJ1d,
formal
- State in
stitutions have ceased to exis t or
to p r o v i d ; g o v c ; ; K ~ ~ ~ ; . ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~
i l i n g
m d f a i l ~ d
starei.-
Ot; o t i ~ ~ ~
E ; ; 1 ~ i _ ,
c - " ;
. ~ - ;
g o v c ~
; ; ; ~ ~ i ; " l 0 { L U C i ~ n
l - ; ; ; g ~ _ i ~ ; ~ ; g _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d " E : ~
I i t i c
~ _ t : ~ e r as
well
as
co
ll
ective goods ,
r e b y
p r c v c n ~ 0
the c c 2 ~ ~ . : : Y
or_
the
r e g i ~ l _ _ J : _ o ~
~ O _ _ t _ ~ ~ ~
L _ : _ ~ ~
' : s ~
imo anarch
y.
In som e cases, such as the
So
ut h
ern
Caucasus, shadow states
over extended periods of time.
These examples challenge the way in
wh
ich
the
concepts
of "state" and
"pu blic"
as
we
ll
as "non state"
and
"p ri vate" arc mo s
tl
y used
interchangeab
ly
111 the social sciences based o n
the
hi sto rical experience
of
'vVestern
moder
nity They also show the implicit
normative connot
ations
of
the dis
tinction
(sec L a d ~ g ; ; - r _ c ; c ; ? ; ~ - ; - ; - ~ h a p t
by
I ~ a c h ; , g ~ ~ ; - ; : { ~ J ; ; j ~ t ~ ~ e ).
We
l l y c l ( . P ~ c _ t s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c t o r s contribute to governan
ce,
~ ~ t b a t t l } c : r _
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ c public rather than the private interest. At least, they are su pp os
ed
to
justit
)r
their actions with regard ro the
commo
n
good
(sec
Zi.i
rn
2005).
Whil
c:
n u k c r
might be
~ c k ~ t a t e ~ _ ' : i : > l _ ? ~ ~
-a
_ n s o J j : c b t e
stale - nu l l l J t t ~
h w
t r a t
2 : _
su }posed to
dir
ect
Lbc
i
r...
toward gove rn ance
in
the c o
mm
on
intere
s
t.
And
if the
y abuse th eir
power,
we
can throw them
oul through democrati
c procedures or, in th e
wo
rst case,
rhrollgh th e judicial sys tem . L_im iled sta tehood, however, consists o r w : k
~ i ~ c - ~ ~ J l t i t u t i c > n
l
ac
king
tJl
c
; ; ~ t r ~ i 1 1 p m v c r f t ~ g
\s
a result, it becomes pr
ob
lematic
t:o
speak
of "public''
a
cror
s
fl r
snch
c.1scs or to
assume rhat state actors
promote the
public inrercsr. As
t:o
private
1
f i E ' < : ~ _ r _ > _ ~ ' C l i ~ ~
~ ~ L _ a
: : a t e C O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ j ) _ l ~ s u e their ; - ; ; ~ ; ~
11;-\o 'd' 1 ,, intcrrstLe
ve
n
if
their
i m : ~ ) _ ~ _ e s
p r ~ t c C . ' i _ j . R Q . d u . < , ; L _ j 2 Q . i ext
c:;
rnalities
f{n
c
~
,,
\:J
1
~ G \ ~ h e
m m u n i t y
{jobs, wclLHe,_\J.).
B ~ t
we
L 1 _
1 2 C
_r
[pt
aC _Q
t
:s
J . e ~ ' l ' c 0 '
w
H llll the
mnf'ines
of
the l.
1w-.md
1f
n
ot, ti
E
__
~
rake
c1 1e
...,.,
& .:,::. of
h e
m.
lS , -
.l,S
ll
lllj'
ti
on:
rh.11
conK wi th rhc " public-j
1r
iva1c" distinction arc
~ t > . , ; . .
e.
)
t "
~ - : , ' 0 ' - ' -
f
>
r gr;mtcd. The conccptu;JI prob lem ca nnot
be
solved easily-fix exa
mple,
. . : -'i-'\. < _ ~ 1 1 . :
could speak of "hybrid" regimes
gr
t o r n ~ < ; _
o f _ g c r n < ~ : : ~ ~ ~ d e r _ : l
V -
the distinction between the
public
;md private r
ea
lms
or
between s
tate
Q ' ' :>-. '
J>
:1
I J ) J I . I . I
:V \
~
\ . l s t ; l l c
actors (e.g., JC ll e e ta .
2002 .
sue
1
a
~ ~ 2 . ) S
IC e-
,o
,
__. / :
l
~ J ) S
' : : _ C r o b
l c m
to discern who provides g o v ~
r n a n
se rvices and w ho docs
-
/ ' -
G ~ w c r n ~ c
in Areas
of
Limit ed Statehood
15
1 . "
al
em
pi rica
Y.
w
10
se rves
as
a
gove
rn ance
a c t o r t ~ ~ ~ Q I : J : 2 _ < po
st-
~ ~ ~ ' : _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
wo
rds,
one wo
uld search
for functional equivalents
ot
public"
act:q_rs
(Draude 2007 , 2008) .
]
1
1tcntion.ality
nd
Normatil ity
of
Governance
These cons
id
er
at
ion s lead
to
a
second problem
w ith re
gar
d to
th
e
app li
cabi
l
ity
of the gove
rnance
co
n
cept
to
areas o
flimit
ed
statehood
.
The govc
rn ::mce
con
cept
as de
li
ned earlier is gea red
toward producing
a
nd implem
e
ntin
g
co l
lec ti vely binding ruJcs and pr ovid ing co llective
goo
ds. In other wo rds,
gover
nance implies
e n t i o n
actio n
toward providing
public se rvices fo r a g i
ve
n
co
mmunit
y
(Mayntz
2004-,
67 ) . Thi
s
docs
not
mean that governance
actors
have
ro
be necessarily
motivated
toward
the public interest
, even though
mo
tivation
s
toward
the common
im
ere
st
do
not hurt.
Poli
cy
-makers, fo r
example, can still
be
egoistic
power-maxim
izers. Yet, in a
conso lidated
state,
they are usually
embedded
in
governance
st ru ct
ures that
institutionalize
the
intent
iona
li
ty
of governance toward providing
services for th e c
ommunily.
6
The inher
ent
intention
a
li
ty
of gove rnan
ce b
eco me
s
problematic
when ap
plied to arcJs
of limited
state h
oo
d . Fir
st,
as
not
ed earlier,
we
can no lo n
ge
r
a
ss um
e
that
gove
rnance institutions
s
11
ch as
the
state
or
its
"s
h
adow of hi
erar
chy'' emb ody
intent
ions
toward
pro viding collective
goods. Second
,
we
need
to c isting
ui
sh b c n v e e t
- l ? E : ? ~ ~ ~ ~ : _ ~ f : . ~ c : ? . l 2 . c _ c _ : ~ . _ e _ 0 ~ - ~ - g _ C ? _ < _ ? ~ l s : ~ i _ : : ~ ~
~ _ l : ' : i ~ ? . . ~ ~ ~ : ~ C . : . 9
.
?J:
_
' t i ' : i ~ i ?.
t:
th
c one
ha
nd,
and
the
exp li
cit reg
ulation of
social i
ss
ues am
\
intentional
~ ; f c ; >
5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ _ ; :
~ ~ L ~
; ~ ~ - ; ;
; ~ i ~
~ ; ; ; ; ; ~ i i ; i g ; ~ : ~
r c i l ; ; J ; f as
g(>\'CI :_
n
anceif we st
ick
to th
e
e a r l < : P t ~ o n .
1 " ;
i : ; ~ 1
the
~ t ~ ~
i t h
an O
il compa
nies such as
Bl'
in A n
go
la
routinel
y usc private security Jirms
to pr
o tect their
indu
st
ri
al produc
ti
on i l i t i c
in
areas
of limit
ed st
ate
h
oo
d .
This transform
s sec
urit
y
int
o a
p
ri
vate good .
Protectin
g such f
:K
ilities mig ht b
:JV
c positive extcrn : litics t
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6
1n
trodu cr io n and Overvi
ew
ln other cases, we arc faced wid1 a c
ontinuum
r;mg in g fio m gover nance
in the sense defi ned here to racketeering : The wari(Jrd who uses
hi
s
mili
tias
to
provide public security the ~ r c a ?f his rule G_: n r eg _
l i c ~ C : : . < : i L i l l f l ;I_cl u b
or
private goo
d.
- ~ ~ -
~ ~ ~ -
~ ~ d
be k c : : : c ~ : :
(Ch
ojnacki
and
7
00 7
; Schuppcrt 2007, 479 ; sec the a 1apt
cr
by Chojnacki and Br,m
ov
ic in this
vo
lume
).
Thus, J
P l?
lyjng g ~ ~ : < : I : ' ~ ~ c _ c : __ ~ _ ' : 2 ~ ~ _ p _
~ 9 . . e a ~ _ o
l i n 1 i state
ho
od
hig
hl
ights its implicit nornl J ti vit)' 1 we de
fi ne governance -a s is comm on in tJ1c soc ial s
ci
ences - as
tJ1c
making and
implementing of co
ll
ectively binding rules aJll'l the provision
of
collective
go ods,
we
cannot re
fr
ain
fr
om aclmow lcdging tha t go
ve
rnance is linked n or
~ n r i v c l toward what is supposed to be in the co
mmon
interest.
But
w ho a rc
those in areas of limited state
hood
in wh ose nam e the co
mmon
interest is
be
in
g What is th e rcle
va
llt co
mmuni
ty
or
collectivity fo r wh om
go vernance is provided ? Once issues : : ~ ~ ? E . ~ < : .
ideal typical modern s_ate }l2
mo
st cases, governance is provided fo r
th e people or the cidz,cns living in a g iven te rritory. \Vhile som e services a rc
only acc
essi ble to
the citizens rather
tJ1an
the reside
nt
s, even
no n
citizen r
es
i
dents enjoy
so me
basic rig
ht
s as well as access
to
at least som e public services.
All thi s b
eco
mes problemati c in areas of limited stateho od ..lnma l})' cases,
it rema
in
s uncle
ar
who arc
th
e
addr
essees of governance, wh o is e ntitled to
whi ch govern ance services, and who ac nta
Jl
y receives them in pract ice. \Ve
cannot simply a
ss
ume that the co
ll
ectivity fo r w
hi
ch governance is
pro
vid ed
is c
learl
y defin
ed
. Take border regions in sub
-S
aharan AJi-ica, fo r cxa1nplc,
dl at ar
c b
ey
ond the control of ce
nt r
al
governm
ents. Arc
tJ
10sc enti tled
to
r
ece
iving go
vern
ance t he people living o n a given territory? Or me
mb
ers of
parricular t
ribal
or ethnic communi t i
es? And who
decid es w ho is CIJtirlcd
to
wh;Jt,
u l a r l
in cases of extr emely scarce resources( Is ir govern ance iC
coll
cc l'ivc
goods become club goods in the sense tl1at only p articular ethnic,
re
li
gious, or
gc
ndcrcd communiti es arc entitled to n:ccivc them >Th e latter
co
nstit'LIITS pr
ac
t
ice
in man y : - ~ r c of limited statehoo d , bo th hi s
tmically and in
th
e contempo rary internati onal system.
T
hu
s, ~ . ' _ l _ . c ~ -
~ ) - ~ ~ ~ ~ :
~ c t t requires taking a
: _ I _ ~ ~ ; J ~ I r a i n i 2 2 _
1 ; 2 j r l i l l g ' ' ~ ~ p _ t u a l
so
-
Gover
nance
in
reas of Limited Stateh
ood 7
lu
tions. 01: _J_
c
_o
nch
a;K , if < ~ K e _s r b l ~
__
::i t1
_
c : : n g
~ oricmati o n tc?:vard the co
mmon
goo d or
the
public n t c i we
,;,ill -not-
fi
;1d much governance in areas of limited stateh
oo
d by definition
(on .t11 is po in t, sec Schu ppcrt 2007 ) . travel
very far outsid e rhc developed OEC D world . On th e o ther hand , if we strip
~ - ~ ( ) ) ; c q ) t
f
govc rn ,1i1cc'o f:{l r t ; J co
nnotati
o ns, ~ ; ; ; : y r h i - ; ; -
of
co
ll
ec
ti ve
goods b
as
IH
J
nmti
ve
we
ig
ht
equal to thcp rovision of pu b lic
goo
ds.
--I so mething in ' : _ C _: way ou t :
w ~ t : _
~ c r govc:r -
_ a ~ ~ ' O t h a \ ? I ~ c s s Y i ~ - ; ~ ~ ~ i t
~ ~ ~ n
& v _ c J )
~ l ~ ~ c g c l o : c : ~ ~ fo rmulat
ed
,_J1e _n)o re _CJ7J.anre and the as
ha
dow rf' ff
eut J
fvt
Cc
:, . : I : I
\
third problem with regard to the application o f the govcman cc concept
.---
to areas of limit ed statehood co ncerns what has been called the shad
ow
of
hie rarchy
(S
charpf 19Y3) - Research
on
modes o f govc
ma n
ce in
d1
e
OE C
D
world ;l l l d on the
tr
ansfo rmation
of
(modern ) statehood h
as
demo n
st
rated
7
:::
l r
~ ; ; r; ,
[o . Uue
r
-
S t ,t
1 }1r;o-:.J
. .tt
n
f
,. / ; ) 11 .;
(.
.
.
- / ' :
" } / ~
(;
f (
J f
v
J , - . __ :'
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
10/64
rl
]
X I
n roduct ion < d
Overview
u
i/
'\' .
0 ,\..
\
) ,y 0- ''
~ \ J . j . \ , ~
r > ' - ~
i .
l }
rhat public-private cooperation (such as PPPs) and private sclfrcgulation arc
usuall y
Jl1-rissu-C:l1--asi- f1c-Eu i:O
-pC:-U1-
Union. Moreover-and pa radoxi-
~ \: - ),
carrv=-
strong
stafcs- o '"stf n s i b ~ _ i l (C5R).
/ l
- -In u m , ."his overview suggests that there arc so me implicit biases in
the
govcrn:1ncc
concept
as it has been
developed
in the
cont
ext ofvVcsten1-b3scd
social sciences
and
modern statehood. However,
one
should not throw out
tl1c
baby
with the
bathwatcr. Th e gov
ernance
concept provides J usdi.d tool
to ana
lyze policies
and
politics in areas
of
limited
statehoo
d,
pr
ecisely be-
~ \ ) 1 ' 6 "
0 \ \
cause
it
directs
our attention to the
role
of
nons ate actors, on
the
one
hand
, ""
1
l ~ ( / \ . ;
and nonhierarcbical mo des of stee
ring,
on the o t h e r . ~ a result,
governance
cJ...LV
overcomes
d1c statc-ccnr
ri
c bias
implicit
in the
literatur
e on Llilcd and Jail -
\
\ St.ltc
butldm
g
Jll
ateJs ofltm Jtcd
statehood 1111ghr
be futile,
hut "govc
Jn.mcc-
ing stJt-cs as
we
ll as d1c modcrniz;uion bias of most develop ment studies.
b ~ . . , ~ ~
\ J A ~ ~
I ,
v\"
1
\
~ ~ '
" - ' ~ )
( ' ' ~ "
._,Jr> (\
/ '
\
\
shaping" ccn
::tinJy is not, :1s Bro;,us
argues
in his chapter.
\
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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2 0
troduction
; ~ n d
Overview
I now turn
to
the co ntriburions
in
this book
in
more detail to explore the
wlc of nonstat:c actors in the provision of governance, on the one hand, and
the con triburion of rhc international communi ty
to
governan
ce
in areas
of
lim
ir
ed statehood,
on
rhc other.
Who
Governs
in Areas of
Limited S
tateho
o
d?
Th e Role of Nomtatc
Act
ors
As arpucd ea
rli
er, areas of limi
ted
statehood arc not devoid
of
governance.
- - - -
-
... --
-- ... -....... - .. _ .. . -
R.at"h cr, nonhicrarchical mod
es of
social interaction and nonstate actors en-
gagccT
in - ; ; ; ~ ; ; ; ; ~ ~ ~ ~ d : rhc
p r e r ..
~ ; i s vo lume. t . i e m ~
t m e .
In stitutional sta
te
weakness implies that public-private partnerships
or
even
~ ~ ~ < > } ~ i t : U t o J : ; i ~ s
of
gpve
rn
ancc. arc becoming the rule rather than the
~ ~ ~ ~ i o n , if governance services ar
c.
supplied at aU. While public-1)rivate
.
---
----
-- ..
--- -- - --
-- "
. .
. . .....______
---
---- ---
l ; ~ ~ p s i n c r e : : : : _ ~ ~ l y _ 5 : ~ 1 ~ q j < . . in \1\Tes tern de-
v c i ~ E _ t ~ l ~ "hey h
av:_
to
t ~ L ~
t ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
k Q e S
_ : ' ~ ~ in areas o f limi ted
~ 1 _ ; 1 : ~ 2 ~ ~ L ' ~ < J f . ~ I
t c n i ~ < l J : y ,
in
p()licy sectors,
or
with regard to
1 ~ 0
J ? . ~ } < : . > n
l(> begin with, the chapter by Sebasti
an
Conrad
rzcl e_ al. argue -in -their c T ; a p t t ~ c ; ~ ~ - i : h c
; ; ; ~ T i t
under which com pani
es
engage in environmental self-regulatio n.
- '
Ili"C
.. ttbsequcnt four de;; , with v c r n role
of
nonstate
actors in areas of 1mi ted statehood fiom va rious empiric
al
perspective s. :.rhc _
ch,lp ler by Sven
Chojn-:1ck.i
and
?.cljkn
Bra no1 ic takes o n a particularly hard
cas: i t h ~ J i ~ ; ; c i i i ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ i ; ; ~ w ich t ; ~ ~ .1:1n her
han
ai \'al"iJ-ed good
em
he prm
id
n l n >cJl under the most adverse con-
~ i r i o n s of
g l f s _
f a i i
~ : - : ;
~ i ~ f
~ c 0 , _ Sta te ) I f , l l
; : s e
n d ~ ; m ~ d con flict
gi
ve.
ri se to areas where security is
pro
vid ed selectively by a va riety
of
state,
quasi -s tare or n s t ~ t e actors. Tn
order
to systematically ditferent iatc and an
alyze the provision of sec
urit
y
in
areas of limited t c h o o d
. ~ l c
aut hors trace
sev
er;
1
modes of security leadin g
to
va rying forms of security gove rn ance
(sec
urity as a public
goo
d, as a club good, and as a private commodity). he
chapter us
es
the anal
ogy of
the market
t"O
argue that the emergen
ce
of
i f ~
ent mod es ot sccunty results from strategJes o( collective actors on
ha:1-
ardo us
1 : i . i 1 c r s o f p r ~ l h e s c arc
J i ~ c
by areas whe re diHcrent public
a ~ v ; 1 r c
acto rs compete over t:erritnri:1l contro
l,
natural resources, and
rJ1e
r ~ ~ ; ; - e n t - o f members. The eme rgence
of u r i r
governance
d c p e n L l
cco
no
nJic a m f i
g r a p h i c opportunity
struct
u1 -cs
and on the expected utility
t:o
invest in prod uctive means instead or unproductive a rming and fighting.
The authors then di scuss the conditions und er whi ch even violcm nonstate
}, j
t t _
. ;
J
{ / I I / , (' < ,;
t r; l l (.
' :
/Vi
': l
. ; : .
;-
tYt
t
f vt
e
OJ
?
rchth or l
I
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
12/64
'
2 2 [ntroductioJ
md
Ov
erv
iew
actors such
as
warlords or rebel groups it
in
their
i 1 J t to
prov
jJ
e _
,
cc
urit y , . public good l
or
a g
iv
en population. Chojnacki and
B r a t ~ o ~ i c
cl
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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~ p
24 Introduction and OveiYicw
become governance actors in t11at t Cy arc s y s t c m a t i < : _ ~ j v eng:1gcd in m J : _ ~ ~ ~ k i ~
or
the provision
of
collective goods.
~ r n a n c c
without a s ate d c p ~ . . : ~ ' - ~ ~ . ~ 1 [ t i c ~ _ J : _ S c J p . c
conditions ;md on incmtivc s t n ~ : ; t ~ E ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~ l t : c i r J g n . o n s . t ~ t c a ~ t g r ~ such
IS
firms or
even warlm:ds
; ; ~ ; . j ; [ ~ - ; J ~ : ; ; ; [ l s . t o
c o n ~ t : i L : u . r s .. P. g o _ y c r n ~ n c s _ : . TI::sc scope concli
t i c ; ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~ ~ ~ E c ~ ~ ; i d ~ - ~ ~ ~ ; c r i o n ~ I : q : t v a l c n ~ ~ E ~ r ~ _ s t _ a E ~ ~ ' : ' 1 J a c ~ o ~ v _ c 2 L i l i ~ r a ; ~ h ) ~ '
~ i s
svstcmatically lacking or even missing in areas
of
limited statehood.
l Lrst b u r - ; i e ~ ~ t , the ci1alJters also dCJJlonstratc tEat
t l J c _ ~ t ~ t c _ ~ : ~ ~ s _ a : :
__
not absent in areas
of
limited statehood. The debate is not between either gover
nance b y c l ; ~ ; t a ~ c ~ - r c l ; ~ ~ o n ~ p l ~ t ~ p ; . i v a t i z a t i o n of governance services. Rat11er,
c _ : n l J ~ i r i c a l
C9_J1tributions
to
tl1is
volume show the various forms of interactions
, u 2 . c U : _ a r g ~ i n i n g rc;lationships between governments and nons ate actors. In some
cases (sec chapter
by
Endcrlcin ct al.), even hostile interactions can contribmc to
the provision
of
collective goods,
in
tl1is
case
macroeconomic stability.
Multilevel Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood:
'fhc Role ofExternal
Actors
Governance in areas of limited statehood regularly involves international
and transnational actors
in
providing basic services and supplying gover
nance. This includes foreign governments, inter national org anizatio ns (such
as the United Nations and its suborgani?,ations ), as well as transnational
nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations, NGOs, .or transnational
Pl'Ps.
The involvement of n t ~ ~ and ~ ~ ~ . i f l l i E . . i . L g m : f J l i l l l c ~ r _ e :
suits from necessity
given tlJC
state weakness in these
_ c o u t 2 2 j C : ~ . : . J D . m.Jny_
c a s l . ~ s : 1 ; - [ c ; : - ~ ; - d ; ; , ~ ; ; ~ a t i ~ ; ~ ; ; r ; ~ t c ; r ~ - d i t : e c t i ) , i ; J ~ ~ r f ~ r ~
with
the "Westphalian
sovereignty"
in
ar-eas of
limited statehood,
that
is, they authoritatively rule
in the absence of a consolidated state (sec chapters
by
Sclmeckcncr and Bro
z;us;
Krasner zoo+; Fearon and Laitin 2004-).
In other
words, shared sewer
rignty
is
an
p ~ i c a l ~ ~ ~ t z _ 2 . _ ~ ~ ~ . L ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ tha_t_Jack t _ h c _ ~ b i i ~ t y to sofqrce
central decisions.
However , shared sovercignty::-th;_
d i v i ~ i _ o n
~ I ~ ~ - d_istributi
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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:
,
26 Imrnducrion
and
Overview
analyzes various state-building strategies, such as "liberalization first,'' se-
curity first," " institutionalization first,'' and "civil society first."
Each of
these
strategies inevitably produces unintended consequences. Liberalization
fir
st" often underestimates the destabilizing effects of rapid democ ratization
and market liberalization. In contrast, "security first" risks
strengthening
rhc statlls quo, including the stabilization of authoritarian rule. While an
emphasis on institution building tends
to
empower those
elites
who
profit
from the status
quo
, focusing on civil society leads to the opposite pitfalls
by underminin g local social structures. Schneckencr then argues that
what
all these strategies have in common
is
to overlook the multilevel
governance
character of external efforts at state building. As a result, incompatibilities
berwecn the goals and time-hori zons of external actors, on
the
one
hand
,
and
local communities,
on
the other hand , arc inevitJblc.
Schncckencr
concludes
that cl
1
c
key
issue for
extend
acto
rs
is
not
how
to
avoid counterprod uctive
eflccts and unintended consequences of their interference
in
the
domestic
sovcreignry of states,
but
how to cope
wicl1
them. First and
foremost,
they
have to underst;U1d that th ey arc not external to local developments, but part
of the process and its dynamics. Since external efforts
at
stabilizing
postcon
Hict si1:1.1at:ions result in multilevel governance structures, the imernationals
have to
rCJli
zc roo that they arc bound
up
with the political, social, eco
nomic, and culrural developments
on
the
ground.
Exit strategies'" amount
in c l f ~ b e t r a y a l . Rather, external actors have to
und
erstand
that
interventions
in the governance arrangements of areas of limited statehood change both
those being interfered with
nn
the intervenors.
ln
other wo;ds, g o v c r n a n c ~
travels back.
The concluding chapter by Lars
Brows
takes
up the
se cha
ll
enges in d
discusses the co n
se
quences of the book's findin gs for
international
fo l ign
and security policy. Current inrernatjonal foreign and security policY, 0,fl2atcs
picture areas oflimited statehood
as
presenting security
challeng
es t(f t
he
so
ca lled developed world. ~ < J S o f the scc iJ.Iri m disc [lssc.d refer to ch
1
llcnges
1
n
11
1 in g Jiom intn nJtional d
cs
tJbili
za
ti on because of conflicts spi lling-mcr
fi nm arc;Is ufl imircd statehood. Terrorism, organiz.cd crimc ,_
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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~ r
:''
2 Introduction and Overview
that also involves nonstate actors in a systema6c fashion (sec the ch apters in
l
:
the second
part of
this volume), we may actually witness
the emergence
of
new political and social orders in areas of imited statehood.
Conclusions
This
book ,
1
rgues that the social science debate on governance implicitly or
l
. - 1 .
11131
115
,,,cdded
to
an ideal
t ]1e of modern statehood-with
full
cxp Clt)'
IC , , ,
I
-, . ,,e
1
eignt" and t11c canaCJt)' to make, tmplcment,
and
enforce
deo-
c omcstK so 1 ' '
-
r
. a glol1tl as well as a historie
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
16/64
lntroductton
,1nd verview
NOTES
I.
I
iJJJnk
Tmja Biirzd 1 nd two .monymous
ITIicwcrs f(Jr very
useful cornrnCIJtS
011
the draft. I also thank Lars Brozus, Ankc Draude, and Ursula Lehmkuhl for numerous
discussions on the topic
of
this chapter.
2
. This section builds upon Risse 2005; Risse 2008; Risse and Lehmkuhl
wu7.
3
. Weber's notion of legitimacy witlt regard to the control
o1u
the means of vio
iciKe
should not be
con i.Ised
with an empirically derived notion of rmmJrr-lif"jJicrm inlwmplr.wn R t ~ f C J y . r t c n r m . \Viesbadcn:
\'S
\'crl.t).'.
fiir
Sozi
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
17/64
ntro u
ction
lJJd
verv iew
lJramlc , Ank
e.
2007. "Wc.r regicrt wi
e>
h ir
ci
ne aquivalcn
zf
unktio nali st iscbe Bcubdch
tung von Governance in
Raumcn
bcgn:nz tcr S taa tlic
hk
eit." SFB
700
Governance
in Raumen bcgrcnztcr S taatlichkeit, fU Berlin, SFB Governance Working l'apc r
Series, Berlin.
--- . zooS. "Wcr rcgicrr wie? Eurozenr rismu s in dcr Govc rn
anc
d orschu ng
und
der
Vcrsuch cincr merhodischcn Grcnziibcr
sc
hre
inm
g." l 71-amdi.rzipliniirc Govcr-
11nllrr
rmdi111(_11- Gcmcimmn hi11tcr den
Stant
blidlc71, edited by SybiUc De La H.
os
a
;
md
Matthias Kiirt e
r,
IOO-
JJ8
.
Baden-Baden: N
om o
s.
Erdmann,
Gcro. woz. "Neopatrimonialc
Herr
schafi- - oder: VVarum es
in
J\fri]q
so v
icl
c H ybrid rcgim c gibt." In
Hyi11
dc
Rq}ime.
%m Konzcptirm und
b upin'c dc
molimti.rc/;rr (
;muz.o71C11,
edited by Petra Bcndc:l, Aurcl Croissant, :lJld l ~ r i c d h c r t W.
Riih, 323-4
2.
Opladcn: Leske l\uclrich.
Frdmann, Gcro, and Ulf Engel. 2007. "Neoparrimoniali sm Reconsidered: C ri tical
Revi
ew
and Elaboration of
;m
Elusive
Co
nccpr."
Commrm
wcnlth n.nd
CompamtiPc
l'
o it.irJ +5
,
no. 1
:95
- 119.
Fe;lron, j ames
D
., and David D. Laitin.
2004
.
"Ncotr
ustccship
an
d
th
e
PrubknJ
of
Weak States:' lntcmatio/1(11
Scrurity
28, no. 4:5- 43.
Fuhr
, l Ia raid , M
;l
rkus Lederer, and l'diri am Sc
hr
oder.
2007
. "Klimascbutz lUJd Ent
wicklungspolirik: Dcr Bei trag privatcr
Unrernehmen." In
RC ficrC/1 ohm
Staat?
GoP
cnuma in
ltdmm11
brgmzztcr Stnat icMrit,
edited by Thomas Risse an d U rsula
l.chmknhl , 292 - 308. Bad en-Baden: Nllmos.
(; bhlcr, Gcrh:ml, Ulrikc 1-loppncr,
;md
Sy bille De La
Ro
sa, cds.
20 0
9.
W
cic
he
Stm r-
111 1/ St11dim wr Stmr:rii1(1J dunh dislmrsiPe Pmlitilim, A
1Zf
111C11fc tmd
SJmbole.
Badcn B;lclcn: Nomos.
c:oldstc in , ju di th L.
,
Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane, and An n e-M ari e SI.HJgh tc r,
cds. woo. "Legalization and World
l'
ol iri cs}' Spccia.l is sue of 11t.crnn.tion nl
0
1;[]'1
11i:.otio11.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. '
Grande, Edgar, and Louis W. Pauly, eds. 2005 . Complr.x S o P c r c ~ 1 1 t )
Rc
cumtitutiii J
l'olitiwl ilutbority
in tbe ' 1 P m t y f i r < t Cm/.111)' Toromo: Toro
nto
U ni vers
it
y Pre ss .
I all , Rodney
Bru
ce, and
Th
om1 s ). llicrslckcr, eds. 2002. '}he /ime1JJC1 1CC of' i Timtc
A11thority iu
Global GoJmwucc.
Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi ty l'rcss.
H criticr, J\dricnnc, ed.
. Common
Goods: R cinFC1Ifi11JJ l it1BJ W1/.
nndlillcn111tional
(;
o1'1'171n1lrc. Lanham ,
Md.:
Rowm an l .ittl
dicld.
- . wo ; . "New lv odcs of Governance in Europe:
Incr
easing Political C1pacity and
l'nlicy Effectiveness>" In 7/Jc Stille
of'tbe European
Union, vol.
o,
Lmr>, l'olitic.tion of
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
36/64
) 2 c;ovcrning Areas
o
Li nitcd Statehood
specific protection measures arc thus not only closely interconnected,
but t
also constitute the core clements for the identification of areas of strategic (
security or insecurity. .
.;
However, territorial control
and the
ability to reduce external threats
do
not in and of hemselves constitu te indicators for
the
quality of security, since
r
that
control of the use of force can also be used for indiscrim inate violence .
'
and the systematic massacre of
the
population in
the
territory. As long
as
. {
rebels
or
local militias provide security
only
sporadically
and
in a territorially
undefined context, security remains a rival commodity that can be excluded
fiom consLmlption Brauer T999, 6-7). Stated differently: by the strategic
maintenance of insecurity and the simultaneou s existence of various forms
of
security witl1in an area, not only is tl1c effectiveness and stability of the
security system called into question, but security also docs not attain tbe
quality of a public good. Nevertheless, there arc ways out
of
insecurity
and
tl1e protection screw (Mchlum, Mocnc, and clorvik zooz, 448), which per-
mit security as a good to once again move more markedly fi-om the private
toward the public realm on a quality axis.
Idc;11ly, in war-torn areas of imited statehood, tlvo basic l(mns of security
without or beside the state can be ascertained: (1) security by coercion and
a certain degree of institutionalization and reliability; and (z) self-organized
l(mns of protection against internal or external threats (self-protective secu
rity). A third conceivable alternative form of sccurit)' production
is
tl1c del
egation
of
protection functions
to
commercial supplicrs
6
AU
three variants
arc brought together systematically in table 4.1.
I
fwc
dcf1nc security govern ance as
the
intentional provision
of the
collec
tive good security for a defined
group of
protection recipients, the first type
is best c1ualified to be conside red security g overnan ce in
the narrower
sense.
This involves tl1c specific strateg ies of militarily potent actors who invest
in
the establishment
of
monopolies on the usc
of
J(xce, and advance processes
of
governance
formation-that
is, the establishment of institutionalized po
litical and economic
systems
of rule. First of all, dominant
and
sanction ap
proved ar med actor s usc tl1cir abilities to control territory and social relations
(i.e., the civilian population)
to
build up internal and external protection
systems; second, they no longer finance themselves by means of organized
looting,
but
rather through institutionalized taxation systems Prototypes arc
rebel groups
as
the Fuerzas armadas rcvolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
or the Sudan People's Liberation
Army
(SPLA) in southern Sudan. But even
local warlord bctions in Afghanistan
or
in Somalia have invested in the build
TAJJLE 4.1 Forms
;md Qualities of Security
.--
orm
T)j C
r
.
Protection provider:
monopolist
.
Mechanism:
institutionalized system
Coercive
security
of
taxation and order
.
Cmgc: territorial control
.
vieans: military
protection
of
the
external borders, internal
control (e.g., police
functions)
.
Protection provider:
recruitment among
own people
.
Mechanism: reactive to
violent context, pooling
Self-protective
of resources
security
.
Range: territorially
limited
t
a defined
group (i.e., selective and
exclud,1blc)
.
vicans: patrols,
fortification systems,
hiring of local militias
.
Protection provider:
commercial security
com pames
Comnlcrciali,Kd
.
Mechanism: competition
security and prices, delegation by
state and private groups
.
Range: persons, property
.
vicans: diverse range of
services
Qual f)
Securit-y equals public
good (no selectivit-y
within tbc territory)
Security equals pool
and club commodity
(group mcm bcrs
clearly identifiable)
Security
c q u ~ l s
private commodity
(however, there
is an
implementation of
security governance)
t
I
I
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7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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'1-J
l;ovnuing
Areas
of Limited Statehood
up
of political and social regulatory structures, which
produce both
a cer
tain degree of
mutual
ex1xctations
and
colleccively
binding
decisions
[
01
.
L. .__ a
defined group. Thus, the assumption of go\'ernancc formation applies to
difkrcnt
degrees of institutionalization
and
to a large number of forms of
nonstate armed organizations.
In
successful cases, security in such situations
increasingly takes the form
of
a public
good.
If security is ranked in a hierarchy
of
public goods
as
the central
pre
condition fclr a
funnioning
political order (
cr
Rorberg
2.003; Komad and
Sk:1pcrdas
2005),
which is necessary t
obtain
positive beneficial cHeers in
other realms, it foUows that the rudimentary instirutionalization can be
re
stricted to the establishment
of
a system of
protection and
taxation. This
implies, first, formal and informal institutions that organize rhc monetary
transaction between the provider and the recipients of protection, and also
an organi?>ationaJ
framework that
guarantees territorial integrity toward
1hird parties.
From
a ncoinsrinltional perspective, this process gives rise to
security expectations,
both on t.hc part
of
the
civi i;m
population and
of the
dominant
armed actors.
The
civilian
population
can assume,
on
the bases of
information
as
to
the military capacities
of
the protection
provider, a certain
degree of effectiveness, t'lut is,
the protectjon provider
in
L1Ct
appears
as
are
liable security monopolist in the eyes of
t:hc
population (cf VVcinstein
20o6,
J )9-70 ). Moreover, it is assumed that the productivity of the civilian popula
tion will increase because of
the
perceived territorial security, since more time
and resources can be invested in production than in sclf-protcctiva means. In
turn, the armed organization achieves reliability regarding a regular income
that it ohuins through the institutionaJizcd taxation system. Thus armed
gwups secure
not
only their own organizational structures, but als
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r
i
) , (]ovcrning Areas
of
Limited Statehood
f om looting),
or
international organizations (e.g., protection of persons or
buildings, mine-clearing). The activities
of
commercial security companies
1rc
clearly defined f1.mctionally (protection
of
an oil field
or of
govern
111
e
tal buildings) a nd direct ed toward a narrowly defined group of beneficiaries .
(members of a company or the public employees of a transitional adnunis
tration). Certainly, the delimitation toward the public-security structures is
often fuzzy. For example, c o m m e r ~ ~ a _ _ s ~ . ~ t y . j t y _cqmpanies engaged to pro
tect buildings may certainly
produce
positive externalities for t he immediate
n c i g l 1 b Z 1 : h ~ ~ d
~ 1 ; d
e x t e 1 ~ d
the
range of
the
protection services they provide .
The protection
of
administrative: _facilities
and
the
constmction of
security
structmcs in l r ~ ~ K I Afghanis:_;ation, or ifmilitaryclul
lcngers endanger a weakly ins tituti onalized system
of
rule. But even
if these
panial orders of violence arc llequently unstable, it should be clear that
the
minimum prerequisite for the classification
as
governance consists primarily
in the quality of security as a collective good as well as the implications of
consumption and territoriality.
New Modes of Security 97
"Jb
explain why and under which conditions violent actors engage in se
curity
governance, in the next section we
mal;;_c
usc
of
the concept
o
security
markets by assuming that the market structures and economic logics in the
security domain encompass the terms under which violent actors shape their
preferences, select strategies tor action, and make decisions.
Security Mar kets
Security, and in the narrower sense, protection, arc not ordinary market com
modities and diller in many ways fl:om
other
consumer goods.
8
As Skaper
das
(2oOJ)
and Skapcrdas and Konrad
(wo+)
have plausibly demonstrated,
the
competition in the provision of protection differs from classic economic
concepts regarding the bctors of
production,
pricing mechanisms, and the
resulting quality of the
market
product. Private protection providers do nor
compete via price mechanisms; rather, tJ1cy usc violent means to gain con
trol
of
territory
and
revenues resulting ilom protection services. Moreover,
it
is necessary to take into account
that
ownership of goods and services
is
not exchanged voluntarily, but is rather acqu ired by force (Eiwert 1999, 87).
Unlike
ordinary commodity markets, greater competition in the protection
providers' segment thercfixe docs not lead to more but rather less gain in
benefits Cor all (Skapcrdas 200 J 174-). At
the
same time, competition bct\vecn
nonstate armed actors witJ1 no regulating central autl1ority means that secu
rity dilemmas and arms races arise that favor an increase in violence. \Vithom
any cifective protecti on of heir lives or property rights, large segments
or
the
population arc prevented l om engaging in economically productive activi
ties and arc Jot-ccd
to
invest in their own protection instead (Bates, Greif, and
Singh
2002
613). This necessity to invest in the means of violence reduces
economic productivity and cilicicncy (Skaperdas,
2001
187).
9
Under
condi
tions of overt violence, resources eomnot be clfcctivcly distributed. Survival
in areas
of
limited
statehood
and the possibilities of profiting from the pro
vision of protection services thus depend on one's relative ability to exercise
violent control of resources and social relations. Violence therefore becomes
a necessary--albeit
not
a su licicnt--condition for the ability
to p a r t i c i p ~ 1 t c
as a competitive actor in the security market. In this context, the growth or
sclf-dclcuse groups in Afghanistan
that
protect t hcmselvcs against attacks
y
the J : 1 l i b ~ 1 1 1 or by unils of the Northern Alliance has to be considcn:d just JS
-
7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
39/64
y (;ovcrning t\rcas o( Limned Statchoud
much as that
of
security-market participants and well-organized
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ill
i 11
1 Governing Arras
ofLimired Statehood
strategies of indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2oo6; Weinstein 2006 ; Olsen
2007; Wood 2008) and promot e diffuse insecurity. Both empirical evidence
and
formal models have provided evidence that arbitrary violence and
de
struction of property arc more probable in zones
of
strategic insecurity
be
cause
of an asymmetric distribution of information and multiple materia]
insecurities (Skaperdas 2001, r88; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006 . However
the
ability to cause either security or insecurity ( or b oth) becomes a political
and economic
resource, and hence
an
alternative source
of
power. As a result
the price for protection services increases with the military capabilities of
potent armed actors (Mehlum,
Mocne, and
T01vik 2002). Theoretically, the
production
of
(in- )security is thus immediately tied
to
the logic of violence
and
resource extraction.
o
sum up, in the context of an increasing tendenc y toward fragmentation
of d1c actors' spectrum, as well as the associated implicat ions for th e forms of
security, d1C concept of the security market describes the structure and com
position of the supply and
demand
side in the provision
of
protection
com
modities and its temporal and spatial coincidence in areas where the provi
sion is not monopolized. Similar to corporations on regular markets, violent
groups
calculate
their profit margi n
of
nvestments in the supply
of
security
that is, whether to invest in the
production of
a secure environ ment (areas of
strategic security) or to perpetuate the violent appropriation
of
resources.
Opportunity Makes Thieves
The structure and d y n ~ m 1 i c s of security markets, like the question of the qual
ity
of security, cannot be adequately
understood
without considering the
ch:mging opportunity structures in areas of limited statehood. If there is any
truth to
rhe
popular saying
opportunity
malzes
thieves; it should be
con
sidered that the absence or breakdown of states creates extraordinary oppor
tunities for entrepreneurs of violence to either enric h themselves by looting,
extortion, or resource exploitation, or else to offer protection against looting
by
violent groups.
Theoretically, structures of opportunity encompass the conditions under
which
actors
formulate preferences, make decisions, and act (Siverson and
Starr 1991; Most and
StaiT
1980; Collier
and
Hocfl ler 1998).
In
the research
into
the causes of
war, they have often been used
as
explanatory
fac "Ors
for
the probability
of
the outbreak
of
both internal and international warfare.
New Modes
of
Security
1 1
f{owevcr, both the twin concepts of oppormnity and willingness developed
y
Benjamin
Most
and Harvey Starr (Starr 1978; Most and Starr 1980) and
UJC
opportunity model
of
he \Vorld Bank
group
around Paul Collier (Collier
and Hoeffler 1998, 200+)J
3
are oriented toward the relatively static bound
a )' conditions of methodological nationalism (including borders,
number
of
dlC
neighboring states, or primary-goods exports). Beyond that, the approach
developed by the
VVorld
Bank group relates the motivation of armed actors
primarily
to
greed and the relative share
of
the export of primaiy goods to
the
overall volume
of
export (cf the criti que by Crame r 2002; Fearon 2005 ).
Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) see structures of opportw1ity as preex
isting factors in conflicts between rebel
group
and governments
that
primarily
reflect the conditions that increase the risk of he outbreak of civil wars involv
ing
two conflicting parties.
But
precisely
under
the conditions offailing states,
opportunity structures
and
the configuration of actors may shift, both in time
and space. Resources may be completely exploited, the emergence of splin
ter factions, and the inte1vention
of
external actors may change the balance
of power between coni1icting parties,
or one of
these parties may over time
establish a dominant position within a defined territory. The term o p p o r t 1 m i ~ '
structures is
therefore used herein
as
a broad category that encompasses
all
ma
terial and territorial
options
actors llnd
under
conditions
of
time and space,
and thus refers
both
to incentive structures favoring the perpetuation
of
vio
lence and to those factors
promoting
the establishment
of
orders
of
violence.
Dominant armed actors GU1 then decide how and to what end they wish to
apply force; unilaterally against the popul ation , offensive against competing
violent groups, or defensively as reliable protection provider for the civilian
population against internal and external threats. Economic and geographic
structures of opportu nity, which we will discuss in greater detail in the follow
ing section, arc thus theoretically especially informative in this context.
Econmnic pportunities
The lack or breakdown
of
security guar
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. : I I ~
1111
ro+ Governing Areas of Limited
Statehood
for
the
development of security markets. Appropriately, research
on
interna
tional war began as early as the 1970s to concepmalizc such geographical con
ditions as
direct
neighborhood and spatial distance as explanatory factors
for
the occurrence and diffusion of armed conflicts and wars (e.g., Diehl 19
9
.
Starr 1991 . Somewhat belatedly, recent civil war research bas d iscovered the
geography of war; Current studies show that topographical variables, like
forests
and
mount ains, not only affect the manner in which internal violent
conflicts
are
carried
out but also arc important in determining
the
prospect
of winning a battle or the war (cf. Gates 2002; Buhaug and Gates 2oo
2
;
J3uhaug and
Rod
2006). At the same time, geography also limi ts th e number
of potential violent actors and provides inf ormatio n for an under stan din g of
organizational logics of violent groups. Both formal models and empirical
evidence indicate that greater distance between cont endin g groups affects the
probability
that competitive violent grou ps will emerge (Gates 20 02, 127).
Particularly linked to geographic opportunity structures is the concen
ttation
of
resources
affecting the possibilities
of
canying
out
certain forms
of
violent
control and making profits from the resource extraction. First,
one
has
to
bear in mind that nan1ral resources differ considerably in their
concentration and location (Lc Billon 2oor, Ross 2004-). Second, central
i:ocd resources such as
petroleum and easily accessible mines arc consider
ably
easier to monitor than geographically widely dispersed resources, such
as opium plantations, alluvial diamonds, or tropical forests. Third, a critical
aspect is the proximity to the headquarter of a rebel group or th9 capital
of
the state. It
has been
demonstrated empirically that nati1ral resources that
arc
located near
the capital
of
a country can be
monitored more
easily
by
the
existing
government than more remote extraction sites (Lc Billon 2001).
The reverse is just as true: the further a potential extraction site
is
away from
the state center,
the easier it is for nonstatc armed groups
to
appropriate
and the
more probable will it be that violent conflicts,
and
hence areas
of
strategic
insecurity,
arise. Rebel organizations that operate in resource-rich
regions
will, in the course of he conflict, in
turn
be confronted
with
a "princi
pal-agent problem" (Ross
1973):
if their combatants operate in remote areas,
they
will be diflicnlt to coordinate and monitor internally. To respond to this
dilemma, there are
two contrary strategies: either, a high degree
of
military
and
social control, such
as
guerilla m ovements prefer, or more decentralized
organizational forms, as in the case of
phenomenon
of warlord systems
(B
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1 l C ~ o v e r n i n g Areas
of
Limited StJtchood
limited statehood
can
be
characterized both
by
zones
of permanent
insecu
rity and by the institutiorulization of protection ~ m d taxation systems (areas
of
strategic security), structures of
politic.1l and
soci
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i ll lit
his
system of rule, Taylor finally, in
1997,
aimed for the presidency of all of
Liberia-with the well-known result of the renewed escalation of violence
in the war in Liberia and his arrest in March 2006 Aside from the ultimate
fate ofTaylor himself, it is clear
that the
state apparanrs
and the
perspective
ofintcrnational recognition remain
important
resources,
both
internally (po-
litical
legitimacy, advantages over political rivals) and externally (e.g., in
the
form
of
international financial aid or by access
to
international assistance).
It
can
therefore be assumed
that opportunity
structures such
as
the
form of
a state and the norm of sovereignty will in the future continue to determine
the options
for
action of (some) private armed groups.
NOTES
1.
The concept of rhe "security marke t" refers to tl1e structure and composition of
the spectnrm of actors
as
well
as
tl1c interaction
of
supply (provision)
and
demand of
and for security.
2.
Security governance thus incorpor ates the regulatory structures
and
processes
by means of which security is provided intentionally as a collective good for a defined
group of recipients. Hence, tl1c present article operates with a minimal definition of
governance, without addressing here the broad range
of
differing definitions. Our
understanding of security governance also differs fi'om Krahmann (2003), who ap-
plies the term to
tl1e
emergence of complex security structures in
Europe
and North
America.
J.
The analytical distinction
common
in the debate over the privatization
of se-
curit;' between top down processes
of
the delegation
of
functions to private suppliers,
and bottom up processes of local sclJ:organization of security appears adequate at ilic
outset, in order to obtain an overview of the multifarious suppliers
of
security
(cf.
Mandel 2003; Bt;'den 2006). In contrast-, its analytical utility
is
restricted: first, it
establishes no immediat-e theoretical correlation between the shortage and tl1e active
provision
of
security; second, neither the forms
and
expressions
nor
the quality of
security arc differentiated.
The central gml functions
of
the usc
of
force arc in the
short
term one's own
survival, the ability to finance on e's c apabil ities t usc force, and tl1e seizure of control
oLm
area.
In the long term, they include the protection
ofthe
comrol against internal
and external challengers.
5
vVc rhus oOcr a middle-gr ound s trategy between the classical definition of secu
rity
as
the absence
of
existential threat s
to
a political unit (sec, for a comprehensive
ew Modes orSecurity
109
discussion, Baylis 2005) and widening the concept
to
include nonstate actors
as
cn
ucpreneurs
of
security governance strengthened by state collapse and the dynamics
of internal wars.
6.
Vlc
concemrate here on security dynamics
without
or beside the stare and will,
therefore, not discuss
other
possible forms such
as
"governa nce witl1 gover nment." A
good example for tl1e latter is provided by Elisabeth Jean Wood (2.008). y exploring
different social processes
of
civil war she illustrates the emergence
of
insurgent gov
ernance" in Sri Lanka by the Li berati on Tigers ofT.
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7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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iii
110
(;ovcrning
Arc,Js of
Limited
Statehood
Olson (1993) or Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) have the problem that they
merely auach
tl1e
extraction logic of violent actors to the civilian popul.1tion,
but
leave
aside alternative structures of oppottunity,
11. Sack (198(,, 19)
defines territoriali ty
as attempt by an
individual
or group
to
ailcct, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships,
by
delimiting and
asserting control over a geographic area."
16. Elwert (1999,
R6)
defines "markets of violence" as ''economic fields dominated
l.>y
civil wars, warlords
or
robbery, in which a sclf:pcrpct uating system emerges which
links non-violent commodity markets
witJ1 the violent
acquisition
of
goods?'
As
highly profitable systems these markets may achieve stability len certain periods of
time.
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Fnil:
Cawcs
a11ti
Cowcqnmccs.
Princeton: Princeton Uni
versity Press.
Sack,
Robert David. 1986.
Human
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" 7JCory and Histm:J' Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Singer, Peter W. 2003. C01pomte Wnnior s: T/;c Rise of he l'rimtizcti;Hilitm:r lndu.rtJy.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univcrsiry Press.
Siverson, Randolph lvl., and ITarvcy Starr. 19' . The Dij}itsion ofWor: A Stmf:y
portmzit)'
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Sbperdas,
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200L The
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VVhcn
the
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t
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lil:i
4
Governing
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Weinstein, Jeremy
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"The Social Processes
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RcPicJP
o(I olitiml Scimrc
11:539-GJ.
5
11-ansnational Public-Private Partnerships
< Uld the Provision
of
Collective Goods
in Developing Countries
ANDREA
LIESE
AND MARIANNE BEISIJE l \1
T
A N S N A T IO N A L P U B L J C - l ' R I V A T E
l ' AR TNER S l l ' S
(PPPs) arc
often described
as an innovative f(xm
ol
governance, in
which nonstatc actors (e.g., nonprofit organiz;atious, companies)
together with state actors (e.g., international organiz:nions,
donor
agencies)
perform functions and provide services that
prcviomly
rested firmly
within
the authority
of
sovereign states.
These actors jointly govern across multiple
levels (transnational
to
local). In the OECD world, community-level Pl'Ps
often complement or supplement governmental rcgulatiorJ
or
services (Vaill
ancourt R osenau 2000 . l n at-e3s
of
limited statehood (sec Risse, chapter
in
this volume; and Risse
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7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
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International Legal and Moral Standards
of Good Governance in Fragile States
BERND LADWIG AND BEATE
Runou:
F
A G I L E STATES A B O U N D I N TH E W O R L I J T O D A Y
The
reasons for state fragility vary greatly, fiom ethni c temions, social
unrest, or increased migration caused by economic
or
environmental
factors
to
inters tate conflicts oYer territory or resources.
\s
a result, nttmcrous
entities
that
arc
considered to
be states
under
public international
hw ::m:
tmablc to exercise
power
over all their territory
or
in all policy fields. Yet,
even if a state, by its flagility, verges on dissolving or being J. fJiJing or
failed state, it re mains a state in the legal sense. This charactcri7>:ltion hardly
squares with the traditional requirement of he definition of a state according,
to which its authorities must exercise cfkctivc 'ower over its population and
territory. Yet, through this legal fiction, imernatioll:d bw protects "bilcd"
states
Ji-om
becoming term md im : d hence the object of military conilKts
for its annexation.
Ncvenhclcss, the lcg
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Ill il
I
lJii llli ftl
Hlj
~ I J i j H I i l 1 ~
',,,j'
"
i J I 1 i l l l : l 1 1 1 1 ~ 1
MHiliili.IH;j
l l
i[ :
1
r
iiiliiiiiPifl:l\1
unable
to
fulJill even t he basic func tion
of
states-securing
internal pe,lCe-Jcr
alone the more
ambitious normative standards of
good
governance.
In
discussing
solutions
to this
tension, we
will
proceed
as follows: we will
show that the rather
ambitious sundards
of
good governance
are already
part
of
positive law, and
that
they also can
be
justiJ1cd
by
a rights-based
ap
proach
of
political morality.
Applied
to
conditions
of
fragile
statehood, the
criteria pose
problems oflegitimacy
on
two
logically distinct levels. We argue
that this gives reason
to
f(xus primarily
on
a responsibility to rebuild, which
is
already recognized
by international
law.
t encompasses,
in particular, the
obligation
to
establish
institutional structures and
social
cohesion that
may
necessitate taking
nonstatc
actors
into account.
v\Te
conclude by
finding that
not
only states, but
nonstate
actors
and the international community
arc
bound by international legal
standards
of good
governance.
In
our contribution, we develop
a
normative concept of
good governance
based
on
public
international
law
and
political morality
that is built on
the
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7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State
50/64
Sure guilding
and
o o d uvcrn mcc
](1 determine the normative dimension
of
smercigntv the vuicJLI . b.
. L
5
I ll he
HIIcrnanonallaw standards of good gove rnance will be examined 1
1
,
1
a
nar-
row sense, Good Governance'' is a concept within the context
of
devclo _
mcnt cooperation, the meaning
of
which varies in diffcrcm lcgoJ cor
t
P
--
'-- 1 cxts.
fn
a more general sense, good governance me;ms the fnllillmcm of public
intemational
law
rules on the way
in which
power must be exercised within
a state. fffidfilled, governance can be
considered
to
he.
"good
governance:'' In
1hc
f ( 1 J l o w i n ~ ,
we shaH examine the cent ral com11onents of Pood
a
01
,e
1
.
, o
in this broad sense: lmman rights, the rule of aw, responsivmes,,, and public
participation.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The most important category
of
11uhlic international law rules on good gov
ernance arc human rights, because they reg ulate the exercise
of power
within
a st;ltc. On the universal level, the cmtral sources arc the International Cov
enant on Civil
-
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r I 1+.
lll
r
1
1ilr:'
1.
l t
lrflll
l i l k r ; , q j l ~ ~
'lll li'l,
ill
i ~ l
lllll1fr.llllfll
.
1
1 lfl[
.:
111
h1
zn+ St.llc Building and (jood Governance
J
CESCR
takes the latter difficulty into account
through the obligation
to
realize economic, social, and cultural rights progressively (article
2. r).1o
Thus
the covenant docs
not
require states to fulfill the rights
immediately,
but
move
as
expeditiously and effectively
as
possible towards that
goal;'u
and "to
the maximum of
its
available resources" (article
2.1
).
Even
the "minimum
core obligation" under
each
covenant right, namely "to ensure the satisfac
tion o( at the very least, minimum essential levels
of
each of the
rights"
is
not
an absolute obligation, but must take
into account
the
resource
constraints
within a
country.)}.
However,
if
a state demonstrably is
not
able to fulfill even
the core rights, it
is
obliged to usc resources available through international
cooperation and assistancc.
1
3
Whether the
international
community, in turn,
is obliged to provide such
help-as
the
ICESCR
Committee assumes-will
be examined later.
The lCCPR does not contain a comparable provision
on
progressive
implementation
of
the rights guaranteed. This diftcrence reflects
the-now
outdated-understanding that
civil
and political rights contain "negative ob
ligations;' that
is,
they require mere abstention, while
economic,
social, and
cultural rights
give
rise to "positive obligations,"
that
is, they necessitate
ac
tion bv the state
and
hence the usc
of
financi
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1 1 1
/
l;ifi\ ;1
l ~ l i l l i i l f f l
W > St.m
Building and c;ood
Governance
of
all
individuals,
on
the
basis
of their active,
hcc
:tnd meaningful partici
pation."'S
Consequently, responsiveness reflects the convic6on that human
beings
arc
at
the