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INA

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PR

OJE

CT

ON

ETH

NIC

RE

LA

TION

S

The P

roje

ct on E

thnic Relatio

ns (PER

)was

founded in 1991 in anticipation of the serious

interethnic conflicts that were to erupt follow

-

ing the collapse of Com

munism

in Central

and Eastern Europe and the form

er Soviet

Union. PE

R conducts program

s of high-level

intervention and dialogue and serves as a

neutral mediator in several m

ajor disputes in

the region. PER

also conducts programs of

training, education, and research at interna-

tional, national, and comm

unity levels.

PER is supported by the C

arnegie Corporation

of New

York, with additional funding from

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illiam

and Flora

Hew

lett Foundation, the Charles Stew

art Mott

Foundation, the Rockefeller B

rothers Fund, the

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epartment of State

(Stability Pact for South East Europe), and the

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an Marshall Fund of the U

nited States.

Individuals and institutions wishing to receive

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publications should write to:

JADWISIN, POLAND APRIL 15-16, 2002

RO

MA

AN

D TH

E Q

UE

STIO

N

OF S

ELF-D

ETE

RM

INA

TION

: FIC

TION

AN

D R

EA

LITY

JAD

WIS

IN, P

OLA

ND

AP

RIL 1

5-1

6, 2

00

2

©C

opyright 2003 by Project on Ethnic R

elations

TAB

LE

OF

CO

NTE

NTS

Pre

face1

Introdu

ction and B

ackground

4

The Jadw

isin Debate

9

The D

eclaratio

n of the

Rom

a Natio

n: A Q

uestio

n of Le

gitimacy

11

The C

once

pt of S

elf-D

ete

rminatio

n in the V

iew

of the

Rom

ani Elite

s:

Cultu

ral Auto

nom

y16

The O

ption o

f Territo

rial Auto

nom

y21

Rom

a and Natio

nal Self-D

ete

rminatio

n23

The Finnish P

reside

nt’s Initiative and R

om

a Natio

nal Self-D

ete

rminatio

n28

Conclu

sions

31

Appe

ndix A36

Appe

ndix B41

Note

s42

List of P

articipants48

Othe

r PER

Publicatio

ns50

1

PR

EFA

CE

With funding from

the Ford Foundation, on April 15-16, 2002,

PER

, in cooperation with the O

ffice for Dem

ocratic Institutions andH

uman R

ights (OD

IHR

) of the OSC

E and its C

ontact Point onR

oma &

Sinti Issues, organized a regional roundtable on “Rom

a andthe Q

uestion of Self-Determ

ination: Fiction and Reality.” T

he meet-

ing, which took place outside of W

arsaw, in Jadw

isin, Poland, was a

follow-up to the PE

R M

arch 2001 meeting in K

rakow on “R

omani

Representation and L

eadership” (see the PER

report Leadership, Rep-

resentation and the Status of the Rom

a, Princeton 2001).

The Jadw

isin roundtable gathered Rom

ani leaders and activists fromE

urope and the Balkans. B

oth the Jadwisin and K

rakow m

eetingsw

ere internal Rom

ani meetings exploring and debating topics, w

hichfor m

any appeared to be new and challenging. T

he participants were

confronted with the question of w

hether the Rom

ani leadership isseeking national self-determ

ination based on recent developments

resembling a serious drive for it. A

mong the issues discussed w

ere:the International R

omani U

nion declaration of the Rom

a Nation; the

Finnish President’s initiative to establish a pan-European consultative

assembly for R

oma, the C

ouncil of Europe’s Parliam

entary Assem

blyR

ecomm

endation on Rom

a that endorses a so-called European R

oma

Forum, the R

oma N

ational Congress’s E

uropean Charter of R

omani

Rights, and the experience of R

omani self-governm

ent and the “cul-tural autonom

y” of the Rom

a in Hungary.

In recent years both the Rom

ani and non-Rom

ani actors have beenraising the issue of R

omani self-determ

ination. Some R

omani organi-

zations recall this principle and make reference to it directly, w

hereasothers contest it verbally, but confirm

it in the kind of claims they

make. T

he Jadwisin debate proved that for m

any Rom

ani participantsw

hat is taking place now is a R

omani national self-determ

inationm

ovement in the m

aking.

More R

omani leaders are eager to utilize the concept of a R

oma

nation and use it as a basis for a number of specific claim

s, includinga claim

to attain a political status only a little short of that of a state,that is, to have the sam

e rights as other nations do. Along w

ith thisw

ould go the Rom

ani leaders’ request to become a subject of interna-

tional law (as a nation) and to have seats assigned to R

omani repre-

32

Andrzej M

irga, chair of the PER

Rom

ani Advisory C

ouncil and co-chairof the Specialist G

roup on Rom

a/Gypsies of the C

ouncil of Europe, con-ceived the m

eeting and prepared the report. PER

takes full responsibilityfor the report, w

hich has not been reviewed by the participants.

Allen H

. Kassof,President

Livia B

. Plaks,E

xecutive Director

Princeton, New

JerseyD

ecember 2002

sentatives in international organizations. Are these claim

s baseless andbelonging to the realm

of fiction?

For the majority of those gathered in Jadw

isin, such initiatives as pre-sented by the Finnish President or by the recent recom

mendation

[1557 (2002)] of the Parliamentary A

ssembly of the C

ouncil ofE

urope on the “Legal Situation of the R

oma in E

urope,” which vali-

dated these claims and, in fact, m

ade a viable reality out of them.

The R

omani leaders seem

to be strengthened in their assertions thatas a nation they posses the right to self-determ

ination.

While participants recalled dem

ographic, historical and human rights

arguments justifying their self-determ

ination case, the overall debateproved, how

ever, that they operate with a rather narrow

interpretationof this concept. T

he Rom

ani participants view it as concom

itant with

the notion of personal autonomy; that is, being in control of one’s ow

nlife, or as a right to decide (decision-m

aking power) – in instances of

cultural autonomy or m

inority’s self-governance, or as a right to equalparticipation in society’s life. A

ll of these, in fact, can be reached with-

in the framew

ork of minority rights. For the m

ajority of the partici-pants how

ever, the framew

ork of self-determination sounded m

ore fit-ting to the R

oma’s current situation. A

s one of the participants argued,“Is self-determ

ination about whether w

e want oppression, or not?”

The debate at the m

eeting made it clear that R

omani leaders are eager

to embrace the concept of self-determ

ination as an idea guidingR

omani political m

obilization. Whether it is the concept the R

omani

leaders were m

issing up to now or not, rem

ains to be seen. At least

claims for becom

ing equal political subjects, and in control of poli-cies and funds w

ere strongly asserted.

Finally, the seminar in Jadw

isin was exceptional not only because of

the topic discussed there. It is rare when R

omani participants con-

tribute to a seminar w

ith papers on the subject. All together 10

papers were prepared, subm

itted to the organizers, and presentedduring the m

eeting. That is a new

quality of Rom

ani seminars w

or-thy to em

phasize. The Jadw

isin meeting w

as meant to be preparation

for a larger seminar w

ith mainstream

politicians, lawm

akers andexperts on this issue.

Photo of the participants by Livia P

laks.

54

notion of a Rom

ani enlightenment, a R

omani em

anci-pation, and a R

omani integration as an avenue for over-

coming the hum

iliating Rom

ani position in society?

Should it turn toward social and econom

ic rights as astrategy for their ow

n comm

unity? Should the elitesinsist

on im

plementing T

hird W

orld developm

entstrategies for their com

munities, despite the fact that

most of the R

omani people live am

ong some of the

most advanced and developed societies in the w

orld?” 4

The R

omani leadership has struggled w

ith these questions for a longtim

e. Similar concerns w

ere also raised within the E

uropean Rom

aR

ights Center (E

RR

C) at its D

ecember 2000 panel, “T

he Rom

aniM

ovement: W

hat Shape, What D

irection?” In that discussion, addi-tional questions w

ere raised about whether the m

ovement should take

the course of “[a]n open and inclusive civil rights movem

ent [or] anexclusive E

uropean nationalism and a ‘nation-building’ process? W

ill itcontain territorial claim

s?” 5

At a previous PE

R sem

inar in Krakow

(April 2001), the R

omani lead-

ership grappled with these questions and attem

pted some answ

ers.T

hey concluded that the Rom

ani elite is at best divided regarding them

ain Rom

ani interest; at worst, its direction rem

ains “elusive” and dif-ficult to define, m

uch less to agree upon. Am

ong the competing visions

are those that have been articulated by the International Rom

ani Union

(IRU

) and the Rom

a National C

ongress (RN

C). 6

The Finnish President’s initiative w

as not discussed at the Krakow

meet-

ing. Since then, however, it has occupied a central place in recent devel-

opments and has been the subject of intense consultations and debates.

Are the R

omani leaders closer to m

aking some definite choices? D

oesthe Finnish initiative introduce a new

factor in the overall internaldebate? In w

hich overall framew

ork should it be placed?

Am

ong Rom

ani organizations, only the RN

C has m

ade references tothe principle of self-determ

ination. Most recently, in a report com

mis-

sioned by the OSC

E for presentation at the W

arsaw Im

plementation

Meeting of O

ctober, 2000, an RN

C board m

ember stated, “Instead of

taking the demands of independent R

oma N

GO

s seriously, an aiding(sic) industry w

as created that does not care about the Rom

a’s right ofself-determ

ination.” He further concluded,

INTR

OD

UC

TION

AN

D B

AC

KG

RO

UN

D

In recent years both Rom

ani and non-Rom

ani leaders in Europe have

raised the issue, directly and indirectly, of self-determination for the

Rom

a. Three developm

ents have added mom

entum to this quest: the

implem

entation of the Hungarian m

odel of minority self-governm

ent,providing m

inorities and Rom

a with collective rights and cultural

autonomy; 1

the International Rom

ani Union D

eclaration of the Rom

anation; 2

and the

Finnish President’s

initiative to

establish a

pan-E

uropean consultative assembly for the R

oma. 3

These acts have encour-

aged the Rom

ani leadership to explore this issue further.

This report sum

marizes the debates on this subject at a m

eeting that was

organized by the Project on Ethnic R

elations in Jadwisin, Poland on

April 15-16, 2002 and that brought together leaders from

the Rom

anicom

munity. T

he Jadwisin discussions w

ere the latest round in a newand com

plex dialogue within the R

omani com

munity. T

he reportbegins w

ith a detailed exposition of that background and will help the

reader to understand the context in which the discussions took place.

In the conclusion of their 1997 paper, “The R

oma in the Tw

enty-First C

entury: A Policy Paper,” authors A

ndrzej Mirga and N

icolaeG

heorghe noted:

“The R

omani com

munity itself needs new

ideas togovern and m

obilize itself, and it is the Rom

ani elitesw

ho must fashion those ideas. W

hich notion will

embody the w

ill to self-determination and the dem

andfor political recognition of the R

omani People – a

Rom

a nation in diaspora, a Rom

ani transnationality, aR

omani nonterritorial E

uropean minority, or even a

Rom

ani nonterritorial state?

Should the Rom

ani elites support the idea of Rom

aniethnic groups, each developing its ow

n politics andstrategies w

ithin the borders, legal framew

orks, andlim

its of a given state? Should they struggle for specif-ic rights as envisioned in the concept of a charter ofR

omani

rights? Is

the hum

an rights

approach,dem

anding equality and nondiscrimination, the one

idea than can overcome all the problem

s facing theR

oma? O

r should the Rom

ani elites focus on the

76

This draft obviously builds on the IR

U declaration, but by lim

iting itsnotion to the R

omani population of the E

U m

ember states falls short of

the IRU

European or even global perspective. N

evertheless, the demand

to have such a Charter recognized by the E

U is sim

ilar to the demands

of the RN

C and IR

U.

The D

ecember 2000 E

RR

C discussion introduced several additional refer-

ences to the question of Rom

a self-determination. N

on-Rom

ani partici-pants in particular w

ere more forthcom

ing in suggesting models for R

oma

to follow. Jam

es Goldston’s “fantasy vision” included the follow

ing:

“Surely Rom

a, who num

ber anywhere from

8 to 12m

illion, enjoy at least as much entitlem

ent to a full-fledged State as the Palestinians do. (…

) Since 1990,num

erous people – Macedonians, B

osnians, Croats,

and Slovenes – have demanded and secured by vio-

lence, by fiat or by other means their ow

n states. Why

not Rom

a? (…) In this fantasy of the future, R

oma

finally claim their ow

n land!” 11

Claude C

ahn, on the other hand, invited Rom

a to learn from the

Zionist m

ovement that led to the establishm

ent of the State of Israel.A

ccording to him, there are a num

ber of similarities betw

een theZ

ionism of the nineteenth century and the R

omani m

ovement of today:

“(…) It is not only on this strict organizational/m

ech-anistic front that Z

ionism has ideas of potential use for

a Rom

ani movem

ent – the core challenges of Zionism

,such as breaking the prim

ary allegiance of Jews to the

national states of other people and building the Jewish

patriot and the Jewish body politics, w

ere nearly iden-tical to challenges facing R

omani activists today.” 12

The R

omani elite, as w

ell as non-Rom

ani politicians and lawm

akers,have difficulty in determ

ining or defining who the R

oma are. 13

A search

of documents and recom

mendations produced over the last decade by

international organizations provides a rather large spectrum of catego-

rizations of

Rom

ani populations

in E

urope (R

om,

Rom

a/Gypsies,

Rom

a and Sinti, Rom

a/Gypsies/Travelers) and an equally large num

berof definitions: the R

oma as a people, as a nation, as a transnational

minority, as a E

uropean minority, as an ethnic group, or as a truly

European m

inority.

“The current developm

ent in Europe how

ever clearlyshow

s that Rom

a, regardless of their social status, areconfronted w

ith overt, anti-gypsy hostility. Such hos-tility cannot be abolished through w

elfare or develop-m

ent projects. In order for social development pro-

jects to succeed, Rom

a must be granted guarantees for

protection of civil liberties. This m

eans a change in thepolitical status of the R

oma tow

ard political, social andcultural self-determ

ination.” 7

The IR

U, on the other hand, refrains from

referring to the principle ofself-determ

ination in its declaration of a nation without a state. In the

words of the IR

U President: “[W

]e are not in search for a self-determi-

nation of the Rom

a in Europe.” 8

Despite this declaration, how

ever, it isan open question as how

best to interpret the fact that at its lastC

ongress (Prague, July 2000) the IRU

established a new structure that

clearly resembles a state, com

plete with President, Parliam

ent, Court,

and Ministers or C

omm

issioners.

Both the R

NC

and the IRU

appear to operate on the premise that the

Rom

a are a nation, using this as the basis for specific claims for politi-

cal status that fall only slightly short of that accorded to a legitimate

state. Both organizations ask that the R

oma becom

e subjects of inter-national law

, in the case of the RN

C through its legally binding C

harterof R

omani R

ights 9signed by the states, and in the case of the IR

U,

through recognition of the existence of a Rom

a nation. Both organiza-

tions also seek assigned seats for Rom

ani representatives alongside mem

-ber nation-states in international organizations.

The

Rom

ani A

ctivists N

etwork

on L

egal and

Political Issues

(RA

NE

LPI), a

Belgian-based

federation of

Rom

ani organizations,

offered yet another proposal, the so-called “Moral C

harter of the Rom

anation in the E

uropean Union.” C

hapter 6 of this draft proposal says,

“The E

uropean Union acknow

ledges the existence ofthe territory of its M

ember-States of a R

oma nation

without a com

pact territory. The definition of the said

nation is one, which the nation gives itself (…

) the EU

declares the Rom

a nation (…) is one of the constituent

nations of Europe, in full equality (…

) with other

nations (…) irrespective of their relations w

ith Statesand territories.” 10

98

national minority w

ithin its borders. The R

NC

also demands recogni-

tion of the Rom

a both as a national minority in each of the countries in

which they live and as a R

oma nation w

ithin Europe.

How

should one judge the beliefs held by Rom

ani leaders? Which are

realistic and have a basis in political and legal fact, and which are pure

fiction?

THE

JAD

WIS

IN D

EB

ATE

The

organizers chose

self-determination

as the

main

topic of

theJadw

isin meeting. T

hey hoped that providing tools for examining the

Rom

a’s internal discourse or claims w

ould make the R

omani leadership

more fam

iliar with the legal fram

ework of the principle of self-determ

i-nation. T

his in turn would help them

to distinguish between legitim

ategrounds for their claim

s and illusory ones.

To date there had been no debate about these issues among the R

omani

leadership, nor had there been any efforts to review existing R

omani

statements about self-determ

ination. Some proposals or ideas had

assumed the form

of widely accepted slogans, but neither the R

oma nor

their supporters had much know

ledge of their specific content.

With this in m

ind, PER

raised the following questions for discussion at

the seminar:

1.H

ow do R

omani leaders define self-determ

ination? What kind

of self-determination do they seek, and w

hat arguments are

used to justify such claims?

2.D

o existing Rom

ani claims have substantial ground and legiti-

macy, or are they w

ishful thinking?

3.W

hat are the historical antecedents of this principle, and arethere m

odels for Rom

a to follow?

4.D

oes a drive toward self-determ

ination constitute a positive ora negative developm

ent in terms of the challenges the R

omani

comm

unity faces in their respective countries and in Europe in

general?

In her opening remarks, PE

R’s executive director noted the upcom

ingtenth anniversary of the landm

ark meeting held by PE

R in Stupava

(then C

zechoslovakia) that

started the

regional dialogue

between

The m

ost recent (2002) Council of E

urope Parliamentary A

ssembly

Recom

mendation N

o. 1557 on the Legal Situation of the Rom

a inE

urope calls upon mem

ber-states to resolve the legal status of the Rom

aand recognize them

as an ethnic or national minority group in each

state. Usually, international organizations refrain from

referring toR

oma as a nation. H

owever, at the W

arsaw m

eeting preparatory to the2001 W

orld Conference A

gainst Racism

in Durban, the N

GO

s gath-ered there endorsed the idea of recognizing R

oma as a nation. 14

At the

NG

O Forum

in Durban, recom

mendations included a sim

ilar demand

to have Rom

a treated on “equal footing with other nations of the

world.” T

he final Declaration and A

ction Plan from the C

onference didnot, how

ever, include those recomm

endations. 15

A num

ber of scholars, in addition to some R

omani and non-R

omani

activists, also promote the idea of R

oma self-determ

ination. The text of

Cara Feyes’ “Tow

ard a New

Paradigm of the N

ation: the Case of the

Rom

a,” which appears on the Patrin W

eb Journal, states,

“The international com

munity (…

) primarily regards

nations as territorially based, and the consolidation ofa nation w

ithin a specific territory has lent legitimacy

to struggle for self-determination. Yet this lim

ited def-inition (…

) undermines equally legitim

ate claims for

self-determination am

ong non-territorially consolidat-ed groups. A

new definition of the nation w

ould allowgroups such as the R

oma (…

) to be accepted as anation and w

ould lend greater international legitimacy

to their struggle for self-determination (…

) which

[does] not aim for statehood but aim

s rather, at achiev-ing greater control over their ow

n lives.”

Pavel Barsa also offers scholarly support of the notion that the R

omani

migration to the W

est, especially to Germ

any, contributed to a refor-m

ulation of the Rom

ani identity. Am

ong Rom

ani leaders in Europe,

the debate is phrased in terms of w

hether the Rom

a and Sinti are one ofthe “V

olksgruppe,” that is, a Germ

an ethnic minority, or w

hether theyare part of a pan-R

omani and pan-E

uropean nation. 16

For some governm

ents and some R

omani activists, how

ever, there is nocontradiction in holding both positions. T

he Czech governm

ent hasrecognized the existence of a R

oma nation in a signed m

emorandum

with the IR

U w

hile at the same tim

e legally treating the Rom

a as a

1110

assimilation, integration, separation, or em

ancipation? If emancipation,

do they seek emancipation as citizens, as a m

inority, or as a nation? Anum

ber of Rom

ani-initiated political documents offer various propos-

als, ideas, or visions. Other ideas have been put forth by governm

ents,private foundations, organizations, and individual scholars. T

heR

omani

elite needs to analyze and debate these proposals, and then formally

incorporate their preferred outcome into the O

SCE

Action Plan.

While the interest of G

adje (non-Rom

a) frequently drive the policiestow

ard Rom

a, it is a fact that the Rom

ani elite have yet to formulate a

clear answer as to w

hat is in the Rom

a’s genuine interest. At present,

non-Rom

a are more involved than the R

omani leadership in determ

in-ing this. T

he PER

discussion papers for this meeting offer a new

frame-

work for debate and evaluation of various proposals. H

e expressed hopethat, w

ith the help of this framew

ork, Rom

a gathered at Jadwisin w

illbe able to develop their ow

n vision of self-determination.

(Am

ong the discussion papers prepared by PER

, the first was incorporated

into the Introduction19

to this report and the second into Appendix A

. 20

The m

aterial was apparently inspiring and provocative for the R

omani

leadership, as evidenced by the fact that eight participants arrived at them

eeting with statem

ents or articles written in direct response to issues

raised in the discussion papers. While this report incorporates m

uch ofthe content of these statem

ents and articles, the actual texts are availablefrom

the PER

office in Princeton. Appendix B

lists the titles and authorsof all papers. B

y providing legal language and mainstream

perspectiveson issues of national definition and self-determ

ination, the organizersw

ere successful in significantly raising the qualityof R

omani leaders’ par-

ticipation in internal Rom

a meetings.)

THE

DE

CL

AR

ATIO

N O

F TH

E R

OM

A N

ATIO

N:

A Q

UE

STIO

N O

F L

EG

ITIMA

CY

The issue of R

oma as a nation, publicly raised by the IR

U D

eclaration, was

discussed at the April 2001 PE

R m

eeting in Krakow

and served as a start-ing point for the Jadw

isin meeting as w

ell. Since the Krakow

meeting,

however, R

omani leaders had been greatly affected by the intense schedule

of consultations organized by the Finnish authorities in response toPresident H

alonen’s proposal. 21T

he prospect of Rom

ani representation atthe European level, and specifically w

ithin the Council of Europe, led

participants to be much m

ore assertive and forceful in their statements.

Rom

ani leaders and governments. 17

In the eleven years of PER

involve-m

ent in Rom

ani issues, she continued, one of their biggest achieve-m

ents has been the ongoing cooperation with R

omani leaders.

She observed that there has been an accelerated awareness of issues rel-

evant to the Rom

a among E

urope’s governments and even in the U

.S.T

hat is mostly the result of the w

ork of Rom

ani activists, she said, butalso of the E

U enlargem

ent process. The inclusion of R

omani issues in

the political criteria of accession (the EC

’s Agenda 2000) also started the

ball rolling in the development of R

omani initiatives and governm

entalpolicies or program

s regarding Rom

a. With this developm

ent, however,

has also come trem

endous pressure on Rom

ani leaders to take positionson various issues of im

portance to their comm

unity.

A concerted discussion about w

hat the Rom

ani leadership wants for

their comm

unity ten or twenty years dow

n the road must therefore

begin now. A

t stake is the future of Rom

ani comm

unities. If the Rom

aw

ill not debate this important issue for them

selves, society at large will

decide for them, and the outcom

e may not be to their liking.

She called attention to great progress made over the past decade in polit-

ical activity, including consciousness-raising and comm

unity organiza-tion, by the R

omani leadership. T

hey developed challenging ideas orvisions of the political future of R

oma, such as the IR

U D

eclaration andthe R

NC

Charter. A

t the same tim

e, other ideas, such as the FinnishPresident’s initiative, have com

e from governm

ents. Who can and should

determine w

hat is best for the Rom

a? She suggested that the Rom

anileadership itself can best answ

er these questions and choose the right pathfor prom

oting the well-being and developm

ent of the Rom

ani comm

uni-ties across Europe. A

great deal is at stake, she concluded, and the Rom

anileadership m

ust formulate the clearest possible answ

ers.

The A

dviser on Rom

a and Sinti Issues at the OSC

E/O

DIH

R/C

PRSI

(Contact Point for R

oma and Sinti Issues) also stressed the im

portanceof this m

eeting, but cited different reasons. As a follow

-up to Decision

No. 7 of the O

SCE

Ministerial C

ouncil meeting in B

ucharest held inD

ecember 2001, his office has been w

orking on the OSC

E A

ction Planof Targeted A

ctivities for Rom

a and Sinti. 18T

his is a proposal foradopting a new

political document that sets forth O

SCE

objectives foryears to com

e.

He challenged the participants to develop a R

omani political vision for

promotion from

within the O

SCE

framew

ork. Do the R

oma w

ant

1312

several dozen separate minorities and also a R

oma nation? H

e suggest-ed that the IR

U D

eclaration had in fact been intended to supersede the1995 definition of R

oma as a m

inority.

This question w

as further addressed by the Advisor on R

oma and Sinti

Issues at the OSC

E. A

ccording to the IRU

position, Rom

ani minorities

in various countries are national minorities of a R

oma nation for w

hichthe IR

U seeks legal recognition. Individual states, how

ever, follow the

Zentralrat (G

erman Sinti and R

omani organization) perspective – that

a Rom

ani comm

unity is to be recognized as a national minority, of

equal status with other m

inorities, in their country of residence. Fromthis perspective, IR

U and R

NC

efforts to obtain Rom

ani recognition atthe E

uropean level are both misdirected.

The R

oma m

ight choose yet another option in seeking a firm political

status, said the speaker. During the last visit to India (in 2001) of a

small group of R

omani leaders led by the IR

U President, the R

oma w

eregiven the option of official recognition as an Indian m

inority and were

offered the same status given to all Indian ém

igrés as Indian minorities

abroad, including passports. For some in the visiting group, this w

as thefulfillm

ent of a long-lived fantasy. How

ever, the IRU

President rejectedit, arguing that it w

as not appropriate for a small circle to m

ake such am

omentous decision w

ithout consulting with R

omani com

munities

and organizations as well as w

ithin the IRU

Parliament. M

oreover, therew

as concern that this might lead G

adje to expel Rom

a forcefully or atleast ask them

to leave their countries and return to India. Additionally,

once recognized as an Indian minority, the R

oma could hardly then

claim to be a nation of their ow

n. The cause of Indian m

inority statusstill circulates am

ong some leaders, such as an individual from

Kosovo

who lives in Yugoslavia and to this day w

rites in favor of recognizing theR

oma as an Indian D

iaspora. 22

How

realistic is it to expect that the Rom

a will attain firm

legal andpolitical status along w

ith representation in international and intergov-ernm

ental institutions? As another participant pointed out, the Finnish

initiative aims to provide R

oma w

ith representation within the C

ouncilof Europe. B

ut since non-territorial and non-state nations have no legalposition w

ithin intergovernmental and inter-states institutions, granting

Rom

a such a status would m

ean not only breaching international lawbut also setting a precedent for other sim

ilar groups.

Whereas at the K

rakow m

eeting the IRU

Declaration m

et with criticism

from m

any participants and especially the RN

C representatives, at

Jadwisin there w

as no such criticism. O

n the contrary, nearly all par-ticipants affirm

ed the assertion that the Rom

a are a nation. Responding

to the discussion paper (Appendix A

), the Rom

ani participants arguedthat neither “territory” nor “state” are required criteria for defining anation. T

he Rom

a possess all the anthropological, cultural, and lin-guistic characteristics of a nation,they

said, as

well

as a

comm

on history of persecution in E

urope.

The

majority

of the

participantsjudged R

omani claim

s to nationalself-determ

ination as legitimate and

legally valid, despite what m

ight beregarded as evidence to the contraryfrom

international law and other

international documents. H

aving previously agreed that the Rom

a area nation, they easily extended this concept to include the right of self-determ

ination as well.

Currently, m

any experts and politicians equate nations with states, bas-

ing an entire international political architecture upon a foundation ofnation-states. From

this perspective, the fact that the Rom

a do not havea state does not invalidate their claim

to nationhood. As the IR

U rep-

resentative pointed out, there is no need for academic discussion as to

whether R

oma are or are not a nation. T

he IRU

says Rom

a are a nation.It has been said to K

ofi Annan, to the C

zech government, and to oth-

ers, and no one objected. Politicians do not deny it. Many interna-

tional documents not only do not deny it, but actually strengthen the

conviction among the R

oma that they are indeed a nation. O

ld ideasand definitions are not adequate for m

odern times, he continued, and

the Rom

a challenge the tradition with the innovative concept of a

nation without territory.

Another IR

U representative raised a question regarding the C

ouncil ofE

urope’s 1995 Framew

ork Convention for the Protection of N

ationalM

inorities, which established criteria for recognizing R

oma as a national

or ethnic minority w

ithin each state in which R

oma reside. M

any statesadopted these criteria, and thus R

oma are now

recognized as minorities

in several dozen European states. H

ow can the R

oma sim

ultaneously be

Many inte

rnational

docu

ments no

t only do

not

deny it, bu

t actually

strengthe

n the co

nviction

among the

Rom

a that they

are inde

ed a natio

n.

1514

There w

ere objections on the part of a few participants. For one young

student of political science, accepted sociological definitions suggestthat the R

oma are not a nation but rather an ethnic unit characterized

by a comm

on language, culture and/or historical traditions, and holdinga shared identity. For him

, it will take m

ore than group identity to rede-fine R

oma from

a minority to a nation. 25

Similarly, for another R

omani student, the idea of a R

oma nation is

unsubstantiated. While it m

ight be useful for purposes of mobilization

or for providing a symbolic dim

ension to the quest for Rom

ani identi-ty, nevertheless, R

omani leadership m

ust think carefully about the con-sequences before m

aking such a baseless claim at the E

uropean level.

Yet another participant raised the issue of internal solidarity and differ-ences am

ong various groups identified as Rom

a or Rom

ani. According

to her, Rom

ani leadership ignores this aspect since it uncovers a realitythat is at odds w

ith the ideological image of a united nation. T

heTravelers, A

shkaliya, Egyptians, and R

udari/Beyashi all claim

to be sep-arate ethnic groups. Should they therefore be considered part of theR

oma nation? H

ow do R

oma respect the rights of these ethnic groups

to their own self-determ

ination? She further pointed out that her own

experience in carrying out projects in the Balkan region taught her that

Rom

ani activists’ prime identification w

as not with R

oma living across

the borders but rather with their surrounding nations, w

hether Serbs,C

roats, or Bosnians. 26

These facts beg the question, can one R

oma

nation be developed?

In Jadwisin, as w

ell as in Krakow

, two different positions tow

ard a Rom

anation w

ere manifested. O

ne can be called a universalistic (and volun-tarist) position, fully expressed by the R

NC

: The R

oma nation exists.

But since R

oma are diverse and hold different traditions and cultures,

any attempt to forge a unitary nation is fruitless. T

he Rom

a nation isan open structure; every group can join it because w

hat binds themtogether is anti-G

ypsy sentiment.

The other position, inclusive but particularistic or even nationalist, can

be attributed to the IRU

, among others. It focuses on R

omani culture,

seeking to develop its unified form along w

ith a codified language andrenew

ed traditions and values. It supports an inclusive and global defi-nition of R

omani identity that is nonetheless rooted in R

omani culture

and socialization. According to this approach, internal fragm

entation orseparation of som

e groups like Egyptians or A

shkaliya is a dangerous

The A

dvisor on Rom

a and Sinti Issues at the OSC

E responded by

explaining that there are a number of legal provisions that can be used

in support of the Rom

a claim. H

e cited, for example, the E

uropeanC

harter for Regional and M

inority Languages (1992), suggesting thatthe R

oma can either use provisions like this to ask for m

ore or wait until

the legal framew

ork becomes m

ore favorable for non-territorial nations.H

e recalled the example of indigenous people, w

ho for many decades

went unrecognized in international organizations. H

owever, they m

obi-lized them

selves, organizing conferences and working groups, and brought

their issues to the fore. Now

they are legally recognized within the U

N

system. T

he Rom

a can do this as well.

In fact, in seeking extra-territorial rights for their people, Rom

ani lead-ers are prom

oting the idea of a non-territorial Rom

a nation. The notion

of extra-territorial rights functions also in mainstream

politics, thisspeaker continued, citing the so-called H

ungarian “status law.” 23

The

Hungarian governm

ent’s effort to assert extra-territorial rights forH

ungarians abroad parallels the Rom

a’s claim and m

ight make that

government and others supportive of the R

omani quest.

For some R

omani participants, the changes in Europe open yet another

avenue of possibilities. Their hopes had been bound up w

ith the vision ofa future Europe consisting of various nations or cultures rather than exclu-sively of nation-states. T

his was also the basis for the IR

U declaration. B

utR

omani leaders now

have to turn to a new philosophy. T

he integrationprocess currently taking place in Europe m

eans that those Rom

a living inE

U-accessing states w

ill soon enter into the European Union.

But how

will these R

omani com

munities be incorporated – as citizens

of their respective states or as Rom

a? If as Rom

a, they will have to be

recognized and granted a new status. In the vision of a future E

urope asa union of cultures, there are grounds for claim

ing a place for the Rom

aon the basis of their culture and history.

The position of the R

NC

, the umbrella federation of the R

oma civil

rights movem

ent, has long been clear and firm, according to its repre-

sentative. Rom

a are a nation, and they do not require anyone’s permis-

sion to make that claim

, said the speaker. Their goal is for R

oma to

become m

ainstream political actors, and not m

erely the objects of a“G

ypsy industry” controlled and run by Gadje w

ho profit greatly fromit and em

ploy a few R

oma for purposes of legitim

ization. 24

1716

decision-making is nevertheless quite real. A

ccording to this speaker,the unique H

ungarian system, despite its im

perfections, provides Rom

aw

ith the greatest legal chances and opportunities for exercising theirrights in the C

EE

region. 27

Another participant put forth a related view

by which self-determ

ina-tion refers to equal rights to participate in the larger society w

ith free useof one’s ow

n cultural, ethnic, or linguistic characteristics. It means,

therefore, that national governments shall accept and create structures

for Rom

a’s equal participation as in Finland, where the C

onstitutionguarantees the R

oma cultural and linguistic rights. In their delibera-

tions on self-determination, she continued, the R

omani leadership can-

not ignore existing provisions and legal systems. C

laiming constitu-

tional or other rights from existing governm

ents is also a realization ofself-determ

ination.

Keeping this sam

e line of reasoning, yet another participant noted thatm

inorities are subjects of law and protection in every country. In the

post-WW

II era, however, the rights of m

inorities have been understoodas individual and not collective rights. T

his position, which has pre-

vailed in international law, underm

ines minorities’ right to self-determ

i-nation. A

ccording to this speaker, national minorities should have pro-

portional participation in political power. B

ut the unresolved dilemm

aof individual vs. collective m

inority rights makes the future of these

minorities uncertain. She doubted w

hether it is enough, for example,

to have the individual right to preserve one’s national minority identity

and culture.

This participant considers the quest for self-determ

ination to be one ofthe m

ost important for R

oma. In her view

, self-determination can have

territorial and extra-territorial forms, w

ith the latter no less important

than the former.

In multiethnic states, she continued, the basic form

of self-determina-

tion is national cultural autonomy. R

ussian law qualifies this as “the

form of national cultural self-determ

ination representing the publicassociation of citizens of R

ussia who consider them

selves as belonging toa definite ethnic com

munity on the basis of their voluntary self-orga-

nizing with a view

of preservation of their originality, language, culture,education.” T

he Rom

a in Russia, am

ong others, have this right to forman extra-territorial national autonom

y and thereby to promote cultural

and educational rights and even legislative initiatives or political repre-

process. Indeed, adherents of this view often blam

e the internationalorganizations for encouraging fragm

entation through their recognitionof separate ethnic groups. E

ach of these two positions is additionally

associated with a different conclusion as to w

hat should be in the Rom

a’sm

ain interest: fighting against anti-Gypsyism

or working to develop a

unifying culture.

THE

CO

NC

EP

T OF

SE

LF

-DE

TER

MIN

ATIO

N IN

THE

VIE

W O

F TH

E R

OM

AN

I EL

ITES

: C

ULTU

RA

L A

UTO

NO

MY

Rom

ani participants perceive the concept of self-determination in a

number of different w

ays. Some view

it as individual or even human

rights, others as group or minority rights w

ithin a nation-state, and stillothers as the rights of a people and a nation, such as at the E

uropeanlevel. For som

e, the concept itself has been a novelty. Others criticized

the discussion papers for espousing only the UN

-based restrictive defi-nition of the self-determ

ination principle. For the adherents of them

inority-within-a-nation-state perspective, the ultim

ate goal is culturalautonom

y, and perhaps eventual territorial autonomy. For adherents of

the national perspective, the goal is official recognition of the Rom

anation. T

hose who see cultural autonom

y as the objective tend to holdboth view

s simultaneously, that the R

oma can be a national m

inority atthe state level and a nation at the E

uropean level.

While the U

N system

offers only one possible way of interpreting the

self-determination principle, there are other perspectives. T

he Advisor

on Rom

a and Sinti Issues at OSC

E explained that his organization’s

Hum

an Dim

ension Perspective views self-determ

ination as a basichum

an right of every individual and every people. This constitutes a

political and legal basis for Rom

a self-determination claim

s within the

OSC

E process. H

e believes the Rom

ani leadership should explore astrategy that builds on this basis.

For some, “self-determ

ination” refers to an individual and collective orgroup’s right to participate in a w

ider public and political process. Inthis view

, self-determination begins w

hen a person or group (national orethnic) seeks to represent their ow

n interests within official fora. In

Hungary, R

oma self-determ

ination has been implem

ented through thesystem

of minority self-governm

ent. While the arenas are currently lim

-ited to issues of culture and education, the possibility to participate in

1918

sentation. In her assessment, how

ever, this promising and prospective

law is not easy to realize in practice, especially in the case of R

oma, since

it does not establish procedures and financial guarantees. 28

A young R

omani student explained that the concept of self-determ

inationis vaguely defined in international law

as “having control over our lives.”It can be achieved through political participation and autonom

y orthrough secession. T

he first two are legal w

ays; the latter, besides posinga challenge to the international order, also raises m

oral questions.

Autonom

y can be personal, cultural, and territorial. For the majority,

any quest for minority autonom

y might be interpreted as a threat to its

territory. For this speaker, the Rom

ani movem

ent is heading toward

securing greater political participation for Rom

a, but is moving too

slowly tow

ard attaining cultural autonomy. R

oma can claim

territorialautonom

y in only a few lim

ited cases.

He also pointed out a concern about m

ultiethnic societies. In his view,

multiculturalism

tends to turn minority claim

s for autonomy into issues

of minority political participation. Since as a rule the m

ajority tends topatronize m

inorities, this is not a desirable direction to pursue. He fur-

ther contended that the discussion paper puts forth the position thatinternal self-determ

ination refers only to indigenous people. According

to him, how

ever, it refers also to minorities, and therefore R

oma can

claim it as w

ell. (For him this is im

portant because he does not believethat R

oma should be considered a nation.)

The R

NC

representative approached the question of self-determination

in a different and provocative way. Instead of defining w

hat self-deter-m

ination is, he attempted to define its opposite. T

hat has been colo-nialism

, oppression, and discrimination. In this view

, self-determina-

tion is equivalent to power. T

hose without it face oppression. T

hequestion is, therefore, do the R

oma w

ant oppression or are they readyto defend them

selves? According to him

, the answer is sim

ple – allR

oma w

ant self-determination because they do not w

ant oppression.H

e warned that this view

of self-determination is quite com

mon am

ongthe younger generation.

Clarifying w

hat self-determination m

eans for Rom

a, he went on to elu-

cidate what R

oma do not accept and w

hat they do want. Further defin-

ing self-determination as being in control or in a position to m

ake deci-sions on one’s ow

n, he said, Rom

a do not accept non-Rom

ani experts.T

hey do not accept non-Rom

a engaging in projects on behalf of Rom

a,

making decisions about w

hat Rom

ani children should learn or whether

they are a nation or not, sending Rom

a to participate in wars in w

hichthey kill each other, or designating their representatives for them

.

What they do w

ant is to elect their own representatives, to decide w

hattheir children w

ill learn, and to participate in the politics of the coun-tries in w

hich they reside as citizens and not just as Rom

a. They w

ant,he

said, to

participate at

theE

uropean level of politics, havingnot only a voice but the pow

er todeterm

ine for themselves w

hat theirrole at that level shall be.

According to this speaker, the prin-

ciple of self-determination lies at

the foundation of every democratic

and pluralistic state. The absence of

such a basis leads to oppression, manipulation, and dictatorship. R

oma

should demand self-determ

ination as a basic human right.

The m

ajority of participants, however, view

ed self-determination as a

question of Rom

a’s participation in the larger society. There w

as con-sensus am

ong them that attaining cultural autonom

y would assert their

right to equal participation. How

ever, for many the cultural autonom

ygranted to H

ungarian Rom

a since the mid-1990s is a false version of

self-determination.

The R

NC

representative said that the Hungarian m

odel of minority

self-government prom

otes separation rather than offering them real par-

ticipation in society. He cited m

any Gadje policies that establish special

arrangements for R

oma – special R

omani schools, R

omani advisors,

mediators, R

omani departm

ents – as examples of im

posed segregationrather than integration. H

e sees similar developm

ents in other countriesas w

ell.

Criticism

of the case of Hungarian R

oma, expressed m

ainly but notexclusively by representatives of R

NC

, brings to light a major dilem

ma

that the Rom

ani elite must eventually resolve. Should R

oma be inte-

grated into participation in the larger society on an ethnic basis or a civicbasis? It has been apparent throughout the debate that R

oma intend to

attain more control of, com

mand over, and the pow

er of decision in allm

atters related to them. T

hey differ, however, in how

to reach this goal.

Rom

a intend to

attainm

ore

contro

l of, co

mm

andove

r, and pow

er o

f de

cision in all m

atters

relate

d to the

m.

2120

as poverty and prejudice. The m

ajor challenge therefore remains: H

owto em

power R

oma to becom

e political players and have a real impact?

THE

OP

TION

OF

TER

RITO

RIA

L A

UTO

NO

MY

Those arguing for the option of territorial autonom

y elaborated furtheron the validity of the ethnic w

ay. While their objective has been to

attain greater participation in decision-making or even self-adm

inistra-tion in som

e localities, the racial characteristics of the Rom

a make it

impossible for them

simply to m

erge unnoticed into the majority.

Traditionally they are perceived as a foreign element, and this is unlike-

ly to change. Even in countries in which governm

ents have extensivelytried

to elim

inate racial

barriers, the

results are

not convincing.

Segregation is a fact, even in advanced democracies.

It is even more intense in post-com

munist countries, speakers said.

There, despite loudly declared program

s of integration, the reality isquite the opposite – displacem

ent, marginalization, and in its final con-

sequences, segregation in ever-growing R

omani ghettos and slum

s. Inthis new

reality, governmental program

s, which lack public and political

will,

and the

activities of

non-governm

ental organizations, which

lack sufficient funding, are barelyable to slow

down the segregation

and mitigate som

e of its impact. 30

A real effort to change has to com

efrom

the

Rom

a them

selves, said

another participant.

T

hey m

ustshow

enough will and determ

ina-tion to defend their interests, tostop being objects of charity andpaternalistic

care, and

to seek

respect, self-esteem

, and

dignity.W

hat Rom

a demand from

the stateand society are not handouts but rights and justice. In his opinion, thiscan com

e about by granting greater self-administration in local R

omani

residential units. There R

oma can gain a stronger position vis-a-vis the

majority. C

laims for greater autonom

y at the national level, by contrast,seem

untenable at this time. Som

e say that at present the Rom

a appearunable to handle this responsibility, but they m

ust learn. 31

For some R

omani leaders, the focus of all efforts throughout the 1990s

was greater R

omani participation in m

ainstream politics. T

hey lobbiedfor R

omani representatives in state institutions, departm

ents, and advi-sory or experts’ groups. T

he leadership’s negotiations with the authori-

ties resulted in the establishment of special bodies or arrangem

ents forthe R

omani m

inority as a group. They opted, in short, for an ethnic

path. Now

, as one of the speakers pointed out, these structures functionas “buffers” betw

een the Rom

a and the state and make it easier for the

state to avoid its responsibility toward the R

oma as citizens.

Some leaders have called for redress of the state policy tow

ard the Rom

a,hoping to achieve for them

the right “to participate in a country’s poli-tics not as R

oma but as citizens.” H

owever, R

oma are not generally real

or welcom

ed partners in mainstream

politics inasmuch as they lack

strong political, economic, or intellectual potential. M

oreover, Rom

a’scivic involvem

ent remains very low

as evidenced by their minim

al par-ticipation in elections. H

ow, then, can they gain influence if not

through the ethnic way of cultural autonom

y? Ironically, those Rom

aw

ho do move into the structures and institutions that are part of the

“arrangements” for R

oma, thereby gaining som

e position and power to

influence Rom

ani politics from w

ithin, tend to be strongly criticized,usually by those w

ho remain outside of it. 29

What is the perspective of those w

ho are inside? In the opinion of a par-ticipant w

ho holds the position of Rom

ani Plenipotentiary in the SlovakG

overnment, the key w

ord in all discussions is “integration.” Govern-

mental strategies developed for R

oma in m

any countries aim at inte-

grating Rom

a into mainstream

society. From her perspective, it is the

government’s responsibility to set forth conditions for R

oma’s integra-

tion. Her Plenipotentiary O

ffice acts at three different levels: thenational m

inority level, at which they aim

to provide Rom

a with all the

institutional infrastructure and provisions to which they are legally enti-

tled; the social and economic level, at w

hich they try to address andresolve difficult and contentious issues of R

oma; and the interethnic

level, at which they w

ork to improve relations, com

munications, and

mutual understanding betw

een Rom

a and the majority.

She is determined to bring positive changes to R

oma, but she also

expects the Rom

ani leadership and representation to act responsibly. Inher opinion, they are the w

eakest link, too divided to represent Rom

aniinterests and influence politics. She claim

s that this is more problem

aticeven than all the disadvantages experienced by the R

oma in Slovakia such

A re

al effo

rt to change

has to co

me fro

m the

Rom

a them

selve

s. They

must sho

w e

nough w

illand de

term

ination to

defe

nd their inte

rests,

to sto

p being o

bjects o

f charity and pate

rnalisticcare

, and to se

ek re

spect,

self-e

steem

, and dignity.

2322

RO

MA

AN

D N

ATIO

NA

L S

EL

F-D

ETE

RM

INA

TION

For a few participants, the concept of R

omani national self-determ

ina-tion appears quite elusive. For som

e, it means creating R

omani pow

erand clarifying objectives to be realized in years to com

e. For others,developing a new

ideology would glue R

omani com

munities together,

similar to the w

ay in which religion binds Jew

s around the world.

Some participants view

ed Rom

ani national self-determination as an

effort to seek emancipation as a nation, w

hereas for others the goal is tohave the R

oma nation recognized and granted new

status in Europe, as

in the IRU

Declaration. A

s one speaker underlined, the Declaration

marks a new

and historical opening that requires Rom

ani leadership totake steps to begin a political process both inside and outside theR

omani com

munity. In so doing, they w

ill need to pay attention to theprocesses of globalization, E

uropean integration, and democratization.

They w

ill also need to pay attention to disintegration processes that aregoing on w

ithin the Rom

ani comm

unity at this time – catastrophic con-

ditions in some com

munities and fragm

entation and growing m

arginal-ization in others.

The self-determ

ination option is a positive one which can trigger

changes in areas of Rom

ani culture and politics, both within and in rela-

tion with governm

ents and international organizations. According to

this speaker, however, for the process of R

omani self-determ

ination tosucceed, there m

ust be prior unification of culture, empow

erment,

strengthening of national symbols, and im

provement in social and eco-

nomic standing for all R

oma.

Historically, secession and the creation of a separate state has been the

objective of national self-determination for m

ost nations. How

ever,secession is not a viable goal for the R

oma, suggested another partici-

pant. Moreover, neither the IR

U D

eclaration nor the RN

C C

laim is

new, he said, citing precedents that w

ere formulated by R

omani leaders

at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 1930s. 32

Those historical efforts to achieve som

e degree of national self-determi-

nation or self-organization were interrupted by the N

azis. What sur-

vived the Nazis w

as further destroyed by Com

munism

. The R

omani

comm

unity emerged socially, financially, and politically broken and cul-

turally uprooted. Even worse, the anti-G

ypsy stereotypes survived andw

ere reproduced in both Western and E

astern Europe.

What can R

omani leaders do to turn the reality of residential segrega-

tion into an asset? The R

omani A

dvisor to OSC

E answ

ered by explor-ing the possibility of a dem

and for territorial autonomy. H

e describedthe territorial distribution of the R

omani population. T

here are regionsw

ith a high proportion of Rom

a (such as in Bulgaria’s M

ontana region,w

here Rom

a make up nearly 15%

; Varna, w

here they comprise 10-

15%; and E

astern Slovakia, where they are nearly 20%

), and there arelocalities w

here Rom

a make up 100%

of the population. There are big

Rom

ani quarters, “mahalas” or ghettos, in m

any cities in the CC

Eregion. T

hey contain as many as several thousand to sixty thousand

people, such as in the Suto Orizari quarter of Skopje in M

acedonia,w

here the majority is seriously concerned about a steadily grow

ingR

omani population.

Decentralization, regionalization, and local self-governm

ent – these arethe European U

nion’s promoted policies, continued the speaker. H

owcan R

oma use these policies? C

an Rom

ani leaders work out a project

whereby R

oma in regions or m

unicipalities with high densities can attain

administrative-territorial autonom

y? If such an option were to be real-

ized, Rom

a would be in a new

position to resume the quest for self-deter-

mination. Precedents are already in place, including in the Suto O

rizariquarter of Skopje. R

omani self-adm

inistered territorial units must be

established in accordance with state rules and law

s, said the speaker.

Such units can be tied into a network, he continued, and elected

Rom

ani mayors and council m

embers could com

e together once a yearto w

ork on comm

on strategies and policies. In this way, the R

oma

would gradually create a territorial structure that fulfills the right of self-

determination through attainm

ent of cultural autonomy. T

he network

should also include regions or municipalities of W

estern Europe that

have high-density Rom

ani populations.

For other participants, however, this vision is threatening. A

s one speak-er observed, R

omani leaders m

aking territorial claims w

ould be seen ascalling for a revolution. W

hen the question is territories, Gadje are

ready to strike against any such demand. E

ncouraging Rom

a to go inthis direction, another participant w

arned, would be very risky in that

this is a particularly sensitive issue for countries in which their ow

npolitical self-determ

ination is under threat, such as in many new

statesof the B

alkan region.

2524

Similar w

orries but from a different perspective w

ere expressed byanother speaker. R

oma use the R

omani w

ord “nacija,” translated intoE

nglish as “nation.” She questioned whether that is the best choice in

English. H

aving participated in many gatherings in E

urope, she learnedthat for m

ainstream politicians the m

ost terrifying mom

ent comes w

henR

oma start to talk about “nation” and “self-determ

ination.” Rom

a shouldfind a m

ore acceptable way to press this claim

at the highest politicallevel, perhaps turning to the w

ord “people” as a more suitable transla-

tion, also because of its connotation of “indigenous people.”

The A

dvisor on Rom

a and Sinti Issues at OSC

E pointed out that the

debate on Rom

a self-determination started in the PE

R-sponsored K

rakowm

eeting, prompted by the exchange betw

een the IRU

President and some

Rom

ani leaders in attendance. The IR

U President argued that the IR

UD

eclaration was rooted in historical precedent. Som

e leaders objected,claim

ing that there were sufficient grounds for such a declaration in pre-

sent-day international documents, including the U

N C

harter. 35

He w

arned that Rom

a must pay attention to w

hat is in the minds of

mainstream

politicians. Gadje m

ay understand that Rom

a seek a terri-tory or a state since they no longer w

ish to be identified as, say, Czech

Rom

a or Rom

anian Rom

a but merely as “the R

oma.” H

e thereforeintroduced a distinction betw

een a “political” nation and a “cultural”nation, stressing that the R

omani leadership m

ust clarify whether they

intend the former or the latter. A

iming at political nationhood im

plies,according to him

and in line with G

adje reasoning, seeking politicalpow

er in the form of governm

ent, territory, borders, and passports. The

Rom

ani leadership must be very careful to assess the interpretations and

implications of w

hat they claim, especially if w

hat they seek is actually“cultural” self-determ

ination.

For some participants, how

ever, the challenge posed by the IRU

Decla-

ration is in essence a political one. Clearly rejecting territorial statehood,

the IRU

foresaw a chance to establish a non-traditional form

of nation-al existence in the idea of a non-territorial or extra-territorial nation. A

sthe IR

U representative explained it, although today’s situation is obvi-

ously different from the period of the first half of the nineteenth centu-

ry when m

any new territorially-based nations w

ere formed, there is still

inspiration in these analogies.

Now

, as then, the world system

is changing. While ideals of dem

ocracyare gaining ground, today they are m

ore likely to appear in the context

For most leaders, the secession option is m

ore a political tactic than areal objective. In 1991, for exam

ple, a Rom

ani mem

ber of the Mace-

donian Parliament m

ade a statement dem

anding recognition of Rom

aas a nation and w

arning that Rom

a may attem

pt to form their ow

n statew

ithin Macedonia (“R

omanistan”). A

s the RN

C representative rem

em-

bered it, this MP faced harsh criticism

from all sides. Later, A

lbaniansm

ade a similar dem

and for recognition as a second constituent nation,and they succeeded. M

acedonians are now afraid of losing their ow

nstate, he concluded.

At the O

ctober 2000 PER

meeting on R

oma in Skopje, a m

ajor Albanian

leader argued that Rom

a are an ethnographic/historical minority and

should remain focused on culture. H

owever, R

oma dem

ands were

different. Seeking to become political actors, they requested self-deter-

mination. T

he Rom

ani nationality is now recognized in the M

acedonianconstitution, but only on paper and not in reality. H

e concluded thatR

oma either do not see w

hat they should do at this point regarding anyfuture claim

s or are afraid to make such claim

s. They seem

to have afear of defending them

selves and their way of life, but that is essentially

what self-determ

ination is all about.

For some participants, the exam

ples of other nations’ rise to self-deter-m

ination, either in the nineteenth century or today, are instructive. Forothers, how

ever, those examples w

ere irrelevant as models for R

oma.

The m

ain argument here is that other nations’ self-determ

ination was

driven by territorial quests, and that Rom

a neither seek territory nor arelikely to be granted it. Several participants w

arned the Rom

ani leader-ship against going in this direction. 33

As one speaker pointed out, the question of national self-determ

inationis essentially about pow

er. Some R

omani leaders seek pow

er, which

would inevitably lead to conflict w

ith the existing state. He posed a per-

tinent question: Do R

oma really believe that G

adje will share their

power w

ith them? W

hat power-holders have ever shared it w

ith thosew

ho are powerless?

In the last ten years, the Rom

ani issue became a subject of large-scale

politics and attracted the involvement of pow

erful governments. B

utw

hat actually happened in this same period to the R

oma in E

urope?W

hile the Rom

ani leadership was advocating integration policies, on

the ground the Rom

a increasingly faced advancing segregation. While

the Rom

ani leadership discusses national self-determination, the m

ainconcern of R

oma in localities is m

ere survival. 34

27

hide their Rom

a identity or manifest it publicly? D

o they opt for inte-gration and assim

ilation or for cultural autonomy? D

o they want for

their children integrated classrooms or separation in education? In his

view, the present-day reality and the unfavorable overall context of their

lives provide little evidence that Rom

a are making coherent choices.

The

prime task of the elite and R

omani organizations should therefore be to

motivate R

oma to acknow

ledge their Rom

ani identity as the initial stepon the road to R

oma self-determ

ination.

For yet another participant, it is the Rom

ani leadership’s task andrespon-

sibility to clarify what exactly R

oma seek, even though the elite w

ill beheld responsible and w

ill be judged by the masses for w

hatever is asked,declared, or claim

ed in their name.

The A

dvisor on Rom

a and Sinti Issues at the OSC

E pointed out that in

many countries, governm

ental programs or national strategies for R

oma

already exist and are being implem

ented in cooperation with R

oma.

But for m

any Rom

ani leaders, these programs represent m

ore the inter-ests of the state than of the R

oma. H

e now proposes a rew

rite of governm

ental strategies, such as the Rom

anian one, from the point of

view of R

omani self-determ

ination and genuine Rom

ani interest. What

would be the new

scenario and the new m

essage?

Despite all these w

orries and warnings, there w

as consensus among the

participants that Rom

ani national self-determination is a reality. T

hem

ain objective of the Rom

a’s claim has been to obtain R

omani nation-

al existence and to have its voice officially acknowledged, w

ith structuresset up for equal R

omani political participation, nationally and interna-

tionally. The R

oma do not need a territory of their ow

n in order toclaim

this right. Once this recognition is established, there is hope that

the Gadje perspective on R

oma w

ill change along with the law

s. Rom

ahave to m

ake it clear that they want neither territory nor a state, but

participation in Europe’s international institutions.

As m

any speakers stressed, there are also pragmatic reasons for seeking

Rom

ani nationhood. It provides Rom

a with a stronger position, giving

them confidence w

hile also leading to better self-organization. For them

ajority of participants, however, it is the Finnish initiative that repre-

sents the most significant step forw

ard for such recognition.

26

of multicultural societies. T

he decreasing role of the state and the for-m

ation of multinational structures such as the E

uropean Union m

akethe IR

U claim

an increasingly plausible reality, said a participant. 36

Several participants pointed to a gap between the level of discourse on the

part of the Rom

ani elites and that of the Rom

ani masses. T

hey argue thatit is the elite’s task to translate abstract notions such as nation or self-deter-m

ination into a message that can be clearly understood by the m

asses.W

hile the gap may not be elim

inated overnight, it can be greatly reducedby the use of language that is both specific and practical.

As one speaker noted, it m

ay be truethat elites can m

ake nations, andthose gathered at this m

eeting arem

embers of the elite. M

oreover, theprocess

of R

omani

national self-

determination has already begun and

some R

omani leaders are m

ore orless aw

are of that process, and some

Rom

ani comm

unities are in differ-ent stages of it. T

his speaker notedthat throughout the last decade ofR

omani discourse, all the efforts of

this elite have been directed toward

the national governments and inter-

national organizations rather than toward the R

omani com

munity.W

hilethe elite have forw

arded demands and requests for governm

ents andinternational institutions to change their policies tow

ard the Rom

a, theyhave failed to develop a political credo for R

oma and R

omani N

GO

sthat w

ill link elite discourse with the daily activities of R

omani activists.

When this m

eeting is over, she will go back to her projects irregardless

of what has been debated or concluded here, and projects w

ill move

forward in all directions w

ith little coordination. She would greatly

prefer to have consistent guidelines and an agreed-upon platform that

would answ

er practical questions and govern activists’ projects.

Similarly, another participant asked about indicators that w

ould demon-

strate that Rom

a are undergoing a process of self-determination. A

nansw

er to this question should include not only claims to that effect, but

also evidence of the choices the Rom

a make on practical issues: D

o they

The m

ain obje

ctive

of the

Rom

a’s claim has

been to

obtain R

om

aninatio

nal existe

nce and to

have its vo

ice o

fficiallyackno

wle

dged, w

ith stru

cture

s set u

p for

equ

al Rom

ani political

participation, natio

nallyand inte

rnationally.

29

culties, since in Europe there are as m

any as 2,500 Rom

ani organiza-tions, few

of which are w

ell-structured.

The so-called “H

elsinki Agreem

ent” endorsed by the RN

C presents a

different scenario. The building blocks of the future R

omani represen-

tative body would be provided by five categories of R

omani organiza-

tions: 1) international and experts’ organizations active at the nationaland international level, such as the IR

U; 2) international and experts’

organizations active at the grassroots, regional, and international levels,such as the R

NC

; 3) Rom

ani religious organizations like GAT

IEF; 40

4)R

omani political organizations or parties active at national level; and 5)

independent national Rom

ani organizations or umbrellas of such orga-

nizations that are not part of the IRU

, RN

C, or R

omani parties active

in specific areas such as human rights, education, youth, culture, etc. 41

Each category of organizations w

ould choose its own representatives

through elections, with full respect for transparency of the process and

gender balance. The total num

ber of Rom

ani representatives to this bodyhas been set at 150. T

he building blocks are comparable to parliam

entaryparties and the European R

oma Forum

can be compared to a parliam

ent.T

he proposal also includes the establishment of a board or executive com

-m

ittee (up to 9 persons) and an advisory group of experts selected by theboard. T

he entire structure would be served by a sm

all secretariat.

In the view of the R

NC

representative, there has not previously beenlegitim

ate representation of Rom

a in most of the states. W

here suchrepresentation does exist, as in H

ungary, it was established as “top-

down,” or state-sponsored, and not reflective of self-determ

ination. The

RN

C scenario, he said, attem

pts to restructure the new body aw

ay fromdivisions of R

omani com

munities across borders to reflect instead the

transnational and European nature of the R

oma.

The Finnish R

omani preventative presented an alternative view

of thecom

position of the European R

oma Forum

. He cited the differences

among various R

omani com

munities in E

urope regarding their positionin different countries, the levels of dem

ocratization and self-organizationof R

oma in W

estern and Eastern Europe, and how

they experience theirow

n identity. These differences have to be taken into consideration, she

said, and a comprom

ise solution that would satisfy those various com

-m

unities must be reached so that all could choose their ow

n representa-tives to this body. 42

28

THE

FIN

NIS

H P

RE

SID

EN

T’S IN

ITIATIV

E A

ND

RO

MA

NA

TION

AL

SE

LF

-DE

TER

MIN

ATIO

N

The Finnish participant and the R

NC

representative introduced theFinnish initiative. 37

The first speaker em

phasized that Finnish PresidentTarja H

alonen formerly chaired the R

oma A

dvisory Board of Finland

and is therefore well inform

ed on Rom

ani issues. She knows that every-

where R

oma are politically m

arginalized and powerless. H

er idea was to

create a special arrangement that w

ould provide Rom

a with effective

participation in public life at various levels, and not only as NG

Os. H

erinitiative aim

ed at securing for the Rom

a a place within the decision-

making process at the level of international organizations, from

which

they are presently excluded. Thus w

as born her idea to establish a con-sultative assem

bly for Rom

a at the European level.

Such a body would have an official m

andate, work w

ith all internation-al institutions, and provide R

oma w

ith a voice in addressing all issuesrelated to them

. While there are currently plenty of international doc-

uments addressing R

omani concerns, the R

oma have no institutional

instruments at hand to use them

effectively. The R

omani leadership

approved this initiative and agreed to set up an exploratory group to work

out the details at a seminar held in the Finnish Parliam

ent on October 21-

22, 2001. After several m

eetings of this group, 38an initial agreem

ent was

reached on the composition of the future pan-European body in H

elsinki– the so-called H

elsinki Agreem

ent of March 11-12, 2002.

The R

NC

representative presented a non-paper that was w

orked out bythe Finnish side and explained to the R

oma at the M

arch meeting in

Helsinki. 39

The m

ain topic of this document is a proposal on how

toset up this R

omani body. T

his speaker stressed that the proposal reflectsthe state’s view

. From each country there w

ill be elected a certain num-

ber of Rom

ani representatives; countries with a larger R

omani com

mu-

nity would be entitled to m

ore seats. For example, the R

omani com

-m

unity in Rom

ania would have five seats, w

hereas the comm

unity inPoland w

ould have only two.

He called this proposal interesting but not realistic. Since the process of

democratization in R

omani com

munities and organizations is rudim

en-tary or non-existent, there are no conditions for carrying out such elec-tions in a fully dem

ocratic manner. T

herefore, following this request

would only lead to chaos and endless conflict betw

een Rom

a and theirorganizations. Sim

ilarly, organizing conventions would run into diffi-

31

the above-mentioned categories of R

omani representatives to the

meetings of the exploratory group and, on the other hand, encourag-

ing their participation in gatherings of the international Rom

aniorganizations.

As one of the participants noted, history itself altered the R

omani

discourse. What the R

omani leadership had sought in vain for a decade

was suddenly offered to them

by the state, the side usually seen as againstthem

. The R

omani leadership itself should have addressed R

omani self-

determination and representation m

uch earlier. But this is just the begin-

ning of the “success story.” 45

For the majority of the participants, President H

alonen’s initiativem

arks a new beginning, opening the door for R

oma’s inclusion into

European institutions and providing an opportunity to raise R

oma’s

self-determination at the E

uropean level. In the absence of a Rom

aniorganization w

ith a mandate to speak in the nam

e of all Rom

a at theinternational level, the Finnish initiative offers both a representativebody and an official m

andate. This is a realization of the quest for

Rom

ani self-determination. 46

Several speakers praised the Finnish authorities for the idea, which

had been raised for a decade by some R

omani leaders and presented

at the highest European levels. A

s one of the participants emphasized,

such a proposal presented by Rom

ani activists got no attention. But

when it cam

e from the President of a country, it w

as a different storyaltogether. T

he Rom

a should not forget, however, that this initiative

might as w

ell be named “M

iranda’s” (Vuolasranta from

Finland) ini-tiative, since she contributed m

uch to sensitize President Halonen on

Rom

ani issues at the time w

hen Ms. H

alonen chaired Finland’s Rom

aA

dvisory Board.

CO

NC

LU

SIO

NS

The Jadw

isin meeting is the second in a series of PE

R-sponsored round-

tables, along with the K

rakow m

eeting of 2001, called the Rom

aniPolitical R

eflection Forum. Its form

ula – encouraging discussion that isopen and self-reflective, w

ell-focused, and touching upon difficult andchallenging questions – has proven to be successful. T

he fact that many

participants came w

ith written statem

ents or papers provides some m

ea-sure of their involvem

ent in the subject matter.

30

According to this speaker, a “national R

omani representation” already

exists in the form of various consultative or advisory bodies. R

omani

representatives to these bodies, who are officially recognized and cur-

rently cooperate with governm

ents, cannot be ignored or left out of thestructure. She called special attention to the fact that the decision toestablish the E

uropean Rom

a Forum depends on the governm

ents’com

mitm

ent to it, and securing that is also Rom

a’s responsibility.

Similarly, another participant pointed out that E

U policy calls for

Rom

ani national organizations working as partners w

ith governments.

It requires that progress toward dem

ocratization be accompanied by

increasing roles for those organizations at the level of nation-states,rather than a few

international Rom

ani organizations active at theE

uropean level. Unfortunately, in m

any countries these organizationshave no inform

ation on the Finnish initiative and are therefore not partof the process.

Yet a different scenario for this body was elaborated by the A

dvisor onR

oma and Sinti Issues at the O

SCE

. Based on his overview

of Rom

aniorganizations in E

urope, 43he suggested a com

promise solution com

-bining delegations by consensus and election procedures. A

ccording tohim

, the Rom

anian representatives and NG

Os expressed their readiness

to carry out such exercises of both, working out a m

echanism for dele-

gation by consensus and also holding model elections am

ong the Rom

aat m

unicipal or district levels. If successful, they may provide suitable

models for use at the national and international levels in setting up the

European R

oma Forum

. 44

In his view, this debate should be extended to local/national settings.

The question of how

to establish legitimate representation to this body

from a country like R

omania, w

here the Rom

ani comm

unity accountsfor m

ore than a million people, is a serious and challenging question.

He called for extending consultations w

ithin Rom

ani comm

unities,stressing that a voice m

ust be given also to those who are considered by

some leaders to be “bought,” i.e., those w

ho are state appointees or work

in state administrations. For now

, the representatives of the RN

C and

IRU

have successfully influenced the debate, but the participation of theR

omani M

Ps and Rom

ani representatives and/or officers serving atstate and local adm

inistration levels has been rather limited. T

hiscontributes to the m

isreading of the Finnish initiative among the

Rom

ani comm

unities in many states. H

e suggested inviting more of

32

The debate in Jadw

isin revealed the following:

■T

here was further consolidation of the assertion shared by m

ost par-ticipants that R

oma are a nation. R

ealization of the Finnish pro-posal has contributed to this notion in a significant w

ay. The

Halonen initiative em

erged at just the right time, com

ing right afterthe IR

U D

eclaration of Nationhood and during the period w

henthe R

omani leadership attem

pted seriously to debate the issue ofR

omani representation at the international level (K

rakow m

eeting).

■T

he EU

enlargement factor contributed to it as w

ell. The R

omani

leadership had been concerned about how the R

omani population

would be part of the integration processes that are currently under

deliberation in Europe. T

he debate proved that the Rom

a havehopes of realizing a vision of a E

urope consisting of nations orregions, am

ong which the R

oma w

ill be recognized and granted sta-tus sim

ilar to that of other nations.

■O

nly a few participants objected to these strong statem

ents. In theview

of those few, the R

oma are a m

inority and not a nation. Forthem

, assertions of nationhood are utopian and unrealistic.

■Tw

o opposing positions toward a R

oma nation w

ere identified. The

“universalistic and voluntaristic” position perceives the Rom

a nationas diverse and does not seek to forge a unitary nationhood. It m

aybe joined by any group that claim

to be Rom

ani, for they are heldtogether by the com

mon experience of anti-G

ypsy sentiment. T

he“inclusive and particularistic” position focuses on culture and seeksto develop a codified language alongside renew

ed emphasis on

shared traditions

and values.

Favoring

a global

definition of

Rom

ani identity, it is against internal fragmentation and recogni-

tion of separate ethnic groups among R

oma. Proponents of this

view place a higher em

phasis on unifying the culture than on fight-ing anti-G

ypsyism.

■T

he question of the Rom

a as a nation has been central to the debate onR

omani self-determ

ination. Not surprisingly, the m

ajority of the partic-ipants perceived R

oma’s claim

s to self-determination as legitim

ate andvalid, w

hether or not they are based on a foundation of nationhood.

■R

omani participants perceived the concept of self-determ

ination asranging from

an individual or basic human right, through a group

or minority right, to the right of a people or nation. U

ltimately,

despite these different positions, most of them

embraced the con-

cept as relevant to their current efforts and a promising guide to

33

Rom

ani political mobilization in the future.

■T

he main difference em

erged between those w

ho maintain that the

self-determination principle is the right of m

inorities and those who

consider it the right of a people or a nation. For the adherents ofthe form

er position, the ultimate realization of this right is the

achievement of cultural autonom

y within a nation-state. T

hroughit, the prospect of territorial autonom

y or self-governance in munic-

ipal or even regional levels has also been explored. In the case of thelatter position, achieving a new

status as a nation in Europe has been

the ultimate aim

. For the majority of the participants, how

ever, theoption of secession or seeking a state has been deem

ed untenableand unrealistic.

■Irrespective of how

the participants viewed the concept of self-deter-

mination, they all see it as a question of R

omani participation in the

larger society. There is consensus am

ong them that attaining som

eform

of cultural autonomy w

ill assert their right to self-determina-

tion as defined by equal participation. For many participants, the

example of the H

ungarian Rom

a is a distorted version of culturalautonom

y and not a positive model.

■T

he case of the Hungarian R

oma and the criticism

of it are symp-

tomatic of a larger dilem

ma for the R

omani leadership: how

best toseek integration and participation of R

oma in the larger society?

Should Rom

a opt for civic or ethnic ways of participation? For the

time being, the R

omani leadership has no clear position on this and

efforts to provide answers usually fall apart.

■E

xploring the possibility of attaining territorial autonomy, som

eparticipants turned to the E

U policy and prom

oted the concepts ofdecentralization, regionalization, and local self-governance. T

hey seeit as a chance for full em

ancipation and as a way to stop the state-

sponsored treatment of R

oma as objects of charity or paternalism

.O

thers, however, objected to it as too risky an option. A

proposalto design R

omani territorial/adm

inistrative units was m

ade.

■R

omani national self-determ

ination is viewed in one of tw

o ways:

as an effort for emancipation by a nation, or as recognition of a new

political status for a Rom

a nation in Europe. In fact, how

ever, bothm

eanings were intertw

ined. The difference betw

een them lies in the

emphasis som

e participants are prepared to place on emancipation

efforts as opposed to achieving some degree of self-organization or

political representation. For some participants, therefore, the IR

U

35

should also lead to a more accurate understanding of the Finnish

initiative among R

omani com

munities.

■T

hroughout the

meeting,

it w

as evident

that the

so-called“E

uropean” or “transnational” approach to the Rom

ani issue hasfostered claim

s to national self-determination. T

he Rom

ani leader-ship seem

s to interpret the recomm

endations and initiatives of theinternational organizations as validating these claim

s.

■PE

R plans a follow

-up to the Jadwisin roundtable debate in w

hichthese conclusions w

ill be shared and discussed with non-R

omani

politicians, lawm

akers, and experts. Such a meeting w

ill attempt to

clarify the content of Rom

ani claims, their direction, political feasi-

bility and legitimacy, along w

ith those of the international organi-zations and w

ith some governm

ent views on the situation of the

Rom

a in Europe.

34

Declaration of N

ationhood has marked a new

and historical open-ing to em

ancipation. For others, it is the Finnish initiative that bestencourages R

omani efforts at self-organization or the establishm

entof legitim

ate representation.

■T

he historical association of national self-determination w

ith terri-torial claim

s has prompted participants to m

ake use of other con-cepts such as “people” or “indigenous people.” T

hese concepts aredeem

ed more suitable, especially in light of positive exam

ples ofachievem

ents attained by indigenous peoples seeking recognition oftheir rights and status at international and national levels.

■Several participants cited the existing gap betw

een the discourselevel of R

omani elites and that of R

omani m

asses, and urged theelite to express abstract ideas in m

ore concrete terms. A

search forevidence of a desire for self-determ

ination among the m

asses shouldinclude analysis of the everyday choices R

oma m

ake on practicalissues that are related to their identity.

■T

here w

as overall

consensus am

ong participants

that R

omani

national self-determination is a reality. T

he main objective of the

Rom

a’s claim has been national and international acknow

ledgement

of the existence of the Rom

a nation and voice, along with structures

for equal political participation by Rom

a. Territory is not a prereq-uisite.

■W

hile most agreed that the Finnish initiative represents a significant

step toward recognition, the content of the Finnish initiative – com

-position and w

ays of setting up the body representing Rom

a inE

urope – has been most contentious. T

he debate has been illustra-tive of the ongoing pow

er struggle between R

omani “international-

ists,” as represented by two organizations, the R

NC

and IRU

, and“nationals,” activists representing a variety of national/local R

omani

organizations. According to the “nationals,” the “internationalist”

scenario for setting up this body diminishes the role of existing

Rom

ani representation at the country level and privileges the two

international organizations.

■C

alls have been made to launch a large-scale consultation on m

ech-anism

s for delegating and electing representatives to this body. The

input of the RN

C and IR

U representatives needs to be m

atched byparticipation from

the Rom

ani MPs and R

omani representatives

and/or officers serving at state and local administration. T

his

37

as “states” (UN

Charter, C

hapter II, Mem

bership, Articles 3, 4 and 5).

International law presum

es the existence of states, which are already

constituted and recognized. Criteria for statehood, according to the

Convention on the R

ights and Duties of States (1933), are: a) perm

a-nent population; b) defined territory; c) governm

ent; and d) capacity toenter into relations w

ith other states. The “perm

anent population” asused here is identical w

ith the “nation.” Nationality refers therefore to

the country or state of which a person is a citizen. T

he permanent pop-

ulation of the state makes up a “national society.” From

the perspectiveof international law

, it is less relevant how “national society” is com

-posed from

within (dom

inant majority and various m

inorities). 50

The U

N docum

ents make specific references w

ith regard to applying theprinciple of self-determ

ination to the categories of non-self-governing ter-ritories and indigenous people. In the case of the form

er the UN

Charter

envisaged, through the principle of self-determination, that all territories in

subordinate position as mandates, trusteeships, or colonies w

ould eventu-ally becom

e sovereign (states) or part of existing sovereign states on thebasis of internal equality (self-governance) (A

rticles 73 and 74 of the UN

Charter). In the context of de-colonization, the principle of territorial

integrity took primacy over “ethnic” self-determ

ination claims. T

he terri-torial boundaries of political units w

ere identical with pre-independence

administrative boundaries, in conform

ity with the principle of uti posside-

tis juris, and the “people” of non-self-governing territories were considered

to comprise the total population of the territories. 51

The V

ienna Declaration, w

hile endorsing and recognizing “the right ofpeople to take any legitim

ate action, in accordance with the C

harter ofU

nited Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-determ

ina-tion…

” (Art. 2, Para. 2), did exclude the use of the right to self-deter-

mination as a basis for secession, as stated in A

rticle 2, Para. 3 (‘this shallnot be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action w

hich would

dismem

ber or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or polit-

ical unity of sovereign and independent states…’).

The notion of “indigenous people,” on the other hand, has an ethnic

rather than a territorial connotation. They are som

etimes nam

ed the“First N

ations” or “dependent nations,” and usually are part of existingsovereign and independent states. C

ontroversy over recognizing theirright to self-determ

ination within the U

N system

relates to qualified orunqualified rights under international law

. In the case of the unquali-

36

AP

PE

ND

IX A

The P

rinciple of Self-Determ

ination: The U

N Perspective

Andrzej M

irga

Project on Ethnic R

elations, Princeton, N.J.

This D

iscussion Paper was distributed to the participants prior to the m

eeting.

The U

N C

harter reference to the principle of self-determination

appears in Chapter I, A

rticle 2, which states: “To develop friendly rela-

tions among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights

and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate m

ea-sures to strengthen universal peace.”

The

UN

C

harter notion

of self-determ

ination draw

s on

PresidentW

oodrow W

ilson’s Fourteen Points as delivered in his speech on January8, 1918, and in particular on his rem

ark: “It is that the world be m

ade fitand safe to live in; and particularly that it be m

ade safe for every peace-loving nation w

hich, like our own, w

ishes to live its own life, determ

ineits ow

n institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by other peo-ples of the w

orld as against force and selfish aggression. All the people

of the world are in effect partners in this interest…

” And further: “A

nevident principle runs through the w

hole program I have outlined. It is

the principle of justice to all people and nationalities, and their right tolive on equal term

s of liberty and safety with one another, w

hether theybe strong or w

eak.” 47

The principle of self-determ

ination was endorsed in tw

o UN

Covenants

on Hum

an Rights adopted in 1966. 48

Article N

o.1 in both Covenants

states: “All people have the right of self-determ

ination. By virtue of that

right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their

economic, social and cultural developm

ent.” It was later restated in the

Vienna D

eclaration’s Article N

o. 2. 49T

his principle is best understoodin the context of other principles that form

the UN

normative basis of

international law, that is, the principle of territorial integrity of states (it

has primacy), of sovereign equality of states, and of non-intervention in

internal affairs of other states (except ‘humanitarian’ interventions based

on resolutions of the Security Council).

More im

portantly however, the U

N norm

ative system uses the concept

of a “nation” or a “people” that is “political,” “voluntarist,” and “territo-rial” (dem

os), as opposed to culturally defined or “ethnic” (ethnos). The

subjects of international law are “nations” or “peoples,” but understood

39

republics in accordance with the principle of uti possidetisjuris,

that is, the new borders of political units m

ust be those thatpreviously existed as the borders of republics of an union or fed-erative state.

In general, there is little support if any under international law for self-

determination claim

s of separate ethnic, linguistic or religious groups exist-ing w

ithin sovereign and independent states. The right to secession is not

a right under international law, and such claim

s are usually consideredinvalid. T

his is also the case when ethnic groups call them

selves “nations”or “people” or som

ething else and claim the right to self-determ

ination.

Still, as some scholars assert, one m

ajor confusion about the principle ofself-determ

ination is that while it w

as based on the Western concept of

political nationhood, in other parts of the world and in C

entral andE

astern Europe it w

as often interpreted as the right of culturally definednations to have their ow

n states (see the case of Czechoslovakian

Constitutions since 1920 to 1992 and use of the self-determ

inationprinciple). In fact, the U

N docum

ents do not operate with the concept

of “national self-determination” but w

ith the notion of “equal rights andself-determ

ination of people,” whereas those w

ho invoke this principleusually fram

e it as “national self-determination,” i.e., nation-states or

independence movem

ents. 54

Many observers or independent scholars perceive that the principle of

self-determination, prom

oted by the UN

Charter’s A

rticles 55 and 56,obligates the international com

munity to enforce it above other princi-

ples such as the sanctity of existing borders. They are critical of efforts

to bridge the gap between these tw

o principles with com

promise solu-

tions such as “limited autonom

y,” as in the case of Kosovo. Som

e evenconsider the principle of self-determ

ination, if realized as “nationalself-determ

ination,” to be basically anti-democratic and inevitably

leading to military or bureaucratic “ethnic cleansing” of non-nationals

or ethnic minorities. 55

Since the UN

system operates w

ith the concept of “national society” or“nation” as “dem

os” as opposed to “ethnos,” the national society there-fore com

prises the population as a whole, that is, all groups and seg-

ments, including m

inorities. The principle of self-determ

ination in thecase of independent states m

eans popular sovereignty that is essentiallydem

ocracy or democratic governance. In the norm

ative system of the

UN

, no reference is made to the principle of self-determ

ination regard-

38

fied right to self-determination, each indigenous group should be rec-

ognized as a “people” that ultimately can claim

the right to be an inde-pendent state. In essence, w

ithin the UN

system, the indigenous peo-

ple have a right to “internal self-determination,” that is, lim

ited auton-om

y on

ethnic grounds

within

existing sovereign

states (see

theInternational Labor O

rganization Convention N

o. 169,1989 concern-ing Indigenous and Tribal People; draft D

eclaration on the Rights of

Indigenous People; Vienna D

eclaration, Article 20; also the position of

the U.S. on indigenous people). 52

The U

N principle of self-determ

ination, as stated in its documents, has

been often criticized for being poorly defined. 53It has been interpreted

in various ways and used to m

ean different things for different people.T

he claim is often m

ade that it does not adequately address such ques-tions as: W

ho are the people and what do the people have a right to?

It might m

ean popular sovereignty, that is, the right of people to choosetheir governm

ent (internal democracy), freedom

from external inter-

vention, or the right of people to have the state of their own. O

n theother hand, “the people” itself m

ight mean nations or states, ethnic

groups as in the case of indigenous people, the entire population ofspecified territories, etc. W

hile this criticism m

ight be true, UN

prac-tice provides som

e clarification.

Regarding w

ho has the right to self-determination and w

hat this right isabout, U

N practice proves the follow

ing:

A)

Populations as a whole or nations (people) of existing states

have a right to an effective democratic system

of governance inw

hich all parts of population participate; they also have a rightto continue to rem

ain independent (not to be subjected to alienrule);

B)

Populations of non-self-governing or occupied territories havea right to self-determ

ination, that is, to freely determine their

political status. Beneficiary of this right is the population of the

territory as a whole. It gives no right to a separate part of pop-

ulation to break out of the territory, that is, to secede;

C)

Indigenous peoples have a right to internal self-determination

and limited autonom

y within existing sovereign states;

D)

In the case of dissolution of larger union republics or federa-tions, the right of self-determ

ination is applied to mem

ber

41

By virtue of that right, they m

ay negotiate their political status within

the framew

ork of existing nation-states and are free to pursue their eco-nom

ic, social, and cultural development. Indigenous people, in exer-

cising their right of internal self-determination, have the internal right

to autonomy or self-governm

ent in matters relating to their local affairs,

including of mem

bership, culture, language, religion, education, infor-m

ation, media, health, housing, em

ployment, social w

elfare, mainte-

nance of comm

unity safety, family relations, econom

ic activities, landsand resources m

anagement, environm

ent and entry by non-mem

bers, asw

ell as ways and m

eans for financing these autonomous functions.” 56

The concept of self-determ

ination, its meaning and application, has

evolved over time. It is therefore not surprising that new

ideas haveem

erged outside the UN

system. A

number of institutions and organi-

zations are exploring this principle with intent to enlarge its application.

Most of these efforts focus on elaborating international standards to pro-

vide this right also to “unrepresented nations or peoples,” “internalnations,” or even m

inorities. Advocates of those groups struggle for a

“qualified recognition of a right to internal self-determination” that is for

some a form

of self-governance or autonomy w

ithin sovereign states. 57

How

ever, sometim

es autonomy is provided w

ithin the framew

ork ofm

inority rights, without reference to the self-determ

ination principle.

AP

PE

ND

IX B

Authors and titles of papers or statem

ents prepared for theJadw

isin meeting:

Dragoljub A

ckovic, Birth of Roma N

ationN

icoleta Bitu, An Inventory of C

rucial PointsN

adia Dem

eter, Untitled paper

Nicolae G

heorghe, The Stage of the D

ebates on the Proposal for Setting up aRom

a Representative Body at Pan-European Level (the Halonen Initiative)

Ciprian N

ecula, The Legitim

acy of the Roma Representation. T

he Nation and

the Self-Determ

ination of Roma People

Bela Lakatos, U

ntitled paperStanislaw

Stankiewicz, Europako Forum

Romano (Propozycja ke C

E)Ivan V

esely, Contribution to D

iscussion on Roma Em

ancipation

40

ing minorities w

ithin the state. International human rights instrum

entsof the U

N, how

ever, (Universal D

eclaration, Covenant on C

ivil andPolitical R

ights, Declaration on the R

ights of Persons Belonging to

National or E

thnic, Religious or Linguistic M

inorities and others),assert a set of tasks and obligation to the state, and on other hand, a setof rights to m

embers of m

inorities that aim at appropriate accom

moda-

tion of minorities w

ithin the “national society.”

The state is obliged to protect m

inorities within its territory and provide

conditions for

continuation and

development

of their

identities.Providing m

inorities with organizational, legal, and adm

inistrative struc-tures that w

ould guarantee full and equal participation in the social andpolitical life of a national society is a crucial but difficult task. T

he major-

ity feels the threat of the alleged minority’s inclination to secede, and on

the other hand, the minority feels the burden of second-class citizenship.

This m

akes finding a proper balance between the state’s integrity and

social cohesion and the demands of m

inorities even more difficult.

Nor does international law

provide normative solutions to the question

of how to accom

modate m

inorities within sovereign and independent

states. Here one can explore various existing arrangem

ents or goodpractices developed in som

e countries such as a consociational democ-

racy or executive power-sharing and self-adm

inistration for each major

national or ethnic group, or territorial sub-division or various forms of

minority local self-governm

ent. Those form

s can include federalism,

autonomy (territorial), regional and m

unicipal local government and

other (cultural autonomy). M

ost of these forms im

ply decentralizationand devolution of state pow

er.

In the most general sense, the right of self-determ

ination means the pow

erof nations or people to determ

ine their own international status, that is,

to become a state. E

xisting states and nations or peoples hold this right.W

ith the exception of the post-colonial territories and recently of indige-nous people, various sub-state groups do not posses that right but onlyclaim

it. Ultim

ately, however, those groups w

ho claim a legitim

acy (his-torical or otherw

ise) and are determined to secede through m

ilitary or vio-lent m

eans might succeed in establishing new

states.

Within the U

N system

, more states are ready to support so-called

“internal self-determination” in relation to indigenous people. T

heposition of the U

.S. National Security C

ouncil in this regard is as fol-low

s: “Indigenous people have a right of internal self-determination.

43

for comm

ents. Most participants of the Jadw

isin meeting received this docum

entprior to the m

eeting.

19A

. Mirga, Rom

a and the Question of Self-determ

ination: Fiction and Reality, a discussionpaper prepared for the Jadw

isin meeting, A

pril 15-16, 2002, PER

, Princeton, N.J.

20A

. Mirga, T

he Principle of Self-Determ

ination: The U

N Perspective, a discussion

paper prepared for the Jadwisin m

eeting, April 15-16, 2002, PE

R, Princeton, N

.J.

21T

he consultations started with a sem

inar “Rom

a Participation in Europe” organized

by the Finns and held in the Finnish Parliament on O

ctober 22, 2001. Since then,a num

ber of meetings have been organized by the Finnish authorities w

ith the sup-port of the C

ouncil of Europe. T

he consultations will end in Septem

ber of this year.

22B

. Haliti, Exodus of the R

omany from

the Original H

omeland, Establishing Tasks and

Contacts w

ith the Mother C

ountry and Recognition of Rom

any as a Historical,

Linguistic and National M

inority, a 20-page document w

ithout date or other refer-ences.

23O

n the so-called Hungarian status law

, see for example, a paper outlining the posi-

tion of the Hungarian G

overnment in relation to the act on H

ungarians living inneighboring countries, European C

omm

issionFor D

emocracy T

hrough Law(V

eniceC

omm

ission), CD

L(2001)80, Strasbourg 2001.

24M

ore on the position of the RN

C on this subject can be found in the PE

R report,

Leadership,Representation and the Status of the Roma, Princeton, N

.J., 2001, pp. 38-43.

25M

ore in C. N

ecula, The Legitim

acy of the Roma Representation: T

he Nation and the Self-

Determ

ination ofRoma People, a paper prepared for this m

eeting. No other references.

26M

ore on this topic in N. B

itu, An Inventory of C

rucial Points, a paper prepared forthis m

eeting, Rom

ani CR

ISS, Bucharest, A

pril 2002.

27See m

ore in B. Lakatos’ w

ritten statement prepared for this m

eeting. No title or

other references.

28M

ore in N. D

emeter’s statem

ent prepared for this meeting. N

o title or other references.

29V

arious aspects of the Rom

ani leadership legitimacy and roles w

ere extensively dis-cussed at the previous PE

R m

eeting. See Leadership, Representation and the Statusof the R

oma, op.cit., pp. 11-32.

30M

ore in I. Vesely, C

ontribution to the Discussion on R

oma Em

ancipation, a paper pre-pared for this m

eeting. No additional references.

31O

p. cit.

32M

ore on the topic in D. A

ckovic, Birth of R

oma N

ation, a paper prepared for thism

eeting, Belgrade. N

o additional references.

33M

ore on this issue in S. Stankiewicz, Europako Forum

Rom

ano (propozycja ke CE

(European Rom

aForum

Proposal to the Council of Europe), a paper prepared for this

meeting, in R

omanes. N

o additional references.

34For m

ore see I. Vesely, op .cit.

35M

ore on this issue in the PER

report, Leadership, Representation and the Status of theR

oma, op.cit.,pp. 33-41.

36O

p. cit.

42

NO

TES

1For m

ore on this topic see the PER

Report, Self-G

overnment in H

ungary: The

Gypsy/R

omaniE

xperience and Prospects for the Future, Princeton, N.J. 1997.

2T

he IRU

Declaration ‘W

e, the Rom

a Nation, H

ave a Dream

” was extensively dis-

cussed at the PER

Krakow

meeting on M

arch 9-10, 2001; see the PER

report,Leadership, Representation and the Status of the R

oma, Princeton, N

.J. 2001.

3T

his initiative was announced during a speech by the President of the R

epublic ofFinland, Tarja H

alonen, at the Parliamentary A

ssembly of the C

ouncil of Europe in

Strasbourg on January 24, 2001.

4See the PE

R report, T

he Rom

a in the Twenty-First C

entury: A Policy Paper,

Princeton, N.J. 1997.

5“T

he Rom

ani movem

ent: what shape, w

hat direction?” in Rom

a Rights, Q

uarterlyJournal of the

European Rom

a Rights C

enter, No. 4, 2001, p. 18.

6M

ore on this debate in the PER

report, Leadership, Representation and the Status ofthe R

oma, op.cit ., pp. 33-43.

7Report on the C

ondition of Rom

a in the OSC

E Region, OSC

E/OD

IHR

, Warsaw

,O

ctober 2000, File No. 166, pp. 14 and 19. T

he Report w

as comm

issioned by theO

SCE

for preparation by rapporteur Rudko K

awczynski. See also: R

oma in Europe:

Status Regulation through Self-Determ

ination, the RN

C D

ocument prepared for the

OSC

E, N

ovember 1998.

8Statem

ent of the IRU

President to the initiative of Mrs. Tarja H

alonen, President ofFinland, Strasbourg, D

ecember 13-14, 2001.

9T

he idea of the Charter w

as recently presented in the Report on the Condition of the

Rom

a in Europe, op. cit., pp. 20-25.10

Project of a Frame-Statute (M

oral Charter) of the R

omani People in the European

Union, no date or additional references m

ade to this document.

11“T

he Rom

ani movem

ent: what shape, w

hat direction?” in Rom

a Rights, op.cit. pp.

20-21.

12O

p. cit., p. 27.

13T

he 2001 PER

report, Leadership, Representation and the Status of the Rom

a,Princeton, illustrates the dilem

mas faced by the R

oma in defining them

selves.

14“W

orld C

onference against

Racism

, R

acial D

iscrimination,

Xenophobia,

andR

elated Intolerance,” in Rom

a Rights, Q

uarterly Journal of the European Rom

a Rights

Center, N

o. 4, 2000, pp. 67-69.

15See points 39–44 of the A

ction Plan. The w

hole text of the Declaration can be

found at http://ww

w.unhchr.ch/htm

l/racism/D

urban.htm.

16“R

omanies at the C

rossroads. The D

ilemm

a of Contem

porary Rom

any Politics,” inC

islo 1, v. 2, 2000.

17T

he Rom

anies in Central and Eastern Europe: Illusions and Reality, PE

R R

eport,Princeton, N

.J., 1992.

18T

he draft of the OSC

E A

ction Plan of Targeted Activities for R

oma and Sinti has

been w

orked out

by the

Contact

Point For

Rom

a and

Sinti Issues

at the

OSC

E/O

DIH

R office in W

arsaw and distributed am

ong the Rom

ani organizations

45

the European level. T

he non-paper also defined two kinds of R

omani constituen-

cies: Rom

ani comm

unities from w

hich the majority of delegates have to be chosen,

without governm

ent interference; and Rom

ani organizations active at the European

level such as the IRU

and RN

C. T

hese two organizations w

ould have either a rightto perm

anent and extensive observer status or to nominate a certain agreed-upon

number of delegates on their ow

n. In addition, various observer status in this bodyw

ould have international nongovernmental organizations prom

oting the rights ofR

oma, N

GO

s, parliamentary assem

blies of CoE

, OSC

E and E

U and som

e govern-m

ents (acting presidents of international institutions on rotational basis).

As regards the num

ber of delegates from countries, the non-paper distinguished

between those in w

hich the Rom

ani comm

unity is very large (5 seats), large (4), sig-nificant (3) and other (2). O

ut of 43 mem

ber states of the CoE

, 35 have Rom

anipopulations; therefore, the future R

omani body can reach 114 seats plus seats that

would be assigned to the IR

U and R

NC

.

The issue of the representativity of this body and w

ays to ensure it has been a focalpoint of the ‘non-paper’ proposal. T

he procedural issue was also raised in the draft

of the Parliamentary A

ssembly recom

mendation, “Legal Situation of the R

oma in

Europe.” It required having a E

uropean Rom

a Consultative Forum

“democratical-

ly established.” There has been, how

ever, an obvious discrepancy between the

Finnish perspective aiming to provide R

oma w

ith a representative body and theR

ecomm

endation’s formula that seeks to establish a consultative body. T

he Finnishscenario for setting up the body has been contested by the m

ajority of Rom

ani lead-ers and activists. For som

e mem

bers of the exploratory group, the Finnish propos-al exposed the basic dilem

ma of the w

hole initiative – should this body be “consul-tative” or “representative”? A

consultative body does not need to be necessarily rep-resentative. O

n the other hand, a representative body, if established through elec-tion, assum

es much m

ore legitimacy and pow

er to take decisions and act on its own

as a legal body. It would, how

ever, require a legal basis. Establishing such a repre-

sentative body at the level of Europe, that is transnationally, inevitably raises the dif-

ficult question of Rom

a citizenship and state sovereignty. Having this body con-

sultative leaves much room

for various ways of designating m

embership (by elec-

tion, delegation, nomination, com

petition, etc.), whereas a representative body

would have to follow

election procedures. Furthermore, a consultative body does

not undermine the legitim

acy of various existing structures of Rom

ani representa-tion, w

hereas a representative body, if assuming an exclusive role in negotiations and

consultations, might. (For m

ore see A. M

irga, Some Rem

arks on the Ways to Establish

a Pan-European Rom

ani Advisory B

ody, a paper presented at the exploratory groupm

eeting in Helsinki, Finland, M

arch 9-12, 2002.

40G

ATIE

F – Gypsies and Travelers International Evangelical Fellow

ship organization,established in 1994 in France.

41T

he Helsinki A

greement’s building blocks w

ere originally described in detail in N.

Gheorghe, C

hart ofRom

ani Organizations, a docum

ent prepared for the meeting of

the exploratory group for a pan-European R

oma A

dvisory Body, M

arch 11-12,2002, H

elsinki, Finland.

42In a later docum

ent, she developed an alternative proposal. In her view, the core of

this body should consist of Rom

ani representatives selected nationally in givencountries (80-100 representatives), and international R

omani organizations (IR

U,

RN

C, G

ATIE

F) should have 2-4 seats in it. In selecting “national” Rom

ani dele-gates to the E

uropean Rom

a Forum she opted for election, along the lines of the

Finnish model of establishing the R

oma A

dvisory Board. (R

omani organizations

44

37T

he Advisor on R

oma and Sinti Issues distributed also his docum

ent, a compilation

of various

documents

and m

inutes from

debates

that w

ere held

within

theexploratory group:T

he Stages of the Debates on the Proposal for Setting U

p a Rom

aRepresentative B

ody at Pan-EuropeanLevel (H

alonen Initiative),Inform

al briefingdrafted by the O

DIH

R C

PRSI, W

arsaw, A

pril 16, 2002.

38B

y October 2001, the Finnish M

inistry of Foreign Affairs, supported by the Finnish

Parliament and the C

ouncil of Europe’s D

irectorate General of Social C

ohesion,secured enough acceptance am

ong Rom

ani leaders for the initiative to concludew

ith the establishment of an exploratory group for further elaboration. Since then,

the exploratory group held several working sessions, either in H

elsinki or inStrasbourg (in D

ecember 2001 and in February and M

arch 2002). In the mean-

time, the C

omm

ittee on Legal Affairs and H

uman R

ights of the Council of E

urope’sParliam

entary Assem

bly began its work and consultations for adoption of a new

report and recomm

endation on the legal situation of the Rom

a in Europe. In its

drafts, the Com

mittee fully supported setting up a E

uropean consultative forum for

Rom

a. By the M

arch 2002 meeting of the exploratory group, a tentative nam

e forthis body, the “R

oma A

dvisory Forum,” had been adopted. T

his name w

as laterchanged to the “E

uropean Rom

a Forum.” T

hroughout this period, the explorato-ry group debated various aspects of setting up the E

uropean Rom

a Forum: aim

sand objectives, size, com

position and representative nature, functions and working

methods, institutional links and funding.

Elaborating further on the H

alonen initiative, the Finnish side set forth its major

objective – the establishment of a European R

omani representative body that w

ouldbe com

posed of Rom

a, selected by the Rom

a and working for the R

oma. It should

mainly be concerned w

ith articulating views representative of the R

oma. It should not

be mistaken for a R

omani civil society or in com

petition with it, nor should it be seen

as an umbrella for it. T

he representative body should be officially set up under theauspices of an international organization so as to provide official input into decision-m

aking processes. The body m

ust be given powers to m

ake recomm

endations or ini-tiatives and to report to an appropriate international organization, and should be con-sulted on standard-setting and program

matic m

easures on the European level thataffect the R

omani m

inorities. It should not be seen as an alternative or competing

avenue for participation in decision-making at the national or local levels. M

odalitiesthat are neutral and enjoy legitim

acy in the view of the R

oma as w

ell as governments

need to be developed for the selection of Rom

ani representatives. For more on this

topic, see A.M

. Nyroos, Participation in D

ecision-Making: A

Pan-European Represen-tative B

ody for Roma, a paper presented at the Finnish Parliam

ent House sem

inar onR

oma Participation in Europe, H

elsinki, Finland, October 22, 2001.

39T

he subject matter w

as raised in the exploratory group chair’s non-paper at theM

arch meeting of the group (N

on-Paper/5.3.2002). The Finnish M

P envisionedsetting up this body in a w

ay that would be representative and reflect the relative

size of Rom

ani constituencies in different European countries. In his proposal he

refrained from advocating an individual balloting procedure, deem

ing it problem-

atic in the case of ethnic minorities (for exam

ple, ethnic registration is forbidden bylaw

in many countries). Instead, he suggested organized conventions of R

omani

NG

Os in each country for the nom

ination of delegates to this body. The nom

ina-tions of delegates w

ould preferably be accomplished by general agreem

ent between

the NG

Os. In case no agreem

ent can be reached, the convention could resort tovoting. M

odel rules of procedures for doing so would be elaborated in advance at

47

52M

ore in: H. H

annum, A

utonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-D

etermination, R

evisedE

dition, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, C

hapter 5, “Indigenous Rights,”

pp. 74-106.

53See

for exam

ple, A

. R

oberts, “B

eyond the

Flawed

Principle of

National

Self-D

etermination,”

in People,

Nation

and State.

T

he M

eaning of

Ethnicity and

Nationalism

, ed. by E. M

ortimer w

ith R. Fine. I.B

. Tauris Publisher, 1999, pp. 77-106.

54For m

ore on this topic see B. Slattery, T

he Paradoxes of National Self-D

etermination, 1995.

55R

. M. H

ayden, Yugoslavia: “Where Self-D

etermination M

eets Ethnic C

leansing,”in N

ew PerspectivesQ

uarterly, V. 9, (Fall), pp. 41-46.56

U.S. N

ational Security Council, position on Indigenous People (January 18, 2001),

University of M

innesota, Hum

an Rights Library.

57For

more

on this

topic, see

Y.N.

Kly

and D

. K

ly, “T

he R

ight to

Self-D

etermination,” C

ollected Papers and Proceedings of the First International Conference

on the Right to Self-D

etermination and the U

nitedN

ations, Geneva 2000. See also,

among

others, activities

of the

UN

PO

(Unrepresented

Nations

and Peoples

Organization) based in T

he Hague claim

ing nearly 50 mem

bers worldw

ide or theLichtenstein Institute on Self-D

etermination, based in Princeton, N

.J.

46

would choose their candidates from

among their m

embers by internal elections or

decisions of their boards, the ministry responsible for R

omani affairs w

ould work as

facilitator and guarantor of the fairness of the process, and finally those selectedw

ould be officially appointed as representatives by governments.) For m

ore on this,see M

. Vuolasranta, European R

oma Forum

. Proposal/Alternative M

odel of Com

posi-tion, Selection and Size ofER

F,May 22, 2002. N

o additional references.

43N

. Gheorghe, C

hart of Rom

ani Organizations, a docum

ent prepared for the meet-

ing of the exploratory group meeting in H

elsinki, March 11-12, 2002.

44T

he Stage of the Debates on the Proposal for Setting U

p a Rom

a Representative Body at

Pan-EuropeanLevel (the H

alonen Initiative), op. cit .45

In May 2002 at another session of the exploratory group in Strasbourg som

e addi-tional com

promise solutions w

ere worked out: T

he number of seats for the IR

Uand the R

NC

in this body dropped to 15 for each organization. It was agreed that

the Rom

ani political parties which have elected representation at local and nation-

al levels and/or are elected from m

ainstream parties w

ould be entitled to delegateone representative each to the body. A

lso, the Rom

ani ‘national’ representationw

ould consist of two delegates from

each mem

ber state of the CoE

, with the

Rom

ani comm

unity representing Rom

ani national nongovernmental organizations

or umbrella N

GO

s. There w

ill be one more m

eeting to conclude the work of the

exploratory group.

46T

he IRU

position has changed since the so-called “Helsinki A

greement” has been

reached. Clearly, concerns that setting up a new

representative body for Rom

aw

ould inevitably undermine the IR

U claim

to be the political representation of aproclaim

ed Rom

a nation were the cornerstone for its initial reservations about the

Finnish initiative. Responding to that challenge, the IR

U proposed to seek the

good will and resources of the Finnish authorities in helping R

oma organize them

-selves in a different w

ay, by accepting the IRU

framew

ork and helping to elect a“constitutional body of a R

oma nation” as proposed by the IR

U Parliam

entR

esolution adopted at its Skopje session (2002). The IR

U-proposed “constitution-

al body” obviously differs essentially from w

hat the Finnish initiative intends to setup. It is interesting that the IR

U has opted for election as a procedure in establish-

ing Rom

ani representation.

47T

he Fourteen Points, contained in the Address of the President of the U

nited StatesD

elivered at a Joint Session of the Two H

ouses of Congress, January 8, 1918. Papers

Relating to the ForeignRelations of the U

nited States, 1918, Supplement 1, T

he World

War, W

ashington, D.C

. US G

overnment Printing O

ffice, 1933, vol. 1, pp. 12-15.

48International C

ovenant on Economic, Social and C

ultural Rightsand the International

Covenant on C

ivil and Political Rights. B

oth were adopted on D

ecember 16, 1966.

49T

he UN

organized the World C

onference on Hum

an Rights in V

ienna (1993)resulting in the D

eclaration and Programm

e of Action.

50For m

ore on this issue, see A. E

ide, “Territorial Integrity of States, Minority

Protection, and Guarantees for A

utonomy A

rrangements: A

pproaches and Roles of

the United N

ations,” in Local Self-Governm

ent, Territorial Integrity and Protection ofM

inorities, Proceedings of the UniD

em Sem

inar, Lausanne, April 25-27, 1996,

Council of E

urope Collection, Science and technique of dem

ocracy, No. 16, 1996,

pp. 273-303.

51O

p. cit.,pp. 283-287.

49

Livia P

laks, Executive D

irector, Project on Ethnic R

elations, USA

Iulius Rostas,International A

dvocacy Officer, E

uropean Rom

a Rights

Center, H

ungary

Norm

unds Rudevics, M

ember of the Foreign A

ffairs Com

mittee,

Parliament of the R

epublic of Latvia

Stanislaw Stankiew

icz,Prime V

ice President, International Rom

aniU

nion; Rom

a Council, Poland

Ivan Vesely,Head, D

zeno Association; C

omm

issioner for Media,

International Rom

ani Union, C

zech Republic

Miranda Vuolasranta,Secretary G

eneral, Advisory B

oard on Rom

aniA

ffairs, Ministry of Social A

ffairs and Health, Finland

48

LIS

T OF

PA

RTIC

IPA

NTS

Dragoljub A

ckovic, President, Rom

a Congress Party, Yugoslavia

Osm

an Balic,President of the E

xecutive Board, Y

UR

OM

Center;

Mem

ber, International Rom

ani Union; Yugoslavia

Nicoleta B

itu, Rom

ani CR

ISS, Rom

ania

Nadezhda D

emeter, Senior R

esearcher, Institute of Ethnography and

Anthropology, R

ussian Academ

y of Sciences, Russian Federation

Asm

et Elezovski,C

oordinator, Rom

ani Com

munity C

enter DR

OM

,K

umanovo, M

acedonia

Orhan G

aljus, Program M

anager, Open Society Institute,

Netw

ork Media Program

– Rom

a Media Fund, H

ungary

Nicolae G

heorghe, Adviser on R

oma and Sinti Issues, C

ontact Pointfor R

oma and Sinti Issues, O

DIH

R/O

SCE

Ondrej G

ina, President, Fund of Hope and U

nderstanding, C

zech Republic

Erika G

odlova,Interpreter, Slovak Republic

Salome H

irvaskoski, Officer on R

oma and Sinti Issues,

OD

IHR

/OSC

E

Rudko K

awczynski, M

ember of the B

oard of Directors,

Rom

a National C

ongress, Germ

any

Nikolay K

irilov, Director, R

oma-Lom

Foundation, Bulgaria;

Director, Pakiv E

uropean Rom

a Fund, Hungary

Bela L

akatos, Director, Pedagogical R

esource Center, M

inistry of E

ducation, Hungary

Andrzej M

irga, Chair, PE

R R

omani A

dvisory Council; C

o-Chair,

Council of E

urope Specialist Group on R

oma/G

ypsies; Poland

Nezdet M

ustafa,Mayor, M

unicipality of Shuto Orizari, M

acedonia

Ciprian N

ecula, Coordinator, M

edia Project, Rom

ani CR

ISS,R

omania

Klara O

rgovanova, Plenipotentiary for Rom

ani Com

munity,

Governm

ent of the Slovak Republic

51

■Schools, L

anguage, and Interethnic Relations in R

omania: T

he Debate

Continues (1998)

■T

he Rom

a in Bulgaria: C

ollaborative Efforts B

etween L

ocal Authorities

and Nongovernm

ental Organizations (1998)

■B

altic-Russian R

elations in the New

Geopolitical Fram

ework (1998)

■Political Participation and the R

oma in H

ungary and Slovakia (1999)

■B

uilding Rom

anian Dem

ocracy: The Police and Ethnic M

inorities (1999)

■C

atastrophe in the Balkans: Serbia's N

eighbors and the Kosovo C

onflict(1999)

■State Policies Tow

ard Rom

ani Com

munities in C

andidate Countries to

the EU

: Governm

ent and Rom

ani Participation in Policy–Making (1999)

■M

ontenegro on the Brink: Avoiding A

nother Yugoslav War (2000)

■R

oma and the L

aw: D

emythologizing the Stereotype of “G

ypsyC

riminality” (2000)

■Vojvodina: T

he Politics of Interethnic Accom

modation (2000)

■T

he Year 2000 Elections in R

omania: Interethnic R

elations andEuropean Integration (2000)

■T

he Rom

a in Hungary: G

overnment Policies, M

inority Expectations,

and the International Com

munity (2000)

■Tow

ard Com

munity Policing: T

he Police and Ethnic M

inorities inH

ungary (2000)

■A

lbanians and Their N

eighbors: Unfinished B

usiness (2000)

■R

oma and Statistics (2000)

■R

oma and the G

overnment in Slovakia: T

he Debate O

ver M

igration (2000)

■A

lbanians as Majorities and M

inorities: A R

egional Dialogue (2001)

■State Policies Tow

ard the Rom

a in Macedonia (2001)

■Parliam

entary Representation of M

inorities in Hungary: L

egal andPolitical Issues (2001)

■Political W

ill: Rom

ania’s Path to Ethnic A

ccomm

odation (2001)

■Yugoslav R

oma Face the Future (2001)

■L

eadership, Representation and the Status of the R

oma (2001)

■Yugoslavia at the C

rossroads (2002)

■T

he Bulgarian E

thnic Experience (2002)

■Political E

xtremism

and Interethnic Relations in the N

ew M

illennium(2002)

50

OTH

ER

PE

R P

UB

LIC

ATIO

NS

■R

omanian-A

merican Sym

posium on Inter-Ethnic R

elations (1991)

■T

he Rom

anies in Central and E

astern Europe: Illusions and Reality

(1992)

■N

ationality Policy in the Russian Federation (1992)

■Interethnic R

elations in Serbia/Yugoslavia: Alternatives for the Future

(1993)

■T

he Media of E

astern Europe and the Former Soviet U

nion: Reporting on

Interethnic Relations (1994)

■M

anaging Ethnic Conflict: T

he Kona Statem

ent (1994)

■C

ountering Anti-R

oma V

iolence in Eastern Europe: T

he SnagovC

onference and Related E

fforts (1994)

■Ethnonationalism

: Fears, Dangers, and Policies in the Post-C

omm

unistW

orld (1995)

■Slovakia R

oundtable in the United States (1995)

■D

emocratic P

rocesses and Ethnic Relations in Yugoslavia (1995)

■R

ussia and Eastern and C

entral Europe: Old D

ivisions and New

Bridges

(1996)

■Second Slovakia R

oundtable (1996)

■Ethnic R

elations: A Selected B

ibliography (1996)

■R

eporting in a Post-Conflict Environm

ent: Bosnian and C

roat JournalistsM

eet (1996)

■T

he Media and the R

oma in C

ontemporary Europe: Facts and Fictions

(1996)

■T

he Rom

a in the Twenty-First C

entury: A Policy Paper (1997)

■P

revention of Violence and D

iscrimination A

gainst the Rom

a inC

entral and Eastern Europe (1997)

■Enhancing R

egional Security: Russian and C

entral European Perspectives(1997)

■T

he New

York Roundtable: Tow

ard Peaceful Accom

modation in K

osovo(1997)

■Im

ages and Issues: Coverage of the R

oma in T

he Mass M

edia in Rom

ania(1997)

■Self-G

overnment in H

ungary: The G

ypsy/Rom

ani Experience and

Prospects for the Future (1997)

■Political L

eaders on Interethnic Relations and R

egional Security inC

entral Europe: A R

oundtable (1998)

■Interethnic R

elations in the Balkans: N

ew G

eneration, New

Politics(1998)