rule 111 cases prosecution of civil action

7/24/2019 Rule 111 Cases Prosecution of Civil Action

1/32

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,vs.

HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court,Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners.Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J .:

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over

a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaintwith the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refundon a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against privaterespondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file therequired answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminaryattachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, andthereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint

sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidateddamages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in thecomplaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from thebody of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which promptedpetitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent JudgeJose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the recordsof said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket feeswere transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial courtwith the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of

Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was thenvacant.

On October 15, 1985, the Court en bancissued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case ofdeficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issuecertificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in theirpleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.


2/32

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 wastemporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificateof assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to includethe same in said certificate.

On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On

August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the twoadditional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, afterhis assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring theparties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty incomplying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed byprivate respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23,1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein aclaim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In thebody of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual andcompensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amendedcomplaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolutionof this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for thereassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on privaterespondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said orderof Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additionalclaim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. OnOctober 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the privaterespondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as itseeks annulment of the order

(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and

(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to theportion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiringthe Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid byprivate respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2

Hence, the instant petition.


3/32

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondentcourt, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lowercourt did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment ofthe correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private

respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, andconsidering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplementalcomplaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent isP257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaintshould be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of theirtheory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs.CA, 4as follows:

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of theprescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will notthereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket feebased on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the

Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement isoverturned and reversed.

On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchestercannot applyretroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there wasno such Manchesterruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable isthe ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete,5wherein this Court held that the trial courtacquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutesregulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense andto that extent. 6

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres,7this Court held that the payment of the full amount of thedocket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry anddetainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a

judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but hedeposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementaryperiod of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited theadditional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On thebasis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction tohear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, 8the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipinocitizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but therequired filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition forcitizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legalrequirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the filing of thepetition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner'sdeclaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing feewas paid on May 23, 1956.


4/32

In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It wasan original petition forquo warrantocontesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates whichwas mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week periodafter the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10However, the required docket fees werepaid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of suchpayment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when

it was mailed.

Again, inGarica vs, Vasquez,11this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paidbefore a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is notapplicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is notrequired to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated inthe same special proceeding then pending before the same court.

Then in Magaspi, 12this Court reiterated the ruling in MalimitandLee that a case is deemedfiled only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Saidcase involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land withdamages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket

fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. Theprayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of thedefendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as ownerthereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthlyrentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff,P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of theaction and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docketfee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recoveryof a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amountof P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as

filing fee.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as thedefendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought waseliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine,attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition tothe amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admittedby the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket feewhich plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid thetotal docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must bebased on the amended complaint.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filedthe case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi,We reiterated the rulethat the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket feeregardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference ofopinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be onefor the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is alsoone, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the


5/32

damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court whichwas based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.

However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves anaction for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of atemporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question,the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgmentthat may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants toexecute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegalforfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay theplaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% ofsaid amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked thetrial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficientfor purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damagessought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amountof over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket feebased on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is notcapable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaintas well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus,this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against theamount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer ofthe complaint.

Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint onSeptember 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of theamount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was

maintained.

On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said caseand other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed theplaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for.This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged wasreduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Saidamended complaint was admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of thedocket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court didnot acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neithercan the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legalpurposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings andactions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment ofdocket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts andcircumstances of this case are similar toManchester. In the body of the original complaint, the


6/32

total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount ofdamages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and theissuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 waspaid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaintwherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual andexemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is

approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the privaterespondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of notless than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additionalclaim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After thepromulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein privaterespondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency ofthis petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondentpaid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paida total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the

amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insiststhat private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and theintent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of theoriginal complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case wasdecided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on thegovernment, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case andthat the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaintwas null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlikeManchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by payingthe additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester musthave had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket feeas ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting hiswillingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficientconsidering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lowercourt and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment ofthe prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter ornature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment ofthe docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no casebeyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.


7/32

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. Thecourt may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyondits applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading

and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim notspecified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be theresponsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assessand collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court aquois hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paidby private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaintand the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereofand to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as tocosts.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[G.R. No. 115683. July 26, 1996]

DELIA MANUEL, petitioner, vs. JUDGE DAVID ALFECHE, JR., in his capacity as thenPresiding Judge of RTC, Region Six, Branch 15, Roxas City, FELIPE CELINO,DANNY FAJARDO and LEMUEL FERNANDEZ, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted unless thecomplainant waives it, or reserves the right to institute it separately or files it prior to thecriminal.Where the trial court renders a judgment finding the accused guilty of libel, but motu

proprio dismisses complainant's claims for, inter alia, moral and exemplary damages on theground of complainant's failure to pay the filing fees therefor, may the complainant raise the

matter via a petition for review on certiorari directly before this Court, while the judgment ofconviction is on appeal before the Court of Appeals? This is the main question brought beforethis Court in this petition to set aside a portion of the Decision[1]of the respondent judge dated

April 21, 1994 in Criminal Case No. 3539 as well as the Order[2]of the same court dated May27, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The Facts
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn1


8/32

On January 9, 1992, the City Prosecutor of the City of Roxas filed with the Regional TrialCourt, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 15, Roxas City an Information [3]for libel worded as follows:

That on or about the period September 20-22, 1991, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, FELIPE CELINO, being then thewriter/author; DANNY FAJARDO, Editor-in-Chief, LEMUEL T. FERNANDEZ, Associate Editor;

and JOHN PAUL TIA, Assistant Editor of a regional newspaper known as Panay News whichhas considerable circulation in Panay Island and throughout Western Visayas, including RoxasCity and Capiz Province, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeachingthe integrity, credibility, honor, and reputation of DELIA MANUEL, and with the further maliciousintent (to expose) DELIA MANUEL to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, prepare,write, arrange, and publish, or cause to be prepared, written, arranged and published in theregular issue of the said Panay News for the period September 20-22, 1991, as Article in thefront page and/or headline entitled LOCAL SHABU PEDDLER NOW A MILLIONAIREthe text ofwhich is quoted hereunder:

LOCAL SHABU PEDDLER NOW A MILLIONAIRE

BY: FELIPE V. CELINO

ROXAS CITY - A middle-aged woman here has joined the ranks of millionaires after severalyears of selling shabu in the island of Panay.

Named by Narcom agents as "Delia" this woman is the alleged "shabu Queen" in WesternVisayas and has been (raking) in millions of pesos since she started peddling shabu, marijuanaand other prohibited drugs in this part of the country.

According to reliable sources, Delia has been transporting about 750 grams of shabu weekly

from Manila to Panay. A gram of this poor man's Cocaine has a street value of P1,000 more orless.

What makes her business prosper almost unscathed and very productive is the protectionprovided her by a top ranking military officer in Manila, they said.

At present, the (sources) said, the shabu Queen is residing near one of the private schools inthis City. She has three brand new cars. Her house's outside walls are made of bamboo but it isfully air-conditioned and complete with luxurious household appliances, PN sources added.

In Iloilo, Delia is known as "Madam-Ex". She doesn't deal with small time users. "Shespecializes in deals with scions of rich businessmen and even local politicians."

The Narcom has allegedly been monitoring the activities of the shabu queen but has not nailedher down yet because of lack of cooperation from the public.

which newspaper issues containing the abovequoted article were sent and circulated to, orcaused to be sent or circulated to, and actually read by subscribers and other readers,especially those in the City of Roxas and Province of Capiz.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn3


9/32

That said accused intended to convey, as in fact (have) actually conveyed in said article, falseimputations and malicious insinuations against the said DELIA MANUEL, that is, that said DeliaManuel is the alleged "SHABU QUEEN" in Western Visayas and has been raking in millions ofpesos since she started peddling shabu, marijuana and other prohibited drugs in this part of thecountry, with no good intention or justifiable motives, thereby (unjustly) and unlawfullybesmirching the good name, character, and reputation of said Delia Manuel as a private person

and as a businesswoman.

That as a direct consequence of the publication of the said article, said Delia Manuel sufferedactual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of TEN MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00).(Italics supplied)

After trial, the respondent judge rendered the assailed Decision finding three of the accusedguilty and acquitting a fourth. However, "(t)he civil indemnity by way of moral damages (was)dismissed for lack of jurisdiction" on the ground that petitioner did not pay the filing feestherefor. In the words of the respondent court:

x x x, close scrutiny of the record disclose that while the offended party seeks to enforce civil

liability against the accused by way of moral damages in the amount of P10,000,000.00 which isalleged in the information, there was no payment of the filing fees corresponding thereto at thetime of the filing of the information on January 9, 1992. For failing on this requisite, the court didnot acquire jurisdiction on the civil indemnity thus claimed. Hence, the claim for recovery ofmoral damages by the offended party is dismissed."

The respondent court cited General vs. Claravall[4]in support of its action.

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner sought to overturn the above dismissal viathe instant petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45.

The Issues

Petitioner argues that "under the new Rules on Criminal Procedure x x x the filing fees,when moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages are claimed in the criminal case, shallconstitute a first lien in the judgment, and thus need not be paid upon the filing of theinformation, (and therefore) the filing fees herein was (sic) not assessed by the Clerk of Court,nor paid by herein petitioner at the time of the filing of the information." Petitioner further insiststhat "it is only when the amount of damages other than actual, has been specified in theinformation that the filingfees is (sic) required to be paid upon the filing of the information, x x xand that since in (this) case the amount of damages stated in the information partakes firstly ofactual damages and is not entirely other than actual, then this case does not fall under the lastpar. of Sec. 1, Rule 111" of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In their comment and subsequently in their memorandum, private respondents counter that

the present petition is erroneously filed. As the questioned Decision is a final judgment, theappropriate remedy would have been ordinary appeal, not appeal by certiorari. They also arguethat "(t)he present petition is pre-mature because the questioned decision is pending appealwith the Honorable Court of Appeals. x x x (I)f the questioned decision be reversed ahead bythe Court of Appeals x x x (there) would then be no more basis for the present petition." Theaccused - herein private respondents - had gone to the Court of Appeals seeking a reversal ofthe judgment of conviction.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn4


10/32

The Court 's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

While petitioner may be correct in asserting that a direct petition may, under appropriatecircumstances, be taken to this Court from the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court on purequestions of law in the form and manner provided for in the Revised Rules of

Court,[5]nevertheless, in view of the factual environment of this case, particularly that privaterespondents herein had already taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals to question the trialcourt's judgment of conviction, the proper remedy for petitioner is simply ordinary appeal to thesaid tribunal.

This is so because the award of moral and exemplary damages by the trial court isinextricably linked to and necessarily dependent upon the factual finding of basis therefor, viz.,the existence of the crime of libel. Inasmuch as the very same Decision herein assailed isalready pending review by the Court of Appeals, there is a distinct possibility that said courtmay, if the facts and the law warrant, reverse the trial court and acquit the accused. In suchevent, the appellate court's action could collide with a ruling finding merit in petitioner'scontentions before this Court. Such a situation would lead to absurdity and confusion in the

ultimate disposition of the case. Obviously, this possibility must be avoided at all cost. This is (atleast partly) theraison d'etre for the rule against forum-shopping.[6]Clearly, then, petitioner oughtto have brought her challenge in the Court of Appeals.

In connection with the foregoing discussion, we note petitioner's vehement insistence thatArt. 33 of the Civil Code allows an independent civil action for damages in cases of defamation,fraud, and physical injuries to be instituted separately and independently from the criminal. Shethen concludes that the civil aspect of the case is not dependent on the criminal, but rather, mayproceed independently thereof, and that therefore, the review of the civil aspect by this Courtmay take place simultaneously with and separately from the review of the criminal aspect by theCourt of Appeals.

Such reasoning is misplaced. Sec. 1 of Rule 111 provides that the civil action for recovery

of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives thecivil action prior to the criminal action. In the present case, the civil action had been actually (not

just impliedly) instituted with the criminal prosecution, as shown by the fact that petitioner tookan active part in the prosecution of the criminal case. As admitted in the petition, "the privateprosecutor, counsel for x x x the petitioner herein" was allowed "upon prior authority and underthe supervision of the City Prosecutor, to handle the prosecution, by presenting all theprosecution's evidence" and even filing the Prosecution's Memorandum.Obviously then, therecan no longer be any independent civil action to speak of, as the civil aspect had previouslybeen included in the criminal. And petitioner, by attempting to have recourse to this Court withthe criminal aspect still pending with the Court of Appeals, was effectively trying to split a singlecause of action. This we cannot allow.

Petitioner also posits the non-necessity of paying the filing and docket fees by reason of the

non-specification of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages being claimed by her,purportedly on the authority of this Court's ruling in General vs. Claravall (supra). For the sake ofclarity, we quote from General:

"This Court's plain intent - to make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees atthe time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions underSection 1, Rule 111only when 'the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn5


11/32

complaint or information' - has thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatoryprovisions (adopted by this Court with effect on October 1, 1988).

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity andcertainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action isdeemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the

Rules of Court - because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved theright to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action -the rule isas follows:

1) when the 'amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information'filed in court, then 'the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon thefiling thereof in Court for trial;

2) in any other case, however - i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in thecomplaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shallsimply 'constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages.

We hold that said General ruling, especially the last subparagraph above-quoted, wasactually intended to apply to a situation wherein either (i) the judgment awards a claim notspecified in the pleading, or (ii) the complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperateand/or nominal damages but has not specified ANY amount at all, leaving the quantificationthereof entirely to the trial court's discretion,[7]and NOT to a situation where the litigant specifiessome amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the different types ofdamages sought be not separately or individually quantified. Were we to hold otherwise, theresult would be to permit litigants to continue availing of one more loophole in the rule onpayment of filing fees, and would not serve to attain the purpose of the revised Sec. 1 of Rule111, which is "to discourage the 'gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's office toinclude in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions ofpesos without paying any filing fees.[8]

WHEREFORE, for utter lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, andFrancisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980

FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,vs.SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:

Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1as it involves pure legal questions.

On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the ownerand operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jul1996/115683.htm#_edn7


12/32

alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendozawas driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, CamarinesSur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the residential house and store ofplaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damageto plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by reason thereof he becamedestitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly

income of P300.00.

The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court ofNabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed thedismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute acivil action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.

The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, thedispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the defendants to payjointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the lossof the store including the merchandise for sale therein, the residential house ofmixed materials, furnitures, clothing and households fixtures; (b) ordering thesaid defendants to pay jointly and severally P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969which represents plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the whole amountof P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an amount equivalent to20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff, plus the costs of this suit.

Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default"was denied.

Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R)they urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3,providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot beinstituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally, theycontended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error inholding them jointly and severally liable.

On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure questionsof law.

We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs.Garcia, et al., 2that:

A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and theresponsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The same negligent actcausing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delitoor culpaextracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free tochoose which remedy to enforce.


13/32

Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case of his right to institute a civilaction separately is quoted hereunder in full:

UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before this HonorableCourt respectfully alleges:

1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police included in thecomplaint the claim of the undersigned for civil liability;

2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil action fordamages, docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Sur, against accused herein and his employer;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of recordtherein and that the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be not included herein.

xxx xxx xxx 3

The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict.This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employeerelationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were causedby the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross negligence andimprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the safetyof persons and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable fordamages. These are, basically, what should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4

As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict,he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of acriminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict.5And

the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of the resultof the criminal case, 6except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act orcommission of the defendant. 7

The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, whichshould be suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, andnot the civil action based on quasi-delict orculpa aquiliana.

We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence inrecklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza,is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of hisemployer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which

explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees andhousehold helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even thoughthe former are not engaged in any business or industry.

For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in theselection and supervision of this employee, 8he is likewise responsible for the damages caused


14/32

by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary andsolidary.

... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180,Civil Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict)caused damage to make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act

of the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary 9

But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer maydemand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will haveto pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40336 October 24, 1975

LAMBERTO V. TORRIJOS, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Alexander H. Brillantes and Romulo R. Candoy for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M.

Kapunan and Solicitor Simfronio I. Ancheta for respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the order of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 20,1975.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Wakat Diamnuan and his wife were the registered owners of one-fourth share of a parcel of landcontaining an area of 39.9643 hectares situated in Sitio Cacuban, Barrio Gumatdang, Pitogon,Benguet, covered by OCT No. O-36, issued in their names and in the names of KangiErangyas, and the heirs of Komising Tagle, who owned the remaining portions.

On May 11, 1968, Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold their one-fourth share in favor of petitionerTorrijos for P7,493.00. the deed of sale, however, was refused registration because Torrijos,who produced OCT No. O-36, did not have the copies thereof held by the other co-owners,Kangi Erangyas and heirs of Komising Tagle.


15/32

In 1969, the entire property, together with the share of Wakat Diamnuan and his wife, was soldto Victor de Guia for P189,379.50. Hence, Torrijos prosecuted Wakat Diamnuan for estafabefore the Baguio Court of First Instance, docketed as Criminal Case No. 70 entitled "People ofthe Philippines versus Wakat Diamnuan."

After trial, the trial Judge convicted the accused in a decision dated January 17, 1973

sentencing him to an imprisonment of 3 months ofarresto mayor, to pay a fine of P7,493.00with subsidiary imprisonment, to indemnify petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum ofP7,493.00and to pay the costs. The trial Judge added as the second paragraph of thedispositive portion of the decision that "Whatever damages may have been suffered by Torrijosbefore the Deed of Sale in favor of Victor de Guia was made by the accused and his co-ownersmay be the subject of some other action, perhaps civil, but not in this case."

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by complainant Torrijos, in an order dated March 5, 1973,the trial court modified its decision by increasing the indemnity in favor of Torrijos fromP7,493.00 to P25,000.00 and the fine from P7,493.00 to P25,000.00..

On March 7, 1973, the accused filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of March 5,1973, which was denied by the court a quoin an order dated April 11, 1973. Thereafter, theaccused appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On August 5, 1973, the accused died, for which reason his counsel moved to dismiss theappeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that thedeath of a convict extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the "pecuniarypenalties" as long as the death occurs before final judgment.

Complainant Torrijos opposed the said motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that the term"pecuniary penalty" should not include civil liability in favor of the offended party, which wasdecreed by the trial court in this case, as the civil action therefor was not reserved, much lessfiled separately from the criminal action.

The respondent Court of Appeals sustained the motion, which is shared by the SolicitorGeneral, and forth with issued the challenged order dated February 20, 1975 dismissing theappeal.

Hence, this petition.

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminalliability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis.Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminalresponsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,ipso factoextinguishes the former, provided,

of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply ininstant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself butfrom a civil contract of purchase and sale. The estafa or swindle existed only after thesubsequent sale by the accused of the same interest in favor of Victor de Guia. There was nocrime of estafa until the accused re-sold the same property to another individual about 5 yearsafter the first sale to Torrijos. If the accused did not comply with the sale he executed in favor ofTorrijos in 1964, after his receipt of the purchase price from Torrijos, but before the second saleto Victor de Guia in 1969, there is no question that the accused would be merely civilly liableeither through an action by Torrijos for specific performance with damages or for rescission of


16/32

contract also with damages. If rescission were pursued by the first vendee, the vendor would beliable to refund the purchase price as well as be responsible in damages. Consequently, in thecase at bar, the civil liability of the accused survives his death; because death is not a validcause for the extinguishment of civil obligations.

Thus, WE held that, despite the acquittal based on death for the crime of homicide or physical

injuries or damage to property through reckless imprudence, notwithstanding the absence ofany reservation to file a civil action, such acquittal does not preclude the offended party frompursuing a civil action for damages based on tort orculpa aquiliana. And the civil action basedon tort or contract need not be reserved (Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et. al., 91 Phil. 972;Dionisio, et al. vs. Alvendia, et. al., 102 Phil. 443, 445-447; Chan vs. Yatco, L-11162, April30,1958; Capuno vs. Pepsi Cola, 13 SCRA 658).

Then again, Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code on human relations establish the civilliability of the accused in this particular case independently of his criminal liability, despite hisdeath before final conviction.

Article 19 directs that "every person must, in the exercise of his right and the performance of hisduties, act with justice, give anymore his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Theaccused in the case at bar, by executing a second sale of the property which he already sold tothe offended party, certainly did not observe honesty nor good faith, much less act with justiceto the complaining witness.

Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causesdamage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same." Certainly in deliberately sellingagain the same property to another person after he had sold the same to the offended party, theaccused willfully or intentionally inflicted damage on the offended party, to whom indemnificationtherefor shall be made by him.

Article 21 states that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner thatis contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, shall compensate the latter for thedamage." It is patent that the act of the accused in the case at bar in alienating the sameproperty which he already sold to the complainant, has violated all the rules of morality andgood customs. Hence, he should be answerable to the offended party for the injury thus causedto him. Even if the moral wrong or injury does not constitute a violation of the statute, his civilliability under this article subsists (Velayo vs. Shell Co., 100 Phil. 186). In the instant case, thewrong committed by the accused is a breach of statutory as well as moral law, for there wasdeceit perpetrated on both the first and second vendees.

Consequently, while the death of the accused here inextinguished his criminal liability includingfine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations aforecited, remains.

Moreover, in "People of the Philippine, plaintiff and appellee. Nicolas Manuel, aggrieved oroffended party-appellant, vs. Celestino Coloma, defendant and appellee, "WE ruled that acriminal case may be reopened in order that the offended party can prove damages, althoughthe decision therein convicting the accused had already become final and made no award of thedamages upon the ground that the information failed to allege any damages suffered; or theaggrieved party may appeal from an unsatisfactory award, as long as he did not reserve hisright to file a separate civil action or has not waived his right to civil indemnity arising from theoffense (105 Phil. 1287-1288; see also People vs. Rodriguez, 97 Phil. 349; People vs. Ursua,


17/32

60 Phil. 252; People vs. Celorico, 67 Phil. 185). In said Coloma case, Chief Justice, thenAssociate Justice, Roberto Concepcion, stated the rationale, thus:

... every criminal case involves two actions, one criminal and another civil. Froma judgment convicting the accused, two appeal may, accordingly, be taken. Theaccused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both actions. Similarly,

the complainant may appeal, with respect only to the civil action, either becausethe lower court has refused or failed to award damages, or because the awardmade is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal, in theevent of conviction of the accused, is not dependent upon the other. Thecomplainant may not, by expressing his conformity to the award of damages,prevent the accused from appealing, either from said award or, from the

judgment of conviction. Neither may the accused, by acquiescing thereto,prevent the complainant from appealing therefrom, insofar as the civil liability isconcerned. Upon the other hand, an appeal by the complainant, with respect tothe aforementioned civil liability, would not impose upon the accused the legalobligation to appeal. He may choose not to appeal from the judgment ofconviction, and, hence, the same may become final and executory, and may be

fully executed, without prejudice to the aforementioned appeal taken by thecomplainant. In the language of this Court, in People vs. Ursua (60 Phil. 252,254-255):

The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in itsprosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of theaccused (section 107, General Orders No. 58), necessarily impliesthat such right is protected in the same manner as the right of theaccused to his defense. If the accused has the right within fifteendays to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended partyshould have the right within the same period to appeal before somuch of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal

should not be made dependent on that of the accused. If uponappeal by the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdictionover the case, the offended party would be deprived of his right toappeal, although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the dateof the judgment, if the accused files his appeal before theexpiration of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently ofthe appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days fromthe date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party,it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsiderationfiled by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liabilityof the accused.

The case of People vs. Rodriguez(decided on July 29, 1955) is, even more, inpoint. The facts therein were: On March 24, 1952, Rodriguez was convicted ofabduction with consent and sentenced accordingly. Thereupon, he commencedto serve the sentence. Three days later, the complainant moved that he beordered to indemnify her. On April 5, the court granted this motion and orderedRodriguez to pay her P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency. On May 7, the corresponding writ of execution was issued, and onMay 12, the sheriff levied upon a house of the defendant, who, subsequently,


18/32

asked the court to set aside its order on April 5 and said writ of execution. Thispetition was granted on August 9 upon the ground that the judgment rendered onMarch 24, 1952 became final on that date, he having immediately begun to servehis sentence, and that, hence, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the order of

April 5, granting indemnity to the offended party. In a unanimous decision,penned by Mr. Justice Padilla, we held, after quoting fromPeople vs.

Ursua, supra, that the trial court had retained its jurisdiction over the civil phaseof the case, despite service of the penalty meted out to the accused, and that noerror had been committed, in the order of April 5,1952, in ordering him toindemnify the offended party in the amount of P1,000.00, before the expiration ofthe fifteen (15) days period provided for the appeal.

Referring now to the issue raised by the appeal of complainant herein, it will berecalled that, in order to justify the absence of an award for damages in itsdecision of conviction, the lower court said therein that "the information failed toallege any damages suffered." This was the very reason by the lower court inPeople vs. Celorico (67 Phil. 185, 186), in refusing to allow the prosecution toprove damages, which was eventually declared erroneous, for the reason that:

"Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art.100, Revised Penal Code). The civil liability of the accused isdetermined in the criminal action, unless the injured partyexpressly waives such liability or reserves his right to have civildamages determined in a separate action. (Art. 112, SpanishCode of Criminal Procedure in relation to sec. 107 of GeneralOrders No. 58; vide, also, U.S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil. 600, and casestherein cited.) Here, there was no waiver or reservation of civilliability, and evidence should have been allowed to establish theextent of the injuries by the offended party and to recover thesame, if proven." (Emphasis ours.)

To repeat, the offended parties in the Coloma and Rodriguez cases were allowed to appealdespite the fact that the decision of conviction had already become final and had beenexecuted, either because the accused had fully served the sentence or was then servingsentence; and the names of the offended parties were included in the title of said cases.

In the case at bar, there is greater reason to allow the appeal to proceed with respect to the civilliability of the accused as the judgment of conviction did not become final by reason of theappeal of the accused, who died during the pendency of the appeal.

Finally, Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides that if defendant diesbefore the final judgment in the Court of First Instance, an action for the recovery of money,debt or interest thereon "shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner specially providedin these rules," meaning the claim should be presented in the testate or intestate proceedingsover the estate of the deceased. The implication is that if death supervenes after the judgmentof the Court of First Instance but pending appeal in the appellate court, the action for therecovery of money may not be dismissed. In such case, the name of the offended party shall beincluded in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representatives or the heirs ofthe deceased accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants.


19/32

Consequently, the appeal in the case at bar should proceed with respect to the right of petitionerherein as offended party in the criminal case to recover the civil liability in the amount ofP25,000.00 awarded by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 20, 1975 IS HEREBY SETASIDE, THE APPEAL SHALL PROCEED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF CIVIL

LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT, AND THE TITLE OF THE CASE SHALLINCLUDE THE NAME OF PETITIONER AS OFFENDED PARTY OR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

AND THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OR HEIRS OF THE DECEASED ACCUSEDSUBSTITUTED AS DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. NO COSTS.

Teehankee, Actg. (Chairman), Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Muoz Palma, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-13134 February 13, 1960

MARIA C. ROA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.SEGUNDA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.

Felimon Cajator for appellant.Valeriano Silva and Abel de Ocera for appellees.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Direct appeal to this Court from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga dismissing

plaintiff's complaint for damages upon defendants' motion on the ground that it was barred byprior judgment.

The facts are not disputed. In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the court below, Segunda de la Cruz,one of herein defendants, was charged with serious oral defamation. The offended party, hereinplaintiff Maria C. Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve her right to institute it, butintervened through counsel in the prosecution of the offense. After trial, the court on April 30,1957 rendered a decision finding the defendant Segunda de la Cruz guilty of slight slander andsentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00. It, likewise, ordered her to suffer subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs, but made no award as to damages.

About a month later, or on May 28, 1957, the offended party Maria C. Roa filed the present

action in the same court below against Segunda de la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas torecover moral and exemplary damages. The cause of action was based on the defamatoryremarks which were the subject matter of the criminal action against Segunda de la Cruz. Theaggregate amount sought to be recovered, including attorney's fees, was P28,000.00.

Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the groundsthat it was barred by prior judgment and that it did not state a cause of action. Sustaining the


20/32

motion on the first ground, the court below dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff in due time filed amotion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.

Article 33 of the new Civil Code provides:

Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injuredparty. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shallrequire only a preponderance of evidence.

Under the above provisions, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for therecovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is apparent,however, from the use of the words "may be", that the institution of such suit is optional. (AnOutline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R. C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54.) In other words, thecivil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings ifthe offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute aseparate civil action against the defendant.1(Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz.,[25] 4633.).

In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa upon whose initiative thecriminal action for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed did notreserve her right to institute an independent civil action. Instead, she chose to intervene in thecriminal proceedings as private prosecutor through counsel employed by her. Such intervention,as observed by the court below, could only be for the purpose of claiming damages orindemnity, and not to secure the conviction and punishment of the accused therein as plaintiffnow pretends. This must be so because an offended party in a criminal case may intervene,personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense, only if he has not waived the civilaction or expressly reserved his right to institute it, subject, always, to the direction and controlof the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court;Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197.) The reason of the law in not permitting the offendedparty to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right toinstitute the civil action is that by such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared.Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al. vs.Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [5] 2526.) The rule, therefore, is that the right ofintervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liabilityborn of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People vs. Orais, 65Phil., 744; People vs. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People vs. Flores et al., G. R. No. L-7528,December 18, 1957; see also U.S. vs. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600.).

Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal casethrough her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor, we hold that the final judgmentrendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based upon the samecause. (See Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.)

. . . A judgment upon the merit bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, brought ina different form of action, and party, therefore, cannot by varying the form of action oradopting a different method of presenting his case escape the operation of the principlethat one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. (Francisco vs. Blas, etal., 93 Phil., 1.).


21/32

The fact that there is no claim or allegation of damages in the complaint or information is nolegal consequence. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art. 100,Revised Penal Code.) It has, therefore, been held that even if the complaint or information issilent as to damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is still liable for them,and the offended has the right to prove and claim for them in the criminal case, unless a waiveror the reservation of the civil action is made, (People vs. Oraza, 83 Phil., 633; 46 Off. Gaz.

Supp. No. 11, p. 86.) As already stated, herein plaintiff not only did not waive or reserve herright to file a separate civil action but actually intervened in the criminal action.

The criminal court, it is true, did not enter a judgment for indemnity when it was duty bound todo so because of the intervention of the offended party. (See People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil., 253.) Itwould appear, however, that plaintiff failed to submit evidence of her damages. For such failure,she has only herself or her counsel to blame. Of course, she could have still filed a motion forreconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But this she failed to do, thus allowing thedecision to become final and executory. Under the principle of res judicata, that judgment isconclusive as to future proceedings at law not only as to every matter which was offered andreceived to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter that could havebeen offered for that purpose. (Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil., 526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366;

NAMARCO vs. Judge Macadaeg, 98 Phil., 185; 52 Off. Gaz. 182.)

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. Withoutpronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,Endencia, and Barrera, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner,

vs.HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, 'Vacation' Judge of RTC, BRANCH 170, Malabon,Metro Manila, and SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI and DANILO MALICSI, respondents.

Leodegario A. Barayang, Sr. for petitioner.

PATAJO, J:

This is a direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Trial Court ofMalabon, Metro Manila dated July 30, 1985 dismissing upon motion of the defendant Civil Case

No. 357-MN.

In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, CristinaMalicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein wasZenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was representedby a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and wassentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved partywas unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able tomake a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a


22/32

new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damagesarising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi which was the subjectof the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor. Said case is Civil Case No.357-MN.

At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal

case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right to file aseparate action for damages. She further admitted that the appearance of said privateprosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages against the accused. After said admissionmade by plaintiff, the parties agreed to have the Court rule on the question of whether or notplaintiff by her being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case and her failing tomake a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred from filing a separate civilaction for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi.

On said issue, the Court a quoruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally upon Roa vs.dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed the case. It said:

There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in casesof fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, and suchaction shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall requireonly a preponderance of evidence Art. 33, New Civil Code). In such cases, theinjured party need not make a reservation in the criminal case for the filing of thecivil action for damages, for the Civil Code already grants or reserves to him thatright, so that his failure to reserve such right in the criminal case does not bar himfrom filing a separate civil action for damages (Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA113; Garcia v. Flerido, 52 SCRA 420). This is true even if Sec. 2 of Rule 111 ofthe former Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Revised Rules of Court (the ruleapplicable herein) required a reservation in the criminal case, because the CivilCode does not require such reservation, and the Rules of Court, being merely

procedural, can not amend the Civil Code which is substantive in nature(Mendoza v. Arrieta and Garcia v. Flerido, supra).

There is, however, an exception to the above rule; namely, when the offendedparty actually intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through aprivate prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he isdeemed to have waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if hefailed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court did not enter a judgmentfor civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the offendedparty failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motionfor reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgmentbecomes res judicata, and an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the NewCivil Code cannot be brought by said offended party anymore (Roa v. de la Cruz,107 Phil. 8; Azucena v. Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468).

We, however, believe that there are demonstrable material differences between the facts in theRoa case and the present case which would make the decision in the Roacase inapplicable inthe present case as precedent. In theRoacase there was a fall-blown hearing where a privateprosecutor participated actively and there could, therefore, be no question that the aggrievedparty's participation through the private prosecutor in said case clearly indicated her intention to


23/32

have her claim for damages litigated in the criminal action against the accused. It was only afterthe trial of the case on the merits that a decision was rendered finding the accused guilty ofslight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 but making no award of damages infavor of the aggrieved party. The reason for the Court's not making any award of damages isbecause of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit evidence to support her claim fordamages. The Court said that by such failure she had only herself or her counsel to blame.

Neither did she file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court nor appealtherefrom to rectify the Court's failure to award damages in her favor. The decision of the Courthad, therefore, become final and any action to be filed by her for damages arising from thesame criminal act of the accused would already be barred on ground of res judicata.

In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the criminalcase against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor, wasrepresented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea ofguilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 preventedpetitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civilaction. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA 454, and it is theruling in the said case rather than the Roacase which is controlling in the present case, Like in

the present case in the Menesescase the aggrieved party was also represented by a privateprosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused upon arraignment pleadedguilty. Distinguishing said case from Roa vs. dela Cruz, the Court said:

The issue now before us is whether or not the rule laid down in the Roa caseshould govern this one. We are of the opinion that there is a demonstrablematerial difference between the circumstances of the two cases. In the first notonly was the offended party represented by a private prosecutor in the criminalaction but the action went through trial on the merits. In fact it was the privateprosecutor who actually handled the case. He therefore had sufficient opportunityto claim and prove damages, for which purpose alone, according to the decisionof this Court, has active intervention was allowed. For if that had not been the

purpose, or if the offended party had reserved the right to file a separate civilaction, such intervention would not have been justified.

In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed totrial, as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of privatecounsel in representation of the offended party did not constitute such activeintervention as could only import an intention to press a claim for damages in thesame action. It is as reasonable to indulge the possibility that the privateprosecutors appeared precisely to be able to make a seasonable reservation ofthe right to file a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary at the timewould nevertheless have been the prudent and practical thing to do for thepurpose of better protecting the interest of their clients. But as matters turned out,

the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced.Thereafter there was no chance to enter such a reservation in the record.

We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to claim damages shouldnecessarily be foreclosed by the fact at best equivocal as to its purpose thatprivate prosecutors entered their appearance at the very inception of theproceeding, which was then cut short at that stage. It cannot be said with anyreasonable certainty that plaintiffs had thereby committed themselves to the


24/32

submission of their action for damages in that action. The rule laid down in Roavs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern this case. The ends of justice will bebetter served if plaintiffs are given their day in court. (pp. 457-458)

Upon authority, therefore, ofMeneses vs. LuatWe find and so hold that the mere appearance ofa private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not

necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only importan intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of herright to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty uponarraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party topresent evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record tofile a separate civil action.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did notforeclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the CivilCode there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action fordamages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and suchreservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding.Mendoza vs.

Arrieta,91 SCRA 113, where this Court, quoting from Garcia vs. Flerido,52 SCRA 420, said:

. . . Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32,33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions tothe general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, whichis procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment ofsubstantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide forthe reservation required in the proviso.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition andordering respondent Court to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 357-MN, with costsagainst private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,vs.HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis

Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:

A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of therespondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay supportpendente liteto


25/32

private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same respondent Judge,dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the action for legalseparation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondentJudge from further hearing and trying the case.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presidedover by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground ofconcubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This case was docketed asCivil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal TrialCourt, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketedon 23 October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application for theprovisional remedy of supportpendente lite,pending a decision in the action for legalseparation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent

judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of supportpendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidentsconsequent thereto, such as, application for supportpendente lite,should be suspended in view

of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent. In support of hiscontention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, whichstates:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended partyshall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from theoffense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall beobserved:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arisingfrom the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .

The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's positionthat such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, sothat all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction oracquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position is this Court's decisionin the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1

Petitioner's contention is not correct.

In Jerusalem,the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legalseparation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec.

1 of Rule 107 of the thenprovisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:

Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwiseprovided by law, the following rules shall he observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liabilityarising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right toinstitute it separately;


26/32

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be institutedseparately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(c)After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from thesame offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever

stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has beenrendered... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to besuspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liabilityarising from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceedahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil actionis notone "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminalactions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtainthe right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of theconjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting

from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge inhis Order dated 5 August 1987:

The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI ofAntique, et al., L-11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. Itapplied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, whichreads:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil actionarising from the same offense can be prosecutedand the sameshall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final

judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.(Emphasis supplied)

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to"civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the firstparagraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arisingfrom the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for therecovery of civil liability arising from t

rule 111 cases prosecution of civil action

Documents