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G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910

ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken

from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value

of the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of

December, 1!1, until the month of "pril, 1!#. "fter hearing the evidence, the court

 belo$ gave %udgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,&'1, $ith interest at ( per

cent from the date of the %udgment. The said sum of P1,&'1 $as made up of t$o items,

one of $hich, P)#1, $as for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the other,

P'#!, the rental value of the premises during the occupations by defendants. *rom this

 %udgment the defendants appealed to this court.

+t appears that the defendants $ere on the 11th day of December, 1!1, members of the

municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed to the

 plaintiff in this case, $ho $as the priest in charge of the church, its appurtenances and

contents, the follo$ing letter

  P"CR, 11th December, 1901.

R. P. "D+/ "/0/, 2enedicto, uriago.

T3D P"DR "fter saluting you, $e take the liberty of $riting you that

in the municipality of $hich $e have charged $e have received an order from

the provincial fiscal, dated the &th instant, $hich says 4The cemeteries,

convents, and the other buildings erected on land belonging to the to$n at the

e5pense of the to$n and preserved by it belong to the to$n, and for this reasonthe municipality is under the obligation of administering them and of collecting

the revenues therefrom, and for this reason $e notify you that from this date all

of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned into the treasury of the

municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them.

+n the same $ay $e notify you that the image of t. 6icente $hich is no$ in the

church, as it is an image donated to the people by its o$ner, by virtue of said

order is also the property of said people, and therefore the alms $hich are given

it by the devotees thereof must be also turned into the municipal treasury for the

 proper preservation of the church and for other necessary purposes. 7e hope

that you $ill vie$ in the proper light and that you $ill deliver to the bearer of

this letter the key of the alms bo5 of the said image in order that $e may

comply $ith our obligation in conformity $ith the dispositions of said order.

7e beg to remain as al$ays by your spiritual sons. 8. 2. . 3.

9igned: "0DR /;D".

T/3" 6+"3/R.

"0DR C"+0"+3/ D/".

?

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the ground that according to panish la$ the Roman Catholic "postolic Church $as not

the o$ner of such property, having only the use thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and

religious purposes, and that the true o$ner thereof $as the municipality or the tate by

reason of the contributions by them, or by the people, of the land and of the funds $ith

$hich the buildings $ere constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case that the

claim of the defendants $as not $ell founded and that the property belonged to the

Roman Catholic Church. The same Auestion $as discussed and decided in the case

of Barlin vs. Ramirez 9) Phil. Rep., #1:, and the case of The Municipality of Ponce vs.

 Roman atholic !postolic hurch in Porto Rico 9B' up. Ct. Rep., )@), ( /ff. ?a.,

1B1@:.

7e have made a careful e5amination of the record and the evidence in this case and $e

have no doubt that the property sued for $as, at the time it $as taken by the defendants,

the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seiure of the same and

occupation of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants $ere $rongful and

illegal. 7e are also convinced, from such e5amination, that the conclusions of the court

 belo$ as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church

for the time of its illegal occupation by the defendants $ere correct and proper. 7hile

some ob%ection $as made on appeal by counsel for the defendants that the value of the

articles taken and of the rent of the church and its appurtenances had not been proved by

competent evidence, no ob%ection to the introduction of the evidence of value $as made

at the trial and $e can not consider that Auestion raised for the first time here.

7e have carefully e5amined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants on

this appeal. 7e find none of them $ell founded. The only one $hich deserves especial

attention at our hands is the one $herein the defendants assert that the court belo$ erred

in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of 

in the name of the bishop of the diocese $ithin $hich the church $as located, or in the

name of the Roman Catholic "postolic Church, as the real party in interest.

+t is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic "postic Church itself is

the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action.

ection 11# of the Code of Civil Procedure reAuires that every action must be prosecuted

in the name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.

ection 11! of the Code of Civil Procedure, ho$ever, provides

C. 11!. !men"ments in #eneral . The court shall, in furtherance of %ustice,

and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allo$ a party to amend any

 pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of *irst

+nstance or the upreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party,

either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party,

or a mistaken or inadeAuate allegation or description in any other respect so that

the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, $ithout regard

to technicalities, and in the most e5peditious, and ine5pensive manner. The

court may also, upon like terms, allo$ an ans$er or other pleading to be made

after the time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same. /rders of the

court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed

in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

ection &!@ of the same code provides

C. &!@. $u"#ment not to be reverse" on technical #roun"s. 0o %udgment

shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not

 pre%udiced the real rights of the e5cepting party.

7e are confident under these provisions that this court has full po$er, apart from that

 po$er and authority $hich is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and

decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. 0ot only

are $e confident that $e may do so, but $e are convinced that $e shoul" do so. uch an

amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff

asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is

engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese

 not by his o$n right, but by right of another. Ee seeks merely to do for the bishop $hat

the bishop might do for himself. Eis o$n personality is not involved. Eis o$n rights are

not presented. Ee claims no interest $hatever in the litigation. Ee seeks only the $elfare

of the great church $hose servant he is. ?ladly permits his identity to be $holly

s$allo$ed up in that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of

the diocese, or the Roman Catholic "postolic Church, for that of Padre "lonso, as party

 plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, of one party for

another, but is simply to make the form e5press the substance. The substance is there. +t

appears all through the proceedings. 0o one is deceived for an instant as to $hose interest

are at stake. The form of its e5pression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not

substantial but formal. Defect in mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is

clearly evident. *orm is a method of speech used to e5press substance and make it clearly

appear. +t is the means by $hich the substance reveals itself. +f the form be faulty and still

the substance sho$s plainly through no, harm can come by making the form accurately

e5pressive of the substance.

 0o one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. +f $e should by

reason of this error send this back for amendment and ne$ trial, there $ould be on the

retrial the same complaint, the same ans$er, the same defense, the same interests, the

same $itnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff $ould constitute the

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only difference bet$een the old trial and the ne$. +n our %udgment there is not enough in

a name to %ustify such action.

There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole

 purpose is to facilitate the application of %ustice to the rival claims of contending parties.

They $ere created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the

administration of %ustice. They do not constitute the thing itself, $hich courts are al$ays

striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that

thing. +n other $ords, they are a means to an end. 7hen they lose the character of the one

and become the other, the administration of %ustice is at fault and courts are

correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than

to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of %ustice. +ts presentation as fatal to the

 plaintiffFs case smacks of skill rather than right. " litigation is not a game of technicalities

in $hich one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and

 position, entraps and destroys the other. +t is, rather, a contest in $hich each contending

 party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as

$holly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,

asks that %ustice be done upon the merits. a$suits, unlike duels, are not to be $on by a

rapierFs thrust. Technicality, $hen it desserts its proper office as an aid to %ustice and

 becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.

There should be no vested rights in technicalities. 0o litigant should be permitted to

challenge a record of a court of these +slands for defect of form $hen his substantial

rights have not been pre%udiced thereby.

+n ordering this substitution, $e are in accord $ith the best %udicial thought.

93cGeighan vs. Eopkins, 1 0eb., @@H Di5on vs. Di5on, 1 +a., &1BH Eodges vs. Gimball,

# +a., &))H anger vs. 0e$ton, 1@# 3ass., @!'H ?eorge vs. Reed, 1!1 3ass., @)'H

2o$den vs. 2urnham, & *ed. Rep., )&BH Phipps and Co. vs. Eurlburt, )! *ed. Rep., B!BH

3cDonal vs. tate, 1!1 *ed. Rep., 1)1H 3orford vs. Diffenbocker, B! 0. 7., (!!H

Costelo vs. Costelo vs. Cro$ell, 1@# 3ass., B'!H 7hitaker vs. Pope, B 7oods, #(@, *ed.

Cas. no. 1)&B'H 3iller vs. Pollock, Pa. t., B!BH 7ilsonvs. Presbyterian Church, &(

?a., &H 7ood vs. Circuit ;udge, '# 3ich., &B1H +nsurance Co, vs. 3ueller, )) +ll., BBH

*arman vs. Doyle, 1B' 3ich., ((H

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?.R. 0o. B1&&JOSEFINA RUIO DE LARENA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.!ERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellee.

The case at bar is a seAuel to case ?. R. 0o. B1)!(, ;osefina Rubio de arena vs.Eermenegildo 6illanueva, decided on 3arch B(, 1B#. II1JJ +n that case $e affirmed adecision of the Court of *irst +nstance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacga%anugar Plantation and the payment by the defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the

rent for the agricultural year 1B!-1BB in the sum of P&,#.B' $ith interest from"ugust B(, 1BB, an for P',!!! in rent for the agricultural year 1B1-1B@. The decisionalso provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.

hortly after the record $as returned to the court belo$, a $rit of e5ecution $as issued, but before levy $as made the parties came to an agreement, under $hich the money %udgment $as to be satisfied by the payment of P1!,&!! in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a d$elling house situated in the municipality of 2ais. The agreement $ascarried out in accordance $ith its terms, and on eptember @!, 1B#, the follo$ingdocument $as e5ecuted by the plaintiff

Eabiendo llegado a un convenio entre la Aue subscribe, e%ecutante, en la causa civil 0o.() decidida por la Corte uprema, y el e%ecutado, Don Eermenegildo 6illanueva, por la

 presente declaro haber recibido del heriff Provincial de 0egros /riental, y mi enterasatisfaccion la suma de die mil Auinientos pesos 9P1!,&!!:, mas una casa residencial consu solar, situada en la plaa del 3unicipio de 2ais, Provincia de 0egros /riental, cuyasdescripciones aparecen an un ocumento aparte, por el importnte de la e%ecusacione5pidida por el ;usgado de 0egros /riental al 1# de mayo de 1B#, en vitud de unadecision de la Corte uprema. Con este Aueda definitivamente cumplimentada estae%ecucion.

= para Aue asi conste, firmo la presente en el 3unicipio de 2ais, Provincia de 0egros/riental, +. *., ante el heriff Provincial de esta Provincia de 0egros /riental y el 0otarioPublico Don *rancisco Romero, Aue ratifica este compromiso.

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7e do not think that the court belo$ erred in absolving the defendant from liability uponthe second cause of action. +t is not $ithout significance that in her original complaint the

 plaintiff claimed only & plo$s, ( carts, @ carabaos an # vacunos, the total value of $hich$as alleged to be P1,@(!H in the first amended complaint filed over t$o years later, thesame claim $as made, but in the last amended complaint a number of other articles $ereincluded, thus increasing the claim to P@,&(. The court belo$ found that the $eight ofthe evidence sho$ed that the missing draft animals died from rinderpest and that theother personal property $as turned over to the provincial sheriff for delivery to the

 plaintiff before the $rit of e5ecution $as returned to the court. +f so, the action $ould lie

against the sheriff rather than against the defendant.

"s to the first cause of action the defendant argues that it $as included in the prayer of anamended complaint filed in case ?. R. 0o. B1)!( and that, although no e5pressdetermination thereof $as made in the decision of the case, it must, nevertheless, beregarded as res %u"icata. That such is not the case is very clear. The Code of CivilProcedure says

That only is deemed to have been so ad%udged in a former %udgment $hich appears uponits face to have been so ad%udged, or $hich $as actually and necessarily included thereinor necessary thereto. 9ec. @!), Code of Civil Proc.:

2ut the defendant maintains that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the

matter in the former case, she cannot no$ enforce the same cause of action in the presentcase. Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res %u"icata butrests on the $ell-kno$n an, in "merican la$, firmly established principle that a party $illnot be permitted to split up a single cause of action an make it the basis for several suits.2ut that is not this case. The rule is $ell established that $hen a lease provides for the

 payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an independent cause ofaction, though it has been held and is good la$, that in an action upon such a lease for therecovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought must be included inthe complaint an that failure to o so $ill constitute a bar to a subseAuent action for the

 payment of that rent. The aforesaid action, ?. R. 0o. B1)!(, $as brought on "ugust B@,1BB, the plaintiff demanding payment of then sue rent in addition to the rescission of thelease. /n ;uly B), 1B@, the plaintiff filed a motion for an amendment to paragraph ( ofthe complaint adding to that paragraph the follo$ing sentence

8ue tambien ha vencido ya el tercer ano el arrendamiento de la finca en cuestion y Auetampoco ha pagado el demandao el canon correspondiente a icho ano.

The plaintiff also amended the prayer of the complaint by asking %udgment for rent foryears subseAuent to 1BB. The motion $as granted, and the case came up for trial on ;uly@!, 1B@, and on eptember ', 1B@, the trial court rendered its decision giving %udgmentfor rent up to and including the rent for the agricultural year ending in 1B@. The leasedid not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, an it appears

 plainly from the record that the rent for an agricultural year $as not considered due untilthe end of the corresponding year. +t follo$s that the rent for the agricultural year 1BB-1B# ha not become sue time of the trial of the case and that conseAuently the trial court

could not render %udgment therefore. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar to thefirst cause of action in the present litigation.

The defendant places much $eigh upon the document of eptember @!, 1B#,hereinbefore Auoted. The document speaks for itself, and it $ill be readily seen that it ismerely a receipt for the satisfaction of the money %udgment in the case ?. R. 0o. -B1)!(and has nothing to $ith the present case.

The only Auestion in regard to the first cause of action relates to the amount of thedamages. The plaintiff contends that the defendant $as a possessor in bad faith, andtherefore, must pay the value of the fruits of the land in accordance $ith article #&& of theCivil Code.

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 December 10, 19*+

OSTRAND, J.:

+n the motion filed by the defendant on 0ovember 1#, 1B' our attention is called to amathematical error in that $e, in discussing the plaintiffFs third cause of action, failed totake into consideration the fact that one-half of the gross ratoon crop produced on theland in Auestion in the agricultural year 1B#-1B& $as ceded to the sugar central ascompensation for the milling of the cane and that the defendant paid the e5penses of the

 production of the total or gross crop. Page ' of the aforesaid decision is thereforeamended so as to read as follo$s

6ery little need be said in regard to the third cause of action. +t relates to a periodsubseAuent to complete termination of the lease by final %udicial order. The defendant hadthen no right $hatever to the possession of the land or to the fruits thereof, and inremoving the fruits, he acted in bad faith. This being the case, he must pay for the fruitsreceived by him, less the necessary e5penses of production 9"rts. #&& and #&@ of theCivil Code.: "s his bad faith commenced long before the fruits in Auestion $ere

 produced, he is not entitled to any part of the net proceeds of the crop. The evidencesho$s that the gross ratoon crop for the year 1B#-1B& $as @,BB(.&! piculs of sugar, andaccording to the defendantFs o$n statement, the market value of the sugar $as in theneighborhood of P11 per picul and the cost of production about P#.&!. The defendant

received only one-half of the gross crop, the other half going to the sugar central ascompensation for the milling of the cane, but the defendant paid the cost of production

 both of his share of the sugar and that of the sugar central. The net result is that under thethird cause of action, the defendant must pay to the plaintiff the sum of P@,BB(.&! $ithinterest.

4*or the reasons stated, the %udgment of the court belo$ is affirmed in regard to thesecond cause of action. +t is reversed as to the first an third causes of action, an it ishereby ordered that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant the sum ofP11,BB(.&! $ith interest at the rate of ( per cent per annum from "pril 1@, 1B&, the dateof the filing of the complaint. 0o costs $ill be allo$ed.4 o ordered.

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 0ovember ', 1@!

?.R. 0o. @B&'LOSSOM AND "OM#AN$, IN"., plaintiff-appellant,vs.MANILA GAS "OR#ORATION, defendant-appellee.

STATEMENT

+n its complaint filed 3arch @, 1B), the plaintiff alleges that on eptember 1!, 11', itentered into a contract $ith the defendant in $hich the plaintiff promised and undertookto purchase and receive from the defendant and the defendant agreed to sell and deliver tothe plaintiff, for a period of four years, three tons of $ater gas tar per month fromeptember to ;anuary 1, 11 and t$enty tons per month after ;anuary 1, 11, for theremaining period of the contractH one-half ton of coal gas tar a month from eptember to;anuary 1, 11, and si5 tons per month after ;anuary 1, 11, for the remainder of thecontract, delivery to be made at the plant of the defendant in the City of 3anila, $ithoutcontainers and at the price of P(& per ton for each kind of gas tar, it being agreed that this

 price should prevail only so long as the ra$ materials coal and crude oil used by thedefendant in the manufacture of gas should cost the defendant the same price as that

 prevailing at the time of the contract, and that in the event of an increase or decrease inthe cost of ra$ material there $ould be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price

of the tar. That on ;anuary @1, 11, this contract $as amended so that it should continueto remain in force for a period of ten years from ;anuary 1, 11, and it $as agreed thatthe plaintiff should not be obliged to take the Aualities of the tars reAuired during the year 11, but that it might purchase tars in such Auantities as it could use to advantage at thestipulated price. That after the year 11 the plaintiff $ould take at least the Auantitiesspecified in the contract of eptember 1!, 11', to be taken from and after ;anuary 1,11, and that at its option it $ould have the right to take any Auantity of $ater gas tar ine5cess of the minimum Auantity specified in that contract and up to the total amount ofoutput of that tar of defendantFs plant and also to take any Auantity of coal gas tar ine5cess of the minimum Auantity specified in that contract and up to &! per cent ofdefendantFs entire output of coal gas tar, and that by giving the defendant ninety daysFnotice, it $ould have the right at its option to take the entire output of defendantFs coalgas tar, e5cept such as it might need for its o$n use in and about its plant. That inconsideration of this modification of the contract of eptember 1!, 11', plaintiff agreedto purchase from the defendant of certain piece of land lying ad%acent to its plant at the

 price of P& per sAuare meter, the proof of $hich is evidenced by 5hibit C. That pursuantto 5hibit C, defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff $hich in turn e5ecuteda mortgage thereon to the defendant for P1),1#!.B!, to secure the payment of the balanceof the purchase price.

+t is then alleged

6+++. That about the last part of ;uly, 1B! the defendant herein, the 3anila ?asCorporation $illfully, and deliberately breached its said contract, 5hibit C, $ith the

 plaintiff by ceasing to deliver any coal and $ater gas tar to it thereunder solely because of the increased price of its tar products and its desire to secure better prices therefor than

 plaintiff $as obliged to pay to it, not$ithstanding the freAuent and urgent demands made

 by the plaintiff upon it to comply $ith its aforesaid contract by continuing to deliver thecoal and $ater gas tar to the plaintiff thereunder, but the said defendant flatly refused tomake any deliveries under said contract, and finally on 0ovember B@, 1B@, the plaintiff$as forced to commence action against the defendant herein in the Court of *irst +nstanceof 3anila, being case 0o. B&@&B, of that court entitled F2lossom K Co., plaintiff,  vs.3anila ?as Corporation, defendant,F to recover the damages $hich it had up to that timesuffered by reason of such flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the defendantherein, and to obtain the specific performance of the said contract and after due trial ofthat action, %udgment $as entered therein in favor of the plaintiff herein and against the

said defendant, the 3anila ?as Corporation, for the sum of PB(,11.!', as the damagessuffered by this plaintiff by the defendantFs breach of said contract from ;uly, 1B!, up toand including eptember, 1B@, $ith legal interest thereon from 0ovember B@, 1B@, andfor the costs but the court refused to order the said defendant to resume the delivery ofthe coal and $ater gas tar to the plaintiff under said contract, but left the plaintiff $ith itsremedy for damages against said defendant for the subseAuent breaches of said contract,$hich said decision, as sho$n by the copy attached hereto as 5hibit ?, and made a parthereof, $as affirmed by our upreme Court on 3arch @, 1B(H

+>. That after the defendant had $illfully and deliberately violated its said contract asherein-before alleged, and the plaintiff suffered great damage by reason thereof, the

 plaintiff claimed the right to off- set its damages against the balance due from it to saiddefendant on account of the purchase of said land from the defendant, and immediately

thereupon and not$ithstanding said defendant $as %ustly indebted to the plaintiff at thattime as sho$n by the %udgment of the Court 5hibit ?, in more that four times theamount due to it from the plaintiff, the said defendant caused to be presented against the

 plaintiff a foreclosure action, kno$n as the 3anila ?as Corporation versus 2lossom KCompany, 0o. B#B(), of the Court of *irst +nstance of 3anila, and obtained %udgmenttherein ordering that 2lossom K Company pay the last installment and interest due onsaid land or else the land and improvements placed thereon by the plaintiff $ould be soldas provided by la$ in such cases to satisfy the same, and the said defendant proceeded$ith the sale of said property under said %udgment and did everything in its po$er to sellthe same for the sole purpose of crushing and destroying the plaintiffFs business and thusrendering it impossible for the plaintiff herein to continue $ith its said contract in theevent that said defendant might in the future consider it more profitable to resume

 performance of the same, but fortunately the plaintiff $as able to redeem its property as$ell as to comply $ith its contract and continued demanding that the defendant performed its said contract and deliver to it the coal and $ater gas tar reAuired thereby.

That the defendant made no deliveries under its contract, 5hibit C, from ;uly, 1B! to3arch B(, 1B(, or until after the upreme Court affirmed the %udgment of the lo$ercourt for damages in the sum of PB(, 11.!'. II1JJ

+t is then alleged that

. . . /n 3arch B(, 1B( the said defendant offered to resume delivery to the plaintiff fromthat date of the minimum monthly Auantities of tars stated in its contract ,and the plaintiff 

 believing that the said defendant $as at least going to try to act in good faith in the

further performance of its said contract, commenced to accept deliveries of said tars fromit, and at once ascertained that the said defendant $as deliberately charging it prices

http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr32958-blossom-and-co-v-manila-gas-corp.html#fn1http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr32958-blossom-and-co-v-manila-gas-corp.html#fn1http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr32958-blossom-and-co-v-manila-gas-corp.html#fn1http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr32958-blossom-and-co-v-manila-gas-corp.html#fn1

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much higher than the contract price, and $hile the plaintiff accepted deliveries of theminimum Auantities of tars stated in said contract up to and including ;anuary, 1B),9although it had demanded deliveries of larger Auantities thereunder, as hereinafteralleged: and paid the increased prices demanded by the defendant, in the belief that it $asits duty to minimie the damages as much as possible $hich the defendant $ould bereAuired to pay to it by reason of its violation of said contract, it has in all cases done sounder protest and $ith the e5press reservation of the right to demand from the saiddefendant an ad%ustment of the prices charged in violation of its contract, and the right tothe payment of the losses $hich it had and $ould suffer by reason of its refusal to make

additional deliveries under said contract, and it also has continuously demanded that thesaid defendant furnish to it statements supported by its invoices sho$ing the cost prices if its ra$ materials coal and crude oil upon $hich the contract price of the tars inAuestion is fi5ed, $hich is the only $ay the plaintiff has to calculate the true price of saidtars, but said defendant has and still refuses to furnish such information, and $illcontinue to refuse to do so, unless ordered to furnish such information to the plaintiff bythe court, and the plaintiff believes from the information $hich it no$ has and so allegesthat the said defendant has overcharged it on the deliveries of said tars mentioned in thesum of at least P1!,!!!, all in violation of the rights of the plaintiff under its said contract$ith the defendant.

That on ;anuary @1, 1B( and pursuant to 5hibit C. plaintiff notified the defendant in$riting that commencing $ith the month of "ugust, 1B( it desired to take delivery of &!

 per cent of defendantFs coal tar production for that month and that on 0ovember 1, 1B(,it desired to take the entire output of defendantFs coal gas tar, but that the defendantrefused and still refuses to make such deliveries unless plaintiff $ould take all of its$ater gas tar production $ith the desired Auantity of coal gas tar $hich refusal $as a

 plain violation of the contract. That on ;anuary B, 1B), and in accord $ith 5hibit C, plaintiff notified the defendant in $riting that $ithin ninety days after the initial deliveryto it of its total coal gas tar production or in *ebruary, 1B), it $ould reAuire &! per centof its total $ater gas tar production and that in "pril 1B), it $ould reAuire the totaloutput of the defendant of both coal and $ater gas tars, and that it refused to make eitherof such deliveries.

+t is then alleged

>+6. That as sho$n by the foregoing allegations of this complaint, it is apparent thatnot$ithstanding the plaintiff in this case has at all times faithfully performed all the termsand conditions of said contract, 5hibit C, on its part of be performed, and has at all timesand is no$ ready, able and $illing to accept and pay for the deliveries of said coal and$ater gas tars reAuired by said contract and the notices given pursuant thereto, the saiddefendant, the 3anila ?as Corporation, does not intend to comply $ith its said contract,5hibit C, and deliver to the plaintiff at the times and under the terms and conditionsstated therein the Auantities of coal and $ater gas tars reAuired by said contract, and theseveral notices given pursuant thereto, and that it is useless for the plaintiff to insistfurther upon its performance of the said contract, and for that reason he only feasiblecourse for the plaintiff to pursue is to ask the court for the rescission of said contract andfor the full damages $hich the plaintiff has suffered from eptember, 1B@, and $ill

suffer for the remainder of said contract by reason of the defendantFs failure and refusal to perform the same, and the plaintiff has so notified the said defendant.

That since eptember, 1B@, by reason of the bad faith of the defendant, the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of P@!!,!!!, for $hich it prays a corresponding %udgment, andthat the contract, 5hibit C, be rescinded and declared void and $ithout force and effect.

"fter the filing and overruling of its demurrer, the defendant filed an ans$er in the natureof a general and specific denial and on "pril 1!, 1B', and upon stipulation of the parties,the court appointed 7. 7. arkin referee, 4to take the evidence and, upon completion ofthe trial, to report his findings of la$ and fact to the court.4

;uly 1', 1B', the defendant filed an amended ans$er in $hich it alleged as anaffirmative defense, first, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitutecause of action the reason that a prior ad%udication has been had of all the issues involvedin this action, and, second, 4that on or about the 1(th day of ;une, 1B&, in an action

 brought in the Court of *irst +nstance of the City on 3anila, Philippine +slands, before theEonorable ?eo. R. Earvey, ;udge, by 2lossom K Company, plaintiff, vs. 3anila ?asCorporation, defendant, being civil case 0o. B&@&@, of said court, for the same cause ofaction as that set fourth in the complaint herein, said plaintiff recovered %udgment uponthe merits thereof, against said defendant decreeing a breach of the contract sued uponherein, and a$arding damages therefor in the sum of PB(,11.!' $ith legal interest from

 0ovember B@, 1B@, and costs of suit, $hich %udgment $as upon appeal affirmed by theupreme Court of the Philippine +slands, in case ?. R. 0o. B#))) of said court, on the @dday of 3arch, 1B( and reported in volume #' Philippines Reports at page '#',4 and it

 prays that plaintiffFs complaint be dismissed $ith costs.

"fter the evidence $as taken the referee made an e5haustive report of si5ty-pages in$hich he found that the plaintiff $as entitled to P&(,!1.&@ damages, $ith legal interestfrom the date of the filing on the complaint, to $hich both parties filed numerouse5ceptions

+n its decision the court says

+ncidental references have been made to the refereeFs report. +t $as admirably prepared.eaving aside the Auestion of damages and the facts upon $hich the referee assessedthem, the facts are not in dispute at least not in serious dispute. They appear in thedocumentary evidence and this decision is based upon documents introduced into

evidence by plaintiff. +f + could have agreed $ith the referee in respect to the Auestion ofla$, + should have approved his report  in toto. +f defendant is liable for the damagesaccruing from 0ovember B@, 1B@, the date the first complaint $as filed, to "pril 1st,1B(, the date of resumption of relationsH and if defendant, after such resumption ofrelations, again violated the contract, the damages assessed by the referee, are, to my $ayof thinking, as fair as could be estimated. Ee $ent to tremendous pains in figuring out thedetails upon $hich he based his decision.

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et %udgment be entered a$arding damages to plaintiff in the sum of PB,B1.(!, $ithcosts.

*rom $hich plaintiff only appealed and assigns t$enty-four different errors, of $hich thefollo$ing are material to this opinion

+. The trial court erred in holding that this suit in so far as the damages from 0ovember,1B@, to 3arch @1, 1B(, are concerned, is res a"%u"icata.

++. The trial court erred in holding that the defendant repudiated the contract in Auestionas a $hole, and that the plaintiff $hen it brought its first suit to collect damages hadalready elected and consented to the dissolution of the contract, and its choice once made,

 being final, it $as estopped to claim that the contract $as alive $hen that suit $as brought.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

6++. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffFs third e5ception to the legalinterpretation placed on the contract in this case by the referee $ith reference to Auantityof tars and his conclusion $ith respect to the terms thereof that

41. Plaintiff must take and defendant must deliver either the minimum or ma5imum

Auantity of $ater gas tar and not any uantity from the minimum to the ma-imum andLor 

4B. Plaintiff must take either the minimum an" any uantity up to fifty per cent of entireoutput of coal gas tar.

4@. 7ith ninety daysF notice by plaintiff to defendant the former must take and the lattermust deliver total output of both tars, e5cept such as might be needed by defendant foruse in and about its plants and not any uantity from the minimum up to total output ofboth tars.4 9'ee page #), RefereeFs report.:

"nd in holding that the option contained in said contract, taking into consideration the purposes of both parties in entering into the contract, $as a claimed by defendant all the$ater gas tar and &! per cent of the coal gas tar upon immediate notice and all tars upon

ninety dayFs notice.

6+++. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffFs fourth e5ception to the findingand conclusion of the referee that from the correspondence bet$een the parties it $asapparent that plaintiff did not make a right use of its option, and that the letter of ;une B&,1B(, and the subseAuent demands, $ith e5ception of the letter of ;uly @1, 1B(, $ere notmade in pursuance to the terms of the contract, and that defendant had no liability inrefusing to comply there$ith, and in allo$ing plaintiff damages only for the failure of thedefendant to deliver Auantities sho$n in 5hibits Ref. B1 and BB. 9'ee pages &1, &B,RefereeFs report.:

+>. The trial court erred in finding and holding that the demands of plaintiff for additionaltars under its contract $ith the defendant $ere e5travagant and not made in good faith,

and that $hen it $rote to defendant that it desired ma5imum Auantities of coal gas tarsand only minimum of $ater gas tars, but $ith the reservation of going back to minimum

Auantities of both at any time it chose, it announced its intention f breaching the contract,and defendant $as under no obligation to deliver ma5imum Auantities of either tars, andsince this $as the efficient cause of the failure of defendant to deliver or plaintiff toaccept tars, the blame is attribute to plaintiff, and it cannot recover for a rescission.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

>>+++. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffFs seventeenth e5ception to thefinding and conclusion of the referee that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the

defendant only the follo$ing sums

7ater gas tar 95hibit Ref. B1:

Coal gas tar 95hibit Ref. BB:

/vercharges on deliveries 95hibit Ref. B@:

or a total of 

$ith interest, and in not a$arding to the plaintiff as damages in this case the sum ofP@1,B&@.#!, $ith legal interest thereon from the date of filing the complaint in this case,in the manner and form computed but it, and in a$arding damages to the plaintiff for thesum of only PB,B1.(!. $ith costs.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

JO!NS, J.:

+n this action plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendant $hich it claims tohave sustained after eptember, 1B@, arising from, and gro$ing out of, its originalcontract of eptember 1!, 11', as modified on ;anuary 1, 11, to continue for a periodof ten years from that date.

+n paragraph 6+++ of its complaint, plaintiff alleges that about the last part of ;uly, 1B!,the defendant 4$illfully and deliberately breached its said contract,4 and that it 4flatlyrefused to make any deliveries under said contract, and finally on 0ovember B@, 1B@,4 it$as forced to commence action in the Court of *irst +nstance against the defendantkno$n as case 0o. B&@&B, to recover the damages $hich it had then sustained by reasonof such flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the defendant, in $hich %udgment$as rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for PB(,111.!', asdamages suffered by this plaintiff by the defendantFs breach of said contract from ;uly1B!, up to and including eptember, 1B@, $ith legal interest thereon from 0ovember

B@, 1B@, and for the costs,4 in $hich the court refused to order the defendant to resumethe delivery of the coal and $ater gas tar to the plaintiff, in accord $ith said contract, but

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left it $ith its remedy for damages against the defendant for any subseAuent breaches ofthe contract. " copy of that %udgment, $hich $as later affirmed by this court, is attachedto, marked 5hibit ?, and made a part of, the complaint in this action.

+n their respective briefs, opposing counsel have much to say about the purpose andintent of the %udgment, and it is vigorously asserted that it $as never intended that itshould be or become a bar to another action by the plaintiff to recover any damages itmay have sustained after eptember, 1B@, during the remainder of the ten-year period of that contract. 2e that as it may, it must be conceded that the Auestion as to $hat $ould be

the legal force and effect of that %udgment in that case $as never presented to, or decided by, the lo$er court or this court. +n the very nature of things, neither court in that case$ould have the po$er to pass upon or decided the legal force and effect of its o$n

 %udgment, for the simple reason that it $ould be premature and outside of the issues ofany pleading, and could not be raised or presented until after the %udgment became finaland then only by an appropriate plea, as in this case.

Plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendant $illfully and deliverately breached thecontract and 4flatly refused to make any deliveries under said contract,4 by reason of.$hich it $as forced to and commenced its former action in $hich it $as a$ardedPB(,11.!' damages against the defendant by reason of its breach of the contract from;uly, 1B!, to eptember, 1B@.

+n the final analysis, plaintiff in this action seeks to recover damages gro$ing out of, andarising from, other and different breaches of that same contract after 0ovember, 1B@, for the remainder of the ten-year period, and the Auestion is thus sAuarely presented as to$hether the rendition of the former %udgment is a bar to the right of the plaintiff torecover damages from and after eptember, 1B@, arising from, and gro$ing out of,

 breaches of the original contract of eptember 1!, 11', as modified on ;anuary 1, 11.That is to say, $hether the plaintiff, in a former action, having recovered %udgment for thedamages $hich it sustained by reason of a breach of its contract by the defendant up toeptember, 1B@, can no$ in this action recover damages it may have sustained aftereptember, 1B@, arising from, and gro$ing out of, a breach of the same contract, uponand for $hich it recovered its %udgment in the former action.

+n the former action in $hich the %udgment $as rendered, it is alleged in the compliant

4). That about the last part of ;uly or the first part of "ugust, 1B!, the 3anila ?asCorporation, the defendant herein, $ithout any cause ceased delivering coal and $atergas tar to the plaintiff hereinH and that from that time up to the present date, the plaintiffcorporation, 2lossom K Company, has freAuently and urgently demanded of thedefendant, the 3anila ?as Corporation, that it comply $ith its aforesaid contract 5hibit" by continuing to deliver coal and $ater gas tar to this plaintiff but that the saiddefendant has refused and still refuses, to deliver to the plaintiff any coal and $ater gastar $hatsoever under the said contract 5hibit ", since the said month of ;uly 1B!.

4. That o$ing to the bad faith of the said 3anila ?as Corporation, defendant herein, innot living up to its said contract 5hibit ", made $ith this plaintiff, and refusing no$ tocarry out the terms of the same, be delivering to this plaintiff the coal and $ater gas tarmentioned in the said 5hibit ", has caused to this plaintiff great and irreparable damages

amounting to the sum total of one hundred t$enty- four thousand eight hundred fortyeight pesos and seventy centavos 9P1B#,'#',)!:Hand that the said defendant corporationhas refused, and still refuses, to pay to this plaintiff the $hole or any part of the aforesaidsum.

41!. That the said contract 5hibit ", $as to be in force until ;anuary 1, 1B, that is tosay ten 91!: years counted from ;anuary 1, 1BH and that unless the defendant againcommence to furnish and supply this plaintiff $ith coal and $ater gas tar, as provided forin the said contract 5hibit ", the damages already suffered by this plaintiff $ill

continually increase and become larger and larger in the course of years preceding thetermination of the said contract on ;anuary 1, 1B.4

+n that action plaintiff prays for %udgment against the defendant

/a That upon trial of this this cause %udgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff andagainst the defendant for the sum of P1B#,'#'#.)!:, $ith legal interest thereon from

 0ovember B@, 1B@H

/b That the court specifically order the defendant to resume the delivery of the coal and$ater gas tar to the plaintiff under the terms of the said contract 5hibit " of thiscomplaint.4

+n the final analysis, plaintiff must stand or fall on its o$n pleadings, and tested by thatrule it must be admitted that the plaintiffFs original cause of action, in $hich it recovered

 %udgment for damages, $as founded on the ten-year contract, and that the damages $hichit then recovered $ere recovered for a breach of that contract.

2oth actions are founded on one and the same contract. 2y the terms of the originalcontract of eptember 1!, 1!1', the defendant $as to sell and the plaintiff $as to

 purchase three tons of $ater gas tar per month form eptember to ;anuary 1, 11, andt$enty tons of $ater gas tar per month after ;anuary 1, 11, one-half ton of coal gas tar

 per month from eptember to ;anuary 1, 11, and si5 tons of coal gas tar per monthafter ;anuary 1, 11. That from and after ;anuary 1, 11, plaintiff $ould take at leastthe Auantities specified in the contract of eptember 1!, 11', and that at its option, it$ould have the right to take the total output of $ater gas tar of defendantFs plant and &!

 per cent of the gross output of its coal gas tar, and upon giving ninety daysF notice, it$ould have the right to the entire output of coal gas tar, e5cept such as the defendantmight need for its o$n use. That is to say, the contract provided for the delivery to the

 plaintiff from month to month of the specified amounts of the different tars as orderedand reAuested by the plaintiff. +n other $ords, under plaintiffFs o$n theory, the defendant$as to make deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years,and it is alleged in both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faithrefused to make any more deliveries.

+n @# Corpus ;uris, p. '@, it is said

"s a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as toauthorie successive actionsH and a %udgment recovered for a single breach of a

continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a subseAuent breach thereof. 2ut

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$here the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only oneaction, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.

+n the case of Rhoelm vs, Eorst, 1)'

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arising form that contract and possessed by any given plaintiff must be presented 9at leastas against any given defendant: in one actionH $hat the plaintiff does not advance heforegoes by conclusive presumption.

+nn "bbott vs. )( and and 7ater Co. 911' Pac., #B&H 1(1 Cal., #B:, at page #B', thecourt said

+n *ish vs. *olley, ( Eill 90. =.:, , it $as held, in accord $ith the rule $e havediscussed, that, $here the defendant had covenanted that plaintiff should have a continual

supply of $ater for his mill from a dam, and subseAuently totally failed to perform fornine years, and plaintiff brought an action for the breach and recovered damagessustained by him to that time, the %udgment $as a bar to a second action arising fromsubseAuent failure to perform, on the theory that, although he covenant $as a continuingone in one sense, it $as an entire contract, and a total breach put an end to it, and gave

 plaintiff the right to sue for an eAuivalent in damages.

+n such a case it is no $arrant for a second action that the party may not be able toactually prove in the first action all the items of the demand, or that all the damage maynot then have been actually suffered. Ee is bound to prove in the first action not onlysuch damages as has been actually suffered, but also such prospective damage by reasonof the breach as he may be legally entitled to, for the %udgment he recovers in such action$ill be a conclusive ad%udication as to the total damage on account of the breach.

+t $ill thus be seen that, $here there is a complete and total breach of a continuouscontract for a term of years, the recovery of a %udgment for damages by reason of the

 breach is a bar to another action on the same contract for and on account of thecontinuous breach.

+n the final analysis is, there is no real dispute about any material fact, and the importantand decisive Auestion is the legal construction of the pleadings in the former case and inthis case, and of the contract bet$een the plaintiff and the defendant of ;anuary 1, 1B!.

The complaint on the former case specifically alleges that the defendant 4has refused andstill refuses, to deliver to the plaintiff any coal and $ater gas tar $hatsoever under thesaid contract 5hibit ", since the said month of ;uly, 1B!.4 4 That o$ing to the bad faith

of the said 3anila ?as Corporation, defendant herein, in not living up to its said contract5hibit ", made $ith this plaintiff, and refusing no$ to carry out the terms of the same.4That is a specific allegation not only a breach of the contract since the month of ;uly,1B!, but of the faith of the defendant in its continuous refusal to make deliveries of anycoal and $ater gas tar. That amended complaint $as filed on ;uly 11, 1B#, or four yearsafter the alleged bad faith in breaking the contract.

Eaving recovered damages against it, covering a period of four years, upon the theorythat the defendant broke the contract, and in bad faith refused to make deliveries of either of the tars, ho$ can the plaintiff no$ claim and assert that the contract is still in fierceand effectM +n the instant case the plaintiff alleges and relies upon the ten year contract on;anuary 11, 1B!, $hich in bad faith $as broken by the defendant. +f the contract $asthen broken, ho$ can it be enforced in this actionM

+t is admitted that the defendant never made any deliveries of any tar from ;uly, 1B!, to"pril, 1@(. "lso that it made nine deliveries to plaintiff of the minimum Auantities ofcoal and $ater gas tar from "pril ), 1B(, to ;anuary &, 1B).

Plaintiff contends that such deliveries $ere made under and in continuation of the oldcontract.

3arch B(, 1B(, after the decision of this court affirming the %udgment in the originalaction, plaintiff $rote the defendant

. . . +t is our desire to take deliveries of at least the minimum Auantities set forth thereinand shall appreciate to have you advise us ho$ soon you $ill be in a position to makedeliveriesH . . .

. . . +n vie$ of the fact that you have only effected settlement up to 0ovember B@, 1B@, please inform us $hat ad%ustment you are $illing to make for the period of time that hassince elapsed $ithout your complying $ith the contract.

+n response to $hich on 3arch @1, 1B(, the defendant $rote this letter to the plaintiff

+n reply to your letter of 3arch B(th, 1B(, in regard to tar, $e beg to advise you that $eare prepared to furnish the minimum Auantities of coal and $ater gas tars as per your

letter, vi t$enty tons of $ater gas tar and si5 tons of coal gas tar. The price figured on present costs of ra$ materials is P@.!1 : Thirty-nine and !1L1!! Pesos: per ton of $atergas and P@@.& 9Thirty-three and &L1!! Pesos: per ton of coal tar.

7e shall e5pect you to take delivery and pay for the above amount of tars at our factoryon or before "pril )th pro5.

Thereafter $e shall be ready to furnish eAual amounts on the first of each month. Gindlymake your arrangements accordingly.

/n ;anuary B, 1B), the plaintiff $rote the defendant that

/n ;uly @1st last, $e made demand upon you, under the terms of our tar contract for &!

 per cent of your total coal tar production for that month and also served notice on youthat beginning ! days from "ugust 1st $e $ould reAuire you total output of coal tarmonthlyH this in addition to the B! tons of $ater gas tar provided for in the contract to betaken monthly.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

7e are here again on your for your total output of coal tar immediately and the regularminimum monthly Auantity of $ater gas tar. +n this connection $e desire to advise youthat $ithin ! days of your initial delivery to us of your total coal tar output $e $illreAuire &! per cent of your total $ater gas tar output, and, further, that t$o monthsthereafter $e $ill reAuire your total output of both tars.

*ebruary B, 1B), the defendant $rote the plaintiff

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Replying to your letter of ;an. B, $e $ould sat that $e have already returned to you thecheck enclosed there $ith. "s $e have repeatedly informed you $e disagree $ith you asto the construction of your contract and insist that you take the $hole output of both tarsif you $ish to secure the $hole of the coal tar.

7ith regard to your threat of further suits $e presume that you $ill act as advised. +f youmake it necessary $e shall do the same.

*rom an analysis of these letters it clearly appears that the plaintiff then sought to reply

upon and enforce the contract of ;anuary 1, 1B!, and that defendant denied plaintiffFsconstruction of the contract, and insisted 4that you take the $hole output of both tars ifyou $ish to secure the $hole of the coal tar.4

*ebruary B', 1B), the plaintiff $rote the defendant

+n vie$ of your numerous violations of and repeated refusal and failure to comply $iththe terms and provisions of our contract dated ;anuary @!-@1, 11, for the delivery to usof $ater and coal gas tars, etc., $e $ill commence action,4 $hich it did.

The record tends to sho$ that tars $hich the defendant delivered after "pril ), 1B(, $erenot delivered under the old contract of ;anuary 1, 1B!, and that at all times since ;uly1B!, the defendant has consistently refused to make any deliveries of any tars under that

contract.

The referee found as a fact that plaintiff $as entitled to PB,B1.(! for and on account ofovercharges $hich the defendant made for the deliveries of fifty-four tons of coal gas tar,and one hundred eighty tons of $ater gas tar after "pril, 1B(, and upon that point thelo$er says

The fourth charge that plaintiff makes is meritorious. The price $as to be fi5ed on the basis of ra$ materials. The charge for deliveries during 1B( $ere too high. +n this +agree $ith entirely $ith the referee and adopt his findings of fact and calculations.9'ee RefereeFs report, p. '@: The referee a$arded for overcharge during the periodaforesaid, the sum of PB,B1.(!. The defendant $as trying to discharge plaintiff from

 buying tars and made the price of ra$ material appear as high as possible.

That finding is sustained upon the theory that the defendant broke its contract $hich itmade $ith the plaintiff for the sale and delivery of the tars on and after "pril, 1B(.

"fter careful study of the many important Auestions presented on this appeal in thee5haustive brief of the appellant, $e are clearly of the opinion that, as found by the lo$er court, the plea of res %u"icata must be sustained. The %udgment of the lo$er court isaffirmed.

+t is so ordered, $ith costs against the appellant.

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%G.R. No. 161135. A&'(l ), 2005*

S+AGMAN !OTELS AND TRAVEL, IN"., petitioner, vs. !ON. "OURT OF

A##EALS, NEAL . "!RISTIAN, respondents.

D E " I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C . J./

3ay a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it $as filed be cured by the

accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the caseM This is the basic issue raised

in this petition for the Courts consideration.

ometime in 1( and 1), petitioner $agman Eotels and Travel, +nc., through

"tty. eonor . +nfante and Rodney David Eegerty, its president and vice-president,

respectively, obtained from private respondent 0eal 2. Christian loans evidenced by three

 promissory notes dated ) "ugust 1(, 1# 3arch 1), and 1# ;uly 1). ach of the

 promissory notes is in the amount of

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+n the instant case, the Court is of the vie$ that the parties merely intended to change the

rate of interest from 1&O per annum to (O per annum $hen the defendant started paying

N)&! per month $hich payments $ere all accepted by the plaintiff from ;anuary 1'

on$ard. The payment of the principal obligation, ho$ever, remains unaffected $hich

means that the defendant should still pay the plaintiff N&!,!!! on "ugust , 1, 3arch

1#, B!!! and ;uly 1#, B!!!.

9B: 7hen the instant case $as filed on *ebruary B, 1, none of the promissory notes

$as due and demandable. "s of this date ho$ever, the first and the second promissory

notes have already matured. Eence, payment is already due.

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The petitioner harps on the absence of a cause of action at the time the private

respondents complaint $as filed $ith the trial court. +n connection $ith this, the

 petitioner raises the issue of novation by arguing that its obligations under the three

 promissory notes $ere novated by the renegotiation that happened in December 1)

$herein the private respondent agreed to $aive the interest in each of the three

 promissory notes and to accept

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the pendency of the case in vie$ of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during

the trial.

uch interpretation of ection &, Rule 1! of the 1) Rules of Civil Procedure is

erroneous.

"mendments of pleadings are allo$ed under Rule 1! of the 1) Rules of Civil

Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most

e5peditious and ine5pensive manner $ithout regard to technicalities, and that all other 

matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding

multiplicity of suits.I1BJection & thereof applies to situations $herein evidence not $ithin

the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to

conform to such evidence the pleadings are subseAuently amended on motion of a party.

Thus, a complaint $hich fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence

 presented during the trial.

Eo$ever, the curing effect under ection & is applicable only if a cause of action in

 fact e-ists at the time the complaint is file", but the complaint is "efective for failure to

alle#e the essential facts. *or e5ample, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a

condition precedent upon $hich the cause of action depends, evidence sho$ing that such

condition had already been fulfilled $hen the complaint $as filed may be presented

during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter.I1@J Thus,

in Roces v. $alan"oni,I1#J  this Court upheld the trial court in taking cogniance of an

other$ise defective complaint $hich $as later cured by the testimony of the plaintiff 

during the trial. +n that case, there $as in fact a cause of action and the only problem $as

the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. This ruling $as reiterated in Pascua

v. ourt of !ppeals.I1&J

+t thus follo$s that a complaint $hose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be

cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the e5istence or 

accrual of a cause of action $hile the case is pending.I1(J uch an action is prematurely

 brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, $hich should be dismissed by the court upon

 proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is

that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to ans$er for 

complaints $hich are immature. "s this Court eloAuently said in 'uri#ao Mine

 2-ploration o., 3nc. v. arrisI1)J

+t is a rule of la$ to $hich there is, perhaps, no e5ception, either at la$ or in eAuity, that

to recover at all ' u4 4o u4 o7 (o o o7 4u(.

"s observed by counsel for appellees, there are reasons of public policy $hy there should

 be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and $hy people $ho are in no default and

against $hom there is yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public

tribunals to ans$er complaints $hich are groundless. 7e say groundless because if the

action is immature, it should not be entertained, and an action prematurely brought is a

groundless suit.

+t is true that an amended complaint and the ans$er thereto take the place of the originals

$hich are thereby regarded as abandoned 9Reynes vs. Compaa ?eneral de Tabacos

I11BJ, B1 Phil. #1(H Ruyman and *arris vs. Director of ands I11(J, @# Phil., #B': and

that the complaint and ans$er having been superseded by the amended complaint and

ans$er thereto, and the ans$er to the original complaint not having been presented inevidence as an e5hibit, the trial court $as not authoried to take it into account. 92astida

vs. 3eni K Co. I1@@J, &' Phil., 1''.: 2ut in none of these cases or in any other case

have $e held that if a right of action did not e5ist $hen the original complaint $as filed,

one could be created by filing an amended complaint. +n some %urisdictions in the

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not a trier of facts, its %urisdiction being limited to revie$ing only errors of la$ that may

have been committed by the lo$er courts. "mong the e5ceptions is $hen the finding of 

fact of the trial court or the Court of "ppeals is not supported by the evidence on record

or is based on a misapprehension of facts. uch e5ception obtains in the present case. IB!J

This Court finds to be contrary to the evidence on record the finding of both the

trial court and the Court of "ppeals that the renegotiation in December 1) resulted in

the reduction of the interest from 1&O to (O per annum and that the monthly payments

of

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ROSENDO A"ALSO, RODRIGO A"ALSO,

MAR"ILIANA . DOLAS, TEROLIO A"ALSO,

ALI#IO A"ALSO, JR., MARIO A"ALSO,

+ILLIAM A"ALSO,ALI#IO A"ALSO III "RISTITA . AES,

Petitioners, - versus - 

MA, LILIA #. GAISON,

TIMOTEO #ADIGOS, #ERFE"TO #ADIGOS,

#RIS"A SALARDA, FLORA GUINTO, ENITA

TEM#LA, SOTERO #ADIGOS, ANDRES #ADIGOS,

EMILIO #ADIGOS, DEMETRIO #ADIGOS, JR.,

+EN"ESLAO #ADIGOS, NELL$ #ADIGOS,

EARTE,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 1?3192 Present 8

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 "fter trial, 2ranch 1( of the Cebu City RTC decidedIBBJ in favor in the therein

 plaintiffs-herein respondents, disposing as follo$s 

+!EREFORE, premises considered, %udgment is herebyrendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

 1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to the

o$nership and possession of the lot in litigationH

 B. Declaring as null and void the Deeds of 

"bsolute ale in AuestionH 

@. /rdering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P&!,!!!.!! as actual and compensatory damagesI,Jthe sum of PB!,!!!.!! as attorneys fees, andP1!,!!!.!! as litigation e5penses.

 #. /rdering the defendants to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.IB@J 9mphasis in the

originalH underscoring supplied:

 

The defendants-herein petitioners 2acalsos appealed.IB#J 3ean$hile, the trialcourt, on respondents 3otion for 5ecution Pending "ppeal,IB&J issued a $rit of e5ecution$hich $as implemented by, among other things, demolishing the houses constructed onthe lot.IB(J

 2y DecisionIB)J of eptember (, B!!&, the Court of "ppeals affirmed the trial

courts decision. Their 3otion for ReconsiderationIB'J having been denied,IBJ  petitionersfiled the present Petition for Revie$ on Certiorari,I@!J faulting the Court of "ppeals

 . . . $hen it ruled that the econd "mended Complaint is

valid and legal, even if not all indispensable parties are impleaded or  %oined . . .

 . . . $hen IitJ $ittingly overlooked the most potent,

unescapable and indubitable fact or circumstance $hich proved thecontinuous possession of ot 0o. @)'1 by the defendants and their 

 predecessors in interest, "lipio 2acalso Ir.J andLor $hen it sanctionedimpliedly the glaring arbitrary RTC order of the ol((o o7 o' @0 y'4 ol ou44, situated on ot 0o. @)'1 CebuCad., belonging to the old lessees, long allo$ed to lease or staythereat 7o' y y'4, by "lipio 2acalso Ir.J, father andIpredecessorJ in interest of the defendants, no$ the hereinPetitioners. The said lessees $ere not even %oined as parties in this

case, much less $ere they given a chance to air their side before their 

houses $ere demolished, in gross violation of the due process clause provided for in ec. 1I,J "rt. +++ of the Constitution . . .

. . . in uphol"in# as #ospel truth the report an" conclusion of  4imro" (ao, the suppose" han"5ritin# e-pert I,J that signatures andthumb marks appearing on all documents of sale presented by thedefendants are forgeries, and not mindful that 0imrod 6ao $as notcross-e5amined thoroughly by the defense counsel as he $as

 prevented from doing so by the trial %udge, in violation of the la$more particularly ec. (, Rule 1@B, Rules of Court andLor the accepted

and usual course of %udicial proceedings and is therefore notadmissible in evidence.

 

. . . I$hen itJ . . . $itt ingly or un$ittingly,again o'loo the vital facts, the circumstances, the la$s andrulings of the upreme Court, $hich are of much $eight, substanceand influence $hich, if considered carefully, undoubtedly uphold thatthe defendants and their predecessors in interests, have long been incontinuous, open, peaceful and adverse, and notorious possessionagainst the $hole $orld of ot 0o. @)'1, Cebu Cad., in concept of absolute o$ners for #( years, a period more than sufficient to sustainor uphold the defense of prescription, provided for in "rt. 11@) of theCivil Code even $ithout good faith.I@1J 9mphasis and underscoring in

the originalH italics supplied: 

Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos 9Teodulfo:, an heir of implicio, $asnot impleaded.I@BJ They contend, ho$ever, that the omission did not deprive the trial courtof %urisdiction because "rticle #') of the Civil Code states that IaJny of the co-o$nersmay bring an action in e%ectment. I@@J

 Respondents contention does not lie. The action is for Auieting of title,

declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and o$nership, anddamages. !rcelona v. ourt of !ppealsI@#J defines indispensable parties under ection ) of Rule @, Rules of Court as follo$s

 IPJarties-in-interest $ithout $hom there can be no final

determination of an action. "s such, they must be %oined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule $ith reference to themaking of parties in a civil action reAuires, of course, the %oinder of allnecessary parties $here possible, and the %oinder of all indispensable

 parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine uanon for the e5ercise of %udicial po$er. +t is precisely $hen anindispensable party is not before the court 9that: the action should bedismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders allsubseAuent actions of the court null and void for $ant of authority toact, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

 

Petitioners are co-o$ners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond isundividedH it is impossible to pinpoint $hich specific portion of the

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 property is o$ned by /landay, et. al. and $hich portion belongs to petitioners. 5 5 5 +ndeed, petitioners should have been properlyimpleaded as indispensable parties. 5 5 5

 5 5 5 5I@&J 9

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thereby depriving this Court of the opportunity to determine his credibility. spina, on theother hand, $ithstood thorough cross-e5amination, re-direct and re-cross e5amination. I&BJ

 The value of the opinion of a hand$riting e5pert depends not upon his mere

statements of $hether a $riting is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may affordin pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and bet$eengenuine and false specimens of $riting $hich $ould ordinarily escape notice or detectionfrom an unpracticed observer .I&@J 7hile differences e5ist bet$een ?audencios signaturesappearing on 5hibits @-@-D and his signatures appearing on the affidavits accompanying

the pleadings in this case,IJ

 the gap of more than @! years from the time he affi5ed hissignatures on the Auestioned document to the time he affi5ed his signatures on the

 pleadings in the case could e5plain the difference. Thus spina observed 

5 5 5 5 

#. 2oth Auestioned and standard signatures e5hibited the same styleand form of the movement impulses in its e5ecutionH

 &. Personal habits of the $riter $ere established in both Auestionedand standard signatures such as misalignment of the $hole structure of the signature, heavy penpressure I sicJ of strokes from initial to theterminal, formation of the loops and ovals, poor line Auality and

spacing bet$een letters are all repeatedH (. 2oth Auestioned and standard signatures Isho$J no radical changein the strokes and letter formation in spite oIfJ their $ide difference indates of e5ecution considering the early $riting maturity of the $riterH ). 6ariations in both $ritings Auestioned and standards $ereconsidered and properly evaluated. 

5 5 5 5 *undamental similarities are observed in the follo$ing characteristicsto $it 

5 5 5 5 

SIGNATURES

 1. /vals of a either rounded or angular at the baseH B. /vals of d either narro$, rounded, or angular at the baseH

 @. oop stems of d consistently tall and retraced in both specimens

Auestioned and standardsH 

#. 2ase alignment of e and i are repeated $ith samenessH 

&. Top of c either $ith a retrace, angular formation or an eyeletH 

(. Terminal ending of o heavy $ith a short tapering formationH 

). oop stem of P $ith $ide space and angularH 

'. /val of P either rounded or multi-angularH 

. 2ase loop of g consistently short either a retrace, a blind loop or 

narro$ space disproportionate to the top ovalH 

1!. "ngular top of s are repeated $ith samenessH11. Terminal ending of s short and heavy $ith blind loop or retrace at

the base. I&&J

 

"nd spina concluded 

5 5 5 5 

ItJhat the four 9#: Auestioned signatures over and above thetype$ritten name and $ord ?"

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?iving due $eight to his testimony, $e find that 5 5 5the vendors in the aforesaid Deeds of ale 5 5 5 $ere not the legalheirs of the registered o$ners of the disputed land. 5 5 5

 5 5 5 5

 "s for 2-hibit 6, the vendor ?avino Padigos is not a legal

heir of the registered o$ner *eli5 Padigos. The latters heirs are plaintiff-appellants 5pedito Padigos, Eenry Padigos and nriAue P.

3alaarte. "ccordingly, 2-hibit 6 is a patent nullity and did not vesttitle of *eli5 Padigos share of ot @)'1 to "lipio I?adianoJ.

  !s for 2-hibit 7 , the vendors ?avino and Rodulfo Padigos

are not the legal heirs of the registered o$ner ?eronimoPadigos. Therefore, these fictitious heirs could not validly conveyo$nership in favor of "lipio I?adianoJ.

 5 5 5 5

 "s for 2-hibit +, the vendor Candido Padigos is not a legal

heir of implicio Padigos. Therefore, the former could not vest title of the land to "lipio 2acalso.

  !s for 2-hibit 8, the vendors ?audencio Padigos,

Eermenegilda Padigos and Domingo Padigos are not the legal heirs of registered o$ner *ortunata Padigos. Eermenegilda Padigos is not akno$n heir of any of the other registered o$ners of the property.

 /n the other hand, plaintiffs-appellants ?audencio and

Domingo Padigos are only some of the collateral grandchildren of *ortunata Padigos. They could not by themselves dispose of the shareof *ortunata Padigos.

5 5 5 5 

 !s for 2-hibit , the vendors in 2-hibit are not the legalheirs of 7enceslao Padigos. The children of registered o$ner 7enceslao Padigos are 7enceslao Padigos, Demetrio Padigos and

 0elly Padigos. Therefore, 2-hibit is null and void and could notconvey the shares of the registered o$ner 7enceslao Padigos in favor of "lipio 2acalso.

  !s for 2-hibit 9, the Deed of ale e5ecuted by "lipio

I?adianoJ in favor of "lipio 2acalso is also void because the shares of the registered o$ners *eli5 and ?eronimo Padigos $ere not validlyconveyed to "lipio I?adianoJ because 2-hibit 6 and ( 5ere voi" contracts. Thus, 2-hibit 9 is also null and void.I&'J 9+talics in theoriginalH underscoring supplied:

 

The evidence regarding the facts of pedigree of the registered o$ners and their heirs does not, ho$ever, satisfy this Court. 0ot only is ?audencios self-serving testimonyuncorroboratedH it contradicts itself on material points. *or instance, on directe5amination, he testified that +gnacio is his father and *ortunata is his grandmother .I&J /ncross-e5amination, ho$ever, he declared that his father +gnacio is the brother of *ortunata.I(!J /n direct e5amination, he testified that his co-plaintiffs 6ictoria and ilia are alreadydead.I(1J /n cross-e5amination, ho$ever, he denied kno$ledge $hether the t$o arealready dead.I(BJ "lso on direct e5amination, he identified 5pedito, Eenry, and nriAue asthe children of *eli5.I(@J 5pedito himself testified, ho$ever, that he is the son of a certain

3amerto Padigos, the son of a certain "polonio Padigos $ho is in turn the son of *eli5.I(#J

 "T " 60T, respondents are guilty of laches the negligence or omission to

assert a right $ithin a reasonable time, $arranting a presumption that the party entitled toassert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. I(&J 7hile, by e5press provision of la$, no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered o$ner shall beacAuired by prescription or adverse possession, it is an enshrined rule that even aregistered o$ner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.I((J

 Respondents insist, ho$ever, that they only learned of the deeds of sale in 1#,

the year that "lipio, r. allegedly commenced possession of the property.I()J The recordsho$s, ho$ever, that although petitioners started renting out the land in 1#, they have

 been tilling it since the 1&!s,I('J and Rosendos house $as constructed in about 1'&.I(J These acts of possession could not have escaped respondents notice given thefollo$ing unassailed considerations, inter alia ?audencio testified that he lived on the lotfrom childhood until 1'&, after $hich he moved to a place three kilometers a$ay, andafter he moved, a certain 6icente Debelos lived on the lot $ith his permission.I)!J Petitioners $itness 3arina "lcoseba, their employee, I)1J testified that ?audencio andDomingo used to cut :umpay planted by petitioners tenant on the lot. I)BJ The ta5declarations in "lipio, r.s name for the years 1()-1'! covering a portion of the lotindicate *ortunatas share to be the north and east boundaries of "lipio, r.sH I)@J hence,respondents could not have been una$are of the acts of possession that petitionerse5ercised over the lot.

 

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+!EREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The eptember (, B!!& decision of the Court of "ppeals is REVERSED SET ASIDE. Civil Case 0o. C2-1)@B( of 2ranch 1( of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED.

 / /RDRD.

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ROGER V. NAVARRO,Petitioner, 

- versus - 

!ON. JOSE L. ES"OIDO, #'4((: Ju:, RT"

' 3?, ":y O'o "(y, BAREN T. GO,

o(: u4(44 u' BARGO

ENTER#RISES,

Respondents. 

G.R. No. 153?))

 

PresentC"RP+/, $., hairperson,/0"RD/-D C"TR/,2R+/0,D C"T+/, and"2"D, $$.

 

Promulgated 

 0ovember B), B!! 

C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- C

D E " I S I O N

 

RION, J . 

This is a petition for revie$ on certiorariI1J that seeks to set aside the Court of "ppeals 9!: DecisionIBJ dated /ctober 1(, B!!1 and ResolutionI@J dated 3ay B, B!!B inC"-?.R. P. 0o. (#)!1. These C" rulings affirmed the ;uly B(, B!!! I#J and 3arch ),B!!1I&J orders of the Regional Trial Court 9 RT :, 3isamis /riental, Cagayan de /ro City,

denying petitioner Roger 6. 0avarros 9 4avarro: motion to dismiss. 

A"BGROUND FA"TS

 

/n eptember 1B, 1', respondent Garen T. ?o filed t$o complaints, docketed as CivilCase 0os. '-& 9 first complaint :I(J and '-&' 9 secon" complaint :,I)J before the RTC for replevin andLor sum of money $ith damages against 0avarro. +n these complaints, Garen?o prayed that the RTC issue $rits of replevin for the seiure of t$o 9B: motor vehicles in

 0avarros possession. The first complaint stated 

1. That plaintiff BAREN T. GO is a *ilipino, of legal age,married to ?00 /. ?/, a resident of Cagayan de /ro City

and o(: u4(44 u' ' BARGOENTER#RISES, an entity duly registered and e5isting under and byvirtue of the la$s of the Republic of the Philippines, $hich has its

 business address at 2ulua, Cagayan de /ro CityH that defendantR/?R 0"6"RR/ is a *ilipino, of legal age, a resident of (BDolores treet, 0aareth, Cagayan de /ro City, $here he may beserved $ith summons and other processes of the Eonorable CourtH thatdefendant ;/E0 D/ $hose real name and address are at presentunkno$n to plaintiff is hereby %oined as party defendant as he may be

the person in $hose possession and custody the personal propertysub%ect matter of this suit may be found if the same is not in the

 possession of defendant R/?R 0"6"RR/H B. That G"R?/ 0TRPR+ is in the business of,

among others, buying and selling motor vehicles, including haulingtrucks and other heavy eAuipmentH

 @. That for the cause of action against defendant R/?R 

 0"6"RR/, it is hereby stated that on "ugust ', 1), the saiddefendant leased IfromJ plaintiff a certain motor vehicle $hich is more

 particularly described as follo$s 

3akeLType *

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P ET=-+> K ((L1!! P/ 9P1@B,(((.((:, or to return the sub%ect motor vehicle as also provided for in the " "?R30T 7+TER+?ET T/ P

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him to comply $ith the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin $ere filed.

 astly, 0avarro posits that since the t$o $rits of replevin $ere issued based on

fla$ed complaints, the vehicles $ere illegally seied from his possession and should bereturned to him immediately.

 Garen ?o, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for 0avarro to state

that she has no real interest in the sub%ect of the complaint, even if the lease agreements

$ere signed only by her husband, ?lenn ?oH she is the o$ner of Gargo nterprises and?lenn ?o signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Gargo nterprises.3oreover, Garen ?o maintains that 0avarros insistence that Gargo nterprises is Garen?os paraphernal property is $ithout basis. 2ased on the la$ and %urisprudence on thematter, all property acAuired during the marriage is presumed to be con%ugal property.*inally, Garen ?o insists that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of actionagainst 0avarro. Thus, $hen the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff,this $as merely to comply $ith the rule that spouses should sue %ointly, and $as notmeant to cure the complaints lack of cause of action.

 T!E "OURTS RULING

 

+ 7( &((o o( o7 '(.

  Karen Go is the real party-in-interest 

 

The 1) Rules of Civil Procedure reAuires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party $hostands to be benefited or in%ured by the %udgment in the suit, or the party entitled to theavails of the suit.I1&J +nterestingly, although 0avarro admits that Garen ?o is the registered o$ner of the

 business name Gargo nterprises, he still insists that Garen ?o is not a real party-in-interest in the case. "ccording to 0avarro, $hile the lease contracts $ere in Gargonterprises name, this $as merely a trade name $ithout a %uridical personality, so theactual parties to the lease agreements $ere 0avarro and ?lenn ?o, to the e5clusion of Garen ?o. 

"s a corollary, 0avarro contends that the RTC acted $ith grave abuse of discretion $hen it ordered the inclusion of ?lenn ?o as co-plaintiff, since this in effectcreated a cause of action for the complaints $hen in truth, there $as none. 7e do not find 0avarros arguments persuasive. 

The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Gargo nterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint $herethe plaintiff $as identified as G"R0 T. ?/ doing business under the name G"R?/

0TRPR+, and this identification $as repeated in the first paragraph of theComplaint.Paragraph B defined the business G"R?/ 0TRPR+

undertakes. Paragraph @ continued $ith the allegation that the defendant leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle that $as thereafter described. ignificantly, theComplaint specifies and attaches as its integral part the ease "greement that underliesthe transaction bet$een the plaintiff and the defendant. "gain, the name G"R?/0TRPR+ entered the picture as this ease "greement provides

 This agreement, made and entered into by and bet$een ?00 /. ?/, of legal age, married, $ith post office

address at 555, herein referred to as the /R-RH '&'4(: BARGO ENTER#RISES 4 (4 M:', 

555 

thus, e5pressly pointing to G"R?/ 0TRPR+ as the principal that ?lenn /. ?orepresented. +n other $ords, by the e5press terms of this ease "greement, ?lenn ?odid sign the agreement only as the manager of Gargo nterprises and the latter is clearlythe real party to the lease agreements.

 "s 0avarro correctly points out, Gargo nterprises is a sole proprietorship,

$hich is neither a natural person, nor a %uridical person, as defined by "rticle ## of theCivil Code

 "rt. ##. The follo$ing are %uridical persons 91: The tate and its political subdivisionsH9B: /ther corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or 

 purpose, created by la$H their personality begins as soon as theyhave been constituted according to la$H

9@: Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interestor purpose to $hich the la$ grants a %uridical personality,separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

 

Thus, pursuant to ection 1, Rule @ of the Rules, I1(J Gargo nterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. This legal reality leads to the Auestion $ho then is the proper party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Gargo nterprisesM

 7e faced a similar Auestion in  $uasin# ar"5are v. Men"oza,I1)J $he