r.k.merton sociological theory

8/13/2019 R.K.merton Sociological Theory

1/13

Sociological TheoryAuthor(s): Robert K. MertonSource: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 6 (May, 1945), pp. 462-473Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2771390

Accessed: 04/11/2010 09:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The University of Chicago Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The

American Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2771390?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2771390?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/13

SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYROBERT K. MERTON

ABSTRACTThe phrase sociological theory has been used to refer to at least six types of analysis which differ signifi-cantly in their bearings on empiricalresearch. These are methodology, general orientations, conceptual analy-sis, postfactum interpretations, empirical generalizations, and sociological theory. The distinctive limits andfunctions of each are described and illustrated. A typical case of the incorporation of an empirical generaliza-tion into a theoretic system is briefly considered. The conventions of formal derivation and codificationare suggested as devices for aiding the integration of theory and empirical research.The recent history of sociological theorycan in large measure be written in terms ofan alternation between two contrastingem-phases. On the one hand, we observe thosesociologistswho seek above all to generalize,to find their way as rapidly as possible tothe formulation of sociological laws. Tend-ing to assess the significanceof sociologicalwork in terms of the scope rather than thedemonstrability of generalizations, theyeschew the triviality of detailed, small-scale observation and seek the grandeurofglobal summaries. At the other extremestands a hardy band who do not hunt too

closely the implications of their researchbut who remainconfidentand assuredthatwhat they report is so. To be sure, their re-ports of facts are verifiableand often veri-fied, but they are somewhatat a loss to re-late these facts to one another or even to ex-plain why these, rather than other, obser-vations have been made. For the firstgroupthe identifying motto would at times seemto be: We do not know whether what wesay is true, but it is at least significant.And for the radical empiricist the mottomay read: This is demonstrably so, but wecannot indicate its significance.Whateverthebasesof adherence o theoneor the other of these camps-different butnot necessarily contradictory accountingswould be provided by psychologists, sociol-ogists of knowledge, and historians of sci-ence-it is abundantly clear that there is nological basis for their being ranged againsteach other.Generalizations an be tempered,if not with mercy, at least with disciplined

observation; close, detailed observationsneed not be rendered trivial by avoidanceof their theoretical pertinence and implica-tions.With all this therewill doubtless be wide-spread if, indeed, not unanimousagreement.But this very unanimity suggests that theseremarks are platitudinous. If, however, onefunctionof theory is to explore the implica-tions of the seemingly self-evident, it maynot be amiss to look into what is entailed bysuch programmatic tatements about the re-lations of sociological theory and empiricalresearch. In doing so, every effortshould bemade to avoid dwelling upon illustrationsdrawn from the more mature sciences-such as physics and biology-not becausethese do not exhibit the logicalproblemsin-volved but because their very maturity per-mits these disciplinesto dealfruitfully withabstractions of a high order to a degreewhich, it is submitted, is not yet the casewith sociology.An indefinitely argenumberof discussionsof scientific method have setforth the logical prerequisites of scientifictheory, but, it would seem, they have oftendone so on such a high level of abstractionthat the prospect of translating these pre-cepts into current sociological research be-comes utopian. Ultimately, sociological re-search must meet the canons of scientificmethod; immediately, the task is so to ex-press these requirements that they mayhave more direct bearing on the analyticalwork which is at present feasible.The term sociologicaltheory has beenwidely used to refer to the products of sev-462


3/13

SOCIOLOGICALHEORY 463eral related but distinct activities carriedon by members of a professional groupcalled sociologists. But since these severaltypes of activity have significantlydifferentbearings upon empirical social research-since they differ in their scientific functions-they should be distinguishedfor purposesof discussion. Moreover, such discrimina-tions provide a basis for assessing the con-tributions and limitations characteristic ofeach of the followingsix types of work whichare often lumped togetheras comprisingso-ciologicaltheory: (i) methodology; (2) gen-eral sociological orientations; (3) analysisof sociologicalconcepts;(4)postfactum ocio-logical interpretations; (5) empiricalgener-alizations in sociology; and (6) sociologicaltheory.

METHODOLOGYAt the outset we shoulddistinguishclear-ly between sociological theory, which hasfor its subject matter certain aspects of theinteraction of men and is hence substantive,and methodology, or the logic of scientificprocedure. The problems of methodology

transcend those found in any one discipline,dealingeither with those common to groupsof disciplines' or, in more generalizedform,with those common to all scientificinquiry.Methodology is not peculiarly bound upwith sociological problems, and, thoughthere is a plenitude of methodological dis-cussions in books and journals of sociology,they are not therebyrenderedsociological ncharacter.Sociologists,in company with allothers who essay scientific work, must bemethodologicallywise; they must be awareof the design of investigation, the nature ofinference, the requirements of a theoreticsystem. But such knowledge does not con-tain or imply the particularcontentof socio-

logical theory. There is, in short, a clear anddecisive difference between knowinghow totest a battery of hypotheses and knowing hetheory rom which to derivehypothesesto betested.2 It is my impressionthat currentso-ciological training is more largely designedto make students understandthe first thanthe second.As Poincareobserveda half-century ago,sociologists have long been hierophants ofmethodology, thus, perhaps, diverting tal-ents and energies from the task of buildingsubstantive theory. This focus of attentionupon the logics of procedurehas its patentscientific function, since such inventories

serve a critical purpose n guidingand assess-ing both theoretical and empirical nquiries.It also reflects the growing-painsof an im-mature discipline. Just as the apprenticewho acquires new skills self-consciously ex-amines each element of these skills, in con-trast to the master who habitually prac-tices them with seeming indifferenceo theirexplicit formulation, so the exponents of adiscipline haltingly moving toward scien-tific status laboriously spell out the logicalgrounds of their procedure.The slim bookson methodology which proliferate in thefields of sociology, economics,and psychol-ogy do not find many counterparts amongthe technical works in the sciences whichhave long since come of age. Whatevertheirintellectual function, these methodologicalwritings imply the perspectives of a fledg-ling discipline, anxiously presenting itscredentialsfor full status in the fraternity ofthe sciences. But, significantlyenough, theinstances of adequate scientific methodutilizedby sociologistsfor illustrative or ex-pository methods are usually drawn fromdisciplinesotherthan sociologyitself. Twen-

I In recent years there have been several volumeswhich set forth methodological concerns ofsociology:Florian Znaniecki, The Method of Sociology (NewYork: Farrar & Rinehart, I934); R. M. MacIver,Social Causation (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1942); G. A.Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology (New York:Macmillan Co., I939); Felix Kaufmann, Methodol-ogy of the Social Sciences (New York: OxfordUniver-sity Press, 1944).

2 However, it should be noted not only that in-struments and procedures used in sociological (orother scientific) inquiry must meet metholodogicalcriteria but that they also logically presuppose sub-stantive theories. As Pierre Duhem observed in thisconnection, the instruments as well as the experi-mental results obtained in science are shot throughwith specific assumptions and theories of a substan-tive order (La Th1oriephysique [Paris: Chevalier etRiviere, I906], p. 278).


4/13

464 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYtieth-century, not sixteenth-century,phys-ics and chemistryare taken as methodologi-cal prototypes or exemplarsfor twentieth-century sociology, with little explicit rec-ognition that between sociology and theseother sciences is a differenceof millions ofman-hours of sustained scientific research.These comparisonsare inevitably program-matic rather than realistic. More appropri-ate methodologicaldemandswouldresult ina gap between methodological aspirationand actual sociologicalattainment at onceless conspicuous and less invidious.

GENERAL SOCIOLOGICALORIENTATIONS

Much of what is describedin textbooksas sociologicaltheoryconsists of generalori-entations toward substantive materials.Such orientations involve broad postulateswhich indicate types of variables which aresomehow to be taken into account ratherthan specifying determinate relationshipsbetween particularvariables. Indispensablethough these orientations are, they provideonly the broadest frameworkfor empiricalinquiry. This is the case with Durkheim'sgeneric hypothesis, which holds that thedeterminingcause of a social fact shouldbe sought among the social facts precedingit and identifies the social factor as in-.stitutional norms toward which behavTiorsoriented.3Or,again, it is said that to a cer-tain approximation t is useful to regard so-ciety as an integrated system of mutuallyinterrelated and functionally interdepend-ent parts. 4So, too, the importanceof thehumanisticcoefficient in cultural data asexpounded by Znaniecki and Sorokin,among others, belongs to this category.Suchgeneralorientationsmay be paraphrasedassaying in effect that the investigator ignores

this order of fact at his peril. They do notset forth specifichypotheses.The chief function of these orientationsis to provide a general context for inquiry;they facilitate the process of arriving at de-terminate hypotheses. To take a case inpoint: Malinowski was led to re-examinethe Freudiannotion of the Oedipuscomplexon the basis of a general sociologicalorienta-tion, which viewed sentiment formation aspatterned by social structure. This genericview clearly underlay his exploration of aspecific psychological complex in its rela-tion to a system of status relationships in asociety differing in structure from that ofwestern Europe. The specific hypotheseswhich he utilized in this inquiry were allcongruentwith the generic orientation butwere not prescribed by it. Otherwise put,the general orientation indicated the rele-vance of somestructuralvariables,but therestill remainedthe task of ferreting out theparticularvar;ablesto be included.Though such general theoretic outlookshave a more inclusive and profound effecton the development of scientific inquirythan do specific hypotheses-they consti-tute the matrix from which, in the wordsofMaurice Arthus, new hypotheses followone another in breathless succession and aharvest of facts follow closely the blossom-ing of these hypotheses -though this is thecase, they constitute only the point of de-parturefor the theorist. It is his task to de-velopspecific, nterrelatedhypotheses by re-formulatingempiricalgeneralizations n thelight of these generic orientations.

It shouldbe noted, furthermore, hat thegrowingcontributionsof sociological theoryto its sister-disciplines ie more in the realmof general sociological orientations thanin that of specific confirmed hypotheses.The development of socialhistory, of in-stitutional economics,and the importationof sociological perspectives into psycho-analytic theory involve recognition of thesociological dimensions of the data ratherthan incorporation of specific confirmedtheories. Social scientists have been led todetect sociological gaps in the application

3 Pmile Durkheim, The Rules of SociologicalMethod(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938),p. IIo; L'Education morale (Paris: Felix Alcan,1925), pp. 9-45, passim.

4Conrad M. Arensberg and Solon Kimball, Fam-ily and Community in Ireland (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1940), p. xxvi.


5/13

SOCIOLOGICALHEORY 465of their theory to concretesocial behavior.They do not so often exhibit sociologicalnaivete in their interpretations.The econ-omist, thepoliticalscientist,andthepsychol-ogist have increasinglycome to recognizethat what they have systematicallytaken asgiven, as data, may be sociologicallyprob-lematical.But thisreceptivityto a sociologi-cal outlook s oftendissipatedby thepaucityof adequatelytested pecifictheoriesof, say,the determinantsof humanwants or of thesocialprocesses nvolved in the distributionand exerciseof social power. Pressures de-riving from the respectivetheoretic gaps ofthe several social sciences may serve, intime, to bringabout an increasingformula-tion of specific and systematic sociologicaltheoriesappropriate o the problems mpliedby these gaps. General orientations do notsuffice. Presumablythis is the context forthe complaint voiced by an economist:

[The economistalways seeks to refer hisanalysisof a problem] ack to some datum,that is to say, to somethingwhich is extra-economic.This somethingmay be apparentlyvery remote romthe problemwhichwas firsttakenup, for the chainsof economic ausationare often very long. But he alwayswants tohandovertheproblemn the endto somesoci-ologistor other-if there s a sociologistwaitingfor him. Veryoften heresn't.S

ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTSIt is at times held that theory is com-prised of concepts, an assertionwhich,beingincomplete, is neither true nor false butvague. To be sure, conceptualanalysis,which is confined to the specificationandclarificationof key concepts,is an indispen-sablephase of theoretic work.But an arrayof concepts-status, role, Gemeinschaft,social interaction,socialdistance, anomie-does not constitute theory, though it mayenter into a theoreticsystem. It maybe con-jectured that, in so far as an antitheoreticbias occursamongsociologists, it is in pro-test against those who identify theory with

clarification of definitions,who mistakenlytake thepartforthe wholeof theoreticanal-ysis. It is onlywhensuchconceptsare inter-related n the form of a schemethat a theorvbeginsto emerge.Concepts, hen, constitutethe definitions(or prescriptions)of what isto be observed;they are the variablesbe-tween which empiricalrelationshipsare tobe sought. When propositionsstating suchrelationships are logically interrelated, atheory has been instituted.The choice of concepts guiding the col-lection and analysis of data is, of course,crucial to empiricalinquiry. For, to statean important truism, if concepts are se-lected such that no relationshipsbetweenthem obtain, the researchwill be sterile, nomatter how meticulousthe subsequentob-servations and inferences.The importanceof this truism lies in its implication thattruly trial-and-errorroceduresn empiricalinquiry are likely to be comparativelyun-fruitful,since the numberof variableswhichare not significantlyconnected is indefinite-ly large.It is, then, one function of conceptualclarification to make explicit the characterof the datasubsumedundera givenconcept.6It thus serves to reduce the likelihood ofspuriousempirical indingscouched n termsof the given concepts. Thus, Sutherland'sre-examination of the received concept ofcrime providesan instructiveinstance ofhow such clarification nduces a revision ofhypotheses concerning the data organized

s J. R. Hicks, Economic Theory and the SocialSciences, The Social Sciences: Their Relations inTheory and in Teaching (London: Le Play Press,I936), p. I35. (Italics mine.)

6As Schumpeter remarksabout the role of ana-lytic apparatus : If we are to speak about pricelevels and to devise methods of measuring them, wemust know what a price level is. If we are to observedemand, we must have a precise concept of its elas-ticity. If we speak about productivity of labor, wemust know what propositions hold true about totalproduct per man-hour and what other propositionshold true about the partial differential coefficient oftotal productwith respect to man-hours. No hypoth-eses enter into such concepts, which simply em-body methods of description and measurement, norinto the propositions defining their relations (so-called theorems), and yet their framing is the chieftask of theory, in economics as elsewhere. This iswhat we mean by tools of analysis (Joseph A.Schumpeter, Business Cycles [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., I9391,I, 3I).


6/13

466 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYin terms of the concept.7He demonstratesan equivocation implicit in criminologicaltheorieswhich seek to account for the factthat thereis a muchhigherrate of crime, asofficiallymeasured, in the lower than inthe uppersocialclasses.These crime data(organizedin terms of a particularopera-tional concept or measure of crime) haveled to a series of hypotheses which viewpoverty, slumconditions, feeble-minded-ness, and other characteristics held to behighly associated with low-class status asthe causes of criminalbehavior.OncetheConceptof crime is clarifiedto refer to theviolationof criminal awand is thus extend-ed to include white-collarcriminality inbusiness and the professions-violationswhichare less oftenreflected n official rimestatistics than are lower-classviolations-the presumptive high association betweenlow social status and crime may no longerobtain. We need not pursue Sutherland'sanalysis further to detect the function ofconceptual clarification n this instance. Itprovidesfor a reconstructionf data by indi-catingmorepreciselyjust what they includeand what they exclude.In doingso, it leadsto a liquidation of hypothesesset up to ac-count for spuriousdata by questioningtheassumptions on which the initial statisticaldata were based. By hanging a questionmarkon an implicitassumptionunderlyingtheresearchdefinitionofcrime-the assump-tion that violations of the criminal code bymembers of the several social classes arerepresentatively registered in the officialstatistics-this conceptualclarificationhaddirectimplications or a nucleus of theories.In similar fashion conceptual analysismay often resolve apparent antinomies inempiricalfindings by indicating that suchcontradictionsare moreapparentthan real.This familiarphrase refers, in part, to thefact that initially crudely defined conceptshave tacitly includedsignificantlydifferentelements so that data organized n terms oftheseconceptsdiffermateriallyand thus ex-

hibit apparentlycontradictorytendencies.8The function of conceptualanalysis in thisinstanceis to maximizethe likelihoodof thecomparability, in significant respects, ofdata whichare to be included n a research.The instance drawn from Sutherlandmerelyillustratesthe moregeneralfact thatin research,as in less disciplinedactivities,our conceptual language tends to fix ourperceptionsand, derivatively, our thoughtandbehavior.The concept definesthe situa-tion, and the researchworkerresponds ac-cordingly.Explicit conceptual analysis aidshim to recognizeto what he is respondingand which (possiblysignificant)elements heis ignoring.The findings of Whorf on thismatter are, with appropriatemodifications,applicable to empiricalresearch.9He foundthat behaviorwas orientedtoward linguis-tic or conceptualmeaningsconnotedby theterms applied to a given situation. Thus,in the presence of objectswhichare concep-tually described as gasoline drums, be-havior will tend modally toward a giventype: greatcare will be exercised.But whenpeople are confrontedwith what are calledemptygasolinedrums, behavior is differ-ent: it is careless, with little control oversmoking and the disposition of cigarettestubs. Yet the empty drumsare the morehazardous, since they contain explosivevapor. Response is not to the physical butto the conceptualized ituation.The conceptempty is hereused equivocally: as a syn-onym for null and void, negative, inert,and as a term appliedto physicalsituationswithout regard to such irrelevancies as

vapor and liquid vestiges in the container.The situation is conceptualized n the second

7Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Crimi-nality, American SociologicalReview, V (I940), I-I2.

8Elaborate formulations of this type of analysisare to be found in CorradoGini, Prime linee di pato-logia economica(Milan:Giuffre, I935); for a brief dis-cussion see C. Gini, Un tentativo di armonizarreteorie disparate e osservazioni contrastanti nelcampo dei fenomeni sociali, Rivista di politicaeconomica,XII (I935), I-23.9 B. L. Whorf, Relation of Habitual Thoughtand Behavior to Language, in L. Spier, A. I. Hal-lowell, and S. S. Newman (eds.), Language,Culture,

and Personality (Menasha: Sapir Memorial FundPublication, I94I), pp. 75-93.


7/13

SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 467sense, and the concept is then responded toin the first sense, with the result that emp-ty gasoline drumsbecome the occasionforfires. Clarification of just what emptymeans in the given universe of discoursewould have a profound effect on behavior.This case may serve as a paradigm of thefunctional effect of conceptual clarificationupon researchbehavior:it makes clear justwhat the researchworkeris doing when hedeals with conceptualized data. He drawsdifferent consequences for empirical re-searchas his conceptualapparatuschanges.

A furthertask of conceptualanalysisis toinstitute observable indices of the socialdata with which empirical research is con-cerned. Early efforts in this direction weremanifest in the works of Durkheim (andconstitute one of his most significant con-tributionsto sociology). Thoughhis formal-izedconceptions alongthese lines do not ap-proach the sophistication of more recentformulations,he was patently utilizing in-terveningvariables, as lately described byTolman and Hull, and seeking to establishindices for these variables.IoThe problem,as far as it need be stated for our immediatepurposes,consists in devising indices of un-observables or symbolic constructs (e.g.,social cohesion)-indices which are theo-retically supportable. Conceptual analysisthus enters as one basis for an initial andperiodic critical appraisal of the extent towhich assumed signs and symbols are anadequate index of the social substratum.Suchanalysissuggestsclues for determining

whether in fact the index (or measuring n-strument) proves adequate to the occasion.POST FACTUM SOCIOLOGICAL

INTERPRETATfONSIt is often the case in empirical social re-search that data are collected and then sub-jected to interpretativecomment.This pro-cedure in which the observations are at handand the interpretations are subsequentlyappliedto the data has the logicalstructureof clinical inquiry. The observationsmay becase-history or statistical in character. Thedefining characteristic of this procedure isthe introduction of an interpretation after

the observations have been made ratherthan the empiricaltestingof a predesignatedhypothesis. The implicit assumptionis thata body of generalizedpropositionshas beenso fully establishedthat it can be appropri-ately applied to the data in hand.Suchpost actum explanations,designedtoexplain given observations,differin logi-cal function from speciously similar pro-cedures where the observational materialsare utilized in orderto derive resh hypothe-ses to be confirmedby new observations.A disarming characteristic of this pro-cedure is that the explanations are indeedconsistent with the given set of observations.This is scarcely surprising, nasmuchas onlythose post factum hypotheses are selectedwhich do accord with these observations.Ifthe basic assumption holds-namely, thatthe postfactum interpretationutilizes abun-dantly confirmed theories-then this typeof explanationindeed shoots arrowy lightinto the dark chaos of materials. But if, asis more often the case in sociologicalinter-IODurkheim's basic formulation, variously re-peated in each of his monographs, reads as follows:It is necessary.... to substitute for the internal

fact which escapes us an external fact that symbol-izes it and to study the former through the latter(see his Rules of Sociological Method, chap. ii; LeSuicide [Paris: F. Alcan, I930], p. 356; and Divisiondu travail ocial[Paris:F. Alcan, I932], pp. 22 ff.).Most detailed consideration of Durkheim's viewson social indices is provided by Harry Alpert, EmileDurkheim and His Sociology (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, I939), pp. I20 ff. On the generalproblem see C. L. Hull, The Problem of Interven-ing Variables in Molar Behavior Theory, Psycho-logicalReview,L (I943), 273-9I.

Among the many functions of conceptual anal-ysis at this point is that of instituting inquiry intothe question of whether or not the index is neutralto its environment. By searching out the assumptionsunderlying the selection (and validation for a givenpopulation) of observables as indices (e.g., religiousaffiliation, an attitude scale), conceptual analysisinitiates appropriate tests of the possibility that theindex has become dissociated from its substratum.For a clear statement of this point see Louis Gutt-man, A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data, Ameri-can SociologicalReview,IX (I'944), I39--50, esp.I49-50.


8/13

468 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYpretation, the postfactumhypothesesarealsoad hocor, at the least, have but a slight de-gree of prior confirmation,then such pre-cocious explanations, as H. S. Sullivancalledthem,producea spurioussense of ade-quacy at the expense of instigating furtherinquiry.Post factum explanations remain at thelevel of plausibility (low evidential value)ratherthan leading o compelling vidence(a highdegreeof confirmation).Plausibility,in distinction to compelling evidence, isfound when an interpretation is consistentwith one set of data (which typically has,indeed, given rise to the decision to utilizeone, rather than another, interpretation).It also implies that alternative interpreta-tions equally consistent with these datahave not been systematically exploredandthat inferencesdrawn from the interpreta-tion have not been tested by new observa-tions.

The logicalfallacyunderlying he postfac-tumexplanationrests in the fact that thereis available a variety of crude hypotheses,each with somemeasureof confirmationbutdesigned to account for quite contradictorysets of affairs.The methodofpostfactumex-planation does not lend itself to nullifiabil-ity, if only because it is so completely flex-ible. For example, it may be reportedthatthe unemployedtend to read fewer booksthan they did previously. This is ex-plained by the hypothesis that anxiety in-creases as a consequenceof unemploymentand, therefore, that any activity requiringconcentration,such as reading,becomes dif-ficult. This type of accounting is plausible,since there is some evidence that increasedanxiety may occur in such situations andsince a state of morbidpreoccupationdoesinterfere with organized activity. If, how-ever, it is now reported that the originaldata were erroneous and it is a fact thatthe unemployedread more than previous-ly a newpostfactum xplanationcanat oncebe invoked.The explanationnow holds thatthe unemployed have more leisure or that

they engagein activity intended to increase

their personal skills. Consequently, theyread more than previously. Thus, whateverthe observations, a new interpretationcanbe found to fit the facts. I2 This examplemay be sufficient to indicate that such re-constructionsserve only as illustrationsandnot as tests. It is this logical inadequacy ofthe post actumconstructionwhich led Peirceto observe:

It is of the essenceof induction hat the con-sequence f the theoryshouldbe drawn irst nregard o the unknown,or virtuallyunknown,resultof experiment; nd that this shouldvir-tuallybe only ascertained fterward.For if welook over the phenomena o find agreementswith the theory, t is a merequestionofingenu-ity and industry how many we shall find.13These reconstructionstypically by-pass anexplicit formulationof the conditions underwhich the hypotheses will be found to holdtrue. In order to meet this logical require-ment, such interpretationswould necessar-ily be predictive rather than postdictive.As a case in point, we may note the fre-quency with which Blumer asserts that theThomas-Znanieckianalyses of documentsmerely seem to be plausible. I4The basisfor plausibility rests in the consistencybetween the interpretation and the data;the absence of compelling evidence stemsfrom the failure to provide distinctive testsof the interpretationsapart from their con-sistency with the initial observations. Theanalysis is fitted to the facts, and there isno indication of just which data would betaken to contravenethe interpretations. Asa consequence, the documentary evidence

12The pertinent data have not been assembled.But, on the plausibility of the second interpretation,see Douglas Waples, People and Print: Social As-pects of Reading in the Depression (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, I937), p. 198.I3 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed.Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, I932), II, 496.I4 Herbert Blumer, An Appraisal of Thomas dndZnaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe andAmerica (New York: Social Service Research Coun-cil, 1939), p. 38; see also ibid., pp. 39, 44, 46, 49, 50,

75.


9/13

SOCIOLOGICALHEORY 469merely illustrates rather than tests thetheory.'5

EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONSIN SOCIOLOGY

Not infrequentlyit is said that the objectof sociological theory is to arrive at state-ments of social uniformities.This is an ellip-tical assertion and hence requires clarifica-tion. For there are two types of statementsof sociological uniformities which differ sig-nificantly in their bearing on theory. Thefirst of these is the empiricalgeneralization:an isolated proposition summarizing ob-serveduniformitiesof relationshipsbetweentwo or more variables.'6 The sociologicalliterature abounds with such generaliza-tions which have not been assimilated tosociological theory. Thus, Engel's lawsof consumption may be cited as examples.So, too, the Halbwachs finding that labor-ers spend more per adult unit for food thanwhite-collaremployees of the same incomeclass.r7 Such generalizations may be ofgreater or less precision, but this does notaffect their logical place in the structure ofinquiry. The Groves-Ogburn inding, for asample of Americancities, that cities witha larger percentage engagedin manufactur-ing also have, on the average, slightly largerpercentagesof young persons married hasbeen expressed in an equation indicating

the degree of this relationship. Althoughpropositions of this order are essential inempirical social research, a miscellany ofsuch propositions only provides the rawmaterials for sociology as a discipline. Thetheoretic task, and the orientation of em-pirical researchtoward theory, first beginswhen the bearing of such uniformitieson aset of interrelatedpropositions s tentativelyestablished.The notion of directedresearchimplies that, in part,'8 empiricalinquiry isso organizedthat if and when empiricaluni-formities are discovered, they have directconsequencesfor a theoretic system. In sofar as the researchis directed, the rationaleof findings is set forth before the findingsare obtained.

SOCIOLOGICALHEORYThe second type of sociological generali-zation, the so-called scientificlaw, differsfrom the foregoing nasmuch as it is a state-ment of invariancederivablerom a theory.The paucity of such laws in the sociologicalfield perhapsreflects the prevailingbifurca-tion of theory and empirical research.De-

spite the many volumes dealing with thehistory of sociological theory and despite

I5 It is difficult to see on what grounds Blumerasserts that these interpretations cannot be merecases of illustration of a theory. His comment thatthe materials acquire significance and understand-ing that they did not have would apply to postfactum explanations generally.x6 This usage of the term empirical is common,as Dewey notes. In this context, empirical meansthat the subject-matter of a given proposition whichhas existential inference, represents merely a set ofuniform conjunctions of traits repeatedly observedto exist, without any understanding of why the con-junction occurs; without a theory which states itsrationale (John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of In-quiry [New York: Henry Holt & Co., I938], p. I93).I7 See a considerable collection of such uniformi-ties summarized by C. C. Zimmerman, Consumptionand Standards of Living (New York: D. Van Nos-trand Co., I936), pp. 5i ff.

i8 In part, if only because it stultifies the pos-sibilities of obtaining fertile new findings to confineresearches wholly to the test of predetermined hy-potheses. Hunches originating in the course of theinquiry which may not have immediately obviousimplications for a broader theoretic system mayeventuate in the discovery of empirical uniformitieswhich can later be incorporated into a theory. Forexample, in the sociology of political behavior, it hasbeen recently established that the larger the numberof social cross-pressures to which voters are sub-jected, the less interest they exhibit in a presidentialelection (P. F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, andHazel Gaudet, The People's Choice [New York:Duell, Sloan & Pearce, i944], pp. 56-64). This find-ing, which was wholly unanticipated when the re-search was first formulated, may well initiate newlines of systematic inquiry into political behavior,even though it is not yet integrated into a general-ized theory. Fruitful empirical research not onlytests theoretically derived hypotheses; it also origi-nates new hypotheses. This might be termed theserendipity component of research, i.e., the dis-covery, by chance or sagacity, of valid results whichwere not sought for.


10/13

470 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYthe plethoraof empirical investigations, so-ciologists (includingthe writer)may discussthe logicalcriteriaof sociologicallaws with-out citing a singleinstancewhichfully satis-fies thesecriteria.r9Approximations o these criteria are notentirely -wanting. To exhibit the relationsof empiricalgeneralizationsto theory andto set forth the functions of theory, it maybe usefulto examinea familiarcase in whichsuch generalizationswere incorporated ntoa body of substantive theory. Thus, it haslong been established as a statistical uni-formity that in a variety of populations,Catholicshada lower suiciderate than Prot-estants.20 In this form the uniformityposeda theoreticalproblem.It merely constitutedan empiricalregularitywhichwouldbecomesignificantfor theory only if it could be de-rivedfroma set of otherpropositions,a taskwhich Durkheim set himself. If we restatehis theoreticassumptionsin formal fashion,the paradigm of his theoretic analysis be-comes clear:i. Social cohesion provides psychic support togroup members subjected to acute stresses

and anxieties.2. Suicide rates are functions of unrelievedanxi-eties and stresses to which persons are sub-jected.3. Catholics have greater social cohesion thanProtestants.4. Therefore, lower suicide rates should be an-ticipated among Catholics than among Prot-estants.2'

This case serves to locate the place ofempirical generalizations in relation totheory and to illustrate the several func-tions of theory.i. It indicates that theoretic pertinenceis not inherently present or absent in em-pirical generalizations but appears whenthe generalization is conceptualized in ab-stractions of higher order (Catholicism-social cohesion-relieved anxieties-suiciderate) which are embodied in more generalstatements of relationships.22What was ini-tially taken as an isolated uniformity is re-stated as a relation, not between religiousaffiliationand behavior,but between groupswith certain conceptualized attributes (so-cial cohesion) and the behavior. The scopeofthe original empirical inding s considerablyextended, and several seemingly disparateuniformities are seen to be interrelated(thus differentials in suicide rates betweenmarried and single persons can be derivedfrom the same theory).2. Once having established the theoreticpertinence of a uniformity by derivingit from a set of interrelatedpropositions,we

provide for the cumulationboth of theoryand of research findings. The differentials-in-suicide-rate uniformities add confirma-tion to the set of propositions from whichthey-and other uniformities-have been

x9E.g., see the discussion by George A. Lund-berg, The Concept of Law in the Social Sciences,Philosophyof Science,V (I938), i89-:203, whichaffirmsthe possibility of such laws without includingany case in point. The book by K. D. Har, SocialLaws (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, I930), does not fulfil the promise implicit inthe title. A panel of social scientists discussing thepossibility of obtaining social laws finds it difficultto instance cases (Blumer, op. cit., pp. I42-50).

20 It need hardly be said that this statement as-sumes that education, income, nationality, rural-urban residence, and other factors which might ren-der this finding spurious have been held constant.21 We need not examine further aspects of this il-lustration, e.g., (i) the extent to which we have ade-

quately stated the premises implicit in Durkheim's

interpretation; (2) the supplementary theoretic anal-ysis which would take these premises not as givenbut as problematic; (3) the grounds on which the po-tentially infinite regression of theoretic interpreta-tions is halted at one rather than another point; (4)the problems involved in the introduction of suchintervening variables as social cohesion which arenot directly measured; (5) the extent to which thepremises have been empirically confirmed; (6) thecomparatively low order of abstraction representedby this illustration; and (7) the fact that Durkheimderived several empirical generalizations from thissame set of hypotheses.

22Thorstein Veblen has put this with typicalcogency: All this may seem like taking pains abouttrivialities. But the data with which any scientificinquiry has to do are trivialities in some other bear-ing than that one in which they are of account(The Place of Science in Modern Civilization [NewYork: Viking Press, I932], p. 42).


11/13

SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 47Iderived. This is a major function of sys-tematic heory.3. Whereasthe empiricaluniformitydidnot lend itself to the drawingof diverse con-sequences, the reformulationgives rise tovarious consequences in fields of conductquite remote fromthat of suicidal behavior.For example, inquiries into obsessive be-havior, morbid preoccupations, and othermaladaptive behavior have found these tobe related to inadequacies of group cohe-sion.23 The conversionof empiricaluniform-ities into theoretic statements thus in-creases the fruitfulness of researchthroughthe successive exploration of implications.4. By providing a rationale, the theoryintroduces a ground or predictionwhich ismore secure than mere empirical extrapola-tion from previouslyobservedtrends. Thus,should independentmeasuresindicate a de-crease of social cohesion among Catholics,the theorist would predict a tendency to-wardincreasedrates of suicidein this group.The atheoretic empiricist would have noalternative, however, but to predict on thebasis of extrapolation.

5. The foregoing list of functions pre-supposes one further attribute of theorywhich is not altogethertrueof the Durkheimformulationand which gives rise to a gen-eral problem that has peculiarly beset so-ciologicaltheory, at least, up to the present.If theory is to be productive, it must besufficiently precise to be determinate.Pre-cision is an integral element of the criterionof testability.The prevailingpressure owardthe utilizationof statistical data in sociology,wheneverpossible, to control andtest theo-retic inferenceshas a justifiablebasis, whenwe considerthe logical place of precisionindisciplinedinquiry.The more precise the inferences (predic-tions) which can be drawn from a theory,

the less the likelihoodof alternative ypoth-eses which will be adequate to these pre-dictions. In other words, precisepredictionsand data serve to reducethe empiricalbear-ing upon research of the logical fallacy ofaffirming he consequent.24t is well knownthat verified predictions derived from atheory do not prove or demonstratethat theory; they merely supply a measureof confirmation, orit is alwayspossiblethatalternative hypotheses drawn from differ-ent theoretic systems can also account forthe predictedphenomena.25 ut those theo-ries which admit of precisepredictionscon-firmedby observationtake on strategic im-portancesince they provide an initial basisfor choice between competing hypotheses.In other words, precisionenhancesthe like-lihood of approximatinga crucial obser-vation or experiment.The internal coherence of a theory hasmuch the same function, for if a variety ofempirically confirmed consequences aredrawn from one theoretic system, this re-duces the likelihood that competing theo-ries can adequately acccount for the samedata. The integratedtheorysustainsa largermeasure of confirmation than is the casewith distinct and unrelatedhypotheses,thusaccumulatinga greaterweight of evidence.

23 See, e.g., Elton Mayo, Human Problems of anIndustrial Civilization (New York: Macmillan Co.,I933), p. II3 et passim. The theoretical frameworkutilized in the studies of industrial morale by White-head, Roethlisberger, and Dickson stemmed appre-ciably from the Durkheim formulations, as the au-thors testify.

24 The paradigm of proof through prediction is,of. course, logically fallacious:If A (hypothesis), then B (prediction).B is observed.Therefore, A is true.

This is not overdisturbing for scientific research,inasmuch as other than formal criteria are involved.

25 As a case in point, consider that different theo-rists had predicted war and internecine conflict on alarge scale at the present time. Sorokin and someMarxists, for example, set forth this prediction onthe basis of quite distinct theoretic systems. The ac-tual outbreak of large-scale conflicts does not in it-self enable us to choose between these schemes ofanalysis, if only because the observed fact is con-sistent with both. Only if the predictions had been sospecified,had been so precise, that the actual occur-rences coincided with the one prediction and notwith the other, would a determinate test have beeninstituted.


12/13

472 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGYBoth pressures-toward precision andlogical coherence-can lead to unproduc-tive activity, particularly in the social sci-

ences. Any procedurecan be abused as wellas used. A premature nsistence on precisionat all costs may sterilize imaginativehypoth-eses. It may lead to a reformulationof thescientificproblem in order to permit meas-urement with, at times, the result that thesubsequentmaterials do not bear on the ini-tial problem in hand.26 n the search forpre-cision, care mustbe taken to see that signifi-cant problems are not thus inadvertentlyblotted from view. Similarly, the pressurefor logical consistency has at times invitedlogomachy and sterile theorizing, inas-much as the assumptions contained in thesystem of analysis are so far removed fromempirical referents or involve such highabstractions as not to permit of empiricalinquiry.27But the warrant for these criteriaof inquiry is not vitiated by such abuses.FORMAL DERIVATIONS AND CODIFICATIONThis inevitably uperficial account hass,

at the very least, pointed to the need for acloser connection between theory and em-pirical research. The prevailing division ofthe two is manifested in markeddiscontinu-ities of empiricalresearch, on the one hand,and systematic theorizing unsustained byempirical test, on the other. There are con-spicuously few instances of consecutive re-search which have cumulatively investi-gated a succession of hypotheses derivedfrom a given theory. Rather, there tends tobe a marked dispersion of empirical in-quiries, oriented toward a concrete field ofhuman behavior, but lackinga central theo-retic orientation. The plethora of discrete

empiricalgeneralizationsand of post factuminterpretations reflect this pattern of re-search. The large bulk of general orienta-tions and conceptual analyses, as distinctfrom sets of interrelatedhypotheses, in turnreflect the tendency to separate theoreticactivity from empirical research. It is acommonplacethat continuity, rather thandispersion,can be,achieved only if our em-piricalstudies are theory-orientedand if ourtheory is empiricallyconfirmable.However,it is possible to go beyond such affirmationsand to suggest certain conventions for so-ciological researchwhich might well facili-tate this process.These conventionsmay betermed formalizedderivation and codi-fication. 28

Both in the designand in the reportingofempiricalresearch, t might be made a defi-nite convention that hypotheses and, when-ever possible, the theoretic grounds (as-sumptionsand postulates) of these hypoth-eses be explicitly set forth. The report ofdata would be in terms of their immediatepertinence for the hypotheses and, deriva-tively, the underlying theory. Attentionshouldbe called specifically to the introduc-tion of interpretative variables other thanthose entailed in the originalformulationofhypotheses and the bearing of these uponthe theory should be indicated. Postfactuminterpretationswhich will inevitably arisewhen new and unexpectedrelationshipsarediscoveredshould be so stated that the di-rection of further probative research be-comes evident. The conclusions of the re-search might well include not only a state-ment of the findingswith respect to the ini-tial hypothesesbut, when this is in point, anindication of the order of observationsneeded to test anewthe furtherimplicationsof the investigation. Formal derivation ofthis characterhas had a salutary effect inpsychology and economics, leading, in the

26 Stuart A. Rice comments on this tendency inpublic opinion research (see Eleven Twenty-six: ADecade of Social Science Research, ed. Louis Wirth[Chicago:University of Chicago Press, I940], p.I67).

27 It is this practice to which E. Ronald Walkerrefers, in the field of economics, as theoretic blight(From Economic Tkeoryto Policy [Chicago: Univer-sity of ChicagoPress, 943], chap. v).

28 To be sure, these conventions are deductionand induction, respectively. Our sole interest at thispoint is to translate these logical procedures intoterms appropriate to current sociological theory andresearch.


13/13

SOCIOLOGICALHEORY 473onecase, to sequential experiments29nd, inthe other, to an articulated series of inves-tigations. One consequence of such formali-zation is that it serves as a control over theintroduction of unrelated, undisciplined,and diffuse interpretations.It does not im-pose upon the reader the task of ferretingout the relations between the interpreta-tions embodied in the text.30Above all, itprepares the way for consecutiveand cumu-lative researchrather than a buckshot arrayof dispersed nvestigations.The correlative process which seemscalled for is that which Lazarsfeld termscodification. Whereas formal derivationfocuses our attention upon the implicationsof a theory, codification seeks to systema-tize available empirical generalizations inapparently different spheres of behavior.Rather than permitting such separateempirical findings to lie fallow or to be re-ferred to distinctive areas of behavior, thedeliberateattempt to institute relevantpro-visional hypotheses promises to extend ex-

isting theory, subject to further empiricalinquiry. Thus, an abundance of empiricalfindings in such fields as propaganda andpublic opinion, reactionsto unemployment,and family responsesto crises suggest thatwhen persons are confronted with an ob-jective stimulus-pattern which would beexpected to elicit responsescounter to theirinitial predispositions, their actual be-havior can be more successfully predictedon the basis of predispositions than of thestimulus-pattern.This is implied by boom-erang effects in propaganda,31 y findingson adjustive and maladjustive responsestounemployment,32and by research on thestability of families confronted with severereductionsin income.33A codified formula-tion, even as crude as this, gives rise to theo-retic problemswhich would be readilyover-looked if the several empiricalfindingswerenot re-examinedwithin a single context. Itis submitted that codification, as a proce-dure complementing the formal derivationof hypothesesto be tested, will facilitate theco-developmentof viable sociological heoryand pertinent empiricalresearch.COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY

29 The work of Clark Hull and associates is pre-eminent in this respect (see, e.g., Hull, Principles ofBehavior [New York: D. Appleton-Century Co.,I943]). See also comparableefforts toward formaliza-tion in-the writings of Kurt Lewin (e.g., Kurt Lewin,Ronald Lippitt, and S. K. Escalona, Studies in Topo-logical and VectorPsychologyI [ University of IowaStudies in Child Welfare, Vol. XVI (Iowa City,I940)], pp. 9-42).

30 A book such as John Dollard's Caste and Classin a Southern Town teems with suggestiveness, butit is an enormous task for the reader to work out ex-plicitly the theoretic problems which are being at-tacked, the interpretive variables, and the implicitassumptions of the interpretations. Yet all this needsto be done if a sequence of studies building uponDollard's work is proposed.

3'Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton,Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda, Transac-tions of theNew York Academy of Sciences, Series 11,VI (I943), 58-79.320. M. Hall, Attitudes and Unemployment,Archives of Psychology,No. i65 (March, I934); E. W.Bakke, The UnemployedWorker (New Haven: YaleUniversityPress, Ig4o).33Mirra Komarovsky, The UnemployedMan andHis Family (New York: Dryden Press, I940); R. C.

Angell, The Family Encounters the Depression (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, I936).

r.k.merton sociological theory

Documents