Robert Post, Another Cosmopolitanism, Seyla BenhabibOxford University Press, New York, November 2006,ISBN 978-0-19-518322-1, (Hbk) £14.99

Megan Kime

Accepted: 18 December 2007 /Published online: 12 January 2008# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Given the amount of recently published works on cosmopolitanism, one might be forgivenfor wondering why we need ‘another,’ but this volume provides a sophisticated analysis ofthe concept and one of its major problems, and so is a valuable addition to the literature.Seyla Benhabib’s 2004 Berkeley Tanner Lectures are presented here, together with anintroduction from the editor, Robert Post, contributions from Jeremy Waldron, BonnieHonig, and Will Kymlicka, and a reply to those comments from Benhabib. Benhabib isconcerned generally with the tension between cosmopolitan universal norms andparticularist legal and democratic forms, and specifically with the case of those individualswho inhabit the gap created by this tension—people who reside in a state other than theirown; so called ‘resident aliens’.

The background to the discussion is well set out by Post in his useful introduction to thevolume. He highlights the ‘inescapable interdependence’ of the world since World War II,and demonstrates how the rise of human rights doctrine has challenged the traditionaldivision between universalism in ethics and the bounded conception of citizenship whichhas dominated political and legal discourse. The tension between universalist ethics and thepositive law of bounded communities is the recurring theme of this volume. Benhabibillustrates this difficulty in her discussion of the correspondence between Hannah Arendtand her mentor Karl Jaspers on the subject of the Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann. Benhabibdraws out a complexity in Arendt’s views that she then uses to demonstrate a centralproblem for Kantian cosmopolitans more generally. The problem is how to imbuecosmopolitan moral oughts with legal and enforceable status, not only for individual actors,but for states and governments as well.

Benhabib’s discussion of membership norms is informed by the discourse tradition ofHabermas, amongst others, but she is willing to criticise those who have preceded her forfailing to deal adequately with the question of ‘discursive scope.’ She shows that the ‘moralconversation’ advocated by discourse theories must be universal, but this brings it intotension with the borders of bounded communities. Further, she identifies an important

Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2008) 11:225–226DOI 10.1007/s10677-007-9104-4

M. Kime (*)The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UKe-mail: m.kime@sheffield.ac.uk

unanswered question: How can we ‘create quasi-legally binding obligations throughvoluntary commitments and in the absence of an overwhelming sovereign power with theultimate right of enforcement?’ (23). Her solution utilises the concept of ‘democraticiteration’ and a model of ‘jurisgenerative politics’ to show how this conflict betweencosmopolitan norms and the democratic wills of bounded communities can be mediated.She draws on two examples from recent European Union (EU) history—‘L’Affaire duFoulard,’ and recent changes to German citizenship law—to demonstrate how this processcan work.

The three commentators provide many helpful and interesting insights. While they aretoo numerous to discuss thoroughly here, it is nonetheless worth noting briefly some majorareas of disagreement. Both Waldron and Honig take issue with Benhabib’s focus on thestate in her analysis. Benhabib’s general reply is that failing to appreciate the significance ofthe state is dangerous, especially with respect to membership norms and cross-bordermovements. Kylimcka’s main concern is that Benhabib has overstated the extent to whichthe growth of international institutions can be seen as challenging and transcending thetraditional model of citizenship which ties it closely with nationhood. Kymlicka argues thatthese developments, especially with regards to the EU, are better understood as attempts toexpand the benefits of liberal nationhood. Benhabib responds to Kymlicka by analysing theconcept of nationhood and raising questions about the ease with which it coexists withliberal democracy.

Whilst Benhabib is right that there is a tension between cosmopolitan norms andbounded democratic communities, it could be argued that her focus on the way in whichthis tension plays out in the cases of those who have crossed borders might lead the readerto make an uncomforting conclusion. She seeks a solution which relies on democraticiterations and makes a good attempt at showing how this process can absorb and furthercosmopolitan norms in these cases. However she pays almost no attention to that moretraditional cosmopolitan concern, namely, the case of individuals who have not crossedborders and are therefore completely excluded from wealthy bounded communities.Benhabib has high hopes for the possibility of resident aliens being able to transform theirown status using the democratic process, but it is hard to see how this can help those manymore who are excluded from affluent bounded societies not only by law but also bygeographical distance. By showing how democratic iteration can work from withinbounded communities, Benhabib unwittingly highlights how difficult it would be fromoutside these borders. Given that she has successfully argued that the scope of the moralconversation needs to be universal, it would perhaps be reasonable to hope that she wouldhave addressed this issue. However, given the short length of the volume, it is on the wholea benefit that Benhabib and her commentators explore in such detail one important issuewhich faces liberal democratic cosmopolitan theorists.

226 M. Kime