robust networking architecture and secure communication scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor...
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Robust Networking Architecture and Secure Communication Scheme for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks. McKenzie McNeal III Ph.D. Candidate for Computer & Information Systems Engineering Advisor: Dr. Wei Chen College of Engineering, Technology, and Computer Science March 15 th , 2012. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Robust Networking Architecture andSecure Communication Scheme for
Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks
McKenzie McNeal IIIPh.D. Candidate for Computer & Information Systems Engineering
Advisor: Dr. Wei Chen
College of Engineering, Technology, and Computer ScienceMarch 15th, 2012
1
Outline
Research Background and Challenges Problem Statement Research Goal and Objectives Key Related Work Conceptual and Preliminary Design Detailed Design and Implementation
Robust networking architecture Secure communication scheme
System Evaluation and Test Results Evaluation of robust networking architecture Analysis of secure communication scheme
Benchmarking Conclusion & Recommendations
2
Research Background – Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
Large collection of small wireless devices with the ability to sense, process, and transmit data. Low cost solution to distributed applications• Military• Civilian
Limited resources• Power• Storage• Processing• Communication
Unreliable communication Unattended operation• Operate autonomously
Homogeneous or Heterogeneous 3
Low-end node (L-node)
Homogeneous Wireless Sensor Network
H
H H
High-end node (H-node)
Low-end node (L-node)
Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Network (HWSN)
General security concerns for communication networks Data needs to be protected Unauthorized access Protection against various attacks
Specific security concerns for WSNs Resource constraints do not support
traditional security methods Attacks can drain network resources Uncontrollable/hostile environment
4
Research Background – Security Concerns for WSNs
Research Challenges
Network Infrastructure Reliability and availability High performance Leverage security tasks
Secured Data Communication Data confidentiality, integrity, freshness & authentication WSNs do not support traditional security methods Function in presence of node compromise
5
Key Related Work
6
Reference Network Architecture
Security Model Limitations
LIGER Flat HWSN Hybrid key management scheme (LIGER)•Unbalanced key distribution•LION-standalone key mgmt.•TIGER-KDC based key mgmt.
•Large numbers of keys stored and key exchanges•Increased node compromise with increased key storage
Kejie Lu Flat HWSN 2 key management schemes•Random key pool-based pre-distribution•Polynomial-based pre-distribution
•Large numbers of keys strored and key exchanges•No analysis for energy usage
Du-Scheme Hierarchical Region-based HWSN
Key management scheme•C-neighbor concept•ECC supports exchange of symmetric key
•Location dependent network architecture•No energy analysis for secure routing
Key Related Work (cont’d)
Summary of LimitationsNo security oriented network hierarchyRandom key pre-distribution schemes encounter the key
exchange issue Large storage of pre-loaded keys Large number of key exchanges
Localization information needed for establishing network architecture
No energy analysis for secure routingResilience against node compromise w/o tamper resistant
hardware
7
Problem Statement
Novel security methods and models are needed for HWSNs to function in the presence of an attack. Heterogeneity provides hierarchy that leverages resource efficient security tasks. This dissertation research focuses on developing a robust networking architecture and secure communication scheme with an efficient key management system and secure routing protocol.
8
Research Goal and Objectives
GoalAddress security challenges and develop a robust networking architecture and secure communication scheme for HWSNs with resource saving key management system and provide secure data communication and resilience against node compromise.Objectives
Define and develop robust hierarchical heterogeneous networking architecture Design secure communication scheme based on the defined hierarchical
HWSN Key management system Cryptographic algorithms Secure and efficient routing protocol
Test and evaluate robust networking architecture and secure communication scheme
9
Conceptual Design
Security system that integrates a robust networking architecture and secure communication scheme for HWSNs
10
Security System for
HWSNs
Secure Communication Scheme
Robust Networking Architecture
Conceptual Design
Efficiency of computation – computation of cryptographic keys and data encryption should be fast
Efficiency of communication protocol – data routing/relay should have low latency
Efficiency of energy – computation and communication tasks for security should not drain the limited power of the sensor nodes
Long Network lifetime – networking architecture can be reconfigured
11
Performance Requirements
Conceptual Design
Data confidentiality –secure channel to prevent information leakage
Data integrity – data should not be altered when transmitted from node to node
Data freshness – data should be up-to-date w/o any replay of old messages
Authentication – verify identity of source Availability – preserve energy while providing
security Self organization –robustness to overcome
node failures and node compromise 12
Security Requirements
HH
H
What is the optimal way to design robust hierarchical networking architecture to support resource efficient security for HWSNs? 13
SINK
Flat HWSN: Data transmission by flooding
HH
Send Data Back
Hierarchical HWSN: Data transmission by hierarchical architecture
Conceptual Design – General Idea
14
H
H H
H-nodeSINK
L-node
H
H H
H-nodeSINK
L-node
H
H H
Cluster
Cluster-head
Cluster member
H-nodeSINK
L-node
H
H H
Cluster
Cluster-head
Cluster member
H-nodeSINK
L-node
Robust Networking Architecture
Data routing/relay
Self-Formatio
nReconfigurati
on
Conceptual Design – Proposed Cluster-based Hierarchical Networking Architecture
(CHNetArch)
Complete graph
15
H-node
Cluster-head
(L-node)
Cluster member(L-node)
H-node
Shared Key
Public key
Secure Communication Scheme
Design
Secure Routing Protocol
Key Management System
Cryptographic Algorithms
Key Pre-distribution Scheme
Key Management
Protocol
Public Key Cryptograph
y
Shared Key Cryptograph
y
Conceptual Design – Proposed Secure Communication Scheme
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture
General Assumptions Communication range: H-node (D) and L-node (d) Algorithms run in rounds.
Each round consists of 1 transmission, 1 reception, and data processing
Data Structures H-node: list of L-nodes in its region, parent and children on
the backbone tree L-node: cluster head, region head
Cluster head: its cluster member list, the parent and children on the backbone tree
CHNetArch
Data routing/rela
ySelf-
FormationReconfigurati
on
Construction of CHNetArch
16
17
CHNetArchSelf-
formation
Node Move-outHead Rotation Node Move-in
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
L-node
H
H
SINK
H
H
H
H
H
HH
H
SINK Cluster head
Cluster member Regional
headStep 1 – Algorithm for region formationRound 1H-nodes broadcast their IDs and L-
nodes receive H-nodes IDs and select H-node with strongest signal
18
Self-formation of CHNetArch
Region head
H-nodeStep 2 – Algorithm for cluster
formationA – Neighbor discoveryRound 1
L-nodes broadcast their IDs and receive IDs
B – ClusteringRounds 1 - 4
L-nodes form clusters by choosing the neighboring node with the lowest ID to be its cluster head
Step 3 – Algorithm for BT formationA – Regional backbone treesStart at region head: region head
becomes activeRounds 1 – 3(1) The active nodes find children,
then turn to inactive(2) Then the children become activeThe above process repeats until the
regional backbone tree is completeB – Connect Regional backbone
treesSink and regional heads form a tree
rooted at the Sink in the same way as regional backbone tree formation
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
19
Theorem 1Given a heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSN), its cluster-based hierarchical networking architecture (CHNetArch) can be formed in O(T) rounds, where T is the height of the backbone tree of CHNetArch.
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
20
CHNetArchreconfigurati
on
Node Move-outHead Rotation Node Move-in
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
21
Head RotationRound 1 – 2
Head request remaining energy.Cluster members send back energy amount.
Round 3 – 5Head chooses new cluster headHead informs cluster members and parent
and children on backbone tree of new head, then changes status to cluster member
Cluster members, parent and children update new head
Reconfiguration of CHNetArchNode Move-inA – Join as cluster memberRound 1 - 2
New node broadcasts a message to join at range d/4 and receives replies
Round 3 New node chooses a cluster head with strongest
signal and becomes cluster memberB – Join as cluster headRound 3 – 5
New node broadcasts a message to join at range d and receive replies
New node chooses a parent (cluster head with weakest signal)
Node Move-outA – Leaving node is cluster member
Rounds 1 – 2Cluster member sends message to cluster head and receives reply, then leaves network
B – Leaving node is cluster headRounds 1 - 7Cluster head invokes head rotation then follows steps to leave network as cluster member
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
22
Theorem 2The reconfiguration of CHNetArch can be done in O(k) rounds, where k is the maximum number of neighboring nodes for an L-node.
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
23
Data Routing/Relay
Detailed Design and Implementation – Robust Networking Architecture (CHNetArch)
u
H
Sink
cluster member
cluster head
regional head
Data relay starts at u: u becomes active. Round 1-2(1) The active node transmits the data to its parent, and becomes inactive. (2) The parent becomes active.The above process continues until the data reaches its final destination
Theorem 3The data routing/relay of CHNetArch can be done in O(T) rounds, where T is the height of the backbone tree in CHNetArch.
24
Security System for
HWSNs
Secure Communication Scheme
Robust Networking Architecture
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
Secure Communication Scheme
Design
Secure Routing Protocol
Key Management
SystemCryptographic
Algorithms
Key Pre-distribution
Scheme
Key Management
Protocol
Public Key Cryptograph
y
Shared Key Cryptograph
y25
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
Public-key cryptography Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Elliptic Curve Integrated
Encryption Scheme (ECIES) Used for public key encryption
and decryption Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) Used for authenticated
broadcasting between region head and cluster head
26
Cryptographic Algorithms
H-node
Cluster-head
(L-node)
Cluster member(L-node)
H-node
Shared KeyPublic key
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
Shared-key cryptography Symmetric key generation using bivariate polynomial
x and y are IDsaij are large prime number
coefficients t is degree of the polynomial, where t
is 50
27
Cryptographic Algorithms
Security Property It requires t compromised nodes to attach the symmetric keys generated by bivariate polynomial
H-node
Cluster-head
(L-node)
Cluster member(L-node)
H-node
Shared Key
Public key
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
Key management protocol Type of keys KG – pre-loaded temporary global
symmetric key K(x)pb/K(x)pr – public and private key
for node x Kuv – symmetric key shared between
node u and v, Kuv = Kvu
Broadcast message {sender.id, key(sender.id, [message])}
Unicast message {sender.id, receiver.id, key(sender.id,
receiver.id, [message])}28
Key Management System
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
Key pre-distribution scheme H-nodes Temporary global symmetric key ECC private/public key pair
L-nodes Temporary global symmetric key Private key of ECC pair
H-node
Cluster-head(L-
node)
Cluster member(L-node)
H-nodeKG
Shared Key
Public key
Key distribution along with CHNetArch self-formationPurpose: (1) Guarantee network architecture formation is
secure(2) Distributed keys will also be used for secured
data routing/relayHow to distribute the keys? (3) In region formation, K(H)pb (encrypted by KG) is
broadcasted to all L-nodes.(4) After the backbone tree is formed, Each region
head H sends L-node list (encrypted by K(H)pr) in its region to the basestation/sink.
(5) The basestation sends the public key list (encrypted by K(H)pb) of the L-lodes to region head H.
29
Key Management Protocol
H
H
HH
H
SINK Cluster head
Cluster member Regional
head
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
CHNetArch self-reconfiguration Key used for reconfiguration:
Kuv – symmetric key shared between nodes u and v Head rotation, node move-in, and node move-out use
Kuv for any transmission from u to v Sender: {u.id, v.id, Kuv(u.id, v.id, [message])} Receiver decrypts message using Kvu and compare plaintext
(u.id, v.id) with encrypted text (u.id, v.id)
30
Key Management Protocol
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
31
Key used: K(H)pb/K(H)pr – public and private key of
region head K(u)pb/K(u)pr – public and private key of cluster
head or cluster member Kuv – shared key between u and v H-node to H-node
{H1.id, H2.id, K(H1)pr(H1.id, H2.id, [message])} Cluster head to H-node
{u.id, h.id, K(u)pr(u.id, h.id, [messasge])} Cluster member to cluster head
{u.id, v.id, Kuv(u.id, v.id [message])}
H2
H1
v
uuv
Secure Routing
Detailed Design and Implementation – Secure Communication Scheme
32
1 2 3 4 5 M-1 M…
Timeslot
…i
Encrypt DecryptTransmit
1 Timeslot
TDMA Used for broadcasting during region formation Number of H-nodes known Assigned fixed timeslots
MAC Protocol
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
33
…0 1 k-1 …0 1 k-1 …0 1 k-1 …0 1 k-1
Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3 Frame 4
Transmission in a random timeslot Receive
Encrypt DecryptTransmit
1 Timeslot
Timeslot
CSMA/CA Used for unicast Nodes transmit at random timeslot in each frame
MAC Protocol
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
34
Total packet size: 28 bytes Initialization vector (IV)
Destination (DST) Active message type (AM) Length of message (LEN) Source (SRC) Counter (CTR) – 216 different messages
Encrypted data Data
MACode (also known as MAC) – check integrity
DST(2 bytes)
AM(1 byte)
LEN(1 byte)
SRC(2 bytes)
CTR(2 bytes)
DATA(16 bytes)
MACode(4 bytes)
IV Encrypted Data
Data Packet Structure and Size
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
35
Proposed AM Types for CHNetArch FormationDescription Name Sender to Receiver
Initialize region formation INTRF Sink/basestation to all nodes
Region formation RFMSG H-node to L-nodes
Neighbor discovery NDREQ L-node to L-node
Clustering (head request) CHREQ L-node to L-node
Clustering (head replying confirmation) CHREP L-node to L-node
Clustering (head drops member request) CHDREQ L-node to L-node
Clustering (head drops member reply) CHDREP L-node to L-node
Backbone tree formation (find children) BTREQ H-node to L-node L-node to L-node
Backbone tree formation (replying to parent) BTREP L-node to H-node
Backbone tree formation (confirm from parent) BTCFM H-node to L-node
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
Formulas based on clustering algorithm and MAC protocols were used to evaluate the time complexity and energy consumption for CHNetArch formation and reconfiguration
36
Functions Time Energy
H-node L-node H-node L-node
Transmission THTx TLTx EHTx ELTx
Reception THRx TLRx EHRx ELRx
Listening THLx TLLx EHLx ELLx
Sleep/Idle THSx TLSx EHSx ELSx
Symmetric Encryption THSE TLSE EHSE ELSE
Symmetric Decryption THSD TLSD EHSD ELSD
Asymmetric Encryption THAE TLAE EHAE ELAE
Asymmetric Decryption THAD TLAD EHAD ELAD
Variables used for evaluation of time complexity and energy consumption
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
Time complexity for region formation
TRF – the time it takes to complete region formation THSE – the time it takes an H-node to perform symmetric encryption TLRx – the time it takes an L-node to receive a message TLSD – the time it takes an L-node to receive a message
Energy consumption for region formation
ERF – the total energy consumed during region formation EHSE – the energy consumed by an H-node to perform symmetric encryption EHTx – the energy consumed by an H-node to transmit a message ELRx – the energy consumed by and L-node to receive a message ELSD – the energy consumed by an L-node to perform symmetric decryption
37
Examples of formulas for CHNetArch formation
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
38
Communication operation(one packet of 28 bytes/108 kbps)
Energy cost (mJ) Time (ms)
Transmit 134.4 2.07Receive 150.8 2.07Listen 8885.7 131.05
Type of node Storage (KB) Encryption / packet Decryption / packetRAM ROM Time (ms) Energy (mJ) Time (ms) Energy
(mJ) MICAz 2 10 1.53 39.08 3.52 89.90
Type of node Storage (KB) ECIES (Encryption) / packet
ECIES (Decryption) / packet
RAM ROM Time (ms) Energy (mJ) Time (ms) Energy (mJ)
MICAz 1.774 20.768 3907.48 98.78 2632.66 63.18
Type of node Storage (KB) Verify (mJ)RAM ROM Time (ms) Energy (mJ)
MICAz 1.51 19.308 61800.34 58480
MACode Storage (KB) Energy (mJ)RAM ROM
CMACode 1 5.8 387.19
Time and energy consumption for communication operations on MICAz
Storage, time, and energy consumption for using AES-128 on MICAz
Storage, time, and energy consumption for using ECC on MICAz
Storage and energy consumption for using ECDSA on MICAz
Storage and energy consumption for using MACode: CMACode
Sensor node modeling
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
500 x 500 meter sensor field 20 H-nodes 1000 – 3000 L-nodes (increments of 500) H-nodes communication range: D = 250 meters L-nodes communication range: d = 60 meters
39
Simulation Environment
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
40
Number of clusters
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Number of L-Nodes
Num
ber
of c
lust
ers
Average size of a cluster
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Number of L-Nodes
Ave
rage
size
of a
clu
ster
Number and size of clusters in CHNetArch
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
41
Execution time
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
Number of L-Nodes
Exe
cutio
n T
ime
(sec
onds
)
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Number of L-Nodes
Ene
rgy
(Jou
les)
Energy consumptionTime and Energy consumption for CHNetArch formation
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
42
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
Region DiscoveryClusteingBackbone Tree Formation
Number of L-Nodes
Exe
cutio
n T
ime
(sec
onds
)
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Region DiscoveryClusteringBackbone Tree Formation
Number of L-Nodes
Ene
rgy
(Jou
les)
Execution time Energy consumption
Time and Energy consumption for each phase of CHNetArch self-formation
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
43
Percentage of e/E, where e is the energy used for CHNetArch formation, and E is the total energy amount for two AA batteries in each L-node
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000.012%
0.013%
0.014%
0.015%
Number of L-Nodes
Perc
enta
ge o
f e/E
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
44
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Head rotationNode move-in as cluster memberNode move-in as cluster headNode move-out as cluster memberNode move-out as cluster head
Number of L-Nodes
Ene
rgy
(Jou
les)
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Head rotationNode move-in: clus-ter memberNode move-in: clus-ter headNode move-out: clus-ter memberNode move-out: clus-ter head
Number of L-Nodes
Exe
cutio
n T
ime
(sec
onds
)System Evaluation and Test Result
– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
Execution time Energy consumption
Time and Energy consumption for each phase of CHNetArch reconfiguration
45
1000 1500 2000 2500 30007863.5
7864
7864.5
7865
7865.5
7866
7866.5
7867
7867.5
7868
Number of L-Nodes
Exe
cutio
n T
ime
(sec
onds
)
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000760
770
780
790
800
810
820
830
Number of L-Nodes
Ene
rgy
(Jou
les)
System Evaluation and Test Result– Evaluation of Robust Networking Architecture
Execution time Energy consumption
Time and Energy consumption for data routing/relay
46
System Evaluation and Test Result– Analysis of Secure Communication Scheme
Evaluation of Key Management SystemThe following variables help define the number of keys stored in CHNetArch
Nh – number of L-nodes in a region where h is region head Kh – number of neighboring H-nodes of an H-node h Nch – number of cluster members in a cluster where ch is cluster head Kch – number of neighbors on backbone tree for cluster head ch Nc – number of clusters in CHNetArch, which is same as number of cluster
heads Let Ah be number of keys stored by a regional head:
Let Bch be the number of keys stored by a cluster head:
Let Ccm be the number of keys stored by a cluster member:
47
System Evaluation and Test Result– Analysis of Secure Communication Scheme
Evaluation of Key Management System
Let Ah be number of keys stored by a regional head: Let Bch be the number of keys stored by a cluster head: Let Ccm be the number of keys stored by a cluster member: Let Kall be the total number of keys stored in CHNetArch:
Variable DefinitionNh number of L-nodes in a region where h is region head
Kh number of neighboring H-nodes of an H-node h
Nch number of cluster members in a cluster where ch is cluster head
Kch number of neighbors on backbone tree for cluster head ch
Nc number of clusters in CHNetArch, which is same as number of cluster heads
The table of variables help define the number of keys stored in CHNetArch
48
Number of stored keys
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Number of L-Nodes
Num
ber
of k
eys
Evaluation of Key Management System
System Evaluation and Test Result– Analysis of Secure Communication Scheme
49
Memory needed to store security algorithms and keys on a cluster head and cluster member
1000 1500 2000 2500 300056300
56400
56500
56600
56700
56800
56900
57000
cluster membercluster head
Number of L-Nodes
Mem
ory
(KB
)
Cluster member two 160-bit keys for ECC one 128-bit shared key
Cluster heads Two 160-bit keys for ECC One 128-bit shared key with each
cluster member One 128-bit shared key with
backbone neighbors For symmetric polynomial
q = 296
(t + 1)log2 q = 0.612 KB 44% of memory use for security
Evaluation of Key Management System
System Evaluation and Test Result– Analysis of Secure Communication Scheme
50
Security AnalysisProvides data confidentiality
Public key and shared key cryptographyProvides data freshness
Counter in IV ensures at least 216 different messagesProvides data integrity
MACode computer over data packet can be verified by receiverProvides data authentication
Sender and receiver IDs are sent in plain text and encrypted text Compare for verification
System Evaluation and Test Result– Analysis of Secure Communication Scheme
Benchmarking
51
Comparison of pre-loaded keys
1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
Proposed key preload-ing: approach 1Proposed key preload-ing: approach 2Du-scheme
Number of L-Nodes
Num
ber
of p
re-lo
aded
key
s
Proposed System vs Du-scheme Networking architecture
Self-formation No location information
Key management Pre-loads less keys Stores less keys
Secure communication Uses temporary global
symmetric key
Conclusion
Robust networking architecture (CHNetArch) Performs self-formation without location information Nodes communicate according to hierarchical network architecture Backbone tree provides high networking performance Network architecture is reconfigurable
Secure communication scheme Resource saving key management system Combination of public and shared key cryptography for secure
network formation Secure routing protocol governed by network hierarchy and key
management system Provide resilience against node compromise
52
Security System for HWSNs
Recommendations
Storage of security algorithms for ECC can be reduced by adjusting switches used for calculation on sensor nodes
Symmetric bivariate polynomial can be designed for a larger value of t
Provides increased resilience against node compromise Use more than one symmetric bivariate polynomial
i.e., one for each region Further research can be conducted to find resource efficient
methods to provide security for HWSNs
53
Security System for HWSNs
Systems Engineering Management PlanSEMP
54
Research Activity 2009 2010 2011 2012SP SU FA SP SU FA SP SU FA SP SU F
AConceptual DesignNeed AnalysisFeasibility StudyPreliminary DesignSystem RequirementsSystem DecompositionTechnical Performance MeasuresProposed SolutionDetailed DesignModeling of Network ArchitectureNetworking Architecture Formation and Reconfiguration AlgorithmsKey Management Protocol and Cryptography
ImplementationNetwork ArchitectureKey management ProtocolMAC ProtocolsTesting and EvaluationTest and Evaluation ModelNetwork PerformanceSecurity AnalysisBenchmarkingReport WritingConference and Journal PublicationsDissertation Final Report
Publications
1. McNeal III, M., Chen, W., Shetty, S., and Aungst, S., “Joint Design of Cluster-Based Hierarchical Network Architecture and Key Management System for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks”, IJCES International Journal of Computer Engineering Science, Volume 1 Issue 3, pages 49-66. December 2011.
2. McNeal III, M., Chen, W., Shetty, S., and Aungst, S., “Security-Oriented Robust Networking Architecture and Key Management for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks”, 10th International Conference on Wireless Networks, 2011.
3. Liang Hong, McKenzie McNeal III, Wei Chen, “Secure cooperative MIMO communications under active compromised nodes”, 9th IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 2011.
4. Wei Chen, McKenzie McNeal III, Liang Hong, “Cross-Layered Design of Security Scheme for Cooperative MIMO Sensor Networks”, 2010 IEEE International Conference on Wireless Information Technology and Systems, 2010.
5. Long, K.J., S.E. Haupt, G.S. Young, L.M. Rodriguez, and M. McNeal, “Source Characterization using a Genetic Algorithm and SCIPUFF”, Seventh Conference on Artificial Intelligence and its Applications to the Environmental Sciences at AMS Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, 2009.
55
Acknowledgements
Committee Members: Dr. Wei Chen Dr. Sachin Shetty Dr. Mohammad Bodruzzaman Dr. Ali Sekmen Dr. Liang Hong Dr. Stanley Aungst
College of Engineering, Technology, & Computer Science Dean Hargrove Dr. Malkani
PSU Research Team Dr. Sue Haupt Kerrie Long Andrew Annuzio Luna Rodriguez
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) DTRA01-03-D-0010-0016 56
Questions/Comments
57
问题 /评论 ?Wenti/Pingrun
58
Homework and assignment
1. How can the cluster-based networking architecture in a sensor network leverage the efficiency of security system?
2. How to realize data confidentiality in a flat sensor networks? Consider a key system.
3. Discuss the tradeoff between public cryptograph and private cryptograph on power, storage, processing and communication, respectively.
4. Give the definition of a compromised node in sensor networks. Does the security system here detects compromised nodes?