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RSCAS 2018/06 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Jacques Delors, the Single Market and the Failed

Attempt to Give a Soul to Europe

Michał Matlak

In memory of Professor Willfried Spohn (1944 – 2012)

European University Institute

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Jacques Delors, the Single Market and the Failed Attempt to

Give a Soul to Europe

Michał Matlak

EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2018/06

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© Michał Matlak, 2018

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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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Abstract

This working paper is concerned with the informal institutionalization of contacts between European

institutions and religious organizations launched by Jacques Delors and its aftermath: the formal

institutionalization of these contacts started by Jose Manuel Barroso. It was with Jacques Delors that

the relationship between religion and the European project gained in importance. As president of the

European Commission he recognised the social role of European religions by inviting them to the

project “A Soul for Europe”, which aimed to find a more robust source of legitimacy for the European

project. Subsequently, I describe the incorporation of Art. 17 in to the Lisbon Treaty obliging dialogue

with churches, religious and philosophical organizations, which is in my opinion a direct aftermath of

the “Soul for Europe”. It is my argument in this paper that the “religious” project of Jacques Delors in

many respects failed, as he did not find a meaningful role for religion in European integration in the

way he was hoping for, nor did he find the robust source of legitimacy for the European project.

Keywords

Religion, secularism, Christianity, European integration, Jacques Delors

1

If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe,

to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up.

Jacques Delors1

We can identify two approaches to institutionalization of the relationship between religion and politics

in the European Union. The first can be understood as a series of formal and informal contacts

between churches and the European Commission concentrating on what could be of mutual interest:

fighting poverty, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, the future of EU enlargement. The other

approach is linked to the constitutionalization of Europe, which is more about setting the limits of the

Community by asserting “who we are” and “what holds us together”. In this paper I will concentrate

on the first assertion.

The protagonist of this paper is Jacques Delors - a politician who has arguably had the most

significant impact on the European Union as we know it. It was he who drove the launch of the Single

Market, the single currency project and the cohesion policies, to name only a few fundamental

enterprises in today’s EU. Jacques Delors also personifies different strands present at the heart of the

history of European integration – a follower of French personalists, a socialist, a practicing Catholic

and a defender of French laicité. These make him a complex personality who contains all that is

important to understand the EU in terms of its willingness (and failure) to engage with religious

matters. What is crucial about Delors is the fact that he was the only politician of the European

Communities who meaningfully posed a question on the role of religion in the European project and

tried to give an answer to this question.

In this paper I will firstly sketch briefly the biography of Jacques Delors, as this might help us

understand his political positions in the fundamental periods of European integration. Then, I will

concentrate on the "Soul for Europe" project – one of the very few EU initiatives dealing with religion.

Subsequently, I will briefly describe the incorporation of Art. 17 into the Lisbon Treaty obliging

dialogue with churches, religious and philosophical organizations, which is in my opinion a direct

aftermath of the “Soul for Europe”.

It is my argument in this paper that the “religious” project of Jacques Delors in many respects

failed. Certainly, Delors did not find a meaningful role for religion in European integration in the way

he was hoping for. The project did, however, bring a concrete result – the practice of consultation

between religious leaders and the EU leaders which was formalized as the Art. 17 of the Lisbon

Treaty. Thus, Delors is the European politician who had the most significant impact on the emergence

of the European agnostic form of secularism.

Christian democrat in disguise

Jacques Delors is perhaps the most paradoxical personality in the history of European integration: a

Catholic defending laicité, a leftist who perpetuated the most free-market oriented period of European

integration, a life-long member of the socialist party who has been closer to the ideology of Christian-

democracy than most life-long Christian democrats.

He was raised in a rather poor Catholic family, as he puts it: “I wasn’t born with a silver spoon in

my mouth.” As one of the members of his cabinet told me, he was “a guy from a humble background

1 ‘President Delors and the Churches’, Newsletter of the European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society,

Brussels no. 2, 2 May 1992, cited in: (Leustean 2012, p.4)

Michał Matlak

2 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers

who does everything to be better than the products of French grands écoles.”2 He is known as a person

who is "driven", "knows every dossier he is working on in great detail", and also a person who was not

easy to work with – “after a stressful meeting, he often used to kick the cat.”3

An important inspiration for his engagement in Europe was the encounter with personalists linked

to “Esprit” – the magazine in which he first became familiar with Maritain and Mounier, the key

French personalist thinkers:

I didn’t meet either of them, but I used to be around Esprit magazine, including writing articles as

early as the 1950s, and communitarian personalism is still my line (Delors & Deschamps 2009,

p.4).

He has rather a developed view on what personalism is:

[I]t is time to go back to our ideal, to be fully conscious of it, through each of our actions in the

field of politics, economics, social and cultural affairs, let us continue to investigate what can

enable each man, each woman to flourish, in full awareness not only of his or her rights, but also

of their duties vis-à-vis others and society as a whole. Let us strive to constantly re-establish

human collectivities in which the individual is able to live and develop, and to grow through

exchanges and cooperation with others (Delors 1989).

His devotion to the idea of Europe was strongly linked with his engagement with personalism and with

Jacques Maritain's thought, as well as being influenced by the French “founding father” of the

European project, Robert Schuman:

Yes, I had read up on all that in my spare time. I’d read it all and it had made a great impression on

me, especially Maritain (…). It was always my underlying inspiration, so to speak. So, over and

above events which I wasn’t always capable of evaluating properly, I wasn’t in a position of

responsibility, but I was perfectly sensitive to it, and especially from the European point of view,

to Maritain (…). I have to say that that was the moment when I realized that Robert Schuman’s

appeal — excuse me for saying this, people will say it’s Christian – was of a high spiritual value.

Not just political but spiritual. And that was the day when I said: ‘There you are, your path is

mapped out’ (…). I think there is a link between that and my commitment to Europe (Delors &

Deschamps 2009, p.3).

He started his political activities as a member of Christian democratic Mouvement Republican

Populaire, but according to Jérôme Vignon, he quickly became disenchanted with the party and

became an activist within Christian democratic worker’s unions (which later got secularized). Much

later, in 1974, he joined the socialist party, a natural move given Delors long-standing sense that he

was a person of the left:

[Étienne Deschamps] And how were you able to put this communitarian personalism into practice

in the active political life you then embarked on?

[Jacques Delors] The Left. There’s this saying by a Swiss writer that ‘Nature is on the right, man is

on the Left’. That’s all. I think that believing in man means being on the Left. After that you can

then start defining it in different ways. There are people in the present majority who think like me.

But that’s it, that’s my point of view, I believe in man with my eyes open (Delors & Deschamps

2009, p.4).

There are different opinions on how Delors’ religiosity translated into political action. People who

worked with him were convinced that religiosity played a significant role in his political life:

You didn't have to work long with Delors to discover that he was a devoted Christian. He was not

a doctrinaire Christian, though.4

2 Interview with David White, 20.09.2016, Brussels.



Jacques Delors, the Single Market and the Failed Attempt to Give a Soul to Europe

European University Institute 3

According to one of his advisors, he even went to see the nuncio of Belgium and asked him what

could be done for Europe from the Catholic point of view. The nuncio suggested Delors to start a

network of prayers in the Benedictine monasteries.5 And indeed he did so – the network is called

Groupe Chevetogne (the name comes from the monastery close to Namur in Belgium).6 This

movement was a clear reference to the monastic history of Europe - one of the fundaments of

European culture, especially in the Middle Ages. It is rather surprising that a French socialist engaged

so openly in an initiative like this and also shows that the dividing lines between Christianity and the

European project are more blurred than one might suppose.

Delors and the Pope: Mutual disappointment

Delors’ religiosity did not lead to his close relationship with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He

was often at odds with those Christians (especially Catholics) who required religious visibility. This is

probably the reason why his relationship with Pope John Paul II was rather a difficult one. They met

for the first time in May 1985, and, as Jérôme Vignon recalls it, both were very much disappointed

after the meeting. Delors probably wanted more support for his big European endeavours; John Paul II

expected a clearer, more explicit reference in the European project to its Christian roots.

Delors was upset that the Pope did not see his efforts to change the fate of the continent and

thought of the project as of economic nature. As he later said:

[L]e Vatican considère la construction européenne comme un phénomène purement matérialiste et

économiciste. Le Vatican n’est-il pas conscient qu’au sein des responsables européens certains

luttent pour essayer de préserver, contre vents et marées, une dimension sociale a l’économie, ainsi

qu’une dimension sociale à l’économie, ainsi qu’une dimension éthique, voire spirituelle?7

Differences between the Pope and President Delors were significant. They inherited very different

visions of the bond between Catholicism and identity. For the Pope, Catholicism was the primary

identity marker – a defining feature for the political reality, even if he endorsed the post-Vaticanum II

notion of the separation between church and state. One of the reasons for such a clear position was,

among others, the communist idea of the atheist state, which John Paul II experienced in Poland.

Delors, who grew up in France, was strongly influenced by the heritage of 1905 law and the

general consensus on the strict separation between Church and state (the French Catholic Church came

to terms with the separation only after the decades of culture wars). Also, his experience was marked

by the failure of the Catholic Church in France in the time of General Petain, which according to

David White was an experience that influenced his vision of the relationship between religion and

politics. This fascist experience was also crucial for the flourishing of left-wing personalism after

World War II in France8 that was so close to Delors' heart. Personalism was also well known to John

Paul II, who as a young priest visited Paris in late 1940s and presumably had contacts with

personalists. Yet, by the 1980s his position on the public role of Christianity was in many respects

different than the one represented by the inheritors of French personalist tradition (especially those on

the left).

It is not surprising that Delors and John Paul II took very different stances in the constitutional

debate. John Paul II was very much in favour of the symbolic presence of Christianity in the

5 Interview with John O’Loughlin, 22.03.2016, via Skype.

6 More information can be found here: https://paradis-paris.com/groupe-de-chevetogne/ and here: http://www.bistum-

eichstaett.de/ru/bischof/bischofsweihe/pressetexte-der-bischoeflichen-pressestelle/pde-text-vom-14102006/ 7 Note to the president of the EC by Marc Luycxs from 30.03.1994:(Massignon 2007, p.142)

8 Although the relationship of personalists with the Petain regime was rather ambiguous as Jan-Werner Mueller argues

(Mueller 2011, p.138).

Michał Matlak


Constitution, while for Delors it was a second range issue. He was more interested in the dialogue

between Commission and churches on the most important issues from his perspective: the fight against

poverty, the enlargement of the EC, the question of unemployment. He did not see Christianity as an

identity marker of Europe.

It is remarkable that Delors was a proponent of Turkish membership in the EU. As Bérengère

Massignon demonstrates, this was in line with his understanding of what Europe should be:

L’argumentaire proposé par Jacques Delors en faveur de l’entrée de la Turquie se rattache aussi au

modèle de l’identité contrat, avec le souhait de rattacher le projet européen a des valeurs

universelles, mais tirées de l’expérience de la construction communautaire (…). L’âme de

l’Europe, c’est son projet qui trouve justement ses racines dans la volonté de dépasser les conflits

de passe. Pour Jacques Delors, l’Union reste une communauté de valeurs (non spécifiquement

européennes certes), mais pourtant au cœur du projet européen depuis les Pères fondateurs, comme

la paix, la démocratie… L’Union, alors, pourrait être un modèle de diffusion des valeurs

démocratiques et de droits de l’homme (Massignon 2007, p.282).

It would be interesting to compare the personalism of founding fathers (like Alcido de Gasperi or

Robert Schuman) with its more contemporary versions. One thing seems to be clear: the personalists

of the 1940s and 1950s did not see the need to make out of Christianity “an identity marker”, because

the European imaginary was still very much Christian. The fact that contemporary personalists like

Delors or Van Rompuy (van Rompuy 2009) are rather far from seeing Christianity as a distinctive

trait of the European project has different meaning in Europe which is largely a post-Christian entity.

The second difference concerns the attitude towards liberalism: today’s personalists are much less

anti-liberal, which would be unthinkable for thinkers like Emmanuel Mounier. To Mounier, liberalism

was perhaps worse than fascism. As Tony Judt put it: “fascism might be the immediate threat, but

liberalism was the true enemy” (Judt 1992, p. 17).

The intensification of integration

Delors became president of the European Commission in 1985. This was a time when the political will

to further liberalize trade arrangements between members of the European Communities and remove

barriers to the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and labour between member countries

was at its high point. In 1985, Delors found a Community in the split between the advanced

constitutional federal order and an intergovernmental political order. The constitutional legal order of

the Communities was the result of two decades of “integration through law” which almost

unnoticeably changed the legal order of the continent by strengthening the legal basis of the

communities, above all through the doctrine of direct effect and the supremacy of European over

national law. Legal federalization was not, however, accompanied by a political one, as the

Luxembourg Accord was still in place. This left each Member State with veto power over Community

legislation affecting “its vital interest”; in practice, this meant a general right of veto for every

Member State (Weiler 2001).

After the first enlargements, consensual decision making became more and more difficult to

achieve. Therefore, there was an idea to switch to Quantified Majority Voting in issues concerning the

single market. This was adopted by the states as a minor revision of the Treaty of Rome. Most heads

of state thought that it is just a simple change that would not change the community's equilibrium and

sold it to the public in their countries as such. However, it became clear that after the adoption of the

Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, the European Communities were moving on to a track of faster

integration.



There is little doubt that much of this was due to Delors and his personality. He managed to bring

Europe on the path of intense political and economic integration9 for the first time since the 1960s.

The SEA marked the beginning of his mandate. He used the pro-European momentum to intensify the

efforts to create a more integrated Europe in both political and economic terms. In the 1992 White

Paper he outlined a path towards a completion of the internal market, proposing simple legislative

steps to achieve this goal. This supposed ideological "neutrality" marked most of revolutionary steps

that the Delors Commission proposed. The same can be said about the Economic and Monetary Union

(Delors programme) and the political union.

There was another aspect to Delors economic and political reforms – the project of a social Europe.

It was Delors who pushed for social legislation on the European level, trying to strengthen the position

of workers in the Member States. He wanted thus to include workers in the growth produced by the

expansion of the Single Market. This was also rationale behind his other achievement, the

development of structural funds that were designed to finance the underdeveloped members of the

Community and compensate their weaker performance in the single market. The deployment of

structural funds played a big role also after the subsequent enlargements and might be seen as one of

the most significant examples of the manifestation of European solidarity.

The 1992 programme resulted in a new treaty – the Treaty of Maastricht – which followed the

impetus given by less spectacular SEA. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union in

place of the European Communities (a step which will be discussed in detail below), the establishment

of the European Monetary Union (leading to the European single currency), the development of the

Common Foreign and Security Policy and strengthening of the role of the Parliament. Maastricht

moved Europe towards a centralized political and economic federation.

Delors’ vision of Europe differed from the one that he managed to achieve. One of the most

significant failures was arguably his vision of “social Europe” which would balance the “single market

Europe” that he successfully brought about. He managed, however, to bring about the political union

which was incorporated into the treaties. The problem is that the political union proved to be incapable

of creating a bond between the European institutions and European citizens. Political federalization of

Europe lacked popular support, and the ambiguity of European societies has thus appeared as a

constant theme in European integration in the last twenty-five years.

Union or Community?

Perhaps the most significant symbolic change which happened during the presidency of Delors was

the change of the name of the polity-in-the-making. Instead of the European Communities, it became

the European Union. According to the member of his cabinet, this went against Jacques Delors and his

insistence on the "community method", instead of the "intergovernmental method" (which was

symbolized by the Union and the need for unanimity):

Most heads of state and government who participated in the Intergovernmental Conference that

took place in 1991–92 was against extending the “community approach”, the third and second

pillar. On that point Delors had lost because he was in favour of such an extension. It was finally

decided that for matters relevant to foreign and security policy, the decision process should be

framed with the intergovernmental procedure. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty clearly signalled

that a new political entity was born out of the combination of three pillars, but only the first under

“community method”, should no longer be called a Community. Delors not only disliked the word

“union”, but this word illustrates an option against his own preference.10

9 With a significant exception of legal integration, as Joseph H.H. Weiler argues in the “Transformation of Europe”

(Weiler 1991). 10

Interview with Jérôme Vignon, 23.12.2016, via Skype.

Michał Matlak


This strong dislike shows a certain division within Delors: he understood the importance of

"community", he emphasised the social aspects, he was attached to subsidiarity,11

but at the same time

he created a market-oriented, centralized polity which seemed to go in the direction of a super-state.

Maybe because of this duality, Delors wanted to pursue a new project that would involve churches in

his work. Maybe this is why he thought that there is a need to give this project a soul, because – as he

famously said – “you cannot fall in love with the Single Market”.

Soul for Europe

Delors thought that the European Union cannot be based solely on market and supranational

bureaucracy. This is why he started to meet regularly with the representatives of Christian churches,

seeking their support in the transforming Europe:

We are in effect at a crossroads in the history of European construction. 1992 is a turning point

(…). The Maastricht summit marked the end of the economic phase of European construction –

what has been described as the ‘semi-automatic’ development of the EC, based on drive towards

the Common Market (…). Believe me, we won’t succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal

expertise or economic know-how. It is impossible to put the potential of Maastricht into practice

without a breath of air. If the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe, to give

it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. This is why I want to revive the intellectual and

spiritual debate on Europe. I invite churches to participate actively in it. The debate must be free

and open. We don’t want to control it; it is a democratic discussion, not to be monopolized by

technocrats. I would like to create a meeting place, a space for free discussion open to men and

women of spirituality, to believers and non-believers, scientists and artists (Leustean 2012, p.4).

The meeting was one of a series of meetings with religious leaders organized under the name of “A

Soul for Europe” and coordinated by the Forward Studies Unit in the European Commission (directly

reporting to the president) and managed by two people: Marc Luycx and Jérôme Vignon.

The project consisted of numerous meetings between the president of the Commission and

religious leaders (Catholic and Protestant, above all – though Delors did not want to close it off to

other religions). At times Delors wanted to discuss with them the current shape of the European

Communities, but usually they were devoted to important social problems, such as unemployment,

agriculture, migration, the problem enlargement and deepening of the EU. It seems clear that the idea

was to discuss the issues important from the perspective of European institutions, not the other way

around.

These meetings were continued by Delors’ successor, Jacques Santer, but were in fact blocked by

the socialist president of the European Commission Romano Prodi. Nevertheless, dialogue with

churches remained institutionally linked with the Forward Studies Unit (changed then to Bureau of

European Policy Advisors, now it is the European Political Strategy Centre).

11

“Another guiding principle of the Maastricht Treaty is the principle of subsidiarity, whereby – to put it briefly – a higher

level of power must be empowered to deal only with those matters which are better dealt with at that level, let’s say (…).

I think the Protestants said it before the Catholics, to be historically accurate. I did a great deal of work on it. And

secondly, a personalist like me can only be in favour of the principle of subsidiarity. So, I realised at a particular time that

the wind, after the Danish referendum result against the Treaty, I realised – and then a UK Presidency – that there had to

be (…) so I proposed repealing a dozen or so directives. And among the ones I did (…) it’s very typical of the

contradictions you find in the European countries, there was one about the transporting of swine or pigs. It said that each

pig should have its own place in the vehicle, and that it must also be able to look at another pig so that it wouldn’t be

mentally or psychologically disturbed. The text had been adopted in 1979, I’d had nothing to do with it. I asked for it to

be repealed. Kohl burst out laughing, but the British, who were keen on animal protection, took another line altogether.

So, I’d put my finger on where it hurt. And as a result, subsidiarity – ‘Yes’, I even told you a moment ago that I

supported the approach taken by the Lisbon Treaty, but the governments also had to find a way out of their

contradictions.” (Delors & Deschamps 2009)



It is not a coincidence that Delors decided to name this project like he did. He spoke of the

European soul on several occasions. The idea of soul is clearly linked with the European philosophical

and spiritual tradition. It was "invented" in ancient Greece – the concept of soul can be found in

Platonic and Aristotelian philosophic systems and was then transferred to Judaic and then Christian

theology – where it constituted a basic feature of the human person and the main source of its dignity.

The soul has a place in the history of European culture and Delors was well aware of that. He was also

aware that there is a need to create a bond between the European societies and the European

institutions – he thought that churches should play a prime role in this endeavour – at least regarding

some groups of European societies.

Did he succeed? It would be very difficult to find arguments for such a thesis. The European

project did not become less technocratic and the regular contact with churches did not change the

economic character of the European Union. There is, however, one lasting element of the Delorsian

dialogue with churches: the institutionalization of dialogue between churches and European

institutions.

The Churches Article

Paradoxically, Jacques Delors was against the institutionalization of dialogue with churches (as an heir

to French laicité he favoured less official form of contacts between religion and politics), but the

presidents of the European Commission who followed him did institutionalize the dialogue. The

formal step was taken by Jose Manuel Barroso in 2005, when he started to organize regular meetings

with the churches and humanist organizations. The article was transferred (as large parts of the TCE)

to the Lisbon Treaty which was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered

into force on 1 December 2009. Thus, Delors set in motion a logic which led to the institutionalization

of the dialogue.

The authors of the Treaty thus decided to incorporate a special article obliging European

institutions to conduct a dialogue with the churches and non-religious organizations:

1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and

religious associations or communities in the Member States.

2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical12

and non-

confessional organizations.

3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open,

transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organizations.

The first format of these contacts established by Barroso is the annual formal high-level meeting event

with representatives of different religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism), which is

devoted each time to a different topic: terrorism, fundamental rights, climate change, economic crisis,

poverty (often linked with the "European Year of" various things). There is one high-level meeting

with the representatives of churches and one with the non-confessional leaders. The EU is represented

by the president of the European Commission (now it’s first vice-president Timmermans), the

president of the European Council and the president of the European Parliament. The second format is

a dialogue seminar organized by churches and religious organizations mostly on the issues where the

Commission has competences (for detailed data see (Houston 2013).

12

The category of philosophical organisation is a part of a French and Belgian legal and cultural landscape, inspired by the

tradition of Enlightenment, fighting against the involvement of the churches in politics, sometimes linked to free-

masonry. In Belgium, humanist organisations are seen as a part of religious landscape. One of the interesting and

paradoxical examples of this approach are the humanist chaplains in the army.

Michał Matlak


The meetings and all the other forms of dialogue were organized by a special work force in the

European Commission which used to be called the Forward Studies Unit (founded by Jacques Delors),

then Group of Policy Advisors (GOPA), then Bureau of European Policy Advisors (then BEPA). All

these units were responsible directly under the president of the European Commission. Under

president Jean-Claude Juncker, however, this has changed. The dialogue with religious and

philosophical organizations is now a competence of the first vice-president of the European

Commission, Frans Timmermans, and is located in the DG Justice, which changes a bit the importance

of the question of dialogue.

The dialogue since Jose Manuel Barroso has been run by Katharina von Schnurbein13

. Although the

level of the officials responsible is high, one cannot avoid the impression that the salience of the

dialogue for the European Commission is not very high. Also, the format of the annual high-level

meetings seems to be problematic from the perspective of both sides. On the one hand, the

Commission has difficulties in finding representative partners (apart from the Catholic Church, which

has a clear hierarchy). Therefore, some representatives of, for example, Muslim or Protestant

communities seem to be chosen randomly. On the other hand, the insights from the meetings do not

seem to be meaningful. As one of their participants told me, “you can write the press release before the

meeting”.

Pope Francis meeting the representatives of COMECE (17.05.2017). Source: www.comece.eu

The issue of representativeness is, as mentioned, not a problem only with regard to Catholicism. The

church is represented by the nuncio (diplomatic representative of the Vatican) and COMECE

(Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences), the equivalent of the Council of the European Union at

the church level. As for “high politics”, it is obviously the competence of the popes and Vatican’s

secretaries of state, and contacts between the leaders of the EU and popes are regular.

It is already a much bigger problem regarding the Protestant and Orthodox churches. They are

represented in Brussels by the CEC (Conference of European Churches), an organization established

in 1959 (with a secretariat since 1967) that brings together various Protestant and Orthodox churches

(the idea to bring the Orthodox churches came about to bring together churches from both sides of the

iron curtain). However, this produces difficulties in coming to a single opinion within the CEC, as the

13

In 2017 Katharina von Schnurbein was replaced by Vincent Depaigne



position of Protestant churches (which is far from united itself) is often very different from the

position of the Orthodox churches, especially regarding sexual morality.

Another problematic issue regarding the dialogue is the question of the balance between religious

and non-religious organizations. While it is more or less clear who is represented by the representation

of churches (i.e. the members of their churches), it is not entirely clear who is represented by the non-

religious organizations. As Katharina von Schnurbein notes it, these organizations often claim to

represent the majorities in many European states who are not practicing any religion (or simply do not

believe in God). It is, however, of course very difficult as the “humanist organizations” are most often

linked with the tradition of masonry, which is a very specific form of non-belief. The question of how

to engage with philosophical beliefs of non-believers seems still in need to be answered.14

Despite criticisms, Jose Manuel Barroso reported being happy with the results Art. 17 brought

about:

It’s a good exercise. Dialogue with various churches, but also those who have no religion. Some

people ask me what is the concrete result of these meetings? Look, the very fact that we have this

dialogue – this in itself is very important. I absolutely don’t agree with European extreme

secularists. Religion is a part of our societies, politics should not try to eradicate it. The political

institutions should be secular of course, but they should have intelligence and openness to

recognize the importance of religion. Radical secularists are so similar to the dogmatism of some

religions that they criticize. They create a kind of a church of secularism. This leads us to an issue

of identity. Identities in the contemporary Europe cannot be understood in an exclusive way –

because then we’re doomed to unresolvable conflicts.15

This excerpt from my interview with Jose Manuel Barroso might serve as a good exemplification of

the state of minds of Brussels elites with regard to religion – most of them sincerely believe in the

need of dialogue with religious organizations and genuinely reject the strict ideological secularism.

They, however, do not look for religious insights, but rather believe in the need to accommodate

certain forms of religiosity in the European public sphere.

14 There is an impression that the Christian churches benefit from the dialogue much more than “philosophical

organizations”. This discrepancy was criticized by the European Ombudsman, who issued a decision criticizing the

European Commission in the case submitted by the European Humanist Federation. The federation complained about the

refusal of the European Commission to organize a dialogue seminar on issue of religious tax exemptions. The

Ombudsman suggested that it “constitutes an instance of maladministration” (European Ombudsman 2013). It is thus not

surprising that article 17 is “a reason for concern” for the humanists (Pollock 2013, p.122). 15

Interview with Jose Manuel Barroso, 29.04.2016, Princeton.

Michał Matlak


Bibliography:

Delors, J., 1989. Address given by Jacques Delors (Bruges, 17 October 1989). pp.1–12.

Delors, J. & Deschamps, E., 2009. Transcription of the interview with Jacques Delors — Part 2 —

Jacques Delors’s career before becoming President of the European Commission (Paris, 16

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Houston, K., 2013. Church-EU Dialogue under Article 17.3: Consensus-Seeking Instrument or Power

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Judt, T., 1992, Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals 1944 - 1956, Berkeley: University of California

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Leustean, L.N., 2012. Representing Religion in the European Union L. N. Leustean, ed., Routledge.

Massignon, B., 2007. Des dieux et des fonctionnaires: religions et laïcités face au défi de la

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Author contacts:

Michał Matlak

Office of the Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament

European Parliament

ASP 12E151

Rue Wiertz 60

B-1047 Brussels

Email: [email protected]

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