rivers as resources, rivers as borders: community and...

Rivers as resources, rivers as borders: communityand transboundary management of fisheriesin the Upper Zambezi River floodplains

JAMES ABBOTTDepartment of Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, 309 Gladfelter Hall, Philadelphia, PA, USA 19122-2585 (e-mail: [email protected])

LISA M. CAMPBELLNicholas School of Environment and Earth Sciences, Duke University, 135 Duke Marine Lab Rd, Beaufort, NC, USA 28516 (e-mail: [email protected])

CLINTON J. HAYMinistry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Private Bag 2116, Mariental, Namibia (e-mail: [email protected])

TOR F. NÆSJENorwegian Institute for Nature Research, Tungasletta 2, NO-7485 Trondheim, Norway (e-mail: [email protected])

AMON NDUMBADepartment of Fisheries, Sesheke, Zambia (deceased)

JOHN PURVISLake Victoria Fisheries Organization, P.O. Box 1625, Jinja, Uganda (e-mail: [email protected])

This article examines the recent convergence ofcommunity-based and transboundary naturalresource management in Africa. We suggest that bothapproaches have potential application tocommon-pool resources such as floodplain fisheries.However, a merging of transboundary andcommunity-based management may reinforceoversimplifications about heterogeneity in resources,users, and institutions. A scalar mismatch betweenthe ecosystem of concern in transboundarymanagement and local resources of concern incommunity-based management, as well as differentcolonial and post-colonial histories contribute to thisheterogeneity. We describe a fishery shared

Les rivieres comme ressources, les rivieres commefrontieres: la gestion communautaire et transfrontieredans la plaine inondable du bassin superieur de lariviere Zambezi

Cet article examine l’etat actuel du processus deconvergence en Afrique entre gestionscommunautaire et transfrontaliere des ressourcesnaturelles. Nous laissons entendre que les deuxapproches ont le potentiel pour servir a la gestion deressources halieutiques communes situees parexemple dans les plaines inondable. Par contre, lafusion des modes de gestion communautaire ettransfrontaliers pourrait renforcer l’idee selonlaquelle l’heterogeneite des ressources, usagers et

The Canadian Geographer / Le Geographe canadien 51, no 3 (2007) 280–302C© / Canadian Association of Geographers / L’Association canadienne des geographes

Rivers as resources, rivers as borders 281

by Namibia and Zambia in terms of hybrid fisheriesmanagement. We examine settlement patterns,fishermen characteristics, sources of conflict, andperceptions regarding present and potential forms offisheries management in the area. We also considerthe implications that initiatives to manage resourceson the local and ecosystem scale have for thesefishing livelihoods. Our findings indicate thatimportant social factors, such as the unequaldistribution of population and fishing effort, as wellas mixed opinions regarding present and futureresponsibility for fisheries management willcomplicate attempts to implement a hybridcommunity-transboundary management initiative.

institutions est plus simple qu’elle ne l’est en realite.Un decalage entre l’ecosysteme en question dans lagestion transfrontaliere et les ressources locales enquestion dans la gestion communautaire, en plus desdiverses histoires coloniales et post-coloniales,contribuent a cette heterogeneite. Une description dela peche que partagent la Namibie et la Zambie estpresentee en termes d’une gestion hybride de lapecherie. Nous examinons les schemas depeuplement, les traits distinctifs des populations depecheurs, les sources de conflit et les perceptions al’egard des modes actuels et potentiels de gestion dela pecherie dans la region. Nous etudions lesconsequences que des initiatives en matiere degestion des ressources a l’echelle locale et a celle del’ecosysteme peuvent avoir sur ces moyens desubsistance. Les resultats semblent montrer que desfacteurs sociaux importants, comme la distributioninegale de la population et l’effort de peche, ainsi quedes opinions partagees concernant l’exercice desresponsabilites dans la gestion de la pecherie peuventcompliquer la tache de mise en uvre d’une initiativede gestion communautaire et transfrontalierehybride.

Introduction

Discussions concerning natural resources inAfrica often question the role of the state andnation as suitable institutional and spatial scalesfor management (e.g., Hulme and Murphree2001; Adams and Mulligan 2003). Proposedalternatives include community-based natural re-source management (CBNRM) and transboundarynatural resource management (TBNRM). Supportfor CBNRM argues that increased local-level in-volvement leads to more equitable and effectivemanagement of natural resources (Agrawal andGibson 1999; Barrow and Murphree 2001), andthat communities have the most at stake in theconservation and sustainable use of locally im-portant resources (Li 2002). By contrast, TBNRMis premised on the idea of the ecosystem beingthe most appropriate scale at which to manageresources. As such, management should not berestricted by national boundaries, but shouldcross them as necessary (Wolmer 2003; Duffy2006).

This article explores questions regarding suit-able scales (institutional and spatial) for the

management of artisanal fisheries in southernAfrica. We consider the promises and challengesof fisheries management at ecosystem and localscales in a floodplain river shared by two coun-tries; thus, in this case, ecosystem managementimplies transboundary management. In particu-lar, we examine differences in settlements, users,fishing practices and institutions on either sideof the political boundary formed by the river.In turn, we consider how these differences mayaffect the feasibility of a ‘hybrid’ combinationof transboundary and community-based fisheriesmanagement being considered for the fishery.

Our case study focuses on the Zambezi River asit flows between Namibia and Zambia. In order toevaluate potential differences in resource use andmanagement norms, we conducted a comprehen-sive survey of fishing settlements and fishers onthe Namibian and Zambian sides of the river todetermine: (1) the number, age, and seasonality ofsettlements; (2) characteristics of fishers in set-tlements, including their ethnic backgrounds; (3)fishing assets and activity; (4) knowledge of rulesconcerning what types of fishing are allowed andwhere, as well as the authorities responsible for

The Canadian Geographer / Le Geographe canadien 51, no 3 (2007)

282 James Abbott et al.

setting and implementing these rules; (5) beliefsabout forms and causes of fishery-related con-flict; and (6) opinions regarding if the fisheryshould be managed, the rationale for manage-ment, and the most appropriate management au-thority. In doing so, we sought to determine ifdifferences exist between Namibian and Zambianfishing settlements, fishers and fishing practicesand how such differences might impact attemptsto implement hybrid CBNRM-TBNRM managementin the region.

We suggest that attributes of both TBNRM andCBNRM have potential application to biologicallyand socially dynamic environments such as flood-plain fisheries (or drylands, e.g., Haro et al. 2005).However, challenges exist when attempts to fusetransboundary and community-based manage-ment carry assumptions of a smooth nesting ofhomogenous and congruent users, activities andinstitutions within a broader management area(Young 2006). These challenges, described below,emerge from contradictions in the spatial scalesof ecosystem and local-level resources, as wellas the institutional scales of transboundary andcommunity-based management.

The first challenge is the potential mismatchbetween the highly dynamic movement of re-sources and users at the scale of the ecosystemtypifying TBNRM, against the local-scale re-sources, users, practices and institutions charac-terizing CBRNM. In our case study, this tensionis illustrated by results showing the majority ofconflicts occur when fishers from the more pop-ulated Zambian side of the river enter Namibianwaters to take advantage of the more abun-dant habitat and fish. In the context of hybridmanagement, a freer movement of users in thefloodplain through transboundary managementfocused on the ecosystem may conflict with exist-ing locally defined rules of tenure and access towhat are considered local resources (e.g., fishinggrounds).

The second challenge concerns the contrastingcolonial and post-colonial histories of southernAfrican nations. These differing histories inturn affect the degree of contiguity amongstindividuals, activities, and institutions broughttogether under supranational arrangement suchas TBNRM. While fishers sharing the floodplainin our case study have similar types of fishingassets and traditional authorities, the proportion

of ethnic groups, population densities, andviews regarding fisheries management differsignificantly (see results). Again, if there isnot sufficient common ground amongst usersand institutions in Namibia and Zambia, hybridmanagement risks aggravating the same types ofpower struggles and access conflicts that havecharacterized other changes in resource use inAfrica (e.g., Neumann 1997). This kind of failedattempt to hybridize management could alsoundermine any already existing and functioningcommunity-based regimes.

Most studies of CBNRM and TBNRM in Africafocus on terrestrial resources (Schroeder 1999;Hulme and Murphree 2001; Adams and Mulligan2003), but the rationale for applying these man-agement approaches is relevant for many in-land fisheries on the continent. The majority ofAfrican inland fisheries are artisanal, character-ized by limited and/or local-level management(Jul-Larsen et al. 2003), making CBNRM an appeal-ing option. At the same time, existing boundariesestablished during Africa’s colonial era frequentlyused rivers as reference points (Sadoff et al.2002), making many inland fisheries transbound-ary for at least part of their range. The impor-tance of fish to the region’s inhabitants and thepotential for a drier regional climate in the fu-ture (de Wit and Stankiewicz 2006) suggests thatmany livelihoods will depend on perennial watersources. The appropriate scale of management oreven if management should take place at all (e.g.,Jul-Larsen et al. 2003) are therefore important is-sues to raise in the context of freshwater envi-ronments in the region.

Our study adds to a growing body of researchconcerning appropriate scale in floodplain fish-eries management (e.g., Hoggarth et al. 1999;Bene et al. 2003; Castro and McGrath 2003;Thompson et al. 2003; Sneddon and Fox 2006)and the role of communities and traditional au-thorities in artisanal fisheries management (e.g.,Hara 1996; Owino 2000; Berkes et al. 2001;Aswani 2005; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2006). Itmay also serve a more practical purpose, by in-forming ongoing government and NGO efforts toincorporate elements of CBNRM and TBNRM inthe region. Examples include the ‘Four Corners’and ‘Heartlands’ projects of the Worldwide Fundfor Nature and the African Wildlife Foundationand the recently formalized Kavango-Zambezi



Transfrontier Conservation Area, described laterin this article.

Our article is organized as follows: In the firstsection, we review the principles of CBNRM andTBNRM in general and their application to fish-eries. We also examine some of the critiquesof each approach and the challenges associatedwith hybrid CBNRM-TBNRM management, namely,the potential mismatch between ecosystem andlocal scales (and associated transboundary andcommunity-based management regimes) and theeffect of contrasting colonial and post-colonialinfluences on settlement patterns, users, activi-ties, and institutions in adjacent countries. In thesecond section, we describe our research area,highlighting the differences and similarities be-tween Namibians and Zambians living in the areaand the institutional environments in which theyfunction. We also describe the floodplain environ-ment and livelihoods, demonstrating the complexhistorical and biophysical factors existing there.These two sections provide the context for un-derstanding our methods and results that follow.In the discussion and conclusion sections, we sit-uate our results in the present and emerging con-cepts regarding fisheries management in Africanfloodplains.

CBNRM and TBNRM in Africa: Conceptsand Practice

CBNRM in Africa emerged from a perceived fail-ure of conventional natural resource manage-ment practiced by government agencies, whichrelied on prohibiting local populations from us-ing particular resources and excluding them fromdecision-making processes (Hulme and Murphree2001). New community-based approaches to man-agement by governments and NGOs (in Africaand elsewhere) seek in principle greater involve-ment of inhabitants, allowing both increased ac-cess to resources and the opportunity to benefitfinancially from protected resources and areas.In addition, attempts have been made to makeresource management itself more participatory,by including local representation and authorityin management objectives and processes (Agrawaland Gibson 1999; Hulme and Murphree 2001;Western et al. 1994). In doing so, CBNRM hastwo goals: (1) to enhance conservation of wildlife,biodiversity and/or the environment; and (2) to

provide economic, social, cultural and politicalbenefits to local people participating in conser-vation (Adams and Hulme 2001).

While the focus of natural resource manage-ment in Africa has shifted to the level of commu-nity over the past 20 years, the scope of resourcemanagement has recently expanded across politi-cal boundaries. In southern Africa, 17 areas havebeen identified as potential sites for TBNRM ini-tiatives (Griffen 1999; cited in McDermott-Hughes2005). The key principle behind TBNRM is theconcept of ecosystems, or bioregionalism, wheremanagement is defined primarily by ecologicalscale and function (Alexander 1990). TBNRM intheory allows for a greater geographical rangeof protection for certain ecological features (e.g.,watersheds, forests) or migratory species (e.g.,wildebeest, elephants) (Magome and Murombedzi2003). However, the rationale for TBRNM, likethe rationale for CBNRM, is not just ecological.For example, the economic importance of wildlife-based tourism in southern Africa provides addi-tional incentives for TBNRM as a means of linkingtourism ‘corridors’ that may run through differ-ent countries (Ramutsindela 2004).

While the logic of TBNRM argues that someresources cannot be managed at the communitylevel (Barrow and Murphree 2001), the prevalenceof ‘community’ in contemporary thinking aboutresource use and management in Africa meansthat proponents of TBNRM cannot overlook it.As a result, TBNRM initiatives also reference lo-cal institutions and inhabitants in the region andcontain important assumptions about them (dis-cussed later in this article). Several examples ex-ist in southern Africa where conservation goalsand means are being defined both at the localand ecosystem scale, such as the Great LimpopoTransfrontier Park and the Kgalagadi Transfron-tier Park (Ramutsindela 2004).

CBNRM and TBNRM in fisheries

Community-based management (and the relatedconcept of co-management) is a prevalent themein artisanal fisheries. However, existing examplesof fishery-related CBNRM occur largely in coastal(e.g., Pido et al. 1997; Berkes et al. 2001; Aswani2005; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2006) and smalllake environments (e.g., McGrath et al. 1993), asopposed to the inland floodplain environment ofthis study. In contrast to floodplains, marine and



lake environments often have discrete and lo-calized fisheries, making their demarcation andenforcement by artisanal fishers and communi-ties less challenging and the potential benefits ofmanagement more apparent (e.g., Sanchirico andWilen 2001).

In southern Africa, attempts to devolve man-agement and/or promote fisher participationhave experienced only modest success (e.g., Nor-mann et al. 1998; Wilson et al. 1999; Harolds-dottir 2000; Geheb and Sarch 2002; Bene et al.2003; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003; Nielsen et al. 2004).Challenges identified as confounding devolutioninclude the variable activity within a fishery (e.g.,Allison and Ellis 2001; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003),conflicts with traditional authorities and govern-ment institutions (e.g., Hara 1996; Owino 2000),and ambiguity regarding management goals (suchas sustainable or equitable use) and what formintervention should take (Haroldsdottir 2000;Geheb and Sarch 2002; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003).

Fisheries policy has also embraced TBNRMthrough the concept of ecosystem-based man-agement (e.g., Babcock and Pikitch 2004). How-ever, application has been limited to marineenvironments, where fisheries straddle nationaland/or international pelagic waters (e.g., Sher-man and Duda 1999). These open-ocean settingsusually fall outside of typical artisanal fishingactivity and management issues are related tocommercial fishing. In these instances, TBNRMinitiatives in fisheries have not had to con-sider community-scale institutions or artisanalfishing patterns. In some inland water bodies,such as the African Rift Valley lakes, or theMiddle Zambezi River, states have successfullycoordinated ecosystem-level research (Gheb andSarch 2002), but attempts to decentralize fish-eries management and/or increase local participa-tion have been limited to activities within states(e.g., Nunan 2006).

Potential for combining CBNRM and TBNRMin floodplain fisheries

New management arrangements combining lo-cal and ecosystem scale through CBNRM andTBNRM have considerable potential for floodplainfisheries. Floodplain environments are by na-ture highly dynamic and diffuse. Fish abundanceand catchability varies spatially and temporally

(Welcomme 1985), as do the levels of fishingeffort and relative tenure that can be asserted(Scudder and Conelly 1985; Welcomme 1985;Thomas and Danjaji 1997). CBNRM offers the in-stitutional flexibility to respond to such variation,for example, to address issues of sustainabil-ity and equity during periods of fish breedingor limited food security. Ecosystem managementof floodplain fisheries is also important, giventhe dispersed nature of the fishery and thefact that key influences on fishery productivity,namely, the timing and duration of flooding, isan outcome of factors outside of the immedi-ate watershed (Sneddon and Fox 2006). More-over, our limited understanding of floodplainecology (Arthington et al. forthcoming) would im-prove with data collected at the local level oncatch-effort patterns in a multispecies fishery(e.g., Ticheler et al. 1998) and the integrationof broader ecosystem-level trends in productivityand exploitation (e.g., Halls et al. 2006).

In spite of the potential usefulness of a hy-brid approach in floodplain fisheries, we did notfind any operating case studies in the literaturesurveyed. In cases where ecosystem-based man-agement has been proposed for floodplain en-vironments, policy makers typically envision anested order of authority, from community-levelmanagement of adjacent waters, to a broader,catchment-level administration (e.g., Hoggarthet al. 1999). With this vision comes the opti-mistic assumption that fishers and communitieshave institutions compatible with this hierarchicalframework and sufficient incentives to cooperatefor local and ecosystem-wide benefit.

Challenges to hybrid CBNRM-TBNRM approaches

Questions about whether resource managementat local and ecosystem levels can be combinedhave not been raised to date in the courseof CBNRM and TBNRM co-evolution in south-ern Africa. This is likely because most of theareas under consideration for TBNRM alreadyhave some form of protected status. Exclusionand marginalization of local users has been acommon characteristic of these areas (Schroeder1999) and attempts to promote local involvementdo not typically involve devolution of any kindof management responsibilities. Instead, focushas been directed at a broader distribution of



monetary benefits from conservation or thedevelopment of alternative livelihoods not de-pendent on wildlife consumption (Adams andHulme 2001). Thus, community participation inthese examples is mostly at low levels (Barrowand Murphree 2001). While protected areasremain sites of contestation between inhabitants,NGOs, and the state over access, use, and benefit(Schroeder 1999; West and Brockington 2006),TBNRM governance remains at the level ofstate–state negotiation.

However, the popularity of TBNRM in man-agement discourse makes it likely that it willbe considered beyond protected areas. Commonproperty resources, such as freshwater fisheries,have less of a history of explicit conservationor marginalization, making issues of local-scaleresource use and governance difficult to over-look. In the following paragraphs, we identify twomain challenges in harmonizing CBNRM and TB-NRM in such cases: mismatches in real (and per-ceived) institutional scales of management andspatial scales of resources; and the heterogene-ity of users and institutions arising from colonialand post-colonial histories.

Institutional and spatial scales

Both CBNRM and TBNRM approaches often con-tain oversimplified assumptions about the struc-ture and behaviour of inhabitants and resourcesof an area, and these can impact on the suc-cess of hybrid CBNRM-TBNRM arrangements. Forexample, CBNRM has been critiqued for itsfailure to adequately consider the meaning of‘community’, too often considering communitiesas homogenous entities acting collectively toachieve common environmental goals and giv-ing little consideration to differences within them(e.g., Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Schroeder 1999).CBNRM often includes a process of formaliz-ing institutions and rules, linked to identifi-able communities (Allison and Ellis 2001). Thisformalization overlooks the fact that most local-scale resource access and use involves ambiguousinstitutional borders and overlapping rationalesfor legitimacy (Neumann 1997; Robbins 2004).Emphasizing exclusive use and tenure to resi-dents can conflict with seasonal resources usedefining many rural livelihoods in Africa (e.g.,Allison and Ellis 2001; Turner 2004). With regards

to resources, CBNRM often assumes local-scaleresources and environments are relatively stableand distinct (and thus amenable to local levelmanagement), but this view has been challengedby new understandings of the spatial and tempo-ral dynamics of ecological systems (Leach et al.1997).

In the case of TBNRM, similarly problematicassumptions are evident. For example, whileecosystems are portrayed as ‘naturally’ delineatedby physical and biological processes, many au-thors have demonstrated how TBNRM in south-ern Africa is influenced by regional and inter-national political processes (e.g., Wolmer 2003;Duffy 2006). As a result, ecosystems are ‘con-structed’ according to how certain actors perceivenature as it is or should be (Robbins 2004). De-marcation and appropriate uses of transbound-ary areas may be driven by narrow definitionsof ecosystems, such as the behaviour of charis-matic megafauna and their habitat (due to theirappeal to tourism). TBNRM proponents often alsoassert that as ecological networks are reopened,so too will previously fractured social networks.Wolmer (2003, 262) argues that the bioregional-ism underpinning TBNRM extends to assumptionsabout local and regional cultures and their root-edness in the landscape. The Peace Parks Foun-dation (1999), the largest TBNRM initiative in theregion, aspires to ‘stitch’ together ecological andsocial landscape separated by local borders (citedin Ramutsindela 2004). In practice, movement byinhabitants may become even more restricted un-der TBNRM. McDermott-Hughes states that estab-lishment of the Great Limpopo TCFA implicitlycarries two ‘geographical notions in polar oppo-sition: “Africa” for tourists; and “community” forpeasants’ (2005, 2). Small-scale resource use andbenefits typical of CBNRM may continue underlimited terms, but free movement encouraged fortourists is not extended to inhabitants.

Colonial and post-colonial differences

TBNRM in Africa seeks to stitch back togetherecosystems fractured by the establishment andpersistence of colonial-era borders. CBNRM ad-dresses policies towards resource use and userspracticed within states. Yet in asserting eitherecological or community legitimacy, the scaleand influence of the state is not removed. State



policies of resource use and management, aswell as the identities created for (and assertedby) inhabitants and institutions persist despitechanges in scale. Moreover, colonial and post-colonial policies and identities are not uniform.Even adjacent countries that were part of thesame colonizing power often experienced vastlydiverse trajectories. These colonial and post-colonial differences must be considered whenattempting to bring together contrasting uses,management and institutions.

Adams (2003) suggests the ‘colonial approach’towards resource conservation in Africa cannotbe generalized. Perceptions of nature, conserva-tion and the proper use of resources varied overtime and amongst actors within colonies. Thesevarying colonial-era ideologies and institutionspersisted in newly independent African nations(Adams 2003). At the same time, states adopted,responded to, or were coerced by the forcesof socialization, economic liberalization, proxywars and global environmentalism. These regionaland global changes in political and economicstructures affected each state differently overtime, adding to contemporary distinctions (e.g.,McDermott-Hughes 2001; Adams 2003; Malasha2003).

Another enduring aspect of colonial rule is howethnic group identity and institutions were de-fined, created and used by administrators. Tra-ditional authorities were co-opted or created toprovide labour, collect taxes and govern certainaspects of indigenous affairs, for a cash-strappedand thinly spread colonial infrastructure (Berry1992). Murombedzi (2003, 141) points out that‘starting with the colonial project of indirect rule,traditional authority in southern Africa has beenengineered and reengineered so many times thatit is hardly fair to refer to the contemporary au-thority figures as “traditional” at all’. Not only arecommunities and institutions ‘imagined’ (Brosiuset al. 1998) but these imaginations are a productof diverse colonial and post-colonial experiences(e.g., West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999).

In the context of hybrid management, the (tenu-ous) assumption that TBNRM brings together har-monious communities and analogous institutionsmay lead to more, rather than less conflict. Scalardifferences in resource use and management mayaggravate conflicts arising over access to differ-ent areas by users deemed as ‘outsiders’ (Nielsen

et al. 2004). If TBNRM fails to consider these is-sues, it may be destined to make the same er-roneous assumptions of homogeneity and stricttenure seen in some CBNRM projects, only atlarger scales and with wider impacts.

As the following description of our study areaillustrates, the Upper Zambezi River floodplainshave a distinct colonial and post-colonial politicalgeography. However, there is also some degreeof contiguity in cultural identity and the struc-ture of traditional authorities. Rules about tenureand use of fisheries are also flexible and context-specific. These conditions, we suggest, presenthope for a workable attempt at hybrid manage-ment. At the same time, we highlight the needto determine in greater detail where similari-ties and differences exist regarding the distribu-tion of fishers, fishing activity, management andconflict.

The Upper Zambezi River

The study focused on a 120 km stretch of the Up-per Zambezi River shared by Namibia and Zam-bia. Many (but not all, see Results) inhabitants onboth sides of the river are members of the Loziethnic group, sharing common cultural character-istics and are often related by family. However,the complex political history of the area and itshigh level of natural variability have acted as im-portant factors in shaping resource access andgovernance.

Once part of a larger paramount Lozi King-dom, the area was cut into two colonies dur-ing the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the late 1800s(Flint 2003). From this stage onwards, the insti-tutional landscape on either side of the river di-verged. The British colonial administration northof the Zambezi River (Northern Rhodesia; presentday Zambia) provided a considerable role for tra-ditional authorities to set and enforce resourcemanagement policies (Bell-Cross 1974), althoughthe influence of traditional authorities declinedconsiderably after Zambian independence in 1964(Flint 2003). In contrast, administration south ofthe river (South West Africa; present day Namibia)was traded between authorities no less thanfive times (between Germany, Britain, modern-dayBotswana and South Africa) until Namibia’s inde-pendence in 1990. These changes were often ac-companied by tightening or loosening of access



to the floodplains on the southern bank by in-habitants of the northern bank (Abbott 2005).These restrictions on border crossing arose notonly due to official policy of one or both coun-tries; during the 1970s and 1980s, the stretch ofriver was also a focal point of the conflict be-tween South Africa and neighbouring states ofAngola, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and movement inthe area was likely curtailed for fear of personalsafety.

At the national level, the two countries con-trast with respect to economic and social de-velopment achievements, with Namibia ranked at125 in the Human Development Index (HDI) andZambia at 166. Namibia’s estimated GDP/capita isUS$ 6,184, compared with Zambia’s GDP/capitaof US$ 877 (UNDP 2005). The extent to whichthese national differences are relevant in our casestudy area is questionable, however, as the regionof Namibia where our research took place hasconsistently had the lowest HDI ranking withinthe country (UNDP 2005) and Namibian residentsof the study area may have income levels andabilities to acquire assets that are more similarto their Zambian neighbours than to their fellowNamibians.1

Traditional authorities on both sides of theriver share an almost identical hierarchical struc-ture, with village, ward and regional represen-tatives (indunas) and councils (khutas). All ofthe traditional authorities, including those inNamibia, ostensibly fall under a paramount chief(Litunga) based in Zambia. Traditional authori-ties in Namibia can be characterized as relevantin that many civil disputes are still arbi-trated within the khuta framework (Purvis 2002).Moreover, government agencies often rely ontraditional authorities as a point of contact forpublic awareness and aid distribution (J. Abbottpersonal observation). Less information is avail-able regarding the status of traditional authoritieson the Zambian side, although the limited gov-ernment presence, combined with the history ofsemi-autonomy prior to independence, suggeststhat traditional authorities and structures are stillrelevant in daily life. Traditional authorities onboth sides of the river have an ambiguous role

1 While there is a high GDP/capita in Namibia, it also has a rela-tively low population density and the highest Gini index (70.7)of all 176 countries (UNDP 2005). Hence, income disparity ismore prevalent in Namibia than Zambia.

in present and emerging fisheries management,as discussed further below.

The Upper Zambezi River is a relatively unmod-ified watercourse compared to other rivers of itssize, with no barriers or irrigation, a rural pop-ulation and limited pollution. Annual cycles offlooding and precipitation cause a seasonal con-traction and expansion of the floodplain, whichin turn affects the productivity of the fishery. Asareas become covered in water, fish migrate ontothe floodplain to feed and reproduce. When wa-ters begin to recede, adult and juvenile fish re-turn to the main channel or become trapped inisolated bodies of water on the floodplain. Fish-ing activity is mostly artisanal, with the major-ity of fishers using monofilament gill nets anddugout canoes (Purvis 2002; Næsje et al. 2003).In many floodplain environments, fishing is usu-ally not targeted towards specific species (Wel-comme 1985), a pattern also seen in the Up-per Zambezi River fishery; over 50 species offish are caught by inhabitants, with the major-ity of individuals being either cichlids or cat-fish (Purvis 2002). Changes in fishing techniqueand effort are linked to seasonal variations inoverall fish biomass and movement of fish be-tween the main channel and floodplain (Purvis2002).

Several sources suggest that the recent increasein the area’s human population, combined withthe adoption of more extractive fishing methodsand an apparent erosion of traditional manage-ment, have resulted in unsustainable levels offishing (Tvedten et al. 1994; Byers 1997; Turpieet al. 1999; Chenje 2000). If catches have de-clined, it may indeed be a result of fishing pres-sure, but may also be linked to reduced decadalflood volumes, changes in herbivore-mediatedfloodplain morphology and nutrient cycling, ora combination of all three (Abbott 2005). Incontrast to this portrayal of declining fisheries,unpublished biological surveys indicate that thetrophic structure and biomass of the fishery doesnot resemble what is expected for heavily ex-ploited fisheries (C. Hay unpublished data) andunpublished data collected by J. Abbott during2002 indicated a wide range of fish species andsizes available in local markets. Given these con-flicting views and the limited biological and fish-ing effort data existing for the area, it is difficultto make concrete statements about the condition



of the fish stock or the effects of present fishingactivity.

At the time of the survey in 2002, the Zam-bian government had fisheries legislation at thenational level, with minimum mesh size of 51mm, an annual closed season between Decemberand February and a prohibition on ‘bashing’ (amethod of catching fish where the water is struckin order to scare fish into nets). Namibia hada very vague pre-independence legislation withtraditional authorities principally responsible forfisheries management in ‘Native’ areas such asthe floodplains (Abbott 2001). Generally speak-ing, the use of active gears such as mosquitonets and dragnets, as well as small mesh netswas prohibited in Namibia. However, there wasand continues to be a heterogeneous interpreta-tion of customary law both within and betweenNamibia’s traditional authorities (Purvis et al.2003). A more informal, yet equally importantaspect of management on both sides of the riveris the silalanda, an area of land and water withina traditional authority’s territory (silalo), associ-ated with a specific kin group. Non-kin wishingto graze livestock or fish in a silalanda areexpected to ask permission (Purvis et al. 2003).

The area’s physical geography has importantimplications for the distribution of fishing ar-eas, settlement, and assertion of fishing tenure.The northern bank of the river is higher thanthe southern bank, where the majority of thefloodplains are located. As a result, the majorityof seasonal inundation occurs in Namibia. Flood-plain settlements are therefore largely seasonal,with tenure to specific areas linked to kinshipand a tradition of use over time. The gentle gradi-ent of the floodplain leads to subtle and dramaticchanges in the areas covered in water and hencethe availability of potential fishing grounds, asadult fish migrate to the inundated floodplain tospawn and feed (Purvis 2002).

Recent changes in Namibian and Zambianlegislation, regional policy initiatives, and NGOinvolvement have important implications forthe current limited and ambiguous nature offisheries management in the study area. At theregional level, the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC), a state-level coordinatingbody, passed the 2001 Protocol on Fisheries,obliging parties (including Namibia and Zambia)to adapt or change fisheries policy to incorporate

traditional authorities and participatory manage-ment (SADC 2001). Also notable is the States’obligation to ‘adopt equitable arrangementswhereby. . .fishers who are traditionally partof a transboundary fishery may continue tofish and trade in goods and services’ (SADC2001). Thus, the policy recognizes the relevanceof both community-based and transboundarymanagement.

Nationally, Namibia introduced a new InlandFisheries Act in 2003. In this Act, control of thefisheries rests with the state. However, there issome scope for community involvement (largelythrough traditional authorities) in the formationand enforcement of regulations, as well as coor-dination with neighbouring states in the manage-ment of shared waterways. Zambia is also in theprocess of adopting legislation with similar provi-sions for potential community and transboundaryinvolvement (P. Kapaasa, DFO staff, personal con-versation with J. Abbott, July 2002). At the sametime, the area falls within the recently formal-ized plans for the Kavango-Zambezi TransfrontierConservation Area, a Peace Parks initiative involv-ing watersheds shared by five countries (PeaceParks 2006). The terms of reference for the fea-sibility study tendered by Peace Parks, outlinessome of the envisioned rationales and benefits ofTBNRM for the area, including ‘harmonizing thepolicies, strategies, and practices of conservingand managing the resources that the five coun-tries share through natural movements’ (PeaceParks 2006).

While fisheries are not explicitly mentioned inthe above passage, their role in the area’s liveli-hoods and tourism makes fisheries use and man-agement an issue. Peace Parks does acknowledgethe ‘people of various nationalities, cultural back-grounds, and income levels whose livelihood de-pend on the shared common waters’ (Peace Parks2006). However, the goal to ‘sustain the economicdevelopments of the people’ (Peace Parks 2006),while suitable in theory, risks an implicit assump-tion of homogeneity, underlining the need to un-derstand where differences lie at this early stagein policy development.

Survey approach

A 120 km stretch of the Zambezi River wassurveyed, collecting multiple types of data



concerning settlements, livelihoods, and man-agement. Data collection was based on framesurveys (e.g., Moses et al. 2002), where the shore-line is divided into sections, or frames. Typically,frame surveys are standardized so areas can berevisited after a period of time to determine ifchange has occurred. It is an exhaustive surveyof all fishing settlements, fishers and fishingassets found within the frame. Due in part tohigh mobility of artisanal fishers and their assets(Allison and Ellis 2001) as well as the ephemeralnature of some floodplain settlements (Sarch andBirkett 2000), there is always the possibility oursurvey missed some fishers or settlements.

A previous frame survey of the Zambian sideof the Zambezi River had been carried out in1996 by the Zambian Department of Fisheries(DoF). DoF staff experienced in frame surveyscooperated in method development and surveyimplementation in the present study. The framesurvey took place during October and November2002, as the flood reached its lowest point.This time was chosen on the assumption that itcoincided with the peak of bank side settlementand fishing activity, since fishing yields arerelatively high and the labour bottlenecks dueto ploughing, which take place with the onset ofthe seasonal rains, are not yet apparent (Purvis2002; see also Shorr 2000).

Survey teams travelled the Zambezi River byboat. Given the range of flooding as well asthe high banks sometimes encountered, we deter-mined that only visiting villages in line of sightof the boat would result in inadequate coverage.As a result, all villages within 500 m of the Zam-bian side or 1 km of the Namibian side of themain channel or navigable waterway were visited.Different distances for each country were chosendue to the different profile of the floodplain oneach side; while the floodplains on the Zambianside are less extensive due to a gradually risinglandscape, the gradient on the Namibian side isalmost nonexistent, allowing for greater potentialinundation.

Initial contact with a settlement was madethrough the village induna (village-level tradi-tional authority), to whom the goals and practicaldetails of the frame survey were explained andfrom whom consent to work in the village wasobtained. For larger settlements (more than fivehouseholds), it was proposed that, where possi-

ble, appointments would be made the next day,allowing the induna to assemble those fisherswho consented to being interviewed. Visits to set-tlements were made between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m.,so as not to interfere during times in the earlymorning and evening when fishers usually attendto their nets.

Once the forms and a recording protocolhad been agreed upon by the survey team, themethod was tested in a village on the Namibianside and refined. The final questionnaire hadthree parts: Part A contained questions aboutthe settlement and were directed towards theinduna, whereas questions in Parts B and C,regarding fishing activity and management, weredirected towards individual fishers. While thefinal survey included 43 questions, those ofinterest in this article addressed: age, location,estimated number of households, fishing assetsand status (i.e., seasonal or permanent) of set-tlements (Part A). Questions directed at fishersgathered data on their age, gender and ethnicgroup, as well as the number and type of fishinggear (and, where relevant, mesh size) used,knowledge of current fishery-related rules andauthority, opinions about sources of conflict andabout what form (if any) future fisheries man-agement should take (Parts B and C). Questionsabout settlements, fisheries activity, conflict andpresent management were open-ended, with themost frequent responses pre-coded for ease ofrecording. Questions about future managementwere in the form of discrete choices.

The eight-person survey team consisted of thelead author, representatives from the ZambianDepartment of Fisheries, the Namibian Ministry ofFisheries and Marine Resources and staff from aWWF-LIFE funded project titled ‘Shared ResourceManagement on the Zambezi/Chobe Systems inNortheast Namibia: Current Practices and FutureOpportunities’. A total of 72 settlements wererecorded and 541 fishers were interviewed dur-ing the survey.

Selected Characteristics of FishingAlong the Upper Zambezi River

Our first set of findings concern the demo-graphic patterns of settlements along the river,especially the distribution, size, permanence andage of settlements. Settlements were found on



Figure 1Villages and fishing settlements enumerated in the 2002 frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River (adapted from Abbott et al. 2003).

both sides of the river along the whole lengthof the survey area (Figure 1). We recorded 18settlements (25 percent) on the Namibian sideof the river, while 54 (75 percent) settlementswere on the Zambian side. Settlement populationwas estimated by recording the number ofhouseholds per site. A household in this contextwas defined as a collection of people who regu-larly eat together. Hence, there could be severalindividual structures within a single householdwith several related and unrelated individualsliving within them. A total of 1,709 householdswere enumerated, with 1,643 households onthe Zambian side and 66 households on theNamibian side. Zambian settlements were onaverage denser (30 households per settlement) incomparison to Namibian settlements (average 3.6households per settlement).

Settlements varied according to how manymonths they were occupied. According to vil-lage indunas, most Namibian settlements wereconsidered seasonal (61 percent), while mostZambian settlements were considered permanent(61 percent). Most Namibian households werein seasonal settlements, while most Zambianhouseholds were in permanent settlements andthe difference in distribution is statistically sig-nificant (Table 1). However, the majority of bothNamibian settlements (69 percent) and Zambiansettlements (67 percent) were occupied for atleast nine months of the year.

The reported age of settlements varied fromone year to up to nine decades. Almost half(41 percent) of all settlements had been estab-lished within the last 20 years. The majorityof Namibian (61 percent) settlements were less



Table 1Estimated households in fishing settlements covered during the 2002frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River1 (Significant; χ2 = 36.30,p ≤ 0.0001)

Seasonal Permanent

Namibia (n = 66) 40 (61%)∗ 26 (39%)∗

Zambia (n = 1,643) 438 (27%) 1,205 (73%)

1Three Zambian settlements were omitted from this analysis, as inthe first two cases the number of households was not given andin the last case a household estimate of over 3,000 was given,suggesting that household number was confused with settlementpopulation in a relatively large settlement (Mambova).∗Cell χ2 residual value above 2 or below –2.

than 20 years old, while the majority of Zambian(61 percent) were between 30 and 90 years old(Figure 2).

Fisher characteristics and assets: Of the 541fishers interviewed, 98 (18 percent) were Namib-ian and 443 (82 percent) were Zambian. Only fourof the fishers interviewed were female. It is im-portant to note that our results do not reflectthe total number of people who may fish in thesurvey area. Women and children who reside inpermanent settlements often use hook and line

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61 to 70 71 to 80 81 to 90

Age (y)

# v

illa

ge

s c

ou

nte

d

Namibia

Zambia

Figure 2Age frequency histograms of Namibian and Zambian settlements enumerated in the 2002 frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River.

or mosquito nets to catch fish as an importantsupplement to their diet. While their exclusionmay be potentially problematic in terms of under-standing fisheries livelihoods and the impact ofmanagement interventions on local inhabitants,the research focused on fishers using dugout ca-noes and nets for three reasons: First, the typesof artisanal fishers recorded in our study arethose normally targeted by management interven-tions like TBNRM and CBNRM. Second, fishingwith mosquito nets are most frequently practicedwhen water is draining out of the floodplains andillegal and controversial; hence users would beunlikely to reveal their fishing practices to oursurvey team. Finally, catches from mosquito nets,along with hook and line fishing, are very smallcompared to gill and dragnet fishing (Næsje et al.2003).

The fishers inhabiting the settlements camefrom a broad range of ethnic backgrounds, with11 different ethnic groups present in the region.The most common ethnic groups overall wereLozi and Subia, accounting for 61 percent and20 percent of fisher affiliations overall. Namib-ian settlements were overall much less diverse,with only four ethnic groups recorded and over90 percent of respondents belonging to one ofthe two major ethnic groups. In Zambia, 11 ethnic



Table 2Fishing assets and activities reported by fishers surveyed during the 2002 frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River

Boat & net Boat only Net only

Fishing asset ownership by fishers (Significant; χ2 = 16.02, p ≤ 0.05)Namibia (n = 98) 84 (86%)∗ 7 (7%)∗ 7 (7%)∗

Zambia (n = 443) 288 (65%) 80 (18%) 75 (17%)

Gill nets Dragnets Both gill and drag Hook and line

Fishing activity (Significant: χ2 = 7.90, p ≤ 0.001)Namibia (n = 94) 87 (93%) 4 (4%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%)Zambia (n = 409) 351 (86%) 52 (13%) 2 (<1%) 4 (1%)

∗Cell χ2 residual value above 2 or below –2.

groups were recorded and 78 percent of fishersbelonged to the Lozi or Subia ethnic groups.

Fishing assets recorded consisted of mokoros(dugout canoes) and fishing nets (Table 2). Whilethere is a statistically significant difference in thenumbers of Namibians and Zambians identifyingdifferent assets, the majority of fishers in bothinstances own both a boat and a net. Proportion-ately more Namibians owned both, while a higherpercentage of Zambians owned either just a boator just a net.

The most common fishing gear used by fish-ers were nets. Nets can be distinguished betweengill nets and dragnets. Gill nets are typically setovernight for passive capture of fish, whereasdragnets are actively pulled through the water.While there is more gear on the Zambian side(reflecting the larger population), most fishers onboth sides of the river use gill nets and there isno statistically significant difference in the num-bers of Namibian and Zambian fishers using gillor dragnets (Table 2). Both groups used similarmesh sizes (Figure 3). The majority of nets re-ported by fishers had a mesh size between 63and 76 mm.

Rules and authority: National law in bothcountries does not distinguish access and tenurebetween different types of fresh water bodies.However, customary law in the Upper Zambezifloodplains does provide for kin-linked tenureof permanent and ephemeral ponds and water-ways (silalanda) as described above. We thereforewanted to know how tenure and access mightvary throughout the survey area. Of those fish-ers interviewed, only 16 percent of Namibian fish-

ers and 17 percent of Zambian fishers indicatedthat permission was needed to fish. Thus, mostfishers on both sides of the river see the fish-ery as predominantly open access. Those whoresponded that permission was needed to fishidentified specific bodies of water where permis-sion was required, with Namibian fishers identify-ing mulapos (small seasonal or permanent lakes)most frequently (62 percent) and Zambian fish-ers identifying streams most frequently (39 per-cent) (Table 3). There was a significant differencein Namibian and Zambian fisher responses to thisquestion.

A total of 60 percent of Namibian fishers and32 percent of Zambian fishers said that no fish-ing methods were prohibited (statistically signifi-cant difference, χ2 = 27.72, p < 0.0001). Amongthe remaining fishers, small mesh nets (note thatthe specific minimum mesh size was not asked)were the most frequently cited as banned byNamibians versus dragnets by Zambians (Table 3).The differences in responses by Namibian andZambian fishers are statistically significant, al-though the conditions for a χ2 test are violatedsince no Namibians identified closed seasons asa management measure. One method does standout; while 20 percent of Zambian identified closeseasons as a management method, no Namib-ians did so. Fishers who cited certain methods asbeing prohibited or management measures werealso asked if illegal fishing took place and 59 per-cent of Namibians and 56 percent of Zambiansagreed that it did (no significant difference, χ2 =0.1275, p = 0.7210).

Fishers who cited management restrictionswere also asked who was responsible for making



Namibia

Mesh size (in.)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

# n

ets

record

ed

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Gill

Drag

Zambia

Mesh size (in.)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Gill

Drag

# n

ets

record

ed

Figure 3Frequency distribution of mesh sizes of nets reported by Namibian and Zambian fishers surveyed in the 2002 frame survey of the Upper ZambeziRiver.

and enforcing restrictions. Of these, 62 percentof Zambian fishers said that the government wasresponsible for restricting methods and enforc-ing rules, while 54 percent of Namibian fishersidentified traditional authorities as responsible

(Table 3) and the differences in responses are sta-tistically significant.

Perceptions of conflict: When asked if fisher-related conflicts occurred in their area, less than



Table 3Perceptions of fishing rules and authority for enforcement reported by fishers surveyed during the 2002 frame survey of the Upper ZambeziRiver

Fishing areas identified as needing permission to use for fishingRespondents could identify more than one area (Significant: χ2 = 15.9, p ≤ 0.01)

Main channel Streams Mulapos All areas

Namibia (n = 16) 4 (25%) 1 (6%) 10 (62%)∗ 1 (6%)∗

Zambia (n = 77) 27 (35%) 30 (39%) 13 (17%)∗ 7 (9%)∗

Fishing methods identified as prohibited, or management measure usedRespondents could identify more than one method or measure

Nothing Small mesh Lamp1 Dragnets Bashing Closed Season Poison

Namibian (n = 98) 59 (60%) 27 (28%) 7 (7%) 8 (8%) 8 (8%) 0 2 (2%)Zambian (n = 443) 141 (32%) 98 (22%) 58 (13%) 30 (28%) 40 (9%) 91 (20%) 3 (1%)

Institutions identified as implementing prohibited fishing measures(Significant: χ2 = 14.98 p ≤ 0.001)

Government Traditional authority Both

Namibia (n = 39) 16 (41%) 21 (54%)∗ 2 (5%)Zambia (n = 302) 187 (62%) 74 (24 %) 35 (12%)

1‘Lamp’ fishing involves fishing at night using a light to attract fish, which are then speared. ‘Bashing’ (kutumpula) is done by striking thewater with a broad piece of wood to scare fish from vegetation into nets.∗Cell χ2 residual value above 2 or below –2.

a fifth of Namibians (18 percent) and just overa quarter (28 percent) of Zambian fishers re-sponded that they did (no significant differencein perceptions of whether or not conflict exists,χ2 = 3.678, p = 0.06), suggesting that conflictis not a major issue for the majority of fisherson both sides of the river. Among those who didperceive conflict, Namibians identified Zambiansas the greatest source of conflict, followed byfellow Namibians in general and their immediateneighbours. Zambians identified other Zambiansand their immediate neighbours as the largestsources of conflict, while few Zambians identi-fied Namibians as sources of conflict (Table 4).Namibians perceived fishing without permissionas the greatest source of conflict, while Zambianssaw sources of conflict spread equally betweenaccess, fishing practices and too many nets (Ta-ble 4), but these differences were not statisticallysignificant.

Opinions on management: When asked, 49percent of Namibians and 79 percent of Zam-bians said that the fishery should be managedand the difference is significant (χ2 = 37.21,p < 0.0001). Of Namibians and Zambians who

supported management, the majority of bothgroups identified their respective national gov-ernment as being the most suitable to managefisheries (Table 5). Following this, Zambians thenpreferred co-management by governments andtraditional authorities, while traditional authori-ties were identified by 25 percent of Namibiansand 9 percent of Zambians as most suitable.The differences in responses by Namibian andZambian fishers regarding management regimesare statistically significant.

The purpose of fishing regulations was re-garded by most fishers of either group to befor ‘conserving fish’ (85 percent of Namibiansand 93 percent of Zambians), with very fewidentifying ‘keeping outsiders away’ as a reasonfor regulation (Table 5). There were no significantdifferences according to nationality regardingpurpose of management.

Discussion

We begin by first summarizing and discussingour results. Then, we consider what implicationsour results have for hybrid CBNRM-TBNRM fish-eries management in the region.



Table 4Perceptions of conflict reported by fishers surveyed during the 2002 frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River

People Namibians &here Namibians Zambians Zambians

Sources of conflict by groupNamibia (n = 18) 1 (5%) 3 (17%) 14 (78%) 0Zambia (n = 123) 46 (37%) 16 (13%) 60 (48%) 1 (1%)

Fishing without Banned Too manyasking methods nets

Sources of conflict by cause (Not significant: χ2 = 4.19, p ≤ 0.10)Namibia (n = 18) 9 (50%) 7 (39%) 2 (11%)Zambia (n = 123) 40 (32%) 41 (33%) 42 (35%)

Table 5Views of future management reported by fishers surveyed during the2002 frame survey of the Upper Zambezi River

TraditionalGovernment Both authority

Preference for regulating institution(Significant: χ2 = 11.28, p ≤ 0.01)Namibia (n = 48) 27 (56%) 9 (19%) 12 (25%)∗

Zambia (n = 350) 219 (62%) 99 (28%) 32 (9%)∗

Conserve Keep outsidersfish away Both

Purpose of fishing regulations(Not significant: χ2 = 5.79, p ≤ 0.10)Namibia (n = 48) 41 (85%) 3 (6%) 4 (8%)Zambia (n = 345)1 322 (93%) 5 (1%) 18 (5%)

1Five responses missing.∗Cell χ2 residual value above 2 or below –2.

There has been a change in the numbers ofsettlements on the river over the course of thelast twenty years, with over a third of all river-side settlements and almost two-thirds of Namib-ian settlements, having been established in thelast twenty years (Figure 2). These findings sup-port anecdotal accounts from Namibian fishersthat numbers of fishing settlements, fishers andfishing activity have increased over time, trendsthat may reflect endogenous population growth(Mendelsohn and Roberts 1997) and perhaps anincreased importance of fishing for some house-holds (Abbott 2005). While we do not have re-liable historical data on fishing exploitation tocompare against present levels, we assume that

as settlements along the river have increased, sohas fishing activity.

Other political, historic, and geographic factorshave likely contributed to settlement patterns.Politically, the end of South Africa’s occupationof Namibia in 1990 led to a cessation of bor-der hostilities as well as increased freedom ofmovement for Namibians. Historically, the largeroverall number of fishers and settlements on theZambian side of the river reflects the long occu-pation and active commerce on the northern bankof the Zambezi River in both pre-colonial andcolonial eras (Gluckmann1968). By contrast, dur-ing colonial and pre-colonial times the Namibianside of the river was used largely as a source offish, reeds or grazing, with relatively few peopleactually living along the river (Gluckman 1968;Prins 1980; Fisch 1999; Herbert 2002, 78 & 97).This settlement pattern was and is linked to ge-ography, as the Namibian side’s higher likelihoodof inundation makes settlement more difficultand explains why the majority of Namibian set-tlements are seasonal rather than permanent.

The ethnic diversity in Zambian and Namibiansettlements is an outcome of pre-colonial ethnicdistributions as well as the colonial and post-colonial institutions that maintained them. Thearea of Zambia covered in our survey is a zoneof convergence for several different ethnic affini-ties and this reflects the long history of com-merce in the region. In contrast, the Namibianarea is mainly composed of two major ethnicgroups that historically dominated in the area.While most Namibians living along the river haverelatives on the Zambian side of the river, border



restrictions during the South African occupationof Namibia and particularly during the bush warof the 1970s and 1980s, prevented cross-bordermigration. In addition, historical reports and re-cent events (such as the attempted secession ofthe Caprivi Region in 1999) suggest that inhabi-tants of the Namibian part of the floodplains aremore resistant to migration or union with otherareas (Stanley 2002).

The similarity in the types of fishing assets onboth sides of the river, as well as the similar-ity in mesh sizes used by Namibian and Zambianfishers reflects the biological and social natureof a floodplain fishery. Given the high variabil-ity of the resource, it makes more sense for par-ticipants in a fishery, regardless of their income,to invest in very simple assets, such as monofil-ament nets and dugout canoes with investmentsgoing into increasing the number of units, ratherthan technology (Scudder and Conelly 1985; Jul-Larsen et al. 2003). In this way, participants in thefishery can more easily enter or leave as opportu-nity costs change, due in part to the seasonalityof floodplain fisheries (Welcomme 1985; Allisonand Ellis 2001).

While the types of fishing assets used are sim-ilar, our survey found a significant difference inthe proportion of asset ownership. Namibian fish-ers were more likely to own both boats and nets.At the national scale, Namibian fishers are partof a stronger economy and currency than Zambia,as well as a formalized system of social pensions(Devereux 2001). Namibian fishers may thereforehave greater potential access to income that canin turn be invested in individual fishing assets.

Gill nets were the predominant fishing gearused throughout the survey area. While the dif-ference in the use of gill versus dragnets wasstatistically insignificant, a higher proportion ofZambians used dragnets and it is worth consider-ing these differences in the context of the overallsize of the population of fishers in Namibia andZambia. Gill netting is a passive fishing methodthat can be done by one fisher in a dugout, whiledragnetting is an active method, requiring teamsof two or more fishers. The higher proportion ofdragnet use amongst Zambian fishers may be re-lated to the apparent lower levels of individualnet ownership, favouring group activity. Similarly,the higher ownership of both nets and boats byNamibians may be out of necessity, as there are

not enough fishers to work cooperatively. How-ever, since our survey did not include questionsabout collaborative fishing activity, we can notconfirm this supposition. Further research on thesocial norms of fishing is required.

A low number of respondents claimed thatpermission is needed to fish and almost onethird of Zambians and two thirds of Namibiansreported that no fishing methods were prohib-ited. These findings support the claim by Scud-der and Conelly (1985) as well as Bene et al.(2003) that most floodplain fisheries have lowlevels of management. The differences in areasidentified as needing permission for access (Ta-ble 3), i.e., the much higher percentage of Namib-ian’s claiming permission is needed to accessmulapos, may reflect the physical differences ofeach side: the more floodplain-dominated topog-raphy of the Namibian side results in more water-courses and pools and hence more potential fortenure over these distinct water bodies. Regard-less, concerns about access to mulapos must beseen in the context of overall low levels of con-cerns about access among Namibians. A similarsituation was reported in case studies by Hitch-cock (1995) and Olomola (1998) regarding accessrules for river fishing in Botswana and Nigeria, re-spectively. While outsiders were expected to askthe ostensible ‘owner’ of a body of water for per-mission to fish, in most cases permission wasgiven and it was only in extreme situations, suchas drought, that exclusion might occur.

The broad and varying range of prohibitedfishing measures reported by fishers is likely dueto the fact that the survey spanned two provincesand wards with traditional authorities that havepotential roles in fisheries management. Theseoverlapping institutions have led to a mosaicof different fishing management policies andenforcement measures. This finding is also re-flected in a related study of fisheries regulationsand the level of traditional authorities, wherespecific prohibited measures varied between theboundaries of each traditional authority along a100 km stretch (Purvis et al. 2003). This situa-tion is typical of transboundary resources, withmultiple users responsible to different authori-ties, with different rules, capabilities and meansof enforcement (Jones and Chonguica 2001).The significant difference between the numberof Zambians and Namibians believing that no



methods are prohibited is likely accounted for bythe fact that Zambia has standardized rules that,while not evenly enforced, are likely known byfishers.

The difference in the apparent role of govern-ment and traditional authorities in each countryis also influenced by the priority each country’sgovernment gives to inland fisheries. In Zambia,fisheries are part of a cabinet-level Ministry, withdecentralized offices throughout the country (P.Kapaasa, DFO staff, personal conversation with J.Abbott, July 2002). Thus, the national governmenthas played a role in local fisheries managementto date. In Namibia, fisheries in general havea more influential profile as a government re-sponsibility; however, most emphasis is given tomarine, rather than freshwater, fisheries. At thetime of research, there was no inland fisherieslegislation and limited extension services. More-over, Namibian fisheries administration is highlycentralized. At the time of the survey, the clos-est inland fisheries office to the Caprivi was lo-cated over 1,000 km to the south. Thus, whilegovernment is ostensibly responsible for manage-ment, the present institutional and policy vacuummeans that fisheries management is limited, ex-plaining the perception amongst most Namibianfishers that no methods are prohibited.

Illegal fishing was reported to occur, with Zam-bians being identified as the most common cul-prits by fishers on both sides of the river. Thiscan be explained in a number of ways. (1) Theabsolute numbers of fishers on either side alsomake it more likely that Zambian fishers are il-legally fishing, at least visibly so, or that conflictbetween fishers involve Zambians. (2) The geog-raphy makes the Namibian side more desirable,so fishing without permission or out of territoryis more likely. (3) Diversity of ethnic groups inZambia means that the outsider/insider divide isnot just between Zambians/Namibians—Zambiansidentify other Zambians as part of the problem.The paramount Chief and other representativesof the traditional authority in Mwandi (Zambia)area have cited a growing trend of ‘outsiders’moving from other areas of Zambia and estab-lishing themselves along the river.

Given the prevalence of fishing as a livelihoodin households with access to fishing throughoutthe study area (Abbott 2005) and the percep-tion of illegal fishing occurring, it is not surpris-

ing that an albeit low number of fishers reportfisheries-related conflicts. Zambians are cited asthe most frequent group with whom conflicts oc-cur by both sides. However, the causes of con-flicts are different on either side of the border.Namibians identify access and methods as beingequally important sources of conflict but hardlymention the issue of too many nets, whereasZambian conflicts are spread equally amongst thethree categories. One potential explanation forthis difference is that due to the floodplain’s to-pography, tenure-related water bodies (such asstreams and mulapos) occur more frequently onthe Namibian side; hence asserting tenure overthese areas may be a greater issue for Namibians.

Only three-quarters of Zambian fishers and lessthan half of Namibian fishers perceived a needfor fisheries management. The majority of fishersthat did see a need for management supportedmanagement by government over traditional au-thorities. The stated support for government maybe biased by the fact that the frame survey it-self was led and conducted in part by govern-ment staff. The higher level of support amongstNamibians for management by traditional author-ities may be due to the history of devolutionof responsibility for fisheries to the local level,which had only lapsed into ambiguity in 1990.By contrast, traditional authorities on the Zam-bian side of the river had experienced increasedcurtailment of their powers, both related to fish-eries and in general, upon independence in 1964(Bell-Cross 1974; Flint 2003). Limited backing formanagement by both government and traditionalauthorities could be due to the novelty or inher-ent ambiguity of the concept of co-managementitself (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson 1999), especiallyin areas with overlapping national and traditionaladministrations and borders.

Perceptions about the rationale of regulationsgave a promising result, as most Zambians andNamibians identified with the concept of conserv-ing fish stocks, rather than excluding others asthe goal. This is cause for optimism that regula-tions will be used in a productive way to over-come issues of access and method cited, despitethe current environment of conflict.

What implications do these results have foremerging hybrid CBNRM and TBNRM efforts inthe area? We address four important aspects ofthis question, namely, the growth and asymmetry



of population and fishing effort in the area, sim-ilarities in fishing assets and activity, sources ofconflict (related to fishing and otherwise) andmanagement capacity.

The asymmetry in settlement patterns has twopotential consequences for CBNRM and TBNRM.The number of settlements, high population,and ethnic diversity on the Zambian side of theriver will make CBNRM more complex, as thereare more stakeholders to consider and more‘communities’ to account for. Community-basedmanagement in Namibia may be less complicatedand Namibians were more supportive of man-agement by traditional authorities. For TBNRM,Zambian fishers may claim larger representationand access to more fishing, particularly theproductive fishing grounds in the Namibianportion of the floodplain, as Zambians are bothmore numerous and their settlements are morepermanent. Namibian fishers would undoubtedlyperceive their minority status under TBRNM withsome concern.

The significance of potentially higher levels offishing and smaller mesh sizes to CBNRM andTBNRM is ambiguous. Highly variable fisheriessuch as floodplains appear to be relativelyrobust to high levels of exploitation comparedto temperate fisheries (Jul-Larsen et al. 2003;Welcomme 1985), meaning that limited manage-ment intervention may be needed. Furthermore,the similarity in fishing assets and patterns ofexploitation amongst fishers implies that whatmanagement intervention might take place couldbe relatively simple and uniform, a prospectappealing to proponents of both CBNRM and TB-NRM. Nevertheless, the asymmetry in topographymeans differences in tenure and managementdemands can lead to ‘conflicts of assignment’(Ostrom et al. 1994), when fishery resourcesare not spread evenly, causing some fishinggrounds to be more productive and hence moredesirable, than others. In effect, conflicts mayarise not due to resource scarcity, but ratherresource distribution (e.g., Turner 2004, 871).Potential conflicts over access to fishing may beespecially apparent since most of the floodplainsand in turn, the most suitable fishing grounds,lie within Namibian territory.

Existing sources of fishery-related conflict re-ported in our results lend support to the signif-icance of asymmetry in settlement. Most respon-

dents identified Zambians as being the greatestsource of conflict, a reasonable finding consider-ing that Zambians are the most numerous. Theethnic diversity of Zambian settlements makesCBNRM and TBNRM more challenging. From abroader context, inhabitants of the area are likelyto invoke a broad range of identities, rangingfrom family to region, influencing how claimsto different resources are asserted. These fluidpoints of reference do not easily fit into the viewof a repaired social fabric envisioned by some ad-vocates of TBNRM.

Similarly, the differences in levels and degreesof management as well as in the capacity tomanage inland fisheries challenge efforts tomake management locally relevant and con-sistent under CBNRM/TBNRM. The Namibiangovernment has a limited (but growing) presencein fisheries management in the region, bothin terms of infrastructure and local legitimacy.The mixed views regarding the most appro-priate institutions for managing fisheries posesimilar potential difficulties. The majority offishers’ support for government management ineither country reflects experiences with specificgovernments, which differ considerably in thecase of Namibia and Zambia. In Zambia, thenational government is responsible for fisheriesmanagement and indeed assumed considerableresponsibility from traditional authorities uponindependence. By contrast, until 1990, Namibiangovernment policy mandated responsibility forfisheries management to traditional authorities.Hence, support for the government by Zambianand Namibian fishers may carry different as-sumptions of the role of other institutions.

The rationales that fishers (as well as otherstakeholders, including NGOs and states) useto support different institutions may arise notout of an institutions’ potential to manage,but rather the degree to which its legitimacyis reinforced. For example, traditional authori-ties and NGO-TBNRM initiatives may both backcommunity-level management, but for differentreasons. Support of CBNRM legitimizes alreadyexisting traditional authority structures; whereasfor NGOs, a focus on the local scale makesnational boundaries seem all the less relevant,backing a rationale for TBNRM. Fishers mean-while may support government managementbecause it has been so limited to date.



Conclusion

Current efforts to incorporate aspects of com-munity and ecosystem in the management oftransboundary resources in southern Africa havebeen critiqued on the basis that differencesin inhabitants’ characteristics, livelihoods andattitudes towards management are overlooked,or at best assumed to largely correspond withgoals of regional collaboration. These issuesbecome particularly important when there is ahigh potential for variation in livelihoods andmanagement, such as when neighbouring stateshave contrasting socio-economic environments,or the livelihood itself is inherently variable,such as artisanal fisheries.

We have described an example of a sharedfishery resource in a river that also acts as aninternational boundary. The low level of man-agement reported throughout the area is char-acteristic of floodplain fisheries and implies thata hybrid arrangement could be made amenableto variable intensity of fishing and movementof fishers. Despite the apparent differences inthe socio-economic and political environments ofNamibia and Zambia, fishers on both sides of theriver have similar assets and fishing behaviour.There was support amongst fishers surveyed onboth sides of the river for management of thefisheries. Moreover, the most frequent rationalereported by fishers to justify management,namely, the conservation of fisheries, is encour-aging as it does not immediately presume thatone group has more of a claim over resourcesthan another. The conflicts reported by Namib-ians are largely linked to requesting permissionto fish in an area, rather than outright encroach-ment (Table 4). This suggests that negotiation,rather than strict rules of tenure and access, maybe a more suitable approach to manage the area’sfisheries.

It is tempting to assume enough commonground and flexibility exists between users, liveli-hoods and institutions to make hybrid fisheriesmanagement an appealing option. Our findingsdo not necessarily contradict this view. However,we underline the constant risks of oversimplifi-cation inherent in CBRNM and TBNRM and howthese conceptual flaws may be magnified in hy-brid management of resources. Management ofthe fishery as an ecosystem addresses fluctua-

tions in the availability of fish and fishing ar-eas. However, the spatial asymmetry of fishersand fishing effort makes it likely that manage-ment at the community scale will focus on ac-cess and use of Namibian resources by Zambianfishers. The greatest challenges in attempting toblend ecosystem and local scales will not arisefrom how it affects the management of the fish-ery, but rather on the myriad of social and po-litical identities that are reinforced, challenged orcreated by the process.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the inhabitants of the survey areafor their help and patience. Amon Ndumba’s knowledge andresearch ideas formed important parts of this research, mak-ing his untimely passing all the more a loss. We are gratefulfor support from the U.S. Agency for Development, NamibiaMission, the World Wildlife Fund and the International Devel-opment Research Council of Canada. Figure 1 was preparedby staff at the Namibia Nature Foundation. We are gratefulfor comments made by anonymous referees on an earlier ver-sion of the text. The findings and opinions expressed in thisarticle do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of theorganizations acknowledged here or mentioned in the text.Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of theauthors.

References

ABBOTT, J. 2001 ‘Traditional fisheries management in the EasternCaprivi region of Namibia’ Proceedings of the FAO ExpertConsultation on the Management of Small-Scale Fisheries inSub-Saharan Africa, Accra, Ghana December 2001

—. 2005 ‘Fishing for a living: Subsistence and income uses ofa common property resource in the Upper Zambezi flood-plains’ Ph.D. Thesis (Durham, NC: Duke University)

ABBOTT, J., HAY, C., KALONGA, M., NÆSJE, T., and PURVIS, J. 2003 Joint FrameSurvey of the Upper Zambezi River (Namibia/Zambia) Direc-torate of Environmental Affairs Research Discussion Paper(Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism)

ADAMS, W. 2003 ‘Nature and the colonial mind’ in DecolonizingNature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era,eds W. Adams and M. Mulligan (London: Earthscan) 17–50

ADAMS, W., and HULME, D. 2001 ‘Changing narratives, policies andpractices in African conservation’ in African Wildlife andLivelihoods: The Promise and Performance of CommunityConservation, eds D. Hulme and M. Murphree (Harare:Weaver Press) 9–23

ADAMS, W., and MULLIGAN, M. 2003 Decolonizing Nature: Strategies forConservation in a Post-Colonial Era (London: Earthscan)

AGRAWAL, A., and GIBSON, C. 1999 ‘Enchantment and disenchantment:The role of community in natural resource conservation’World Development 27(4), 629–649



ALEXANDER, D. 1990 ‘Bioregionalism: Science or Sensibility?’ Envi-ronmental Ethics 12(2), 161–173

ALLISON, E., and ELLIS, F. 2001 ‘The livelihoods approach and man-agement of small-scale fisheries’ Marine Policy 25(5), 377–388

ARTHINGTON, A., LORENZEN, K., PUSEY, B., ABELL, R., HALLS, A., WINEMILLER, K., AAR-

RINGTON, D., and BARAN, E. Forthcoming ‘River fisheries: Ecologi-cal basis for management and conservation’ in Ecology andManagement of Large Rivers, eds R. Welcomme and T. Petr(Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission)

ASWANI, S. 2005 ‘Customary sea tenure in Oceania as a case ofrights-based fishery management: Does it work?’ Reviews inFish Biology and Fisheries 15, 285–307

BABCOCK, E., and PIKITCH, E. 2004 ‘Can we reach agreement on astandardized approach to ecosystem-based fishery manage-ment?’ Bulletin of Marine Science 74, 685–692

BARROW, E., and MURPHREE, M. 2001 ‘Community conservation: Fromconcept to practice’ in African Wildlife and Livelihoods. ThePromise and Performance of Community Conservation, edsD. Hulme and M. Murphree (Harare: Weaver Press) 24–37

BELL-CROSS, G. 1974 ‘A fisheries survey of the Upper ZambeziRiver System’ Occasional Papers of the National Museumsand Monuments of Rhodesia B5(5), 278–338

BENE, C., NEILAND, A., JOLLEY, T., LADU, B., OVIE, S., SULE, O., BABA, M., BELAL, E., MIND-

JIMBA, K., TIOTSOP, F., DARA, L., ZAKARA, A., and QUENSIERE, J. 2003 ‘Naturalresource institutions and property rights in inland Africanfisheries’ International Journal of Social Economics 30(3),275–301

BERKES, F., MAHNON, R., MCCONNEY, P., POLLNAC, R., and POMEROY, R. 2001 Man-aging Small-scale Fisheries: Alternative Directions and Meth-ods (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre)

BERRY, S. 1992 ‘Hegemony on a shoestring: Indirect rule and ac-cess to agricultural land’ Africa 62(3), 327–355

BROSIUS, J., TSING, A., and ZERNER, C. 1998 ‘Representing communities:Histories and politics of community-based natural resourcemanagement’ Society & Natural Resources 11(2), 157–168

BYERS, B. 1997 Environmental Threats and Opportunities inNamibia: A Comprehensive Assessment (Windhoek: Depart-ment of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environmentand Tourism)

CASTRO, F., and MCGRATH, D. 2003 ‘Moving towards sustainability inthe local management of floodplain lake fisheries in theBrazilian Amazon’ Human Organization 62(2), 123–133

CHENJE, M. 2000 State of the Environment Zambezi Basin 2000(Lusaka: SADC/IUCN/ZRA/SARDC)

DEVEREUX, S. 2001 Social Pensions in Namibia and South Africa,IDS Discussion Paper No. 379 (Sussex: Institute of Develop-ment Studies)

DE WIT, M., and STANKIEWICZ, J. 2006 ‘Changes in surface water sup-ply across Africa with predicted climate change’ Science311(5769), 1917–1921

DUFFY, R. 2006 ‘The potential and pitfalls of global environmen-tal governance: The politics of transfrontier conservationareas in Southern Africa’ Political Geography 25, 89–112

FISCH, M. 1999 The Caprivi Strip during the German Colonial Pe-riod 1980 to 1914 (Windhoek: Out of Africa Publishers)

FLINT, L. 2003 ‘State-building in central southern Africa: Citizen-ship and subjectivity in Barotseland and Caprivi’ Interna-tional Journal of African Historical Studies 36(2), 393–428

GEHEB, K., and SARCH, M.-T. 2002 Africa’s Inland Fisheries: The Man-agement Challenge (Kampala: Fountain)

GLUCKMANN, M. 1968 Economy of the Central Barotse Plain.(Manchester: Manchester University Press)

HALLS, A., WELCOMME, R., and BURN, R. 2006 ‘The relationship betweenmulti-species catch and effort: Among fishery comparisons’Fisheries Research 77, 78–83

HARA, M. 1996 Problems of Introducing Community Participationin Fisheries Management: Lesson from the Lake Malombeand Upper Shire River (Malawi) Participatory Fisheries Man-agement Programme (Bellville: University of the WesternCape)

HARO, G., DOYO, G., and MCPEAK, J. 2005 ‘Linkages between community,environmental, and conflict management: Experiences fromnorthern Kenya’ World Development 33(2), 285–299

HAROLDSDOTTIR, G. 2000 ‘Tradition, Co-Management, Diversity andthe FAO in Small-Scale Inland Fisheries in Africa’ in Stateand Community in Fisheries Management: Power, Policyand Practice, eds E. Durrenburger and T. King (Greenwood:Bergin & Garvey) 131–148

HERBERT, E. 2002 Twilight on the Zambezi: Late Colonialism inCentral Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)

HITCHCOCK, R.K. 1995 ‘Centralization, resource depletion, and co-ercive conservation among the Tyua of the NortheasternKalahari’ Human Ecology 23(2), 169–198

HOGGARTH, D., COWAN, V., HALLS, A., AERON-THOMAS, M., MCGREGOR, J., GARAWAY,

C., PAYNE, I., and WELCOMME, R. 1999 Management Guidelines forAsian Floodplain River Fisheries (Rome: Food and Agricul-tural Organization)

HULME D., and MURPHREE, M. 2001 African Wildlife and Livelihoods:The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation(Oxford: James Currey)

JONES, B., and CHONGUICA, E. 2001 Review and Analysis of SpecificTransboundary Natural Resource Management Initiatives inthe Southern African Region (Harare: IUCN)

JUL-LARSEN, E., KOLDING, J., OVERA, R., NIELSEN, J., and ZWIETEN, P. 2003 Manage-ment, Co-Management or No Management? Major Dilemmasin Southern Africa Freshwater Fisheries (Rome: Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations)

LEACH M., MEARNS, R., and SCOONES, I. 1997 ‘Challenges to community-based sustainable development—dynamics, entitlements, in-stitutions’ IDS Bulletin 28(4), 4–14

LI, T. 2002 ‘Engaging simplifications: Community-based re-source management, market processes and state agendasin upland southeast Asia’ World Development 30(2), 265–283

MAGOME, H., and MUROMBEDZI, J. 2003 ‘Sharing South African NationalParks: Community land and conservation in a democraticSouth Africa’ in Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conser-vation in a Post-Colonial Era, eds W. Dams and M. Mulligan(London: Earthscan) 108–134

MALASHA, I. 2003 Colonial and Postcolonial Fisheries Regulations:The Cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe (Rome: Food and Agri-cultural Organization)

MCDERMOTT-HUGHES, D. 2001 ‘Cadastral politics in Zimbabwe andMozambique’ Development and Change 32, 748–767

—. 2005 ‘Third nature: Making space and time in the GreatLimpopo conservation area’ Cultural Anthropology 20(2),157–184

MCGRATH, D., DE CASTRO, F., FUTEMMA DOMINGUES, C., DE AMARAL, B., and CAL-

ABRIA, J. 1993 ‘Fisheries and the evolution of resource man-agement on the lower Amazon floodplain’ Human Ecology21(2), 167–195



MENDELSOHN, J., and ROBERTS, C. 1997 An Environmental Profile andAtlas of the Caprivi (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan)

MOSES, B., UDOIDIONG, O., and OKON, A. 2002 ‘A statistical survey of theartisanal fisheries of south-eastern Nigeria and the influ-ence of hydroclimatic factors on catch and resource pro-ductivity’ Fisheries Research 57, 267–278

MUROMBEDZI, J. 2003 ‘Devolving the expropriation of nature: The‘devolution’ of wildlife management in southern Africa’ inDecolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era, eds W. Adams and M. Mulligan (Sterling: Earth-scan) 135–151

NÆSJE, T., STRAND, R., HAY, C., PURVIS, J., THORSTAD, E., ABBOTT, J., and NICKANOR, N.

2003 Shared Resource Management on the Zambezi/ChobeSystems in Northeast Namibia: Current Practices and FutureOpportunities (River fisheries study: February 2002–2003.Unpublished Report to USAID)

NEUMANN, R. 1997 ‘Primitive ideas: protected area buffer zonesand the politics of land in Africa’ Development and Change28(3), 559–582

NIELSEN, J., DEGNBOL, P., VISWANATHAN, K., AHMED, M., HARA, M., and ABDULLAH,

N. 2004 ‘Fisheries co-management: An institutional innova-tion? Lessons from South East Asia and Southern Africa’Marine Policy 28(15), 1–16

NORMANN, A., NIELSEN, J., and SVERDRUP-JENSEN, S. 1998 Fisheries Co-Management in Africa. Proceedings from a Regional Work-shop on Fisheries Co-Management Research (Hirtshals, Den-mark: Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Com-munity Development)

NUNAN, F. 2006 ‘Empowerment and institutions: Managing fish-eries in Uganda’ World Development 34(7), 1316–1332

OLOMOLA, A. 1998 ‘Sources and resolution of conflicts in Nigerianartisanal fisheries’ Society & Natural Resources 11(2), 894–920

OSTROM, E., GARDNER, R., and WALKER, J. 1994 Rules, Games andCommon-pool Resources (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress)

OWINO, J. P. 2000 Traditional and Central Management Systems ofthe Lake Victoria Fisheries in Kenya (Nairobi: IUCN EasternAfrica Programme)

PEACE PARKS FOUNDATION. 2006 Terms of Reference for a Consul-tancy to Undertake a Pre-Feasibility Study of the ProposedKavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (Avail-able at: http://www.peaceparks.org/new/news.php?pid =72&mid = 555, accessed 15 September 2006).

PIDO, M., POMEROY, R., GARCES, L., and CARLOS, M. 1997 ‘A rapid appraisalapproach to evaluation of community-level fisheries man-agement systems: Framework and field application at se-lected coastal fishing villages in the Philippines and Indone-sia’ Coastal Management 25, 183–204

POMEROY, R., and RIVERA-GUIEB, R. 2006 Fishery Co-Management: APractical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: CABI)

PRINS, G. 1980 The Hidden Hippopotamus: Reappraisal in AfricanHistory: The Early Colonial Experience in Western Zambia(Oxford: Oxford University Press)

PURVIS, J. 2002 Fish and Livelihoods: Fisheries on the EasternFloodplains, Caprivi (Windhoek, Namibia: Directorate of En-vironmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism)

PURVIS, J., ABBOTT, J., NÆSJE, T., and HAY, C. 2003 Shared ResourceManagement on the Zambezi/Chobe Systems in NortheastNamibia: Current Practices and Future Opportunities Exist-ing Fishery Management Systems and Implications for Fu-ture Management (Unpublished Report to USAID)

RAMUTSINDELA, M. 2004 ‘Glocalisation and nature conservationstrategies in 21st-century Southern Africa’ Tijdschrift voorEconomische en Sociale Geografie 95(1), 61–72

ROBBINS, P. 2004 Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction (Ames:Blackwell Publishing)

SADC. 2001 Protocol on Fisheries (Gaborone: Southern AfricanDevelopment Community)

SADOFF, C., WHITTINGTON, D., and GREY, D. 2002 Africa’s InternationalRivers: An Economic Perspective (Washington, DC: TheWorld Bank)

SANCHIRICO, J., and WILEN, J. 2001 ‘A bioeconomic model of marinereserve creation’ Journal of Environmental Economics andManagement 42, 257–276

SARCH, M., and BIRKETT, C. 2000 ‘Fishing and farming at Lake Chad:responses to lake-level fluctuations’ Geographical Journal166(2), 156–172

SCHROEDER, R. 1999 ‘Geographies of environmental interven-tion in Africa’ Progress in Human Geography 23(3), 359–378

SCUDDER, T., and CONELLY, T. 1985 Management Systems for RiverineFisheries (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization)

SHERMAN, K., and DUDA, A. 1999 ‘Large marine ecosystems: Anemerging paradigm for fishery sustainability’ Fisheries24(4), 15–26

SHORR, N. 2000 ‘Early utilization of flood recession soils as a re-sponse to the intensification of fishing and upland agricul-ture: Resource-use dynamics in a large Tikuna community’Human Ecology 28(1), 73–107

STANLEY, W. 2002 ‘Namibia’s unstable northern frontier’ Tijd-schrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 93(4), 369–382

SNEDDON, C., and FOX, C. 2006 ‘Rethinking transboundary waters: Acritical hydropolitics of the Mekong Basin’ Political Geogra-phy 25, 181–202

THOMAS, D., and DANJAJI, M. 1997 ‘Mapping change in time andspace: Floodplain fishing communities in Nigeria’ PLA Notes30, 29–33

THOMPSON, P., SULTANA, P., and ISLAM, N. 2003 ‘Lessons fromcommunity-based management of floodplain fisheries inBangladesh’ Journal of Environmental Management 69(3),307–321

TICHELER, H., KOLDING, J., and CHANDA, B. 1998 ‘Participation of lo-cal fishermen in scientific fisheries data collection: A casestudy from the Bangweulu Swamps, Zambia’ Fisheries Man-agement and Ecology 5(1), 81–94

TURNER, M. 2004 ‘Political ecology and the moral dimensions of“resource conflicts”: The case of farmer-herder conflicts inthe Sahel’ Political Geography 23, 863–889

TURPIE, J., SMITH, B., EMERTON, L., and BARNES, J. 1999 Economic Value ofthe Zambezi Basin Wetlands (Cape Town: University of CapeTown)

TVEDTEN, I., GIRVAN, S., POMUTI, N., and VAN ROY, R. 1994 FreshwaterFisheries and Fisheries Management in Namibia (Wind-hoek: University of Namibia) Report No. 12, Social ScienceDivision

UNDP. 2005 Human Development Report 2005 (New York:United Nations Development Program)

WELCOMME, R. 1985 River Fisheries (Rome: Food and AgricultureOrganization)

WEST, H., and KLOECK-JENSON, S. 1999 ‘Betwixt and between: “Tradi-tional authority” and democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique’ African Affairs 98, 455–484



WEST, P., and BROCKINGTON, D. 2006 ‘An anthropological perspectiveon some unexpected consequences of protected areas’ Con-servation Biology 20(3), 609–616

WESTERN, D., WRIGHT, M., and STRUM, S. 1994 Natural Connections: Per-spectives in Community-Based Conservation (Washington,DC: Island Press)

WILSON, D., MEDARD, M., HARRIS, C., and WILEY, D. 1999 ‘The implicationsfor participatory fisheries management of intensified com-

mercialization on Lake Victoria’ Rural Sociology 64(4), 554–572

WOLMER, W. 2003 ‘Transboundary conservation: The politics ofecological integrity in the Great Limpopo TransfrontierPark’ Journal of Southern African Studies 29(1), 261–278

YOUNG, O. 2006 ‘Vertical interplay among scale-dependent envi-ronmental and resource regimes’ Ecology and Society 11(1),27


rivers as resources, rivers as borders: community and...

Documents