!!!!

!What are the implications of introducing unmanned

aerial vehicles to peacekeeping operations?

!

Andrew Thayer Glenn

SID: 430574128

!!!+61 450448086

Agle8834@sydney.uni.edu.au

11,500 words

!2

!!!

The labours of men of genius, however erroneously directed, scarcely ever fail in ultimately turning

to the solid advantage of mankind

!I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel...

— Mary Shelley, "Frankenstein"

!As the quotes from "Frankenstein" demonstrate, advances in science and technology

inhabit a dual nature. On the one hand they seem to embody progress and hope of a better

future; on the other, they arouse suspicion and fears of unintended consequences. Culturally,

there are a plethora of portrayals of scientific advancements leading to either a utopian future,

or a dystopian nightmare. Robots seem to occupy a special niche in this regard, spanning as

they do the spectrum from the menacing and merciless robot in Terminator to the soul-search-

ing and sensitive Data appearing in Star Trek. Robots are like Frankenstein's creation, fasci-

nating yet frightening. The nexus between ethics, utility, and technology has become more

prominent as robotics technology improves. This is evident in the debates between public offi-

cials, military leaders, and the media over the US military's use of unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs) to conduct armed strikes, colloquially referred to as 'drone strikes'.

This paper looks at the above nexus within the context of peacekeeping operations

(PKOs). As robotic platforms proliferate, they will increasingly be deployed in contexts out-

side of the ‘Global War on Terror’. French and Dutch peacekeepers have used drones in

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Northern Mali to improve their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabili-

ties. Given current technological advances in robotics and the quick adoption of new plat1 -

forms by militaries, it is important to analyse the potential impact robots may have on PKOs.

To do so, this paper will begin by providing an epistemological and ontological frame-

work of PKOs. First, a definitional and theoretical overview of PKOs and robotics will pro-

vide a conceptual framework to determine the types of operations that will be discussed.

Chapter I will then provide a historical overview of the developments of PKOs. This overview

will provide an important context of the general characteristics and principles which consti-

tute contemporary PKOs. Finally, this framework will be looked at within the context of in-

troducing robotics into PKOs. Essentially, it will consider how robotics can impact upon the

basic conceptual and constitutive components of PKOs and whether or not robotics are a plat-

form which will aid or hinder such operations. At this stage it is important to note that this

paper will use the terms ‘UAV’ and ‘robot’ interchangeably except in limited occasions. UAVs

are a specific robotic platform and much of the analysis throughout this paper is applicable to

the broader category of ‘robots’ as well. However, given the present pervasiveness of UAVs in

the contemporary debate surrounding ‘robotic warfare’ most literature and researchers have

concentrated specifically on UAVs.

!Definitions and Theoretical Foundations of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

It will be important to maintain a balance between praxis and the conceptual in this

analysis. Theories and definitions must be kept within pragmatic parameters. Over theorising

"France to Use Unarmed U.S.-Made Drones to Hunt Al Qaeda in Mali," Reuters 2013.1

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threatens to obscure as much as it illuminates. In contrast, overemphasising practice and pol2 -

icy risks the investigation becoming intellectually stunted and isolated from other branches of

international relations. If macrotheoretical questions are ignored, broader questions about the

nature and significance of PKOs in the international system remain untested and innovation

remains stifled. With these factors in mind, the following section lays out the conceptual 3

framework for PKOs to be used throughout this paper.

!In Search of Meaning

Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali attempted to provide a definitive PFO

definition in his Agenda for Peace as:

the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the

parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently

civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of

conflict and the making of peace. 4

!This definition is unsuitable. It is too restrictive in that it requires a PKO to involve the

deployment of UN personnel. This is problematic given the prevalence of regional organisa-

tions and coalitions of states which have undertaken PKOs independent of UN involvement

(e.g. NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Additionally, the requirement that all parties concerned

S. Ryan. 'United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principle?', Ramsbotham, Oliver, and Tom Woodhouse. 2

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Routledge, 2013, p. 27-47.

Roland Paris. "Broadening the study of peace operations." International Studies Review 2, no. 3 (2000): 27-44.3

Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." In4 -ternational Relations 11, no. 3 (1992). p 205.

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must have provided consent is unrealistic. In some instances there may be parties which, for

political, logistical, or self interested reasons, are unable or unwilling to give consent. Whilst

consent may be desirable, there are instances in which intervention in a conflict is justifiable

on moral, legal, and/or humanitarian motivations within the international community whether

or not that consent is forthcoming. Despite its flaws, this definition was important in that it

recognised PKOs as a valid tool for third parties to contribute to preventing, managing, or

resolving conflicts.

A better definition of PKOs is required in order to provide a basis for common under-

standing and to distinguish the type/s of operations which fall under the purview of relevant

analysis. This is not a straightforward endeavor; there is no universal definition for 'peace-

keeping' or the multitude of operations it has come to encompass. The situation is further 5

hindered by the fact that the UN Charter does not use the terms 'peacekeeping' or 'peace op-

erations'. There is a similar lack of a distinct lexical term universally used to refer to these

types of operation. This is problematic not merely for the academic, but also because the term

'peacekeeping' and its variants have come to encompass certain normative features such as

'impartiality' and 'legitimacy' that imply obligations in practice. These normative attributes 6

have been used in attempts to justify military activities which are of predominantly self-inter-

ested and of questionable morality. Some examples include the US invasion of Grenada in 7

Alex J.Bellamy and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010.5

The normative features of peacekeeping will be explored further below.6

Alan James. Peacekeeping in international politics. London: Macmillan, 1990.7

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1983 and Russian counter-insurgency operations in Chechnya. Of course, it is possible for 8 9

two actors to conceptualise the same phenomenon differently when dealing with a highly

politicised activity such as a PKO. 10

Little wonder that the UN has been unable to produce a definitive definition of 'peace-

keeping operations'. Disagreements between member states regarding the scope of such con-

cepts as neutrality, impartiality, and the minimum use of force have prevented a definitive

agreement on a universally applicable term. In lieu of a definition, the UN has adopted a 11

taxicological approach and identified where peacekeeping operations lie within the broader

category of 'peace operations'. Such activities include:

▪ Conflict prevention - including structural and diplomatic measures to prevent disputes

from evolving into violent conflict;

▪ Peacemaking - the use of diplomatic measures to bring hostile parties to a negotiated

agreement;

▪ Peacekeeping - the use of uniformed personnel (e.g. Military, police) and civilian per-

sonnel to establish the foundations for sustainable peace;

▪ Peace enforcement - the use of military and other measures to enforce the will of the Se-

curity Council;

Paul F. Diehl. International peacekeeping: With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia. Johns 8

Hopkins University Press, 1994. p 4.

Norrie MacQueen. Peacekeeping and the international system. Routledge, 2012. p 3.9

P.D. Williams. "Peace Operations." In The International Stuies Compendium Project, edited by R. Denemark 10

et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010.11

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▪ Peacebuilding- a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing

into conflict. 12

This is a sort of definition by exclusion however. It attempts to define what a PKO is by illus-

trating what it is not. Whilst categorising and situating activities on a spectrum is a useful

conceptual tool, it does little to provide a definition as to what a PKO is in itself. Academics 13

and non-UN organisations have also attempted to derive an acceptable definition. For in-

stance, William Durch defined PKOs as 'internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military

efforts to promote and protect... transitions from war to peace'. Similarly, the Center on In14 -

ternational Cooperation defines interventions from non-UN actors as a PKO if the operation

is conducted by regional organisations or coalitions of states with the stated intention to be ‘an

instrument in facilitating peace agreements already in place, support a peace process, or assist

in the prevention of conflict and/or support peace building efforts’. Both these definitions 15

acknowledge that PKOs can remain legitimate even if the operation is undertaken indepen-

dently of the UN. What is important is that the operation is driven by the goal of achieving, or

assisting in the achievement of, peace. This paper will take a similar approach. A PKO is de-

fined here as ‘the use of uniformed personnel (e.g. military and/or police personnel) with or without UN

authorization serving some humanitarian interest and a mandate to:

▪ Assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process;

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. "Principles and Guidelines." United Nations Peacekeeping Op12 -erations (2008). p 17-18.

This categorisation of PKO activities will be revisited throughout this paper.13

William J. Durch, ed. Twenty-first-century peace operations. US Institute of Peace Press, 2006.14

Center on International Cooperation (New York University). Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. 15

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.

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▪ Serve as an observer or assist in the implementation of ceasefire/peace agreements; or

▪ Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN in order to achieve an environment in

which to build a stable peace.’

This definition is suitably broad enough to include the variety of actors which have undertak-

en PKOs (e.g. UN, regional organisations, coalitions of states, or individual states) but re-

strictive enough to exclude other types of interventions and conflicts by third parties (e.g.

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or combat support). The inclusion of a humanitarian

interest precludes actors with purely opportunistic or self-interested motivations. This should

not be construed to mean, however, that states cannot have self-interest as a component of

their PKO.

! Theoretical Foundations

The study of peace operations benefits from developments in several disciplines. This is

to be expected since PKOs impact upon many different dimensions including social, econom-

ic, security, and political. As our understanding of security and the factors which drive con-

flicts has broadened to include non-traditional dimensions such as food, health, and environ-

mental security, so has the need to incorporate these dimensions into ongoing analysis of the

field. A full analysis of all relevant theoretical developments pertinent to PKOs is beyond the

scope of this paper. This paper will instead identify the primary theories relevant to under-

standing contemporary PKOs. These will in turn be used in Chapter II as a conceptual

framework with which to analyse potential implications of using robotics in peace operations.

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Arguably, the liberal peace theory is one of the most influential theories in both concept

and practice for PKOs. Broadly, this theory states that at intra-state level democratic sys16 -

tems are unlikely to resort to civil war. Powerful institutional constraints, a diffusion of deci-

sion-making authority, protection of human rights, and the opportunity for non-violent av-

enues for change and dispute resolution mean there few reasons to resort to war. In practice, 17

PKOs are increasingly used to create or maintain peace within states. This means that many

operations incorporate elements to build structures for a democratic society in the interest of

long lasting stability, the idea being that by establishing a functioning democracy the state will

be less likely to fail. Moreover, at the inter-state level, it is held that democratic systems are

less likely to wage war with each other. The logic is that establishing a democratic system en-

courages not only internal stability but international peace as well.

The application of the liberal peace theory is not without controversy, however. Some

states, such as China, argue that PKOs should be concerned with assisting states and other

actors to resolve differences rather than imposing a particular ideology during the process. 18

Additionally, the logic of employing democratization is not without its challengers. Rapid de-

mocratisation of post-war societies can be counter-productive, having destabilising effects. 19

Furthermore, its empirical assumptions can be undermined by pointing to wars between or

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010. p 23.16

John M. Owen. "How liberalism produces democratic peace." International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 87-125.17

Sally Morphet. "China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council October 1971—December 1999." 18

Security Dialogue 31, no. 2 (2000): 151-166.

Roland Paris. At war's end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge University Press, 2004.19

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within democracies or by arguing that the dataset remains too small to draw universal con20 -

clusions. Finally, another critique of the theory finds the values underwriting the theory are 21

not casually connected to peace but merely reflect the ideological preferences of the in-

ternational community's most powerful actors. 22

Another important theory is Cosmopolitanism, which emphasises inclusivity and ac-

countability. Within the context of PKOs, a Cosmopolitan approach treats the protection of 23

civilians as its primary objective. This has led some scholars in the field, such as Tom Wood24 -

house and Oliver Ramsbotham, to call for a standing UN Emergency Peace Service (UN-

EPS). This is similar to Kaldor's schema which seeks to establish a new type of professional, 25

one combining the capabilities of soldiers and law enforcement. These professionals would 26

be capable of protecting civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law. What is 27

most important for our study of PKOs, however, is the assertion that it is unreasonable to ex-

pect all belligerents in a conflict to consent to this type of force. Therefore, consent should be

This assertion opens up a broader debate about what constitutes a 'true' democratic state and whether or not 20

this actually undermines the liberal peace theory. Further analysis of this issue is not required for the purpose of this paper however. Regardless of the theory's accuracy, it has still been a key influence in the practice and exe-cution of contemporary PKOs.

John J. Mearcheimer. "The false promise of international institutions." International security (1994): 5-49.21

Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. "The imperial peace: democracy, force and globalization." European Journal 22

of International Relations 5, no. 4 (1999): 403-434.

Simon Capey. "Justice beyond borders: a global political theory." (2005).23

Woodhouse, Tom, and Oliver Ramsbotham. "Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and the globalization of security." 24

International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 (2005): 139-156.

Ibid.25

Mary Kaldor. New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.26

Ibid.27

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sought not from belligerents but victims. The concept of 'impartiality' in this instance is an28 -

chored in using force to protect civilians regardless of the source of insecurity. Cosmopoli-

tanism brings to light new issues but it offers little in way of a solution to these issues. A

standing UN force is unlikely to be a political reality in the near future. Furthermore, the real-

ity in most contemporary PKOs is that it is often be difficult to discern civilians and perpetra-

tors of violence. Cosmopolitanism nonetheless remains relevant due to its ideas having been 29

assimilated into wider contemporary views of what PKOs should aim to accomplish. 30

Finally, Critical Security Studies (CSS) have also been a source of developments in

conceptualising peace operations. This is unsurprising given CSS's emphasis on the individ-

ual, emancipation, and human security. When concerned with human emancipation, it is im31 -

portant for PKOs to take into account the experiences and opinions of those who are often

marginalised in the process. By paying attention to these groups, PKOs can incorporate a

wider array of issues (e.g. disenfranchisement, inadequate healthcare, domestic violence, rape,

etc.) and use these alternative elements when constructing peace processes and agreements. 32

This provides a different perspective on instability and emphasises the importance of the indi-

vidual at local levels. CSS also widens traditional perceptions of what constitutes a security

Ibid, p 135.28

Paul Q. Hirst. War and power in the 21st century: the State, military conflict, and the international system. 29

Polity, 2001.

For example, many of Kaldor's views correspond closely with some of the ideas laid out in the UN's Brahimi 30

Report in 2000. This report will be discussed further in Chapter I.

Defined here as freeing individuals 'from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would 31

freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others'. Ken Booth. Theory of world security. Vol. 105. Cambridge University Press, 2007. p 112.

Eli Stamnes. "Critical security studies and the United Nations preventive deployment in Macedonia." In32 -ternational Peacekeeping 11, no. 1 (2004): 161-181.

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issue. Moving away from a state-centric and state-military foci, a broader array of issues can

be considered as sources of insecurity. The number 'security issues' considered to be under 33

the rubric of PKO has obvious implications when planning and resourcing a mission. This po-

tentially complicates planning and resourcing. In addition, agreeing on which security issues

should be included will likely be difficult. This could in turn lead to lack of a clear mandate, a

source of failure in previous PKOs. 34

! The theories discussed above do not exhaust all frameworks. Nonetheless, they do

provide a valuable set of tools that can help to simplify complex issues like PKOs. Given their

influence on the development of PKOs, each is important when assessing the potential impact/

s robotics may introduce.

!What is a Robot?

Whilst the idea of mechanical agents has been around since ancient times, the modern 35

incarnation of a digital, programmable robot emerged in 1954 when Unimate designed and

sold a mechanical arm to General Motors for lifting hot sheet metal off factory lines. Robotic

technology has since grown as computing capabilities expand and costs decrease. Robots have

proliferated. The concept now includes machines performing tasks as varied as vacuuming a

room and flying thousands of miles autonomously.

Some examples of potential security issues include: health, energy, food, environmental, gender, and popula33 -tion issues.

This will be discussed further in Chapter I.34

The Greeks believed the god Hephaestus created Talos, a bronze man who defended Crete from invaders.35

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Robotic applications hold numerous potential benefits for militaries, the most obvious

being the removal of a human from danger. Unsurprisingly, one of the first uses of a modern

robot by a military was the US armed force's use of robots in bomb disarmament and disposal.

When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, it had only a handful of unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs). Seven years later it possessed 7,000 UAVs ranging from the now-contentious Preda-

tor and Reaper models to smaller micro-drones able to fit in a soldiers backpack. These sys36 -

tems are capable of an increasing variety of tasks ranging from surveillance to carrying out

lethal engagement of targets. Present day robotic systems have been likened to the Model T’s

description as a 'horseless carriage', intuiting a potential momentous shift regarding what ro-

botic systems will eventually present in the way of capabilities. 37

Clearly, the term 'robot' is expansive, encompassing a broad array of machines intended

for and capable of a variety of tasks. While the specific definition of a robot is still debated,

there is a general recognition that three characteristics known as the 'sense-think-act' par-

adigm must be present for a machine to merit the moniker. A robot must have sensors capable

of monitoring its environment and detecting changes in it; processors/artificial intelligence guiding

its responses and activities; and effectors which act in a manner reflecting a 'decision' and en-

abling the mechanism to enact a change in the environment around it. For the purposes of 38

this paper, a robot will be any system which fulfils the 'sense-think-act' paradigm. This definition suffi-

Peter W. Singer "Unmanned Systems and Robotic Warfare." Brookings Institute (March 23, 2010). http://36

www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/03/23-unmanned-systems-singer

Ibid.37

Peter W. Singer. Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. Penguin, 38

2009.

!14

ciently restricts the term to a coherent set of technologies presently in use whilst also allowing

for projected technologies and platforms to be included in our analysis.

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Chapter I. Peacekeeping Operations: A Historical Over-

view

PKOs can be thought to have emerged in their present form through a series of devel-

opment waves. The first wave roughly corresponds with missions prior to the creation of the

UN; the second from the creation of the UN to the end of the Cold War between 1988-1993.

The third wave marked a period of initial enthusiasm for PKOs followed by a quick re-

trenchment after several failures in the 1990s. Finally, a fourth wave began in 1999 and con-

tinues to the present day. These are not arbitrary temporal demarcations. Each wave encom-

passes a specific trend or set of practices which have influenced how PKOs are thought of and

operate to this day. The present day fourth wave is of the most concern to this paper. Howev-

er, a consideration of background is important if we are to understand the contemporary is-

sues facing PKOs.

! First Wave —Before the UN

The first wave covers the period during which the initial conceptual seeds of PKOs

where planted. The idea that certain rights extend beyond borders and are universal is deeply

entrenched in history. This eventually evolved into today's conception of human rights. The

idea of collective security also began to form as states realised that inter- and intra-state wars

were a concern for the international community as a whole. Finally, the privileged position of

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great powers was acknowledged, but with the important caveat that these actors also had spe-

cial responsibilities to maintain the system. Intuitively this makes sense. The great powers

benefit from the stability of the status quo. Therefore, their greater responsibility to safeguard

is commensurate with the benefits they are able to reap.

The thinking that great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining peace and securi-

ty dates as far back as antiquity. The Roman Empire established that laws could cross political

boundaries and all peoples were governed by the ius gentium, or universal law. Nineteenth 39

and early 20th

-century great powers would similarly expend national treasure in attempts to

manage conflicts, protect the human rights, and form coalitions to exert a collective will on

other powers. 40

The 1815 Congress of Vienna marked an important event with its creation of the 'Con-

cert of Europe'. This was an early attempt at a system designed to manage potential great

power conflicts and prevent a hegemonic order from emerging within Europe. It was there41 -

fore one of the earliest attempts at collective security, an innovative idea that placed responsi-

bilities for preventing and repelling aggressors on all members of international society (limited

in this sense to European powers). Another important development from the Congress was

the assertion that the European powers had an established interest in protecting the human

rights of Christians in the Balkans and Middle East. Whilst this may have been a veiled justi-

B. Buzan and R. Little. International Systems in World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. p 39

200.

Simon Chesterman. Just war or just peace?: humanitarian intervention and international law. Oxford Univer40 -sity Press, 2001.

John G. Ikenberry. After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars. 41

Princeton University Press, 2009. p 80-116.

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fication for interference into the Middle East in some instances, it was also partly grounded in

a genuine concern and interest in protecting the rights of Christians. 42

The League of Nations was founded in 1919 after the profound violence characterising

World War I. As opposed to the narrow-interests of the most dominant powers that the Con-

cert of Europe represented, the League of Nations was more ambitious and based on what

were thought to be universal values. An important development of the League was the idea 43

that great powers should have a legislated executive role. This bound them to their responsi-

bilities whilst also protecting their privileges within the interstate system. The primary func-

tion of the League, however, was the provision of collective security. The League despatched

troops, acted as a mediator, and observed peace agreements in the service of this end, such as

when it sent 3,300 troops to dissuade rising German nationalism and interdict that country’s

revanchist effort to reclaim the Saar basin. Despite its ambitions, the League proved too 44

weak to prevent the outbreak of a second catastrophic war.

! Second Wave — 1988-1993

For example, French troops dispatched to Syria in 1860-61 were given a narrow mandate and the French ex42 -plicitly stated that they would not seek a permanent presence or territorial claims.

Simon Chesterman. Just war or just peace?: humanitarian intervention and international law. Oxford

University Press, 2001. p 32-33.

Ibid, 77.43

Two important principles guiding this force would also become key elements of UN PKOs: the operation re44 -quired the host's consent, and troops were only allowed to use force for self-defence.

Alan James. Peacekeeping in international politics. London: Macmillan, 1990. p 76.

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The creation of the UN marked another significant turning point for PKOs. Like af45 -

ter the First World War, the end of WWII provided the motivation for another international

organisation to promote collective security issues and peace. The UN preserved the idea that

the great powers should maintain a legalised executive role, that embodied in the Security

Council. The inclusion of the USSR, and later the People’s Republic of China, would prove a

recipe for political gridlock during the Cold War. This was seen early on when the USSR

terminated early attempts to form a UN standing army. The United Nations Charter’s Chap46 -

ter VII was originally designed to be used for establishing collective security agreements but

evolved to be used in the context of PKOs due to the highly charged political environment. 47

As geopolitical and ideological interests disrupted cooperation, the UN became less a vehicle

for collective security on the international scale than an instrument of crisis management. 48

PKOs during this wave were primarily influenced by two important developments: decoloni-

sation and the emerging debate between state sovereignty.

Due to the highly contentious political nature of the UN through this period, there

were very few PKOs relative to later periods. The majority of PKOs during this wave were of

the more traditional variety with mandates limited to observing and supervising peace agree-

During the period of the second wave there were non-UN led PKOs. However, a detailed discussion of these 45

is beyond the scope of this paper as the majority of significant developments originated within the UN led mis-sions.

Joseph P. Lorenz. Peace, power, and the United Nations: a security system for the twenty-first century. West46 -view Press, 1999.

Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010. p 48-4947

Lowe, et al. The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 48

1945: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press, 2008.

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ments between consenting belligerent states. These missions were limited in part due to the 49

geopolitical rivalry between the Security Council members. However the decolonisation

movement also created a strong impetus for limited mandates. Newly formed states from for-

mer empires emphasised the principle of non-interference as a means to resist the great pow-

ers. For these reasons, PKOs were often kept to limited mandates and with a strong empha50 -

sis on respecting state sovereignty.

The scars left by the Holocaust and other atrocities during World War II also com-

pelled the international community to place human rights at the core of the UN's mission.

This created a tension with the value of non-interference. The dilemma facing the great pow-

ers and the UN was how should to pursue peace and security if doing so requires interference

in the domestic affairs of other states. This lead to the beginning of a broader debate over

Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of state sovereignty. Strict adherence to the

Westphalian order was necessary in part to limit great powers and former colonies from sim-

ply imposing their will upon newly formed and weaker states. However, as decolonisation

progressed this dilemma grew as the transition from colony to state in some regions — such as

the Congo— sometimes became extremely bloody and protracted. This prompted the devel-

opment of post-Westphalian concepts of state sovereignty as conditional on the state’s ability

to protect its citizens and ability to prevent mass atrocities, such as genocide. This debate over

Westphalian and post-Westphalian implications for PKOs would become more prominent in

the third wave as the Cold War ended and globalisation became a more pronounced phe-

William J. Durch. ed. The evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis. New York: 49

St. Martin's Press, 1993. p 16-38.

Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. The expansion of international society. Oxford University Press, USA, 50

1984.

!20

nomenon. Chapter II will also elaborate upon this state sovereignty issue in relation to the 51

present day use of UAVs. State sovereignty is especially contentious due to the US Military

operating drones over Yemeni, Pakistani, and Somali territory without consent.

! Third Wave — 1993-1999

The third wave of PKOs was driven by two new phenomena: the end of the Cold War

and globalisation. These two driving factors led to three major changes — quantitative, norma-

tive, and qualitative — within PKOs. The end of the Cold War simultaneously created an in52 -

creased demand and willingness to undertake PKOs. With the new Russian Federation pre-

occupied by the dismantling of the Soviet empire, the consistent threat of it wielding its veto

power evaporated. This freed the UN from the geopolitical pressure of the Cold War. Addi-

tionally, the power politics which enabled and sustained civil wars through the Cold War dis-

appeared and great powers began withdrawing their patronage. The increased effects of glob-

alisation began to transform the economic, social, and political dimensions of interstate rela-

tionships. Whilst the effects of globalisation have largely been driven by mature and stable 53

states, weaker states have often been left to react to processes they have little influence over.

Globalisation has enabled the rise of organised crime, terrorism, and other actors to challenge

the state's traditional monopoly of force. Some, such as Kaldor, argued that from this, glob54 -

David Held, ed. Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Stanford University Press, 1999.51

Ibid, p 97.52

Colin Hay. "Contemporary capitalism, globalization, regionalization and the persistence of national variation." 53

Review of International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 509-531.

Herfried Münkler. The new wars. Polity, 2005.54

!21

alisation has led to 'new wars' in which the traditional lines between war, independent actors,

and large-scale violence and human rights violations are increasingly blurred. This in turn 55

meant more instances of PKOs being required to address state failure and intrastate issues.

In effect, these two factors led the three-fold change in the nature of PKOs. Quantita-

tively PKOs were not only more numerous, but larger in scale as well. The increased demand 56

for PKOs initially spiked at the end of the Cold War as pre-existing civil conflicts began to

wind down. However, this increase in demand cannot solely account for the increase in 57

number of PKOs. The relatively benign security environment, the accelerated spread of de-

mocratisation, spread of human rights, and CNN effect also led to the belief that PKOs were 58

politically viable and desirable. This period further saw an increase in the number of states 59

willing to contribute to UN PKOs. The UK and France and some middle powers such as

Canada and Australia contributed in efforts to be perceived as 'good global citizens'. The 60

Mary Kaldor. New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.55

The first quantitative increase is evidenced by the fact that between 1988-1993 the UN initiated more PKOs 56

than it had previously since its founding. Dennis C. Jett. Why peacekeeping fails. St. Martin's Press, 2000.

William J. Durch ed. The evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis. New York: 57

St. Martin's Press, 1993. p 16-38.

See: Piers Robinson. The CNN effect. London: Routledge, 2002.58

Peter Viggo Jakobsen. "The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s Adding Global59 -ization to the Conventional 'End of the Cold War Explanation'." Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 (2002): 267-282.

Gareth J. Evans. Cooperating for peace: the global agenda for the 1990's and beyond. St Leonards, NSW: 60

Allen & Unwin, 1993.

!22

end of the Cold War also freed up military capacity. Many militaries sought new missions in

order to preserve budgets threatened by the 'peace dividend'. 61

Normative and qualitative changes followed the quantitative change. Normative changes

emerged from the growing belief among member states that a post-Westphalian approach to

PKOs was required to achieve stable peace. This in turn lead to a qualitative change in the

complexity of missions. Between 1988-91, nine new missions were mandated. Initially these 62

began as a re-engagement with more classical PKOs akin to the previous wave (e.g. monitor-

ing troop withdrawal, peace agreements). However, hints of larger normative changes

emerged as missions evolved to meet new challenges. For example, ONUCA (The UN mis-

sion in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala) was the first UN mission to monitor elections

and to disarm and demobilise rebel forces. Furthermore, these missions were widely success63 -

ful. This supported perceptions that PKOs were tools for resolving conflicts and humanitarian

crises. As the former UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar said in 1991: 'we are clearly

witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the

defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal doc-

uments'. These successes would soon give way however to a series of failures in Angola, 64

Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda that caused UN PKOs to enter a period of retrenchment.

Peter Viggo Jackobsen. "The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s Adding Glob61 -alization to the Conventional 'End of the Cold War Explanation'." Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 (2002): 273.

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010. p 93-12062

Thomas George Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate S. Pease. The United Nations and 63

changing world politics. No. Part I. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. p 274.

Quoted in: David Scheffer, Richard N. Gardner, and Gerald B. Helman. Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UN 64

Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention. US Institute of Peace, 1992. p 4.

!23

In place of the UN, regional organisations and existing alliance systems began to initi-

ate PKOs. Notably, after Srebrenica, NATO adopted a peace enforcement mission Operation

Deliberate Force, in the former Yugoslavia. In reaction to its failures, the UN issued reports

accepting responsibility for and detailing the many failures of the UN PKOs in Srebrenica

and Rwanda. Three of the most important findings were:

i. Peace operations were likely to fail without the proper support of the Security Council

and adequate resources which informed a clear and achievable mission mandate;

ii. 'Demilitarised zones' and 'safe zones' are two distinct types of space. The former are

created under the authority of international law and the consent of belligerents; the

latter enjoys no such consent and should therefore must be defended by credible a mili-

tary deterrent;

iii. Strategies of genocide and ethnic cleansing could only be stopped by credible threat

and use of force. 65

These findings led to the view that PKOs needed to be more complex, multidimension-

al, forceful, and well-equipped in order to achieve future success. Robotics clearly presents 66

an opportunity to address the issue of ‘well-equipped’. Robotics act as a force multiplier, al-

lowing troops to ‘do more with less’ or use resources more efficiently. This will be further

elaborated upon in Chapter II.

!!

Koffi Annan. "Report of Th Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55: The Fall of 65

Srebrenica." UN, 1999.

Philip Wilkinson. "Sharpening the weapons of peace: peace support operations and complex emergencies." 66

International Peacekeeping 7, no. 1 (2000): 63-79.

!24

Fourth Wave — 1999-present

Two new PKOs were launched in 1999 which renewed impetus within the in-

ternational community for peace operations. The first was the NATO-led Operation Allied

Force; the second was the Australian led INTERFET mission in East Timor. After both mis-

sions accomplished their original mandates, the UN initiated two new peace operations,

UNMIK and UNTAET, to act as transitional authorities in Kosovo and East Timor respec-

tively. Furthermore, the UN would undertake two new PKOs, MONUC in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC) and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. After the failures in the mid 90s,

it seemed PKOs were popular once again. The reason for the renewed interest in PKOs is

roughly due to five main factors: interest in humanitarianism and a merger of security and de-

velopment agendas; Western government concerns over humanitarian issues within their

neighbourhoods; regional organisations, existing coalitions, and pivotal states taking a larger

role; increased regional capacity in Africa; and renewed confidence in PKOs after attempts to

learn lessons from previous failures. 67

The first reason grew out of a recognition of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia. With-

out a secure environment, humanitarian aid and development programs found it hard to assist

the local population due to corruption, violence, and outright theft. This led to a merger of se-

curity and development goals as the rule of law and a secure and stable environment were

viewed as prerequisite for social development and human rights protection. The second rea68 -

son was seen in the NATO and Australian missions. In both cases the destabilising events in

Koffi Annan. "Report of Th Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55: The Fall of 67

Srebrenica." UN, 1999.

Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh. "Security sector transformation in post-conflict societies." The Conflict, Secu68 -rity and Development group (2002).

!25

Kosovo and East Timor threatened Western interests. In Kosovo, NATO states were worried

about another humanitarian crisis like in Bosnia. In East Timor, Australia saw its commercial

interests in danger and viewed further appeasement of Indonesia as untenable to security in

the region. Additionally, both Operation Allied Force and INTERFET were led indepen69 -

dently of the UN command structure. This allowed the operations to preserve their refined

decision-making, coordination, and inter-operability skills. All of these were thought of as dif-

ficult to achieve in the UN. This also marks the emergence of a new form of PKOs referred 70

to by some as 'partnership peacekeeping'. These types of arrangements involve a blending or 71

shared burden between various PKO contributing states. INTERFET for instance started as

an Australian mission, but was later handed over to the UN to oversee the subsequent transi-

tional and capacity building phase. Other arrangements involved different organisations or

actors in the same theatre responsible for different actions, pool capacities, or other hybrid

arrangements.

This wave is also witnessing an increase of PKOs in Africa. This is due in part to the

increased regional capacity to undertake these missions. States such as Nigeria and South

Africa have begun to play more proactive roles in regional security issues as the beneficiaries

of regional security development programs. Regional organisations in Africa have also 72

Peter Chalk. Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention. 69

No. RAND/MR-1409-SRF. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 2001.

Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010. p 123.70

Norrie MacQueen. Peacekeeping and the International System. Routledge, 2012.71

For example the US African Crisis Response Initiative (later the Africa Contingency Operations Training 72

Assistance), Britain's Africa Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, and France's Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme.

!26

emerged as capable PKO contributors such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS with 73

its associated military arm ECOMOG. The former organisation is currently operating in 74

conjunction with the UN in Somalia (AMISOM) and the later was a contributor to the UN-

AMSIL mission.

The fourth reason for increased interest in PKOs is renewed confidence within the UN

based on lessons learned from recent peacekeeping operations. This is best illustrated by the

UN's issuing of the Brahimi Report in 2000. The report was an objective and critical look at

the UN's ability to undertake PKOs and what changes were necessary to achieve more effec-

tive results. Its scope included operational, doctrinal, and organisational changes. Among the

recommendations were suggestions to improve decision-making capacities at UN headquar-

ters to more rapidly respond to information from the field; undertake procedural and financial

reforms to craft clearer mandates and address the gulf between ends and means which has

chronically plagued UN PKOs; adopt measures to ensure that troops can be deployed rapidly

and effectively; and finally, ensure that deployed forces have the capacity and ability to carry

out the mandate. These requirements implied the need for stronger military components, more

robust training, and the development of 'best practices' common to all UN missions. The 75

Brahimi Report was followed by a Capstone Doctrine aimed at establishing strategic guidance

for future UN PKOs. Unfortunately, whilst the Brahimi Report was received favourably by

the Security Council members, it proved difficult politically to institute the recommended re-

Economic Community of West African Sates73

Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States74

William J. Durch, Victoria K Holt, Caroline R Earle, and Moira K Shanahan. The Brahimi Report and the 75

Future of Un Peace Operations. Henry L. Stimson Center Washington, DC, 2003.

!27

forms. What eventuated was a more cautious adaptation, reflected in the final version of the 76

Capstone Doctrine issued in 2008. Instead of constituting actual overarching guidance, the

document represented more of a reflection on contemporary operations. This change was 77

most notable in the underlying conceptual principles identified in the document:

▪Consent - peacekeepers should be deployed with consent of the parties;

▪Impartiality - peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the

conflict, but not neutral in their execution of the mandate;

▪Restraint in the use of force - peacekeepers must use force in restraint, it is allowed when

necessary to protect themselves, their mandate, and groups identified in the mandate;

▪Credibility - requires rapid deployment, proper resourcing, ability to deter spoilers, and

the ability to manage expectations;

▪Legitimacy - conferred by legal mandate, firm and fair exercise of the mandate, circum-

spect use of force, discipline of the peacekeepers, and respect shown to the local popu-

lation;

▪Promotion of local and national ownership - peacekeepers should promote national and lo-

cal ownership of the peace process.

In the original Capstone document all six were principles. In the final version only the

first three remained principles and the remainder were identified as 'success factors'. The 78

Brahimi Report further recommended that peacekeepers should presume to have a mandate

Christine Gray. "Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?." Journal 76

of Conflict and Security Law 6, no. 2 (2001): 267-288.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. "Principles and Guidelines." United Nations Peacekeeping Op77 -erations (2008).

Ibid, p 31-41.78

!28

to protect civilians from harm by force if necessary. Instead of adopting this suggestion, the

final draft of the document insisted that force should only be used in self defence, or defence

of the mandate when approved by the Security Council. Regardless, both the Brahimi Re79 -

port and the final version of the Capstone document were crucial to re-conceptualising princi-

ples and guidelines, clarifying the nature and purpose, and establishing a recognised best

practice for UN PKOs.

The changes to the nature of PKOs in the present have been crucial to their reinvigo-

ration as a credible policy for international reform. New partnership peacekeeping operations

have allowed for states with vested interests to undertake PKOs instead of relying on ad hoc

troop commitments from various UN members. This has improved the commitment and quali-

ty of interventions and avoided previous issues of poor readiness and troop quality. Further-

more, the emergence of local organisations capable of contributing to PKOs has allowed for

broader burden sharing. Finally, after some introspection, the UN has re-emerged as an im-

portant actor in PKOs. Whilst many of the reforms have been bogged down in politics, the

adaptation of principles and purpose has helped to create stronger mandates and clarified the

nature of contemporary PKOs.

!!The development of what we now know as PKOs has been a long and gradual devel-

opment. In the first wave the underlying concepts of PKOs were formed, with collective secu-

rity, humanitarian issues, and the responsibilities of great states emerging as a foundation. The

second wave included the effects of decolonisation and the dilemma between state sovereignty

Ibid, p 34-35.79

!29

and human rights. This is a complex issue not yet fully resolved today. The third wave was a

period of initial enthusiasm but one ending in a series of failures stemming from a poor under-

standing of intrastate conflict. After a period of introspection, PKOs have re-emerged in a

new form. New forms of partnerships have begun to undertake PKOs, often in conjunction

with the UN, and the foundations of PKOs have been reconstituted to better adhere to con-

temporary realities. The next chapter will look at how the introduction of robotics can assist,

or hinder, troops in fulfilling their mission mandates during such undertakings.

!!

!30

!!!

Chapter II. Robots for Peace

Robotics have already had a substantial impact on existing military operations, most

notably as a tool in the Global War on Terror. The use of UAVs (also referred to as 'drones')

has given the military increased flexibility and scope in its ISR capabilities. Additionally, once

weaponised, UAVs are capable of tactical strikes to eliminate targets. UAVs can utilise both of

these capabilities to loiter in areas in order to gather information and give decision-makers

more context before deciding whether or not to attack a target. This has been controversial

however, and the ethical, legal, and strategic dimensions of these 'drone strikes' have been

called into question.

This is typical of newly introduced technologies. As old systems and methods of fight-

ing are superseded, notions of what war is are challenged. Sometimes this is a challenge to

ideas of how war ought to be. Other times it is a challenge to the nature of war itself. An ex-

ample of the first type of change would be the challenge that the longbow posed to the French

in the 14th

century. The arrival of an infantry weapon that was cheap and readily deployable 80

upset the engrained warrior ethos of the age. The second type of change is what is sometimes

to referred to as a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). In essence, an RMA is a funda81 -

Sidney Painter. French Chivalry: Chivalric Ideas and Practices in Mediaeval France. Cornell University 80

Press, 1940. 1-27

Steven Metz and James Kievit. Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy. DI81 -ANE Publishing, 1995.

!31

mental change in how war itself is fought. A contemporary example is the development of nu-

clear weapons. Whereas the first type of change is more of incremental, the second is revision-

ist.

Whilst robotics are unlikely to revolutionise warfare in the immediate future, they 82

still prompt many important questions, such as what are the moral implications? How does a

change from the who to the what fights alter our perceptions of war? Do robotics alienate us

from the act of war so completely that we lose a sense of its costs? Many of these touch on

broader philosophical issues which are beyond the scope of this paper, but some are beginning

to play out at the tactical and strategic level and are being debated within the public sphere by

the media, academics, and others.

This chapter analyses the relevant issues inherent in using robotics during PKOs. The

analysis considers drone use in current PKOs and the US military's counterinsurgency drone

program. The inclusion of counterinsurgency data is valuable for three reasons. First, many of

the practical questions and issues surrounding the use of robotics have arisen from US coun-

terinsurgency operations. Secondly, from a military standpoint, counterinsurgencies and

PKOs share many characteristics. Both are classified as 'low-intensity conflict' and share doc-

trinal guidelines. Additionally, the two types of operations run parallel to each other, as is the 83

case in Afghanistan. Lastly, whilst drones have begun to be used in PKOs (most notably in

Northern Mali and the UN MONUSCO mission) there is little information analysing the use

of drones in that context. Counterinsurgency cases therefore offer supplementary information

Lynn E. Davis, Michael J. McNerney, James Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting, and Daniel Byman. 82

Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and US Security. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 2014.

U. S. Army "FM 100-20 (Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict)." Washington, DC: Department of 83

the Army (1990).

!32

to enhance our analysis of the impact of robotic platforms. Before undertaking that considera-

tion, however, it is necessary to consider the reasons robotics might benefit those conducting

PKO.

!Why use robots?

The most ready response to this question is the simple fact that a robot removes a hu-

man from physical harm, offers new capabilities, or augments existing capabilities. For ex84 -

ample, UAVs are able to gather large amounts of data and surveil extensive amounts of terri-

tory that would be difficult or risky for manned aircraft or individuals conducting ground re-

connaissance. Another obvious advantage of being inorganic is the ability to go into high-risk

or uninhabitable environments under peacetime conditions. During the Fukushima disaster,

for instance, drones were flown by the US Navy to monitor radiation levels and relay images

of the damaged reactor. As opposed to their human counterparts, robots also do not suffer 85

fatigue or need to take frequent breaks. They are essentially able to operate as long as the

equipment does not fail and their power supply remains alive. Finally, by removing the human

element, robots also allow for a lighter mission footprint.

Robots can also do the same tasks more economically than people in many instances. 86

This is especially true when currently available drones are compared to the employment of

Peter W. Singer. Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. Penguin, 84

2009.

A. C. Madrigal "Inside the Drone Missions to Fukushima." Retrieved April 7 (2011): 2013.85

Scott Shane and Thom Shanker. "Yemen strike reflects US shift to drones as cheaper war tool." New York 86

Times (2011).

!33

manned aircraft. The cost benefits are also likely to continue to accrue as technologies get 87

cheaper through economies of scale and general cost reductions of constituent parts (e.g. sen-

sor arrays, computer processors, and bandwidth costs). Furthermore, money can be saved 88

by sharing research and development costs through the design of flexible platforms with

adaptable payloads as was done with the Grey Eagle and Reaper model drones. (Both were

based off of the original Predator model and altered according to their intended missions.)

Training people to operate drones is also relatively simple compared to many other systems.

Whilst the earliest drone pilots were originally actual airplane pilots, more recent operators

increasingly have little or no flying experience in manned craft. Given their relatively low 89

costs and ease of use, drones can be easily replaced if lost and their numbers increased as mis-

sions demand. Finally, robots are also able to react to situations faster in less time than

manned systems. This is sometimes referred to as 'shortening the loop'. The CRAM system, 90

for instance, is able to act as an early warning system or shoot down ordinance such as rock-

ets, artillery rounds, or missiles. Such systems are already in use in Afghanistan where they

are help defend bases from insurgent fire.

Furthermore, the above advantages are the most readily realisable. As technology de-

velops, robots are likely to become increasingly more capable and versatile. Developments in

autonomy are especially pivotal to the development of robotics as many of the advantages (e.g.

A. Boyle. "The Us and Its Uavs: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." American Security Project, 2012.87

Chris Anderson. "Here Come the Drones! Between cheap sensors, off-the-shelf parts, and free software, now 88

anyone can have their own personal flying robot. Five drones at work, rules for proper droning, the flying smartphone, and more." Wired-New York (2012).

Peter W. Singer. Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. Penguin, 89

2009.

Counter Rocket Artillery Missile90

!34

cost) that robots offer will become increasingly reliant on a person's ability to operate multiple

robots simultaneously. This is no easy feat, as at the moment, trying to operate more than one

machine at a time can still be likened to trying to drive two cars at once. Another advantage 91

of more autonomous drones is that attacks on command, control, and communications net-

works are less likely to render drones vulnerable. At the moment most drones are 'doornail-

dumb' and capable of only limited autonomy involving such simple commands such as 'stay

stationary' or 'follow this flight path'. As technology continues to improve, more robotic plat92 -

forms will be developed which can operate in different environments. At the moment most of

the advanced robots operate in the air due to the relatively obstacle free environment. Ground

and sea bound robots have more difficult operational environments. Progress has therefore

been slower in building systems capable of handling them. DARPA is also funding a vari93 94 -

ety of robotic research projects ranging from the MULE, a robot designed to transport sup95 -

plies and equipment, to the combined medical evacuation and treatment robots REV and

REX. Combined, these two projects alone accounted for over $64 million in research grants 96

in 2009. This also accounts for a small margin of the projects over the horizon. Given their 97

Peter Singer has often used this analogy only with video games instead of cars. I have opted for this alterna91 -tive however as it less readily links robots to the argument that they 'videogame-ise' war.

"Up in the Air." The Economist, 2014, 11-12.92

Peter W. Singer Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. Penguin, 93

2009. Kindle location 2060-2301

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency94

Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle95

Robotic Evacuation Vehicle and Robotic Extraction Vehicle96

Ibid, Kindle location 2111-2139.97

!35

numerous advantages, robots are likely to remain a research and development priority for

years to come.

!Platform versus Policy

The looming pervasiveness of robots adds weight to the debate over their proper role

within military operations. This can be referred to as the 'platform versus policy debate'. In

short, it is a debate over whether robots are inherently problematic in themselves or is the

problem in the policy – how robots are designed and used. Isaac Asimov famously created a

set of rules as a kind of design principle for all robots. Whilst his rules were for a fictional 98

story, he was correct to think that robots will need regulation and controls. This paper argues

that the source of a problem lies in the policy, not the platform itself. Robots are machines

with no will of their own and are designed by people for an end. For this reason, it is impor99 -

tant to concentrate on the ends instead of the means. For example, if a civilian drone is used

by someone as a peeping Tom, then it is the individual who should be held accountable, not

the platform. For all the advances robotics have seen, the technology is far from creating an 100

autonomous capability with a complex will or 'inner-life' capable of judgement or intuition. 101

Despite what some of the literature is currently portraying, robotics is likely still decades or 102

Isaac Asimov. "Runaround." Astounding Science Fiction 29, no. 1 (1942): 94-103.98

"That Thou Art Mindful of Him: Robots Are as Good, or as, Bad, as the People Who Make Them." The 99

Economist, 2014, 20.

Example from Ibid.100

Ibid101

E.g. "The Case Against Killer Robots." Foreign Affairs. 10 May 2014. Web. 10 June 2014. <http://www.for102 -eignaffairs.com/articles/141407/denise-garcia/the-case-against-killer-robots>.

!36

centuries away from any form of singularity. The debate over the broader ethical implica103 -

tions of robotics is important, but as the platform currently exists, regulation which concen-

trates on the ends are capable of controlling how and why robots are used. In time, as auton-

omy because more realistic, this debate should continue as it is a meaningful and needed. For

the near future, however, autonomous and 'thinking' robots are likely to remain the stuff of

science fiction as numerous barriers in fields such as artificial intelligence, computing sciences,

and software engineering must be overcome. As William James once put it: "We are literally

in the midst of an infinite", but it is important to remember that an infinite can be a very 104

long time.

This analysis remains within the realm of the near future. As previously mentioned, the

current drone program is largely conducted within the wider Global War on Terror and sup-

ports US military counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and – more controver-

sially – Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. This section will identify many of the controversial as-

pects of this drone program while also analyzing the current information available on drones

currently deployed during PKOs. By combining these two types of similar yet distinct opera-

tions, the wider implications of robotics can be more readily understood.

Two UN PKOs are currently utilising drones: MONUSCO in the Democratic Repub-

lic of Congo (DRC) and MINUSMA in Northern Mali. Drones were first deployed in this 105

Peter W. Singer Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the twenty-first century. Penguin, 103

2009. Kindle location 1789-2046.

William James. "Subjective effects of nitrous oxide." (1882). Accessed through WIkiSource: http://en.wik104 -isource.org/wiki/Subjective_Effects_of_Nitrous_Oxide

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali105

!37

regard on December 13th

, 2013 in the DRC. The drones are primarily being utilised to en106 -

hance peacekeeping organizations’ ISR capabilities and monitor a 250-kilometre area near the

DRC-Rwandan border. This eastern region of the DRC is prone to militia activity such as

cross-border weapon smuggling. The drones offer 24-hour surveillance capability. At the 107

tactical level this allows peacekeeping troops to be more flexible, helping to address the chron-

ic resource shortage that PKOs often face. With improved situational awareness, troops can

use information collected by drones to identify risks, respond more rapidly to militia move-

ments, and monitor illicit goods trafficking (e.g. conflict minerals, arms). It is crucial to main-

tain the hierarchy of tactics and strategy however. If tactics drive strategy, what may result is

limited successes that are isolated from the broader strategy, to the overall detriment of the

mission. New technology such as robots offer new capabilities and it can be easy to build 108

plans around those capabilities instead of developing a plan which is informed by them.

Shortly after drones were deployed in the DRC, the UN also began soliciting bids for

contracts to provide drones for its MINUSMA mission. The contract criteria require 109

drones for a period of three years with the ability to fly long range to points of interest, loiter

on patrol, and return to base. This evidences another ISR based role for drones, one similar to

"TSG Intelbrief: Un Mission and Isr Support in Africa: A New Paradigm." The Soufan Group, December 4, 106

2013.

Ibid. 107

"TSG Intelbrief: Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones the New Blue Helmets?". The Soufan Group, January 14, 2014.

Audrey Kurth Cronin. "Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy." Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (2013): 108

32-43.

M. Nichols. "U.N. Seeks Surveillance Drones for Mali, Shelves Plans for Ivory Coast." Reuters, May 12, 109

2014.

!38

that in the DRC. Again, the MINUSMA mission will likely use the drones to supplement re-

source shortages; the Security Council mandated a 12,600-strong force but there are only

7,500 troops on the ground. Dutch and French troops have also begun utilising unarmed 110

drones in Northern Mali as a component of their interventions. The French intervention pre-

ceded and now aides the UN mission; the Dutch are a major contributor to the UN mission. 111

Again, these are predominately for ISR missions.

Drone ISR capabilities are well suited to serving PKO needs. Their ability to loiter

and maintain constant surveillance allows troops to operate more efficiently. Greater situa-

tional awareness allows peacekeepers to deploy when they are needed, and where they are

needed. The UAVs therefore act as what in military terms is referred to as a economy of force

role. By discerning enemy whereabouts, peacekeepers can also reduce troop casualties and

better protect civilians. Increased ISR capabilities also allow for peacekeepers to uphold the

principles of PKOs. Being able to track combatant movements better allows peacekeepers to

engage enemies before they reach civilians or establish proper defences to respond to militia

movements. Furthermore, the information available to troops from better ISR capabilities

may allow peacekeepers to better realise their mandate through improved troop effectiveness,

coordination, and lethality against combatants whilst simultaneously reducing the risk to civil-

ians. This in turn enhances their credibility and legitimacy.

Ibid.110

C. Lynch "Dutch Double Down in Mali." Foreign Policy, Nov 13, 2013. 111

A. Hirsch "France to Send Drones to Mali in Fight against Al-Qaida-Backed Insurgents." The Guardian, Octo-ber 23, 2012.

!39

Traditionally, UN PKOs have often had to rely on single-source human intelligence

from host nation personnel. Often these sources have been inadequate or misleading. Fur112 -

thermore, the types of missions peacekeepers are operating in today are generally more dan-

gerous due to those personnel being targeted directly. Intelligence forms an important com113 -

ponent in any complex mission. As illustrated previously, PKOs are incredibly complex, with

a multitude of interacting dynamics ranging from the individual and local level, to global

trends. It seems obvious then that by increasing PKO intelligence capabilities, the mission

stands to benefit. Drones are quickly becoming an important tool in modern operational intel-

ligence gathering due to their technical capabilities. Their proliferation across missions is evi-

dence of their utility, as is the fact that South Sudan and the Ivory Coast have also asked for

drones to be deployed to supplement peacekeeping troops in their territories. 114

The use of drones for ISR capabilities in PKOs has not been without controversy.

Some countries are upset that the UN may be abandoning its traditional posture that the UN

'must have clean hands' and will become a front for Western spooks. Other countries, such 115

as Brazil and Germany, are concerned over mass data collection. Others are suspicious that 116

drones will be used to subvert national sovereignty. Finally, concerns have also been raised

"TSG Intelbrief: Un Mission and Isr Support in Africa: A New Paradigm." The Soufan Group, December 4, 112

2013.

For example, last year in Mali, Islamist insurgents killed two Chadian peacekeepers and a civilian in a suicide 113

bomb attack. C. Lynch. "Dutch Double Down in Mali." Foreign Policy, Nov 13, 2013.

"TSG Intelbrief: Un Mission and Isr Support in Africa: A New Paradigm." The Soufan Group, December 4, 114

2013.

C. Lynch. "Dutch Double Down in Mali." Foreign Policy, Nov 13, 2013.115

Ibid.116

!40

issues over the lack of transparency regarding what information is being gathered and how it is

used. Rwanda, for example, is reluctant to tolerate drones operating near its borders with the

DRC. Also, the UN has not issued any information regarding what information the drones 117

are permitted to collect and how that information is used. Is the information only used by UN

troops? Can they share collected information with other military personnel for other opera-

tions? Who has access to the information? In the case of Rwanda, if the drones do not enter

Rwandan airspace their protests may be legally moot. Furthermore, Rwanda is suspected of

enabling hostile militias and illegal resource extraction in the DRC, making its protests du118 -

bious attempts at trying to hide its own malfeasance. As previously discussed, issues of state

sovereignty are sensitive in PKOs. This is exacerbated by the US drone program’s operating

in countries, such as in Yemen, where it lacks the permission to do so, leading to the percep119 -

tion that drones are overly invasive. The lack of transparency over information collection and

sharing ought to be addressed if only to allay fears of smaller countries that the drones pro-

gram is a front for Western intelligence agencies. Being the first UN operations to utilise

drones, both will be scrutinised for any wrongdoings. In this regard, public and regional fears

could be addressed by developing a comprehensive framework governing the collection and

dissemination of drone-collected data. Another potential avenue for the UN to receive drone-

collected data would be to reach information sharing agreements with partner organisations

or states in PKO the UN may be in a partnership peacekeeping arrangement. In this way the

"TSG Intelbrief: Unmanned Peacekeeping: Are Drones the New Blue Helmets?". The Soufan Group, Jan117 -uary 14, 2014.

Ibid.118

Pakistan may back the use of drones in its territory privately but decries it publicly. 119

"Us Embassy Cables: Pakistan Backs Us Drone Attacks on Tribal Areas." The Guardian, December 1, 2010.

!41

UN could maintain an ‘arm’s length’ from the actual activity and controversy of using the

drone themselves. The obvious downsides to such an approach however is the UN lacks con-

trol over the collection of the information and the UN becomes dependent on the goodwill of

operational partners with the access to drones.

Given the controversy of drone strikes, it is doubtful that the UN would presently de-

ploy armed drones for lethal engagements regardless of their efficacy. It would also come

across as hypocritical of the UN to do so after having recently issued a report criticising US

drone strikes. Moreover, worldwide public opinion polls of drone strikes are 120

unfavourable. Regardless, analysing the controversial elements of drone strikes is important 121

to this paper. The negative perception of drones may prove to be a historical aberration. Many

newly introduced technologies are rejected or resisted at first. It may be that over time atti-

tudes towards drone strikes are no longer singled out for special malice and with time become

thought of more or less the same as other military assets. As technology diffuses, it tends to

become more widely integrated and no longer considered 'foreign' or 'alien'. Attitudes that 122

drone strikes are immoral and wrong may prove unassailable, but as robots proliferate and

other armed platforms are developed it will be important to understand what exactly makes

armed robots so despised. This refers back to previous discussion: Is it the robot itself or how

it is deployed that is the issue?

!!

Charlie Savage. "U.N. Report Highly Critical of U.S. Drone Attacks." New York Times, June 2, 2010.120

PewResearch. "The US and the World." Global Attitudes Project, 2012.121

Everett M. Rogers. Diffusion of innovations. Simon and Schuster, 2010.122

!42

Drone strikes: an example of a policy issue

The controversy surrounding drone strikes consists of three main elements: legal,

moral, and strategic. Each is considered in turn, starting with the legal element. The legality of

the present drone program received widespread attention on November 3rd

, 2002 when a US

drone killed Ali al-Harithi, an al-Qaida operative in Yemen suspected of being involved in the

bombing of the USS Cole. This not only marked the beginning of utilising armed drones for 123

targeted killings; the event also was not an active war zone. Further complicating the legal is-

sue: In active war zones, drones are operated by US Air Force (USAF) pilots; in areas outside

of active war zones, drones are piloted by the CIA. The legal wrinkle is that the ground crews

who maintain the drones and the pilots for the CIA program are still USAF members who are

transferred to the CIA. In theory, deploying military forces to a state can be considered an act

of war. By running a portion of the drone program through the CIA, a non-military entity, the

US maintains it is not conducting an act of war. Furthermore, the US has also stated that tar-

gets not in combat zones are still considered 'enemy combatants' and are therefore legitimate

targets. If applied in the context of a PKO, however, the legal issue is debatable as long as 124

the use of force is reasonable and within the bounds of the mission mandate. Moreover, if the

PKO is legitimate, the legal slight-of-hand is unnecessary since the use of military assets

should not be construed as an act of war.

Secondly, the moral element of the drone program controversy is centred on three

main arguments: that drone strikes are relatively easy to conduct; drones are inherently unfair

M. Bowden "The Killing Machines: How to Think About Drones." The Atlantic, September 2013.123

Jordan J. Paust. “War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War." Yale J. Int'l L. 28 (2003).124

!43

or unnatural; and, drones result in an unacceptable level of civilian casualties. The first of 125 126

these arguments is specious as technological progress is a core component of conflict be it

weapons, armour, training, or a doctrinal innovation. Furthermore, some have also argued 127

that drone strikes are too far removed from the act of killing through a 'videogame effect’. 128

This argument claims that by distancing the drone operator from the act of killing so com-

pletely, the operator does not recognise or register that what they have done is an act of vio-

lence. These arguments are similar to the arguments by the French aristocracy that the long-

bow was unfair and unchivalrous and therefore unacceptable. Notions of 'fairness' and 'hon-

our' are irrelevant within the context of war as long as the force used is proportionate, appro-

priate, and necessary. Additionally, similar claims of the 'removal' of the person from the act 129

of killing have been levelled against almost every technological innovation, from gunpowder

to airplanes. The veracity of this claim is also undermined as evidence is beginning to show

that drone operators suffer from the same psychological stress disorders that soldiers in com-

bat do. 130

O. Bartolomei "The Morality of Drones." International Policy Digest, May 14, 2013.125

Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan. "Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal secu126 -rity-scapes." Theoretical Criminology 15, no. 3 (2011): 239-254.

R. Cline. "Technology and Intelligence." Terrorism 10, no. 3 (1987): 253-55.127

Marc Pitzke. "Interview with a Drone Pilot:'It Is Not a Video Game'." Spiegel Online 3, no. 12 (2010): 2010.128

Nancy Kassop. "Rivals for Influence on Counterterrorism Policy: White House Political Staff Versus Execu129 -tive Branch Legal Advisors." Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (2013): 252-73.

J. Dao "Drone Pilots Are Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do." New York Times, 130

February 22, 2013.

!44

The second moral argument, that drones result in unacceptable levels of civilian

deaths, is also unfounded. Whilst drone strikes do result in civilian deaths, they are lower 131

than alternative methods such as aerial-bombing. Given the evidence, arguments against 132

using drones would therefore have to be applied to the use of the drone as the platform re-

gardless of the policy. Not only is this illogical; it is also immoral. If drones are the superior

platform relative to others in keeping civilian deaths to a minimum, suggesting to use the al-

ternatives regardless of this fact would essentially result in more civilian deaths. Drone strikes

therefore arguably adhere to the principle of the restrained use of force better than alternative

tactics.

The third contested element is an argument over strategy and the efficacy of drone

strikes against militant groups. Evidence suggests that drones pose a serious obstacle to al-

Qaida leadership as shown by internal communiques and guides to operatives on how to avoid

drones. It must also be noted that drones have a high success rate of killing their targets,

largely due to the drone's ability to stay aloft over areas and wait for opportune times to

strike. Militant organisations have demonstrated an ability to use the unpopularity of drone 133

strikes to their advantage as a recruiting tool. David Petraeus expressed this concern openly

to Congress and whilst in charge of the CIA actually decreased the number of drone strikes. 134

"Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Cost of Us Targeted Killings in Yemen." Human Rights Watch, Octo131 -ber, 2013.

Mark Mazzetti. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (Lon132 -don: Penguin, 2013), Chapter 9.

Daniel Byman. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Foreign Affairs 92, no. 133

4 (2013): 32-43.

Trevor McCricken. "Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice." International Affairs 134

87, no. 4 (2011): 781-801.

!45

Militant organisations also seem capable of absorbing losses and adapting to survive —ques-

tioning the underlying logic of such strikes. Be that as it may, firstly, evidence suggests that 135

al-Qaida has struggled as a result of successful drone strikes; secondly, there is no empirical 136

evidence to suggest that terrorist networks, and this can be assumed to apply to other uncon-

ventional militant groups as well, are more resilient to this kind of attack than others. 137

Inevitably however, the use of armed drones may be successful at the tactical level but

counterproductive at the strategic level. In a mission which relies on a 'hearts and minds' ap-

proach, the use of drone strikes may 'win the battle but lose the war'. Perceptions in these

kinds of operations matter, and if a drone strike is despised by the population the mission is

supposed to aid, then its continued use may endanger the mission no matter how efficacious it

is. Given the widespread dislike of drone strikes, this argument gives pause to arming drones

in PKOs as they are likely to hinder objective accomplishment more than help. From a CSS

and human security perspective, the actual use of the drone for lethal strikes is unnecessary,

as the individual’s subjective feelings of insecurity may still result in drones being considered a

threat. The reliance on local support and concerns over credibility, consent, and legitimacy

makes the argument to arm drones difficult. Whilst an armed drone may result in fewer civil-

ian casualties and therefore uphold the principle of reasonable force, it endangers the mission

by risking other principles of PKOs. A practical barrier to utilising armed drones is the diffi-

culty in procuring the technology. The US does sell its drone platforms to select allies; it does

D. Killcullen and A. Exum. "Death from above, Outrage Down Below." New York Times, May 26, 2009.135

Miles Kahler. "Collective action and clandestine Networks: The case of al Qaeda." Networked Politics: 136

Agency, Power, and Governance (2009): 103-24.

Matte Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones. "Assessing the dangers of illicit networks: Why al-Qaida may 137

be less threatening than many think." International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 7-44.

!46

not sell weaponised drones. For instance, when France purchased Reaper drones (the

weaponised model of the Predator drone), the US did not include its weapons system in the

sale. France had to develop its own system. As competition between countries over drones 138

grows, they may be hesitant to lend their equipment out to be used in PKOs. This leads to yet

another practical issue: if a drone is weaponised, who has the authority to approve a kill?

Countries who contribute to PKO often have variable rules of engagement and operate under

the orders of their home country. Given the potential strategic impacts of drone strikes, it

would make sense for individuals who are involved in the strategic planning of the mission

should have the authority to approve strikes. This may be impractical though if the individuals

at that level of authority cannot exercise it over those who operate the drones.

One caveat to note is that whilst armed drones may be controversial and counterpro-

ductive to achieving PKO goals at this time, that does not mean that all armed robotic systems

are unsuitable for PKOs. Robots armed for purely defensive purposes, like the aforemen-

tioned CRAM system, may be able to improve peacekeeping troops defensive capabilities.

Peacekeeping troops are often lightly armed under the pre-tense of maintaining a light foot-

print and upholding the principle of the appropriate use of force. However this sometimes

overlooks situations in which peacekeeping troops are overmatched. The Srebrenica massacre

provides a pertinent example. Peacekeeping troops were lightly armed relative to the Army of

Republika Srpska (VRS) forces. The VRS possessed artillery and mortar units, which the 139

lightly armed Dutch troops would not have been able to counter. A CRAM system would give

Lynn E. DavisMichael J McNerney, James Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting, and Daniel Byman. 138

"Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and US Security." DTIC Document, 2014.

Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul Williams. Understanding peacekeeping. Polity, 2010. p 201-202.139

!47

peacekeeping troops the ability to better protect safe zones whilst still maintaining a light

footprint. This is not to suggest that Srebrenica could have been avoided in the peacekeeping

troops had such a system; there were numerous shortcomings during that mission which led to

the catastrophic failure. It is used as an instance in which a defensively armed robotic sys140 -

tem could improve PKO defensive capabilities in a hostile environment. As noted in the

Brahimi report, safe zones are not legally recognised like demilitarised zones and therefore

must be adequately protected. Defensive robotic platforms such as a CRAM system offer

peacekeeping troops a greater military deterrent and can be used to better protect civilian

populations.

!!From the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that robotics offer PKOs greater flexi-

bility at the tactical and operational levels. UAVs offer PKOs the ability to enhance tradition-

ally weak peacekeeping troop capabilities such as ISR. By utilising drones in this manner,

peacekeepers can uphold the principles of peacekeeping more effectively by improving the

operational capabilities of the mission to achieve its mandate. At this stage, employing armed

drones for offensive purposes may do more harm than good given public perceptions. Howev-

er, the potential for defensively armed systems should not be overlooked. Presently, robotics

should be viewed as a force-multiplier tool for peacekeepers helping to address the gulf be-

tween ends and means often faced during PKOs. It is also important to stress that robotic

platforms must be used carefully given their controversial status. To this end, a comprehensive

Ibid.140

!48

framework for the collection and use of drone-gathered data for peacekeeping purposes would

be beneficial in helping to address public doubts surrounding their use in peacekeeping.

!!Conclusion

Those conducting peacekeeping operations stand to gain by continued use of robots.

Drones do not pose an inherent threat to the underlying principles of those conducting PKOs.

Accusations that drones are ill-suited to PKOs often conflate platform and policy. Unmanned

aerial vehicles provide a flexible and economic means with which to improve tactical and op-

erational capabilities. Correct use can help peacekeepers address longstanding problems such

as the gulf between ends and means and a lack of reliable ISR information. This will in turn

make them more efficacious and better able to achieve mission mandates with a lower mission

footprint due to the drone’s force multiplier and economy of force capabilities.

There is unlikely to be broader acceptance of armed drones use during peacekeeping

operations in the near future. While such platforms offer numerous advantages including re-

duced civilian casualties, negative public perceptions render these null. Public sensitivities

with respect to drone strikes must be respected given the ‘hearts and minds’ nature of PKOs.

However, though systems capable of armed attack remain controversial, robots designed and

operated for defensive purposes – such as the CRAM platform – should tend to be more wide-

ly accepted. Further research is advisable to determine the extent to which this is true in vari-

ous cultural environments.

More comprehensive research into the potential costs and benefits of PKO employ-

ment of robots is also warranted. This paper provides but an initial analysis of relevant fac-

!49

tors, to include some of the more contentious issues associated with such use. Drones applica-

tions during peacekeeping operations are sure to have second- and higher-order effects. As

such the suggested further research should incorporate the: cost-benefit analysis of commit-

ting drones to PKOs vis-à-vis alternative resources; potential for decreasing the cost of PKOs

via reduced personnel and other requirements; and, potential changes to public perception of

drones stemming from their use in PKOs.

Additional research would also benefit future peacekeepers were it to consider addi-

tional uses for drones beyond their current ISR and attack capabilities. Alternative mission

types could include the delivery of assistance (e.g. medical supplies, food, equipment) to civil-

ians or peacekeepers themselves, and persistent monitoring of environmental conditions in

areas adversely affected by climate change, food shortages, or adverse weather conditions.

The potential long-term deleterious affects of drones also warrant close attention. Drones

should be thought of as a complement for peacekeeping troops, not a substitute. While poten-

tially capable of reducing both manpower and economic costs, robotic capabilities are current-

ly incapable of altogether replacing boots on the ground. Personal interface will be essential; it

will remain so in the foreseeable future, particularly during operations involving cultures less

familiar with advanced technologies. Furthermore, current drone programs remain secretive.

Public perceptions may continue to remain negative and undermine trust in the states and the

institutions that operate them should this trend persist, raising issues of credibility and legiti-

macy.

It is important to remember that drones and other robots are relatively new platforms.

Their eventual range of capabilities and limitations remain to be seen. There is a temptation to

compare current systems to what the Model T was to automobiles or the Kitty Hawk was to

!50

aircraft. The number and scope of proposed applications and research avenues for robots is

staggering. An important distinction with robots in comparison with other revolutionary tech-

nologies is their potential for true autonomy, which raises interesting philosophical questions

and perhaps inflated fears. Until such capabilities become the norm, however, it would be

wise to remind ourselves that the most widely purchased robot is the Roomba: an innocent

little robot designed to vacuum our floors.

!51

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