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G.R. No. 151007 July 17, 2006TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,vs.PNB-REPUBLIC BANK and SOLID BUILDERS, INC.,respondents.

D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court assails the May 29, 2001 decision1of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed thepetition for certiorari filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises,

Inc. for lack of merit.The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract,mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against Leverage& Services Group, Inc.2and respondents PNB-Republic Bankand Solid Builders, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court ofPasig City, Branch 153. It was docketed as Civil Case No.64941.Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of landsituated in Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to SolidBuilders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to awardinstead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioner's claimwas rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of theproperties to Solid Builders, Inc. After the rejection ofpetitioner's bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate brokerwhose services were engaged by petitioner for itsnegotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the Tagaytay

properties, obtained a legal opinion3

from the Office of theGovernment Corporate Counsel (OGCC):

xxx xxx xxxIn summary therefore, - (b) the authority given tothe Committee/SMCC to dispose of and approve thesale of acquired assets under Board Resolution No.000231-1993 is subject to Board approval if theamount is over P3 Million. The absence therefore ofthe required Board approval on the sale of thesubject properties to Solid Builders did not perfectthe contract to sell the subject properties; (c) itfollows therefore that the Bank may now entertainother offers to purchase the subject properties butany disposition of the subject properties must bewith the prior approval of the Board of Directors ofthe Bank.4

During the pre-trial conference, petitioner marked theDecember 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit "C" andoffered the matter of its existence for stipulation between theparties. Respondents admitted the existence of the opinionbut manifested their disagreement with its contents.During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify. WhenRoque's testimony was offered specifically with respect to thelegal opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents objectedto its admission for being violative of the rule on attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.The trial court sustained the objection.Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quo'srefusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an orderdated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed thepresentation and admission in evidence of any testimonyreferring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. Theprohibition was based on the ground that the testimony wasin violation of the rule on privileged communication betweenattorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with theCourt of Appeals. However, the appellate court dismissed thepetition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the samewas denied. Hence, this petition.Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruledthat the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretionin disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence ofRoque's testimony.The petition has no merit.Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal,board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave

abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain,speedy and adequate remedy at law.5The writ may be issuedonly where it is convincingly proved that the lower courtcommitted grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent andgross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtualrefusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplationof law, or that the trial court exercised its power in anarbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion orpersonal hostility.6While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedyto assail an interlocutory order in cases where the tribunalhas issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every

controversial interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quotewith approval the pronouncement of the appellate court:

In this jurisdiction, there is an "erroneous impressionthat interlocutory [orders] of trial courts ondebatable legal points may be assailed by certiorari.To correct that impression and to avoid clogging theappellate court with future certiorari petitions itshould be underscored that the office of the writ ofcertiorari has been reduced to the correction ofdefects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally beused for any other purpose."7

The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary caseswherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body iswholly void.8Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of

jurisdiction and not errors in judgment.9The rationale of thisrule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an errorcommitted while so engaged does not deprive it of the

jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.10Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its

jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a voidjudgment.11When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person ofthe defendant, any mistake in the application of the law andthe appreciation of evidence committed by a court may becorrected only by appeal.12The determination made by thetrial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but anexercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have

perpetrated in making such a determination is an error injudgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule thatrulings of the trial court on procedural questions and onadmissibility of evidence during the course of a trial areinterlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of aseparate appeal or review on certiorari. They must beassigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly takenfrom the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits ofthe case.13Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowingthe admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on theopinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse ofdiscretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore,the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assumingthat it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgmentnot correctable by the writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004TERESITA S. DAVID, BENJAMIN S. DAVID,PACIFICO S.DAVID, NEMESIO S. DAVID, CELINE S. DAVID,CRISTINA S. DAVID, PAULINA S. DAVID, and LEONIE S.DAVID-DE LEON, Petitioners,vs.AGUSTIN RIVERA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-square meter portion (hereafter, "subject land") of Lot No.38-B,1a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway,Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Riverafiled on May 10, 1994 a Complaint2for "Maintenance ofPeaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction" before the Provincial AdjudicationBoard (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga againstpetitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David.3The respondent averred that the petitioners had beenharassing him for the purpose of making him vacate thesubject land although it had already been given to himsometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as"disturbance compensation", in consideration of hisrenunciation of his tenurial rights over the original eighteen(18)-hectare farmholding.For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint4for ejectmentbefore the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat

and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondentwas occupying the subject land without paying rentalstherefor. The petitioners also averred that they need thesubject land for their personal use but the respondent refusedto vacate it despite repeated demands.In hisAnswer5to the ejectment complaint, the respondentasserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case inlight of the tenancy relationship between him and thepredecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced bythe Certification6issued by the Municipal Agrarian ReformOffice (MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He likewise reiteratedhis claim of ownership over the subject land and informed thecourt of the complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB.

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On January 31, 1995, or during the pendency of theejectment case, the PARAB rendered its Decision7declaringthe respondent as tenant of the land and ordering that hispeaceful possession thereof be maintained. Expectedly, thepetitioners appealed the PARAB Decision to the Department ofthe Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision8ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The courtfound that there was a dearth of evidence supportive of therespondents claim that the land is agricultural or that it isdevoted to agricultural production. Further, it ruled that thepetitioners as the registered owners have a better right topossession of the subject land. The decretal portion of theDecision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered in favor of herein plaintiffs and against hereindefendant and any one claiming rights under him by orderingthe latter to:

(1) Vacate the subject premises and to peacefullyturn over possession of the same to the plaintiffs orto their authorized representatives;(2) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of P720,000.00as reasonable rentals in arrears as of July, 1994 andto pay monthly rentals of P12,000.00 from August,1994 up to the time he (defendant) finally vacatesthe premises;(3) To pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as

attorneys fees and to pay the cost of the suit; (4) Defendant(s) counterclaim is hereby DENIED forlack of proof.

SO ORDERED.Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period toappeal, the respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Angeles City a Petition9for prohibition withpreliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust ofthe petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as theissue before it was agrarian in nature.On October 30, 1995, the RTC issued a TemporaryRestraining Order10enjoining the petitioners from enforcingthe MCTC Decision. Thereafter, it proceeded to hear therespondents application for preliminary injunction. OnNovember 29, 1995, the RTC granted the motion and ordered

the issuance ofWrit of Preliminary Injunction upon theposting of bond in the amount of P500,000.00.11On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed theirAnswer12tothe Petition for prohibition in which they asserted that theMCTC could not be divested of its jurisdiction by simplyinterposing the defense of tenancy. The petitioners alsodisputed the respondents claim that he acquired the subjectproperty by way of disturbance compensation for the reasonthat in 1956, when the property was allegedly given, the lawproviding for the payment of disturbance compensation wasnot yet in effect. Moreover, the petitioners contended, noproof had been adduced evidencing the conveyance of theproperty in favor of the respondent.The case went to trial with the respondent as petitionerpresenting his evidence in chief. However, after therespondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motionto Dismiss13raising as grounds, inter alia: (1) that theextraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made asubstitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal;(2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga waslegally vested, determined as it was by the averments of thecomplaint in conformity with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court;hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimateand valid exercise of its jurisdiction.On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order14denying themotion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which wasfiled after the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence,partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1,Rule 33 of the Rules of Court,15may be granted only upon ashowing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the reliefprayed for. Noting that "the evidence presented by the

petitioner establishes an issue which is addressed to [the]court for resolution. . . whether or not the respondent courthad jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filedbefore it", the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion todismiss is proper. The petitioners moved for reconsideration16but was denied in an Order17dated June 23, 1998.Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari18inthe Court of Appeals. On September 3, 1999, the appellatecourt rendered a Decision,19finding no grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion todismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration of its order.The appellate court ratiocinated that the order of denial ismerely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in apetition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In

addition, it held that issues raised in the petition forprohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating thepresentation of evidence by both parties.The petitioners now come before us, seeking the nullificationof the decision of the Court of Appeals. At the crux of thepetition is the issue of whether the denial of the motion todismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted withgrave abuse of discretion.In the Resolution of October 4, 1999,20we denied the petitionfor failure of the petitioners to accompany the same with aclearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of theassailed decision. The petitioners filed a new petition primarilyon the basis ofPhilippine Airlines v. Confesor,21where thisCourt held that a petition dismissed under Circular No. 1-8822may be filed again as a new petition as long as it is donewithin the reglementary period. In the Resolution23of March8, 2000, we allowed the re-filing of the petition and requiredthe respondent to comment thereon.In his Comment,24the respondent counters that the RTC didnot commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motionto dismiss inasmuch as the MCTC had no jurisdiction torender the assailed judgment. He points out that the PARABhad already declared him the owner of the land and that thePARAB decision was affirmed by the Department of AgrarianReform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its Decision25datedMarch 6, 2000.We deny the petition.

At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari doesnot lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion todismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidencefiled after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and restedhis case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer toevidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of apetition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners shouldpresent their evidence and if the decision of the trial judgewould be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal thesame issues raised in the demurrer.26However, it is alsosettled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when thedenial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court acted withgrave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer. They insistthat appeal, not prohibition, is the proper remedy to question

the judgment of the MCTC and that the question ofjurisdiction is one of law which may be ruled upon without theevidence of the parties.We are not convinced. We uphold the Court of Appeals.It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibitionto correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of

jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of therecourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil inview of the following considerations:First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, wheretwo tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involvingthe same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimatelyrendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case forprohibition. The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the casefor ejectment pursuant to Section 33 ofBatas PambansaBlg.129,28as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination ofthe DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the casefalls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or wasconnected with, agrarian relations. The respondent also pointsout that his right to possess the land, as a registered tenant,was submitted for determination before the PARAB prior tothe filing of the case for ejectment.Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 665729confers on the Departmentof Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicateagrarian reform matters.30In the process of reorganizing theDAR, Executive Order No. 129-A31created the DARAB toassume the powers and functions with respect to theadjudication of agrarian reform cases.32Section 1, Rule II ofthe DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases fallingwithin the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB,which is quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue

at bar:Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and AppellateJurisdiction. The board shall have primary and exclusive

jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine andadjudicate all agrarian disputes involving theimplementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram (CARP) under Republic Act no. 6657, ExecutiveOrder Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 asamended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No.27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules andregulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but notbe limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whethernatural or juridical engaged in the management,

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cultivation and use of all agricultural lands coveredby the CARP and other agrarian laws;. . .g) Those cases previously falling under the originaland exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court ofAgrarian Relations under Section 12 of PresidentialDecree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereofand Presidential Decree No. 815.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints orpetitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation ofRepublic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 andother agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall bethe exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretaryof the DAR.h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters orconcerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.Prescinding from the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that theexistence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true,will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tiecompels the characterization of the controversy as an"agrarian dispute." Agrarian dispute refers to anycontroversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whetherleasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over landsdevoted to agriculture, including disputes concerningfarmworkers' associations or representation of persons in

negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking toarrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.33Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the actionstill involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenantrelationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by aformer landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to havebeen given as compensation in consideration of therenunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists anagrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'allcases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlordor by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition ofdisputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant .. . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theCourt of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does notrequire the continuance of the relationship of landlord

and tenant at the time of the dispute. The same mayhave arisen, and often times arises, precisely from theprevious termination of such relationship. If the same existedimmediately, or shortly, before the controversy and thesubject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship hasbeen lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwisesprings or originates from the relationship of landlordand tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable only bythe Court of Agrarian Relations . . .34As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reformmatters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through theDARAB.With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of

jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of theproper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civilaction of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is theproper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of

jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,35or when, in theexercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within itscognizance the inferior court transgresses the boundsprescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequateremedy available in the ordinary course of law by which suchrelief can be obtained."36The purpose of a writ of prohibitionis to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction inorder to maintain the administration of justice in orderlychannels.37Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to questionthe judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract fromthe authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition torestrain the inferior court, among other instances, fromproceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided

the case without jurisdiction.38

Since the right to prohibition isdefeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of aremedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where theremedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.39To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC Decision hasalready attained finality because the respondent opted to filea petition for prohibition instead of an appeal is to sacrificeneedlessly respondents right at the altar of technicalities.Should tenancy relationship be duly proven, the respondentas a tenant should be protected in keeping with the social

justice precept enshrined in the Constitution.40Alsonoteworthy is the fact that the petition for prohibition wasfiled within the reglementary period to appeal; hence, it

cannot be claimed that the same was used as substitute for alost appeal.At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing uponthe propriety of the issuance of a writ of prohibition in favorof the respondent. As we have earlier pointed out,adjudication on this matter is best left to the RTC, where thecase for prohibition pends, after the reception of the evidenceof both parties.Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners assertion that

jurisdiction is a question of law; hence, the RTC could haveruled on the matter without the reception of the partiesevidence. The very issue determinative of the question of

jurisdiction is the realrelationship existing between theparties. It is necessary that evidence thereon be firstpresented by the parties before the question of jurisdictionmay be passed upon by the court.It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to theappellate court the Orderof the RTC denying their motion todismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer toevidence is an objection by one party to the adequacy of theevidence of his adversary to make out a case. Otherwisestated, the party demurring challenges the sufficiency of thewhole evidence to sustain a verdict.41In this case, the trialcourt ruled that respondents evidence in support of hisapplication for a writ of prohibition was sufficient to requirethe presentation of petitioners contravening proof. The RTCdid not commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.

The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding thelower courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss.WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review isDENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137237 September 17, 2002ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONYESQUIVEL, petitioners,vs.THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRDDIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES andHERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O NQUISUMBING,J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus1 with prayer for preliminary injunction and/ortemporary restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1)the Ombudsman resolution2 dated June 15, 1998 finding

prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the order3denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Further, intheir supplemental petition,4 petitioners assail theSandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without orbeyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and thePeople of the Philippines as additional parties in thiscase.1wphi1.ntThe factual antecedents of this case are as follows:PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutanare both residents ofBarangayDampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija,but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and InvestigationDivision (RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, SanFernando, Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits,5 filed before the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), ThirdRegional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners AntonioProspero Esquivel,6 municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother,Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangaycaptain ofbarangayApo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Alsoincluded in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp.Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of theJaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed

that at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardowas about to eat lunch at his parents house at Sta. MonicaVillage, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitionersarrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, andseveral unidentified persons accompanied them. Withoutfurther ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receiptand COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him toboard petitioners vehicle and brought him to the JaenMunicipal Hall.PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way tothe town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of afirearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed agun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-inamo, papatayinkita,

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aaksidentihinkitadito, bakitmoakokinakalaban!"(You son of abitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you. Why areyou against me?)Upon reaching the municipal hall, BarangayCaptain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardoinside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayinmonaiyan atgawanngsenaryo at report."(Kill him, then create a scenarioand make a report.)At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived toverify what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, butMayor Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel thenordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Stationto file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor onceagain struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, whileMark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regainedhis consciousness, he was told that he would be released.Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign astatement in the police blotter that he was in good physicalcondition.PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he wasmost likely maltreated and threatened because ofjuetengandtupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the lawenforcers who raided ajueteng den in Jaen that same day. Hesurmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrestedmembers of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.7In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a

medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and otherdocumentary evidence.8After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third RegionalOffice forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.9The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted apreliminary investigation and required petitioners and theircompanions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their

joint counter-affidavit,10 petitioners and their companionsdenied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged thatPO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstandingwarrant of arrest for malversation. They further alleged thatthe gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of anillegal possession of firearm complaint.On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issuedthe impugned resolution11 recommending that both Mayor

Esquivel and BarangayCaptain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivelbe indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, andMayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges againstthe other respondents below were dismissed, eitherprovisionally or with finality.On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desiertoapproved the aforesaid resolution.Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal CaseNo. 2477712 for less serious physical injuries against MayorEsquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and CriminalCase No. 2477813 for grave threats against petitioner mayor,were filed with the Sandiganbayan.On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration ofthe August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman forLuzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise fileda motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation14 with the Officeof the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however,denied by the OSP in the assailed order15 dated December 7,1998. On December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved theOSPs order of denial.On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in bothcases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedingspreviously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of theirmotion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter tothis Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part ofpublic respondents in rendering the resolution and the order.On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitionersmotion16 reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TROdirecting public respondents to refrain from prosecutingCriminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.17

Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMANGRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION INDISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATERESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICALCONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THEPOLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMANGRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDINGPROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHENPETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THEARREST OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUEOF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA

UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATIONOF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTSANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to thefollowing:(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion indirecting the filing of the informations against petitioners?(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretionin assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and24778?Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed graveabuse of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatoryevidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he leftthe police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.18 With such admission,PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he wasinjured since it is conclusive evidence against him and neednot be proven in any other proceeding.19Public respondents, represented by the Office of theOmbudsman through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise afactual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorariaction. They further postulate that this is the very samedefense advanced by petitioners in the charges against themand being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only bethreshed out in a full-blown trial.20

We find the present petition without merit.The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether thereexists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has beencommitted and that the accused is probably guilty thereofand, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with theappropriate courts.21 Settled is the rule that the SupremeCourt will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmansexercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers withoutgood and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.22 Saidexercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate23and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule isbased not only upon respect for the investigatory andprosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Officeof the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatoryproceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously

hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much thesame way that courts will be swamped if they had to reviewthe exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutorseach time they decided to file an information or dismiss acomplaint by a private complainant.24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs.Sandiganbayan,25 we held that:

This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistentpolicy of non-interference in the determination of theOmbudsman regarding the existence of probablecause, provided there is no grave abuse in theexercise of such discretion.

In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that theOmbudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in renderingthe disputed resolution and order.There was no abuse of discretion on the part of theOmbudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2Eduardos admission that he was in good physical conditionwhen he was released from the police headquarters.26 Suchadmission was never brought up during the preliminaryinvestigation. The records show that no such averment wasmade in petitioners counter-affidavit27 nor was there anydocument purporting to be the exculpatory statementattached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners onlyraised this issue in their motion for reconsideration.28 In hisopposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing adocument to the effect that he was in good physical conditionwhen he left the police station. However, the admissionmerely applied to the execution of said document and not tothe truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admissionthat petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter ofevidence best addressed to the public respondents

appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probativevalue can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on themerits.Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the properremedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:

. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not itsfunction to examine and evaluate the probative valueof all evidence presented to the concerned tribunalwhich formed the basis of its impugned decision,resolution or order.29

Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayansexercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78.Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction overtheir persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act

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No. 7975.30 As the positions of municipal mayors andbarangaycaptains are not mentioned therein, they claim theyare not covered by said law under the principle ofexpressiouniusestexclusio alterius.31Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.Sandiganbayan,32Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs.Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fallunder the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan. Nor can BarangayCaptain Mark AnthonyEsquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he isoutside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, asamended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides that it is only in caseswhere "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) areoccupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 orhigher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested inthe proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the casemay be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as providedin Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended."37 Note that underthe 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has asalary grade of 27.38 Since BarangayCaptain Esquivel is theco-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel,whose position falls under salary grade 27, theSandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion inassuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as overCriminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, thewrit of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.

For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ ofprohibition must also be denied.First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the courtitself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a

jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim.39 As earlierdiscussed, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over CriminalCases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot beresorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies providedby law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is grantedonly where no other remedy is available or sufficient to affordredress. That the petitioners have another and completeremedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generallyheld sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ.41In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in theordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to

quash the informations at the first instance but they did not.They have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapseas they have not shown any adequate excuse for their failureto do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for timeto file a motion to quash the informations, during their muchdelayed arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subjectfor certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely aninterlocutory order.43Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against aninferior court unless the attention of the court whoseproceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to thealleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 The foundation of thisrule is the respect and consideration due to the lower courtand the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;45 itcannot be presumed that the lower court would not properlyrule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presentedto it.46 The records show that petitioners only raised the issueof the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayanbefore this Court.1wphi1.ntNor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, whenrefused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and nota discretionary duty.47 The duty is ministerial only when thedischarge of the same requires neither the exercise of officialdiscretion nor judgment.48 Hence, this Court cannot issue awrit of mandamus to control or review the exercise ofdiscretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and

judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court.When a decision has been reached in a matter involvingdiscretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of toreview or correct it, however erroneous it may be.49

Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had anotherremedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where suchremedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamuswill not lie.50WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack ofmerit. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107040 April 12, 2000PILO MILITANTE, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Sixth Division,NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, represented by its

Project Manager, ANNABELLE D. CARANGDANG, and theREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.PUNO,J.:Petitioner files this petition for review of the Decision andResolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 254291upholding the constitutionality of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1315.Petitioner PiloMilitante is the registered owner of three (3)contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcelsare covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, allderived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of Deedsof Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live inthese lots.In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 13152expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in BagongBarrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and73960, and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018.Section 1 of said P.D. reads:

Sec. 1. The real properties covered by TransferCertificate of Title Nos. 70289, 73960 and a portionof 71357 identified as Lot Nos. 3593, 3594 and 3629in the name of Maria B. Castro and Lot No. 3206 inthe name of Bonifacio Co as Tax Declaration No.25395 with an aggregate area of 403,799 squaremeters, more or less; Lot Nos. 3591 and 3592containing a total area of 1440 square meters in the

name of Abdon Chan as per Tax Declaration Nos.24853 and 24854 and Lot Nos. 3603, 3605 and 3607containing a combined area of 1,590 square metersin the name of Pio [sic] Militante as per TaxDeclaration No. 24876 all of which were previouslycovered by Transfer Certificate [of] Title No. 71357and the adjacent real properties covered by TransferCertificates of Title No. 2017 and 2018 registered inthe name Leonora Carriedo containing an area of141,133 square meters, more less and all located atBagong Barrio, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, havingbeen identified as a blighted area and included in theSIR Program established under Letters ofInstructions No. 555 and ZIP Program as provided byExecutive Order No. 6-77 dated 21 July 1977 of theGovernor, Metropolitan Manila, are hereby declared

expropriated. The National Housing Authorityhereinafter referred to as the "Authority" isdesignated administrator for the nationalgovernment and is authorized to immediately takepossession, control and disposition of theexpropriated properties with the power of demolitionof their improvements. Pursuant thereto, theAuthority with the government of Caloocan City andin consultation with the Metro Manila Commissionshall evolve and implement a comprehensivedevelopment plan for the condemned properties.

The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slumarea that required the upgrading of basic facilities andservices and the disposal of the lots to their bona fideoccupants in accordance with the national Slum Improvementand Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila ZonalImprovement Program (ZIP).3It set aside P40 million as themaximum amount of just compensation to be paid thelandowners.4The NHA, as the decree's designated administrator for thenational government, undertook the implementation of P.D.1315 in seven (7) phases called the Bagong Barrio Project(BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquiredin 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioner'sland, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.On September 11, 1979, Proclamation No. 1893 declared theentire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone.Proclamation No. 1893 was amended on May 14, 1980 byProclamation No. 1967 which identified 244 sites inMetropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and

Urban Land Reform Zones.Meanwhile, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1396 created theDepartment of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHAunder the supervision of said Department.5On February 7,1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatoryfunctions of the NHA to the Human Settlements RegulatoryCommission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body attached to theDHS.6On September 24, 1981, petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking adeclaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land ReformProgram of the government. On October 2, 1981, HSRCCommissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificatedeclaring petitioner's lots "outside the declared Urban LandReform Zone." The certification reads as follows:

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Mr. PiloMelitante [sic]110 G. de Jesus St.Caloocan City.

Re: Subject : CertificationLand Description : Lot No. 3603,

3605, 3607 of theCadastral

Survey ofCaloocan

Cadastral CaseNo. 34 GLRO

CadastralRecord No.

1606.a. Tax Decl. No. :52773b. Location : G. de JesusSt., Caloocan Cityc. Title :53066, 53067, 53068d. Owner :PiloMelitante [sic]

Dear Mr. Militante:Anent your request dated 24 September 1981concerning the abovementioned subject property,

please be informed that said parcel of land is locatedoutside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone(LURZ) [sic].

Very truly yours,

RAYMUNDO R. DIZON, JR.Commissioner.7

With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate thesquatters on his land. Acting on the request, GeneralGaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a letter datedOctober 6, 1981 to Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr., of CaloocanCity, to conduct a census of the families occupyingpetitioners lots.8The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into thepossibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to

find out why a clearance should be issued or not for theremoval/demolition of all the illegal structures in the saidproperty."9The squatters did not attend the meeting. In viewof their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting DivisionManager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandumto the Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA,recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.10On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias grantedclearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures onpetitioner's property within three (3) months from receipt ofthe order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the24 families to the SapangPalay Resettlement Project. Theclearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio and reads asfollows:

Sir:This has reference to the letter of Mr. PiloMelitante[sic] which was received by our Office on 24September 1981 regarding his request for therelocation of the families presently occupying hisproperty situated at G. de Jesus Street, Balintawak,that City, covered by TCT Nos. 53066, 53067 and53068, subject of 1st Indorsement of City EngineerJose Uson.Evaluation of the request shows the same to meritfavorable consideration. In view thereof, clearance ishereby given that Office to dismantle and/or removeall the illegal structures from the above-citedproperties within three (3) months upon receipthereof, pursuant to the provisions of LOIs 19 and19-A, and its implementing directives from the Officeof the President.

A. Qualified for government resettlementassistance to SapangPalay ResettlementProject:[list of names of the 24 occupants]B. Disqualified from governmentresettlement assistance

NONE This clearance shall also cover all otherstructures on subject premises whoseowners refused to be interviewed and thosewho entered the same after the conduct ofcensus survey in 1981.May we request that the affected families beserved written notices given them at least

fifteen (15) days within which to vacatevoluntarily and/or prepare for theirrelocation, copies of which must befurnished this Office.To ensure the smooth conduct of relocationoperation thereat, we further request thatyou inform this Authority at least one (1)week ahead of the scheduled date ofimplementation of this clearance so wecould send our representative to coordinatethe same.Very truly yours,G. V. TOBIASMaj. Gen., AFP (Ret)General Manager.11

The demolition did not take place. In a letter datedSeptember 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired fromMayor Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans ofdeveloping petitioner's properties in the BagongBarrio Project. On December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistioreplied that "considering the said properties areprivate in character, the City has no plans presentlyor in the immediate future to develop or underwritethe development of said properties."12Four (4) years later, in 1986, BBP Phase 7 was listedas among the priority projects for implementationunder the government's Community Self-Help

Program.13

The NHA, through General Tobias,approved an emergency fund of P2 million for theacquisition of petitioner's lots. NHA startednegotiations with petitioner. In 1987, petitioner,through an authorized representative, made an initialoffer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made acounter-offer of P175.00 per square meter.Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and laterto P3,000.00. NHA General Manager Raymundo R.Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHA's maximumoffer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner,through his lawyer, in a letter dated March 20, 1989.14On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel,requested for a revalidation of his demolitionclearance and relocation of the squatters.15

On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager MonicoJacob revalidated the demolition clearance andinformed Mayor Asistio that the NHA was makingavailable enough serviced home lots in BagongSilangResettlement Project for the 24 families. The letter ofrevalidation reads:

Honorable Macario C. Asistio, Jr.MayorCaloocan City

Re: Revalidation of Letter-Adviceon the Relocation and Resettlementof Twenty-four (24) Families fromG. de Jesus St., Balintawak,Caloocan City.

Dear Mayor Asistio,This has reference to the twenty-four (24)squatter families from G. de Jesus St.,Balintawak, Caloocan City for relocation andresettlement by your City pursuant to theauthority vested by LOIs 19, 19-A and 691.Finding the documents submitted by yourCity to NHA to be in order, the provisions ofthe aforementioned LOIs and theimplementing directive from the Office ofthe President on squatter relocation andresettlement may be enforced.In accordance with the existing provisions ofLOI 19 that indigent families be givenresettlement assistance, we are advisingyou that the National Housing Authority ismaking available enough serviced homelots

in BagongSilang Resettlement Project fortwenty-four (24) families qualified forresettlement assistance per attachedapproved master list.We are sending our NHA representatives tocause the accomplishment and issuance ofthe necessary Entry Passes for the familiesgoing to our resettlement project and toprovide technical assistance and monitoryour relocation operation.We trust that the established policies,procedures and guidelines on squatterprevention and resettlement including theconduct of information drive, inter-agency

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coordination and the issuance of notices toaffected families, would be strictly observedto ensure peaceful, orderly and humanerelocation operation.Kindly be informed further that theeffectivity of this letter advice is valid onlyfor three (3) months from receipt hereof,subject to revalidation upon yourrecommendation if necessary.

Very truly yours,MONICO V. JACOBGeneral Manager.16

Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHAProject Manager in Bagong Barrio, refusedto implement the clearance to eject thesquatters on petitioner's land. At theconference of February 13, 1991,Carangdang claimed that petitioners landhad already been declared expropriated byP.D. 1315.Petitioner then filed with the respondentCourt of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibitionand Mandamus with Declaration asInexistent and Unconstitutional PresidentialDecree No. 1315" against the NHA andCarangdang.In a decision dated April 24, 1992, the

respondent Court of Appeals dismissed thepetition and held that petitioner failed toovercome the presumption of the decree'sconstitutionality.17Petitioner's motion forreconsideration was also denied on August31, 1992.18Hence, this recourse wherepetitioner raises the following issues:

IWHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTANNABELLE CARANGDANG CAN BECOMPELLED TO EFFECT THEDIRECTIVE/ MEMORANDUM OFRELOCATION/ RESETTLEMENTSUBJECTING THE SAID 24SQUATTER FAMILIES FROMUNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING

PETITIONERS SUBJECT PROPERTYWITHOUT DECLARING P.D. 1315AS VOID ANDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; AND

IIWHETHER OR NOT SAID P. D.1315 AT LEAST UP TO THE EXTENTOF PETITIONERS PROPERTIESADVERSELY AFFECTED CAN BEDECLARED NULL AND VOID FORBEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL.19

We deny the petition.First. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ ofprohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of anytribunal, corporation, board, orperson, whether exercisingfunctions judicial or ministerial, arewithout or in excess of its

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion, and there is no appealor any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law, a person aggrievedthereby may file a verified petitionin the proper court alleging thefacts with certainty and prayingthat judgment be renderedcommanding the defendant todesistfrom further proceedings in

the action or matter specifiedtherein.x xx x xx x x

x20Prohibition is a preventive remedy.21It seeks for a judgment orderingthe defendant to desist fromcontinuing with the commission ofan act perceived to be illegal.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not praythat respondent Carangdang should beordered to desist from relocating thesquatters. What petitioner challenges isrespondent Carangdang's refusal to

implement the demolition clearance issuedby her administrative superiors. The remedyfor a refusal to discharge a legal duty ismandamus, not prohibition.Second. The petitioner is not also entitled toa writ ofmandamus. Section 3, Rule 65provides:

Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation,board, or person, unlawfullyneglects the performance of an actwhich the law specifically enjoinsas a duty resulting from an office,trust or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use andenjoyment of a right or office towhich such other is entitled, andthere is no other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law, the personaggrieved thereby may file averified petition in the proper courtalleging the facts with certaintyand praying that judgment berendered commanding thedefendant, immediately or at someother specified time, to do the act

required to be done to protect therights of petitioner, and to pay thedamages sustained by thepetitioner by reason of thewrongful acts of the defendant.22

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,corporation, board, or person to do the actrequired to be done when it or he unlawfullyneglects the performance of an act whichthe law specifically enjoins as a dutyresulting from an office, trust or station, orunlawfully excludes another from the useand enjoyment of a right or office to whichsuch other is entitled, there being no otherplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law.23

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has awell-defined, clear and certain right to warrant thegrant of the writ of mandamus.24He failed todischarge this burden. The records show that there isno direct order from the NHA General Manageraddressed to respondent Carangdang to evict thesquatters and demolish their shanties on the subjectproperty. The NHA demolition clearance issued byGeneral Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressedto Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. Theclearance's revalidation by NHA General ManagerMonico Jacob was likewise addressed to MayorAsistio.1wphi1.ntFurthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedythat may be availed of only when there is no plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courseof law. A petition for mandamus is premature if thereare administrative remedies available to thepetitioner.25If superior administrative officers couldgrant the relief prayed for, special civil actions aregenerally not entertained.26In the instant case,petitioner has not exhausted his administrativeremedies. He may seek another demolition orderfrom the NHA General Manager this time directlyaddressed to respondent Carangdang or thepertinent NHA representative. In fact, theGovernment Corporate Counsel27asserts thatpetitioner should have brought Carangdang'sinaction to the attention of her superiors. There istherefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicialaction as the administrative set-up could have easily

corrected the alleged failure to act.28

The GeneralManager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, hasthe power of supervision over the operations andinternal affairs of NHA.29Third. Petitioner's procedure in assailing theconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 is flawed. Hisprincipal concern is the relocation of the squatters onhis land. If he could attain this aim, petitionerhimself admits in his Petition that "there may not bea need for declaring P.D. No. 1315 null and void."30Indeed, petitioner assails P.D. No. 1315, purely outof pique against respondent Carangdang who refusedto implement the demolition order of her superior.To use petitioner's own words, he has to attack the

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7/29/2019 Rule 65 Full Text (1)

8/67

constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 "to . . . breakrespondent Carangdang's hypocrisy and pretension."We hold that petitioner has no privilege to assail P.D.No. 1315 as unconstitutional to serve a pettypurpose.Moreover, the facts reveal that petitioner's land isnot in clear danger of expropriation. P.D. No. 1315was issued way back in 1975. It covered 40 hectaresof land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Almost all ofthese 40 hectares had been expropriated as early as1979 except the 1,590 sq. m. lot of petitioner.Considering this long lapse of time, it is doubtful ifthe government would still desire to expropriatepetitioner's lot which only measures 1,590 sq. m.There is another reason why petitioner's lot may nolonger be expropriated by government. The landsought to be expropriated under P.D. No. 1315 isdefined as an area "identified as a blighted area andincluded in the SIR Program" which means SlumImprovement and Resettlement Program. OnOctober 2, 1981, however, HSRC CommissionerDizon, Jr. certified that petitioner's lot is "outside thedeclared Urban Land Reform Zone." With thiscertification, there is reason to believe that takingpetitioner's tiny lot of 1,590 sq. m. will serve nosocial purpose.Finally, petitioner cannot blow hot and cold on the

constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315. He did notquestion its constitutionality when it was decreed in1975. In 1987, he even negotiated with NHA for theprice of his land. Implicitly but clearly, he recognizedthe validity of the decree. The negotiationunfortunately fell and the government did not takeany further step to expropriate his land. It was onlyin 1991 after respondent Carangdang refused toeject the squatters in petitioner's land thatpetitioner, out of pique, alleged that P.D. No. 1315 isconstitutionally infirmed. A well recognized rule inconstitutional law is that estoppel may operate toprevent a party from asserting that an act isunconstitutional.31There is also merit to the cautionary words of theSolicitor General that to allow petitioner's flip-

flopping stance "might spawn legal and socialramifications which cannot just be lightly ignored,"32since almost all of the 40 hectare land covered byP.D. No. 1315 had been expropriated and awardedto the poor people of our society without theirlandowners challenging the validity of the decree. Inhis Concurring Opinion, our esteemed colleague, Mr.Justice Mendoza, denigrates this warning and cites

Alfonso v. Pasay City33as authority for the view that"if property is taken by the government without thebenefit of expropriation proceedings and is devotedto public use, such as a road, after many years, theproperty owner may no longer bring an action forrecovery of his land, but may simply demandpayment of just compensation for his land."34Acareful reading of the Alfonso case, however, willshow that this Court did not rule that the onlyremedy of an aggrieved landowner in such asituation is to "simply demand payment of justcompensation." To be sure, this Court contemplatedthe remedy of restoring possession to the aggrievedlandowner. If it did not order the remedy, it was onlybecause it was no longer feasible as the lot involvedhad already been converted to a road. The exactruling states:35

As registered owner, he could bring anaction to recover possession at any timebecause possession is one of the attributesof ownership of land. However, saidrestoration of possession by the City ofPasay is neither convenient nor feasible

because it is now and has been used forroad purposes. So, the only relief availableis for the City of Pasay to make duecompensation, which it could and shouldhave done years ago since 1925.

In the case at bar, the landowners concerned maynot opt for the right to be paid just compensation.The process is not an easy one and may take yearsespecially in light of the budget difficulties of thegovernment. We take judicial notice of the fact thatthe current budget deficit of the governmentamounts to P8.9 billion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133033 June 15, 2005PAMANA, INC., petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former NinthDivision), FEDERICO HERNANDEZ, DANILOHERNANDEZ, ISAGANI VILLANUEVA, ROMEOVILLANUEVA, ISAIS VILLANUEVA, ROSITA PACHECO,CRISTITUTO PACHECO, ANNABELLE PACHECO,TERESITA FLORES, NORMA VILLAMIN, LIZA LIWANAG,ANSELMO SATURNO, ROBERTO VILLANUEVA, EDENBLANCA, FRANCISCO CAYANAN, ISIDRA MANGIRON,CRESENCIO TOLENTINO, VIRGILIO VILLANUEVA,PABLO MANIMTIM, FEDELIZA ALVAREZ, MAMERTOALVAREZ, LYDIA ZAPANTA, FILOMINO ENCARNACION,CARLITO ALMENDRALA, NORMA SOLON, ROMEOHENURALDA, NELIA CHAVEZ, MARISSA GONZALES,MARIA SANONE, ISABEL CONDE, LILY GECES,MAGDALENA RIVERA, JIMMY RAZON, JESSIE BEBIS,CORAZON DE VERA, MARISSA GAMUTIN, JESSIEROBLEDO, EDUARDO MANAGA, NESTO CORVILLA,GUILLERMO DEL SOL, MARIQUITA BAMBILLA,GABRIELA MENDRALA, JORGE SATURNO, ANASTACIOALVAREZ and DEMETRIA ALVAREZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O NGARCIA,J.:On appeal to this Court by way of this petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are thefollowing issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 45879, to wit:

1. Decision dated January 7, 1998,1setting asidethe Order of Execution and the writs of executionand demolition issued by the Municipal Trial Court ofCalamba, Laguna insofar as Lots 5 and 7 areconcerned, in the ejectment suit thereat commencedby the petitioner against the herein respondents;and2. Resolution dated March 5, 1998,2denyingpetitioners motion for reconsideration.

Reviewed, the records disclose the following factual backdrop:On April 17, 1996, in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,Laguna two (2) separate complaints,3both for forcible entrywith prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, were filed by

the petitioner against two (2) sets of defendants (now, therespondents). Docketed in the same court as Civil Cases No.3414 and 3424, the complaints uniformly alleged, inter alia,that petitioner is the owner and in lawful possession ofparcels of land located at barrios Bocal and Leche