round 4&5 compiled

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LocGov A2010ORDOEZ V. GUSTILO [NOTE: THIS

CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INMUNICIPALITY, CHAPTER 3, CHIEF

EXECUTIVE POWERS]192 SCRA 469

(1990)MINI

Term of Office [CONTINUED FROMPAGE 68]

OSMEA V COMELEC199 SCRA 750

July 30, 1991; PARAS, J.LORA

FACTS- The petitioners pray for the Court to declareRepublic Act No. 7056 An Act Providing for theNational and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way forSynchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning

1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor," asunconstitutional and, therefore, invalid andinoperative because:1. It violates the mandate of the Constitution for theholding of synchronized national and local elections onthe second Monday of May 1992.2. Particularly Section 3, 2nd par. providing that allincumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shallhold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve untiltheir successors shall have been duly elected andqualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (TransitoryProvision) of the Constitution.3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure ofoffice of local officials to be elected on the 2nd

Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, ArticleX of the Constitution.4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for thecampaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidentialand Senatorial elections, violates the provision ofSection 9, Article IX under the title Commission onElections of the Constitution.5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountableproblems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 tosynchronized national and local elections set by theConstitution' on the second Monday of May, 1992, arenot sufficient, much less, valid justification forpostponing the local elections to the second Mondayof November 1992, and in the process violating theConstitution itself If, at all, Congress can devise ways

and means, within the parameters of the Constitution,to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and ifthis, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the

self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution forits amendment or revision.- The Solicitor General contends that Republic Act7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power byCongress and that the regular amending processprescribed by the Constitution does not apply to itstransitory provisions.

ISSUEWON RA 7056 is unconstitutional.

HELDYES.- Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 (Transitory Provisions)of the 1987 ConstitutionSec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House ofRepresentatives and the local officials first electedunder this Constitution shall serve until noon of June30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in the election in1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number ofvotes shall serve for six years and the remainingtwelve for three years.Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent Presidentand Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986election is, for purposes of synchronization of

elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,1992.The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on thesecond Monday of May, 1992.- It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,Members of the House of Representatives, the localofficials, the President and the Vice-President havebeen synchronized to end on the same hour, date andyear noon of June 30, 1992.- It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization isused synonymously as the phrase holdingsimultaneously since this is the precise intent interminating their Office Tenure on the same day or

occasion. This common termination date willsynchronize future elections to once every three years.- That the election for Senators, Members of the Houseof Representatives and the local officials (under Sec.2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with theelection for President and Vice President (under Sec.5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the records of theproceedings in the Constitutional Commission.- It thus becomes very evident that the Constitutionhas mandated a synchronized national and localelection prior to June 30,1992 or more specifically asprovided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the secondMonday of May, 1992.- The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, is fixed by the Constitution at threeyears (Sec. 8, Art. X). The incumbent local officialswere elected in January 1988. Therefore, their termwould have expired on February 2, 1991. But their

term was adjusted to expire at noon of June 30, 1992.The reason for the said adjustment, as well as those ofthe Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President and Vice-President, is thesame - to synchronize the national and local elections.- Upon the other hand, and contrary to the expressmandate of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act 7056provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 asfollows:Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization - To start the process

of synchronization of election in accordance with thepolicy hereinbefore declared there shall be held:(a) An election for President and Vice-President of thePhilippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all electiveMembers of the House of Representatives on thesecond Monday of May, 1992, and

(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipalelective officials on the second Monday of November,1992.- The purpose of Republic Act 7056:to start, as muchas practicable, the synchronization of the elections sothat the process can be completed in the 1995elections with the result that beginning 1995 thereshall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections

for national and local elective officials every three (3)years.- With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution tohold synchronized (simultaneous) national and localelections in the second Monday of May, 1992, theinevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056is clearly violative of the Constitution because itprovides for the holding of a desynchronized election.Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularlySections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII,Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.- There are other provisions of the Constitutionviolated by RA 7056.1. Section 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution whichprovides that the local official first elected under the

Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent localofficials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 andshall serve until their successors shall have been dulyelected and qualified.- It is not competent for the legislature to extend theterm of officers by providing that they shall hold overuntil their successors are elected and qualified wherethe constitution has in effect or by clear implicationprescribed the term and when the Constitution fixesthe day on which the official term shall begin, there isno legislative authority to continue the office beyondthat period even though the successors fail to qualifywithin the time.2. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution: The term of

office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials which shall be determined by law shall bethree years and no such official shall serve for morethan three consecutive terms . . .

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LocGov A2010- But if the local election will be held on the secondMonday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those tobe elected will be serving for only two years andseven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to

June 30, 1995, not three years as provided for by theConstitution.3. Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution: Unlessotherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases,the election period shall commence ninety daysbefore the day of election and shall end thirty days

thereafter.- Under this provision the filing of the Certificate ofCandidacy and the ensuing campaign period must beembraced or circumscribed within that election periodof ninety days, except when in special cases, theComelec (not Congress) alters the period. But RA 7056provides for a different campaign period. Sec. 8:(a) For President and Vice-Presidential elections onehundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.(b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days beforethe day of the election, and(c) For the election of Members of the House ofRepresentatives and local elective provincial, city andmunicipal officials forty-five (45) days before the dayof the elections.

- All these - the postponement of the holding of asynchronized national and local election from 1992 to1995; the hold-over provision for incumbent localofficials; the reduction of the term of office of localofficials to be elected on the second Monday ofNovember 1992 and the change in the campaignperiods, are violative of the 1987 Constitution.- The contention of the Solicitor General that themethod of amendment or revision prescribed by theConstitution (Article XVIII) does not apply to the

Transitory Provisions because in the nature of thingsTransitory Provisions are to be carried out as soon aspracticable, and Congress can, in the exercise of itslegislative power enact the needed legislation, in thiscase RA 7056, deserves no consideration at all.

- The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear andcategorical language that "the six-year term of theincumbent President and Vice-President elected in theFebruary 7, 1986 election is, for purposes ofsynchronization of elections, hereby extended to noonof June 30, 1992 (Article XVIII, Sec. 5)." As discussedearlier, the elections referred to, to be synchronizedwith the election of the President and Vice-Presidenton the second Monday of May 1992, is the election forSenators, Members of the House of Representativesand local officials.- Synchronization - as the act or result ofsynchronizing; concurrence of events or motions inrespect to time.- Synchronize - to happen or take place at the same

time; to represent or arrange event so as to indicatecoincidence or coexistence; to cause to agree in time.- The mere absence of a provision in the 1987Constitution which would prohibit the holding of

separate elections does not mean that theConstitution does not intend the holding ofsimultaneous or synchronized elections.Disposition. RA 7056 declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL,hence, NULL and VOID.

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO vs HON.RAMON V. MITRA, JR.

Davide, Jr.; 15 October 1991; 202

SCRA 779MARGE

FACTS:-Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representativefor the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987elections. He took his oath of office on 9 Jan 1987 andthereafter performed the duties and enjoyed therights and privileges pertaining thereto.-15 Jan 1990: he filed with COMELEC a Certificate ofCandidacy for the position of ARMM RegionalGovernor. The election was scheduled for 17 Feb1990.-Upon being informed of this development,respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of

Representatives excluded Dimaporos name from theRoll of Members of the House of Representatives(HoR) pursuant to Sec 67, Art IX of the OmnibusElection Code (B.P. Blg. 881)1.-Having lost in the autonomous region elections,Dimaporo, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 addressed toSpeaker Mitra, expressed his intention "to resumeperforming my duties and functions as electedMember of Congress." The record does not indicatewhat action was taken on this communication.-When Dimaporo failed in his bid to regain his seat inCongress, he filed, 31 Jan 1991, this petition prayingfor such relief.

ISSUES1. WON Sec.67, Art.IX, of BP881 is operative under the1987 Constitution.2. WON respondents may, by administrative act,exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the HoR

HELD:1. YES.-Legislative deliberations show the rationale behindthe law: (a) to prevent abuse of facilities of power orthe use of office facilities; and (b) to prevent electedofficials from trifling with the mandate of the people,as mandated by the Constis new chapter onaccountability of public officers. The mere fact of filing

1

Any elective official whether national or local running for anyoffice other than the one which he is holding in a permanentcapacity except for President and Vice-President shall beconsidered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filingof his certificate of candidacy.

a certificate (of candidacy) should be considered theovert act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandateto the people; he should therefore resign if he wantsto seek another position which he feels he could be ofbetter service.-Rather than cut short the term of office of electivepublic officials, this statutory provision seeks toensure that such officials serve out their entire term ofoffice by discouraging them from running for anotherpublic office and thereby cutting short their tenure by

making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy,they cannot go back to their former position. This isconsonant with the constitutional edict that all publicofficials must serve the people with utmost loyalty andnot trifle with the mandate which they have receivedfrom their constituents.-In theorizing that the provision under considerationcuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" ofoffice. As succinctly distinguished by the SolicitorGeneral: The term of office prescribed by theConstitution may not be extended or shortened by thelegislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which anofficer actually holds the office (tenure), may beaffected by circumstances within or beyond the power

of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term orit may not exist at all. These situations will not changethe duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nuenovs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12).-Under the questioned provision, when an electiveofficial covered thereby files a certificate of candidacyfor another office, he is deemed to have voluntarilycut short his tenure, not his term. The term remainsand his successor, if any, is allowed to serve itsunexpired portion.-That the ground cited in BP881 is not mentioned inthe Constitution itself as a mode of shortening thetenure of office of members of Congress, does notpreclude its application to present members ofCongress. Sec.2 of Art.XI2 clearly recognizes that the

four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution3

2Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of theConstitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may beremoved from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graftand corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.All other public officers and employees may be removed fromoffice as provided by law, but not by impeachment.3 As summarized by the petitioner, these grounds are:a) 1987 Consti, Art VI, Sec 13: Forfeiture of his seat by

holding any other office or employment in the govt or anysubdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includingGOCCs or subsidiaries;

b) Sec 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderlybehavior;c) Sec 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the

Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; andd) Sec7, par.2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

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LocGov A2010by which the tenure of a Congressman may beshortened are not exclusive. The expression in theconstitution of the circumstances which shall bringabout a vacancy does not necessarily exclude allothers. Neither does it preclude the legislature fromprescribing other grounds.-Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation ofoffice under Sec.7, Art.VI of the Consti is broadenough to include the situation envisioned in Sec.67,Art.IX of BP881. The term voluntary renunciation is

more general than abandonment and resignation. Theact of filing a certificate of candidacy for another officeconstitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntaryrenunciation of the elective office presently beingheld. [see discussions by the ConstitutionalCommissioners]-Monroy vs. CA: forfeiture (is) automatic andpermanently effective upon the filing of the certificateof candidacy for another office. Only the moment andact of filing are considered. Once the certificate isfiled, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save anew election or appointment can restore the oustedofficial.-The ground for forfeiture in Sec.13, Art.VI of the 1987Consti is different from the forfeiture decreed in

Sec.67, Art.IX of BP881, which is actually a mode ofvoluntary renunciation of office under Sec.7,par.2 ofArt.VI of the Consti.

2. YES.-The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy foranother office having been spelled out in BP881 itself,no statutory interpretation was indulged in byrespondents Speaker and Secretary of the HoR inexcluding petitioner's name from the Roll of Members.

The Speaker is the administrative head of the HoR andhe exercises administrative powers and functionsattached to his office. As administrative officers, boththe Speaker and House Secretary-General performministerial functions. It was their duty to remove

petitioners name from the Roll considering theunequivocal tenor of BP881. These officers cannotrefuse to perform their duty on the ground of analleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.Officers of the government from the highest to thelowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obeyit.-A public office is a public trust. It is created for theinterest and benefit of the people. As such, the holderthereof is subject to such regulations and conditionsas the law may impose and he cannot complain of anyrestrictions which public policy may dictate on hisoffice.Disposition Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

The respondents added the following grounds: resignation,death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty ofdisqualification to hold public office.

Voting 8 justices constituted the majority 3dissented

J. GUTIERREZ,JR., dissenting:-Respondents have no power, in purportedimplementation of an invalid statute, to erase fromthe Rolls of the House the name of a member dulyelected by his sovereign constituents to representthem in Congress.-Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act

to the causes for disqualification or removal ofconstitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide adifferent procedure for disciplining constitutionalofficers other than those provided in the Constitution.

This is as true for the President and the members ofthis Court as it is for members of Congress itself. Thecauses and procedures for removal found in theConstitution are not mere disciplinary measures. Theyare intended to protect constitutional officers in theunhampered and independent discharge of theirfunctions.-The grounds for removal mentioned in theConstitution are exclusive. The non-inclusion ofphysical causes like death, being permanentlycomatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the

sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an actof Congress expelling one of its members for reasonsother than those found in the Constitution.Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It isvoluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreigncountry or express renunciation of Philippinecitizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty ofdisqualification is a disqualification against running forpublic office. Whether or not the conviction for such acrime while the Congressman is in office may be aground to expel him from Congress is a matter whichwe cannot decide obiter. We must await the propercase and controversy. My point is Congress cannotby statute or disciplinary action add to the causes fordisqualification or removal of its members. Only the

Constitution can do it.-All the earlier statutes about elective officials beingconsidered resigned upon the filing of a certificate ofcandidacy refer to non-constitutional officers.Congress has not only the power but also the duty toprescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city,and municipal officials. It has no such power when itcomes to constitutional officers. Such a provisioncould not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be inthe constitution.-Running for another elective office is not voluntaryrenunciation."Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind. It is true thatintentions may be deduced from a person's acts; butfor 50 yrs of our constitutional history, running for a

local government position was not considered avoluntary renunciation.-In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation,the Court should also be guided by the principle that

all presumptions should be in favor of representation,str ictly against disenfranchisement. I f disenfranchisement should there be, the same shouldonly be by due process of law, both substantive andprocedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, andultra vires, 'administrative act' of the respondents.[end]

Permanent Vacancies

MENZON V PETILLA197 SCRA 251

GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 20, 1991ANTON

NATUREMotion for reconsideration of the resolution of theCourt which initially denied the petition for certiorariand mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor ofLeyte, Aurelio D. Menzon.

FACTS

- February 16, 1988: by virtue of the fact that noGovernor had been proclaimed in the province ofLeyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santosdesignated the Vice-Governor, Respondent LeopoldoE. Petilla (PETILLA) as Acting Governor of Leyte.- Petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon (MENZON), a seniormember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was alsodesignated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as theVice-Governor for the province of Leyte. MENZON tookhis oath of office before then senator Alberto Romulo.- May 29, 1989: the Provincial Administrator, Tente U.Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of theDepartment of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar,

Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of MENZON toact as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

- Undersecretary Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337has no provision relating to succession in the Office ofthe Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, theappointment of MENZON as the temporary Vice-Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governorwho is temporarily performing the functions of theGovernor, could concurrently assume the functions ofboth offices.- As a result of the communications between Tenteroand Rubillar, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, issuedResolution No. 505 where it held invalid theappointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.- MENZON sought clarification from UndersecretaryRubillar regarding the latters opinion. Rubillar

explained that the designation extended by theSecretary of Local Government in favor of one of theSangguniang Panlalawigan Members of Leyte totemporarily discharge the powers and duties of the

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LocGov A2010vice-governor does not contradict the stand we haveon the matter; designation is merely an imposition ofadditional duties to be performed by the designee inaddition to the official functions attached to his office.- In view of Rubillars clarificatory letter, the RegionalDirector of the Department of Local Government,Region 8, Resurreccion Salvatierra, wrote a letteraddressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte PETILLA,requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of theSangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly.

Despite these several letters of request, the ActingGovernor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refusedto correct Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly topay the petitioner the emoluments attached to theOffice of Vice-Governor.- MENZON filed before this Court a petition forcertiorari and mandamus. The petition sought thenullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the paymentof his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.- The pending election dispute was resolved in themeantime; LARRAZABAL was proclaimed governor ofLeyte.- During the pendency of the petition, the provincialtreasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the

payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, forthe actual services rendered by the petitioner asacting Vice-Governor.- August 28, 1990: this Court dismissed thepetition filed by MENZON.- PETILLA, by virtue of the above resolution requestedGovernor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to payback to the province of Leyte all the emoluments andcompensation which he received while acting as theVice-Governor of Leyte.- MENZON filed a motion for reconsideration of ourresolution. The motion prayed that this Court upholdthe petitioner's right to receive the salary andemoluments attached to the office of the Vice-

Governor while he was acting as such.

ISSUE(S)1. WON there was a vacancy.2. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the

authority to make temporary appointments.

HELD1. YESRatio There is a vacancy when there is no personlawfully authorized to assume and exercise at presentthe duties of the office (The law on Public Officersstates that there is no vacancy whenever the office isoccupied by a legally qualified incumbent.).Reasoning

- It can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor PETILLA was appointed Acting Governor. Inthe eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected

was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercisethe duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.- There is no satisfactory showing that PETILLA,notwithstanding his succession to the Office of theGovernor, continued to simultaneously exercise theduties of the Vice-Governor.- The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor callfor a full-time occupant to discharge them. More sowhen the vacancy is for an extended period (almosttwo years). Precisely, it was PETILLAs automatic

assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted inthe vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. Thefact that the Secretary of Local Government wasprompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need tofill up the position during the period it was vacant.- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and findsno approbation under the law for it deprives theconstituents of their right of representation andgovernance in their own local government.

2. YESRatio Considering the silence of the LocalGovernment Code, the Court rules that, in order toobviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnumcreated by the vacancy, the President, acting through

her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, mayremedy the situation. The temporary appointmentextended to MENZON to act as the Vice-Governor istherefore valid. The exigencies of public servicedemanded nothing less than the immediateappointment of an acting Vice-Governor.Reasoning- The contingency of having simultaneous vacancies inboth offices cannot just be set aside. It was best forLeyte to have a full-time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concernof those in the government. It is a continuous dutyunbridled by any political considerations.- The Local Government Code (LGC) is silent on themode of succession in the event of a temporary

vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However,the silence of the law must not be understood toconvey that a remedy in law is wanting.- The two-year interregnum which would result fromthe respondents' view of the law is disfavored as itwould cause disruptions and delays in the delivery ofbasic services to the people and in the propermanagement of the affairs of the local government ofLeyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leavethe situation without affording any remedy was everintended by the LGC.- Under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the RevisedAdministrative Code of 1987, the President isempowered to make temporary appointments incertain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may

occur (however, both laws deal only with thefilling of vacancies in appointive positions). Inthe absence of any contrary provision in the LGC andin the best interest of public service, we see no cogent

reason why the procedure thus outlined by the twolaws may not be similarly applied in the present case.- As between the President who has supervision overlocal governments as provided by law and themembers of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of thePresident, until the law provides otherwise.- Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governorwould maim or prejudice the province of Leyte,is for higher officials to decide or, in proper

cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate.- The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is infull accord with the intent behind the LocalGovernment Code. There is no question that Section49 in connection with Section 52 of the LocalGovernment Code shows clearly the intent to providefor continuity in the performance of the duties of theVice-Governor.- The mode of succession provided for permanentvacancies may likewise be observed in case of atemporary vacancy in the same office. In this case,there was a need to fill the vacancy.- In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to bepaid the salary attached to the Office of the ViceGovernor is indubitable. Even granting that the

President, acting through the Secretary of LocalGovernment, possesses no power to appoint thepetitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a defacto officer entitled to compensation.- The appointment has the color of validity. Therespondents themselves acknowledged the validity ofthe petitioner's appointment and dealt with him assuch.

DISPOSITIONMotion for Reconsideration is granted.

GOVERNORS OF THE PHILIPPINES V.PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 73823JU-C GANDANGHARI AZURA

Permanent Vacancies in theSanggunian

FARIAS V. BARBA256 SCRA 396

MENDOZA; April 19, 1996MONCH

FACTS- Carlito B. Domingo was a member of theSangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Heresigned after going without leave to the US. To fill thevacancy, Mayor Barba recomended to Gov. Farinas

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LocGov A2010the appointment of Edward Palafox. A similarrecommendation was made by the SangguniangBayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation wasmade to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing therecommendation, was submitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Ilocos Norte.- The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved theresolution, saying that the power to appointSanggunian Bayan members is lodged with theGovernor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan then

recomended the appointment of Al Nacino. Nacinowas appointed and sworn the same day. Mayor Barba,on the other hand, appointed Palafox for the sameposition.- Petitioners then filed with the Regional Trial Court ofIlocos Norte a petition for quo warranto andprohibition. The trial court upheld the appointment ofBarba. MFR was denied.- Petitioners contend that the power to fill a vacancy inthe Sangguniang Bayan, which is created as a resultof the cessation from office of a member who does notbelong to a political party, is vested in the provincialgovernor upon recommendation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan. They cite Sec 45(c) of the LGC.Sec 45. Permanent Vacancies in the

Sanggunian.(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian whereautomatic successions provided above do not applyshall be filled by appointment in the followingmanner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary,in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and thesangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized citiesand independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniangpanlungsod of component cities and the sangguniangbayan;

(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of thesangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of thesangguniang barangay concerned.

(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only thenominee of the political party under which thesanggunian member concerned had been elected andwhose elevation to the position next higher in rankcreated the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall beappointed in the manner hereinabove provided. Theappointee shall come from the same political party asthat of the sanggunian member who caused thevacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of thevacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, anomination and a certificate of membership of theappointee from the highest official of the politicalparty concerned are conditions sine qua non, and anyappointment without such nomination and certificationshall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground

for administrative action against the officialresponsible therefor.(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by asanggunian member who does not belong to any

political party, the local chief executive shall, uponrecommendation of the sanggunian concerned,appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.

ISSUE/S1. Who is entitled to the vacant seat (Palafox orNacino)

HELD:1. Neither.

Ratio Sec 45 should be construed to mean asI. Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by aSanggunian Member Belonging to a Political Party

A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and SangguniangPanlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independentcomponent cities The President, through theExecutive Secretary, upon the nomination andcertification of the political party to which the memberwho caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in45 (b).

B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component citiesand Sangguniang Bayan The Governor upon thenomination and certification of the political party towhich the member who caused the vacancy belonged,as provided in 45 (b).

II. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a SanggunianMember Not Belonging to a Political PartyA. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang

Panlungsod of highly urbanized and independentcomponent cites The President, through theExecutive Secretary, upon recommendation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan or SangguniangPanlungsod as the case may be

B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component citiesand Sangguniang Bayan The Governor uponrecommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod orSangguniang Bayan as the case may beIII. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of theSangguniang Barangay City or Municipal Mayorupon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay

Reasoning But who is the "local chief executive"referred? And which is the "sanggunian concerned"?With respect to the first ("local chief executive"),petitioners look to Sec45(a) for the answer and saythat it is the governor, with respect to vacancies in theSangguniang Panlungsod of component cities andSangguniang Bayan, or the mayor with respect tovacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay.- In support of this view, they cite, first of all, thefollowing provision of the former Local GovernmentCode (B.P. Blg. 337):

Sec 50. Permanent Vacancies in the LocalSanggunians. In case of permanent vacancy in thesangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,sangguniang bayan, or sangguniang barangay, the

President of the Philippines, upon recommendation ofthe Minister of Local Government, shall appoint aqualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniangpanlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod; the

governor, in the case of sangguniang bayan members;or the city or municipal mayor, in the case ofsangguniang barangay members. Except for thesangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come fromthe political party of the sanggunian member whocaused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpiredterm of the vacant office.and, second, the following provision of the presentCode:Se 63. Preventive Suspension. (a) Preventive

suspension may be imposed:(1) By the President, if the respondent is an electiveofficial of a province, a highly urbanized or anindependent component city;(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an electiveofficial of a component city or municipality; or(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an electiveofficial of the barangay. . .- Reference to these provisions is appropriate not forthe reason advanced by petitioners, i.e., that thepower to appoint implies the power to remove, butbecause implicit in these provisions is a policy to vestin the President, the governor and the mayor indescending order the exercise of an executive powerwhether to appoint in order to fill vacancies in local

councils or to suspend local officials. These provisionsare in pari materia with Sec 45.- To be sure the President of the Philippines can not bereferred to as "local chief executive" in Sec 45(c) but itis apparent that the phrase is a misnomer and thatthe choice of this phrase was simply dictated by theneed to avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminablyrepeating the officials on whom the power to appointis conferred. Perhaps "authorities concerned" wouldhave been a more accurate generic phrase to use.- For that matter, to follow private respondents'interpretation would be to run into a similar, if notgreater, difficulty. For Sec 45(a) (3) vests the power tofill vacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay in themayor but the local chief executive of a barangay is

not the mayor. It is the punong barangay. Yet "localchief executive" cannot be applied to the punongbarangay without rendering Sec 45(a) (3)meaningless. For then there would never be anyoccasion when the mayor, under this provision, canappoint a replacement for a member of theSangguniang Bayan who for one reason or anotherceases from office for reason other than the expirationof his term. And why should a vacancy in theSangguniang Panlalawigan be filled by a differentauthority (the governor, according to this view) simplybecause the vacancy was created by a member whodoes not belong to a political party when, according toSec 45(a) (1), a vacancy created by a member whobelongs to a political party must be filled by

appointment by the President of the Philippines?- With reference to the phrase "sangguniangconcerned" in Sec 45(c), petitioners say it means, withrespect to a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, the

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LocGov A2010Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Their reason is that underSec 61 of the Code, the power to investigatecomplaints against elective municipal officials isvested in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Thisinterpretation is inconsistent with the fact that infilling vacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay it is theSangguniang Barangay which under Sec 45(a) (3)recommends the appointee, not the SangguniangPanlungsod or the Sangguniang Bayan, which wouldbe the case if petitioners' view were to prevail. We

think that the phrase "sanggunian concerned" in Sec45(c) should more properly be understood as referringto the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created.- Is the appointing authority limited to theappointment of those "recommended" to him? Theappointing authority is not bound to appoint anyonerecommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned.

The power of appointment is a discretionary power.On the other hand, neither is the appointing powervested with so large a discretion that he can disregardthe recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned,Since the recommendation takes the place ofnomination by political party, the recommendationmust likewise be considered a condition sine qua nonfor the validity of the appointment, by analogy to the

provision of Sec 45(b).- The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, sinceneither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent EdwardPalafox was appointed in the manner indicated in thepreceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat inthe Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Nortewhich was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. Forwhile petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by theprovincial governor, he was not recommended by theSangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by theSangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not theprovincial governor who appointed him.

Local Legislative PowerContempt Powers

NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRICCOOPERATIVE, INC. SANGGUNIANG

PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE155 SCRA 421

CORTES; November 5, 1987AJANG

FACTS- The Ad Hoc Committee of the SangguniangPanlungsod of Dumaguete was conducting an

investigation in connection with pending legislationrelated to the operations of public utilities in the Cityof Dumaguete where NORECO II, an electric

cooperative, had its principal place of business.Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on thealleged installation and use by NORECO II ofinefficient power lines in that city. The chairmanand co-chairman of the committee on Public Utilitiesand Franchises signed a subpoena sent to Paterio

Torres, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and ArturoUmbac, the General Manager, of NORECO II, requiringtheir attendance and testimony at the Committee'sinvestigation. The two failed to show up, so the

Committee on a latter date issued an order directingthem to show cause why they should not be punishedfor legislative contempt due to their failure to appearat said investigation. The two filed a motion to Quashbut was denied. Hence, this Petition for certiorari andProhibition with Preliminary Injunction and/orRestraining Order. They contend that theSangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft ofthe power to compel the attendance and testimony ofwitnesses, nor the power to order the arrest ofwitnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. And even ifassuming that they do, still the investigation ofmatters affecting the terms and conditions of thefranchise granted to NORECO II are beyond their

jurisdiction.

ISSUEWON the Ah Hoc committee of the Sangguinan hascontempt powers.

HELDNO.

The court started by saying that a line should bedrawn between the powers of Congress as therepository of the legislative power under theConstitution, and the powers that may be exercised bythe legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g.the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Dumaguete which, asmere creatures of law, possess only delegatedlegislative power. While the Constitution does not

expressly vest Congress with contempt powers, suchhas nevertheless been invoked by the legislative bodyas a means of preserving its authority and dignity.

The exercise by Congress of this power wasquestioned for the first time in the leading case of

Arnault v. Nazareno, where this Court held that thelegislative body indeed possessed the contemptpower. (The case involved a legislative inquiry into theacquisition by the Philippine Government of theBuenavista and Tambobong estates. During theSenate, investigation, Amault refused to reveal theIdentity of the person to whom he gave the money.He was held in custody until he revealed so.)

Even in the absence of an express Constitutionalgrant, said power must be considered implied or

incidental to the exercise of legislative power in orderfor it to be able to require and compel the disclosureof such knowledge and information in its investigation.

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power

is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of thegovernment vested with the legislative power,independently of the judicial branch, asserts itsauthority and punishes contempts thereof. When theframers of the Constitution adopted the principle ofseparation of powers, making each branch supremewithin the real of its respective authority, it must haveintended each department's authority to be full andcomplete. And how could the authority and powerbecome complete if for every act of refusal every act

of defiance, the legislative body must resort to thejudicial department for the appropriate remedy. The contempt power of the legislature is,

therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodiescannot correctly claim to possess it for the samereasons that the national legislature does. The powerattaches not to the discharge of legislative functionsper se but to the character of the legislature as one ofthe three independent and coordinate branches ofgovernment. The same thing cannot be said of locallegislative bodies which are mere creations of law.

There is no express provision either in the 1973Constitution or in the LGC granting local legislativebodies such power. The contempt power and thesubpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They

cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.Neither can they exist as mere incidents of theperformance of legislative functions. To allow locallegislative bodies or administrative agencies toexercise these powers without express statutory basiswould run afoul of the doctrine of separation ofpowers. Thus, the contempt power, as well as thesubpoena power, which the framers of thefundamental law did not expressly provide for butwhich the then Congress has asserted essentially forself-preservation as one of three co-equal branches ofthe government cannot be deemed implied in thedelegation of certain legislative functions to locallegislative bodies. This must be considered as anexception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for

liberal rules of interpretation in favor of localautonomy.Since the existence of the contempt power

inevitably poses a potential derogation of individualrights, the law cannot be liberally construed to haveimpliedly granted such powers to local legislativebodies.

The grant of such power must be express. Therebeing no provision in the Local Government Codeexplicitly granting local legislative bodies, the powerto issue compulsory process and the power to punishfor contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod ofDumaguete is devoid of power to punish the

petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.And even if the committee possessed this power,

the matter of their inquiry is beyond their jurisdiction.It comes evident that the inquiry would touch uponthe efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II and,necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such

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LocGov A2010inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondentSangguniang Panlungsod and its ad hoc committee assuch is within the jurisdiction of the NationalElectrification Administration.

Validity of an Ordinance

LAGCAO V LABRA

SUPRA PAGE 26 OF DIGESTAIDA

TANO V. SOCRATES278 SCRA 154

DAVIDE, JR; August 21, 1997REAN

FACTS- Petitioners Tano et al. filed petition to SC amongother to: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) OrdinanceNo. 15-92, of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof PuertoPrincesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993,

issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of PuertoPrincesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, OrdinanceNo. 2, Series ofSangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan;and, (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof.- Without seeking redress from the concerned localgovernment units, prosecutors office and courts,petitioners directly invoked SCs original jurisdictionby filing this petition- Ordinance No. 15-92 is: An ordinance banning theshipment of all live fish (except catfish, sea bass,mudfish, milkfish fries) and lobster outside PuertoPrincesa City from Jan. 1 93 to Jan. 1 98, andproviding for exemptions and penalties.- Office Order No. 23 to implement city ordinance,authorized and directed the proper authorities to

check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoescontaining live fish and lobster being shipped out fromthe Puerto Princesa Airport / Wharf or at any portwithin city jurisdiction. The purpose of the inspectionis to ascertain whether the shipper possessed therequired Mayors Permit issued by this Office and theshipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued bythe local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and AquaticResources and as to compliance with all other existingrules and regulations on the matter- Resolution No. 33 prohibited the catching, gathering,possessing, buying, selling ad shipment of live marinecoral dwelling aquatic organisms like mameng, suno,panther or senorita, lobster below 200g, taklobo,mother pearl, giant clams, oysters, loba, tiger prawn

breeder, and tropical aquarium fishes. This is toprotect the environment and impose appropriatepenalties upon acts which endanger the environment

such as dynamite fishing and other forms ofdestructive fishing, among others.- Without seeking redress from the concerned localgovernment units, prosecutors office and courts,petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction byfiling this petition. Petitioners contend: [1] TheOrdinances deprived them of due process of law, theirlivelihood, and unduly restricted them from thepractice of their trade, in violation Consti. [2] OfficeOrder No. 23 contained neither regulation nor

condition under which the Mayors permit could begranted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had theabsolute authority to determine whether or not toissue permit. [3] Ordinance No. 2 took away the rightof -fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways;and that members of Airline Shippers Associationwere unduly prevented from pursuing their vocationand entering into contracts which are proper,necessary, and essential to carry out their business.[4] Since Ord. No. 2 is null and void, the criminal casesbased thereon against petitioners Tano et al must bedismissed.- Respondents Gov. Socrates et al. defended thevalidity of the ordinances under the general welfareclause (Sec 16 LGC), and its specific power to protect

the environment and impose appropriate penalties foracts that endanger the environment. Also, there wasno violation of due process because public hearingswere conducted, and that there was a lawful purposeand employed reasonable means. As to equalprotection, a substantial distinction existed betweena fisherman who catches live fish with the intention ofselling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fishwith no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., theformer uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not.So the Ordinance applied equally to all thosebelonging to one class- Despite procedural obstacles, SC resolved to resolvethe case on the merits.

ISSUEWON the ordinances in question are unconstitutional

HELDNO- It is settled that laws (including ordinances enactedby local government units) enjoy the presumption ofconstitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, theremust be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentativecontradiction. In short, the conflict with theConstitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can beno finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is tosustain.

- After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and theprovisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to havebeen violated, we find petitioners contentionsbaseless and so hold that the former do not suffer

from any infirmity, both under the Constitution andapplicable laws.- Note the state policy enshrined in the Constitutionregarding the duty of the State to protect andadvance the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm andharmony of nature. See Oposa v. Factoran.- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carrieswith it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing theenvironment ... The LGC provisions invoked by private

respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood tothe right of the people to a balanced and healthfulecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause (Sec16LGC), expressly mentions this right: to enhance theright of the people to a balanced ecology.- Moreover, Section 5(c) of LGC explicitly mandatesthat the general welfare provisions of the LGC shallbe liberally interpreted to give more powers to thelocal government units in accelerating economicdevelopment and upgrading the quality of life for thepeople of the community.- The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grantfishery privileges in municipal waters and to imposerentals, fees or charges; to penalize, thru ordinances,the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous

substances, electricity, muro-ami, and otherdeleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute anyviolation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang

panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan aredirected to enact ordinances for the general welfare ofthe municipality and its inhabitants, which shallinclude, ordinances that protect the environment andimpose appropriate penalties for acts which endangerthe environment such as dynamite fishing and otherforms of destructive fishing ... and such otheractivities which result in pollution, of rivers and lakesor of ecological imbalance.- The centerpiece of LGC is the system ofdecentralization as expressly mandated by the Consti.

Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGCexpressly provides that any provision on a power of aLGU shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and incase of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolvedin favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU.Devolution refers to the act by which the NationalGovernment confers power and authority upon thevarious LGUs to perform specific functions andresponsibilities.- One of the devolved powers enumerated in thesection of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement offishery laws in municipal waters including theconservation of mangroves. This necessarily includesenactment of ordinances to effectively carry out suchfishery laws within the municipal waters.

- In light then of the principles of decentralization anddevolution enshrined in the LGC and the powersgranted to local government units under Sec 16 (theGeneral Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447

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LocGov A2010(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), whichunquestionably involve the exercise of police power,the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot bedoubted.Disposition Petition DISMISSED.

Approval by Mayor Not a MinisterialAct

MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES VSANDIGANBAYAN

281 SCRA 631ROMERO; Nov 13, 1997

BRI

FACTS-Petitioner, with 2 others, was charged withfalsification of a public document, specificallyResolution No. 57-S-92 (the RESOLUTION) dated July27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles,Bataan. The complaint alleged that the resolution,appropriating P8,500 for the payment of the terminal

leave of 2 municipal employees, was anomalous fornot having been approved by the said Council, as theminutes of the proceedings therein made no referenceto the supposed approval thereof. It contended that itsseeming passage was carried out by petitioner inconnivance with Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member

Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita. OnSep 21, 1994, an information was filed before theSandiganbayan.-On Oct 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment, petitionerfiled a Motion for Reinvestigation arguing, amongother things, "that the Ombudsman previouslydismissed a similar complaint against him involvingthe same factual setting." Likewise adduced in themotion is the joint affidavit of the other members of

the SB of Mariveles attesting to the actual passageand approval of the RESOLUTION.-In a resolution dated Dec 29, 1994, respondentSandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation.Motion for Reconsideration was also denied on May24, 1995.

ISSUES1. WON approval by mayor is a ministerial act2. WON Sandiganbayans order was proper

HELD1. NO.Ratio The grant of the veto power confers authoritybeyond the simple mechanical act of signing an

ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to itsenforceability. It accords the local chief executive thediscretion to sustain a resolution/ordinance in the firstinstance or to veto it and return it with his objections

to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsiderthe same. The Sanggunian concerned, however, mayoverride the veto by a 2/3 vote of all its membersthereby making the ordinance/resolution effective. Itis clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a localchief executive in the enactment of an ordinance orresolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, butthe application of judgment after meticulous analysisand intelligence as well.Reasoning Petitioner argues that the deliberations

undertaken and the consequent passage of theRESOLUTION are legislative in nature. And as localchief executive, he has neither the official custody ofnor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, hecould not have taken advantage of his official positionin committing the crime of falsification.Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court thatthe final step in the approval of an ordinance orresolution, where the local chief executive affixes hissignature, is purely a ministerial act. This view iserroneous. Art 109(b) of the LGC outlines the vetopower of the Local Chief Executive which provides:

The local chief executive, except the punongbarangay shall have the power to veto anyparticular item or items of an appropriations

ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting alocal development plan and public investmentprogram or an ordinance directing the payment ofmoneyor creating liability. .

2. YES.Reasoning As explained by Deputy SpecialProsecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment, theother case relied upon by petitioner has no relationwhatsoever with the one in question. Notably, theformer case was subject of a separate complaint andpreliminary investigation, hence, the findings andrecords therein could not be "made part of the caseunder consideration."

The Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes takenduring the session of the SB held last July 27, 1992,

which petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence ofwhat actually transpired therein. In a long line ofcases, the Court, in resolving conflicting assertions ofthe protagonists in a case, has placed reliance on theminutes or the transcribed stenographic notes toascertain the truth of the proceedings therein.Here, the minutes of the session reveal that petitionerattended the session of the SB on July 27, 1992. It isevident, therefore, that petitioner approved thesubject resolution knowing fully well that "the subjectmatter treated therein was neither taken up anddiscussed nor passed upon by the SB during thelegislative session."

The Court accords full recognition to the minutes asthe official repository of what actually transpires in

every proceeding. It has happened that the minutesmay be corrected to reflect the true account of aproceeding, thus giving the Court more reason toaccord them great weight for such subsequent

corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve theaccuracy of the records. In light of the conflictingclaims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court,without resorting to the minutes, will encounterdifficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.With regard to the joint affidavit of some members ofthe SB attesting to the actual passage and approval ofthe RESOLUTION, the Court finds the same to havebeen belatedly submitted as a last minute attempt tobolster petitioner's position, and, therefore, could not

in any way aid the latter's cause.Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioner's counselare best taken up in the trial on the merits.Disposition WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailedresolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 29,1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED. Thetemporary restraining order issued by this Court onSeptember 18, 1995, is hereby LIFTED.

The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal CaseNo. 21073 for arraignment and trial.

Review of Component City andMunicipality Ordinance

MODAY VS. CA (Agusan del Sur)268 SCRA 586

ROMERO; February 20, 1997RICKY

FACTS- In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalityof Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No.43-89, authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate thePetition for Expropriation of a One Hectare Portion of acertain lot along the National Highway owned byPercival Moday for the Site of the Bunawan FarmersCenter and other government sports facilities. It wasapproved by Municipal Mayor Anuncio Bustillo andtransmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for itsapproval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapprovedsaid Resolution and returned it with the comment that"expropriation is unnecessary considering that thereare still available lots in Bunawan for theestablishment of the government center."- The Municipality of Bunawan subsequently filed apetition for Eminent Domain against Moday before theAgusan del Sur RTC. The complaint was later amendedto include the registered owners, Percival Moday'sparents, as party defendants. The municipality filed aMotion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession ofSubject Matter of This Case stating that it had alreadydeposited with the municipal treasurer the necessaryamount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of theRevised ROC and that it would be in the government's

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LocGov A2010best interest to be allowed to take possession of theproperty.- Despite Moday's opposition and after a hearing onthe merits, the RTC granted the motion. It held thatthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare theresolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that theduty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely toreview the ordinances and resolutions passed by theSangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of the oldLocal Government Code and that the exercise of

eminent domain is not one of the two actsenumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring theapproval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The CAaffirmed.

ISSUEWON a municipality may expropriate private propertyby virtue of a municipal resolution which wasdisapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELDYES.Ratio The only ground upon which a provincial boardmay declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, ororder invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or

order is "beyond the powers conferred upon thecouncil or president making the same." Absolutely noother ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legalquestion is before the provincial board in itsconsideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, ororder. The provincial (board's) disapproval of anyresolution, ordinance, or order must be premisedspecifically upon the fact that such resolution,ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legalpowers conferred by law. If a provincial board passesthese limits, it usurps the legislative function of themunicipal council or president.Reasoning The Sangguniang Panlalawigan waswithout the authority to disapprove MunicipalResolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan

clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminentdomain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity topromulgate said resolution pursuant to B.P. 337 (oldLGC). It follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid andbinding and could be used as lawful authority topetition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.- As regards the accusation of political oppression, it isalleged that Moday incurred the ire of Mayor Bustillowhen he refused to support the latter's candidacy formayor in previous elections. Moday claims that MayorBustillo used the expropriation to retaliate byexpropriating their land even if there were otherproperties belonging to the municipality and availablefor the purpose, specifically, a vacant seven-hectareproperty adjacent to his land evidenced by a sketch

plan. The Court however found no evidentiary supportfor petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopyof the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that themunicipality does own vacant land adjacent to

petitioners' property suited to the purpose of theexpropriation. Consequently, the Court held thatModay's demand that the mayor be personally liablefor damages is without basis.DispositiveDecision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V VMREALTY

SUPRA -PAGE 31 OF DIGEST

AJANG

Grounds for Disciplinary ActionReliance on Good Faith

ARIAS v SANDIGANBAYAN180 SCRA 309

GUTIERREZ; December 19, 1989JOEY

FACTS (taken from Dissenting Opinion)- The implementation of the Manggahan Floodway

Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering Districtheaded by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. Heformed a committee composed of, among others,Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose forsurveys.- A memorandum was sent to Data by Public WorksDirector Anolin, directing that all affected landscovered by the Project shall be excluded fromreevaluation and reassessment.- Among the lots affected was a portion of ricelandregistered in the name of Benjamin Agleham. The landwas previously owned by the parents of the accusedNatividad Gutierrez.- Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" was

declared for taxation. Its assessed value was P0.15per square meter. Another Tax Declaration was issuedfor the same ricefield" with declared market value ofP150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessedvalue of P60,340.- Ten months later, another Tax Declaration wasissued wherein the market value of the same"ricefield," jumped P10 per square meter. Its assessedvalue was fixed at P120,680.

-Natividad Gutierrez, armed with a SPA allegedlyexecuted by Agleham in her favor, filed an applicationfor payment at the District Engineer's Office. Shesubmitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No.47895 bearing a false date, and describing theproperty as "residential", with a fair market value of

P80 per square meter and assessed value ofP724,056.- The documents supporting Agleham's claim were"examined" by the Administrative Officer Arcaya, who,

after initiating them, turned them over to Cruz, ADeed of Absolute Sale was prepared by Cruz who alsoinitialed the supporting documents and transmittedthem to District Engr. Data.- The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by Data andGutierrez. Data sent the papers to Director Anolin whorecommended to the Asst Sec of Public Works theapproval of the Deed of Sale. The documents werethen returned to Data's office. The sale was registeredand a TCT was issued in the name of the Government.

- General Voucher No. 85-2-7809-52 for the amount ofP1,520,320 bore fourth certifications of. (1) Cruz asSenior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando asSupervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data asDistrict Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as ProjectActing Accountant. The voucher and its supportingdocuments were pre-audited and approved forpayment by the accused,Arias, as auditor of theEngineering District. 16 PNB checks for the total sumof Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as paymentfor Agleham's property.-During investigation, it was established that the deedof sale was pre-audited by Arias, auditor of the RizalEngineering District, who approved the payment toGutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount

of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e.,"snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by theamount of P1,520,320 in words and figures, norchecking the veracity of the supporting documentslisted at the back of the General Voucher, some ofwhich were fake, forged or altered.- An information was filed against Data, Fernando,Cruz, Jose, Arcaya and Arias in the Sandiganbayan forviolating Section 3, par (e), of the Anti Graft andCorrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that theyconspired with accused Gutierrez to overprice theland. Sandiganbayan convicted Gutierrez, Data, Cruz,

Jose and Arias. Arias and Data appealed.

ISSUE

WON Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Arias andData

HELDYES.- Under the SB decision, a department secretary,bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, andall chief auditors would be equally culpable for everycrime arising from disbursements which they haveapproved. The department head or chief auditor wouldbe guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the lastof a long line of officials and employees who actedupon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guiltmust be premised on a more knowing, personal, anddeliberate participation of each individual who is

charged with others as part of a conspiracy.- Petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in thefalsification of public documents or preparation ofspurious supporting papers. The charge is causing

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LocGov A2010undue injury to the Government and giving a privateparty unwarranted benefits through manifestpartiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusablenegligence.- The alleged undue injury is the Governmentpurchase of land for P80.00 instead of the P5.00 valueper square meter appearing in the tax declarationsand fixed by the municipal assessor, not by thelandowner. The assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 persquare meter of land is completely unrealistic and

arbitrary as the basis for conviction.- The property was acquired through negotiatedpurchase. It was, therefor, nothing more than anordinary contract of sale where the purchase price hadto be arrived at by agreement between the partiesand could never be left to the discretion of one of thecontracting parties. For it is the essence of a contractof sale that there must be a meeting of the mindsbetween the seller and the buyer upon the thing whichis the object of the contract and upon the price.Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate thereasonableness of the price, taking into considerationsuch other factors as location, potentials,surroundings and capabilities.- There can be no overpricing for purposes of a

criminal conviction where no proof adduced duringorderly proceedings has been presented andaccepted.- It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized officecould personally do all these things in all voucherspresented for his signature. All heads of offices haveto rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinatesand on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchasesupplies, or enter into negotiations. If a departmentsecretary entertains important visitors, the auditor isnot ordinarily expected to call the restaurant aboutthe amount of the bill, question each guest whetherhe was present at the luncheon, inquire whether thecorrect amount of food was served and otherwise

personally look into the reimbursement voucher's

accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to besome added reason why he should examine eachvoucher in such detail. Any executive head of evensmall government agencies or commissions can attestto the volume of papers that must be signed. Thereare hundreds of document , letters and supportingpaper that routinely pass through his hands. Thenumber in bigger offices or departments is even moreappalling.- There should be other grounds than the meresignature or approval appearing on a voucher tosustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.- Data did not take any direct and active part in theacquisition of land for the Manggahan floodway; onthe basis of the supporting certified documents which

appeared regular and complete on their face, Data, ashead of the office and the signing authority at thatlevel, merely signed but did not approve the deed of

sale as the approval thereof was the prerogative ofthe Secretary of Public Works- Prosecution has not shown any positive andconvincing evidence of conspiracy.Dispositive Sandiganbayan decision SET ASIDE. Ariasand Data are acquitted on grounds of reasonabledoubt.

SEPARATE OPINION

GRIO-AQUINO [dissent]- A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidenceof the acts charged, but may and generally must beproven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions andcircumstances. This case presents a conspiracy ofsilence and inaction- It was too much of a coincidence that bothpetitioners were negligent at the same time over thesame transaction.- The primary function of an auditor is to preventirregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagantexpenditures of government funds. The auditorialfunction of an auditor, as a representative of theCommission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the

accounts, funds, financial transactions and resourcesof the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction. Examination, as applied to auditing,means "to probe records, or inspect securities or otherdocuments; review procedures, and question persons,all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion ofaccuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like.- We reject Arias casuistic explanation that since hissubordinates had passed upon the transaction, hecould assume that it was lawful and regular for, if hewould be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates,his position as auditor would be useless andunnecessary.- Data claims innocence because he allegedly did nottake any direct and active participation in the

acquisition of the property. However, under theprinciple of command responsibility, he wasresponsible for the manner in which the committeeperformed its tasks for it was he who in fact signedthe deed of sale prepared by the committee. Bysigning the deed of sale and certifications prepared forhis signature by his committee, he in effect, madetheir acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty withthose members of the committee who accepted thefake tax declarations and made false certificationsregarding the use and value of the property.- We find no merit in the argument that the Aglehamriceland was not overpriced because the price fixed inthe deed of sale was reasonable. It was further arguedthat the valuation in the owner's genuine tax

declaration may not be used as a standard indetermining the fair market value of the propertybecause PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory inexpropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the

property as declared by the owner, or as determinedby the assessor, whichever is lower), were declarednull and void. That argument is not well taken becausePD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified)applied to the expropriation of property for public use.

The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done byexpropriation but through a negotiated sale. In thecourse of the negotiations, there was absolutely noallegation nor proof that the price of P80 per squaremeter was its fair market value. What the accused did

was to prove the value of the land through fake taxdeclarations, false certifications and a forged swornstatement on the current and fair market value of thereal property submitted by the accused in support ofthe deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents wereused, it may not be said that the State agreed to paythe price on the basis of its fairness, for theGovernment was in fact deceived concerning thereasonable value of the land.

DELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN217 SCRA 49Jan 13, 1993

CHRISCAPSFACTS- Deloso is the incumbent Governor of Zambales,former Mayor of Botolan.- He was charged w/ violating Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, that while he was Mayor, he gaveunwarranted benefits to 5 pvt individuals by issuing tothem a tractor purchased by the municipality w/o anyagreement as to payment of rentals, causing injury tothe municipality.- Deloso filed Demurrer to evidence. Demurrer wasdenied as regards 3 cases but granted as to 2.- Sandiganbayan found Deloso guilty.- Other facts established

- Sangguniang Bayan of Botolan authorized theobtention by Municipality of loan for purpose ofpurchasing 5 farm tractos to aid farmers in thearea.- But not one farmer opted to make use thereof.- To make the best of a bad situation, Sanggunianplanned to lease them to affluent landownersselected by the municipality. Deloso had no partin the selection.- Tractors were turned over to lessees w/o writtencontract. Resolution was adopted by Sangguniansetting out generally conditions for use.- Tractors were returned and eventuallydeteriorated and were sold as junk.

- Sandiganbayans conclusions

- Tractors were irresponsibly delivered w/o paperto evidence delivery.- There was no written agreement.

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LocGov A2010- There was no bond w/c is usually posted.- Beneficiaries pd nary a cent until NBI questionedthem.- Grant of tractors wasnt made thru canvass orpublic bidding.

ISSUESWON Deloso was correctly found guilty

HELD

NO.- All 3 beneficiaries (Ferrer, Encarnacion, Lim) werepresented and all declared that they rcvd tractorsupon understanding that theyd pay rentals and keepthem in good repair. The facts they established arethe same as those demonstrated by the evidence ofdefense.- Sison (Municipal Treas) testified that payments weremade by lessees.- Deloso himself took witness stand. He said he askedthat the terms of lease be embodied in Resolution butSanggunian had declined at that time, saying itsunable to do so bec docs werent yet in its possession.What Deloso did was to instruct Municipal Treas toincorporate general terms in a memorandum receipt.

Deloso also personally explained terms of lease to thebeneficiaries.- Sandiganbayans conclusions are erroneous. Thelease in this case isnt one of those required by law tobe in writing / in any particular form to be valid /enforceable. Absence of bond doesnt maketransactions criminal. Theres also no evidence thatcanvass / bidding is a requirement.- Lower court said that beneficiaries were suborned byDeloso. This is too tenuous a premise.- Also incorrect is that Deloso didnt followrequirement of Local Govt Audit Office that renting ofgovt equipment must be based on fees set by DPWH.No proof of such requirement.

Preventive Suspension

NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT andRICARDO M. TAMARGO v. OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAULDORAN

G.R. No. 111304VITUG; June 17, 1994

EDEL

FACTS:-This petition for review challenges the Resolution,

dated 28 June 1993, of the Office of the Ombudsmanfinding petitioners guilty of simple misconduct andoppression in the performance of official duties andrecommending the penalty of a 2-month suspension

from office, without pay, and the Order, dated 29 July1993, rejecting petitioners' motion for reconsideration.- Petitioner Nemesio Arturo S. Yabut, Vice Mayor of themunicipality and Private respondent Paul Doran, anAmerican national, figured in an altercation while theformer was directing traffic. Doran stopped where

Yabut was and asked "why it took so long to make aleft turn?" Petitioner Yabut answered "Sorry, sir, itstraffic." Doran then exclaimed, "Who the hell are you,"and stuck a dirty finger sign at Yabut. Yabut's traffic

officers joined the fray. They pulled out Doran from hiscar and started beating him until three men rescuedDoran and brought him to the nearby Pacific StarBuilding. Both Yabut and Doran suffered injuries as aresult of the scuffle.- Doran made a formal complaint against Yabut beforethe National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)- Yabut filed his affidavit and that of his witnesses. TheNBI forthwith indorsed the case to respondent Officeof the Ombudsman, which promptly imposed a ninety-day preventive suspension on Yabut.- Yabut moved for the reconsideration of thesuspension order.- In an Order, dated 12 March 1993, the Ombudsmanordered that:

1. The complainant be furnished with copies ofthe affidavits of the respondent and hiswitnesses, and for the former, if he so desires, tomake a reply thereto within ten (10) days fromreceipt of the same;2. Ricardo M. Tamargo, security aide of therespondent, be named as a co-respondent in theabove-entitled case; that he be furnished withcopies of the sworn statements of thecomplainant and his witnesses; and that he mayfile further responsive pleadings, if he so desires,within ten (10) days from receipt of the same;3. The resolution of the respondent's motion tolift suspension order be held in abeyance untiland after the respective pleadings/evidence of

the parties have been submitted.- During the preliminary conference held on 19 May1993, the parties agreed to submit the case forresolution. Yabut also moved for the lifting of hispreventive suspension. The following day, thepreventive suspension order was lifted.- On 28 June 1993, the investigating officer submittedthe questioned Resolution containing her findings andrecommendation.- The resolution which was approved by the OverallDeputy Ombudsman recommended that respondents

Yabut and Tamargo be meted with the penalty ofsuspension from office without payfor a period of two(2) months effective upon receipt of a copy of saidresolution.

- Petitioner Yabut filed a "Motion forClarification/Reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Court may review decisions/resolutions ofthe Ombudsman in administrative cases2. WON the preventive suspension meted by theOmbudsman to the petitioner prior to the resolution ofthe administrative case should be credited to thepenalty of suspension imposed on him

HELD:1. YES.While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to

determine whether or not a criminal case shouldbe filed, this Court is not precluded fromreviewing the Ombudsman's action when thereis an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65of the Rules of Court may exceptionally beinvoked pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the1987 Constitution.Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides:

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1)All provisionary orders at the Office of theOmbudsman are immediately effective andexecutory.A motion for reconsideration of any order,directive or decision of the Office of theOmbudsman must be filed within five (5) days

after receipt of written notice and shall beentertained only on any of the following grounds:(1) New evidence has been discovered whichmaterially affects the order, directive or decision;(2) Errors of law or irregularities have beencommitted prejudicial to the interest of themovant. The motion for reconsideration shall beresolved within three (3) days from filing:Provided, That only one motion forreconsideration shall be entertained.Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsmanwhen supported by substantial evidence areconclusive. Any order, directive or decisionimposing the penalty of public censure orreprimand, suspension of not more than one

month's salary shall be final and unappealable.In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,directives, or decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman may be appealed to the SupremeCourtby filing a petition for certiorari within ten(10) days from receipt of the written notice ofthe order, directive or decision or denial of themotion for reconsideration in accordance withRule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified bythe Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of

justice may require.Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules ofProcedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) alsoprovides thus:

Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. Where therespondent is absolved of the charge, and incase of conviction where the penalty imposed ispublic censure or reprimand, suspension of not

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LocGov A2010more than one month, or a fine equivalent to onemonth salary, the decision shall be final andunappealable. In all other cases, the decisionshall become final after the expiration of ten(10) days from receipt thereof by therespondent, unless a motion for reconsiderationor petition for certiorari shall have been filed byhim as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.

However, in the instant petition, the Court findsneither an error of law nor grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the Ombudsman. The attendantcircumstances, it might be said, could have wellcaused tempers to rise and patience to break;nevertheless, they served no excuse for the maulingand shooting incidents that followed. While the Courtdoes not condone the act of provocation made byDoran, which in the words of petitioners was no lessthan "an act of spite, degradation and mockery," it didnot, however, justify an equally abhorrent reactionfrom them. Petitioners were public officers; Doran wasnot. The Court seconds the Solicitor General in thisobservation:

A public official, more especially an elected one,should not be onion skinned. Strict personaldiscipline is expected of an occupant of a public

office because a public official is a property ofthe public. He is looked upon to set the examplehow public officials should correctly conductthemselves even in the face of extremeprovocation. Always he is expected to act andserve with the highest degree of responsibility,integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remainaccountable for his conduct to the people.

2. NO.A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsmanby virtue of his authority under Section 21 of RepublicAct No. 6770, in relation to Section 9 of AdministrativeOrder No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but ameans taken to insure the proper and impartialconduct of an investigation. The Court has ruled, in a

number of times before, that a preventive suspensionmay be ordered even before the charges are heard, aswell as before the official concerned is given anopportunity to prove his innocence, being merely ameasure that is precisely designed in order not tohamper the normal course of an investigation throughthe use of influence and authority.Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.No special pronouncement on costs.

CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY206 SCRA 290

PARAS; February 14, 1992JAVI

FACTS

-Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer andmember of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with aprayer for TRO.-RA 6875, entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THEPHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZEDDEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCALGOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, allegedlycontravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution:The State shall establish and maintain one police

force, which shall be national in scope and civilian incharacter, to be administered and controlled by anational police commission. The authority of localexecutives over the police units in their jurisdictionshall be provided by law.-petitioner herein respectfully advances the view thatRA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commissionby limiting its power "to administrative control" overthe Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control"remained with the Department Secretary under whomboth the National Police Commission and the PNP wereplaced

ISSUEWON RA 6875 is unconstitutional

HELD: NO-To begin with, one need only refer to thefundamentally accepted principle in ConstitutionalLaw that the President has control of all executivedepartments, bureaus, and offices to lay at restpetitioner's contention on the matter.-This presidential power of control over the executivebranch of government extends over all executiveofficers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerkand has been held by us, in the landmark case ofMondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [thePresident] to alter or modify or nullify or set asidewhat a subordinate officer had done in theperformance of his duties and to substitute the

judgment of the former with that of the latter."- As a corollary rule to the control powers of thePresident is the Doctrine of Qualified PoliticalAgency. As the President cannot be expected toexercise his control powers all at the same time and inperson, he will have to delegate some of them to hisCabinet members.-Under this doctrine, which recognizes theestablishment of a single executive, all executive andadministrative organizations are adjuncts of theExecutive Department, the heads of the variousexecutive departments are assistants and agents ofthe Chief Executive, and, except in cases where theChief Executive is required by the Constitution or lawto act in person or the exigencies of the situation

demand that he act personally, the multifariousexecutive and administrative functions of the ChiefExecutive are performed by and through theexecutive departments, and the acts of the

Secretaries of such departments, performed andpromulgated in the regular course of business, unlessdisapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, arepresumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.-Thus, the Presidents power of control is directlyexercised by him over the members of the Cabinetwho, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureausand other offices

round 4&5 compiled

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