user: pass: LiteratureRhino ImagesRhino ForumsRhino SpeciesLinksAbout the RRCRegisterVisit our sponsors:Reference BaseRussell, Wittgenstein an the problem of the rhinoceros!ac"onal, #$F$, %&&'$ Russell, Wittgenstein and the problem of the rhinoceros. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (!: "#$%File a(ailableetailsLocation: WorldSub)ect: &ultureSpecies: 'll Rhino Species *riginal te+t on this topic:(s there a rhinoceros in the room) *ne of the earliest encounters bet+een ,ertrand Russell and the young -ud+ig Wittgenstein in.ol.ed adiscussion about +hether there +as a rhinoceros in their room. 'pparently, +hen Wittgenstein /refused to admit that it +as certain that there+as not a rhinoceros in the room,/ Russell half$0o1ingly loo1ed underneath the des1s to pro.e it. ,ut to no a.ail. /2y 3erman engineer, ( thin1,is a fool,/ concluded Russell. /4e thin1s nothing empirical is 1no+able$( as1ed him to admit that there +as not a rhinoceros in the room, but he+ouldn/t./5167he cru8 of the dispute appears to be a thesis held by Wittgenstein at the time concerning /asserted propositions./ 'ccording to Russell,Wittgenstein maintained that /there is nothing in the +orld e8cept asserted propositions/ and refused /to admit the e8istence of anythinge8cept asserted propositions./5%6 ,ut +hat this thesis amounts to and ho+ it is related to his remar1s about nothing empirical being 1no+ableand about +hether there is a rhinoceros in the room is difficult to determine. 9or one thing, it is difficult to see ho+ Wittgenstein could bearguing that nothing empirical is 1no+able gi.en the central importance for his early thin1ing of his idea that only propositions of naturalscience can be said. 9or another, his reported claim that there is nothing in the +orld e8cept asserted propositions is hard to s:uare +ith hiscontention in the /;otes on -ogic/ that there are only unasserted propositions. What +e need is an interpretation that can ma1e sense ofWittgenstein/s reported remar1s, +hile ta1ing into account their relation to his fundamental ideas and his .ie+s in the /;otes on -ogic/ andelse+here. 'lso, it must offer some account of Russell/s e8treme reaction to Wittgenstein and his +orry that Wittgenstein may ha.e been afool.(n his recent biography, Wittgenstein: ' -ife, ,rian 2c3uinness proposes an interesting interpretation of Russell and Wittgenstein/scon.ersation, one echoed by Ray 2on1 in his Wittgenstein: 7he ## article 5?7he ;ature ofJudgement/6 according to +hich the +orld is formed of concepts./56 'ccording to 2c3uinness, Wittgenstein/s correction is based on the ideathat the +orld consists of facts$facts being asserted propositions$not of things or +hat 2oore called simple concepts. 7he correction thusseems to anticipate the idea that /the +orld is the totality of facts, not of things,/ the second remar1 of the 7ractatus.5@62c3uinness reminds us that the phrase /asserted proposition/ is central to the accounts of the nature of a proposition defended by Russell and2oore, accounts that Wittgenstein is practically certain to ha.e 1no+n about. 7he situation, as 2c3uinness has it, is that Wittgenstein hadalready formed an ob0ection to Russell and 2oore, +hich he then attempted to e8press in his con.ersation +ith Russell. (n sum, 2c3uinnessassumes that Wittgenstein meant by the phrase /asserted proposition/ +hat Russell and 2oore had meant by it.5A67he notion of an /asserted proposition/ is connected +ith Russell and 2oore/s belief that the content of a proposition is its essential feature andtheir .ie+ that the psychological processes in.ol.ed in 0udgments concerning this content ha.e a secondary status. *n their conception, aproposition is not a psychic phenomenon as it is for -oc1e but rather is +hat -oc1ean ideas and the li1e are about.5B6 2oore called the entitiesthat ma1e up propositions /concepts/ and Russell called them /terms./ ' proposition, on this .ie+, is +hat 2oore too1 to be a comple8 or +hatRussell called a set of terms. (t is not something mental, but rather a comple8 or collection of subsistent, Platonic, entities.*n Russell and 2oore/s conception, facts are identified +ith true propositions. 7ruth is not$as it is on the correspondence theory$a relationshipbet+een a proposition (considered as a mental or linguistic entity! and something else. Rather it is a property of a proposition, no+ consideredas a comple8 or configuration of terms. Some proposition 0ust happens to be true, and those propositions are facts. 's 2oore says,*nce it is definitely recogni=ed that the proposition is to denote not a belief (in the psychological sense!, nor a form of +ords, but the ob0ectof belief, it seems plain that it differs in no respect from the reality to +hich it is supposed merely to correspond, i.e. the truth that /( e8ist/differs in no respect from the corresponding reality /my e8istence./ 5>6What differentiates a true proposition, or a fact, from a false proposition is the :uality it has of /being asserted./ Russell says,7rue and false propositions ali1e are in some sense entities, and are in some sense capable of being logical sub0ectsC but +hen a propositionhappens to be true, it has a further :uality o.er and abo.e that +hich it shares +ith false propositions, and it is this further :uality +hich is+hat ( mean by assertion in a logical as opposed to a psychological sense.5#6'n asserted proposition, then, is Russell/s term for differentiating a true proposition, a fact, from a false propositionC true propositions ha.ethe property of /being asserted,/ +hich false propositions lac1.2c3uinness thin1s that Wittgenstein +as har1ing bac1 to this use of the phrase /asserted proposition/ in his con.ersation +ith Russell. 4ethin1s that by saying /there is nothing in the +orld e8cept asserted propositions,/ Wittgenstein +as intending to challenge Russell and 2oore/sbasic assumption that there +as something more fundamental than facts. *n the .ie+ being attributed to Wittgenstein, false propositions arenot /entities,/ as Russell and 2oore belie.edC there is not a comple8 of terms (or concepts! in .irtue of +hich something is notC the +orld iscomposed of facts, not of terms, concepts, or things.9or 2c3uinness, then, the discussion bet+een Wittgenstein and Russell amounted to the :uestion /What comple8 can reasonably be supposedto e8ist in .irtue of there not being a rhinoceros in the room)/51"6 4e holds that Russell +as of the .ie+ that such a comple8 e8isted, +hereasWittgenstein in arguing that there +as nothing e8cept asserted propositions, +as denying this claim. 's 2c3uinness puts it,5Wittgenstein +as6 denying e8istence in this sense to e.erything e8cept asserted propositions or facts. 7hus he had already reached theposition e8pressed in the first propositions of the 7ractatus that the +orld consists of facts . . . 5and that6 things, ob0ects, or +hat 2oore calledsimple concepts do not go to ma1e up the +orld./5116(n spite of 2c3uinness/ insistence that Wittgenstein/s remar1 +as /clearly intended/ as a correction of 2oore/s position, +e must surely regardhis interpretation as con0ectural. *ther than the appearance of the phrase /asserted proposition,/ there is no direct e.idence to be found inRussell/s letters to -ady *ttoline to suggest that the t+o men +ere discussing 2oore/s article or indeed any of 2oore/s or Russell/s earlier.ie+s. (n fact, if +e are to discern anything definite on the basis of Russell/s letters, it is that Russell +as +orried about +hether the t+o men+ere discussing anything at allC +hat emerges from his reports to -ady *ttoline is not that Russell +as alarmed by +hat Wittgenstein +assaying but rather by +hether he +as saying anything.7hese con.ersations, it must be remembered, occurred .ery early in their relationship, in fact +ithin the first three +ee1s or so after theymet. 't this stage, Wittgenstein/s intellectual credentials +ere not yet clear to Russell and he +orries that Wittgenstein may be /a fool,/ /aninfliction,/ and /a cran1./51%6 2c3uinness/ claim that Wittgenstein/s remar1 /+as clearly intended as a correction of 2oore/s position/ does notRRC: Russell, Wittgenstein and the problem of the rhinoceros http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&COD...1 de 4 09/06/2015 06:23 p.m.ta1e into account the serious doubts Russell had about WittgensteinC it presumes that the frame+or1 of discussion bet+een the t+o men +asmuch more settled than appears to ha.e been the case.51367his point is especially telling gi.en that the position 2c3uinness attributes to Wittgenstein +as, as 2c3uinness himself points out, alreadyconsidered and re0ected by Russell in his discussion of 2einong.5l6 (f 2c3uinness is right, it is e8tremely pu==ling ho+ Wittgenstein/sproposing a sophisticated .ie+ about the nature of false propositions and comple8es +hich Russell had earlier considered and re0ected couldha.e dri.en Russell to suspect that Wittgenstein may ha.e been, not merely +rong, but rather a fool and an infliction and a cran1. D.en ifWittgenstein had articulated his position poorly, Russell +ould presumably ha.e (at the .ery least! been able to recogni=e the possibility of aposition he had earlier considered.'nother serious difficulty +ith 2c3uinness/s interpretation is that Wittgenstein states in the /;otes on -ogic/ of 1#13 that /there are onlyunasserted propositions./51@6 (f Wittgenstein/s remar1s to Russell about asserted propositions anticipate the opening remar1s of the 7ractatus,+e must suppose that Wittgenstein changed his mind bet+een 1#11 and 1#13, and then changed it bac1 again by the time of +riting the7ractatus. ,esides being implausible, this runs counter to a fact that 2c3uinness himself uses to support his contention that the earlycon.ersation anticipated ideas later e8pressed in the 7ractatus, namely that Wittgenstein claimed that his fundamental ideas came to him .eryearly.51A6 7he continuity in Wittgenstein/s thin1ing ma1es it e.en more difficult to see ho+ Wittgenstein could ha.e changed his mind about/asserted propositions/ and yet ha.e had the same ideas in 1#11 and 1#1>. 't the .ery least, if 2c3uinness is to appeal to the continuitybet+een Wittgenstein/s earlier and later remar1s, he o+es us an account of the remar1s from the /;otes on -ogic/ concerning unassertedpropositions.' further difficulty +ith 2c3uinness/ reading is his failure to offer an account of Wittgenstein/s remar1 that /nothing empirical is 1no+able/ andho+ it s:uares +ith Wittgenstein/s idea that only propositions of natural science can be said. (ndeed, 2c3uinness argues that any conclusionsabout our 1no+ledge that Wittgenstein dre+ from his .ie+ about the contents of the +orld is too /con0ectural/ and cannot be stated /+ithoutfalling into confusion +ith different and more usual assumptions about the nature of propositions./51B6 *n 2c3uinness/ account, then, animportant piece of the pu==le concerning that early con.ersation remains essentially unaccounted for.9inally, on 2c3uinness/ interpretation, remar1s from the 7ractatus, such as /the +orld consists of facts, not of things/ are assumed to beontological claims, ontological claims anticipated by Wittgenstein in his con.ersation +ith Russell. 2c3uinness/ .ie+ is that Wittgenstein +as/correcting 2oore,/ both in the opening remar1s of the 7ractatusand in his earlier ob0ection to Russell. 7his suggests that Wittgenstein, 2oore, and Russell shared a similar program: to offer an account of thefurniture of the +orld. Where they differed, thin1s 2c3uinness, +as only o.er +hether the furniture consisted of facts (or assertedpropositions! or, concepts.51>64o+e.er, the logical status of the opening remar1s concerning the +orld and facts, and indeed the status of all the remar1s of the 7ractatus,has by no means been settled. (ndeed, it is clear that for Wittgenstein the :uestion /What does the +orld consist of)/ is in some senseillegitimate and nonsensical, and so too are the propositions that are proposed as ans+ers to it. 2oreo.er, Wittgenstein ma1es it abundantlyclear that his aim is not to propound philosophical doctrines, but to sho+ that such doctrines stem from a misunderstanding of the logic of thelanguage.51#6 ,y ta1ing Wittgenstein to ha.e been proposing ontological theses (e.en if these theses are seen as undermining all suchtheses! 2c3uinness do+nplays the centrality of Wittgenstein/s antitheoretical remar1s 5%"6(n sum, 2c3uinness/ interpretation fails to deal ade:uately +ith Russell and Wittgenstein/s early con.ersation. ;ot only does it fail to accountfor Russell/s e8treme reaction, it attributes a .ie+ to Wittgenstein concerning asserted propositions +hich is inconsistent +ith the .ie+s thathe e8pressed shortly after+ards. 's +ell, 2c3uinness presents .ery little e8planation of Wittgenstein/s reported remar1 that /nothing empiricalis 1no+able/ and ho+ this s:uares +ith his idea that only propositions of natural science can be said. 9inally, 2c3uinness/ interpretationassumes that Wittgenstein/s interest lies in proposing philosophical theories, an idea +hich runs counter to a fundamental theme of his early(and later! philosophy.'s a first step to+ards clarifying Wittgenstein/s ob0ection to Russell, it is helpful to distinguish t+o uses that Wittgenstein ma1es of /assertion/in the /;otes on -ogic,/ notes +ritten +ithin t+o years of that early con.ersation. (n one use, Wittgenstein spea1s of /assertion/ +hencritici=ing +hat he ta1es as Russell/s confusion of the logical +ith the psychological. 4e says,Judgment, :uestion and command are all on the same le.el. What interests logic in them is only the unasserted proposition.7here are only unasserted propositions. 'ssertion is merely psychological. 5%16(n this use, Wittgenstein critici=es Russell and 9rege for confusing the psychological aspect of asserting something +ith the logical propertiesof a proposition. 9or Wittgenstein, assertion isn/t a property of a proposition, as it is for Russell, and +hen +e disentangle assertion from thereal logical properties of a proposition, +e are left only +ith /unasserted propositions./ 9or our purposes, the important thing to see is thatWittgenstein/s only use for /assertion/ in Russell/s sense is critical. 't this stage he +ould not ha.e said that /there are only assertedpropositions/ meaning by /asserted proposition/ +hat Russell meant by it. 9or that +ould presuppose that he thought that /assertedproposition/ e8presses a coherent concept, contrary to the argument of the /;otes on -ogic./(n his second use, Wittgenstein spea1s of /assertion/ in the conte8t of determining +hat cannot be asserted, of indicating +hat it +ould bemeaningless to assert. 7hus Wittgenstein says /' proposition cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true./ 4e says,Russell/s /comple8es/ +ere to ha.e the useful property of being compounded, and +ere to combine +ith this the agreeable property that theycould be treated li1e /simples./ ,ut this alone made them unser.iceable as logical types, since there +ould ha.e been significance in assertingof a simple, that it +as comple8.'s +ell, he declares,7ypes can ne.er be distinguished from each other by saying (as is often done! that one has these but the other has those properties, for thispresupposes that there is a meaning in asserting all these properties of both types.5%%6(n the /;otes 6 Russell/s ridiculing of Wittgenstein by loo1ing underneath the des1s in the room seems more connected +ith hisdismissing Wittgenstein as a cran1 than it does +ith his re0ecting an implausible s1eptical argument. 2oreo.er, +e must not forget thatWittgenstein/s ob0ection to the rhinoceros remar1 +as part and parcel of his positi.e contention that /there is nothing in the +orld e8ceptasserted propositions/C this does not sound li1e the remar1 of a s1eptic. ('nd remember too that, according to Russell/s later anecdote, hisob0ection concerned the meaning of e8istential propositions.! (n short, it +ould seem that Wittgenstein +as ma1ing a point about +hat can bemeaningfully said, not about +hat +e don/t 1no+.(t is unli1ely, then, that +hat annoyed Russell +as that Wittgenstein +as .enturing a s1eptical hypothesis. What is more li1ely is that he +asannoyed $ to the point of suspecting that Wittgenstein may ha.e been a fool, infliction, and cran1 $ +ith Wittgenstein/s actually ob0ecting tohis apparently innocent assertion that there +as not a rhinoceros in the room. *n my interpretation, Wittgenstein +as :uestioning the senseof Russell/s statement insofar as it pretended to be a species of an e.eryday assertion. 'nd it is no more immediately ob.ious +hy there couldbe anything ob0ectionable about the sense of the proposition about the rhinoceros than it is ob.ious that there is something ob0ectionableabout the sense of the proposition that, say, /( 1no+ that (/.e ne.er been to the moon./53B6So, if Wittgenstein/s ob0ection to Russell +as indeed moti.ated by a concern +ith nonsense of the sort discussed in *n &ertainty andelse+here,53>6 there is a significant line of continuity bet+een his .ie+s e8pressed in his first meetings +ith Russell and the .ery last days ofhis life. Dstablishing this line of continuity, ho+e.er, re:uires our recogni=ing a much greater gap bet+een the early Wittgenstein and Russell(and 9rege! than is ordinarily seen. 'nother +ay of saying this is that if the 7ractatus is to be interpreted as e8pressing a concern +ithnonsense, as th of *ctober, 1#11, and the discussion about the rhinoceros appears in his letters +ritten bet+een the 1#th of *ctober and the %nd of;o.ember.(t is interesting to note that in his article in 2ind, Russell says that the discussion concerned a hippopotamus, not a rhinoceros. 'lso, Russell/sclaim to ha.e loo1ed underneath the des1s does not appear in his letters to -ady *ttoline 2orell. See ,ertrand Russell, /-ud+ig Wittgenstein,/2ind A" (1#@1!, %#B$%#>. Russell/s letters +ere reprinted in ,rian 2c3uinness, Wittgenstein: ' -ife (,er1eley and -os 'ngeles: 7he Eni.ersityof &alifornia Press, 1#>>!, >>$># and Ray 2on1, Wittgenstein: 7he #.% Wittgenstein/s reported remar1s about /asserted propositions/ occur in Russell/s letters of the Bth and 13th of ;o.ember, 1#11. See 2on1, p.".3 2y ob0ecti.e is to raise :uestions about 2c3uinness/s hypothesis so as to suggest an alternati.e +ay of reading Wittgenstein/s earliestremar1s. ( am not claiming to offer a definiti.e interpretation of that early con.ersation. 's 2c3uinness points out, there is too littleinformation for that to be possible. 2c3uinness, p. #1.@ -ud+ig Wittgenstein, 7ractatus -ogico$Philosophicua, #.13 7he con.ersation in +hich, according to another of Russell/s famous anecdotes, Wittgenstein as1s Russell +hether he (Wittgenstein! is/utterly hopeless at philosophy/ and thus +hether he should go into aeronautics or philosophy +as not to ta1e place until ;o.ember %B, 1#11,more than three +ee1s after the rhinoceros con.ersation. (n response to Wittgenstein/s :uestion, Russell says /( told him ( didn/t 1no+ but (thought not. ( as1ed him to bring me something +ritten to help me to 0udge./ (t +ould seem that three +ee1s after the rhinoceroscon.ersation, Russell +as still ha.ing doubts. See 2on1, p. ".1 2c3uinness, p. #".1@ -ud+ig Wittgenstein, /;otes on -ogic,/ ;oteboo1s 1#1$1#1A, %nd re.. ed., 3. 4. .on Wright and 3. D. 2. 'nscombe (ed.! 3. D. 2.'nscombe (trans.! (*8ford: ,asil ,lac1+ell, 1#A1!, #@. ,oth the /;otes on -ogic/ and the /;otes When ( insist that 2c3uinness has an ontological reading of the 7ractatus, ( am saying that he thin1s Wittgenstein is (at least initially!presenting an account of the nature of language and of the +orld (and so in that broad sense is similar to Russell and 2oore!. ( am a+are that2c3uinness differs from most interpreters in holding that the ultimate purpose of Wittgenstein/s aims is to sho+ the absurdity of all suchaccounts. ;e.ertheless, on 2c3uinness/ interpretation, success in sho+ing the absurdity of philosophical accounts of language and the +orldmust rest on our understanding of the correctness of the account Wittgenstein initially presents. (n other +ords, +e must understand and beassured that Wittgenstein/s (linguistic! ontology is correct before +e can dra+ the conse:uence of ultimate /unsayableness./ (n my .ie+, tointerpret Wittgenstein in this manner is to admit that he has a doctrine after all, e.en if this doctrine cannot properly be said, contrary toWittgenstein/s disclaimer about philosophical doctrines. 9or more on 2c*uinneas/ .ie+,see ,rian 2c3uinness, /-anguage and Reality in the 7ractatus,/ 7eoria (1#>@!, 13@$1.1# See, e.g., 7ractatus, p. 3, .""3, .11%, and A.@3. 7his re0ection of philosophical theories appears in the /;otes on -ogic/ as +ell as in theBractatus. See p. 1"A +here Wittgenstein says /(n philosophy there are no deductionsC it is purely descripti.e/ and /Philosophy gi.es nopictures of reality./%" 'nother +ay of saying this is that 2c3uinness has not ta1en seriously enough the :uestion raised by &ora %!, B".3% 7he e8pression /9orm der 'bbildung/ has been translated by Pears and 2c3uinness as /pictorial form/ and by *gden and Ramsey as /form ofrepresentation./ 9or the purposes at hand, ( do not thin1 much importance rests on distinguishing these t+o translations. ( shall use /form ofrepresentation/ as it brings out more clearly Wittgenstein/s interest in distinguishing the means of representation from +hat is represented.See -ud+ig Wittgenstein, 7ractatus -ogico$Philosophicus, %nd re.. ed., &. H. *gden and 9. P. Ramsey (trans.! (-ondon: Routledge G 2eganPaul, 1#33!, %.1@ and %.1B.33 We can perhaps see elements of the idea that the form of representation cannot be represented anticipated in Wittgenstein/s oftenmentioned use of the phrase /form of a proposition/ in the /;otes on -ogic./ 9or e8ample, he critici=es Russell for confusing the form of aproposition for a thing. See /;otes on -ogic/ p. 1"@. ' full discussion of this idea of its origins in his early philosophy +ould ta1e me too farafield.3 7he term /illusion of a perspecti.e/ comes from &ora %.3A Recall that Wittgenstein says that /scepticism is not irrefutable, but ob.iously nonsensical./ See 7ractatus, A.@1.3B *n &ertainty, paragraph 111.3> 7o say that Wittgenstein/s philosophy is similarly moti.ated in this regard is not to deny the substantial differences bet+een his t+ophilosophical periods. *ne thing +e must a.oid is the fallacy that Wittgenstein/s criticisms of the 7ractatus do not contain de.elopments of.ie+s first e8pressed in the 7ractatus, though perhaps in an inade:uate form.3# Dmphasis added. ( +ish to than1 Paul 3enest, Paul 9orster, and especially 'ndre+ -ugg for their helpful comments.5 4ome 65 -iterature 65 Rhino (mages 65 Rhino 9orums 65 Rhino Species 65 -in1s 65 'bout 6RRC: Russell, Wittgenstein and the problem of the rhinoceros http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&COD...4 de 4 09/06/2015 06:23 p.m.