role of supreme court
TRANSCRIPT
ROLE OF SUPREME COURT IN CONTEMPORARY AGE
SYED ALI ZAFAR “Law des not stand still. It moves continually. Once this is recognized, then the task of the Judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time:” (Lord Denning).
INTRODUCTION
With the establishment of modern nation states came the basis for the
formation of formal judicial institutions and the concept of an apex court
of ultimate jurisdiction.
When the framers of US Constitution were defining the power of the
legislature and the executive, the argument was that there must be a
body which would have the right to declare what the constitution means.
This right was given (somewhat reluctantly) to the U.S Supreme Court
and what persuaded the framers to give this jurisdiction to the Court was
the argument that the Supreme Court was a weak branch of government
which had neither power over the “purse or the sword”. In political,
parlance the superior Judiciary could neither show the carrot nor wave
the stick, which is still the case. Initially, this appeared to be true. In
1793, the U.S Supreme Court in the case of Chilsom vs. Georgia tried to
strike down State laws but the reaction of the various States was swift
and ferocious. Congress was besieged and the state of Georgia even
passed a bill that the federal officials who attempt to enforce the Chilsom
judgment would be “guilty of felony and shall suffer death”. Congress
was forced to adopt the 11th amendment, in March 1794. Faced with all
this the Supreme Court promptly retreated and there was a time
thereafter that President Washington found it difficult to find anyone to
fill the post of the US Supreme Court Chief Justice! The Supreme Court
of U.S.A ended its first decade, anything but supreme in public
estimation. All this, however, was soon to change and the institution
which was perceived to be powerless, asserted itself thereafter to play a
most crucial role in its country’s history. The first step in this regard was
the establishment of its rights of judicial review in the celebrated case of
Marbury vs. Madison, and since that time the U.S Supreme Court has
traveled far and would today not feel at all hesitant in annulling state
actions which contravene its understanding of the Constitution.
The function of the Supreme Court in today’s world has become complex,
multidimensional and indeed crucial. Societies, all over the world today,
and more so perhaps in Pakistan, expect the final constitutional court
now to perform multiple tasks, not only of resolving conflicts and
disputes, be they amongst governments (Federal/provincial), or between
the government and individuals, or individuals inter se, but also of acting
as a custodian and upholder of the rights, liberties and freedoms of the
citizens. It is also expected now to play the political role of unifying and
integrating the nation, its regions, institutions and communities and to
maintain harmony and balance between the three pillars of the State
(legislature, executive and judiciary) while ensuring that the state organs
perform their respective functions within the stipulated limits and
constraints. As guardian of the Constitution, the Court is required to
“preserve, protect and defend” this document. Power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely, and hence, with the expansion of its
powers, in this 21st century, it is also now expected of the Supreme Court
to be equally equipped with the capacities of self restraint and self
control.
In the context of Pakistan, given its geo-political, social and religious
background and history, the Supreme Court will have to continue to play
what I call ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ roles, but with changed
emphasis and focus and an increased sense of responsibility to its own
checks and balances. To me, the tasks to be performed by the Supreme
Court of Pakistan certainly extend beyond the jurisdiction that the House
of Lords would ever consider within its powers, and would be more than
what the US Supreme Court would ever be required to perform.
TRADITIONAL ROLE AS MAINTAINER OF RULE OF LAW
The most fundamentally important ‘traditional’ and also non-
controversial role that the Pakistani Supreme Court, and indeed any
apex court would be required to perform would be to apply the law (in its
simple form, i.e, statutes and past judicial decisions), consistently,
independently, without fear and favor, and to reach a decision on the
dispute, accordingly. This role obviously shall continue to be a most
crucial function of the Supreme Court.
In the current world scenario, where globalization is the norm and
economics is the barometer to judge a nation’s progress, the first
function of the judge (that is the proper and just application of the law) is
the key to a nation’s survival. It is said that to judge a country’s potential
one needs only to look at the performance of its courts in applying the
rule of law to all. In the context of economic welfare and foreign and local
investment also, this aspect, other than security within the country, is
the paramount consideration. Indeed, the principles of uniform
application of the rule of law have, in the context of the world, been
enshrined since the twelfth century in the charter of the ‘Magna Carta’
and in the particular religious context of Pakistan, equally well
established in the Quran in which mankind has been repeatedly called
upon to be “maintainers of justice” (4:185) and to “judge between men
justly” (38:26). The Judiciary’s importance is even greater in modern
nation states and it is a common view that a country can survive any
adversity so long as the rule of law prevails in a judicial system. This is
often illustrated by a recent historical fact. At the time when the German
army under Hitler were on a rampage and appeared to be winning World
War II, the assembled press asked Churchill whether there were any
chances of the Allies being victorious. Churchill’s immediate response
was to ask whether ‘Her Majesty’s Courts’ were functioning. When he
was told by the slightly puzzled audience that indeed the courts were
working, Churchill was making the point that a nation can survive any
hurdle as long as the laws are being enforced properly by the Courts.
In order to apply the law independently, without fear and favour, judges
must obviously be honest and armed with the strength necessary to do
justice. If the Government in power does a wrong, and the person’s
liberty is curtailed illegally or economic sanctions imposed upon him
unlawfully then the courts should be able to immediately apply the law
and set aside the wrong committed by the Government. Similarly, if the
powerful try and subjugate the weak, the courts should be in a position
to forcefully redress the wrong. Howsoever just the judge may be, the
Constitution and the law of the land must give basic protection from
arbitrary removal from service. In Pakistan, the bulk of the judiciary
comes from the fraternity of lawyers, who by profession, training and
nature, are fierce exponents and protectors of the law, and therefore,
there is no dearth of capable, freedom-loving judges in our courts. The
Constitution of 1973 also gives ample protection to the judges of the
Superior Courts who cannot be removed arbitrarily. The Supreme Court
in Pakistan is therefore generally quite capable of performing this
traditional role (and indeed has been admirably doing so, barring a few
exceptions, which given the chequered constitutional history of our
country and the apex courts of other countries, is explainable).
RIGHT TO DECIDE A MATTER FINALLY IS NOT A PRIVILEGE BUT
AN OBLIGATION TO DECIDE CORRECTLY
Simply to be capable, independent, fair and impartial is not enough
because an integral part of applying the rule of law is to apply it
consistently, and this is an aspect which the Supreme Court needs to be
conscious of, not only by itself following it but also by ensuring that
courts all over Pakistan do the same. For our society to function in an
orderly manner, the Government which governs the country, the
executive which applies the law and the people who live as a nation,
must all know what the law is and how it will be applied by the courts. It
is for this purpose that in legal jurisprudence the principle of judicial
precedent or stare decisis has been so well established. Under this
system, a judgment given on a point of law is binding on all courts and
becomes the law of the land. In Pakistan, this means that a decision by
the Supreme Court on a point of law is binding on all the courts of the
country and is also to be followed by the Supreme Court subsequently,
unless if for very cogent and considered reasons the Supreme Court
expressly decides that the past decisions are not good law and overrules
them. The purpose of having binding judicial precedents is to avoid cases
being decided by judges on the basis of whims and fancies as any such
system is bound to lead to mayhem and anarchy. Another reason for
adhering to the concept of judicial precedent is that when the Supreme
Court has given a decision and such decision has been followed for some
time, it then becomes a part of the legal system and people regulate their
lives, commerce, business, sale and purchase of their properties,
formation of their contracts and any other general conduct of their
affairs, accordingly. If the apex court does not itself follow precedents,
society will be unable to conduct its affairs with any certainty, and all
aspects of life, including business and commerce would suffer and
ultimately the entire system would collapse. The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to decide finally what the law is. Indeed there is no higher
court to which an appeal can be filed against a decision of the Supreme
Court. This power to be the final arbitrator and to lay down the law of
Pakistan on all points can be intoxicating and therefore capable of giving
rise to a sense of infallibility. We have seen this happen to our leaders.
That is why a famous judge once said that we are fallible because we are
final and not final because we are infallible. The correct and mature
approach is therefore to recognize and accept that while being an
extremely powerful tool, this power to finally decide a matter is not a
privilege, but a duty and an obligation to decide correctly. We must
remember therefore that in this modern society, with the younger
generation equipped with more knowledge and intellectual power,
inconsistency in applying the law will be interpreted as discrimination
and will indeed eventually lead to disrespect for the courts and ultimately
to a refusal to obey its decisions.
NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES
At different times, in various countries, the apex courts have been called
upon to perform roles which are not formally perceived to be the
functions of judges in society. This is especially true for Pakistan, where
in addition to its traditional roles, the Supreme Court will have to
continue to act as a ‘Platonic Guardian of Democracy’ and as an
‘Enforcer of Values’. The functions performed by the courts outside the
traditional roles have given rise to a great deal of debate and controversy
over the past decades, but in the modern times, and given the political
and social setups of different countries, there are certain roles,
‘abnormal’ though they may seem, which have to be performed by the
apex courts, to varying degrees of course. In the context of Pakistan, my
analysis is that the Supreme Court has through its power of judicial
review and interpretation of the constitution and statutes, a substantial
‘political role’ to play, which includes the protection of the constitution of
the country, and its democracy. Equally, though less controversially, the
Supreme Court has to play an increasing role as a protector of
Fundamental rights, Human rights including the right to life, and an
enforcer of laws for the protection of the environment. Lastly (and again
though not universally accepted as a role that an apex court should
perform), the Supreme Court sometimes has to act as an upholder, and
even as a changer of social norms. Since society is advancing at break-
neck speed, with this comes the responsibility to bridge the gap between
the law and society by changing the law, with stability.
The ‘political’ role is the first non-traditional role which in reality the
Supreme Court has had to, and shall continue to have to perform. In the
modern world, in my view, a Supreme Court in any country will need to
engage in the political process. This role of course is extremely difficult
because the Supreme Court is primarily a judicial institution, a court of
law, and thus subject to the rules and norms of judicial behavior, and by
nature not a political animal.
Although most judges deny that they have any role in the political life of
a country, the fact is that judge-made law now plays a much larger part
in the governance of the people than is generally perceived. According to
de Tocqueville (more than a century and a half ago) ‘scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question’. This statement is even truer in the case of
Pakistan. As expressed earlier, in this process, the judges are like
‘Platonic Guardians of Democracy’ except that unlike the real platonic
guardians who took actual substantive control of the government, the
Supreme Court has to continue to sit largely apart from the physical
political process, and primarily to safeguard the constitution, the
democracy, and what is sometimes referred to as ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’
law. In a way, the Supreme Courts have become a national forum for
achieving consensus.
How did this institution which has neither a hand over the purse or the
sword acquire this status and authority in the working of the state? One
simple answer is that what the judiciary possesses, no other pillar of the
state has or is trained to use. The tool in the hand of the judiciary is its
intellectual power and proficiency by which it can innovate and expand
the scope of judicial review and give meaning to the otherwise static and
cold words of the law, making them come alive.
Impact of Judicial Review
In countries with a written Constitution, including Pakistan, the
supreme courts have construed this jurisdiction of judicial review
adroitly and have developed the concept as well as the parameters of
judicial review. The power of judicial review is now the most awesome,
and potentially the most effective, power in the hands of the judiciary, in
general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. It may be defined as the
ultimate power of any court to declare unconstitutional and hence
unenforceable; (i) any law that it deems to be in conflict with the
Constitution and, (ii) any official action which contravenes the law.
Often, laws or actions are declared illegal because they are obviously
contrary to the Constitution or the action is clearly ultra vires of the law
under which it was taken. This exercise of power of judicial review is
simple and non-controversial. However sometimes laws and actions are
struck down in situations where there is no express constitutional or
statutory provision, on the ground that the laws or actions are contrary
to the judge’s perception of some kind of ‘fundamental laws’ or ‘rights
that are basic to society’ or ‘values which are part of the community’.
This may be done consciously or subconsciously, but it is through this
power that the courts enter the political arena. Courts in every
democratic country hold clearly that they do not legislate, but in the
same breath will also admit that they ‘enforce values’ and may overturn
laws passed by a democratically elected legislature, if the laws are
opposed to those ‘values’. Courts will say, ‘No it is not any values which I
may personally have but these are values I have discovered somewhere
outside myself, in history, or perhaps in the true hearts and minds of my
fellow countrymen’. The truth is that there is no natural law, and it is
basically a feeling of right and wrong, a general consensus within society
on an issue which the judges need to pick and choose and apply as the
value of the society.
The extension of the scope of judicial review through this process to
strike down laws or actions has given rise to considerable controversy.
There is a strong argument that judicial review is antidemocratic. It is
questioned why less than 15 men, who have not been democratically
elected by the people, but selected through a secret process, and who
have no exposure of dealing with the masses, should be able to declare a
law passed by the Parliament as being illegal. It may be appropriate to
deal shortly with this aspect.
The debate is evenly balanced. The ultimate argument in favour of the
right of the Supreme Court to use their power of judicial review seems to
be that in a country with a written constitution there must be some
arbiter of what the limits are within which the Parliament can pass laws,
or the elected representatives can govern, and therefore if that arbiter
has to be the courts, so be it. In the context of the Pakistani
Constitution, there are additional reasons also.
First and foremost, Pakistan has a written constitution which is the
supreme law of the land and establishes precisely what a government
can do and what it is to be prevented from doing. As with any
constitution, our Constitution also does not speak with one voice and
there is a compromise between the philosophical and political beliefs of
the various varying interests of those who framed the Constitution. In
addition, there are in-built sources of conflict between the rights of an
individual and the powers of the elected government. The Supreme Court
of Pakistan has had to, and shall continue to step into the void and
adjudicate between the rival claims, as well as to pronounce upon and
interpret the Constitution. In this context the Supreme Court cannot
avoid entering the political arena.
The fact that the Constitution is a compromise has led inevitably to
certain confusions in those areas where agreement was hardest to reach.
Discovering what the Constitution means is a central part of the
Supreme Court’s work and it is not straightforward except in special
cases. This is true of most written Constitutions. In 1942, the U.S.
Supreme Court maintained that the right to hire a lawyer was not a
right. In 1962 however, this changed and Hugo Black in the case of
Gideon vs Wainwright wrote that the right to a lawyer of one charged
with a crime, is a fundamental and essential right to face trial. Here, a
new Constitutional principle was articulated. This power to give meaning
to the Constitution is a fundamental role in a contemporary age, which
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and the apex court of any country is
required to fulfill. It is well understood that the Constitution is what the
court decides it is.
Also, in my view the Constitution of Pakistan establishes only a limited
republic, not a direct or pure democracy. Popular sentiments are filtered
through a system of representation. The majority vote is limited by
various restrictions in the Constitution. For example, candidates must be
of a certain age, the President must be a Muslim, regardless of what the
people want. The Senate which represents the minority sentiment can
delay the passing of bills and provide checks and balances. Fundamental
rights also inhibit the passing of law by the majority. The democratic and
constitutional setup of Pakistan is hence such that the Supreme Court,
acting under the Constitution and on behalf of the people as their
delegate, has to decide constitutional issues which affect the political,
social and economic thinking of the national as a whole.
How then do you ensure that the final arbiter itself does not get
corrupted by this power of judicial review and starts overruling laws on
the personal notions of what the fundamental law or value of the society
is? All jurists, and judges alike, whether they oppose or support the
power of the courts to legislate in this manner, agree that the power
must be harnessed by the judiciary itself. In order to perform its function
as the final arbiter of the Constitution the Superior Courts have
developed a basic philosophy of judicial restraint and in the
contemporary age when the Supreme Court needs to keep extending its
jurisdiction, it must also continue to exercise this self imposed restraint.
Under this philosophy, the courts have denied themselves access to
certain areas which they have prudently left to the public opinion or the
parliamentarians to deal with. It is only when an issue of social,
economic or political nature is raised and formulated in legal or
constitutional terms that the courts decide the same. They avoid deciding
political, economic and social issues directly, and only do so when they
arise in a legal form. This enables the polity to comprehend and adjust to
the new concept and allows time to the parliamentarians to assess and
decide if they would like to take the issue back to the Parliament or go
along with the trend set by the judgment. Ultimately, the answer is really
that one has to trust the intellectual integrity of the Supreme Court, and
in the case of Pakistani Supreme Court it has done little to cause grave
concern in this regard.
Role of Dynamic Interpretation
The second, more obvious role apart from judicial review, by which the
Supreme Court may and does advance the political process is through
interpretation, and here too in the modern day the Supreme Court has to
advance into the era of the dynamic approach to interpretation.
There was a time when it was being argued and accepted in the courts
that all judges can do is to discover the original intent of the law-giver.
This was an attempt at putting a restraint upon the judges from
expanding the jurisdiction which had irritated the executives. For a
while, the judges gave in to the executive’s plea as in the case of the US
Supreme Court which denied black Americans fundamental rights, on
the grounds that the intention of the founding fathers was to confer the
fundamental rights only on white Americans. Then however, came a
turning point and this started a new phase which was not to revert to the
original intent but to consider the Constitution not only as an inheritor of
the past but harbinger of the future. It opened the gateway to what is
known as dynamic interpretation. We are today living in the era of
dynamic interpretation of the law. Briefly, it means that the law should
be seen not only from the point of view of the law-giver but also from the
point of view of the interpreter when it comes for interpretation. Thus,
judges should not only know the law but have knowledge about history,
philosophy and other social sciences and must be fully aware of the
social trends and conventions prevalent in a country when he is applying
his interpretational skills on the constitutional documents. He knows
that the constitution cannot be easily amended when it goes through the
legislative process which is a time consuming and a difficult path.
Judges have come to supplement the need of the society and they do it
through their intellectual endeavor, by keeping the law in the forefront
but at the same time not being unmindful of contemporaries.
In this context, the role of the judiciary becomes political. However we
must remember at all times that in Pakistan there are not more than 17
men constituting the Supreme Court and they are not magicians, able to
conjure order out of confusion or harmony out of deep divisions.
Ultimately, it is up to politicians to fulfill their due role in upholding the
values of society, principles of law and the fundamentals of democracy,
and for the society to ensure that they follow those principles.
Constitutional cum Political Cases
The courts have thus provided both a forum for constitutional dialogues
and the rules to conduct the dialogue (i.e. the judicial restraint). In
Pakistan too there have been many political issues which have presented
themselves for dialogue and adjudication before the Supreme Court.
Interesting and learned constitutional dialogue was conducted in the
form of arguments under the adversary system. Let us see some of the
cases where the constitutional dialogue was successfully carried on
within the parameters of judicial review.
The Supreme Court has been embroiled in politics since its inception.
The first disruption which overwhelmed the country was on October 24,
1954 when the Governor-General declared a state of Emergency and
dissolved the Constituent Assembly and dismissed the Prime Minister
along with his Council of Ministers. The President of the Constituent
Assembly Moulvi Tamizuzddin Khan, instituted proceedings by filing a
writ petition which was accepted. The Federal Government challenged
this decision in the Federal Court and the Federal Court found that the
challenge to the action taken by the Governor-General was made through
a petition which was instituted under a law (section 223-A of the
Government of India Act) which itself was not a competent piece of
legislation, inasmuch as the said section 223-A was introduced by
amending the Government of India Act, 1935 (as adopted to Pakistan
and the functioning country’s interim Constitution) without the assent of
the Governor-General, and therefore, could not be deemed to have
become a valid part of the Constitution and hence no action could validly
be taken in pursuance of the petition filed under its provisions. [Maulvi
Tamizuddin Case--PLD 1955 FC 240]. By this decision, the question
whether the Governor-General was authorized and could legally have
dissolved the Constituent Assembly was postponed to a more propitious
time. However, when the Governor-General thereafter promulgated an
Ordinance purporting to validate certain laws, the Court found that the
Governor-General was not competent to promulgate the validity
Ordinance, it being beyond his competence. [Yousaf Patel case PLD 1955
FC 387]. This decision resulted in the Governor-General making a
Reference to the Federal Court seeking its advice as to how the crises
regarding the setting up of the new Constituent Assembly to replace the
Constituent Assembly which had earlier been dissolved, could be
resolved.
The Court in answering this Reference, went on to lay down the
principles for setting up of the new Constituent Assembly, in that it
should be established consistent with the provisions of the Indian
Independence Act, 1947. In so doing, the Federal Court succeeded in
resolving the rule of law in a situation where the executive fiat appeared
all-evasive, and made possible the revival of the Constituent Assembly
[PLD 1955 FC 435]. Indeed the framing of the first Constitution of
Pakistan, namely the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
1956 was the handiwork of this Constituent Assembly.
The Supreme Court again had to participate in the political process when
on October 7, 1958, the Constitution was abrogated, all representative
institutions were abolished and the whole country was placed under
Martial Law to be administered by the Chief Marital Law Administrator.
There was potential fear of a state of lawlessness. The Supreme Court
had two options; to accept the state of anarchy or to act to ensure some
sort of rule of law. In a widely criticized decision, the Supreme Court
decided that the new dispensation ushered in by the Martial Law
Government, which it described as the Revolutionary Government, was
legal, on the principle that the new legal order created by a victorious
revolution was itself a law creating fact. Although the correctness of this
doctrine is doubtful, yet it brought the martial law under a “legal norm” if
not a constitutional norm, thereby ensuring governance in accordance
with law, rather than on the fancies of a Military Commander.
As it shown by the subsequent cases of Mehdi Ali Khan Panni and
Khuhro, the Supreme Court then tried to ensure that during the entire
period of Martial Law the country continued to be governed under a legal
instrument, in accordance with rules and not by the whims of the
Military Commanders.
In Khuro’s case, after having found that it has the jurisdiction to
examine the matter, the Supreme Court then decided that it had the
power of judicial review to set aside an the order passed by a Special
Judge trying a case under a Martial Law Regulation.
After lifting of the Martial Law of 1958, and the promulgation of the new
Constitution of 1962 the Court had to examine the legality of a
Presidential Order titled “Removal of Difficulties (Appointment of
Ministers) Order, 1962”. By this Order, the essential principles on which
the said Constitution of 1962 was based were sought to be altered. The
Supreme Court felt no hesitation in finding that the Removal of
Difficulties Order issued by the President was without lawful authority
and observed that it (the Court) was under a duty and obligation to
protect, uphold and defend the Constitution and to see that it was not
tampered with by any authority, howsoever high. In finding that the
Order allowing Ministers to retain their seats in the National Assembly
after accepting the Office of Minister, was not within the powers of the
President, it declared the said Order to be bad in law. This ruling was
given in the case of Fazlul Quader Chaudhary [Fazlul Quader Chaudhary
PLD 1963 SC 486].
Reference may usefully be made to the cases of Maulana Maudoodi
[Maulana Maudoodi Case -- PLD 1964 SC 473], in which the “opinion” of
the executive which formed the basis for taking the action of declaring
the Jamaat-I-Islami an unlawful association was found to be untenable
on any objective criteria. Accordingly, the aforesaid action taken by the
Government, pursuant to the opinion formed on subjective
considerations was quashed.
The Court’s anxiety to safeguard the liberty of the citizens was again
demonstrated in the case of Ghulam Jilani v. The Government of West
Pakistan [Ghulam Jilani case PLD 1967 SC 373]. Here, the question was
whether the assertion made by the detaining authorities that it was
“satisfied” in terms of Rule 32 of the Defense of Pakistan Rules that the
detention of Ghulam Jilani was expedient in the public interest, was
subject to judicial review? The Supreme Court opined that the word
“satisfaction” must be a state of mind that had been induced by the
existence of “reasonable grounds” for such satisfaction. It accordingly
held that “power for an authority acting under Rule 32 is, therefore, no
more immune to judicial review”. This finding was a significant
breakthrough by the judiciary in cases involving detention of citizens, as
the Pakistan Supreme Court was making a clear departure from the view
earlier expressed by the House of Lords in Liversidge’s case (LR 72 1A
241) and followed by Courts in India and Pakistan, namely that the
“satisfaction” of detaining authorities being a subjective matter could not
be scrutinized on the touchstone of objective considerations.
The height of the Supreme Court’s exercise of power of course is
demonstrated by the famous case of Asma Jilani where the court
examined the validity of the 2nd Martial Law imposed in March 1969. The
Supreme Court dissenting from the earlier view expressed by it in the
case of Dosso, held that the Martial Law imposed by General Yahya Khan
was illegal and that Gen. Yahya Khan was a ‘usurper’ in that he had, by
illegally proclaiming Martial Law, usurped the powers of Government.
Martial Law Regulation No. 78 issued by him in pursuance of the
aforesaid proclamation of Martial Law was, therefore, void and of no legal
effect. As a result of this judgment, all punitive and repressive actions
taken during the Martial Law period, whose effects were still continuing,
came to an end and ceased to have effect. The court, through this
pronouncement, also tried to deter future Army Chiefs from proclaiming
Martial Laws on the assumption that they could escape the
consequences of abrogating the Constitution and on the plea that the
success of their action (revolution) created its own legality and would
make them the new law givers. Under the ruling in Asma Jilani’s case,
they were to be treated not as law-givers but as usurpers. [Asma Jillani
case --- PLD 1972 SC 139]
This enabled the High Court to punish for contempt, a senior army
officer for disobedience of its orders on the principle that no one is above
the law. [Hashmat Ali vs. Col. Muhammad Shafi Durrani – Writ Petition
No.87/1969 decided on 07/03/1972]
A third Martial Law was proclaimed on July 5, 1977, and the
Constitution of 1973 was abrogated. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of
Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, feeling aggrieved by the detention of her
husband, inter alia, challenged the imposition of the Martial Law.
According to her Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief of Army Staff who had
proclaimed Martial Law had no authority to do so under the 1973
Constitution. Accordingly, the proclamation of Martial Law was liable to
be quashed. In this connection she relied upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in Asma Jilani’s case [Asma Jillani case – PLD 1972 SC
139]. The Government countered this plea by relying on Dosso’ case.
The Supreme Court declined to reverse the view taken by it in Asma
Jilani’s case and also did not revert to the view taken in the earlier case
of Dosso. Instead the Supreme Court took a purely political decision and
accepted the legality of Zia’s Martial Law. According to the Court,
widespread rigging took place on March 7, 1977, sparking off an
agitation which spread from Karachi to Khyber rendering the situation
beyond the control of the civilian administration. The disturbances
accompanying this agitation resulted in heavy loss of life and property
throughout the country. Educational, social and economic activities had
come to a standstill and the entry of the army in specified cities, called in
aid to civil power, was not able to control the agitation. The country was
on the brink of civil war and in such grave condition Martial Law could
justifiably be proclaimed. Accordingly, the impugned declaration of
Martial Law was held to be justified on the principle of State necessity.
[Begum Nusrat Bhutto case –PLD 1977 SC 639].
The Supreme Court on this occasion exercised a legitimizing function but
while doing so it did try to place some restraints on the unbridled
exercise of power by the Martial Law Authorities, by allowing the Courts
to exercise the power of judicial review during the period of Martial Law.
In justification of this legitimizing act the Court also took into
consideration the circumstance that Martial Law was to remain in force
for a limited period according to the assurance given by Gen. Zia at the
time of promulgating the Martial Law. Unfortunately however, the Court
by also conferring upon the Chief Martial Law Administrator the power to
amend the Constitution (to carry out the purposes of Martial Law)
enabled him to make major amendments in the Constitution. This
authority was exercised, inter alia, to oust the jurisdiction of Courts to
review orders of Martial Law Authorities, to extend the period of Martial
Law and make other amendments in the Constitution, and even
drastically amend some of its existing provisions. These amendments
later caused manifold problems for Courts.
In the Benazir Bhutto Case [PLD 1989 SC 66] certain amendments made
during the Martial Law period in the Representation of the People Act,
1976, especially the provision which put a clog in the way of allocation of
a common election symbol to candidates of a political party contesting a
general election as its party candidates, were struck down, and
Fundamental Right 17 guaranteeing the right to “form a political party”
was so interpreted as to allow the allocation of a common symbol to all
candidates who were contesting elections as candidates of the same
political party.
The Supreme Court was involved in the political arena in the Haji
Saifullah case (PLD 1989 SC 166), where the dissolution of the National
Assembly of Pakistan ordered by General Zia-ul-Haq on May 29, 1988, in
exercise of the enhanced powers conferred on the President as the price
for lifting Martial Law and reviving the Constitution namely, under the
newly-added clause (b) of Article 58(2) was challenged. The Supreme
Court decided that the discretion conferred on the President to dissolve
the National Assembly was justiciable and also agreed with the High
Court that the said discretion had not been exercised legally, in that no
sufficient nexus existed between the grounds on which the dissolution
was ordered and the ground stated in clause (b) of Article-58(2) on which
the dissolution of the Assembly could validly be ordered.
The Supreme Court also decided the case of “Mustafa Khar” [Mustafa
Khar Case – PLD 1989 SC 26], which significantly diluted the immunity
granted by Article 270-A of the Constitution to the convictions recorded
by the Military Courts during the period of Zia-ul-Haq’s Martial Law. The
Court, while doing so observed:-
“[O]n Legislature when it grants power to take action or pass an order contemplates a mala fide exercise of power; a malafide order is a fraud on the statute. Apart from that, in view of the assurance given to the proceedings which suffered from the lack or excess of jurisdiction or were malafide or were coram non judice could not conceivable be regarded as done, taken or held in connection with the previous operation of a Martial Law Regulation or Martial Law order.”
The President of Pakistan dissolved the National assembly on three
occasions, twice during the time when Benazir Bhutto was the prime
minister and once during the time that Nawaz Sharif was the Prime
Minister. In each of these cases the Supreme Court held that the power
to dissolve though discretionary, is to be exercised sparingly,
independently, honestly, fairly and reasonably without any bias and ill-
will. If the exercise of the above power is tainted with personal likes or
dislikes, the same shall stand vitiated.
Once again, the Supreme Court was called upon to deal with a military
intervention when on October 12, 1998, General Pervaiz Musharaf took
over as Chief Executive, declared an emergency and dismissed the civil
government while dissolving the Parliament and the Provincial
Assemblies.
This time the Supreme Court fixed a time for return to civil government
and restoration of the constitution i.e. (3 years), which was adhered to
and the constitution was restored on November 15, 2002. However, the
Supreme Court is criticized for having given power to the Chief Executive
to amend the constitution, on the ground that as the Supreme Court did
not possess any power to amend the constitution it could not give such
power to the Chief Executive. I believe that criticism is valid.
CONCLUSION ON POLITICAL ROLE
The Constitution of a country is meant to cater to the needs of the
society for all times to come. Approach to it must be dynamic, providing
adequate answers to questions arising due to the changes in the society.
Cultural changes and awareness of the society must be noted, whether
by the Parliament or appropriately by the judiciary through a
constitutional dialogue within the parameters of judicial review. One
must remember that the parliamentary agenda is over-congested, the
parliamentarians are many times involved in their personal scrabbles
and that laws are often framed in the absence of opposition. The
parliamentary history of Pakistan shows that Parliamentary Committees
are not effective and most of the times even the quorum is not present
when the bills are passed. In these circumstances, it is necessary that
the judiciary fills in the gap and attends to eminent problems on the
social, constitutional-cum-political issues.
One of the recent and appropriate examples of the Supreme Court
providing for a remedy which may not have come through legislative
process is that of the appointment of judges to the High Court, the status
of the acting Chief Justice, and position of ad-hoc judges in the Supreme
Court. In marathon constitutional dialogues these issues have been
settled and in what may soon be referred to as the consultation doctrine,
will gradually become a part of our cultural milieu. The consultation
doctrine may be summed-up as follows:-
“When the constitution makes someone a consultee, the process of consultation must be meaningful and purposive, thus achieving the objective of consultation” (In this case to assure that man of merits and integrity adorn the benches).
Now it is for the jurists, opinion-makers, journalists, lawyers and others
to help assimilate the consultation doctrine into our constitutional
culture.
We cannot end here and have to maintain the national dialogue. The
political confrontation must be replaced by learned and considered
discussions within the parameters of judicial review. Other topics which
would require to be tackled with immediacy are the issues of
accountability, punishment to the plunderers, defection, and cheaper
elections. If the Parliament fails to attend to these problems, the
Supreme Court shall have to fill-in the empty shoes of the opposition and
maintain the dialogue.
SUPREME COURT AS PROTECTOR OF RIGHTS
An important and indispensable function of the courts today is to protect
fundamental rights, human rights and the right to life. This is the least
controversial, but not the easiest of functions which the Supreme Court
is now required to perform. The Constitution of 1973 provides for certain
fundamental rights (like the freedom of speech and assembly, right to be
treated equally and without discrimination and the right to be treated in
accordance with law only). The Supreme Court has a constitutional duty
to protect those rights. In the ever-changing world, living of course within
the parameters of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is constantly
obliged to see that the concepts and words of these rights do not become
static but continue to develop. In this context, the Supreme Court has in
the past not been lagging behind. It is a positive trend in issues of
fundamental rights that the superior courts in recent years have been
increasingly widening the definition and scope of fundamental rights as
well as accepting fewer and fewer restrictions as necessary.
I need not discuss the role that the Supreme Court has to play as an
enforcer of these rights in detail. The Supreme Court has already made a
number of inroads into this and established the principles that have to
be followed by the courts. In respect of the enforcement and protection of
rights, the Supreme Court has already decided that even individual
cases, raising serious questions of violation of law or enforcement of
fundamental rights which may likely have a bearing on the community,
are issues of public importance, and may be entertained directly by the
Supreme Court. The incumbent Chief Justice has made it simpler and
easier. In the past the Court has intervened to correct malpractices in
our educational system; (ii) to afford protection to women of any origin
(Pakistan or Foreign) subject to any sex-related offence and to stop the
menace of obnoxious calls to them; (iii) to protect the property rights of
female heirs/owners by issuance of directions to the attorney general to
take steps to amend the relevant existing law or to cause fresh legislation
to be initiated for securing their rights; (iv) to suspend all restrictions
imposed against nurses working in military hospitals and air hostesses
of Pakistan International Airlines regarding getting married while in
service; (v) to stay public hangings as being contrary to the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the dignity of man; (vi) to issue guidelines for
controlling the traffic muddle in Karachi; (vii) to check the practice of
extortion of money by railway staff from the passengers traveling in the
Samjotha Express (train running between Pakistan and India) with a
commission of advocates and human rights activists appointed to
monitor the situation; (viii) to direct the Federal and Provincial
Governments to stop making appointments against the retirement rules,
a practice which was violative of the fundamental right of equal
opportunity for all citizens to enter a profession; and (ix) to issue
guidelines to be observed by the authorities to check environmental
pollution caused by fumes of motor vehicles, deforestation, open
sewerages, dumping of nuclear waste etc;
In the case of Darshan Masih (PLD 1990 SC 661) it was decided that the
fundamental constitutional right to equality allows the State of Pakistan
to make special provisions for the protection of women and children. The
Court found that this imposed on the State a positive obligation on all
State organs to take active measures to safeguard the interests of women
and children. In 1991 SCMR 2114 it was decided that the Islamic
concept of justice is that “paramount human right that is inviolable and
inalienable” and therefore every citizen has the right to obtain justice.
In the case of Shahla Zia & othes vs. Wapda PLD 1994 SC 693 a group
of residents approached the Court seeking to halt the construction of an
electricity grid station by the Water and Power Development Authority in
their neighborhood. The residents cited the health hazards of electro-
magnetic transmissions. The Court held that the petitioner’s claim was
based on the rights to life (Art 9) and dignity (Art 14), which include the
right to live in a clean environment. The Court applied the ‘precautionary
principle’ set out in the 1992 Rio Declaration, which states that lack of
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost
effective measures to prevent environment degradation. Although not
‘binding’, the Court stated that the principle was of “persuasive value
and commands respect” and held that while the court did not have the
expertise to adjudicate on the different scientific and policy arguments, it
ordered the WAPDA to introduce a public consultation procedure for all
projects involving grid stations and power-lines. It also ordered the
establishment of a commission of scientists to examine the health risks.
The Court also held that constitutional rights are higher than the rights
conferred by other laws, i.e., municipal law, common law. Therefore, a
conscientious citizen, aware of the rights vested under the Constitution
and alive to the possibility of danger, could invoke Art. 184 on behalf of a
large number of citizens who cannot make such representations due to
poverty, ignorance or any such disability.
In the case of General Secretary West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour Union
(CBA) Khewra, Khelu Vs the Director Industries and Mineral
Development Punjab Lahore 1996 SCMR 2061 a petition was filed in the
Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution against the
pollution of water supply source to the residents and mine workers of
Khewra. It was held that persons exposed to such danger were entitled to
claim that their fundamental right to life, guaranteed to them under the
constitution, has been violated and that this is a case for enforcement of
fundamental rights by giving directions or passing orders to restrain the
parties and authorities from committing such violation or to perform
their duties.
Quoting Art 184(3) of the Constitution, the Court observed that
‘it is well settled that in human rights cases/public interest litigation under Art 184(3), the procedural trappings and restrictions, pre condition of being an aggrieved person and the similar technical objections cannot bar the jurisdiction of the Court. This court has vast power under Art. 184(3) to investigate in to questions of fact as well, independently, by recording evidence or appointing commissions or any other reasonable and legal manner to ascertain the correct position. Art. 184(3) provides that this Court has power to make order of the nature mentioned in Art. 199, the fact that the order or direction should be in the nature mentioned in
Art. 199 enlarges the scope of granting relief and the relief so granted by this Court can be molded according to the facts and circumstances of each case”.
In another land mark decision which legally settles the issue of a woman
contracting marriage of her own volition as being valid, a full bench of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared that Muslim girls can marry
without their wali’s consent and an admission by the couple is sufficient
proof of marriage. This verdict puts to rest, at least technically, a long-
drawn out controversy which was given a fillip by a September 1996
verdict of a single bench of the Lahore High Court, declaring all
marriages contracted without a Wali’s consent as void. The Supreme
Court bench has also ruled that the High Court and all subordinate
courts are bound to follow the judgment.
A news item titled “N-Waste to be dumped in Balochistan” was published
in Dawn, a daily newspaper in its issue dated July 3, 1992. In the report,
concern was expressed that certain businessmen were making attempts
to purchase coastal areas of Balochistan or any area within the territorial
waters of Pakistan for this purpose.
It was held in this case that Government functionaries, particularly the
authorities which are charged with the duty to allot the land in coastal
areas should insert a condition in the allotment letter/license/lease that
the allottee/tenant shall not use the land for dumping, treating, burying
or destroying, by any device, waste of any nature, including industrial or
nuclear waste, in any form. The Balochistan Development Authority was
also directed to further obtain similar undertakings from all those to
whom allotments have been made for ship-breaking, agriculture or any
other purpose.
Suo motu action under Art 184(3) of the Constitution originated from an
article appearing in a weekly sent by a citizen, with the request that on
having gone through the said article, restriction be imposed on kite flying
as it was causing loss of billions of rupees of property as well as loss of
valuable human life. The Supreme Court, in view of the situation created
by kite flying issued certain directions which included directions such as
i) the owners/occupants of the houses, shops, hospitals, buildings etc.
shall not allow kite flying activity on their rooftops, failing which they
would also be liable for action of contempt of court; (ii) the kite flying
associations and the Provincial Government shall jointly examine ways
and means to protect the citizens from loss of life and property in future.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has time and again made it abundantly
clear that no technical or procedural difficulties should prevent a court
from deciding cases which involve human rights violations. Recently,
under the direct interest of the incumbent Chief Justice, the Mukhtaran
Mai case, Sonia Naz Case, New Murree City Project, Kite Flying and ban
of lavish meals served on marriage parties are few examples in which the
Honourable Supreme Court has taken suo motu action, and in many
cases proceedings are pending. The public at large has warmly
appreciated the parental jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on taking suo
motu actions on various issues of public importance.
This is however the age where the Supreme Court will continue to be
active in the fields of protection of the basic rights of people.
AS ENFORCER OF VALUES
A controversial role which in the context of Pakistan is something that
may be required of the Supreme Court is as an enforcer of society’s
values. The judges impose universally and naturally accepted values
through their judgments, which however must relate to fundamental
rights, policies of the state, social injustices etc. Of course, primarily it is
for the Parliament to undertake reforms, yet judges do have a sense of
responsibility towards the Constitution and therefore, also towards the
people who are the givers and final protectors of the Constitution.
I must register my caveat that this responsibility must be discharged by
the judiciary with great restraint and in a manner that advances both the
respect for the judiciary and reinforcement of the values and the rights.
CONCLUSION
In the present contemporary world in which value-added knowledge is
the currency, the task of a superior court is both difficult and exciting.
The court’ function appropriately and productively when other
institutions in the country are similarly performing their respective
functions and duties. It is in that atmosphere of a vibrant Parliament,
free media and press, proactive consumer-related organizations and an
aware citizenry that the judges through their knowledge of history,
philosophy and constitutional norms advance the quality of life and
ensure the rule of law. Where other organs are faulty or dysfunctional
the burden on the superior courts correspondingly increases.
To sum up, the Supreme Court has powerful tools in the shape of
judicial review, their jurisdiction to interpret the law and the
Constitution, which if exercised with judicial restraint can certainly
benefit the nation.
Syed Ali Zafar