Copyright © 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press. All rights reserved.

Journal of Modern Greek Studies 15.2 (1997) 349-370

Greeks in Europe: Antinomies in National Identities

Roy Panagiotopoulou

Tables

Abstract: The attempt to create a common European identity is considered a prerequisite for achieving cultural homogeneityas well as essential for supporting the supranational decision-making institutional framework. The problems of maintainingboth national sovereignty and national identity, and of preserving cultural particularity have preoccupied Greek politicaldiscourse since the beginning of the negotiations for Greece's accession into the EC. Although presenting an overall pro-EUprofile, Greeks have reacted negatively to measures allowing aliens to participate in national and local issues. The situationhas become even more complex owing to Balkan and Eastern Europe instability and also to the continuing politicoeconomiccrisis in Greece itself. Structural changes and the modernization of the functions of the state have become inevitable in orderto maintain Greece's position in the EU and to allow the country to catch up with Europe's overall development. Thesedilemmas have triggered ambivalent feelings toward national and European identity and toward the necessity of modernizingthe nation's social, economic, and political structures.

Introduction

The process leading to European unification accelerated at the beginning of the 1990s, bringing to the forefront a much debatedproblematic initially posed at the end of the 1970s. This concerned the supranational jurisdiction of European Union institutions and thetransfer of responsibility from national decision-making bodies to European ones. 1 A search has been added for those processes orpractices that could bring about a convergence or a homogenization of the viewpoints of European citizens. The goal is to insure thesmooth implementation of supranational decisions--decisions that, passing beyond economics, extend to political and social choices thatmay clash with the national interests of the EU member-states. The idea of "European identity" 2 has been put forward as the mostappropriate means to meet the goal of unification. Such identity would need to be [End Page 349] stronger than national identity in theconsciousness of the citizens of the member-states. It would consolidate the viewpoints, positions, attitudes, and desires of all EU citizens.

This article first interprets the preconditions leading to the effort to "construct" a European identity that would constitute the supremeimagined identification or, if it did not more than make up for the national identification, would at least influence the latter. The article thenpresents the reactions of Greek citizens regarding various choices for the promotion of this identity.

The general attitude of Greeks and of the citizens of other member-states displays antinomies that derive primarily from the need tomodernize their society's social and political structures and secondarily from international circumstances. In recent years a tendencytoward the globalization of political and cultural relations has been evident, as has the phenomenon of economic globalization; yet thesame period has seen the phenomenon of a nationalism displaying violent racist tendencies and/or milder but often longer-lastingxenophobic ones. 3

Before proceeding to an analysis of Greek attitudes regarding national identity versus European identity, I wish to comment briefly onthese two opposing phenomena of modernity.

National identity versus global identity

It is well known that no form of social cohesion can exist without identity; nor can an individual psyche be formed. The process ofindividual socialization is based primarily on imitation and identification. In addition, it is well known that ideologies become acceptedprimarily because they offer people a symbolic and imagined framework that allows them to be identified. This identification arms themagainst chance, the unknown that arises from difference and seeks interpretation, order, and classification (Demertzis 1995:81).

National identity is not just any collective identification. It is an imagined one (Anderson 1991) that, broader than all other social andindividual identifications, embodies, coordinates, and grades all social and individual identifications (Kellas 1991:16; Demertzis 1995:81-82).

On the theoretical level as much as on the historical, the foundation of a nation is based on and legitimized by the ideology of an absolute,unique national identity that functions as a mechanism for the formation and control of the community of "us" in juxtaposition to thecommunity of "them."

National identity is a special form of collective identity in which the element of community involves not only shared territory, language,[End Page 350] religion, and customs, but also a sense of continuity, historical memory, and common destiny, all of which connect theindividual member to his or her society (Smith 1990:179). Generally, these elements constitute the basic characteristics that differentiate anational collective culture--i.e., one that is historically specific and spatially bounded. They also reproduce those images and symbols thatinsure the continuation of imagined identification (Smith 1990:178). In the process of the construction of collective identities, value-ladenpractices are created that "legitimate" "normative" or "philosophical" standards in the consciousness of individuals, and advance both theuniqueness of the "self" and the superiority of the nation, justifying the national community's self-image and self-appraisal (Tsoucalas1991:60; Chouliaras 1990:91 ff.).

When nationalism accentuates national limits, often closing societies to the outside world, globalization in both the organization of world-wide production and the exploitation of world-wide markets eliminates spatial and temporal barriers (Robins 1991:25ff.), surpasses the

limits of transformations in economic relations, and spreads to cultural transformation and the globalization of culture. 4 Globalizationattempts to "construct" a global culture in the same way that the nation constructed its own imagined community (Smith 1991:177).National identity, a unique identification limited by time, space, and the obligations thereby imposed, is valid only within a strict culturalframework 5 whereas collective cultural identity is cosmopolitan in nature because it is not supported by a common past, commonhistorical origins, historical memory, or a sense of continuity but, on the contrary, is supported by the mass production of cultural goods tosuit common tastes and habits emerging from "global" consumption models and the creation of "global" needs. Time and distance do notintervene in the relationship with "other" cultures; however, their absence or gradual compression leads to the perception of an imaginedworld of instantaneity and depthlessness (Robins 1991:33)--in other words, a world in which the individual's social environment seems atthe same time to be the world environment.

A necessary condition for globalization's success is the acceptance of Western liberalism's basic characteristics--a conviction that Westernculture guarantees a living standard sufficiently high to minimize the insecurity that produces defensive or xenophobic tendencies withregard to "others" who may "threaten" national security and personal welfare (Wieworka 1994:8-25). 6 As Beck (1994:480) accuratelyobserves, we can speak of the desire to build not a "Europe of institutions but a Europe of individuals guided by the non-identity of thenational." 7 [End Page 351]

European identity as a requirement for the success of European unification

The significance attached to the questions of national identity and cultural difference in EU countries does not stem only from thereadjustments and movements of population triggered by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe 8 or by the resurgence of nationalisticconfrontation. The crisis in the Balkans 9 exacerbated existing conditions, especially for Greece (Ioakimidis 1993:418). Among the factorsthat gave it priority was the need to safeguard progress toward European unification on the economic and political levels.

A decade later, at the end of the 1980s, the old issue of Political Union (PU) returned to the Community's negotiating table in connectionwith the revision of the Maastricht Treaty. Proponents of PU argued that it was important to strengthen the Community's role in the worldthrough the development of common foreign and defense policy. 10 During the negotiations on the Treaty, the smaller countries supportedthe view that supranational institutions (in other words, a strengthened European Parliament) could guarantee balance--namely, the equalrole of the small countries in Community decisions.

The deeper significance of European Union is its respect for the national particularities of geographically defined member-states: for theiraesthetic and cultural-ecological identity (Ioakimidis 1992:28) and for a citizenship that continues to be defined "traditionally"--that is, onthe basis of national territorial sovereignty (Puhle 1994:23). However, respect for national differences, added to fears that nationalequilibrium will be disturbed, has led the inhabitants of the member-states--for the time being at least--to contradictory evaluations of theMaastricht Treaty (indeed to intense contradictions in the case of Denmark) or to nationalistic prejudices against the remaining countries ofthe EU. 11

Today, the demand is for the creation of a cultural homogeneity that can then serve as the foundation for acceptance of decisions made by asovereign supranational entity, the European Community. As mentioned above, the common denominator for enhancing cohesion is seenas the construction of a "European identity" shared by the citizens of the member-states. Hence the discourse concerning this shared"European identity" has become a tool for a given purpose, a tool that relies on the a priori assumption that Western liberal culture is thecommon and more-or-less obligatory framework for all the EU countries. 12

Evidence for the belief that there is a broader community of culture among the residents of the EU countries is provided by the trendtoward homogenization and uniformity in expectations and life-style. Possible factors producing this homogenization are industrialization,[End Page 352] the level of technological progress, democracy as a system of government, institutional regulations, consumption patterns,the mass production and internationalization of the commodities turned out by the culture industry and the mass media, migration, andrecreational modes such as tourism (Esser 1988:240). These features are often employed to evaluate and compare the standards of living invarious European countries; they are also used to produce empirical evidence for the construction of international standards according towhich countries may be ranked. Often the search for common tendencies and the same "comparative" degree is ideologically loaded,creating the impression that societies have or should have common origins, values, and development (Tsoucalas 1993:60-61; Chouliaras1993:88-90), and involving the danger of using assumed prevailing averages to construct convergence or divergence, similarity ordifference.

Regardless of the epistemological difficulties that may arise from attempts to compare the incomparable, emphasis on comparison shouldbe seen as part of the effort to construct a shared "European consciousness"--that is, a more general identification legitimating theCommunity's unificatory intervention in the affairs of the member-states. There is also an endeavor to construct an "average" cultural levelfrom which the member-states are not meant to "deviate" to any significant degree. Since this tactic involves indirect intervention in thevarious European cultures, using selected homogenizing features, the risk is that it may backfire, producing precisely the opposite effect. Inother words, it may provoke (1) defensive resistance that embraces national specificity and uniqueness as the features that differentiate theculture in question, providing a permanent contrast to "the others" and to "competitive" cultures, (2) xenophobic attitudes that eliminatenot only every rational confrontation with the issue but also every attempt to strengthen the ties between European citizens, and (3) formsof prejudice and stereotypical evaluations.

The formation of the national self in contemporary Greek society.

When Constantine Karamanlis, prime minister at the time, used the watchword "we belong to the West" to propagandize for Greekaccession to the EC, he was clearly not referring solely to economic or strategic options. On the symbolic and ideological level, hisformulation alluded to the differences between East and West, adding a new dimension to the ongoing debate in Greece concerning theneed to modernize the traditional structures of Greek society and the direction that modernization ought to take (Diamandouros 1983:46-49; Tsoucalas 1983:37-48; [End Page 353] Fatouros 1993:24-35; Demertzis 1994:22-27). The participants in that debate were, on the onehand, those who advocated a path of development approximating the fundamental "construction" of Western liberalism--a liberalism basedon the social contract and thus involving the introduction of universalistic and "rational" relations between the citizen and society--and, onthe other hand, those who argued that historically established individualistic behavior is the unique feature of social and cultural relationsin Greece (Mouzelis 1992; Diamandouros 1993; Lipovats 1994:122-123).

Since the foundation of the modern Greek state, institutional reform has imposed normatively liberal social structures; however, these havenever created the moral, social, and political commitments produced in the West. Separation between state and society, between politicalparties and government, and between the private and the public sphere has never occurred (Tsoucalas 1981 and 1991; Pollis 1977;

Mouzelis 1978; Charalambis and Demertzis 1993). Greeks have obstinately refused to accept the rules that govern liberal politicalsystems. Western individualism, expressed as the institutionalized impersonal and collective organization of society, has been interpretedin Greece as individual action obedient to, and identified with, rules formulated through family relationships and governed primarily bypersonal commitments. The concept of the self as individual is not recognized in Greek social relations. Hence the individual is definedneither as the possessor of specific rights that he is duty-bound to acquire and the community is duty-bound to respect, nor as a subjectdetermined by his own will and responsibility. The Greek "self" is an organic part of the nuclear family and kindred (Lipovats 1990:18;Pollis 1977:8 and 1992:200 ff.; Demertzis 1990:75 ff.). Outside the family, individuals construct their identities through relations with the(local) community and the nation. 13 Consequently, the boundaries of identity are marked by the dis-tinction between "kith and kin" (i.e.,nuclear family, kindred, people of shared geographical origin, other Greeks) and "outsiders" (all those outside the above categories). Thiscreates powerful dichotomies of inclusion and exclusion that have had a decisive effect on the social integration of those who migrated tothe urban centers or abroad, often making it easier for them to integrate smoothly into the new social environment. !IR"14" This traditionalconcept of the mutual responsibilities of the individual and society cuts across social classes and permeates every sphere of social andpolitical activity.

In sum, the moral code of the West has not succeeded as yet in penetrating the social relations of Greece. On the contrary, Greek society isdominated by the stereotypes of an "anarchic individualism" in [End Page 354] which freedom is seen as synonymous with completeirresponsibility toward the law and toward others--that is, toward "outsiders" (Tsoucalas 1995:199-200 ff.; Lipovats 1991:238-265).

The fundamental points characterizing Greek national identity are the following:

(1) The primary self-image of Greeks is deeply Greek-centered. This image does not allow partial identification with elements of any othernationality. Furthermore, it expresses itself in interpretations based on opposite pairs such as we/others, East/West, domestic/imported,local/national, and traditional/modern (Tsoucalas 1991:60-61; Lipovats 1994:130).

(2) Greeks hold a symbolic monopoly on the exploitation of ancient Greek civilization; thus they see themselves as a point of reference forthe international community and for humanity in general. As a result, neither the country's international policies nor the residents' everydayperceptions in their relations with "others" takes account of globally valid, rational demands or claims of interest (Heraklidis 1995:28-29).Hence when Greeks feel that their demands have not been met, they typically conclude that they have been wronged by enemies (orfriends) and that no one is willing to try to understand the "fairness" of their demands.

(3) Those Greeks who do not identify completely with the ethnocentric model should be isolated. For them, the processes of socialintegration do not apply.

Considering these fundamental points characterizing Greek national identification, it should be all too clear that Greeks have been verylittle influenced so far by the goal of European identity or the tendency toward global homogenization of cultural models.

Attitudes and perceptions of Greeks regarding "national" and "European" identification. The attitude of Greeks regarding national and/orEuropean identification and consequently their country's membership in the EU is remarkably inconsistent.

As can be seen from data published since 1981 in Eurobarometer surveys, 15 the Greeks have changed their attitude toward accession,moving from a rather negative view to an extremely positive one. In 1981, only 38% believed that accession would be a good thing whilein 1993 this positive view was expressed by 74% of the respondents (Eurobarometer 1994a:75-76). In 1983, 44% stated that their countryhad benefited from membership whereas more than 70% held the same view ten years later (see also tables 1 and 2). [End Page 355][Begin Page 357]

It should be borne in mind that Greece has one of the highest scores on this item along with Ireland (82%) and Portugal (74%). 16 Theenthusiastic shift in opinion after 1985 derives primarily from improved living standards, given that a large part of the EU's financialsupport has been spent on increasing household consumption and not on meeting Greece's obligations to the Community.

It is commonly accepted that accession did not lead to the structural changes demanded in both the economic and social spheres, despite allthe economic support and special adjustments. As a result, Greece is today experiencing an acute socioeconomic crisis (Ioakimidis 1993;Thomadakis 1993).

Another significant factor explaining the remarkable shift of public opinion is that PASOK, following its abandonment in 1985 of acontradictory and often negative stance toward the EC, promulgated a clearly pro-EC policy. The ideological confrontations of the pastgrew progressively fewer. In the entire political spectrum, only the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has continued to oppose accession.In addition, a segment of PASOK supporters of left wing origin find it difficult to accept their party's turnabout and the limits placed oncertain political decisions by participation in the EU. 17

From the viewpoint of identification with the European Union, the profile presented by Greeks is highly pro-European, given that at onepoint 55% regarded themselves as Greek and European citizens at the same time, a percentage exceeding the Community average of 48%(Eurobarometer 1992a:A54). In 1993 the percentage decreased to 52% and in 1995 to 41%, while there was a corresponding increase inthe number who considered themselves only Greek: from 38% in 1992 to 41% in 1993 and 1995 (Eurobarometer 1992a:A54; 1993b:A73;1995:B14). The increase in the percentage of individuals who considered themselves only Greek betrays another dimension of thephenomenon of the recent alignment of citizens with national issues in addition to a reaction to the continuing conflict in the Balkans andto the threat of the country's involvement in that conflict.

The crisis in the Balkans after the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the differences between Greece and the newly formedneighboring state to the north with the name Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the contradictory initiatives ofthe Greek government in addition to the everyday rekindling by the mass media of "threatening" tensions and real or imagined "dangers,"refueled the nationalist discourse and created a climate of national "anxiety" that lasted more than three years. The old disputes withTurkey strengthened these tendencies. It is thus understandable that the nationalist recipe used by virtually all the mass media helped tocreate [End Page 357] illusions, emotional overloading, negative and/or aggressive stands regarding the acceptance of foreigners andespecially regarding their integration, and that this recipe finally strengthened a defensive, introverted tendency to negate everything that isnot Greek.

However, despite all the international circumstances, Greeks do not appear particularly worried about losing their national identity duringthe process of European unification. Six out of ten respondents believe that national identity can coexist with European identity.

Although the general concept of European citizenship creates no difficulties when national identification is contrasted to a European

identification that is abstract, the concrete prospect of "foreigners" standing as candidates, or even voting in local elections, is rejected,with approximately 70% of respondents disagreeing with the idea of giving foreigners the right to run for office in local elections, and 52%opposing the idea of enfranchising them (Eurobarometer 1992a:A55). However, when national identification is contrasted with a generaland abstract European identification, Greeks are well disposed, and a pro-European attitude prevails. Whenever the presence of foreignersis seen as endangering underlying relations (especially on the local level, where social relations have traditionally been strong), negativeattitudes gain the upper hand. There can be no doubt that the kith and kin/outsider syndrome still affects Greek social life. In 1988, only12% of respondents stated that their circle of friends contained a foreigner (Eurobarometer 1989:55). Clearly, a high degree of nationaluniformity still exists in relationships on the levels of everyday life and interpersonal friendship.

There is an obvious fear that foreigners might threaten well-established balances in social relations, perhaps putting an end to the familiar(and often irrational) modes of social ascendance, social control, and clientelistic relations. This fear causes hostility, commonly expressedin a tendency to exclude foreigners from social integration.

From hospitality to xenophobia. The attitudes of Greeks concerning the notional "other" have been negatively affected in periods of socialor economic crisis and also in periods of significant development both internationally and domestically. The remarkable increase inimmigrants and political refugees since 1988 (Petrinioti 1993:16-32) has transformed Greece from a country of significant emigration to acountry of immigration and political refuge without providing the necessary material and institutional infrastructure, and has alsotransformed it from a country with a high level of national homogeneity 18 in most regions to a country in which aliens (legal and illegal)are settled throughout the national territory and may upset the given secure [End Page 358] balance on the social level (primarily in thecountryside) and may therefore influence the attitudes and behavior of Greeks.

Prior to the constant increase in the number of aliens in recent years, Greeks were generally vaguely liberal regarding immigrants,especially because most had relations with some immigrant in their close family or personal circle. This high degree of tolerance prevailedin spite of the fact that such liberal viewpoints often contradict the ethnocentric prejudices of the national "self." Foreigners were acceptedinsofar as their presence did not challenge personal relationships (i.e., family, kinship, or friendship ties), working relationships, morals, orcustoms. A general indifference and tolerance obtained regarding differences in culture, habits, and symbolic identities (Dodos et al.1993:4; Voulgaris et al. 1995:82).

However, with the mass appearance of immigrants and refugees there was a rapid ideological turnabout. The well-known traditional Greekhospitality--the positive and, in the worst case, indifferent stance toward foreign tourists, immigrants, sailors, etc.--came into conflict withthe new reluctance of Greeks to accept foreigners and, much more, to integrate them into Greek society. One may assume that the previoustolerance toward foreigners was based more on indifference or ignorance than on sensitivity concerning human rights or on deeper ties toother cultural modes. Nevertheless, the present-day phenomenon of xenophobia may be a response to circumstances and a diffusedsocioeconomic insecurity rather than constituting a stable change in ideology and behavior.

In contrast to what took place in other European countries, an ultra-right ideological current of notable political presence did not emerge inGreece following the political change of 1974. However, some ideological viewpoints characteristic of the ultra right do exist and havegrown stronger in recent years. So far, they have not had an important political effect. 19 Yet 25% of Greek respondents declared in 1993that they were bothered by the presence of individuals in their close circle who came from a different race, approximately 30% said thatthey were bothered by the presence of individuals of a different religious orientation, 20 and 28% avowed that they were bothered bysomeone else's dif-ferent nationality. This last percentage is the highest of all the countries of the EU and double the EU average of 14%(Eurobarometer 1992a:A64).

This feeling of being bothered by foreigners, combined with increased general discontent, appears to be gradually turning into xenophobia.The intolerance toward foreigners has intensified: from 1990 to 1993 the percentage of Greeks who believed that there were too manyimmigrants doubled, going from 29% to 57%. Furthermore, 31% [End Page 359] stated that immigration from Eastern Europe should notbe allowed at all, while 57% asserted that it should be allowed only with restrictions (Eurobarometer 1993a:A53). Finally, the increasedxenophobia is expressed by the fact that within two years, that is from 1990 to 1992, those who believed that (except for EU citizens) therights of aliens should be limited rose from 27% to 35%, while 19% declared that they did not want Greece to welcome individualsseeking political asylum (Eurobarometer 1992a: A65).

The clear increase in prejudice and xenophobia must result from the massive increase of economic refugees, primarily Albanians, most ofwhom reside and work illegally in Greece. 21 The illegal cheap labor provided by these immigrants, apart from threatening increasedunemployment, is connected with the extension of the shadow economy and black labor market, with tax evasion, and with violation ofworkers' rights (Linardos-Rylmon 1993:9).

Conclusions

In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the impasse facing Greece's social and political structure. The malfunctioningand unreliability of the country's institutions, exacerbated by the prolonged economic crisis, have caused ever more frequent and powerfulexpressions of dissatisfaction. The prolonged economic crisis is aggravating the problem, and the desire for reform is gaining ground. It isbecoming more widely accepted that a fundamental obstacle to any attempt at modernization is the manner in which the political systemoperates, especially its reliance on clientelistic relationships.

A desire for reform is gaining ground. Given that many politicians support modernization (although of course with differing ideologicalorientations) and that a significant percentage of Greek citizens from all social strata acknowledge the need to halt traditional politicalpractices, why do all sides persevere in the familiar ineffective patterns that lead only to deadlock?

There are many possible answers to this question. Regarding the formation of national identity and the new prospect of the parallelformation of European identity, the dichotomies East/West and tradition/modernization are once again predominant as dilemmasengendering love/hate relationships. Modernization is viewed as impersonal, strict, and imported, yet as an inevitable model that promisesto be the only solution to the problems of Greek society. Tradition is viewed as familiar, local, authentic, and indigenous, yet as responsiblefor the profound crisis at every level of Greek social organization. 22

The sense of social deadlock seems to have affected every class. [End Page 360] The most serious fear for many Greeks is that theprivileges, jobs, and, above all, the chance for upward mobility acquired without planning under the clientelistic system will disappear.People fail to realize that the same lack of institutional protection that made upward social mobility so easy and rapid can just as easilycause the loss of privileges gained without respect for institutional rules.

The pressures exerted by the EU in the form of measures to bring about institutional reform and to contribute to economic recovery areacting, in combination with the more general lack of credibility from which Greeks suffer internationally, 23 to reinforce the ambivalencewith which Greeks view change and the acceptance of the Western European model of social organization. Western culture as the onlyacceptable manner of formulating social relations seems both menacing and inevitable not only to Greeks but also to the citizens of someof the other small EU member-states. Although those citizens are culturally closer to the model than Greeks are, they too are concernedthat they might lose their cultural uniqueness. Thus they, too, often express resistance to change.

Most Greeks do not seem to worry about the formation of a global collective culture because they do not see it as a serious possibility forthemselves. This is either because of the Greek language, which is inappropriate for global communication, or because of technologicalbackwardness. Consequently, the adoption of supranational cultural models is not seen as a serious possibility. In general, a "Europeanidentity" will acquire widespread appeal only if it can guarantee greater cultural toleration and thereby cease to threaten the nationalidentity of each member-state. 24 Nonetheless, it is a fact that there is no place in the framework of European unification--at least as agreedupon so far--for widespread cultural divergence. 25

The future is uncertain not only for developments in Greece but also for European unification itself. It is far too early to attempt forecastsof any kind. In the case of Greece, though, we can be sure that the country stands on the threshold of decisions and developments that willbe decisive for the future. If maintenance of the present-day social organization and social identity is chosen, there is the danger ofinternational isolation together with the ensuing repercussions. This could happen in a number of ways. It does not necessarily meanwithdrawal from the EU or a radical reduction in trade with the member-states. The most likely scenario is a low profile policy that wouldprovide Greece with some special adjustments, as Greece herself has requested so many times. This would insure that Greece remain in theEU, but it would also result in Greece's marginalization in negotiations and in decision-making regarding European policy (Kazakos1988:503). [End Page 361]

If convergence toward a Western European style of modernization is finally chosen, then rebuilding the ideological and cultural principlesof Greek national identity will be unavoidable. On the other hand, if modernization becomes a one-way street in Greece's future, it willhave many detours and certainly will not be strewn with roses.

University of Athens

Notes1. The problem was that of limiting the national sovereignty of the EC member-states by transferring some areas of jurisdiction fromnational decision-making bodies to the international bodies that apply Community justice against the domestic legitimate order andexercise powers that are binding upon the member countries. See Aron (1974:644-651). Discussion of this issue--concerning the content,functioning, and supranational nature of European institutions, as well as the position of each member-state within these institutions--wasalso conducted in Greece; however, it assumed an intensely political character and was summed up in a polarized, partisan confrontation ofpositive and negative arguments of the type "Yes or No to the EC." See Giataganas (1979: 58-59); Special Associate (1979); Bilalis(1979).

2. It is interesting to note that during the 1970s a similar problematic dealt with the meaning of "multinational citizenship" and the politicalrights and obligations that could arise, but not with the "construction of a European identity," which refers more to a cultural community.Since then, doubts have been expressed as to whether a "United States of Europe" would be capable of replacing the European nation-states. See Aron (1974:638-656).

3. The intensification of the phenomenon of nationalism is interpreted by some scholars either as support for the nation-state in the newlyformed relationship between the local and the global, or as a defensive stance with regard to the formation of supranational institutions(e.g., the European Union). With regard to this problematic, see Held (1991:208-212).

4. In the framework of this article, it is not possible to refer exhaustively to all the different theoretical approaches and to the rich literaturerelated to the phenomenon of globalization generally or to the globalization of culture in particular. I do refer, however, to Featherstone(1990); Robins (1991:28-33); Robertson (1992); Beck (1994:466-481); and Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994).

5. Lekkas (1992:124) stresses that "the national identity is not an issue of a simple acceptance of cultural particularities, but an issue ofactual political recognition, an issue of the fortification of the uniqueness of the nation in independent political existence." Also see Gellner(1992:14-24); Anderson (1991:37ff.); Elwert (1989:441ff.); Esser (1988:235-248).

6. In recent years, the promotion of a European identity to the residents of the EU member-states has taken place soundlessly, almostinvisibly, by means of the strengthening of physical and cultural mobility, the increase in communication possibilities, the extension ofpersonal contacts (through funding networks, conferences, citizen initiatives, etc.). and the recognition of the "other" as different but withthe same rights and obligations. See Keane (1995:204-205).

7. The globalization of politics opens new and different fields of confrontation in which the national states are no longer the only decision-makers since Western Europe as a whole is one as well. At the level of social relations this means more frequent common handling ofdisputes or confrontational situations (e.g., with the USA or Japan in the economic sphere) by the countries of the EU. If we consider thehistorical and economic development of different national states as a starting point of European unity, then the following question arises:After Political Union as a supranational state, will the Community's unification ensue, or is it a matter of attempting to build asupranational state without the parallel construction of a supranational identity? See Lepsius (1991:26); Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller (1993:239-240). Taking the above into consideration, one could assume that the EU seeks to form not a "European identity" but rather acommunity of experience in the way of living and a commonality of pursued goals concerning a better individual standard of living (whichin the final analysis is what binds together all the citizens of the EU).

8. According to the estimates of EUROSTAT (1993), the net flow (i.e, the relationship between inflow and outflow) of legal immigration inthe countries of the EU, in which immigration had increased on a stable basis since 1985, increased dramatically in 1992, doubling from600,000 in 1985 to 1,200,000 in 1992. Germany accepts the greatest number of legal immigrants (approximately more than half of thosewho settle in the EU), with Great Britain and Italy following. In Greece, despite measurement difficulties owing to different types ofcalculation, Petrinioti (1993) estimates that the number of legal immigrants decreased by 13.5% between 1988-89 and 1990-93. But therewas an increase in the number of immigrants, primarily from Eastern Europe and the Third World, who entered without residence permits.It has been estimated that between 280,000 and 350,000 illegal aliens were living in Greece in 1993 whereas only approximately 70,000were there in 1988-89 (Petrinioti (1993:18, 37); Linardos-Rylmon (1993: 9).

9. If one considers the historical development in the relations between Greece and its Balkan neighbors, the sensitivity and tensiondisplayed by Greece concerning national issues vis-à-vis the territorial claims at the country's northern borders becomes immediatelyunderstandable. A portrayal of the Macedonian question from the mid-nineteenth century until today naturally exceeds the scope of thisessay. For further information, see among others Castelan (1991); Koppa (1994); Koliopoulos (1995).

10. In order to achieve these goals, the rather vague content of the PU promoted two political orientations. The first aimed at the creationof a supranational institutional framework; the second favored intergovernmental agreements as a means to bring the PU into being. Inother words, what was being advocated was a strengthening of the Council of Ministers or the European Council at the expense of thesupranational institutions--namely, the Commission and the European Parliament. See Ioakimidis (1992: 23-24).

11. Repeated reference has been made recently to the so-called Anti-Maastricht Syndrome (AMS), which equates the creation of a UnitedEurope with the sacrifice of national identity. Pointing out that national identities are threatened, it works against European integration,competition, minorities, and potential immigration. The reasons are obvious: the socioeconomic crisis in EU countries and the rise ofmovements and parties with ultra-right ideologies, both of which have retarded the processes of European unification. Until today, no EUmember-state appears fully ready to accept political, social, and economic union. With regard to the problematic that prevails among thevarious members, see Puhle (1994:22-23); for the specific problematic in Greece see Kazakos (1992:275); Tsoucalas (1993:73-78);Chouliaras (1993:79-80, 120-122).

12. The article by Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller (1993) attempts an empirical investigation of the cognitive dimension that defines the limitsof "we" and "other" at a national level and of the individual evaluative dimension that contributes to the crystallization of impressionsregarding the hierarchic classification of "others" relative to the national "we." Their research concludes that, at least in those EU countriesthat belong to the so-called northern bloc, the behavior and evaluations of their inhabitants exhibit certain common characteristics, withoutnational borders constituting a significant factor of differentiation. However, the prospects and consequences of integrating even thesecountries into a supranational sovereign union have not been fully comprehended. The evaluation of the "others" is based on the economicdevelopment of other countries and on the degree to which each may be considered part of Western European culture. The number ofimmigrants and refugees who reside in each country, and particularly the immigrants who do not come from some other member-state,constitutes an important additional element determining attitudes toward the "others." What prevails in the attitudes of rejection oracceptance of foreigners is people's real experience as opposed to attitudes that support national identification with an imaginarycommunity. The countries of the Mediterranean, as well as other smaller countries of the EU that have a lower percentage of aliens (e.g.,Ireland), show less enmity toward "others" but greater reservation toward European integration.

13. Campbell (1983:189) observes that the Greek Orthodox Church is included in the threefold group of family, community, and nation,and that for this reason it cannot be considered a separate factor of influence in the formation of identities.

14. It has been observed that immigrants of agricultural origin are often directed from their village to some urban neighborhood whererelatives or fellow villagers already live. The neighborhood assumes the burden of replacing, to some degree, the lost familiarity providedby the agricultural community. See Burgel (1972:81); Mousourou (1984:67-70). Thus when the residents of agricultural regions settle incities they do not become isolated or cut off from their roots. The network of family relations and of fellow villagers undertakes to offerconnections both with the residents of the city, an aid that can be useful in problem-solving, and with other fellow villagers. In Athens, forexample, the phenomenon of local associations is truly striking. In this way, social integration into the new urban environment isfacilitated, while at the same time traditional values, attitudes, and methods of reproduction are perpetuated, and the structure of aculturally divided community is provided. See Pollis (1965:38); Campbell (1983:205, 198).

15. The Eurobarometer contains the official and regularly recorded measurements of public opinion in EU countries. The issuesinvestigated vary according to developments in the EU and to timeliness. The questions are the same for all the member-states. For reasonsof comparability, all the data that follow derive from various measurements of Eurobarometer unless a different source is cited.

16. It is interesting that in 1994 and 1995 there was dissatisfaction in Greece toward the EU primarily owing to the negative positions ofthe member-states on the issue of "Skopja" (FYROM) and to Greece being sent to the European Court. This dissatisfaction was reflected inan increased ethnocentric political orientation at the expense of a pro-European one. In 1994, the percentages of people who consideredGreece's entry into the EU a "good thing" and who believed that the country had benefited from entry declined by approximately tenpoints, falling to 64% and 68%, respectively. In 1995 the percentages declined still further to 63% and 62%, respectively. In spite of this,these percentages continued to be noticeably higher than the average of the member-states, which in 1994 rose to 47% and in 1995 to 56%.See Eurobarometer (1994a:75-76, 92; 1995:B10), and tables 1 and 2.

17. For this period, Kazakos (1992:276) characteristically observes a shift from a predominantly negative stance toward the Community(primarily by PASOK supporters) to a pro-European stance: "Words, ideas, and programs have their own life cycles and influencebehavior, even if this does not occur immediately or consistently. PASOK was the last of the socialist parties in the Community formally toadopt a pro-Community stance."

18. According to the 1981 census, the number of people who did not have Greek citizenship was 180,595, compared to 9,558,994 Greekcitizens. That is to say, aliens made up 1.88% of the population. See National Statistical Service of Greece (1990) and Petrinioti(1993:107).

19. In a Gallup poll by the MRB company taken in May 1994, a climate of xenophobia was recorded in connection with party alignment.The percentage of voters who declared that they were bothered by the presence of foreign immigrants in the country was 79.3% for thesupporters of Political Spring, followed by 74% for the supporters of New Democracy, and 72.2% for PASOK supporters, while thesupporters of the Communist Party of Greece and those of Alliance of the Left declared themselves less bothered at 44.3% and 37.6%,respectively. From these data, one could hypothesize that the lack of tolerance toward immigrants and the phenomenon of xenophobia areinfluenced by the greater or lesser ethnocentricity expressed by the various political parties. See Eleftherotipia (1994:4 June).

20. It should be noted that the data for 1993 display a steady increase in the lack of tolerance for aliens, given that, in 1992, 24% werebothered by the presence of individuals of a different race, and 25% by the presence of individuals of a different religion. It is alsointeresting that these percentages are noticeably above the average for the remaining countries of the EU, which was 16% in 1992 and1993 with regard to different race, and fluctuated around 14% in 1992 and 13% in 1993 with regard to a different religion. SeeEurobarometer (1992a:A64 and 1993a:A51).

21. However, it must be stressed that after the second world war the inhabitants of the neighboring Balkan counties remained outside theborders of Greece. During the decade of the 1980s, some (primarily Yugoslavians) visited Greece either as tourists or to find occasionalemployment mainly in agriculture or in low-paid, tiring work avoided by Greeks. Since the crisis in the Balkans, many more inhabitants ofthose countries have crossed the borders into Greece, where they demand work that, given the country's long-lasting economic crisis, has

become increasingly scarce. Thus, the Greeks' reaction to the inhabitants of the Balkan counties has become more extreme, theirstereotypes and prejudices stronger, and their feelings of xenophobia and social isolation more intense than those that they have for othernationalities.

22. Concerning the psychological development processes of the individual during the formation of national identity, as during theformation of any other identity, Lipovats (1994:122-123) observes that the appearance--and, even more so, the acceptance--of newconditions and situations involves an internal journey of self-alienation from familiar, hereditary "morals and customs." This journeycommences the moment when a group comprehends that what is in its best interests is more effectively obtained in a new way.

23. Credibility is considered the individual's lack of will to act or react in accordance with the moral obligations imposed by rationality orlaw--i.e., by internalized individual values and norms. On the contrary, the individual acts or reacts owing to social pressure or groupcontrol, refuses to accept responsibility and, for this reason, attributes all responsibility for the consequences of his actions to others(Lipovats 1990:19). Eurobarometer (1993a:84, A50) asked, "How much do you trust the citizens of other countries?" Along with Italians,Irish, Spanish, and Portuguese, Greeks were evaluated by the residents of the EU as inspiring the lowest degree of trustworthiness. Finally,in research undertaken in the twelve member-states in April 1994, Greece was given the lowest position, drawing minimally positiveanswers (1%) to the question: "Which country do you consider your most trustworthy political ally in the EU?" See European (1994:13-19May); Eleftherotipia (1994:27 May).

24. The reasoning behind the reservations and fears expressed by public opinion concerning the EU's political consequences may besummarized and ranked as follows: The citizens are against a Europe that (1) threatens national identity and cultural diversity, (2) givescitizens insufficient democratic influence, (3) gives their country and its gov-ernment no say in European decision-making, (4) centralizes"everything" in "Brussels," and (5) is run by an enormous Brussels bureaucracy that is out of touch with the real world of the citizen. (SeeEurobarometer 1992b:IX.)

25. The Maastricht Treaty gives EU institutions wide jurisdiction over policies affecting cultural activities. However, the position of thecitizens of the member-states on this issue is rather negative. In 1994, 56% of the citizens of all the EU countries felt that cultural policymust be exercised only by the national governments, while 36% maintained that decisions should be made by the EU in cooperation withthe national governments. On this point, Greeks are categorical. In 1994, 63% believed that cultural policy is the business of the nationalstates. It is interesting to note that this percentage changed quickly after 1992, when the same viewpoint was supported by only 49%. SeeEurobarometer (1992a:A36; 1994b:A34-A35).

References CitedAnderson, Benedict

1991 Imagined Communities. Reþections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. London: Verso.

Aron, Raymond

1974 "Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?" Social Research 41 (winter):638-656.

Beck, Ulrich

1994 "Nationalismus oder das Europa der Individuen." In Riskante Freiheiten. Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften, edited byUlrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck Gernsheim, 466-481. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash

1994 Reþexive Modernization. Oxford: Polity Press.

Bilalis, Michael

1979 Mix�lhq Mpil�lhq, «H eunik� kyriarx�a met� thn �ntajh sthn EOK ». Oikonomik�q Taxydr�moq, 13 September.

Burgel, Guy

1972 La condition industrielle à Athènes. Volume 1: Mobilité géographique et mobilité social. Athens: CNRS-EKKE.

Campbell, J. K.

1983 "Traditional Values and Continuities in Greek Society." In Greece in the 1980s, edited by Richard Clogg, 184-207. London:Macmillan.

Castelan, Georg

1991 Tz�rtz Kastel�n , H istor�a tvn Balkan�vn. 14oq -20oq ai�naq. Athens: Govostis.

Charalambis, Dimitris and Nicolas Demertzis

1993 "Politics and Citizenship in Greece: Cultural and Structural Facets." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 11:219-240.

Chouliaras, Yorgos

1993 "Greek Culture in the New Europe." In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, edited by Harry J.Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, 79-122. New York: Pella.

Demertzis, Nikos

1990 N�koq Demertz�q, «H ellhnik� politik� koylto�ra sth dekaet�a toy '80 ». In Eklog�q kai k�mmata sth dekaet�a toy '80,ejel�jeiq kai prooptik�q toy politiko� syst�matoq, edited by Christos Lyrintzis and Ilias Nicolacopoulos, 70-96, Athens: Themelio.

1994 «Eisagvg� sthn ellhnik� politik� koylto�ra, uevrhtik� kai ereynhtik� zht�mata ». In H ellhnik� politik� koylto�ra

s�mera, edited by Nikos Demertzis, 7-39. Athens: Odysseas.

1995 «O eunikism�q vq ideolog�a ». In Eunoq, Kr�toq, Eunikism�q, Episthmonik� Symp�sio, 21-22 Ianoyar�oy 1994. Etaire�aMel�thq N�oy Ellhnismo� kai Genik�q Paide�aq, 67-116. Athens.

Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos

1983 "Greek Political Culture in Transition." In Greece in the 1980s, edited by Richard Clogg, 43-69. London: Macmillan.

Dodos, D., T. Kafetzis, C. Lyrintzis, I. Nicolakopoulos, M. Spourdalakis, C. Tsoucalas, and Y. Voulgaris.

1993 Minorities in Greece: The Perception of Aliens and the Constitution of Otherness. Research Project. Athens: Lambrakis ResearchFoundation (mimeographed).

Eleftherotipia

1994 Eleyuerotyp�a (newspaper).

Elwert, Georg

1989 "Nationalismus und Ethnizität. Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 41(3):440-464.

Esser, Hartmut

1988 "Ethnische Differenzierung und moderne Gesellschaft." Zeitschrift für Soziologie 17 (4):235-248.

Eurobarometer

1989 "Racism and Xenophobia." Special Issue, November.

1992a No. 37, June.

1992b No. 38, September.

1993a No. 39, June.

1993b No. 40, December.

1994a "Trend Variables 1974-1993." Special Issue, May.

1994b No. 41, July.

1995 No. 43, Autumn.

European

1994 The European (newspaper).

EUROSTAT

1993 Demographic Statistics. Luxemburg.

Fatouros, Argyrios

1993 "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the European Community." In Greece, the New Europe, and theChanging International Order, edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, 28-42. New York: Pella.

Featherstone, Mike

1990 Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. London: Sage.

Fuchs, Dieter, Jürgen Gerhards, and Edeltraud Roller

1993 "Ethnozentrismus in den zwölf Ländern der europäischen Gemeinschaft." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 45(2):238-253.

Gellner, Ernest

1992 |Eunh kai eunikism�q. Athens: Alexandia. (First published as Nation and Nationalism, London: Blackwell, 1983.)

Giataganas, Xenophon

1979 Jenof�n Giatag�naq, «P�so oi eyrvpa�ko� uesmo� e�nai ypereuniko� ;» S�gxrona U�mata, period 2, issue 5:58-68.

Held, David

1991 "Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System." In Political Theory Today, edited by David Held, 197-235. Cambridge: PolityPress

Heraklidis, Alexis

1995 Al�jhq Hrakle�dhq, «Oi eik�neq toy euniko� " eayto� " kai toy "�lloy " stiq dieune�q sx�seiq: h per�ptvsh thq ellhnik�q

ejvterik�q politik�q ». S�gxrona U�mata, period 2, issue 54:27-35.

Ioakimidis, P.K.

1992 P. K. Ivakeim�dhq, H Eyr�ph se anaz�thsh n�aq arxitektonik�q. H pore�a proq thn Eyrvpa�k� |Envsh kai h Ell�da.Athens: Themelio.

1993 "Greece in the EC: Experiences and Prospects." In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, edited by HarryJ. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, 405-420. New York: Pella.

Kazakos, Panos

1988 P�noq Kaz�koq, «H Ell�da an�mesa s' ensvm�tvsh kai periuvriopo�hsh. Epilog�q gia thn ep�menh dekaet�a stiqellhnokoinotik�q sx�seiq ». In H Ell�da proq to 2000. Politik� kai koinvn�a, oikonom�a, ejvterik�q sx�seiq, edited by I.Katsoulis, T. Giannitsis, and P. Kazakos, 489-516, Athens: Papazissis Publications and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

1992 "Socialist Attitudes toward European Integration in the Eighties." In The Greek Socialist Experiment. Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989, edited by Theodore C. Kariotis, 257-278. New York: Pella.

Keane, John

1995 "Nations, Nationalism and European Citizens." In Notions of Nationalism, edited by Sukumar Perival, 182-207. London: CentralEuropean University Press.

Kellas, James G.

1991 The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan.

Koliopoulos, Ioannis

1995 Iv�nnhq Koli�poyloq, Lehlas�a fronhm�tvn. To Makedonik� Z�thma sthn katex�menh Dytik� Makedon�a 1941 - 1944. 2volumes. Thessaloniki: Vanias.

Koppa, Marilena

1994 Maril�na Kopp� , M�a e�uraysth dhmokrat�a. Athens: Papazissis.

Lekkas, Pandelis

1992 Pantel�q L�kkaq, H eunikistik� ideolog�a. P�nte ypou�seiq ergas�aq sthn istorik� koinvniolog�a. Athens: Society for theStudy of New Hellenism--Mnemon.

Lepsius, M. Rainer

1991 "Nationalstaat und Nationalitätenstaat als Modell für die Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft." In StaatswerdungEuropas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, edited by Rudolph Wildenmann, 19-40. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

Linardos-Rylmon, Petros

1993 P�troq Lin�rdos-Rylm�n, Allodapo� ergaz�menoi kai agor� ergas�aq sthn Ell�da. Athens: INE Publications.

Lipovats, Thanos

1990 U�noq L�pobatq, «H Ell�da mia dixasm�nh tayt�thta ». S�gxrona U�mata, issue 43:17-24.

1991 Probl�mata politik�q cyxolog�aq. Athens: Exandas.

1994 «H dixasm�nh ellhnik� tayt�thta kai to pr�blhma toy eunikismo� ». In H ellhnik� politik� koylto�ra s�mera, edited byNikos Demertzis, 115-132. Athens: Odysseas.

Mousourou, Loukia

1984 Loyk�a Moyso�roy , H ellhnik� oikog�neia. Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation.

Mouzelis, Nicos

1978 N�koq Moyz�lhq, Neo-ellhnik� koinvn�a, �ceiq ypan�ptyjhq. Athens: Exandas.

1992 «Uesmo� kai politik� koylto�ra ». To B�ma thq Kyriak�q, August 23:A10.

National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG)

1990 Statistical Yearbook 1988. Athens.

Petrinioti, Xanthi

1993 Janu� Petrini�th, H metan�steysh proq thn Ell�da. Mia pr�th katagraf�, tajin�mhsh kai an�lysh. Athens: Odysseas.

Pollis, Adamandia

1965 "Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self." The British Journal of Sociology 16 (1):29-47.

1977 "The Impact of Traditional Cultural Patterns on Greek Politics." The Greek Review of Social Research (English edition), 29:2-14.

1992 "Gender and Social Change in Greece: the Role of Women." In The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989,edited by Theodore C. Kariotis, 279-303. New York: Pella.

Puhle, Hans Jürgen

1994 «Eunik� kr�th, eunikism�q kai dhmokrat�a ». Ellhnik� Epiue�rhsh Politik�q Epist�mhq, no. 3:5-35.

Robertson, Roland

1992 Globalisation, Social Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage.

Robins, Kevin

1991 "Tradition and Translation: National Culture in its Global Context." In Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture,edited by John Corner and Sylvia Harvey, 21-44. London: Routledge.

Smith, Anthony

1990 "Towards a Global Culture?" In Global Culture, Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, edited by Mike Featherstone, 171-191.London: Sage.

Special Associate

1979 Eidik�q Synerg�thq toy Oikonomiko� Taxydr�moy, «H yperox� toy Koinotiko� dika�oy param�nei ak�ma a�thma par�pragmatik�thta ». Oikonomik�q Taxydr�moq, 20 September.

Thomadakis, Stavros B.

1993 "European Economic Integration, the Greek State, and the Challenges of the 1990s." In Greece, the New Europe, and the ChangingInternational Order, edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, 351-375. New York: Pella.

Tsoucalas, Constantine

1981 Kvnstant�noq Tsoykal�q, Koinvnik� an�ptyjh kai kr�toq. H sygkr�thsh toy Dhm�sioy x�roy sthn Ell�da. Athens:Themelio.

1983 «Par�dosh kai eksygxronism�q. Merik� genik�tera ervt�mata ». In Ellhnism�q kai ellhnik�thta, edited by D. Tsaousis, 37-38, Athens: Estia.

1991 "Enlighted Concepts in the Dark. Power and Freedom, Politics and Society." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 9:1-23.

1993 "Greek National Identity in an Integrated Europe and a Changing World Order." In Greece, the New Europe, and the ChangingInternational Order, edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, 57-78. New York: Pella.

1995 "Free Riders in Wonderland, or of Greeks in Greece." In Greece Prepares for the Twenty-Þrst Century, edited by Dimitri Constas andTheofanis Stavrou, 191-219. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Voulgaris, G., D. Dodos, P. Kafetzis, Ch. Lyrintzis, K. Michalopoulou, I. Nicolakopoulos, M. Spourdalakis, and C. Tsoucalas

1995 G. Bo�lgarhq, D. D�doq, P. Kafetz�q, X. Lyrintz�q, K. Mixalopo�loy, H. Nikolak�poyloq, M. Spoyrdal�khq, kai K.Tsoykal�q, « H pr�slhch kai h antimet�pish toy " |Alloy " sth shmerin� Ell�da ». Ellhnik� Epiue�rhsh Politik�q Epist�mhq5:81-100.

Wieworka, Michel

1994 "Introduction." In Racisme et xenophobie en Europe, une comparaison internationale, sous la direction de Michel Wieworka, 7-25.Paris: Edition La Découverte.

.