ross. on christian philosophy

8/11/2019 Ross. on Christian Philosophy

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Hegeler Institute

ON CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: UNA VERA PHILOSOPHIA?Author(s): James F. RossSource: The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 3, Christian Philosophy (JULY 1992), pp. 354-380Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903298 .Accessed: 03/11/2013 14:49

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ON CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: UNA VERAPHILOSOPHIAl

I. INTRODUCTION

We have to framea

position that fits philosophyas

it is done now, butrespects its perennial features yet also responds to the literature concerningmedieval writers1 and the recent suggestions for contemporary philosophy.2

Philosophy, as Aquinas, and many others, described it?as a demonstrative progression from self-evident premises to evident (or even necessary[Scotus]) conclusions?is rarely attempted nowadays, even by "scholastic" philosophers. Demonstrative success?that is, entirely to eliminate

competitors to one's conclusions?is not the expectation now, nor has itbeen the achievement of philosophers historically. Thus, some restrictionsupon starting points may be relaxed as unnecessary, e.g., that they be self

evident.Nevertheless, the idea that one is not entitled to premise things one

does not find out on one's own, and that others cannot evaluate publiclyand interpersonally, seems to retain force, though not unqualified force.For, pulling against that restriction are, first, the recognition that a gooddeal of what we know independently in fact comes by a system of reliances(e.g., reliance on measuring instruments from spoons to micrometers; onthe authenticity of texts we cannot check; on records made by others; onstatistical theories one cannot verify, and on traditions of how to makeobservations and to record them, and even on traditions of how to evaluate

reasoning and classify data, on traditions of logic, and even on ourmemories and senses) and that we are entitled to rely upon such things, withcaution. Secondly, we recognize that the rational basis for some importantcommitments is to be found both in natural faith (in our parents) and inrefined feelings by which commitments are obtained and sustained. Stablecommitment ismore amatter of appraising and exercising the rational functions of the will (aimed at our good3), than it is amatter of items of evidenceor individual arguments. The upshot is that philosophy, and science in

general, does not have the self-evident, or clear and distinct, beginnings envisioned by Aristotle's commentators and

adaptors,or even

byDescartes

and other modern philosophers. Rather, both philosophy and science aresystems of commitment, often based on comprehension, but as much basedon reliances, quite different in origin and structure from what is typically

Copyright 1992, THEMONIST, La Salle, IL 61301.

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ON CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 355

proposed. Still, in certain areas of science, for instance, general mechanics,statistical theory of gasses, and optics, the outcome is like the derivation of

many and varied truths from a few first principles that are evident on experienced consideration. And some areas of philosophy contain equally impressive reasoning, for instance, as to why there cannot be a satisfactoryphenomenalist analysis of physical-object statements, or why the principleof verifiability is not an adequate principle of meaningfulness, or (to takemore classical themes) why causation cannot account for being-as-such, orwhy possibility cannot be prior to being-as-such, or why act is prior topotency absolutely. Some considerations seem to be dispositive, tomake thecomprehension so elementary as to put the burden wholly on anychallenger. But those are the exceptions, even though there may be many ofthem. In general, important and disputed points are not directly resolved byargument, but are (as Jung said of conflicts) transcended or transformed byshifts of evaluation. Arguments do not, typically, change minds on substantial issues like the existence of God, the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul, points central to Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes, oreven on ontological issues like the relationships of universals, commonnatures and individuation, among

Aquinas, Scotus,and Ockham. Never

theless, the arguments are essential elements in the cognitive progression,forming the steps to which a response makes an advance.

Because we are not doing demonstrations for the most part, we have toreconsider whether, with certain cautions, we can employ knowledge wehave gained by revelation.4 For as long as the starting points are true andreasonably believed, what will be the basis for excluding them? Maybe we

will have to fall back on the traditional argument that philosophy is essentially an endeavour on our own, without elements provided only by publicrevelation, and that theology isa similar endeavour towhich revelation isan

integral starting point. That will put Plantinga's recommended "ChristianPhilosophy,"5 which is to be marked by its outright theistic commitment(not, however, presented as something discovered or proved by merely rational inquiry) into the category of theology. The view I develop hereassumes that we can prove the existence of God and that the "faithelements" that make a philosophy Christian are quite different from that.Similarly, the classical monotheist philosophers, from Aristotle throughAugustine, Anselm, Maimonides, Avicenna, Averro?s, Albertus Magnus,Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, and Leibnitz, were agreed that onecan demonstrate the existence of God. Thus itwas not their theism, or even

their conviction about proof, that marked them as Christian, Muslim orJewish philosophers, but other elements of their faith that, at least by

magnetism, affected their philosophies.



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356 JAMES F. ROSS

Today in philosophy where proof is attempted, it is more likely to be

"proof by a preponderance of the evidence," or "proof by clear and con

vincing evidence," or "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (see Section V,below), rather than proof with the additional marks of a demonstration,namely, that it eliminates all counterpossibilities to its conclusion.Sometimes we can reach demonstrative standard; but those are not the

points about which there is division both in principle and in lived conviction.

Manyof the observations made in the context of the famous discussion

of the "Christian philosophies" of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, St.

Thomas, and Duns Scotus,6 are still enlightening and will be adapted here.But the framing assumption that philosophy is a demonstrative science hasto be put aside for more limited objectives. Still, I think the reality of God isaccessible to rational inquiry and can be proved by considerations that

range?according to the dispositions of those who examine them?from "a

preponderance of the evidence" to "beyond a reasonable doubt," thoughfalling short of the finality of demonstration. In any case, it is otherfeatures that make a philosophy Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and

Taoist.The Outcome.

Thus we can come directly to the issue as it exists now, and answerwithout reservation. Of course, there isChristian philosophy in at least fouruseful senses, each of which I will discuss: (1) when the philosophy has

distinctively Christian insights into what is involved in a question of interestto philosophers regardless of their faiths, e.g., "Can a thing be of morethan one nature or quiddity?" (Incarnation); (2)when the philosopher considers Christian revelation indispensable as a source of considerations to be

accommodated, negatively or positively, (even if not mentioned or madepart of the doctrine)?here E. Gilson's famous notion seems to apply, asdoes what J. Wippel calls "being Christian in the moment of discovery";7(3) when the basic issue (of morality, of law, of cognition, the will, or even

being) cannot even be comprehensively framed neutrally to the Christianfaith: what is true human freedom? the ability to attain life with God);

what is a properly functioning cognitive system? (one prior to the Fall or

partly restored by grace, or given the blessed in accord with original divine

design); what is the problem of evil? (the mystery of God's creating deathand

permitting evil);8and

(4) lastly,but most

distinctively,when the whole

Christian Wisdom, including not only the disciplined and articulate

understanding of life and of the path for attaining fulfilment, but also its



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elaboration into Christian civilization, with all its arts, sciences,technologies and means for developing human potential, is compared contrastively to other Wisdoms and Ways, ranging from the philosophies of thepagans that Augustine considers, to other secular or pagan (Greek, Roman)wisdoms, other religions (Buddhist, Hindu), other ethical systems (Confucian), and even other "folk mythologies," the stories and rituals by whichpeople (say, native American) integrate individual and community life withall of nature. For it is exactly in such a contrastive context that Augustine'squestion becomes central: which is the one true philosophy? And

Augustine's answer becomes one we can adopt: "Christianitas est una veraphilosophia," though my application of the word ismore inclusive than his,and "Christianity" as a philosophy has not one or a few expressions, or anyone more authoritative than all others or any that is even consistent on allpoints.

II. PHILOSOPHY AS ARTICULATEDCOMPREHENSION

Philosophy as an intellectual discipline ismarked from its beginnings

by the cogent articulation, through courses of connected reasoning, of comprehension of questions about the ultimate "causes" of things. Not allphilosophy is expressed as connected courses of reasoning; other activities

may serve related ends. For instance, Plato used myths, stories, analogies,dramatic tension, historical connections and even characters who displaythe positions and temperaments being examined. Still, the dominant featureof the discipline is its articulated reasoning in aid of comprehension of thekind that terminates the inquiry with an insight that satisfies the originatingquestioning.

Mastery at philosophy as a discipline isdisplayed by concert-quality ar

ticulation of connected reasoning about ultimate matters, along with extraordinary skills at communication, some of which are skills at disclosure(see Plato, Sartre, and Wittgenstein). Since the object of philosophy, likescience, is expressed comprehension that terminates inquiry with insight,display and disclosure of comprehension can be just as effective as concertarticulation of cogent reasoning, or serve cooperatively with it to achievepersuasiveness. In fact, as Plato exemplified, the greatest philosophersmaster many forms of expression, typically inventing literary forms toachieve their objectives as well.

Philosophersare also attracted and affected by intellectual fashions,9

e.g., to emphasize formal argument (Scotus), to fill the work with formal

logic (some contemporary writers), to make philosophy look like science



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358 JAMES F. ROSS

(some ancient, medieval, and a whole tribe of recent philosophers), even

though such features are surface markings, like styles in clothes. Thus,Russell thought he had achieved a new level of discipline and decisivethought; so had Leibniz; so had Spinoza; so had Descartes. Theirs were justfashions within a perennial discipline.

Philosophy, as a discipline, is neither Christian nor non-Christian,though it has flourished in the Christian West, and enriched Christianity fora thousand years after it ceased to be a key feature of Judaism or Islam, oreven of Greek and Russian Orthodox Christianity. In fact, the cultivationof the discipline (as well as of natural science) marks a distinctive aspect of

Western Christianity: fides quaerens intellectum. Furthermore, the cultivation of the discipline has caused an important religious difference between

Catholics and Reformers over the proper role and extent of rational inquiryinto matters religious in the life of a Christian. In the Christian West

philosophy has had, and still has a societal role in the way thought is to bedisciplined, even religious thought. One would have to say, then, thatphilosophy as a discipline is incidentally Christian from its influence uponChristainity and its societal role as one important continuation of Greekand Roman culture into the new Christian civilization.

But we also have to ask about the content of philosophy, both aboutthe understanding of the questions and of the answers. For it turns out thatthe content of certain problems, even some ontological and epistemologicalones, is not religiously neutral, as we shall see.

III. PHILOSOPHY UNDER CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES

There are a number of respects in which one's philosophy may be

enough under Christian (Muslim or Jewish) influences that one may call it

"Christian (orMuslim or Jewish) philosophy" even though itmay have ornot have more Christian (Muslim or Jewish) content than its sensitivity tothe religious effect of philosophical positions, or the extensiveness with

which issues that are of concern to religious people are debated (e.g., therelation of time to eternity; the relation of God to natural causality; of

foreknowledge to predestination.10Most obvious are the philosophies that develop issues of explicitly

religious concern, rather than, or as well as, philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Others reflect religious differences, asImentioned, in their preoccupations: Christians with providence; Muslims

with occasionalism and fatalism. Broadly, Augustine, Bonaventure, Anselm and Aquinas and Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz,



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Locke and Kant11 have to be called Christian philosophers in these respects. Moreover, in each we can find much more than concentration onthemes inwhich Christians have particular interest; we can find positive adjustments to take account of faith and negative adjustments to avoid conflict with the faith.

There is content to be considered Christian in apparently neutral questions, like "What constitutes the identity of a person over time andchange?", because the outcomes have an impact upon religiously centralnotions (e.g., "what is a person?"). First, the outcome may conflict withone's religious commitments; secondly, one's lack of sensitivity in foreseeingsuch outcomes may blunt one's understanding, so that one gets little ofsignificance from an inquiry rich with potentialities for the faith, as I thinkhappened to the Christian "applied modal semanticists" (Ross, 1990b) andas certainly happened to the Christians who tried to accommodatePositivism.12 Thirdly, the content of a successful philosophy needs distinctively Christian elements, negatively, to avoid conflict with the faith, andpositively, because some issues cannot even be correctly framed withoutelements of Christian faith (e.g., the proper functioning of human cognitive

systemscannot be described

neutrallyto the doctrine of the

Fall,as A. Plan

tinga also observes; nor can the nature of human beings be determined independently of their supernatural origin and destiny). Fourthly, some partsof philosophy have to be developed specifically for the expression ofreligious mysteries, for example, a theory of real kinds is needed to discussthe Incarnation (or a substitute for real kinds, as Descartes tried to resolvethe matter); a theory of "persons" for the Trinity of Divine persons, and atheory of real presence for the Eucharist, and of causation for the relationship of nature and grace and the divine operations in nature and throughhumans.

A Christian philosopher hasa

different insight into what is involved incertain questions?e.g., "Can one substance have two natures?", and "Iswhat a physical thing is determined by itsmicro-parts?", "Can one and thesame living thing be reassembled with different physical parts after havingdied and disintegrated?"?because of the implications for the Incarnationand the Eucharist, and bodily resurrection, even should no mention of such

things occur in the inquiry. I could imagine a Hindu similarly influenced bythe background conviction that all matter is illusion or that survival as adistinct person is of no importance, when considering the same questions.Christianity, like many other preoccupying backgrounds, can modulate

content without becoming part of it. Those are the first levels of involvement, the very minimum ways in which Augustine, Anselm, and the long



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360 JAMES F. ROSS

line of others Imentioned, wrote Christian philosophies, just as the Arabswrote Islamic philosophy and the Jews wrote Jewish philosophy.

Present-day Christian philosophers, like the great medieval writers,typically confront philosophical issues that have to be resolved as generalphilosophical questions, through considerations directly concerned with thereligion. Thus elaborations of the theory of final causality, where the inquiry and subsequent disputes are triggered by questions about how graceoperates on the will, have to be done and sustained by the kind of thinkingthat is indisputably philosophical, even though there is to be a religious application of the outcome later on. Thus, within the overtly theologicalworks of Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham there are extensive treatments thatare indisputably philosophical inquiries and disputes, regardless of thetheological environment that triggered them. For instance, there isno way aserious Christian or Jew or Muslim can approach issues of personal con

tinuity through physical change without having an eye toward accounts thatwill cohere with their notions of bodily resurrection.

Their religious perspectives give them an independence from thesecular academic establishment (Plantinga also remarks on this), allowingthem to contribute

something specialto the

developmentof

ideas,whether

or not the establishment listens. If the quality of the intellectual discipline ishigh enough to make the philosophy meritorious, I think one's actuallystating what religious commitment prompted or motivated one's inquiry orsuggested one's outcome will only make one's writing more interesting,even to non-believing readers. At the same time, I have to acknowledge thatintellectual prejudice is so rampant that the mere association of work withone another Christian tradition will cause many of the best philosopherssimply to tune it out. But that is a mere feature of our time, one thatchanges when the establishment changes.

IV. PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT NEUTRALCONTENT

This is the controversial and the novel part. There is Christianphilosophy, too, in the sense that on a number of the basic problems ofphilosophy, including the "problem of evil," the foundations of moral law,and the goals and proper functioning of human cognitive powers, or evenwhat freedom is, and whether possibility is consequent on being, there is no

religiously neutral standpoint from which even to state the problem com

prehensively,13 despitecenturies of

prettymuch

unchallenged thinkingthat

there always is. This is the feature in the discussion of "ChristianPhilosophy" that has not been discussed before. Instead, it has always been



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assumed that genuinely philosophical issues can be adequately stated andresolved without any content that presupposes one or another religiouscommitment. Even Aquinas seemed to believe that. It now seems to me onseveral crucial points to be quite the opposite.

In fact, so marked is the religious perspective, and so necessary (e.g.,the doctrine of the Fall as it affects conceptions of human rationality), that

Christians, and in this case Jews and Muslims or Hindus, may claim thattheirs is the only adequate statement of the basic problem. On other matters, Christians may claim theirs alone is the correct way to formulate theproblem. Moreover, there may be no religiously neutral standpoint fromwhich to state the problem adequately. I will explain this further, notingthat I was entirely opposed to this view for many years, never having noticed such a case, until I thought I discerned that approach to the problemof evil in papers respectively byMarilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump;14 certainly that seems to be a reasonable conclusion to draw from their insightsinto the factors involved. Then I began to notice that there is no neutral wayto discuss the nature of human freedom at sufficient depth, except from thepoint of view of what is lost in the Fall and restored with grace and ex

pressedin the death of Jesus.15 That inclined me to

Plantinga's (andWolterstorff s and Alston's) position.There is not a religiously neutral standpoint from which even to state

what properly functioning human cognitive powers have to be able to do,or what the role of the will is in belief and unbelief and to what extent persons may be responsible for what they do and do not believe,16 or whetherthe command-force of moral law may come from divine will, (see Philip

Quinn on divine-command morality). These recognitions seem to take aconsiderable step beyond the restraint of Aquinas and Scotus, for example,and, as to content, do threaten a loss of the prized neutrality of philosophy

amongsectarian differences. Yet another advance has also been achieved:

that philosophers of similar degrees of disciplinary excellence can and docontinue effective communication despite content in their views that reflectstheir sectarian differences or differences of tradition (e.g., Protestant or

Catholic). In fact, they find themselves nowadays in a common enterprise inresponse to the far-advanced secularization of philosophy in the "establish

ment" universities.For example, a believer inGod should be quick to point out the absur

dity of reasoning that supposes that itwould be evil for an omnipotent and

perfect creator to make the biotic kingdom inwhich life comes from death

and predators and prey are intertwined in their perfections. The theistshould point out that no world ismade impossible by the amount of evil in



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Some philosophical subjects are actually philosophy done "in house"by Christian believers, such as the dispute about the role of natural theologythat Iwill comment upon, and inquiries into the rationality of commitmentto the Christian faith, or about what sanctity really is, or whether there is aplace for "proof" in the rational basis for Christian belief. Sometimesdisputes are thrust upon the believer by outside attacks; for instance, thedispute, now defunct, over what, if anything, can be said meaningfullyabout God.19 Philosophy done "in house" in response to outside attacks orto differences of religious tradition can and does influence the largerphilosophical community when it is well done, as can be seen from the effects of the "reformed epistemologists" and other Christian responses uponthe notions of empirical knowledge and of scientific knowledge in general.

The whole field of epistemology is changing.

V. A DISTINCTIVELY CHRISTIAN RATIONALINQUIRY

Philosophical Theology, though once part of Judaic and Muslimthought, is now almost exclusively practised by Christians. The enterprise

might be called a distinctively Christian kind of philosophy. Yet, that is anhistorical accident since the inquiries are appropriate to any monotheism.The subjects have been strictly limited to things accessible to reason unaidedby revelation, even though prompted, often, by religious wonderment, e.g.,the relationship of providence, foreknowledge and predestination to free

will. It tells us something about the Christian religious culture, namely thatit is integrated with and employs the efforts of human reason, thatphilosophy has a societal role inWestern Christendom. Other religioustraditions do not, or no longer, have an associated rational practice like"natural theology."20 Secondly, there is a traditional religious dispute, go

ing at least as far back as St. Bernard's hostility to dialecticians, about theextent and role of natural theology within the Christian religious tradition,having to do with the extent to which our own intellectual efforts can, first,make cognitively accessible, and secondly, establish, elements of thingsrevealed, like the existence of God. The difference represents a difference ofattitude toward the extent to which it is religiously appropriate to say thatsomething that is revealed is also accessible to rational inquiry, and the extent to which it is religiously appropriate to substitute our own "findingout" (unreliable as it often is) for unyielding acceptance of the word ofGod. In addition, after the Reformation, a more pessimistic view of thecondition of human cognitive and voluntary powers on account of the Fall

("total depravity") gained currency, with a consequent devaluation of the



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364 JAMES F. ROSS

supposed accomplishments of human reason, and an impatience with thefutility, religious evasion, and even distrust of the divine word that such inquiries seem to display. There are other differences as well, some of themexaggerations.

One exaggeration attributes to "Catholics" and sometimes to Jesuitsand sometimes to Aquinas, the intention to compel assent with argument,as if they intended "to clobber one into belief." Some over-eager apologists

may have intended that, but it is a deviant view. However, Catholics dothink people can realize21 that God exists by reflecting on things made plainby our experience (of the need for an ultimate explanation of order, mean

ing, causation, the foundations of justice, the being and beauty of theworld, etc.). No special training is required, just clarity of insight (how frequent it is, is not important). Moreover, they think that with proper training, or an astute intelligence, one can figure out for oneself, in an articulatecourse of reasoning that rests on things obvious to perception, that God exists, more or less the way one figures out how to breed roses or make a boatseaworthy, or at least, the orbits of the planets and celestial navigation.

Whether cogent lines of reasoning amount to demonstrations or somethng

less is disputed. Further, many understand St. Paulto

have stated thesame

general idea and think Vatican I pronounced the same view: that a humanbeing is able (fit), by nature, tofind out for itself that God exists (conditionsbeing favorable), though there is no claim that this will happen with anyparticular frequency or that all will describe God the same way or even succeed in the discovery. None of that, not even augmented with the convictions of St. Augustin, St. Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Descartes,Leibniz and even Locke, that the existence of God can be proved, supportsthe idea that belief inGod can be compelled by argument.

On the other hand, the courses of reasoning offered to disclose the ex

istence of God should not be disdainfully downgraded, just because of thecenturies of dispute about how best to formulate them, or because of whatappears to beginners and even journeymen, to be gaps. For they begin withwhat is plain to see and look for its deepest explanation and may very wellmake thematter "beyond reasonable doubt" or at least "plain and certain"for a person, depending upon how much he or she knows and on otherpsychological and social conditions. In a word, they may fall short of ex

cluding all other options but may in fact exclude all other reasonable andcoherent options. Of course, equally to be avoided is the shameful exaggeration of the demonstrative success of particular formulations of lines ofreasoning in which the well-trained can see unjustified gaps, as often happens when amateurs formulate the design arguments or the moralarguments or the arguments for a first cause.22



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Sometimes there are exaggerations of the differences between Catholicand Reformed thinking on these matters, too. Thus the "reformed epistemologica " claim that theistic belief does not (in general) need argu

ment in order to be justified or reasonably maintained, or even have anevidential basis in the fabric of one's belief, isone Catholics typically share,but for a different reason: After all, if belief inGod comes by natural faith,it is as reasonable as one's belief in the identity of one's parents, or that theearth is a planet, or that the stars, far away, are like the sun. Moreover, ifnatural faith is confirmed with the grace of Baptism, the belief has to be

regarded as stablilized by the hand of God, as it were. And if convictionthat God exists comes as a result of one's figuring things out, then it is

justified and reasonable, provided there are not too many and too large errors in the thinking. Even more, conviction that comes from natural faith,can and often does amount to knowledge; that, of course, isdisputed,23 butI think by persons who fail to see how much we know as a result of parentalinstruction and schooling. I even think we can take St. Paul to express thesame idea when he says that faith is our cognition of things unseen. In anycase, one does not have to accept Plantinga's analysis that belief in God

may be a "basic belief," one that requires no evidential grounding, to getthe same effect. (My objection here is not to the outcome, but to thefoundationalist-framework in which the result is attained.) I prefer toreason that "natural faith" from "rational reliances" makes commitmentrational, even in the absence of evidence. The outcomes are the same.

In fact, there is a general position about empirical knowledge relevanthere. Where belief isnot compelled either way by the evidence, the engine ofassent is the will (volition) which is aimed at our apprehended goods. I haveargued elsewhere (Ross: 1985) that Aquinas not only held that position, but,as far as I can tell, invented it as a general account of cognition in the

absence of self-evidenceor

scientific knowledge.Theistic commitment does

not need an evidential basis. In fact, the knowledge of God's reality doesnot need an evidential basis. It can come from natural faith and be as certain to us as that sunlight makes the sky blue, even though (before we learnabout diffusion and wavelengths of light we cannot understand why the

yellow sun makes the sky blue). It is also worth noting that by having ac

quired certain conceptual sets by natural faith in childhood and having con

sistently used them in judgment, the reality of God is directly evident tosome people, the way light is evident to me when I am seeing.24

There is a second position on which I agree with Plantinga and other

"reformed epistemologists": that theistic conviction can be supported byarguments. Then, we differ again, in that he thinks the many "good"arguments only lend likelihood to the conclusion we accept on faith.25 I



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366 JAMES F. ROSS

think some arguments can put the matter of God's existence "beyond areasonable doubt" for some people, for others "make it clear and convincing" that God exists, and for still others make it "sure by a preponderanceof the evidence" (say, as sure as that the Exxon Valdez polluted an Alaskan

bay), but which considerations will do that, and for whom, vary greatlywith the subjective preparation and proclivities of individuals, even thoughthe items to be considered are objective and accessible. Thus with a littletraining, I think a person can be brought to recognize that the only condi

tion under which a divine being is even possible (rather than outright impossible) is if such a being actually exists. (For it cannot, for many reasons,begin to be or have ceased to be, or merely "might have been.") Next one isbrought to see that a divine being is really possible, perhaps, as Duns Scotussuggests, from the nature of causation or being or finality in things, or insome other way.26 For now Iwill take it that most people feel no discomfort

with the idea that a divine being is really possible and that their convictionon that point is epistemically prior, for them, to their seeing that actual being is a condition for the real possibility of a divine being. Then, the conclusion simply drops out, that God exists. One just brings "Actual existence is

a condition of real possibility for God" into focus after the person reachesconviction about the real possibility of God. (It is quite important to keepthe cognitive order that way; otherwise, a person may come to think that hisjudgment that a divine being is really possible is no longer warranted.)

Others are more readily reached with considerations of design, or of acause for matter or a cause of objective justice in a universe inwhich there is

moral evil. That sort of reasoning, while itwill not put the matter beyondreasonable doubt (because of challenges about evil, the mysteries of sin anddeath, etc.), can still amount to clear and convincing evidence for a personinterested in explaining such features of the universe and conversant withthe failure of all other options to do so.

And for those disposed and equipped, comparing various accounts ofhuman life and the cosmos, in detail (as ifwe were holding a complex trialon the explanation of an airplane crash and had to consider thousands ofpages of proposed evidence), that is, all the major philosophical storiesabout the origin and nature of being, etc., many will find a preponderanceof the evidence favoring the proposal that there is a spiritual creator of the

material world.27 In those respects and by those standards, I have no doubtthat there are "good theistic arguments," just as Plantinga, using asomewhat different

measure,thinks there are

"goodtheistic

arguments"from other considerations that I do not evaluate here. Whatever the differences of detail, there seems to be a convergence between reformers and



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Catholics here: the Catholics don't propose to produce classical demonstrations of the existence of God (though there may be some to be produced?that issue is not settled); and the "reformers" don't say there are noarguments with any weight even relevant to the matter. So both endorse thereasonableness of figuring the matter out, with the Catholics expecting toachieve a higher degree of rational certainty, but the "reformers" beingopen to achieving a high degree of likelihood.

Nevertheless, there is a residual difference that Plantinga expressesnicely, as a doubt about the propriety of replacing a belief held by divine

gift with a mere product of human inquiry?whether natural theologyought to transform "faith into knowledge," as if a higher moral state isconverted into a lessworthy one.28 The reformers were rightly suspicious ofany suggestion that one has to see and see why God exists to have rationallypermissible faith in the Creation, Fall and Redemption. That you have tofind out that God exists on your own, is not only opposed to the preachingof Jesus and the Apostles, but a threat to the general idea that faith is entirely a gift of God, and obviously cannot be improved by some effort ofreason. Nevertheless, there is no oddity about getting a scientific grasp of

God's existence, or even reasoning that places it beyond doubtor

makes itclear and convincing, as if a divine gift were replaced with something inferior. Scientific grasp is not superior to divine faith as a source of certainty, but it is a more perfect exercise of our cognitive powers, one to which weare ordered by nature and enabled by grace, in the same way that thebeatific vision is superior to divine faith and hope in via. For, of course, onehas faith and hope in things to be seen.

Looked at one way, philosophical theology is a study in its own right:what can we come to know by human reasoning, about God. (Aquinasdescribes it that way, SCG. I.9.4.). In another way, it can be part of a Chris

tian philosophy, a worked-out world-view, full of reasons where reasonscan be found, but rich from God with the revelation of what is necessaryand sufficient for human fulfilment in the broad sense of a "worked-outworld-view on how and why things are and how to live accordingly" that Idescribe in the next section. Thirdly, philosophical theology can be done asa part of the believer's activity of understanding his faith, as seekingreasons where reasons are to be found, not because of any deficiency in thefaith, but because this is "fides quaerens intellectum" philosophical in

quiry inspired and prompted by religious faith, a kind of common "Christian philosophy" regardless of the differences of philosophical or religiousdoctrines arrived at; so the doctrinally deviant Scotus Eriugena, Durandus,or Wycliff, or Descartes is as much a Christian philosopher as the more orthodox Augustine and Aquinas.



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368 JAMES F. ROSS

VI. DISTINCTIVELY CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

From ancient times "philosophy" was associated just as much with a"world-view and a way to live according to it"?what I call, "a Wisdomand aWay"?as with a thought-discipline with articulate courses of reason

ing about ultimate realities. Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, Aristotelianism are as much associated with a world-story and the ethics, politicaltheory, and individual prudence that organizes life within such a worldview, as they are with metaphysics and epistemology. Now it is as philosophy in that broader sense that St. Augustine, in The City of God, TheConfessions, De Beata Vita, Contra Julianum, etc., sees Christianity as

pre-eminent. In The City of God, XIX, 12.2, he mentions Varro's "now lostmanual of philosophy in which 288 different 'philosophies' had been

distinguished precisely according to the kinds of answer itwas possible to

give to the questions how the happy life is to be attained."29 R. A. Markusgoes on to say, "This conception of philosophy as an all-embracing activityconcerned with everything relevant to the realization of the ultimate purpose of human life is itself derived from antiquity." That is right. And

Augustine,making comparison to all the others, says inC. Julian, IV, 14.72

(PL 44.774) that Christianity is the one true philosophy. In order to makethat claim good, Augustine had consciously to ignore the idea thatphilosophy iswholly the product of human inquiry and reflection, withoutany admixture of authority or trust. Instead, he emphasized that among theadvantages of Christianity is the authority that makes it ure (De Ordine, II,5.16). Moreover, the other "philosophies" were not the pure products ofreason alone, either. Thus Manichaeism, Stoicism, Epicureanism (which

Augustine regarded as vulgar and corrupting), and all the varieties of

gnostic philosophy, often involved mythological, religious, and superstitious

elements.Moreover, there is an intermediate sense of Christian "philosophy"which others might now call "theology," but I think inaccurately: that is, asa name for the Wisdom that is the product of the "spoils of the Egyptians"doctrine (DeDoctrina Christiana, 11,40.60). St. Augustine says, just as Godordered the Israelites to "take the spoils of the Egyptians" when they left

captivity for the promised land, so Christians are to take the best of paganlearning to enrich their understanding of the things God has revealed. Thepagan learning is of course transformed in its new Christian home but alsocauses new understandings and new appreciation of the elements of revela

tion. The reason I think it inaccurate to call the Christian product, made upof the "spoils" and the faith, "theology" is that a great deal of what is to



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be taken into the promised land from among the pagans is literature, music,drama, poetry, law, physical science, history, astronomy, mathematics,physics, philosophy, political economy, and every other ornament of the intellect and human achievement (I suppose, including military tactics andcivil engineering), and thus, we produce a combined and transformedwisdom that is not theology, though itmay have one important part whichis theology (in the sense in which Aquinas spoke of "divine science" inSumma Theologica). So we have a Christian wisdom that is much more thantheology, yet very little the product of human demonstrative reasoningfrom self-evident first principles, and in fact, full of things to which such anotion is irrelevant. I call that "philosophy" too.

Yet there is something even broader still, that is the whole Wisdom andWay, and may be called the one true philosophy. We would be shortweighting Christian Wisdom were we unwilling to regard it as a whole. The"separate provinces"30 staked out for theology and philosophy by St.Thomas, while dividing two sciences from one another, is no more than aminor subdivision within Christian Wisdom. We have to keep inmind thatThomas's distinction was between sciences, between intellectual practicesand their

products. Christianityas a wisdom and a

way,rich with the

spoilsof its pagan benefactors which have developed and been transformed asChristian practices for two millennia, is neither a mere combination ofsciences nor a unified body of mere assertions, nor amere library of ancientand modern learning combined with a museum of ancient and modern art.

When we talk of Christian Wisdom, we are not speaking of a unifiedscience, though the wisdom may have scientific parts, for instance, boththeology and philosophy, along with secular sciences and arts. But thescientific parts, though characteristic and important, are small in substancecompared with the literature, plastic art, architecture, music, poetry,

meditation, reflection, history, law, spiritual traditions, and varieties ofspiritual life. Nor are we speaking of a unified and single body ofknowledge or true belief taken as itemizations; for one thing there are different versions of Christian Wisdom, both sectarian (religious) andphilosophical and historical (e.g., Byzantine vs. Roman), and differentphases both historically and geographically. I deliberately extendAugustine's notion by which he called Christianity a philosophy, indeed theone true one, to include as much a human learning, wisdom and art, as

marks and identifies the whole Christian culture as product of art and intellect, transformed by faith (the way Bach's St. John Passion is a unity of

musical genius and comprehending faith).



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370 JAMES F. ROSS

That Christian Wisdom, with its inheritance from pagan cultures,along with the intellectual accounts, both by rational inquiry and religiousfaith, and the whole of the way of living that is fitting to such culture and

wisdom, amounts to a Christian philosophy of comprehensiveness suitablefor comparison, along with the society it creates, to any other competitor ofsuitable generality along with the society it creates. (Indeed, it is even worthasking whether there is another suitably unified and variegated competitorfor comparison.)

The relevant notion of "truth," then, isnot item-by-item accuracy, butfidelity, in the overall themes as to the fundamental truth, the reality, of theorigin, meaning, and purpose of things and how one should live, to therevelation and to the riches incorporated from every source Christianculture apprehends, a fidelity that contrastively discloses opposing wisdomsto be at essential points in error.

Thus a useful notion of Christianity as the one true philosophy is thatChristian wisdom contains the fundamental truth and is faithful to it, notwithout error and distortion as far as the human contributions to it are concerned. But in contrast to any other wisdom comprehensive enough to com

pete, especiallyas to the

dignityand enoblement of the individual human

life, the others contain elements that are, by inquiries accessible to humanreason, in error on central points and contain elements opposed to the revealed truth, however much they may be rightly admired, imitated and evenassimilated into Christianity.31 Thus, the philosophies that conclude thatthe material world is an illusion are in that respect false. The philosophiesthat conclude that there is nothing but matter (conceived in a corpuscularian 18th-centuryish way) are false. The philosophies that concludethere is no personal God are false; and so on, for those that deny free will,survival after death, or claim that one may do evil that good may come of it,

or deny that there is any real justice or hold that some humans are above thelaw, or that human life is of no worth.

The claim that Christianity is the one true philosophy can only amountto a claim that, in certain comparative contexts, Christian wisdom, taken asa whole with its many varieties and better and worse versions, is superiorboth as an account of the ultimate realities and of mankind's relationship tothose realities and of what is the path to personal human fulfilment.Superiority is a matter of avoiding crucial errors about what reality is fundamental, and about how humans are to behave and how much they are tobe invested in this world, while being qualitatively more revealing about theultimate reality and the right path for living.



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Moreover, there can, in this respect, be various expressions of Christian philosophy, of varying merit, and, as I said above, they can and mustbe developed and renovated from time to time. For example, the earlyChristian philosophies were too much influenced by Plato and did not contain an appraisal of competing societal organizations based on diverseeconomic principles. Now a Christian philosophy without a critique of notions of social justice and the just distribution of wealth and opportunity,and a theory of remedial justice (how to get from an unjust society to a justone), along with reasonable restraints on coercion and eminent domain insuch a project, will be woefully inadequate. A Christian world view thatdoes not contain a rational account of the way the dispossessed may useforce (but perhaps, not lethal, or at least not massively lethal force) to attainredistribution of wealth and opportunity is inadequate and unrealistic.

Christian ideas that would allow the denial of free expression in order tocontrol the speaking and writing of error and the production of corrupting"art," would be a deterioration from what Christian thought has alreadyaccomplished. Christian philosophy has to be renovated because old ideasbecome threadbare: simple views that civil government is the result of theFall and necessitated

bysin (instead of a view, say, that civil government is a

means of obtaining goods for all that cannot be obtained by mere cooperation among persons acting entirely out of individual self-interest, and

without a common conception of the goods cooperation attains; for instance, preparation of society for the Second Coming) have to be revised, asdo notions that the right way to resolve social conflicts is by legislation andimplicit coercion, when we all know, as did the ancients, that tranquility oforder and conformity to law arises from respect from the law as a minimalstandard of public conduct, and not by regulation and coercion.

No philosophy,on

the scaleI am

discussing,can

betaken as a

conjunction of claims and pronounced true. But contrastively, and at the level ofgeneral themes and cultural accomplishment, they can be compared and

judged, even though there isno "neutral" position from which to do that.32For one cannot step outside religious faith and its cultural unity to appraise,say Hindu religion and culture. Yet, for all our respectful appreciation, wehave to judge that polytheism, pantheism and animism are mistaken, as are

fatalism, destruction of the environment, acceptance, even exploitation, ofthe conditions of the poor, the ill and the despised, or that human action isof no cosmic significance and individual action of no importance.



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372 JAMES F. ROSS

Indeed, we would be remiss not to compare thinking and society on thevast scale, and with the varied forms Imention, because it is as real as isEnglish, the language that subsists in all the utterances, mostly ungrammatical, invaried dialects and vocabularies, accents, idioms, platitudes andfigures of speech, and variations throughout the world. Some partial ex

pressions of the Wisdom and Way, like Augustine's, Aquinas's, andBonaventure's, philosophical-theological and Scriptural expressions, alongwith the artistic expressions of Dante, Milton, Marlowe, Shakespeare andthe achievements of architecture and painting, sculpture and window

making, manuscript illumination and liturgy, as well as the achievements ofspiritual life, political advancement and literature, will stand for millennia.

Others will have shorter or more limited and ancillary life as steps towardnew "classical" expressions. Thus, de Chardin's speculations about evolution and the unity of the universe will probably be incorporated andtransformed within some new Christain philosophy of greater scope andcomprehensiveness. And present stages of painting and of the novel will bereincarnated by geniuses into deeper appreciation of the spiritual plight ofhumans and the means that have been offered to escape it.

Someonemight

say we shouldjust

reserve the word "Christianwisdom" for this conglomerate of faith, science, history, humanities andculture. Why devalue the word 'philosophy', especially when 'true' appliesonly in the adapted sense of "fidelity to fundamental realities both revealedand real," and where "superiority" inwhat is agreed to be spiritually, artistically and humanly rich, has to do with avoiding error on the fundamentals and attaining better the potentialities of mankind? First, calling such

wisdoms and ways "philosophies" is not at variance with the ordinarydiscourse of non-specialists. "Philosophy" as understood by non

specialists is largely the sort of "Wisdom and Way" even applied to the way

people think of a particular task or business or of themselves. So there ismore immediate recognition of the notion of "Christian Philosophy" thanthere is of "Christian Wisdom" which is thought to be the accomplishmentof a few talented and brilliant Christians, most people being too modest tothink they share wisdom, but not hesitant to say they share a philosophy.Secondly, not even specialists restrict the word 'philosophy' to ademonstrative science from first principles, or even to the backbone ofdisciplined thought I described above. Everyone learned is aware that thereis a thought-discipline with an ancient history, that is 'philosophy', eventhough there is little agreement about how to describe it, despite our beingable to recognise, under the passing fashions in its expression and thefashions in the subjects explored, the backbone of disciplined reasoning



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about "ultimate explanations." No specialist is going to confuse thatdiscipline, the perennial philosophy, even when it is done with explicit orimplicit religious content, with the broad notions I used above. So there isno devaluation to be feared.

The real danger of devaluation of the notion of philosophy comes fromthe idea that truth and falsity have little to do with it, that the discipline isan illusion, that philosophy is a kind of literary criticism or a kind ofhermeneutical mediation among views expressed in science, literature, andart (as Richard Rorty and some Continentals seem to suppose). It is simply

without any basis at all to say the discipline of thinking of the kind Idescribed above has bankrupted itself, and to insist that philosophy hastransformed, by its own pretensions and failures, into some vaguehermeneutical negotiation (as Rorty recommended), or into some kind ofliterature where the "polarity" of the "true" and the "false" is collapsed,and all explanatory objectives are abandoned. Even if that were the outcome of three centuries of philosophy (as Rorty thinks and I deny), that

would still leave out the prospects of a realignment with medieval and ancient thinking that would resuscitate the grasping enterprise. If that pessi

mistic, historically myopic, unimaginative depressed proposal is what isto be "postmodern philosophy," then indeed there is a devaluation, but itis of the discipline.

The expression and embellishment of Christianity as a philosophy (aWisdom and a Way) is the collective enterprise of all Christian (andChristian-influenced) philosophers, theologians, moralists, legalists, artists,writers, scientists and scholars, each doing his or her job well, whether theyare aware of the effect or not. It is a collective enterprise that is both a pathto individual Christian fulfillment and a display of Christianity's unparalleled excellence, in comparison with all other "philosophies of life."The collective effect is to develop Christian Wisdom, speculative, artistic,spiritual and practical, as "the one true philosophy." Truth, of this sort, ispossessed only in the fundamentals and some of the embellishments, but isotherwise sought and projected. For when we make a comparison on thescale Augustine proposed, enlarged even as I suggest here, to compare bothour accounts of the being and order of the universe and our way to humanfulfilment, with all competing wisdoms and ways, the scale of elements includes the whole culture and its cultural history and its future for millennia.It is participation in and contribution to such a common objective, pursued

mostly by the independent efforts of writers, painters, musicians, artists,

businessmen, philanthropists, churchmen and statesmen, and even governments, that not only makes individual life coherent, rich, and properly



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374 JAMES F. ROSS

aimed, but gives to the history of the people of God a collective aim thatcan be discerned from the accomplishments of the society, just as the faithof the Middle Ages can be read off the great cathedrals.

James F. RossUniversity of Pennsylvania

NOTES1. John Wippel (1984),with extensive citations, assesses the "great debate" E.

Gilson sparked by speaking of the "Christian" philosophies of St. Augustine, St.Bonaventure and St. Thomas. Gilson asked "How can thinking become Christianand remain philosophy?" Among the writers Wippel cites, are E. Sillem, VanSteenbergen, J. Owens, J. Maritain, A. Pegis, and J. Weisheipel.

Leo Sweeny, S.J. (1985) presents views much like the one I develop here; heconsiders Maurice Nedoncelle (I960) to offer a good summary of the controversy inrecent times. The collection of Fr. Joseph Owens (1990) came tomy notice after thispaper was written. Fr. Owens elegantly expresses three key ideas of Christian

philosophy: first, that "A world penetrated through and through by the supernatural cannot be understood satisfactorily when the naturally knowable aspects areregarded asmaking it a complete and finished object" (Owens: 1990: ix); secondly,that "even supernatural facts, like the trinity, have aspects that belong tophilosophy: existence, being, action, quality, relation and the like." (Owens: 1990:ix); and thirdly, hat reality described scientifically nd interpreted eligiously canbe given marvellous intellectual appeal under floodlighting by Christianphilosophy." (Owens: 1990: 307)Except formy emphasis upon the deflated expectation of what can be accomplished philosophically, and my exploration of two verybroad notions of Christian philosophy, Fr. Owens made the other points of thispaper.

2. Plantinga (1984); see also, his 1983; 1986a; 1986b: 307; 1987;and 1988a. John

Wippel (1983) seems to think philosophy isa demonstrative rational inquiry that canonly incidentally e aided by faith, as in its moments of discovery," where the ideato be considered is suggested by the Christian faith. Plantinga, on the contrary,seems at first obe advocating amuch deeper influence f one's Christian faith. Butthen one notices that he is insisting that one's philosophy be overtly theistic, ndevenmentioned that in this sense it can be Jewish orMoslem, as well. And here thecrucial difference with St. Thomas, and with Fr. Owens (1990), shows up. For Plantinga thinks one has to rely upon faith in the reality f God because the existence of

God cannot be proved or demonstrated, though he acknowledges there are many"good" but only probabilistic arguments for it.Moreover, he gives no detail as toany further cope of the "Christian" content of philosophy, except for its findingtheistic roots in

epistemological problems previously thoughtto be neutral to God's

existence; Joseph Owens (1990) goes much further n explaining the Christian content of philosophy. See: Plantinga (1988b: 159), and James A. Keller (1988: 165). Idescribe a deeper Christian involvement, as does Fr. Owens.



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3. See James Ross "Cognitive Finality" (1992a, expected), and (1986) and(1985).Aquinas sees science as proceeding demonstratively from insight ompelledby a "manifestant visionem veritatis" in self-evident premises to a conclusion com

pelled by the transparent necessity of the logical steps. Duns Scotus raises the stakesby requiring for a demonstration that the self-evident remises be modalized intonecessary ones and that conclusions be derived that re necessary, too: thus developsthe procedure he adopts for proving the existence of God. See also James Ross(1990a and 1992a, forthcoming), which discusses the roles of reliance and the internal rationality of our cognitive processes.

4. St. Anselm in Cur Deus Homo was too ambitious, trying odemonstrate whathe could not. But hismistake was not in

tryingodemonstrate what is

revealed,for it

is common practice to try odemonstrate the existence of God. Rather, the Incarnation is considered a revealed supernatural truth, not subject to demonstration oreven to our knowing the fact, absent divine revelation.

A few decades ago, George Mavrodes challenged: why can't one use everythingone knows as premises inphilosophy, including the thingswe know on the testimonyof God? I think itwould be an evasion (and false) to say that what we believe ontestimony snot something known, as used to be the practice. With Aquinas, faithdoes yield cognition (cognitionem), though not science (scientia), except in the specialcase of "divine science" not discussed here. A better reply seems to be: what you canbegin with depends upon the extent of the initial greements you can expect from thediscoursing community.

5. Plantinga (1984: 255).6. See the extensive literature sed by John Wippel, cited in nl, above.7. The matter is highly controversial, asWippel* s references (cited above) in

dicate. Basically, I think ?son regarded Augustine's, Aquinas's, Bonaventure's andScotus's philosophies as "Christian" because, despite the origins in Plato or in

Aristotle, their philosophical accounts of such matters as "being," "universale,""participation,"?and every other detail?were clearlymodified by and moulded bytheir wareness of the implications for what they believed by revelation, even whenno revealed matter was being discussed. Moreover, the whole effect, even leaving outthe "theology," is detectably and measurably "Christian" in its emphasis, in the

way it is used to prepare answers that become part of the theology (e.g., "what isaperson?"). It is Christian from the aim in which philosophy is appropriated frompagans, the spects developed indetail and the nticipations of issues that have to beresolved to explain Christian doctrine. So, Aquinas's doctrine of being and of participation and of the ipsum esse subsistens isworked out so as to be compatible withand advance the intelligibility f the notion of three upposita of one nature that re,yet, one substance.

8. Items (1), (2), and (3) combined, particularly with extensive discussions of occasionalism and fatalism byMuslims and of freedom and providence by Christians

make up a distinctively Christian or Muslim philosophy, without any purelytheological (revelation) content.

9. Like the dialectical arguments in Plato, the mixed empiricism and abstractarguments of Aristotle, the more geometrico of Duns Scotus (esp.De Primo Prin

cipio)and

Spinoza,the

formal modal argument inDuns Scotus and many recentphilosophers, and the penchant for writing out quasi-logical formulas or lists of"truth-conditions," and other tools for precision.



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376 JAMES F. ROSS

10. On a number of occasions bright students reading medieval philosophy arealienated from the prominent theism; I sympathize, remembering my aversion totalk of "the gods" inPlato.

11. See Stephen Palmquist (1989).Even Hume, by reaction and yet concentrationon themes peculiar to Christians (e.g., miracles), can be counted, although onehistorian towhom Imentioned that, while accepting thatWilliam James, Berkeley,Locke, and Leibniz may be counted, thought Hume should not.

12. See the extensive literature cite inRoss: 1981: ch. 7. Plantinga also uses thisexample in "Advice" (Plantinga: 1984: 256).

13. This seems to be the view of A. Plantinga, and I think, N. Wolterstorff, aswell as other "reformed" Christian

philosophers.14.Marilyn Adams and Eleonore Stump renovated the discussion of the problemof evil by undercutting the assumption that there is some religiously neutral statement of exactly what the problem is. See Adams (1986).Also seeAdams (1985; 1987;1975and 1976-77; and also 1988),and Stump (1983). One of the roles of religion is totell us what the "brokenness" of man, visible inoutline even to secular philosophers,and the resolution of evil, actually consist in.

15. See the forthcoming Ross: "Mindful of Man."16. See Ross (1986) and similar papers on "cognitive voluntarism."17. See Ross (1990).18. See Plantinga (1980).19. See Ross (1981 :ch. 7) for the literature, specially themortifying ccommoda

tions various Christian writers attempted tomake to the demands of the senselessveriflability test for meaningfulness.20. For instance, see the summary of Aquinas's views in Leo J. Elders, S.V.D.

(1990).21. This is not an inferior tate, but one of knowing, attentive knowing.22. See Ross (1970).23. See the papers, mentioned above, on Aquinas on faith and reason, on

Augustine and on various aspects of cognitive voluntarism.24. I acknowledge Aquinas's view that for God to become directly present to the

understanding in his being rather than as a cause, the abstractive intellect has to bebypassed by God's using His own being, as intelligible species, to enable and actualize the human understanding. I am talking here only about an habitual

awareness of the presence of God in things s the enablement of our knowing naturalobjects, in effect, habitual awareness of the "existence of God in things" thatAquinas discusses in ST, Ia.q.8.

Alvin Plantinga seems to think (see above-mentioned papers) that one is notnecessarily improved by replacing faith inGod's existence with scientific knowledgeon the point. Doubts of that kind show a post-Reformation difference mong Christian philosophers. To use our cognitive powers successfully to find out for ourselvesthat God exists, or even to become scientific nough to see that, nd why God exists,is not to go from a more perfect moral state of accepting a divine gift, to a lessperfect state of acting on our own. Rather, belief is an anticipatory commitment towhat is (in this case) to be seen. So we progress from cognitively lessperfect state toamore

perfectone; the fact that divine faith is a virtue in no

way derogatesthe fact

that science is a virtue as well.



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25. Moreover, we not only differ on the force of the arguments, we differ on theitems that are candidates for the list of "good" arguments, even arguments lendinglikelihood. That is because Plantinga, in listing "a dozen or so" good arguments,lists several that require the existence of God for the permanent being and infinity fpropositions, numbers, sets, and the like,whereas I do not think there re any sucheternal, infinite bstract objects, apart from human or perhaps angelic thought, ndthink it a limitation, inappropriate to God, to have to think mathematically, bylogical forms or any process) or to have one's thought-contents orted linguisticallyinto propositions, or the like. God cannot think that way, as I believe I show inTruth and Impossibility (forthcoming). On the other hand, I argue that without theexistence of God there would be no problem of evil, not even a

genuine mystery,because there would be no background against which to "find something bjectivelywrong" in the universe, but only an anthropomorphic projection as Spinoza reasoned.

26. Some philosophers think that mere consistency of the claim is enough for realpossibility. Unfortunately, I can now show that to be false; see Truth and Impossibility. So it is not exactly clear how we recognize the real possibility of thingswhose existence isnot evident to us, but we do, frequently. nd most people have little or no difficulty reaching that conviction about God, especially when facing thechallenge "Well, if you think there couldn't be a divine being, showme why not."

One relevant consideration is that esse has to be prior both to causation and topossibility, because, otherwise, there could be neither: thus some ipsum ese subsistens ispossible.

27. Where proof by preponderance of the evidence is involved, it s not impossibleor even unlikely that well-disposed persons of different education, especially different emotional training, might reach opposed conclusions each finding it supported by a preponderance of the same body of evidence.

28. See Plantinga's papers cited in n2, above. See also, Gary Gutting (1985).29. See R. A. Markus (1967: 344).30. See F. Copleston, S.J. (1985: 146),where he describes Aquinas by using this

phrase.31. There are advocates of cultural understanding who consider it solecism even

to consider whether Hinduism or Islam or Christianity, taken as a whole culture, including its science, philosophy, literature, rts, its historical achievements and itscontribution to the dignity nd ennoblement of individual human life, is"superior"as aWisdom and aWay for humans, or even true in a way the others are not. Forone thing, there is supposed to be no "fair" and "neutral" standpoint from whichto judge. But that ispart of the Christian message and objective. Christianity doesnot encourage vulgar disrespect. Such comparisons require a Christian frame ofrespect and love along with one's interest n truth nd open-mindedness to the richesof other greatWays andWisdoms.

32. It is a mistake to think that sceptical threats re supported by our admittingthat there sno neutral standpoint, not part of one of the contestants, from which tojudge, and therefore, that all such judgments are culturally nd religiously biased. Ideveloped some principles for suchmatters in Ross (1992b).



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Marilyn McCord Adams. 1975. "Hell and the God of Justice," ReligiousStudies, 433-447.

_ 1976-77. "Divine Justice, Divine Love and the Life to Come,"Crux, pp. 12-28.

_ 1986. "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problemof Evil," inRationality, Religious Belief andMoral Commitment: NewEssays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William

Wainwright, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. pp. 248-267._ 1987. "Duns Scotus on the Goodness of God," Faith and Philoso

phy, vol. 4, 486-505._ 1988. "Problems of Evil: More Advice to Christian Philosophers,"

pp. 121-143. Faith and Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2, April.F. Copleston, 1985. A History of Philosophy, vol. II: Augustine to Scotus,

Doubleday: New York, p. 146.Leo J. Elders. 1990. The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas,

E. J. Brill: New York.Lewis S. Ford. 1984. The

Emergence ofWhitehead's

Metaphysics,1925

1929. State University of New York Press: Albany, NY.Gary Gutting. 1985. "The Catholic and the Calvinist: A Dialogue on Faith

and Reason." Faith and Philosophy, vol. 2, 236-256.Charles Hartshorne. 1983. Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers: An

Evaluation of Western Philosophy, State University of New YorkPress: Albany, NY.

James A. Keller. 1988. "Response to Plantinga," Faith and Philosophy,vol. 5, no. 2, April.

_ 1988. "Reflections on a Methodology for Christian Philosophers,"

Faith and Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2. April, pp. 144-158.R. A. Markus. 1967. "Augustine". The Cambridge History of Later Greekand Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong, CambridgeUniversity Press: London.

Maurice Nedoncelle. 1960. Is There a Christian Philosophy? New York:Hawthorn Books.

Robert C. Neville. 1980. Reconstruction of Thinking, State University ofNew York Press: Albany, NY.

Shubert M. Ogden. 1986. On Theology, Harper and Row: San Francisco.Fr. Joseph Owens. 1990. Towards a Christian Philosophy, Catholic Univer

sity of America Press: Washington, DC.Stephen Palmquist. 1989. "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?",

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