Roots of BC Trade Unionism

declined tc give figures for paid-up

membership, arg-inr that this gives

management an edg- in retrenching

Seven black consciousness unions have

begun exploring possibilities or

feder-ation. Meanwhile they are linked

in a loose alliance, witn BAKCWU

general secretary Prjidelani Nefolcvhodwt

acting as co-ordlmtor. Along with

other union officiala , he discussed

the alliance, and B ' directions

and attitudes on labour.

In 1S70, the South -frican Students

Organisation (SASO), then tre rr.ainspring

of rhe 3C movement, resolved at a

general studert council to „r.dertake

labour organisatior.. This wat the

beginning of EC's searcn to expand its

constituency beyond its student base.

Two years later, tne Black Allied

Workers Union (BAWJ) was foried.

15“ 5-77 inarked a further, brief stage

of cilitancy, and attempts tc broaden

the base to include urban community

groups. AZAPO's fornatior., a year after

the O c t o b e r 1 9 7 7 bannings which wiped

out r.ost BC organisations, narked a new

phase.lt emphasised the need for labour

organisation and asserted a socialist

objective. After 1992, a number of BC

unions w ere formed, most with close

links to A2AP0.

Recent reports describing the

formation of a federation of these 3C

unions were rather exaggerated. At an

initial meeting in Feoruary chis year,

sever, of them agreed in principle to

forr an alliance, as a first step

towards a putative feceratior..

The unions concerned are: the Slack

Allied Mining and Construction Workers

Union (BAMCWT?), the Insurance and

Assurance Workers Union of SA ( IAWUSA, ,

the Slack Electronics and Electrical

Worrfars Union (BEF.WU1, the African

Allied Workers Union (AAW'U), th* B'laci'

General Workers Union (E3WU), the

National Union of Workers cf SA (MWSA-,

anc tne Amalgamated Blac.t Ger.eral

Workers Union (ABGWu).

Nefolovhodwe anc athei officials

menoerc. They claired 75 000 as a total

fcr the alliance. However, SALDRU’s

Li rectory i,outh ifricin Trade ’Jr.icns I

! g: ves I9t!3 cl^ir.ei * efr.t.ership figures

of 2 5 000 for BA.x:.V, -23 for IAWUSA I an'j a 06-S for AV*V.

It was r : t en-.ire.ly urii'-o'*: for

I e.T-.-rgent rnicnr i ' their early years tc *

| assert ler.tinacy u; th inflated

; membership. Had somethin*, ol the sort i i [ o'currdo nere? '?.‘c, ve'rs pi-sn m at

st3s;e. Certainly the past vexr, and

prooaoly the ccrir.g yeur, are hard tires

fcr organisation,* Nefolovhodwe answered.

All alliance nerc.e rs are nation-wide unions, he says. As co-cruinator for the

alliance, Nefolovncdwe is mandated to

draft a federation constitution for

considerati or..

’ WO AKIM0SI7Y, NO CONTACT'

He has to form-late a policy outline

according to the alliance's declaration

of intent, in conformity with individual

unions' policy. He must outline

possibilities for financial co-cperaticr

in fundraising and administration.

Finally, he would co-ordinate response

if any other unior federation contacts

the grojp. Sc far, relations are 'no

anirosity, no contact. We dc have

infernal relations with the unions wno

left the unity tal.-;s - af~„er all, we

work from the sate building.'

BAMCWU, IAWUSA, 3EEWU ari E0«V are

self-sufficient, oper%tirg off itwoers'

duer, accc-rcing tc Nefolc/hodwe. ut;

there is l i t t ." lef*- fcr le/al advice

applications, hsr.r* u.e inner.tion | to fir.firais? joir.t.’ v.

AAWV's general secretary and alliance

[ put Li city official .'.jpnirV-.a-n Ncru’tana

I explain-.-c: ’We jre . j c;'ar>.-.:j *v. ;:r h t

i for- redress cr da;.-co-day . sr.ues

through the legal machinery - dismissals

for striking, unfair la&our practices. -

without feeling compromised in dealing

with a state we don't recognise. Hunan

rignts issues can be fought tnis wa\ -

for example, we're willing to take

anotter union to court to break a closed

shop agreement, as that's a principle of

freedc**. of association.'

Similarly, Nqcukana says that at

present i t 's alliance policy not to

participate in industrial councils, 'on

the sane basis as we won't participate

in government-created structures. 3ut

policy on industrial council

participation is a matter of tactics,

not of principle, and we would decide

to adapt to a changing situation .'

Unions in the alliance span almost all

industries, their officials point cut.

Nefolovnodwe enumerated, 'mining,

construction, quarries, cementation,

civil engineering and allied industries

in BAXCWU. There are electronics and

electrical workers, and employees ir. a

range of financial and commercial

institutions. '

Sir.ce four alliance members are

general workers unions, they have

members from a broad spectrum of

industries as well. 5ut they a” e

concerned to organise ty industry,

rather tnan 'accect any mart-:.'.~the-

street' .

Would such diversity not re sn

obstacle to a funct .ning federation0 No said Nefolovhoa.e. hv cited the

of blac* expej-ence c ' cypress' or.,

across the spectru.* from skiiJ-si t:

unskilled, migrant to urban. H«-

expanded:

The only base for fundamenta± change

in Soutn Africa is the group of people

that is most oppressed. That is the

working class. They »ili produce the

agents of change, or vanguard.

Not all levels of the »ork;ng cj-sss

are in fact agents of cr.ange - t.nese

are constituted in thv black working

class. Though rural communities,

students and some sections of the miadit

class also come into the political

picture, it is the black working class

that must lead.

In fact, rural unemployed are not

separate from the wording class. ' I f you

accept that rural people in homeland

labour reservoirs are integrally bound

into the system of labour exploitation

in SA, and that there is almost nothing

left of a peasantry that makes its

living from the land, then you perceive

that tr.e rural oppressed art an

extension, part of the working class.

'Tnis is particularly evident when it

co-.; ; to industries like mining and

construction -r.ich use a great deal of

mirri-.* labour. I t 's a definition that

ir.ci.ies almost every oppressed person.'

TN'TT LLECTUAl-S AS ORGANISERS

What of the rcle of black intellectuals, j

liKe the alliance officials themselves?

Nefolovnodwe replied vigorously: 'I f

intellectuals won't admit that's what

they are , they're going to be useless

organisers. If you truthf-ily accept

what you are, you w o t k at interacting

with workers, listening a^d accepting.

Then you can systematise and fcrr the

id:a<" that project working-class

aspirations.

'I would argue that black

intellectuals have an advantage, if

they have co.Tie from the same background

as .lost workers, and if they are able

to throw off the conformist legacy of

their education.

*Thin doesn't near, that .intellectuals

can't use their skills and expertise.

What's at issue is their practise: I

would argue that in tr.eir critique of

'bureaucratic wnite _nte .lectuals ' in

MAVJ, VMMAWEA get r c 11 of the -.rcng end

cf the ctick. T:,e p o m ’- rhould:. 't have

_r ■

r.ere. . e t i j . a c . . ucn,

i;*' ' * s’,” £nfen ' r: ticisr

-hit-, or net,

shouid have I-ee- pr. ; . . B- . n

orgaris-.ticn.l r“ r-. 'a." a^ arj t n r ;■ j a-.Cc' ?r 1 own

ir'crnal .■iesiciritic -strict..--« and

P-rjcti: cs? EAi'.JV' is given as an

eyc::iie. Zfi - c i ei s a e ty tne

annual congress and rai.e up its Natior.a.

Executive Corw.itte>. Tnis is

responsible to tne National *crkers

Cour.c.l (NVC.', which is -ace up of all

regional, area anc brar.cr executives,

plus ’.'EC metirjers.

Anyone critical, or disciplines, can

appeal from the NEC ~o tr.~ and

beycr.d that to the genera, union

congress - i f necessary calling a

special session. All members are

entitled to attend and vote at

congresses. Attendance at last June's

annual congress was about 1 300.

How does the alliance see itself as

differing from the Council of Unions of

SA fC.SA), which also stresses black

leadersr.ip in unionisation? According

to Nqcukana: 'We wouldn't .ant tc

criticise. The alliance hasn't come to

22

. — . .i ■ - anr

a firm decision about whether to join

existing union federations like CUSA or

FOSATU. We're not in opposition to them

as such, and i f invited, we'd consider

the case on its own merits. Of course

we're willing to include anyone who

wants to join the alliance, i f they're

harry with our objectives.'

lid the BC movement, and later its

unions, suffer from lack of experience

in techniques of labour organisation,

not uncommon among new unions during

the 1970s? Nefolovhodwe replied: 'No,

we had people like Drake Koka heading

BAWV. His organisational experience

went back to the Liberal Party. And

Lir.dele Mabandla, a teacher who,

having served as vice-president of SASO,

wer.t on to take charge of SA W in

Durr a n . '

BC ENTERS LABOUR

Eve", before BAWU was formed in 1972,

SAEI set up the Black Workers Project

(BW-' under Bckwe Mafuna in 1971.

Mafuna was succeeded by Welile Nhlapo.

BVF ran labour clinics. 'We didn 't deal

so cjch with issues like compensation,

UIF or dismissals, as attempt to

conscientise workers about black

bargaining power. The clinics operated

in Johannesburg, Durban and to a lesser

extent Cape Town'.

SASO decided to for:", the Elack

People's Convention (SFC' in 1972. It

was intended to serve as a national

political organisation in the move away

froc student- and intellectual-based

politics. Within months, BPC in turn

forred 3AWU. The EWF was later handed over to BAWU, a prccess co-ordinated by

Nefclcvhodwe' s SASO executive, on which

both Muntu .Vye2a and Terror Lekota

served.

During the 1973 Durban strikes, BAWU

and the BPC were very active in

pamrr.leting and politicising,

Nef. . ' vhodwe says, with friths Cooper

anc' itrini Xoudlev I-.aaini . After :•

release fror R oh ben i.-lar..; ir; * he early

19803' along with the cthere

sentenced in the SASO-BfC trial of I T ’n-

76, they were active in A"API ar.d the

forratio.n of the National Forum.

Of the nine sentenced in the SA.SO-BPC

trial. Cooper, Moodley, Myeza, Zithulele

Cindi, Aubrey Mokcape and Nefolovhodwe

are still active in BC organisations.

Terror Lekota is UDF publicity secretary.

By 1974 wr.en top BC officials were

detained, a number of issues that would

impact on the second half of the 1970s

had been spelled cut, Nefolovhodwe

believes. A 1974 SASO general student

council produced a lengthy paper on

galvanising school students to reject

government institutions, foreshadowing

1976. SASC had also begun to form a

number of 'community based'

organisations; the 2A Students

Movement (SASM), the Southern African

Students Movement, the National Yc-ith

Organisation, the Union of ElacK

Journalists were examples cited.

Ir the course of EAWU's turbulent

history, riven with sp iiis , it hac many

offshoots. Nefolovhodwe ria-ns that

AAW'U and AAGWU are descendants of BAWU,

that SAAWl ar.d KACWUSA ai~o derive from

it by a prccess of schismatic

reproduction. Spinoffs of the EC labour

thrust in the early 197Cs oy splits and

influence extend to CCA'WUSA and CUSA he

believed.

After 1977, when a massive gamut of

BC organisations were banned, it took

a year for AZAPO to emerge, with its

mere explicit rejection of capitalism

as the motor of apartheid. BC activists

then on Robben Island expected to

disagree with the new BC generation.

Eu't, Nefoic\hodwe said, it dian't zlrn

out that way: 'There was no fundane.ntaal

ch an g e frorr the BC cornerstone. At

different times in a movement's history,

you neec to emohasise different things

j i n the line you walK bet-een your

I constituency and your theorists'

perceptions cf social dynasties. We

teg=r by stressing black self-*orth

and dignity, beginning frcr. oeop.e's

experience and reaction tc denigration.

Lat<*r, ve ~ o / e d or: i n our o r g x i f ational

x z n c ? t a b s t r a c t n r T ic n i like

j c r . ' i i . u t s o f r a p ita - isn : and i t ^ r o l e ac !

i- ••'irr.t "t’* ijprus.? . ’ i. Put cotr. #vre

rt i'*-/ :n t *c r ir.y one .ir. e. *

d ^ ' v e t t i n t-npnrri? i s v- no

I 'C ‘.h e 1- st s i c h s h i f t t i t . '

Diamonds are Forever But is the Mine?

De Beers and its wholly-owned Namibian

subsidiary, CDM, face allegations of

irresponsible mining and marketing

practices. They deny these strongly,

but the controversy is far from over.

Consolidated Diamond Mines, De Beer?’

Namibian subsidiary, has face; a storm

of malpractice allegations m reier.t

months. First the corporation anc its

Namibian MD Doug Hoffe were tcr.gue-

lashed by Justice Thirion, r.ead of the

commission of enquiry into government

corruption in Namibia.

De Beers and CDM had refuse: tc give

evidence under oath at a public hearing

of tr.e commission. During hearings on

Namibia's Diamond Beard, Thirion's

investigators had testifiec chat the

country's lack of control over diamond

exports was so extrem= that CDM could

have evaded tax cn up tc Ri-tilljon

(R1 C60-million) by underpricing

expert diamonds between 1976 and 1983.

LEAKED DOCUMENTS_____________________________

Then confidential CDM documents were

leases. CDM faced allegations in the

SA press that it haa been 1overmining'

at its Oranjemund mine. Crudely put,

the allegations - current for years in

Namibia - say that after 1952 CDM

steeply increased the tempc cf its

Oranjemund mining operations.

The alleged result was to shorter,

the life of the mine, to deplete the

country's single most valuable mineral

resource in advance cf its

independence. The gems that were not

sold are safely stockpiled in the

vaults of De Beers' Central Selling

Organisation (CSC).

Such practices, if true, brs&k the

61 year-old Haibscheid Agresrent,

which gives CDM exclusive rights to

mine ar,a prospect in Namibia c

Sperrgebiet, the forbidden diamond

area. The agreement specifies thorough '

ar.c economic mining practices, 'not

with a view to exhausting the

superficial and more valuable deposits

tc ire detriment cf the low g^aoe

decc sits ’ .

." is Namibia's single Jarger,t

SO-" ce or* tax revenue. The mint -s

::•! - ta.'.ed at 2 rcte of 75", aact up of

diar end profit tax, c:amend expc rt

t -' company tax and diamond cor par.y

tax. Ir. the ter years tc the cr. J of

t r. r '9?2-S3 finar.cial yeor, i t

con: r.buted nearly R1-ti»ijor. in - 3 Y

mere than on-: third of tne :c ;:nt •’’* J *tax re/enue over the cericd r *

e r

■ r ’’ ' , CDM's tax p.ayr.,entr. cropped

arz.rr.ly because of the diamond market

i recession and production cutbacks 3t

! Cl- to about 10% of Namibia's tax

1 revenue.

According to the last De Beers'

annual report, CDM contributes ' L% cf

De Beers' income. CDM's Cranjeaund

air.e is a series of operations along a

ICC km strip of the southern desert

ccast. A highly capital-intensive

operation, its annual investment

amounts to some R750-million.

In massive earthmoving operations,

miners shift sand and overburden to

ge: at the diamond-bearing gravel. In

one area the sea has been pushed back

ICC metres to allow mining in the surf

2cr.e.

A confidential 'L ife of Mine

Forecast' in 1977 estimated that CDM's

Oranjemund mine had ’ A years of

j operation remaining. It. said that, at

the rate of mining then practised, the

mine would be played out in 1991. The

forecast adaed that 'only eight cf

tree? years prove profitable'.

.- further memorandum tc the mining

mar.iger from Clive Ross. CDM's

c; trail err. rer ■??.•'cr; manag?.-. cs~er 3 1

19So, discusses tr.rc" mining

'Plan l: Maximum mining policy to the

end cf the mine;

Plan. 2: Maxinun ninir.fr urti] 1965,

ther. reverting (suddenly) to an average

mining policy;

Piar 3: A gradual sncoth shift from

the current maxinun mining to an

average mining policy in 1982'.

Graphs sent to the mining manager

with this memorandum forecast that

Piar. i would result ir, the n.ne working

at a loss ty 199C . Pl\r. 2 wo.: Id have

the same result in 985, while Plan 3

would result ir. losses by 19G3.

Market prices on whicn there

prcjfctior.s are ti-.sec ere net Kr.owr..

but tne nemerancum antedates t-.e

sudcea sharp drop ir. deitnrf for

diamonds of l980-81.

CDM PESPUNSF

While De Beers and CDM responses to

the Thirion commission allegations

seem unco-ordinated and evasive, they

came out fighting on the allegations

of overmining, with press statements,

advertisements, interviews and

explanations in refutation.

Ce Beers spokesmen explain that

periodic forecasts of the life of the

mire change continually as mining

technology advances, making unpayable

areas payable as new reserves are

discovered (CDM is heavily engaged in

prospecting inland along the Orange

River and northwards along the Atlantic

coast). In fact, they say, the mine's

reserves are not static, but

continually opening up - as a result

cf CD."' s activity and investment.

The term ’ overmining' found in the

leaked documents is a technical one,

De Seers spokesmen say. It describes

the average grade of diamonds actually

mined in a year in relation to the

estirated average in the diamond

concession reserves.

Ir. ‘.977, for examole, tne payable

grade was given ?s G ,'5S CLtic merres,

while the actua] recrverec: grade was

0,235 carats per c.iri. metre, ar over-

recovery or. payable reserves rf -7” .

The overmining figure giver, on total

production figures is £9%. But to pay

for r.ead office costs, increased

capital expenditure and :ro-eased tax

liacilty, target grades must rise, CDM

points out.

De Eeers does not deny that CDM

sharply increased production in the

1970s, and that the en; of the mine's

life may be closer than earlier

statements led the public to believe.

This was in keeping with sounc

mining practice and die net violate

the Halbscheid agreement, though, CDM

says. It makes the following points:

The late 1970s saw unprecedented

speculation in the diamond trade, and

'production from all sources, including

CDM, was maxiSised consistent with

good mining practice, to take advantage

of the favourable selling conditions

am maintain an orderlv iarket, wnich

| is ir t.ie long terr ir:erest of all• prooucers1.

r.sthe- tr.an planning !* ?xha :3 t

rete-ves in advaro- p. lit iceif rt — ’’ C*' ' ! ^ i f " r’ n ; r, ' r i !• •> ># ,,w 1— . K - , - - ►-1CS ^ • “ vifi L j t

har r**er; i Ty •*£- w • ssr\p /cs-

ods of treatirv ir.t. zi no

payable dj a.Tcnc-cea~ir.g g-cwrtf remains

when operations finally cense, an? to

preserve the value of the product'.

After’ demand for high quality

diamonds aropped sharply after ' 980,

one of CDM's four conglomerate crushers

was closed, and it also ceased

production from the screening plants.

It would take detailec investigation

into Namibia's diamond industry to

settle the issue finally. South

Africa 's administrator general in

Namibia, W illie van Niekerk, refused

to broaden the scope of the Thirion

commission to include the mining

industry, leaving it witr.in its mandate

to investigate government bodies. His

grounds were that tecnnical mining

experts would be required for a

broadened investigation.

Sut after the last, heated headings

on the Diamond Board in Windhoek,

Justice Thirion is orepa-ing his

report, which is due in Cctoter. Van

Niekerk's office says rt is waiting

for Thirior.'s report, ar.: ma;>

I consider a further investigati~r in

the .light or the rcpp-t.

Irvestig* tion ir.t: ov.-j iDle “ S’

! evasion ty transfer ir: ; .r g »'ru.d open

i up more ctnr.ex c,uec':. _r : tt’.an tne

I irsut cf ' r.ir.r' - .-etre- ir its

J technical or non-ts: ~n. t a. sf-.r?. Thr

r.*i :-r.g issue- wci. : -‘e:*.a.-3 info n a tio n

about activities of the m a n of

loosely linked trading tt.-.panier

making up De Beers' CSC.

According to Juiiar. Og: lv\-Thcmsscn,

De Peers deouty chair.Tar, chai-mar. is

Harry Cpper.neimer), tne company -efused

to give evidence ir. response to

allegations of transfer pricing before

the Thirion commission when it w: s

refused permission to testify in

camera. because it c!id not want to bi

forced to disclose confidential coupa-. ■

information, as well as that of its * partners around the world.

Similarly, Ogilvy-Thompson said, 'We do not release information on the' estimated life of our mines, because

this information, on the strength of

De Beers’ future production, could

affect the overall diamond market and our control of it.

SECRETIVE SELLERS

Certainly information on the CSO's

buying quotas from its various

suppliers inside and outside the

group, and about its stockpiles would

affect De Beers' near-monopoly of

world diamond trade. It has always

beer extremely secretive, giving

minimal information on its operations

to shareholders and customers.

cso buys diamonds from producers

around the world. Each has a quota.

The CSC does not lower the prices it

pays for rough stones. For the right

to buy on an exclusive basis from

independent producers, it agrees to

buy total production or a set quota

from producers at set or rising prices.

It does not drop its prices, though

when demand falls as it did in 19 8 0 ,

the CSO releases fewer stones on to

the market. Sough diamond prices are

maintained, while De Beers stockpiles

diamonds at its own expense, waiting for better days.

Martin Grote, an economic researcher

who provided information to the Thirion

commission, said that neither the

Diamond Board nor anyone else in

government appeared to know the end

prices of Namibian diamonds.

It was possible, he said, that CDM

had understated the selling price of

the diamonds by sore thar; Rl-billion

over the five years since 1978. I f

this had happened, Namibia had lost

revenue of about R66C-millior., at the

tax rates tnat then applied. The

country's annual budget only recently topped Rl-billion.

The only figures on value and amount

o ' diamonds exported were thos®

j '-Jpol^ed bj r.i/M. The Dia-r.J Scard

| soreticaiiy r.zvn controlled

£r.c checked .Namibia’s diamond txports.

j i-ut it.s most important functions were

j v."»egr-.ted to De Beers functionaries,

j ;he Hoard had no inspection facilities

. no inspection agents, and no inspection

j star * either inside tne country or

overseas - tfxcept CDM employees.

C-rote used USA Department of Mines

statistics on the value of imported rough diamonds as a basis of

comparison. Some 66% of CDM's rough

diamonds enter the US. According to

his calculations, after 1978 Namibian

__ diamonds were fetching up to R21U per

carat more in America than CDM's

locally quoted prices.

Between 1955 and 1977, there were no

significant differences between diamond

prices given by CDM and the Diamond

Board and those estimated from US statistics.

Some CSO companies are registered in

Bermuda, which is a tax haven. Grote'a

testimony stressed that it was possible

that CDM's exports had been undervalued

in order to taxe acvantage of the tax haven.

Grote cited other instances of the

lack o: control exercised by the

Diamond Board. In a ' year's-old

swopping scheme' between De Beers and

CDM, packages of up to 300 0G0 carats

of CDM's hign quality diamonds were

exchanged for equal weights from De

Beers South African mines. The Board

had no comparative records of the

quality, quantity or value of the

stones involved. In 1 9 8 1 , he said, 45%

of Namibia's diamonds went to

j Switzerland instead of to London,

: without the Diamond Board knowing of

it . Namibian diamonds were being

| traded, stockpiled and swopped in

j foreign countries without independent

I state knowledge, let alone supervision.

The content of Thirion*s report will

open the issue up further. Whether it

! will be made public, or if another

enquiry will be set afoot is an open

question. De Beers is still enormously

powerful in South Africa, and CDM is

relatively still mere so in Namibia.

Nevertheless, they may have to provide

xore information than they have so far.

Unemployment and Social Security: The UIF InvestigationThe social security system for South

Africa’ s growing number of unemployed

is deeply flawed. GEORGINA JAFFEE

analyses a recently released memorandum

or the Unemployment Insurance Fund.

South Africa's Unemployment Insurance

Fund is inefficient, open to abuse,

and inadequate. When a number of

organisations assisting unemployed

workers concluded this, they launched

an investigation into the Fund and its

administration.

Their investigations have resulted

in a recently released memorandum and

Benefit Charter, endorsed by a wide

range of trade union, service and

community organisations.

As the recession deepened, more and

more people approached advice offices

for assistance in claiming unemployment

benefits. This initially focused

attention on the scope and

administration of the state-run

Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).

Unemployment has reached two-and-a-

half zillion , and m ’ 983 the Fund

pais cut three times more than 1 951-2.

Payments totalled R ’04-m, and this led

the Department of Manpower tc sell

R20-m cf UIF benefits to meet increased

claims. Government has declared that

it is presently conducting a review of

the Fund's finances.

As early as 1962, service

organisations having difficulty in

obtaining unemployment benefits for

their clients began preparing a

memorandum on all aspects of the Fund.

2y July 1984 this memorandum, drawn up

in consultation with unions and

unemployed workers, was released. At

the same time, a group including the

Black Sash, the South African Institute

of Race Relations, the East Rand

Advice 5ureau, the Industrial Aid

Society, the Industrial Aid Centre,

and a number of independent unions,

produced a Benefit Charter. This

encourages community organisations and

trade unions to take up the Charter's

recommendations as popular demands.

HOW THE

FUND WORKS

The Unemployment Insurance Fund is

only accessible to those who have

contributed to it. It is not a general

assistance scheme and makes no

provision for people who are entering

the work-force for the first time. The

Fund only covers certain categories of

workers, and excludes casual, public

service, seasonal, domestic and

agricultural workers, and contract

workers from other countries in

Southern Africa. In rural areas it

oniv covers Africans working in

factories or mines, and those earning

over R16 000 per year. The 1980 Report

of tr;e Department of Manpower estimates

* hat only 3 5?0 R49 ~iT an economically

ac'.ive pcuuirtion of 9 490 COO were

c-cr.-tr.Tjtor? to vhe Fund.

Tn: s failure of UIF to prc^r'de ‘‘or

fne Dc.j.t vulne~able sectors c;" ttv*

work-fo^ce is a major issue troight

out in the me-irorar.dtin. So is the

Fund's inability to include those wno

nave never worked nr will nave little

opportunity af ever finding employment.

T'oe -und p;iy3 45% of the average

wagt calculated over the last 13 weeks

of employment. It provides one weeir's

benefit for every six weeks worked.

The beneficiary must nave contributed

to the Fund fcr 13 of the previous 52

weekr to qualify for payment. Benefits

may be received for a maximum of 26

weeks, although it is possible to

apply for an extension cf this period.

But this is not often done due to

ignorance of the procedures involved.

When such applications are made; they

are not often granted. Benefits can be

27

cla.med two weeks from the da:*> of

application, except where a pens'.tv 1 imposed for voluntary I csj of

ecricyment 'resignation).

Tne Fund is finantec by employers,

employees and the ■’tate, but the- stat*

ccntributicn has Gecreased in recent

years. Employees pay 0,5:% of earnings,

eiplovers 0,3%. In 1977 the state

reduced its contribution from 50% to

?5* of the joint er.pioyer and employee

contribution. The state also set a

licit of R7-m as its contribution.

In 1982 employer and employee

contributions amounted to R*19 235 155

compared to the state’ s R7-m. I f no

ceiling had been placed on the state's

25% contribution, it would have

amounted to R29 800 000.

PROBLEMS IN THE

FUND'S ADMINISTRATION

Advice offices for the unemployed, as

well as recent research, suggest that

there are multiple problems with the

Fund. These are well documented in

the memorandum, and include:

Employer responsibilities

According to the Unemployment Insurance

Act, employers are obliged to register

with the Department of Manpower and

take responsibility for workers' UIF

carcs. These record deductions and

information rega-cir.g termirc.tior of

employment. Employers are subject to

pens.ties for contravening these

regu.ations, but often dc not Jeduct

the correct amounts tr fa_l to obtain

UIF cards for employees. At m e height

of tne recession there were numerous

cases where migrant workers, forced to

return to the bantustans, could not

apply for UIF benefits as they had not

received a cara.

Employers often do not record the

correct reason for dismissal. Cards of

retrenched workers examined did not

record their retrenchment, rather

detailing employment termination under

tne category ’ other'. This meant

applicants for benefits were forced to

wait for a longer period before

receiving benefits.

WorKers have no control over their

UIF cards. And once they apply for

benefits they are often unjustly

penalised by claims officers who have

the power to interpret the reasons for

loss of employment. A right of appeal

s, but both ig.icrar.ct and complex

i r e ^ j c r a t i ' procedures prevert most

ur.r-j,]oye . wcrk- rs frcs exercisingtr, s.

Ar >? lcntior. a no p a y re r .re^rch dCf f

benefits

t:)v r.\ -ri;:s<. ions

::ich drafted th; -* r.c rar.uur. pointed

tc the lacic of operatic:. of clerks

at t!Lr offices, and long delays in the

payment of benefits.

The process of applying for UIF is

cumbersome. African workers are

required to register as work-seexers

and ottain a fore from the Department

of Co-operation and Development

certifying that they are locking for

employment. Before receiving this

fora, they have to prove that they

have applied unsuccessfully for a

number of Jobs. This procedure leaves

the unemployed completely vulnerable

to arbitrary and bureaucratic

procedure.

The Industrial Aid Society cites

the case of a man who applied for UIF

benefits in 1982. He was sent to a

factory which required a Code 10

driver, but as he had a Code 6 licence

he was not suitable for the job. Three

months later he was notified that his

application for benefits had been

refused on the grounds that he wa3 not

available for work.

The procedure surrounding the payouts

is equally problematic. Workers receive

incorrect amounts cr jscei-e them for

shorter periods tr.ari ■=..>:?* it*-1 . Hv/insr

to sign t register ’•?£-'lai i ' it- prc.v»

continuing u.i*r_ _ loynf’it in\ Ived.

travel to the i<lf 'i f ic s s . i -r vtitces

it is not persit.-e for claimants t-c

get there on a particular d v, anc

they forfeit thiir bentfics The net.!

to sign a register particularly

Glscrinlnat.es against workers in rural

areas who sometimes nave to travel

over 50 km to reach a UIF office.

Retrenched workers interviewed in

KwaZulu were either ignorant of ’JIF

benefits available, or became totally

disillusioned by regular trips to the

labour bureau to sign the register.

Many did not have the money to travel

the distance every two weeks. Migrant

workers who become unemployed are

forced to return to the bantustans to

receive UIF benefits. Their position

is made even more difficult as the

South African state has encouraged the

’ independent' bantustans to set up

unemployment insurance s'cnemer of

28

w ' n ^ * ; . . *2 .4** 3 5 L *2 i__i > 7 r**-^-i5*vsuarfljs$

* B 5 E ; £ 3 2 1 ' . ( Q S 68I^S E ^t2 ™MBE»irs3fn 5 fTO .^>feg,.tgj^giaa>ig at r <<• r ■: i ’.'

Workers waiting for unarplcyment benefits at Dukuza labour bureau,

Upper Tugela Location, KwaZulu

their own. This has enabled the central

state tc shift some cf the costs of

unemployment onto the fcantustan

administrations.The Black Sash reports widespread

corruption in the cashing of UIF

cheques. Clerks have been accused of

foraery, and workers wno do not have

oant’ accounts are force: to cash

chec-jes at local stores. Tney are

after not paid tne- fu .l ar-obnt. by

those cashing the cheques.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND

SUGGESTED CHANGES

The memorandum recommends that in

addition to unemployment insurance

which provides benefits to the

temocrarily unemployed, there should

also be a subsistence fund. This

would cover those wno have never

I scsche-as, ?-nd that the Fand h

■ central body; ’.har. \

wcr-red, and those who nc longer receive

U IT benefits. This scheme should

be state funded and set up to alleviate

the serious poverty which the

unemployed face.

Tr« memorandum suggest? tr.se s.li

categories cf workers be include- :.r.

the present unemployment insurari■?e org-i-iised

he : -.at*

ma. e s greater firartl.il cf'iitrihut_on:

an: trat. expioyers pay in ti.e stmt

an cur.: a: ecplojees. It propcr.es that

the state increases cenefits to at

least 60% of the average wage of the

las: 13 weeks; that claimants be giver,

exact information of due amounts and

wher. they will be received; that

workers receive one week's benefit for

every four weeks they have contributec

to the Fund, and that they get these

benefits for up to a year; that workers

shculd not have to wait longer than

se.'en days for benefits after

application; and that workers be giver

a choice of where they apply fcr ana

receive benefits.

Other recommendations include

increasing the number of c l a n s

offices; fortnightly payouts for urban

unemployed and monthly payments for

rural unemployed; a choice of payment

by cheque or cash; more control over

penalties and possibilities for appeal

against the decisions of claims

officers; better control over employers

ar.d the opportunity for employee

representation on the Unemployment

Insurance Board. It is also proposed

trial the public be fully informed

abcut the operation of the Fund,

including its investment policies.

Finally, the memorandum calls for

money in the Fund to be used on

prcjects for the unemployed, and for

mere to be spent on training schemes.

RESPONSES

According to the groups who compiled

the memorandum, there has not yet been

much response from employer

organisations. They have been told

that the Department of Manpower has

submitted a copy to the IMF Board 'for

consideration'.

But the memorandum has already

bee-, successful in generating

widespread intreat in unemployment

insurance. Some workers' organisations

have askfsd those involved ir. drafting

the memo to address meetings, and

community organisation:* nave been

as<ed to distribute the B e ^ f i t Charter.

The memorandum has played an

important role in providing information

and -aislng questions about the

unemployed. Its final impact will

depend on whether trade unions and

community organisations take up the

issjes raised. It is unlikely that the

recommendations will be implemented

without forceful pressure from these

groups.

Unemployment insurance raises a

numter of questions: will trade unions

see the issue of the unemployed as a

priority, or even an area which they

wish to participate in? To what extent

will they take up the question with

employer organisations?

'F03ATU, while not formally endorsing

the memorandum or the Benefit Charter,

is presently engaged in research on

ur,employment. Th* reirraiicn believes

that while the wh-_2e UJ: *c"ere nsc-ds

restructuring, ino 'tase. benefits

under the current syster *cu-d bankrupt I the Func. J

Capital and the state have indicated

concern over the threat posed by

increas.ng unemployment. But it is not

clear whether they would support a

better social security system as a way

of preventing social and political

instability. In count~ier litce the

United Kingdom and the United States,

expanded social security benefits have

had a conservative effect on unemployed i

and retired workers.

Unemployment benefits have become a

minimum right in some capitalist

societies. Who finances these remains

a source of conflict. Eut whoever

pays, welfare and social security do

not solve the unemployment problem.

There is no doubt that assistance to

South Africa 's unemployed can be

Improved, and that more control over

the Fund by contributors would be an

important step forward. But these

demands should go hand in hand with

programmes to train ar.d educate the

unemployed, labour intensive

industries, and the p r o d u c t io n o f

commodities that meet the m a j o r i t y ' s (

b a 3 i c neecs.

This article is hared rr the

Unemployment MemoranJ-. .. and the Draft

j Benefit Charter, ire fo : l e w .ng-trade

I unions hive endom 13 c-rth do?uni nta:

; African Food ana U s , 3 worker: Union

Amalgamated Blacr Jrion

; Cape Town Municipal Vc~>>ers Asrociation

Council of Unions cf South Afiica

Food and Canning Workers Union

General Workers Union

Municipal and General Workers Union

Orange-Vaal General Workers Union

Paper, Wood and Alliec Workers Union

Scooter Drivers and Tescates Union

SA Black Municipal and Allied Workers

SA Domestic Workers Association.

The autnors of the memorandum were

interviewed for this article, and use

was made cf Carole Cooper's Carnegie

Conference Paper (number 299), 'South

Africa 's Unemployment Fund: an

inadequate cover for the unemployed'.

Information regarding the memorandum

and the Benefit Charter can be obtained

from the Industrial Aid Society PO Box 26119

2032 Excom

Johannesburg

30

Labour Action

Joint ballot at Highveld SteelOn 1£ August, the Meta] and Allied

Vcrr er-s Union (MAW) and the predtminantly white South African

Boilermakers Society voted together in

favour of strike action at four

divisions and a subsidiary of Anglo's

massive Highveld Steel Corporation.

The vote, and the co-operation of

white and black unions that preceded it ,

sets a landmark precedent for labour

organisation.

KAsj rebuilt its Highveld base lart

year, after a crushing defeat in 1982

wher. 1 200 workers v >re retrenched.

Until recently, however, it was unable

to institute effective opposition over

wage demands, partly because white

unions in the plant generally accepted

management offers.

B-;t during industrial council

negtiaticns this year, both MAWU and

the Boilermakers refused to accept

proposed increases. Management's wage

offer was for 7 - 13% increases, the

same as SEIFSA'b offer in the industrial

council. This meant a 20c nourly

increase for labourers and a 40c

increase for artisans.

At the first in-plant bargaining

meeting after the industrial council,

the *r.ite unions declared disputes over

wages. Present were the Boilermakers,

the :'3ter en Staal Unie and the

Amalgamated Engineering Union. MAWU

was not present but at a subsequent

meeting it also declared a dispute with

management. Alb unions demanded the

right to report back to their

membership and meetings of all unions'

members were held.Yster en Staal finally accepted

management's offer. The AEU neither

accepted or rejected the offer, and

their position remains unclear.

The Boilermakers and MAWU opted to

take further action. Their shop

stewards held joint meetings and

decided to go aiead with an industrial

action ballot.

The ballot, was held over three days.

On the first two, the three Witbank

divisions (Highveld, Ventra and Rand

Carbide) and a subsiduary, Trans Alloy,

voted. On the third day a ballot was

held at Mapocho mine.

Legally two ballots had to be taken,

| one for each of the unions. >'AWU and

! the Boilermakers decided to hole a

I third ta. lc1. for workers, wr.o w«=re not

' n.eir.bjrs of either ur.ion.

The o^icor'ti was rescinding v in

i favcur of s '.n ke action Well over 93%

of KAWU membership voted i.i favour.70X of the Boilermakers votea in favour.

Ir. the third informal bailot. more than

-90G of the 89£ white wo.'tors celor.^ing

to other unions -er.t against their anion

o ffic ia ls1 instructions az.d voted in

favour of industrial action. Over 70%

of the work-foree of about I 700 workers,

voted for industrial action.

The dispute resulted in increased

support and membership for tcth unions.

MAWU signed up 343 new members arid the

Boilermakers have gained at lesst 50

new members who have switched

allegiance from Yster en Staal arid the

Mineworkers Union.

The Boilermakers and MAWU were able

to demand that wage negotiations be

re—opened from a position of strength.

Management agreed, and talks began on

Friday, 31 August. Together, the

unions forced an intransigent management

('consistently arrogant and

antogonistic' was one organiser's

description) to renegotiate.

The outcome will affect the metal

industry as a whole. Highveld Steel

management has considerable influence

within SEIFSA. Other SEIFSA affiliates

are liKeXv to follow Highveld's exar.ipj.e.

31 rnssssmmssmm, ----- » i g g a a - g g i a i

According to MAWU's orgar.; ser at

Highveld, the co-operation of the two

unions representing black unski 1 lei

workers and white skilled artisans was

in part made possible by MAWJ’ s

Darticipation in the in-noose

bargaining. MAWU's move into the

industrial council, while continuing

plant-based negotiations appears to be

paying o ff.

The issue also generated a split in

the white unions. Boilermakers, having

placed themselves firmly against

management, have gained support, while

those unions which accepted management

offers lost members. Also for the first

time, white workers went against express

union instructions and voted together

with black workers. So there has been

a shift away from the pure white trade

unionism of unions like Yster en Staal.

A MAWU spokesman believes that still

| rr.crc v n itc workers ha".'* voted ,

I had i t not been fo r rjim>_rn that

' r a n ‘igener.t would in:rea-.e 1 jlsc-

t .> .‘5.5C O i f th e y v o t e c . rSur.ojr s ^ i d t w,

. ; *rni te w o r K e r s *■ n t t r, s t r i k e t “".-:\

were i n d a n g e r o f th>. _r h ou ses

e n t i r e l y .

The question is which way white

workers will finally gc. One V.AW

organiser said, 'It is difficult tc say

what future relation.; between MAWU and

Boilermakers will b e , put there has

been good co-operaticn between shop

stewards of both unions. It depends on

responses from the shop floor. I f

there is co-operation, we will build on it .

For the first time in South Africa,

management now faces a united front of

both skilled and unskilled and black

and white workers.

Penge miners lose battleOn 14 July, 1 700 workers at the Penge

asbestos mine went on strike. Workers

demanded a RIO per ten hour shift

increase and the recognition of the

Black Allied Mining and Construction

Workers Union (BAMCWU). Other grievances

were overlong working hoars and

dangerous working conditions.

BAMCWU has struggled for recognition

at Penge mine since 1982. It has

continually met an intransigent

management which refuses to recognise

officials as worker representatives. The union's access agreement tc organise

on the mine was cancelled during the

strike. BAMCWU claims 90% representation

at Fenge Mine. Penge is owned by the

Griqualand Exploration and Finance

Company (GSFCO), a subsidiary of GEN’COF:.

I

THE STHIKE

After four days on strik? all the

workers were fired, t

•;onL-?.s+ently refjsed tc r.eet v .zr w z : rerreftit.i-at. »■«.«: sr,<j ri the

union permits!in to address s.riking

workers. Instead, . t wa~ >'il.lir.2tc negotiate with tne v.rks cc-.nittee,

a ermraittee appoir ec’ by m&napenent and

rejected by the majcrity of the

work—force•

Police stood by as ► or-.ers gathered

in the mine compound. They had refused

to collect their severance pay.

Production was at a standstill. It was

only then that management agree.? to

meet BAMCWU representatives.

Tne two subsequent meetings between

BAMCWU and Penge management »ere

unsuccessful. Management refused to

reconsider the eviction of workers

froa the hostels, saying that since

the strike was illegc.l, workers had

effectively dismissed themselves from

the.r jobs. They also refused to

discuss the recruitment of 460 scabs.

These new workers were drawn from an

extensive pool of unemployed who live

in the area. The scabs were miners who

had been retrenched from asbestos nines

in the area. So limited production at

Pengs was soon underway.

The union then opposed the eviction

court order brought by management to

get workers out of the mine hostels.

BAMCVU claimed that management had not

followed the health examination

procedures required for worker

d isaissal. Mine workers should have

beer. X-rayed on the date of discharge

or vithin 30 days thereafter. The _

Supreme Court over-ruled this claim as

invalid .After the strike GEFCO management

offered to re-er.ploy 1 000 workers.

Workers however deuanded that all

scats leave the mine and that they be

reinstated with no loss of pay and at

the same rate of pay. Management

refused, and began recruiting labour

froc Lesotho and the Trarskei through

TEEA, the Chamte- of Mines’ recruiter

agency. Management therefore bypasieu

local unemployed.Striking workers finally decided to

accept severance pay anc leave the

compound. BAMCWU stated that workers'

decision to finally cojlect their

severance pay was because 'they fee] if

the;/ do not go back, the company will

be forced to employ inexperienced

recruits and in this way, production

will s u ffe r '.

EFFECTS ON GEFCO

But w ill this action affect GE.-C0

substantially? The evidence suggests

not. GEFCO at present has a total

monopoly over the mining and

distribution of both blue(crocidolite)

and brown(amosite) asbestos. GEFCO's

net income after tax this year was

------- 33

R25—ir, up sever, r.ijlior. fror.i last year.

It hsS reduccQ capital expenditure fnor

?{9,f'-n to ^ 5 ,0-- . Ir. 3dci~icn, the

asoestof. rines arc or..y ieing *orked at

tm uiu 50'* capac: . • . Ir. Gr.NCGr-

stepped releasing ; roc'-:tior, ar;c sai.es

figures for its nines, tut expert sales

for asbestos in ::e ..sec . £:-:ucrts to the

US, tne IK ari Western L-'ropc are

dropping, probably rtia.s** of increasing

awareness of -the hc~.tr. hazards of

asbestos use. Lu* it is fairly certain

that exports to the Far £ast are

increasing, where shipping cost:, are

less, and health ccaes less stringent.

t

BAMCVU ORGANISATION A7 PENGE

The extent of BAMCWU's cn-the-ground

organisation at the Per.je mine is

unclear. It claims to have signed up

90% of the work-foree before and during

the strike and to have 'lets of shcp

stewards'. The union claims that its

organisation is more community than

production based.

The area is plagued by an extremely

high level of unemployment. Many

residents are lorg-terr sufferers from

asbestos-related diseases. Since the

196Gs, retrenchment has continually-

exacerbated the unemployment p r e fe r .

The work-force of F en£- nine h >s beer,

reduced from about 15 Zj0 in the l^oCt

to 1 700 befo-e the rT .i :e ir Ju.v this

year. BAMCWU says tn-et tv.- close tias

between the <tork—f - 0 1 *" ; - . '-ne ... '

the local populfctj n ‘ •"li.t-.ter

) organisation,

Wages were- a ct: -rsi. : r t for the

union during tre we e ,

| t : f .ing only P £.*■'■ “ per ‘ur sh ift ,

p.,.d the ".:ghf?t id *c rke. “ , ‘ hose

with 2b or more yecrs service, o-u;

received R2el per mcr«th. But recause of

the large numbers of -orke* vno 5u:fer

from asbestosis, mesothelioma, £-. latal ,

cancel of the lung lining, and other

asoestos-rel atrec aiseE-se*;, t.ve issue

of workmen's compensation .s important

for tne workers and the community.

BAMCWU says it has recently i.e^ur to

focus or. such healtr. ar.d safety issues.

I t has emphasised these curing

recognition talks with management. The

union is also keeping records cf

members who have contracted occupation-

related diseases, in order to assist

workers with compensation claims.

Health and safety precautions at

Penge are inadequate, claims BAMCWU.

% > . - .,

■ • ’<*UdiLJj.u&&±. v m .***. * . - wA Penge minei laid off after contracting ssbesto^is.

Workers are examined ever; nine months.

Those workers found to ht 'e a-.sbesto.sis

or related diseases are laid o ff .

Compensation includes a lump sum of

between R1 490 for asbestosis

sufferers and R1 790 for those who have

TB and asbestosis. The union claims

that this sum does not include refunded

pension money or unemployment insurance.

.ne dilemma facing Penge workers has been a classic catch 22. The choice was

usbestor;s ane^p. - it.er.

potential K illers. *ci*-er

in their jobs anc ;<e expc

health hazards. Cr tN.y "

n. c- '.-.iient to irnprov’e worj

health conditions or. the

either a drop in .ages t/r

improved conditions, or t:

unemployment in an area v:f

almost impossible to come

■ ea

-Id

. r.t

'.o r,i -c.--

:rcs3

and

anc f c . e

Tianager.ent

■ere j o b s are

Cv .

Hlobane findings and finesConsequences of the Hlobane Cclllery

disaster in September last year

continue to unfold. Last February's

inquest/enquiry into the methane

explosion which killed 68 miners found

that the final act of negligence in

the causal chain leading to the blast

was the failure of a deceased white

miner to test for methane.

The presiding magistrate found that

the owners of Hlobane Colliery should

be held criminally responsible for

34

this negligence, and for the death of

the 68 miners. Counsel representing

five of the dead miners' families

stressed that 2 i Mines anc Vcrks Act

regulations had been contravened, sone repeatedly.

In a criminal case held in Vrvheid

in August, the Vryheid Railway Ccal

and Iron Company, an ISCOF subsidiary

which owns Hlobane, was cha-sed. Mine

manager David Watson represented the

company, anc alsc faced charges _n his

own capacity, along with a shift boss

and wr.ite miner.

According to the Mines and Works

Act, an individual act of negligence

which endangers the safety of persons

carries a fine of up to R1 000. The

company pleaded guilty to the charge

relating to the presence of dangerous

non-fiameproof equipment at the blast

site, and was fined R^OO. Watson was

found guilty, cautioned and discharged.

Shift boss Petrus Claasens was fined

R20C for neglecting to obey an order

from the mine foreman to close a hole

in or.e of the airways. Robert Morgan,

a miner, was fined R200 for falling to

carry out Claasens' instruction to

close the hole. They had pleaded

guilty to these charges.

There had been some doubt that the

attorney general's office would proceed

with marges. Cyril Ramaphosa, general

secretary of the National Union of

Mlneworkers, expressed surprise that

the urion was not told that the case

was pending. In the event, the case

showed signs of being ill-prepared.

The cr.arge sheet shows a random

selection of offences exposed in the

enquiry, with others omitted altogether.

One of the three counts on which the

mine owners were found guilty presents

a striking example: the 12 pieces of ncr/-flameproof equipment found

at the explosion site could have

constituted 12 charges, rather than

one.

The nominal fine imposed on the

owners could be seen as a wrist-slap,

with blame laid largely on the three

individual mine employees, however,

all the guilty pleas were in effect an

admission of liability .

Families of about 40 of the deceased

are applying for increased compensation

to the Workmen’ s Compensation Court.

Under the Act, increased compensation

car. be awarded where an accident was

caused bv negligence of a mine employee

in a supervisory or higher position,

or where a patent defect was involved;

that is , defective equipment which

responsible people negligently failed

to -erair.

Over the nine year pericd between

197 ' ar.a 1963, only 23 increased

con.pe.--sation claims were made - none

of them in the mining industry. As one

lawyer put it , increased compensation

is 'strikingly underused', probably

because of widespread ignorance about

it. L'ricnisation on tne mines may

change this pattern.

Hlobane has not set any precedents

so far, but it has had an impact.

It has indicated tc tne Chamber of

Mir.es that NUM is seri:_c about mine

safety, and will tackle the issue in a

serious way. At the er.r n r y , for

example, Nl'M's team of LiJyers and

mining experts was the rest prepared.

NUM has also gained rer-esentaticn on

tne Chamber of Mine?' r-evention of

Accidents Committee.

The stranglehold on te-nnical

knowledge, arising free tne fact that

South African mining enrerts are

almost exclusively mine employees, was

broken: at least in the coal mining

industry, there is a crrsiderable body

of Independent overseas expertise tnat

was, anc can be used ty unions as

expert evidence.

In the wake of the i'-_est the

government mining engineer, JH

Badenhorst, was higr.lv critical cf

Hlobane's techniques ft.* methane

detection, and its anticuated

ventilation system. He remarked tnat

eighteenth century ventilation was

being used with twentieth century

mining technology.

Though there might be some dcubt

about safety inspection prior to

the disaster (see box), tne inspector

cf mines conducted a thtrough

investigation into the er-.piosicr and Its causes.

On the issue of safet;- ratings for

mines, the Chamber has ccr.ceced that

Hlobane was not inspect*: properly. In

terns of the Chamber's complex loss

control system, a mine is awarder a

number of stars, accorcitg tc its

performance in terms cf 21 separate

elements. Hlobane had be?-. awarded

four stars after its precious audit by

the Chamber's mine safety division.

Critics argue that the rysteir,

designed by the Interna: tonal Lest,

Control Institute in the ’'SA, cigfct be

{•etropnate for factories, but i? not

re for mines. Its com .s are

inr.L-prcpnrto, they rt; . stressing

good housekeeper..;' c. •- safety

precautions, at the wo r T i e /

p-»i-!t to the fsct that write repcrtatlt*

injuries : ..taping the ; i ' t : i fror -•ci-1;

i or Tore thf-r. s.v.fts detreat-c

last ye;ir. ieaths ri - nr:.

The Chamber rep.iee at rue t;rafe

of the Hlobane e x p l o s i o n .it hac been

‘ * months s ^ n c e the l a s : a j d i t ; 3 i s o .

there nad been a change -f management

two-and-a-half months before the

disaster, which night have affected

the reporting system.

The Chamber argues that it takes

tine for routine habits of sarety

precaution to percolate down to the

workface, and points to the decline in

mine death figures for the first six

months of the year.

A dilemma pointed cut by critics is

tnat time spent on safety precautions

at the work-place takes up work time

not directly used in production. At

Hlctane Colliery, as in South Africa 's

nines in general, white miners'

productivity bonuses depend on the

output, of teacs cf black workers who

work a r, f "act. As a resjl! wnite

miners have nc direct incentive to

ensjre safety at the expanse cf

production output.

Feform m South African mine safety

legislation usually fciicws mine

disasters. The last lajor acendr’ent tc

the Mines and Wcrks Act of 1970 grew

..ut of the Coalbroor: disaster ten

years earlier' - after a lengthy

cocnissior, of enquiry wnose report was never published in full. Hopefully, of

course, it will not take until 1993 for necessary reforms emerging from

the Hlobare disaster to be drafted.

x - <' ■■ ; • •

■ ■ ■ • ■ • ’m inquest/ertgiiiry into the nlobar.e explosion In February this year, the

.ng negligent practices were erpceed;■£*>?>& > • ■ .» '•

•/TSfca atipolated *m Lm t cf air frequently did net to d l the coal

* , At .the tine, a d jk* had been mined, releasing an inci'sased amount of

^"VaetSaite. So special precautions were taken, end the mine ventilation officernotified,

return airway was broken in no, reducing the

amount of sir at LQe paal face ty more than half. A ainer was instructed to

=cloa* the hoi a and failed to do so;

■ * 'Hine cfficifilC cn idufcv at the time did net check whether he had carrier!

.oat ai.3 tasK;

'* '* r*Q| 29 pieces o f wjaipcent found at the site of the explosion, 1 2 were act

. flameprooff and coaitf give off sparks. The court found that one of these,

^coel Bcoop 5 6 , had probably ignited the explosion;

'V *- ,* »e<*i before theexplo alon , a asiner reported that he had found a

dangerously h ig» *ethann level af Mine regulations stipulate that the

/N ; presence- of gar ®M£t_ fca. reported by mine management to the inspector cf

■ Tor icreotigetion- This was neglected;

K*>i<0fcly four of tan' lasrpu required by lav to monitor methane levels were

fTcrc after the explosion. Orly one cf the four was fitted with a apcclal

jysbe attachment to "detect methane layer© on the min* roof;

* _ vTt.e coal dust -t?»a probably not been watered down because of ar>

ic<:arraptioc of vatar supply at the time of the accident;

* ' 3e?pite. tfte lack o f vater, production uf.s not halted;

-•* :<3ise bi*attiC9 aeterial used co direct air- along the virkface wan not

fix«p ro o r ,V ^d d>4;-not sieet SABS specification*.^ A - ' V' N . • ‘ ;.

J* * %■ . ■ : '¥<••• ■ : ' ! * V --S' • tv. V * -

«n»

Strikes and DisputesC O M P A N Y A N D A R E A ti N I 0 N I S S U E

TRANSVAAL

Alfa Romeo

(Assembly plant)

Erits

NAx-.WiJ Workers crrsme- ? 5Cc acrcs^

the-'board incr«s:-'. Management

offered 1 1c

Bold Stone

(Tombstone factory)

Pretoria

N j atL Union recognition

Bophuthatswana Transport

Holdings (BTH)

Pitso transport depot

Erasmus

Team Workers

Union

Re-instatement of two dismissed

bus drivers;

Union recognition

CHT Manufacturing

(Motor components)

Rosslyn

NAAWU Fe-instatemer.t of 120 NAAWU

members fired on 2^ February

for refusing to work overtime

Chubby Chicks

Potchefstroom

FBWU Police action against unionist

adressing worker gathering

outside factory during strike

Diesel Electric

(Automobile spares)

Johannesburg

Harassment of shop stewards;

Union recognition;

Wage increase

Edgars CCAWUSA Wage negotiations

Hercules Cold Storage

Pretoria

RAWU/NGWU Union recognition

Iliman Plastics

(four plants)

KAWU Re-instatement of fired worker

at Booysens plant

Industrial Leatherworks

Johannesburg

GAWU Wage negotiations outside

industrial council;

Union recogr_ticn

= 37 s

W O R K E R S

800 09-16.07.84 Workers demanded a 5Or. across-the-board increase.

Management offered 11c, negctieticns deaalc.ked,

and workers struck. NAAW'J acceptea a subsequent

management offer of an immediate "6c increase,

with a further 4c in October.

70 Mid-July -

26 .07 .94

Bold Stone became only the second employer to

allege that a unior. was guilty of an unfair labour

practice. On 20 July, at least seven cf the

strikers were arrested by police investigating

Intimidation Act charges.

At a meeting of the industrial council called to

discuss the dispute, NGWU agreed that strikers

would return to work on 26 July.

300 30 .07 .84 -

03 .08 .84

Twelve workers were injured and four arrested

when Bophuthatswana police batcn-charged strikers.

The strike ended with Bophuthatswana authorities

agreed tc recognise the union unde; the new

Industrial Conciliation Act once tne union 'gets

itself organised'.

24 .02 .84 -

06 .08 .84

Th 2 industrial court ordereo the err. panv tc

re-instate the workers fror ? August. NA/.WL

indicater disappeartaent tnst re-\ nsv* tever.t was

not fror the February date of dis.-i a:=p.i.

Sikn&khsr.e was convicted with 2'- wzrxtrs for

holding an illegal gacnering the factory

during a dispute. Lawyers ji .. ? r : u . affinst this

-^ecisior. cf a rotchtfstrcon re?... :•?.«. i rj.Kirtrate.

170 13 .07 .84 -

2 OCO Wags increases affecting 2 COO Edgarr. workers

countrywide, ranging between P^8 and P65, to be

implemented from 1' July, were agreed to.

The con.pany refuses to recognise tn.e union,

which has declared a dispute and threatened

a consumer boycott of Hansa Meats.

i 400 27 .06 .84 Workers fired after cowr.ing tools in solidarity

with a dismissed colleague. Negotiations, but

no settlement.

♦ 300 08-09.08.84 Workers went on strike after the company refused

to negotiate wages outside of the industrial

council agreeaent. Workers ignored a management

ultimatum tc return to work, and were dismissed.

C O M P A N Y A N D A R E A U N I O N I S S U E

M ice's Kitchen Re-ir.statement of three

dismissed workers

Par. African Shopfitters

Geraiston

BAMCWU Fe-instatement of

dismissed wor..er

Park President Construction

Wadeville

BAMCWU Victimisation of union members;

dismissal of two shop stewards

and 17 workers

PL'TCO TGWU

TAWU

Wage increases and other

ber.efi ts

Siaba Quix

Iaar.do

SFAWU fie-instateaent of three

dismissed workers

South African E.-eweries

Watloo Depot

FFWU No-ccnficence vote in management

appointee workr cour.ci:

Supercola

Rcsslyn

N’GWU Wage increji-es

Tempest International

(radio manufacturers)

Pietersburg and Seshego

BEEWU Wage m crfaies,

■j‘;i recognj tior.:

Stop to ur.fa^r dismi sr-a i •

Faid mat e m it v lea/e

Trar.svaal Steel and Reinforcing

Pietersburg

33WU Wage increases;

Union recognition

Trident Steel

Geraiston

SEAWU After a dispute in July ever

wage increases, mcst employees

were disaissed. On 6 August,

SEAWU members picketed the

factory. Management obtained a

court interdict preventing

the picketing

ORANGE FREE STATE

Zeederberg and Toristo Hotels,

Krocnstad

CCAWUSA Wages and overtime pay;

Delays in wage payment;

Victimisation

•

W O R K E R S D A T E E V E N T S A N D O U T C O M E

30 Mid-July

KOO 30-31.07.8- Management agreed to reinstate the dismissed

worker. Strikers returned to work.

09-OS.8A -*

The unicr. has laid a complaint against the

company with the industrial council and has

.threatened legal action.

8 600 0 E .0 8 .8* After a year long dispute with PITCO, the unions

negotiated a 12% pay increase fcr 6 600 employees.

Workers will also receive an additional paid public

holiday, an increased tool allowance, maternity

benefits with guaranteed re-employment, extended

funeral benefits, and increased hospital fees

reimbursement.

40G 13-08.64 Striking- workers dismissed. The union claims that

the dismissals violate an agreement net to fire

strikers for three days after they have downed

tools. Management claims workers had stopped work

four tines in three weeks.

200 Mid-August Talks between the union and management due to

begin on 5 September.

250 16-23.07.84 Management agreed to negotiate wages with tne

union. Strikers returned to work.

: 700 06-06. O S .84 Management threatened to close factory i f workers

aid not return. Workers mandated union officials

to discuss their dennnds with marhgement, and

returned to work.

20 ' 3 . C8 £- V.nai^'t.sr.t ac-rfed t: t ? 3 k tc the risr through

,U-{L>_ sc.v:r>err 3rd ci rector j . Wc r»-?r* resolved tc

stay c j* until :.r»«:r aema .es were r.-t.

125 1 5. 06. &*! Aft^r worKerj- had dc-manoec wigt Srcreese.n, tney

were cJegeo- y forced t.o cror.r-t tetwe«:i overtime

won. anc' cisraissal. Shop stevards ctsmarjd«d to

negotiate the. isiue wj tn mansgf mer.t. tut the

parties deadloc<:ea. '<25 worxers -e.-e ciamissti,

ar.d the union aeclarecl a dispute with the

compar.v.

H2 3r . 0" . 8i( - The union, which claims representative membership

attempted to contact management of botn hotels,

tut without success.

... «rt»

C O M P A N Y A N D A R t A U N I O N I 5 S U E

EASTERN CAFE

Framt

East London

SAAKU Deduction of membership dues

for TUCSA’ s TWIU

Volkswagen

Uitenhage

NAAWU

/

Scuffle between white foreman

and black worker, and

management's response to this

WESTERN CAPE

Dairybelle

Cape Town

RAW'J Company's labour recruiting

system

Everite

Eracker.fell

CVfU

:. . . .

C.narges agairst five ur or

ahop t-Xviz rds

PA Concrete Products NJrt U

NATAL

aec :

Sew Germany

SACWU Unfair distribution of

short tine

Bakers Ltd SFAWU Workers demanded R2C across-the-

board increase. Management

offered P12.50

BT.~ Sarmcol

Howick

MAWU Wage dispute led to legal strike

ballot and overtime ban

Ccr.solidated Woodwaahing and

Processing (Frame group)

Pinetown

NUTW Wage increases in line with

those granted other Frame

employees

41

%i.

*1

W O R K E R S

In itially 800,

then 4 500

In itially 300,

then *• 000

%600

! 00

(• 160

SCO

911

1 6C

D A T E

2 i .0 7 .a u -

E V E N T S A N D O U T C O M E

Workers objected to the deduction of dues for

the TUCSA-affiliated TWIU. At first 800 struck,

then the entire work-force of 4 500 downed tools.

Mid-July; I Arter a scuffle between a white foreman and a

End July. | black worker, workers downed tools. The body

Plant closed I shcp could not continue operating, and workers in

0 7 . 0 6 , re- I that f ection were temoorarily laid off without

opened 14.08. | struck, demanding compensation for thelay-off period. After negotiations with

management, they returned to work.

After another work stoppage in early August,

the plant was closed down, and 4 000 workers

tempora-i ] laic off. It was re-opened on ^4

August when strikers agreed to return.

05 .07 .8J - In the company's recruiting system, workers are

not given caJj-in carcs. This jeopardises their

cnanges of qualifying for penr.ar.frit urban

residence terns of influx control legislation.

Talks between the company and RAW deadlocked, and the strjke continued.

20-23.0^. 8L Workers demanded that management withdraw

charges against five shop stewa.-u;. arrested

for allegedly damaging a company office.

Management rejected the demmc, and workers returned.

Late August. Striking contract workers were fired, and then

arrestee: for being in the Western Cape illegally.

16-19.07.84

13.08.34

Returned to work after three days., ar.d

resumed normal working hours._____________

Dispute referred to industrial council on

17 August.

Workers returned to work.

April 198-

14.08.84Union accepted minimum wage of R329 per month.

Negotiated half a day unpaid leave on labour day.

16-2 0 .0 7 .84 | Frame refused to negotiate.

142 workers fired after refusing to meet a

return-to-work deadline.

42

C O M P A N Y A N D A R E A U N I O N I S S U E

Dunlop Tyre Company

Durban

MAWU Dismissal of four union

members

/

Dunlop Tyre Conpany

Ladysmith

MAWU Sympathy strike with Durbar

workers

Dunlop Tyre Company

Benrr.i

CW1U Threaten.?:; r;,r.pat.hy str.ke

wit’.-) PLi'.or -i;r<e's

Durban City Council

Electricity Department

African Workers

Association

Wage derand of '2 9 across-the-

board Pfrje ted 4%

increase ot ;'er

Fedics Food Services

University of Natal

CCAWUSA Heinstatement of dismissed

workers;

Wage increases

Frame Consolidated Cotton

Corporation

New Germany

NUTW Dispute over union recognition

at Franetex, Seltex, Pinetex,

Natal Knitting Mill and

Nortex

Goodhope Concrete Pipes

Pietermaritzburg

Wage increases and benefits,

including pensions

Hart Ltd

Umbilc

MAWU 20% wage increase

Keely Forwarding

Durban

GWU Company paid workers below

minimum wage without

permission of Department of

Manpower

KwaZulu Development

Corporation

SFAWU Wage aispute

Collection Number: AK2117 DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985 - 1989 PUBLISHER: Publisher:-Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:-Johannesburg ©2012

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