G.R. No. 86792 March 21, 1990

SPOUSES MARINO AND LINA JOEL SAPUGAY,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MOBIL PHILIPPINES, INC. AND RICARDO CARDENAS,respondents.

Cuesta, Bermudez & Associates for petitioners.

Camacho & Associates for Mobil Phils., Inc.

REGALADO,JFor review in this petition is the decision1of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07614 thereof, dated November 11, 1988, deleting the award made by the courta quo2for rental, storage and guarding fees and unrealized profits, the reduction of the other damages granted, and the exclusion and exclupation from liability of respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas, as well as the resolution3of respondent court of January 30, 1989 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The following facts, culled from respondent court's decision and sustained by the evidence opf record, are adopted by us in our adjudication:

1. On September 27, 1982, plaintiff Mobil Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint for replevin with damages against defendant Lina Joel Sapugay before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint,which was duly amended on October 11, 1982 alleges the following: that upon the termination of the Dealership Agreement between Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and Nemar Marketing Corporation, defendant applied to the plaintiff to become a dealer of the latter's products; that pending consideration of the dealership application, plaintiff loaned to the defendant the properties installed in the premises of Nemar at Sto. Tomas, Batangas, valued at P1,500,000.00; that for a period of three (3) months from the date of application, defendant failed to secure and file the required surety bond, compelling plaintiff to reject defendant's application and the return and redelivery of the aforementioned properties; that defendant refused to return said equipments, and demanded instead that defendant be paid first the sum of P15,000.00 daily as rental and guard's fees from June 8, 1982 up to the day of actual pull-out. Thus, plaintiff prays for the return of said properties or its value including damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

2. On October 12, 1982, the lower court issued an order for thdggfvb e issuance of a writ of replevin upon the filing of plaintiff's bond.

3. On November 29, 1982, defendant filed her answer alleging as affirmative defenses that upon presentation of defendant's application, plaintiff and it's manager, R.P. Cardenas, imposed upon them as a condition for the approval of their application defendant's acquisition of the premises where the business will be conducted; that consequently applicant-defendant purchased the said land for seven hundred thousand (P700,000.00) pesos; that on June 21, 1982, a preliminary agreement was signed constituting defendant as plaintiff's authorized dealer, whereupon plaintiff turned over to the defendant the equipment to be used therefor; that plaintiff instructed dependant to commence operation whereupon the latter made the necessary preparations amounting to P38,000.00; that defendant commenced operation on June 26, 1982, pending execution of the formal dealership agreement; that on the last week of July, 1982, they signed the formal dealership agreement a copy of which was withheld from them by the plaintiff pending its notarization; that as the formal agreement had already been signed, defendant and her husband requested plaintiff that they be allowed to get gas even on a cash basis, but plaintiff denied the request claiming that they still have to post a surety bond which was initially fixed at P200,000.00 then later increased to P700,000.00; that defendant and her husband exerted their best effort to secure a bond but the bonding companies required a copy of the dealership agreement which was continiously withheld from them by plaintiff, that defendant discovered that plaintiff and its manager intended all along, to award said dealership to Island Air Product Corporation; that in furtherance of said scheme plaintiff caused all the LP-Gas equipment to be publicly pulled out from defendant's premises. As counterclaim, defendant prayed that plaintiff and its manager be made liable for their pre-operation expenses rental, storage, and guarding fees, unrealized profit including damages and the return of the LP-Gas equipment to the premises.

4. On December 9, 1982, the writ of replevin dated October 22, 1982 issued by Honorable Eduardo C. Abaya of the Court of First Instance, Rizal, Branch XXIV was duly executed.

5. On September 8, 1983, the pre-trial conference in Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila was terminated without any amicable settlement, and trial was set for November 3, 1983.

6. On November 3, 1983, the trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, alleging that plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. having been taken over by Caltex Philippines, Inc., and prior to dissolution, assigned and transferred all the rights, interest, claim and cause of action in favor of Mobil Philippines, Inc.

7. On August 8, 1985, the trial court, after finding that plaintiff and its manager, R.P. Cardenas, have reneged on its promise to award the dealership to defendant Sapugay, rendered judgment in favor of the latter, dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff and its manager to pay the pre-operation expenses, rental, storage, and guarding fees of plaintiff's LPG equipment; unrealized profits, moral damages including litigation expenses, attorney's fees and costs of the suit.

8. On August 26, 1985, defendant filed a motion for application to have plaintiffs bond posted by the Malayan Surety Company liable for the satisfaction of the judgment.

9. On August 29, 1985, the plaintiff-corporation filed a notice of appeal manifesting that it was appealing to the Court of Appeals from the decision promulgated on August 8, 1985.

10. On September 17, 1985, the trial court issued an order denying the defendant's motion considering that the lower court no longer had any jurisdiction to act on the matter with the perfection of plaintiffs appeal.4On November 11, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that the awards of rental, storage and guarding fees and the award of unrealized profits, are hereby DELETED, and the award of damages REDUCED. The decision is AFFIRMED in all other aspects with Mobil Philippines, lnc. being solely liable.5The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioners, praying that the bond posted by Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in behalf of herein private respondents be made liable for damages suffered by petitioners, was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated January 30, 1989. Hence, this petition.

The issues raised by petitioners for resolution are whether respondent court committed serious errors of law amounting to grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction:

1. In excluding from the case and exculpating from liability respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas, an indispensable party;

2. In deleting from the decision of the courta quothe awards for guarding fee and unrealized profits; and

3. In holding that Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., is not liable on the bond.

In their comment, private respondents aver that since the counterclaim of petitioners against the former is permissive in nature and since no docket fee was paid, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, hence the awards rendered on petioners' counterclaim should be dismissed.

Under the first assigned error, petitioners assert that respondent Court of Appeals erred in exculpating Cardenas from liability and in holding that said Cardenas, who is not a party to the original action, may not be impleaded by petitioners in their counterclaim on the ground that a counterclaim cannot be filed against a person who is not an actual party to the litigation. In effect, what respondent court is saying is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas, hence he cannot be held jointly liable with Mobil Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, Mobil for short). On the contrary, petitioners submit that Cardenas is an indispensable party since he was the one who negotiated with them in transacting the dealership agreement.

A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.6However, the general rule that a defendant cannot by a counterclaim bring into the action any claim against persons other than the plaintiff admits of an exception under Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that "when the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained." The inclusion, therefore, of Cardenas in petioners' counterclaim is sanctioned by the rules.

The next question to be resolved is whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas. It has been held that a counterclaim stands on the same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were, an independent action.7Hence, the same rules on jurisdiction in an independent action ordinarily apply equally to a counterclaim.

In her answer, filed on November 29, 1982, to the amended complaint, petitioner Lina Sapugay impleaded Cardenas as a defendant in her counterclaim therein, and prayed that judgment be rendered holding specifically Mobil and Cardenas jointly and severally liable to herein petitioners.8Thereafter, petitioner filed a "Motion to Declare Plaintiff and its Manager, Ricardo P. Cardenas, in Default on Defendant's Counterclaim" for failure of private respondents to answer the counterclaim.9Cardenas was furnished copies of both the answer and the motion to declare herein private respondents indefault.10Respondent Mobil filed an opposition to the motion to declare them in default, alleging that they, the private respondents herein, may not be so declared.11The court below agreed with private respondents' reasoning therein that a compulsory counterclaim being involved, the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint, hence the complaint itself stood as the answer to defendant's counterclaim. Consequently, the trial court denied the motion to declare the herein private respondents in default.12It is noteworthy that Cardenas did not file a motion to dismiss the counterclaim against him on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. While it is a settled rule that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised even for the first time on appeal, this does not obtain in the instant case. Although it was only Mobil which filed an opposition to the motion to declare in default, the fact that the trial court denied said motion, both as to Mobil and Cardenas on the ground that Mobil's complaint should be considered as the answer to petioners' compulsory counterclaim, leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the trial court treated the opposition as having been filed in behalf of both Mobil and Cardenas and that the latter had adopted as his answer the allegations raised in the complaint of Mobil. Obviously, it was this ratiocination which led the trial court to deny the motion to declare Mobil and Cardenas in default. Furthermore, Cardenas was not unaware of said incidents and the proceedings therein as he testified and was present during the trial, not to speak of the fact that as manager of Mobil he would necessarily be interested in the case and could readily have access to the records and pleadings filed therein.

By adopting as his answer the allegations in the complaint which seeks affirmative relief, Cardenas is deemed to have recognized the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person and submitted thereto. He may not now be heard to repudiate or question that jurisdiction.13Mobil likewise questions the jurisdiction of the trial court in entertaining the counterclaim since no docket fee was paid. It avers that since it is a permissive counterclaim, petitioners should have paid the necessary docket fee. On the contrary, we find and so hold that the counterclaim of petitioners is compulsory in nature since both the complaint and counterclaim involve the same transaction and arose from the same occurrence. Besides, as earlier discussed, in Mobil's opposition to the motion for a default order, it categorically stated that petitioners' counterclaim is compulsory in nature,14which was likewise the view of the trial court and the precise reason why it denied said motion. Private respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise. In the recent case ofSun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al.vs.Hon.Asuncion, et al.15involving the rule on payment of docket fees in ordinary actions, the rule was affirmed and made to apply specifically to permissive counterclaims only, thereby excluding compulsory counterclaims from its purview.

As to the second assigned error, the finding of the Court of Appeals that no sufficient and substantial evidence exists to warrant an award of guarding fees and unearned profits is conclusively binding on this Court, for failure of private respondents to show that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion or erred in making such finding. Fundamental is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed unless shown to have been rendered with arbitrariness, nor are any of the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions thereto present in this case.

Anent the issue on the surety's liability upon the replevin bond, we do not believe that Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. should be made liable thereon. As correctly observed by respondent court, "the damages awarded by the trial court were based on Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code and not on the deprivation of personal properties subject of the replevin bond. Moreover, no judgment was entered for the return of the properties subject of the replevin bond to the defendant, the latter never having raised the issue of rightful possession to the said properties."16A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the action. He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment entered for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's deprivation of possession by the plaintiff. Indeed, even where the judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing damages in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that the property should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of the sureties.17There is no denying the active participation of Cardenas in the anomalous transactions had with petitioner Lina Sapugay as found by the Court of Appeals, to wit:

Indeed, a perusal of the letters referred to show that plaintiff corporation, particularly its manager, gave cause for defendant Sapugay to believe that she is the authorized supplier and refiller of Mobil Philippines, to wit, plaintiff's letter to defendant signed by its Manager R.P. Cardenas dated July 2, 1982 (Exhibit "2"), referred to defendant "as a major supplier of LPG and as the authorized refiller of Mobil Oil Philippines . . . committed to the government as well as to all Mobil LP-Gas customers to uphold the highest standard in respect to marketing as well as safety (Exhibit "2-b")." This belief is further bolstered by the Memorandum dated July 12, 1982 signed by Cardenas and sent to defendant by registered mail (Exhibit "5") attaching a copy of Ministry Order No. 82-06-08 (Exhibit "3-b") prohibiting LPG cylinder exchange and the refilling of other brands of cylinder without the brand owner's authority.

As to the existence of a Formal Dealership Agreement, this Court failed to find any other evidence other than defendant's testimony to substantiate the allegation that plaintiff and defendant had already signed a dealership agreement in July 1982 which the former withheld from the latter, causing defendant's failure to submit the requisite bond. Moreover, this Court notes that the blank standard dealership agreement form presented by plaintiff (Exhibit "L"), shows no requirement for the filing of a bond. Further, Manager Cardenas himself testified that this standard agreement contained all the terms and conditions of a dealership, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the lower court found that the requirement of posting a bond, initially fixed at P200,000.00 then raised to P700,000.00 was apreplanned scheme of plaintiff and/or R..Cardenas to put every hindrance before the defendant so that the latter could not get the dealership agreement. . .

xxx xxx xxx

As found by the trial court,all these acts of plaintiff and its manager, R..Cardenas, are contrary to Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

for which plaintiff must be made to recompense the damages the defendant suffered. (Emphasis supplied)19We, therefore, find and so hold that private respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas should be held jointly and severally liable with his co-respondent Mobil Philippines, Inc. for having acted in bad faith by impeding and preventing the award of the dealership to petitioners through fraudulent means.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that respondents Mobil Philipines, Inc. and Ricardo P. Cardenas are held jointly and severally liable to herein petitioners Marino and Lina Joel Sapugay.

ALIBSAR ADOMA,complainant, vs. ROMEO GATCHECO, Sheriff III, andEUGENIO TAGUBA, Process Server, of Branches 1 and 2, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

The instant administrative complaint filed against respondents for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee, arose from the execution of a writ of replevin inAdoma v. Spouses Edmundo Andres and Luzviminda Andres, docketed as Civil Case No. 1404-1-669, for recovery of possession of motor vehicle with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin before Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, presided by Judge Ruben Plata.

Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that on August 16, 2003 a writ of replevin[1]for the recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor. On the same day, respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. He was accompanied by respondent Eugenio Taguba, a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago City, who volunteered to assist respondent sheriff. After the two respondents seized the vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00, allegedly promised by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1,000.00 and another P1,000.00 the following day.[2]The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof. With the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day, complainant threatened to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. Finally, on August 29, 2003, the latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. Respondents, however, continued to demand P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.[3]Respondents, on the other hand, denied soliciting and receiving any amount from the complainant. Respondent sheriff admitted, however, that complainant promised to give him P10,000.00 if the vehicle will be sold.[4]On September 10, 2003, the Court referred the instant administrative complaint to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report and recommendation.[5]In her investigation report, Judge Madrid found the testimony of complainant which was corroborated by two witnesses, to be more credible. She refused to believe the claim of respondent sheriff that he did not release the vehicle to complainant after 5 days from the implementation of the writ on August 16, 2003, because he was awaiting instructions from Judge Plata. However, she found that respondent sheriff did not actually demand money for the implementation of the writ because it was complainant who promised to give money in exchange for the implementation of the writ of replevin. Nevertheless, she concluded that respondent sheriff is guilty of misconduct considering that he accepted partial payment and insisted on its full payment.

As to respondent Taguba, Judge Madrid recommended that he be reprimanded for trying to abet the misconduct of respondent sheriff.

Upon receipt of thereportof Judge Madrid, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.[6]In its Memorandum dated June 4, 2004, the OCA affirmed the investigating Judges report. It recommended that respondent sheriff be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a court employee and that respondent Taguba be reprimanded for trying to abet the misconduct of a fellow employee of another court.

On July 5, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. However, to date, the parties have yet to file their manifestation. Hence, we are constrained to dispense the filing of such manifestation.

The Court agrees with the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA that respondents received the amount of P2,000.00 and that they demanded the payment of an additional P6,000.00 from complainant. The testimony of complainant before the investigating Judge is worthy of belief because the same was not only candid and direct but also corroborated by two witnesses who attested to the veracity of complainants accusations. The writ of replevin has been implemented and the vehicle is now in complainants possession.

Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes are:first, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him;second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses;third,the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court andex-oficiosheriff;fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; andfifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.[7]In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited procedure. He failed to make and submit estimate of the sheriffs expenses. The amounts received and demanded by him are therefore unauthorized fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting said monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee but also for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised. Since the adverse party did not object to the complainants bond nor posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the vehicle taken under the writ of replevin, respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it took respondent sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides

SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (6a)

InApuyan, Jr. v. Sta Isabel,[8]citingAlvarez, Jr. v. Martin,[9]a sheriff was similarly found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service for receiving and soliciting money from the complainant and for deliberately ignoring the rules for the implementation of a writ of attachment, thus

Furthermore, respondents act of demanding money and receiving P1,500.00 from the complainant for the lunch andmeriendaof the policemen who will accompany him in executing the decision of the Court is a clear violation of section 9, Rule 141. The Rules require the sheriff to estimate his expenses in the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party. In this case, no estimate of sheriffs expenses was submitted to the court by respondent. In fact, the money which respondent deputy sheriff had demanded and received from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.

Finally, the procedure for execution of a final judgment is the same as that in carrying out a writ of preliminary attachment, as set forth in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court

Clearly, in this case, respondent not only utterly failed to live up to the high ethical standards required of a sheriff, but also, he totally ignored Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Respondent failed to demonstrate that he followed the procedure laid down by Rule 141.

The OCAs recommendation that respondent be found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is firmly supported by the records of this case.

Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Resolution No. 991936, effective September 27, 1999), provides

Section 52.Classification of Offenses. -Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

1. Dishonesty

1st Offense Dismissal

3. Grave Misconduct

1st Offense Dismissal

20. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

1st offense Suspension (6 mos. 1 day to 1 year)

2nd offense Dismissal

The imposable penalty for commission of the first offense of grave misconduct and dishonesty is dismissal. In the cases ofApuyan, Jr. v. Sta Isabel,[10]andAlbello v. Galvez,[11]however, the fact that the respondent sheriffs were first time offenders was considered a mitigating circumstance, hence they were meted the penalty of 1 year suspension instead of dismissal. Accordingly, since this is respondent sheriffs first offense, the penalty of 1 year suspension will suffice.

With respect to respondent Taguba, we find the sanction of reprimand too light a penalty for his transgression. Although it was not him who deliberately delayed the delivery of the vehicle to force complainant to yield to the sheriffs demand, and that complainant did not point to him as the one who received the amount of P2,000.00, respondent Taguba assisted respondent sheriff in soliciting money from complainant. Note that respondent Taguba is a process server of another branch of the MTCC of Santiago City but he volunteered to aid respondent sheriff in the implementation of the writ. He not only demanded P8,000.00 from complainant after the implementation of the writ but also tagged along with respondent sheriff when the latter tried to exact P6,000.00 from complainant before the vehicle was released to the latter. Furthermore, respondent Taguba had been previously suspended for 1 month inAlbano-Madrid v. Apolonio,[12]for simple misconduct in playing cards with other court personnel inside the Judges chambers during office hours. Indeed, reprimand is not commensurate to his incorrigible conduct. Under the circumstances, the penalty of 6 months suspension is appropriate.

At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrityof the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowestof its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.[13]WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Romeo Gatcheco, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Santiago City is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is SUSPENDED for one (1) year, without pay. Respondent Eugenio Taguba, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Santiago City is found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay.

Respondents are warned that a repetition of the same or any other act of infraction in the future shall be dealt with most severely.

ADVENT CAPITAL ANDG.R. No. 183018FINANCE CORPORATION,Petitioner,.ROLANDYOUNG,Promulgated:Respondent.August 3, 2011CARPIO,J.:The CaseThis petition for review1assails the 28 December 2007 Decision2and 15 May 2008 Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96266. The Court of Appeals set aside the 24 March 2006 and 5 July 2006 Orders4of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147, and directed petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation to return the seized vehicle to respondent Roland Young. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.The AntecedentsThe present controversy stemmed from areplevinsuit instituted by petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent) against respondent Roland Young (Young) to recover the possession of a 1996 Mercedes Benz E230 with plate number UMN-168, which is registered in Advents name.5Prior to thereplevincase, or on 16 July 2001, Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 (rehabilitation court).6On 27 August 2001, the rehabilitation court issued an Order (stay order) which states that the enforcement of all claims whether for money or otherwise, and whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against the petitioner (Advent), its guarantors and sureties notsolidarilyliable with it, is stayed.7On 5 November 2001, Young filed his Comment to the Petition for Rehabilitation, claiming, among others, several employee benefits allegedly due him as Advents former president and chief executive officer.On 6 November 2002, the rehabilitation court approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Advent. Included in the inventory of Advents assets was the subject car which remained in Youngs possession at the time.Youngs obstinate refusal to return the subject car, after repeated demands, prompted Advent to file thereplevincase on 8 July 2003. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-776, was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147 (trial court).After Advents posting ofP3,000,000replevinbond, which was double the value of the subject car at the time, through Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated (Stronghold), the trial court issued a Writ of Seizure8directing the Sheriff to seize the subject car from Young. Upon receipt of the Writ of Seizure, Young turned over the car to Advent,9which delivered the same to the rehabilitation receiver.10Thereafter, Young filed an Answer alleging that as a former employee of Advent, he had the option to purchase the subject car at book value pursuant to the company car plan and to offset the value of the car with the proceeds of his retirement pay and stock option plan. Young sought the (1) execution of a deed of sale over the subject car; and (2) determination and payment of the net amount due him as retirement benefits under the stock option plan.Advent filed a Reply with a motion to dismiss Youngs counterclaim, alleging that the counterclaim did not arise fromorhas no logical relationship with the issue of ownership of the subject car.After issues have been joined, the parties entered into pre-trial on 2 April 2004, which resulted in the issuance of a pre-trial order of even date reciting the facts and the issues to be resolved during the trial.On 28 April 2005, the trial court issued an Order dismissing thereplevincase without prejudice for Advents failure to prosecute. In the same order, the trial court dismissed Youngs counterclaim against Advent for lack of jurisdiction. The order pertinently reads:It appears that as of July 28, 2003, subject motor vehicle has been turned over to the plaintiff, thru its authorized representative, andadknowledgedby the parties respective counsels in separate Manifestations filed. To date, no action had been taken by the plaintiff in the further prosecution of this case. Accordingly, this case is ordered dismissed without prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute.Anent plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss defendant Youngs counterclaim for benefits under the retirement and stock purchase plan, the Court rules as follows: The only issue in this case is who is entitled to the possession of the subject motor vehicle. This issue may have a connection, but not a necessary connection with defendants rights under the retirement plan and stock purchase plan as to be considered a compulsory counterclaim.xxxNotably, defendants claim is basically one for benefits under and by virtue of his employment with the plaintiff, and the subject vehicle is merely an incident in that claim. Said claim is properly ventilated, as it is resolvable by, the Rehabilitation Court which has jurisdiction and has acquired jurisdiction, to the exclusion of this Court. Accordingly, plaintiffs MotionToDismiss defendant Youngs counterclaim is granted.11On 10 June 2005, Young filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the dismissal order with respect to his counterclaim.On 8 July 2005, Young filed an omnibus motion, praying that Advent return the subject car and pay himP1.2 million in damages (f)orthe improper and irregular seizure of the subject car, to be charged against thereplevinbond posted by Advent through Stronghold.On 24 March 2006, the trial court issued an Order denying Youngs motion for partial reconsideration,viz:In the instant case, defendant, in his counterclaim anchored her [sic] right of possession to the subject vehicle on his alleged right to purchase the same under the company car plan. However, considering that the Court has already declared that it no longer has jurisdiction to try defendants counterclaim as it is now part of the rehabilitation proceedings before the corporate court concerned, the assertions in the Motion for Reconsiderations (sic) will no longer stand.On the other hand, the plaintiff did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the same Order, dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute, within thereglementaryperiod. Hence, the same has attained finality.Defendant alleged that the dismissal of the case resulted in the dissolution of the writ. Nonetheless, the Court deems it proper to suspend the resolution of the return of the subject vehicle. In this case, the subject vehicle was turned over to plaintiff by virtue of a writ ofreplevinvalidly issued, the latter having sufficiently shown that it is the absolute/registered owner thereof. This was not denied by the defendant. Plaintiffs ownership includes its right of possession. The case has been dismissed without a decision on the merits having been rendered. Thus, to order the return of the vehicle to one who is yet to prove his right of possession would not be proper.Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is denied.12On 8 June 2006, Young filed a motion to resolve his omnibus motion.In an Order dated 5 July 2006, the trial court denied the motion to resolve, to wit:In the instant case, the Court suspended the resolution of the return of the vehicle to defendant Roland Young. It should be noted that the writ ofreplevinwas validly issued infavorof the plaintiff and that it has sufficiently established ownership over the subject vehicle which includes its right to possess. On the other hand, the case (Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals) cited by defendant finds no application to this case, inasmuch as in the former the Court has not rendered judgment affirming plaintiffs (Olympia) right of possession on the property seized. Moreover, the Court, in the Order dated April 28, 2005, has already denied defendants counterclaim upon which he based his right of possession on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reiterates its previous ruling that to order the return of the subject vehicle to defendant Young, who is yet to prove his right of possession before the Rehabilitation Court would not be proper.WHEREFORE, there being no new and substantial arguments raised, the Motion to Resolve is denied.13Young filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the trial courts Orders of 24 March 2006 and 5 July 2006.The Court of Appeals RulingIn his petition before the Court of Appeals, Young argued mainly that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) not directing the return of the subject vehicle to him; (2) refusing to hold a hearing to determine the damages to be recovered against thereplevinbond; and (3) dismissing his counterclaim.The Court of Appeals ruled infavorof Young and annulled the assailed rulings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held:It is noteworthy that the case was dismissed by the courta quofor failure of Advent to prosecute the same. Upon dismissal of the case, the writ of seizure issued as an incident of the main action (forreplevin) becamefunctusofficioand should have been recalled or lifted. Since there was no adjudication on the merits of the case, the issue of who between Advent and petitioner has the better right to possess the subject car was not determined. As such, the parties should be restored to their status immediately before the institution of the case.The Supreme Courts ruling inOlympia International, Inc. vs. Court ofAppeals(supra) squarely applies to the present controversy, to wit:Indeed, logic and equity demand that the writ ofreplevinbe cancelled. Being provisional and ancillary in character, its existence and efficacy depended on the outcome of the case. The case having been dismissed, so must the writs existence and efficacy bedissolved.To let the writ stand even after the dismissal of the case would be adjudging Olympia as the prevailing party, when precisely, no decision on the merits had been rendered.The case having been dismissed, it is as if no case was filed at all and the parties must revert to their status before the litigation.Indeed, as an eminent commentator on Remedial Law expounds:The plaintiff who obtains possession of the personal property by a writ ofreplevindoes not acquire absolute title thereto, nor does the defendant acquire such title byrebondingthe property, as they only hold the property subject to the final judgment in the action. (IRegalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Eighth Revised Edition, p. 686)Reversion of the parties to thestatus quo anteis the consequenceexpropriovigoreof the dismissal of the case. Thus, inLaureanovs. Court ofAppeals(324 SCRA 414), it was held:(A)lthoughthe commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all.By the same token, return of the subject car to petitioner pending rehabilitation of Advent does not constitute enforcement of claims against it, much more adjudication on the merits of petitioners counterclaim. In other words, an order for such return is not a violation of the stay order, which was issued by the rehabilitation court on August 27, 2001. xxxCorollarily, petitioners claim against thereplevinbond has no connection at all with the rehabilitation proceedings. The claim is not against the insolvent debtor (Advent) but against bondsman, Stronghold. Such claim is expressly authorized by Sec. 10, Rule 60, in relation to Sec. 20, Rule 57, id.,xxx14The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The orders of the Regional Trial Court dated March 24, 2006 and July 5, 2006 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE in so far as they suspended resolution of petitioners motion for, and/or disallowed, the return of the subject car to petitioner. Accordingly, respondent Advent Capital and Finance Corporation is directed to return the subject car to petitioner.The Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 147) is directed to conduct a hearing on, and determine, petitioners claim for damages against thereplevinbond posted by Stronghold Insurance Co.SO ORDERED.15Advent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 15 May 2008.The IssueThe main issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in (1) directing the return of the seized car to Young; and (2) ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of damages against thereplevinbond.The Courts RulingThe petition is partially meritorious.On returning the seized vehicle to YoungWe agree with the Court of Appeals in directing the trial court to return the seized car to Young since this is the necessary consequence of the dismissal of thereplevincase for failure to prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of thereplevincase for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in nature, becamefunctusofficioand should have been lifted. There was no adjudication on the merits, which means that there was no determination of the issue who has the better right to possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain possession of the subject car considering that it was not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy ofreplevin.Contrary to Advents view,Olympia International Inc. v. Court of Appeals16applies to this case.The dismissal of thereplevincase for failure to prosecute results in the restoration of the parties status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all.To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to theirstatus quo ante. Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of thereplevincase, the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.Advents contention that returning the subject car to Young would constitute a violation of the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court is untenable. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, returning the seized vehicle to Young is not an enforcement of a claim against Advent which must be suspended by virtue of the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court pursuant to Section 6 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules).17The issue in thereplevincase is who has better right to possession of the car, and it was Advent that claimed a better right in filing thereplevincase against Young. Indefense, Young claimed a better right to possession of the car arising from Advents car plan to its executives, which he asserts entitles him to offset the value of the car against the proceeds of his retirement pay and stock option plan.Young cannot collect a money claim against Advent within the contemplation of the Interim Rules. Theterm claim has been construed to refer to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have money paid by the company under rehabilitation to its creditors.18In thereplevincase, Young cannot demand that Advent pay him money because such payment, even if valid, has been stayed by order of the rehabilitation court. However, in thereplevincase, Young can raise Advents car plan, coupled with his retirement pay and stock option plan, as giving him a better right to possession of the car. To repeat, Young is entitled to recover the subject car as a necessary consequence of the dismissal of thereplevincase for failure to prosecute without prejudice.On the damages against thereplevinbondSection 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court19governs claims for damages on account of improper or irregular seizure inreplevincases. It provides that inreplevincases, as in receivership and injunction cases, the damages to be awarded upon the bond shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 57 which reads:Sec. 20.Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment.- An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomesexecutory, with due notice to the attachingobligeeor his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.eIf the judgment of the appellate court befavorableto the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court with notice to the party in whosefavorthe attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomesexecutory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attachingobligeenot exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.The above provision essentially allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory.20It should be filed in the same case that is the main action,21and with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application.22eremedIn this case, there was no application for damages against Stronghold resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure before the finality of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. It appears that Young filed his omnibus motion claiming damages against Stronghold after the dismissal order issued by the trial court on 28 April 2005 had attained finality. While Young filed a motion for partial reconsideration on 10 June 2005, it only concerned the dismissal of his counterclaim, without any claim for damages against thereplevinbond. It was only on 8 July 2005 that Young filed an omnibus motion seeking damages against thereplevinbond, after the dismissal order had already become final for Advents non-appeal of such order. In fact, in his omnibus motion, Young stressed the finality of the dismissal order.23Thus, Young is barred from claiming damages against thereplevinbond.InJaov. Royal Financing Corporation,24the Court held that defendant therein was precluded from claiming damages against the surety bond since defendant failed to file the application for damages before the termination of the case, thus:The dismissal of the case filed by the plaintiffs-appelleeson July 11, 1959, had become final andexecutorybefore the defendant-appelleecorporation filed its motion for judgment on the bond on September 7, 1959. In the order of the trial court, dismissing the complaint, there appears no pronouncement whatsoever against the surety bond. Theappellee-corporation failed to file its proper application for damages prior to the termination of the case against it. It is barred to do so now. The prevailing party, if such would be the proper term for theappellee-corporation, having failed to file its application for damages against the bond prior to the entry of final judgment, the bondsman-appellant is relieved of further liabilitythereunder.Since Young is time-barred from claiming damages against thereplevinbond, the dismissal order having attained finality after the application for damages, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of damages against thereplevinbond.WHEREFORE, the CourtGRANTSthe petitionIN PART. The CourtSETS ASIDEthe portion in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96266 ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of damages against thereplevinbond.G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA,Petitioners,vs.MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA,Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

LEONEN,J.:Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x."1This is raised through aPetition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 from the"Decision"rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20 March 2012.

From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed aPetition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparoin the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2This case was docketed asIn the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.

TheAmparowas directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ ofAmparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate forAmparocases.5In anOrderdated 2 March 2012,6Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer".7The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily inAmparocases.8He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.9Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.11On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision"granting the issuance of the Writ ofAmparo.The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.

In anOrderdated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied theMotion for Reconsiderationdated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision"dated 20 March 2012 through aPetition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo(A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:

SEC. 19.Appeal. Any party may appeal from thefinal judgmentororderto the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).

It is the Courts view that the "Decision"dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ ofAmparois not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.

The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy ofAmparoto put its procedures in the proper context.

The remedy of the Writ ofAmparois an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty12and security13as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.14The Rule on the Writ ofAmparowas issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.15It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.16Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief.17It is initiated through apetition18to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed".21After evaluation, the judge has the option toissue the WritofAmparo22or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

The respondents are required to file aReturn23after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.25Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.

There will be asummary hearing26only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be doneex parte.27After the hearing, the court will render thejudgmentwithin ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.28If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in theAmparocase. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject toappealto the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. InAmparocases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed either criminal or civil.31Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy ofAmparoallows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.

The "Decision"dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitionerscould not bethe judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to wit:

The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ ofAmparo.

Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ ofAmparoin an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.

This "Decision"pertained to theissuance of the writunder Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, not thejudgmentunder Section 18. The "Decision"is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders areinterim reliefsthat may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition butbeforefinal judgment is rendered.32The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs ofAmparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in hisOrderdated 2 March 2012:

Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ ofAmparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.

Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the following circumstances:

SECTION 1.Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A.Civil Cases:(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed x x x.

B.Criminal Cases:(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

x x x x

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certaincivilandcriminalcases. A writ ofAmparois aspecial proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main casepriorto the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return inAmparocases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo.35The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision"dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision, the RTC stated:

"Accordingly this courtGRANTS the privilege of the writ and theinterimreliefsprayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was thejudgmentsince the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo:

"SEC. 18.Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shallgrant the privilege of the writ and such reliefsas may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ ofAmparoshould be distinguished from theactual ordercalled theWrit of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ ofAmparoarise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ ofAmparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.

It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case.When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.ThePetition for Reviewis not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated as"Decision"dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited.36Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ ofAmparowere promulgated.

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.37The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the CourtRESOLVESto:

(1)NULLIFYall orders that are subject of thisResolutionissued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed thePetition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;

(2)DIRECTJudge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of thisResolutionwhether the issuance of the Writ ofAmparois proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of thisResolutionon Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM,Petitioner,vs.Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section 191of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103and September 6, 20104Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioners petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Paraaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City.6Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelinos family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.9On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together.12On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum13to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelinos brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines.14On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the childs subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section 919of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parents custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and

3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological mother.

The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors.23On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25The RTC, however, deniedChristinas motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.26On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son.28The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss Christinas argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws29and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moons representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julians custody.30The Court rejects petitioners contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31this Court held:

[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico33enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.1wphi1In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.37Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

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