rule 72 the mr of the petitioners was denied; hence,...

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 60

RULE 72Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001)Arcilla, Jay

FACTS:Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died

intestate in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his elevenchildren, who are all of legal age. He left several real propertieslocated in Manila and in Tarlac including a business- Manalo’sMachine Shop with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela. InNovember, the respondents, who are eight of thesurviving children filed a petition with the RTC for the judicialsettlement of the estate of their late father and for theappointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof.The trial court issued an order setting the said petition forhearing and directing the publication of the order for three (3)consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation inMetro Manila, and directing service by registered mail of theorder. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole worldin default, except the government, and set the receptionof evidence of the petitioners.

However, this order of general default was set aside by the trialcourt upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10)days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

The trial court called resolved such issues in thefollowing manner: 1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering themerits 2. denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses areirrelevant and immaterial 3.declared that the court hadjurisdiction 4.denied the motion for inhibition 5.) set theapplication of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regularadministrator in the for hearing.

The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed apetition forcertiorari, contending that: (1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did notacquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of thesurviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;(4)there was absence of earnest efforts towardcompromise among members of the same family, inaccordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification ofnon-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition forreview.

ISSUES: W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the

RTC which denied their motion for the outright dismissalof the petition for judicial settlement of estate ?

RULING:NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of

Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is aSPECIAL PROCEEDING and, as such, it is a remedywhereby the respondents seek to establish a status, aright, or a particular fact..

In the determination of the nature of an actionor proceeding, the averments and the character ofthe relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling.A careful scrutiny of the petition belies the claim that the sameis in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petitioncontains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in apetition for the settlement of estate of adeceased person such as the fact of death andhis residence which are foundation facts uponwhich all the subsequent proceedings in theadministration of the estate rest. It alsocontains an enumeration of the names of his legalheirs including a tentative list of the properties left bythe deceased which are sought to be settled inthe probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs


prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubtas regard the intention to seek judicial settlement of theestate of their deceased father.

DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit

PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS Arcilla, Jay

FACTS:Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra

were registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila .Upon thedeath of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his sixchildren entered into an extrajudicial settlement ofGraciana's estate. They adjudicated and divided amongthemselves the real property .Under the agreement: Gracianoreceived 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14share of the said property .The heirs executed and forged an"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property withWaiver of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves theparcel of land. Graciano then donated to his children, share andshare alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 squaremeters registered under Graciano's name .The land wasfurther subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1st

lot to a third person but retained ownership over the 2ndlot.Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher .He sold the2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name. Gracianodies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs .A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila bythe 6 children; alleging that Natcher through the employment

of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd

lot by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Salein her favour; that their legitimes have been impaired. In herreply, Natcher averred that she was legally married toGraciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, shewas likewise considered a compulsory heir of thelatter .RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by the lateGraciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited bylaw and thus a complete nullity, that no evidence that aseparation of property was agreed upon in the marriagesettlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation ofproperty between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibitedfrom entering into a contract of sale. It is not also a validdonation BUT can be regarded as an extension ofadvance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being acompulsory heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decisionratiocinating t is the probate court that has exclusivejurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of theestate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action forreconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond itsjurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a specialproceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceasedperson.ISSUE:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of generaljurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of titlewith damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement ofthe estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as toadvancement of property made by the decedent to any of theheirs?

HELD:NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.


Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in thiswise: a) A civil actionis one by which a party sues another forthe enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention orredress of a wrong.A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both aregoverned by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject tospecific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A specialproceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish astatus, a right or a particular fact. There lies a markeddistinction between an action and a special proceeding. Anactionis a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice inthe manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is themethod of applying legal remedies according to definiteestablished rules. The term special proceedingmay bedefined as an application or proceeding to establish the statusor right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in specialproceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless thestatute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, theremedy is granted generally upon an application or motionIt may accordingly be stated generally that actions includethose proceedings which are instituted and prosecutedaccording to the ordinary rules and provisions relating toactions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedingsinclude those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense,but is instituted and prosecuted according to some specialmode as in the case of proceedings commenced withoutsummons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which arecharacteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding musttherefore be in the nature of a distinct and independentproceeding for particular relief, such as may be institutedindependently of a pending action, by petition or motion uponnotice

TABUADA VS. RUIZAzarcon, Pia Lea

FACTS:

Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestateestate of Calaliman) was filed in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered adecision that they will no longer be setting any hearing asparties assured that they are going to submit a "Motion forjudgment based on an amicable settlement" on or beforeDecember 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC terminated theproceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement invokingSec.3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calalimanfiled MR. On the ground that it was premature there being yetno payment of debt and distribution of estate and that theyhave prepared necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR,denied.Hence this petition.

ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing thecase for failure of parties to submit amicable settlement?

RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failureof parties to submit amicable settlement. While a compromiseagreement or an amicable settlement is very stronglyencouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrantany procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for thecourt to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not havebeen terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account ofthe mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicablesettlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On AnAmicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature ofspecial proceedings (which do not depend on the will of anactor, but on a state or condition of things or persons notentirely within the control of the parties interested), itsdismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where thetermination of the proceeding is the sole remedy consistentwith equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of theparties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, whichauthorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintifffails to comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannoteven be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous,termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of theDecember 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial courtneither required the submission of the amicable settlement orthe aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that


should they fail to submit the compromise within the givenperiod, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot becategorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent thatits defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. Andeven if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannotbe forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only stronglyencouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate acompromise. An order requiring submission of an amicablesettlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and ispremised on an erroneous interpretation and application of thelaw and rules.

HILADO VS. CAAzarcon, Pia Lea

Facts:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto diedintestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, privaterespondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the timeof his death, there were two pending civil cases againstBenedicto involving the petitioners. The first, was then pendingwith the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44,with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.The second was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and FirstFarmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.

Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filedwith the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters ofadministration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 ofthe Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an orderappointing private respondent as administrator of the estate ofher deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration inher favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted anInventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the Listof Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondentincluded as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two

pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod Citycourts.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC aManifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that theybe furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertainingto the intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an omnibusmotion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for thesubmission by private respondent of the required inventory ofthe decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings ormotions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part ofprivate respondent in her administration of the estate, andassailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far asunverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion,on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties withinthe contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in theintestate proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim

have the right to participate in the settlement proceeding byway of intervention under Rule 19

Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate ofthe deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes andorders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.

RULING:Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set

forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedentwhose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodatecontingent claims.

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurerequires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter inlitigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or aninterest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely


affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in thecustody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from interveningin the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held thatthe legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual andmaterial, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent andexpectant."

Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class ofclaims to be filed under the notice to creditors required underRule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive thedeath of the decedent and may be commenced against theadministrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.

#2In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings donot provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate,the right to participate in every aspect of the testate orintestate proceedings, but instead provides for specificinstances when such persons may accordingly act in thoseproceedings, we deem that while there is no general right tointervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed toseek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court notexplicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or reliefsought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, andthere is no other modality under the Rules by which suchinterests can be protected.

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to therecords of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferableprecedent than mandating the service of court processes andpleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditorin seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposedof in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on SpecialProceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties"the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to suchnotice. The instances when notice has to be given to interestedparties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the

time and place of examining and allowing the account of theexecutor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerningthe petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sellpersonal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumberreal estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing forthe application for an order for distribution of the estateresidue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged inher submitted inventory, the existence of the pending casesfiled by the petitioners.

RULE 73Venue and Process

EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIOAlvarez, Miguel Lorenzo

FACTS:

In the instant case, petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed withthe CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administratorof the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that hisfather, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City.Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente andCarlos),on the other hand, who claim that they are illegitimatechildren of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged thatAndres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayedfor the dismissal of the case on the ground that the venue hadbeen improperly laid. The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Eugenio Eusebio. Hence thepetition.

ISSUE:Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal?

RULING:

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 0

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don AndresEusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always beendomiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a houseand lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because hisson, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transferto the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and wasforced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that“domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a placemerely for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledgethat one will never again be able, on account of illness, to returnhome. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, thepresumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon Citypermanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andresdid not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely;Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was notpresented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, oralienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of hischildren remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of hishouse at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando,Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed byAndres when he was married in articulo mortis to ConcepcionVillanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residenceis San Fernando, Pampanga.

The requisites for a change of domicile include (1)capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presenceat the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently.Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there isno change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.

With respect to the contention that appellants submittedthemselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because theyintroduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it mustbe noted that appellants specifically made of record that theywere NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court,except for the purpose only of assailing the same.

In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at thetime of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; thatthe CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint anadministrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue havingbeen laid improperly.

GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALSAlvarez, Miguel Lorenzo

FACTS:On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned

property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fulefiled with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration andexparte appointment as special administratrix over the estate.Subsequently, the motion was granted..There was an allegationthat the wife was Carolina Carpio

Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf oftheir child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied byCFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, andas a mere illegitimate sister of thedeceased is not entitled tosucceed from him.

The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled theappointment of Fule. Preciosa became special administratrixupon a bond of P30, 000.00.

ISSUES:a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdictionb.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of

Court Rule 73, Section 1 mean?RULING:

Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant ofthe Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or analien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administrationgranted, and his estate settled at the CFI in theprovince inwhich he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an


inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in whichhe had estate.

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of theestate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusionof all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far asit depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or ofthelocation of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit orproceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe originalcase, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that thedeceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore thevenueof Laguna was improper.

Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), butPreciosa did not waive it, merely requested foralternativeremedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse.However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction” which is conferredby Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIsindependently from the place of residence of the deceased.

Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition shouldshow the existence of jurisdiction to make theappointmentsought, and should allege all the necessary factssuch as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets,intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next ofkin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.

Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic andshould be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of thestatute or rule in which it isemployed.-Same meaning as“inhabitant”.

CUENCO VS. CABalanay, Rendel Bryan

FACTS:

In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors’Hospital survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, RosaCayetano Cuenco and their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69

Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by hischildren of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion CuencoManguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes andTeresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed aPetition for Letters of Administration with the Court of FirstInstance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate inManila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu andQuezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco,the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) forthe probate of the last will and testament, where she wasnamed executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion todismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolutionover the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on theprobate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFIQuezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or impropervenue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusivejurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismisswere denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes andissued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

The CA ruled in the following manner:Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers bothtestate and intestate proceedings. The Special Proceeding ofthe Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whosejurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is thatcourt which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factualissues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a validwill, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebuat the time of his death.Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted inthe Cebu CFI), it follows that the said court must exercisejurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the


petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa CayetanoCuenco. The said respondent should assert her rights within theframework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead ofinvoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge ofthe Cebu CFI, stated that the petition for appointment of specialadministrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of theCourt today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try thisproceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in this connection that thesaid judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdictionover the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from themoment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise ofjurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At allevents, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law anddoes not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.

ISSUEWhether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with

whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquiresexclusive jurisdiction.

RULING:No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in

issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City courtfrom proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling andsetting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admissionto probate of the last will and testament of the deceased andappointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bondpursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdictionto the exclusion of all other courts, not the court with whom theestate or intestate petition is first filed. Since the Quezon Citycourt took cognizance over the probate petition before it andassumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent anddeference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be

left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercisejurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is notan element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely ofvenue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the promptadministration of justice. It would be an unfair imposition uponpetitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of thedecedent's last will and settle his estate in accordancetherewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venueand the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much moretime, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to theCebu court every time she has an important matter of theestate to take up with the probate court.

In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizanceof the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to thetestate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and ineffect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residenceof the decedent and whether he did leave a last will andtestament upon which would depend the proper venue of theestate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.

Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court'sassumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on thebasis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widowand finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence ofthe decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein— with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —could not be contested except by appeal from said court in theoriginal case. The last paragraph of said Rule expresslyprovides:... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends onthe place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of hisestate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except inan appeal from that court, in the original case, or when thewant of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdictionappears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had


such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon Citycourt not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwiseshown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petitionbefore it and assumed jurisdiction.

Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to theQuezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and inavoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court'sexercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent(with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and itsadmission to probate of his last will and testament andappointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bondin pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its ordersand actions taken in the testate proceedings before it beapproved and authorized rather than to annul all suchproceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the sameproceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more tothe Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeedand in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court onthe strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence ofrecord, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of thedecedent.

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUISBalanay, Rendel Bryan

FACTS:During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted

three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit onMarch 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, onMay 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whomhe had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee,an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before theFamily Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued aDecree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custodyon December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo marriedFelicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.),then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondentbut lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage

up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death ofFelicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in this case) sought thedissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and thesettlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, shefiled a petition for letters of administration before the RegionalTrial Court of Makati City.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of thechildren of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion todismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state acause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters ofadministration should have been filed in the Province of Lagunabecause this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to hisdeath. He further claimed that respondent has no legalpersonality to file the petition because she was only a mistressof Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was stilllegally married to Merry Lee.

The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent,possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that thevenue was properly laid. Mila, one of the children by firstmarriage, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan.The motion was granted and the case was reraffled to Branch134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were raised at thesecond trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition forletters of administration. It held that, at the the time ofFelicisimo’s death, he was duly elected governor and a residentof Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled thatrespondent was without legal capacity to file the petition forletters of administration because her marriage with thedecedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.

On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. Theappellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rulesof Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, forpurposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actualresidence or place of abode of a person as distinguished fromlegal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo


discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actuallyresided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters ofadministration was properly filed in Makati City.

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insistthat the venue of the subject petition for letters ofadministration was improperly laid because at the time of hisdeath, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Theycontend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray andRomualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" issynonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanentresidence to which when absent, one intends to return. Theyclaim that a person can only have one domicile at any giventime. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petitionfor letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,Laguna.

Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether venue was properly laid.

RULING:Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the

petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimoshould be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "inwhich he resides at the time of his death." The term "resides"connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpretedin the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule inwhich it is employed. In the application of venue statutes andrules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is ofsuch nature - residence rather than domicile is the significantfactor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it isconstrued as meaning residence and not domicile in thetechnical sense. The word "resides" should be viewed orunderstood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actualor physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of

abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual staythereat.

In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residencesimply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a givenplace, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place andalso an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular lengthof time of residence is required though; however, the residencemust be more than temporary. There is a distinction between"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" forpurposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms,that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes offixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of aperson is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actualresidence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be hislegal residence or domicile provided he resides therein withcontinuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a personmay have his residence in one place and domicile in another. Inthe instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimowas domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that healso maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find thatFelicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes offixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. The subjectpetition for letters of administration was validly filed in theRegional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction overAlabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed onDecember 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still amunicipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of theNational Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdictionover Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as perSupreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subjectpetition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court ofMakati City.

Petition is DENIED.


CAMAYA VS. PATULANDONBorja, Catherine

FACTS:On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix)

executed a notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A toher grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, thetestatrix herself filed the petition for the probate. Later, thetestatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising thesaid Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (theexecutor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan, and her grandsonMangulabnan – to the extent of 1/5 each.

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him byexecutor Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandongrefused to heed the request because of the codicil whichmodified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an‘action for partition’ against Patulandong in the RTC. The courtin this partition ordered the partitioning of the property.However, the court holds that the partition is without prejudiceto the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules ofCourt. Hence, subsequently, Patulandong filed before theRegional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of thecodicil of the testatrix.Meanwhile, by virtue of the decision in the partition case,Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrixover Lot No. 288-A and a new TCT was issued in his name. Helater on sold the lot to herein petitioner, Camayas.Finally, when the RTC ruled on admitting the petition filed byPatulandong for probate of the codicil, the RTC likewise declaredthat the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas, null andvoid.ISSUE:

Does the RTC Nueva Ecija as probate court havejurisdiction to declare the sale between Mangulabnan andCamayas null and void?

RULING:It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in

charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannotadjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a partof the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outsideparties. All that said court could do as regards said properties isto determine whether they should or should not be included inthe inventory or list of properties to be administered by theadministrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if thereis, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing partieshave to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination ofthe conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannotdo so.

Having been apprised of the fact that the property inquestion was in the possession of third parties and moreimportant, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in thename of such third parties, the respondent court should havedenied the motion of the respondent administrator andexcluded the property in question from the inventory of theproperty of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such thirdpersons of their possession and ownership of the propertyMoreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree providesthat certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.

PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHINGBorja, Catherine

FACTS:Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock

investments, bank deposits and interests in certain businesses.She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their twominor children. Milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelitafiled with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement ofMiguelita’s estate. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the groundsthat petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties ofan administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composedof “paraphernal properties.”


Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition,alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in theestate. Respondent countered that she has direct and materialinterest in the estate because she gave half of her inheritedproperties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “wouldundertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in thecapacity of business partners.”Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court anomnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1)payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of theestate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’sfees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition anddistribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,”considering that there is yet no determination “whether theproperties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernalor owned in a joint venture.”

The intestate court allowed the payment of the estatetaxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer forpartition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed“premature.” It also ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claimas indicated in her opposition to the instant petition isnecessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in theamended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal orthe paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownershipbetween the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnershipventure.’”

ISSUE:May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and

pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimedto be part of the decedents estate?RULING:

It is already recognized that probate court may hear andpass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is todetermine whether or not a property should be included in theinventory. In such situations the adjudication is merelyincidental and provisional.However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose ofthe hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine

the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According tothe intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent)owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that shehas a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, sheshould be given her day in court. The intended day in court orhearing is geared towards resolving the propriety ofrespondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulkof Miguelitas estate.Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intentwas to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory,however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings revealsher real intention.Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had oversteppedits jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain ahands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in thisjurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line ofdecisions, that when a question arises as to ownership ofproperty alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceasedperson, but claimed by some other person to be his property,not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased butby title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, suchquestion cannot be determined in the course of an intestate orprobate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has nojurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must besubmitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdictionas a regional trial court.

REYES vs. SOTEROBueno, Jirene Mercy

FACTS:

Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition forthe settlement of estate of Elena Lising, claiming that she is theniece and heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyesfiled for an Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child ofElena Lising and the latter’s husband Serafin Delos Santos,hence the petition should be dismissed and that she beappointed administrator of the estate.


In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued bethe Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she was adopted bythe spouses pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court ofFirst Instance promulgated and duly registered with the Office ofCivil Registrar. Also presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicatingthat the adoption decree was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and aDecree of Final Distribution issued by the Philippine VeteransAffairs Office (PVAO) showing that benefits were paid to ElenaLising, widow of Serafin Delos Santos and his daughter AnnaJoyce Delos Santos.

Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of theadoption decree claiming that no proceedings for adoption evertook place. Upon Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, howeverCA dismissed the petition which became final and executory.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediateresolution of her opposition. RTC issued a Resolution deferringresolution pending the outcome of the criminal case filedagainst the Petitioner for falsification of public documents.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint SpecialAdministrator before the RTC, praying that the Branch Clerk ofCourt Atty. Paulino Saguyod be appointed as such, which thecourt granted.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of AttySaguyod reiterating his contention that she is the sole heir ofthe decedent and that the former was appointed without beingrequired to file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a specialcivil action before the CA alleging that said resolution. CAnullified the resolution of the RTC and it held that the presidingRespondent Judge Cesar Sotero gravely abused his discretion inappointing Atty. Saguyod as special administrator.

ISSUE:Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her

adoption as assailed by the respondents in the proceeding ofsettlement of estate.

RULING:No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any

evidence other than those which she had already presentedbefore the trial court. The documents presented by thePetitioners were issued under the seal of the issuing offices andwere signed by the proper officers.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in theperformance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated. Mere imputations ofirregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoptiondecree since the certifications and its contents are presumedvalid until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proofcan be presented only in a separate action brought principallyfor the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot beassailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement ofdecedent’s estate as held in Santos v. Aranzanso.

Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity ofthe adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim thatshe is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categoricalpronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree ofadoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter as wellas the facts stated should be deemed legitimate, genuine andreal.

Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remainsrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against herstanding as such. Therefore as long as petitioner’s adoption isconsidered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in thedecedent’s estate.

COCA VS. BORROMEOBueno, Jirene Mercy

FACTS:

Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate. They


possessed property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97hectares covered by OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan;Lot 1112 with an area of 18.02 hectares covered by OCT in thename of heirs of Juan Pangilinan and Lot 1920 with an area of 8hectares which was surveyed in the name of ConcepcionPangilinan. The spouses had 3 children namely, Prima,Concepcion, and Francisco all surnamed Pangilinan.

A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estateof the deceased spouses Pangilinan. The administratorpresented a project partition combining Lots 1927 and 1112with an area of 22 hectares. The partition are as follows: 3hectares for Crispin Borromeo for his attorney’s fees; 5.3hectares for Francis; 6.33 hectares for Prima and 7.3 hectaresfor Concepcion. It was also provided therein that the sum of5,O88.50 pesos as alleged debt of Concepcion should equallydivided among the 3 heirs.

Heirs of Francisco opposed the said partition contending that inan order of the court in December 6, 1963, Francisco owned 12hectares in 18 hectares of Lot 1112 because Prima sold hershare to Francis and what is left for Concepcion is only 6hectares and that the payment for Concepcion’s debt was notproperly allowed.

The lower court deferred action on the partition until ownershipof the 12 hectares is determined in an ordinary action.. Heirs ofFrancisco moreover filed a supplemental opposition praying thatLot 1920 with 8 hectares should also be included in the projectpartition.

No separate action had been filed with regard to the ownershipof the 12 hectare land hence the trial court approve the projectpartition excluding the 12 hectares. Petitioners headed byFilomena Coca, as administrator assailed the lower court’sdecision, which however was sustained by the CA.

Petitioners appealed contending that the lower court as aprobate court has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the12 hectare portion of Lot 1112.

ISSUE: Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be

decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action.

RULING:

It should be clarified that whether a particular mattershould be resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its generaljurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not ajurisdictional question. It is a procedural question involving amode of practice which may be waived.

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should notbe passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. Thatquestion should be ventilated in a separate action. Howeverthat general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified byexpediency and convenience.

Although generally, probate court may not decide a question oftitle of ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, orthe question is one of collation or advancement or the partiesconsent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate courtand the rights of third parties are not impaired then the probatecourt is competent to decide the question of ownership.

We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception tothe general rule. Here the probate court had already receivedevidence on the ownership of the 12 hectare land during thehearing of the motion for its exclusion from the inventory. Theonly interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared inthe intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratumof society, they should not be forced to incur additionalexpenses by bringing a separate action to determine theownership of the 12-hectare land. The just, expeditious andinexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco to file inthe intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding, a motion in theform of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for


the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts insupport of their claim.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,VS.LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRANBorlagdatan, April

FACTS:

It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal,Sr.) contracted two marriages.

1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughternamed Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2ndmarriage with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to aboy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).

By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver ofRights executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over theestate of their father, a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued aTCT in the name of “Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.

Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.

In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by SoleHeir of Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself theCaloocan parcel of land, and was subsequently registered(1988) in her name “Leonila Portugal Beltran, married toMerardo M. Beltran, Jr.”

In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaintagainst Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication andTCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila is not relatedwhatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled toinherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly prayed thatsaid TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in their(petitioner’s) name.

A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial courtdismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack ofjurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trialorder, on the ground that petitioner’s status and right asputative heirs had not been established before a probate court.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carinovs. Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court maypass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of theparties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted toquestion the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essentialto the determination of the case.

However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellatecourt held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity ofthe two marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issueis the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed theTC’s dismissal of the case.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the casefor annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and ofthe TCT issued in her name.

RULING: NO.In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or

wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate,executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit ofAdjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 ofthe Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to thegeneral rule that when a person dies leaving a property, itshould be judicially administered and the competent courtshould appoint a qualified administrator, in the orderestablished in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.


Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction todeclare who are the heirs of a deceased.

CALMA VS. TANEDO

Shain Ann C.

Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal propertyshould be filed in the testamentary proceeding of the deceasedwife.

FACTS:

Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were owners ofthe subject property, being their conjugal property. They wereindebted to respondent Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable againstthe conjugal property. Fausta died leaving a will wherein sheappointed her daughter, Maria Calma as administratrix of herproperties. In the probate proceedings, Maria was appointed asjudicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased.

While probate proceedings were pending, respondent Tanedofiled a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of thedebt. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. In theexecution of the judgment, the subject property was sold by thesheriff.

Maria Calma ,as administratrix of the estate of Fausta, filed thepresent action to annul the sale of the property and prays thatthe estate of the deceased be declared as the absolute owner.The probate proceedings of the deceased were instituted inaccordance with Act No. 3176.

ISSUE: Whether the debts may be recovered against thehusband of the deceased.

RULING:No.

Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for theliquidation of conjugal property:

1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for thesettlement of the estate of a deceased spouse

2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of theproperty of a conjugal partnership.

These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.

In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was alreadyinstituted for the partition of the conjugal property. It followsthen that when respondent filed a suit, the power of EulalioCalma as legal administrator of the conjugal property whileFausta was living had ceased and passed to Maria Calma asadministratrix appointed in the testamentary proceedings.

Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable against theconjugal property should have been filed in the testamentaryproceedings of the deceased and not against the husband ofthe deceased who had already ceased as administrator of theconjugal property.

The court also annulled the sale of the subject property. Theproperty should be demed subject to the testamentaryproceedings of the deceased Fausta.

OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANOCastillo, Shain Ann

Doctrine: Husband is no longer an administrator of theconjugal estate of deceased wife.

FACTS:


Spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco executed adeed to convey to spouses Conrado Potenciano and RufinaReyes by way of sale with pacto de retro a town lot with ahouse. The subject property though registered in the name ofOcampo, in reality it belonged to him and his wife as conjugalproperty.

On the same day, Ocampo signed another document, making itappear that, for an annual rental, the spouses Potenciano wereleasing the house to him for the duration of the redemptionperiod.

Petitioner spouses failed to repurchase the property. Thus, anaffidavit for consolidation of title was filed by Potenciano, on thestrength of which, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the nameof spouses Potenciano.

When Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes died, respondentPotenciano gave Paz Yatco another option to repurchase theproperty. Yatco sought to exercise the option and deposited themoney in court, when Potenciano rejected the same. Yatcobrought an action to compel respondent to accept the moneyand to have the property reinstated in her name and that of herhusband. She also alleged that the real transaction betweenthem was an equitable mortgage.

Potenciano’s children intervened and filed a cross-complaint,alleging that the option to repurchase was null and void as tothe share of their mother Rufina Reyes in the property whichshare passed to them by right of inheritance.

ISSUES:(1) What is the real contract between the parties?

(2) Whether the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has theauthority to enter in anagreement of repurchase after the deathof his wife.

RULING:

(1) The real contract entered into between petitioner andrespondent was an equitable mortgage. Therefore, theconsolidation of title effected by respondent Potencianowas null and void. As a consequence, Potenciano’schildren has no right over the subject property, since theproperty never passed to their parents.

(2) Potenciano had no such authority. The rule that upon thedissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, thehusband must liquidate the partnership affairs is nowobsolete.

The present rules of court now provides that,“when themarriage is dissolved by the death of either husband orwife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in thetestate or intestate proceedings of the deceasedspouse.”

RULE 74Summary Settlement of Estates

MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIOCastillo, Rochelle Jane

FACTS:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First

Instance of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas,the Hon. J.S. Powell presiding, awarding the possession of thelands described in the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs. Theaction is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of thegoods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the saiddeceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which thesaid Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the


defendants had been occupying for some years before thecommencement of this action.

ISSUE:Whether or not Simon Malahacan can validly demand

the recovery of possession from the Ignacio?

RULING:No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership

of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in hisdeath. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the landsinvolved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs atlaw, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners andwere entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is notalleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record orthe evidence in this case that there were debts outstandingagainst Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The onlyground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs atlaw possession of the real estate of which his intestate diedseized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay thedebts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre, administrator ofthe estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil.Rep., 321), this court said: "x x x The Code of Procedure in CivilActions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition forpartition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.When there are no debts existing against the estate, there iscertainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator inthe settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs.When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts,there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with thecosts and expenses of an administrator. The property belongingabsolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts againstthe estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in anyway whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs."

ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJOCastillo, Rochelle Jane

FACTS:

Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga onNovember 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separatepetitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. Thislot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late EustaquioArcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City ofZamboanga. In the petition dated November 12 GeronimoArcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought thecancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased andprayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the namesof the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in thepetition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death ofthe deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales oftheir respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor ofco-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496(Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that theproportion of each heir's participation in said lot should beaccurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before anyother material pleading could be filed with respect to thispetition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed theNovember 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition,docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for theissuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitionerpreparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in

dismissing the administration proceedings under the authorityof section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon avermentsthat the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share inits distribution are all of age?

RULING: No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court,

if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs andlegatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by theirjudicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters ofadministration, divide the estate among themselves as they see


fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of theRegister of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so inan ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on theproposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimumrequirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. thedecedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institutionof special proceedings and the appointment of an administratorfor the settlement of the estate for the reason that it issuperfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondentsapparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon theheirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pendingobligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age. We cannotentirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention inthe past, we had occasion to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan,et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not preclude the heirs frominstituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has nodebts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for goodreasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allowsthe heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they maysee fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does notcompel them to do so if they have good reasons to take adifferent course of action. Said section is not mandatory orcompulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein ofthe word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of therule would have employed the word shall as was done in otherprovisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the wordmay its used not only once but in the whole section whichindicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to thediscretion of the heirs.

PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALSCadavis, Albert

FACTS:

• Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without awill and survived by his spouse victoria herein petitionerand his sister Rita herein private respondent.

• Rita instituted a special proceeding before the RTC forthe issuance of letters of administration in her favoralleging that:

1) She and Victoria are the only surviving heirs;

2) Deceased left no will;

3) There are no creditors;

4) He left several properties his death benefits to PAL,PALEA, PESALA and SSS as well as savings depositwith PNB and PCIB

5) 300 sqm lot

6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliarynurse and ½of her salary forms part of the estate.

• Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismissalleging that there exists no estate of the deceased forpurposes of administration and if an estate exists, theletters of administration be issued in her favor as thesurviving spouse.

• RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of thedeceased upon a bond posted by her in the amount of1k. The Trial Court ordered her to take custody of thereal and personal properties and make an inventorythereof.

• Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:

1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres forpurposes of administration?


2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessarywhere there are no debts lefts by decedent?

RULING:

1) Petitioner contends that there exists no estate forpurposes of administration for the reason: First, thedeath benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belongexclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and shesubmitted letter-replies to support her claim showingthat she is the exclusive beneficiary. Second, the savingsdeposit of her husband from PNB and PCIB had beenused to defray the funeral expenses. Finally, only realproperty of the deceased extrajudicially settled betweenthem as the only surviving heirs.

Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decidewhat properties form part of the estate and toappropriate for herself. She also points out that thisfunction is vested in the court in charge of the intestateproceedings.

Petitioner asks this court to declare that the propertiesspecified do not belong to the estate of the deceased onthe basis of her bare allegations and handful documents.Since this court is the trier of facts, the court cannotorder unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion ofthe property involved from the estate.

The resolution is better left to the probate court beforewhich the administration proceeding are pending. Thetrial court is in the best position to receive evidence. Thefunction of resolving WON the property should beincluded in the inventory or list of properties is oneclearly within the competence of the probate court.

2) The general rule is that when a person dies leavingproperty, the same should be judicially administered andthe competent court should appoint a qualifiedadministrator established in sec. 6 rule 78, in case thedeceased left no will or in case he had left one, or shouldhe fail to name an executor therein. An exception to thisrule, when all of the heirs of lawful age and there are nodebts due to the estate, they may agree in writing topartition the property without instituting the judicialadministration or applying for the appointment of anadministrator.

Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs frominstituting administration proceedings even if the estatehas no debts or obligations, if they do not desire toresort for good reasons to an ordinary action forpartition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to divide theestate among themselves as they may see fit, or toresort to an ordinary action for partition, the saidprovision does not compel them to do so if they havegood reasons to take a different course of action. Itshould be noted that recourse to an administrationproceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctionedonly if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to anaction for partition.

When partition is possible, either in or out of court, theestate should not be burdened with an administrationproceeding without good or compelling reasons.

The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to thecase at bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admittedthat there are no debts. What is apparent is that these 2are not in good terms. The reason why private


respondent seeks the appointment is her to obtainpossession for her own purposes, since these propertiesare presently in the hands of the petitioner whosupposedly disposed in fraudulently.

The court is of the opinion that this is not a compellingreason which will necessitate a judicial administration ofthe estate of the deceased.

The Court hold that, the Trial court which theadministration proceedings are pending was not justifiedin issuing the letters of administration there being nogood reasons for burdening the estate.

PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALSCadavis, Albert

FACTS:• Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano,

Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta.He died intestate.

• His estate included a parcel land a residential andcoconut land in Leyte. It is the northern portioncadastral Lot which is the subject to the instantcontroversy.

• During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother,feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build ahouse on the northern. Then feliciano died, his son,Pastor, continued living in the house together with hiseight children. Petitioner Verona Pada hilario, one ofPastor/s children, has been living in that house.

• The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into anextrajudicial partition of his estate. Forthis purpose, they executed a private document

which they, however, never registered in the office ofthe Registrar of Deed.

• Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by hisdaughter, Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocatedduring the said partition. Then Ananias died, hisdaughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner ofsaid property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto Paderes,the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.

• La te r on , Mar ia Pada se l l the coownersh i p r igh t o f h i s f a the r , Marc iano. Pr i va terespondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was thebuyer.

• Private respondent demanded that petitioner spousesvacate the northern portion so his family can utilize thesaid area. The amicable settlement was failed.

• Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint forejectment with prayer for damages against petitionerspouses. However, the heirs of Amador Pada executed aDeed of Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Padahilario, their respective shares as co-owners of the lot.Petitioner spouses alleged that the northern portion ofthe Lot had already been donated to them by the heirsof Amador Pada.

• They contended that the extra-judicial partition of theestate of Jacinto Pada executed was invalid andineffectual since no special power of attorneywas executed by Marciano, Amador or Higino in favorof their respective children presented them in theextrajudicial partition.

• Moreover, it was effectuated only through a privatedocument that was never registered in the office ofthe Registrar of Deeds of leyte. the MCTC renderedjudgment in favor of petitioner spouses.

• Private respondent appealed to the Regional trial courtand render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed


in the court of Appeals a petition for relief and later on, aMotion for Reconsideration, however, bot heredismissed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate isvalid

RULING:We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of

Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid albeitexecuted in an unregistered private document. No law requirespartition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in orderto be valid. The requirement in sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the RevisedRules of court that a partitionbe put in a public document and registeredhas for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardyclaims. The object of registration is to serve as constructivenotice to others. it follows then that the intrinsic validity ofpartition not executed with the prescribed formalities is notundermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditorsto take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of anestate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof inmanner and upon a plan different from those provided by therules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred thata writing and be registered in order to be valid. The partition ofinherited property need not be embodied in a public documentso as to be effective as regards the heirs that participatedtherein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada’s estatebeing legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and mariapada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot toengr. Paderes and private respondent.

MCMICKING VS. SY CONBIENGdela Cruz, Kyzeth

FACTS:

Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, diedsometime on February 1902 in Amoy, China. EngracioPalanca was appointed as administrator of the estate leftby Jose, which estate was partly located in Hong Kong andpartly in the Philippines. Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempcoand Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of Palancawho thereafter took possession of all the properties ofJose. Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palancawas required to furnish a new bond, which new bond wassubsequently filed through new sureties.

Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estateand Doroteo Velasco was appointed as its administratorwith sureties Mariano Velasco and Pio de la GuardiaBarretto. Mariano Ocampo was also survived by hisheirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his estate and 3sons in China to whom he left the remaining 1/3 of hisestate. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampo’s estate administratorfiled a complete report and inventory of the latter’sproperties, together with a statement of all his debts andliabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed aninstrument signed by all of the persons interested in theestate of Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partitition ofthe estate among themselves without proceedings incourt, at the same time assuming the payment of allobligations against the estate. Such partition agreed towas affirmed and approved by an order of the court andDoroteo, in pursuance of such order and after havingsettled all liabilities of the estate delivered all of theproperties to the respective devisees and legatees leavingno property of the estate in his hands.


Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed fromoffice as the administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate byreason of the fact that Palanca failed and refused torender an account of the property and funds of the saidestate and even failed and refused to deliver suchproperty and funds to his successor Jose McMicking whowas appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estatein Palanca’s stead. Palanca retained possession of saidproperty and funds, absconded with the same, and neverreturned to the Philippines. Due to these circumstancesMcMicking instituted a claim against the estate of MarianoOcampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approvedsuch claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, theadministrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he hadsufficient funds. No payment was made to MargaritaJose’s estate.

McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate ofPio de la Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio wasone of the sureties of Doroteo Velasco when he wasappointed as administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate.Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito SyConbieng was appointed as administrator. Thecommittee appointed by the court to appraise and hearclaims against Pio’s estate disallowed McMicking’s claimand such finding of the committee was affirmed by saidlower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Piode la Guardia Barretto’s estate is liable for the claim madeby Jose McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s estate.

HELD:

Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim againstPio de la Guardia Barretto’s estate affirmed.

Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety,would not have been liable himselfhad this action beencommenced against him. If the principal is not liable uponthe obligation, the surety cannot be. The basis of theliability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault orfailure of the principal. If the latter incurs no liability, theformer incurs none. The administrator who complies withthe law incurs no liability to any person.

The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’soriginal claim was made and to which Doroteo Velascowas appointed as administrator was already partitioned atthe time the claim was made.

A partition of the property of a deceased person may bemade under the provisions of sections 596 and 597 of theCode of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that anadministrator with the will annexed has been appointedand the administration of the estate under saidappointment is in progress. Such provisions are applicableno matter what stage the administration has reached.

"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without


legalproceedings, in certain cases.—Whenever allthe heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age andlegal capacity, and there are no debts due from theintestate estate, or all the debts have been paid bythe heirs, the heirs may, by a family council asknown under Spanish law, or by agreement betweenthemselves, duly executed in writing, apportion anddivide the estate among themselves, as they maysee fit, without proceedings in court."

"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts.—But if it shall appear, at any time within two yearsafter such settlement and distribution of the estate,that there are debts outstanding against the estatewhich have not been paid, any creditor may compelthe settlement of the estate in the courts in themanner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shallbe paid, with interest; and the administratorappointed by the court may recover the assets ofthe estate from those who have received them, forthe purpose of paying the debts; and the real estatebelonging to the deceased shall remain charged withthe liability to creditors for the full period of twoyears after such distribution, notwithstanding anytransfers thereof that may have been made."

These sections provide for the voluntary division of thewhole property of the decedent without proceedings incourt.

Where, after the appointment of an administrator with thewill annexed of a deceased person and the due making ofthe inventory of the property and the taking possessionthereof by such administrator, an agreement is madebetween the owners thereof under the will already

probated partitioning the same between them under saidsections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of theproperty to such partitioning owners by suchadministrator, under proper proceedings and order ofcourt and after compliance with the provisions of suchsections, is, in effect, a discharge of such administrator asto all future obligations and responsibilities in relation tosaid property. In other words, if he turns such propertyover to the owners thereof after a partition among themwas made in complete accordance with said sections, andhe performs his full duty as such administrator, neither henor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act. Anadministrator cannot be held to accountability forproperty over which he has no power or control orjurisdiction and in which he has no legal interest. Thething on which he was appointed to operate having beenwithdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (thelaw, secs. 596 and 597) which appointed him, there is acomplete revocation of the original appointment datingfrom the day of the removal from his hands of theproperty which he was appointed to administer.

The administrator has no power or control or jurisdictionand no legal interest in the property anymore because bysuch partition, the estate passes out of existence. Thewhole property is taken from the administrator andpassed on to the owners. They become the absoluteowners thereof, subject only to the liability of divestitureon the happening of certain events; but even suchdivestiture may be avoided by paying the debt, which isthe moving cause thereof.


While at any time within two years after such partition theproperty, or a portion thereof, then in possession of thepartitioning parties, may be placed again inadministration in the event of the discovery of unpaiddebts "within two years after such settlement anddistribution of the estate," it would not be the sameestate represented by the prior administrator, and hewould not be the administrator of the new estate by virtueof his appointment in the old. It would be necessary toappoint, upon proper application and notice, anotheradministrator for the purposes set forth in said sections.Before this, it is necessary that the requisite conditionsare present; the unpaid debt must be discovered and thecreditor must make his application. In the case at bar,neither of the above conditions being present, there couldbe no administration after partition. No new administratorwas or could be appointed. There was no administration.The appointment of commissioners to hear plaintiff'sclaim was without authority. It was an appointment inrespect to an estate that did not legally exist and inrelation to an administration that had never beeninaugurated. The acts of such commissioners werewithout legal effect.

In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations,which deprives all debtsnot discovered within theprescribed time, of the power of requiring anadministration of the estate remaining. Suchadministration, after partition, depends upon thediscovery of the debt "at any time within two years afterthe settlement and distribution of the estate." Thesesections do not operate unless that discovery is made

within the time prescribed.

The partition provided for in these sections is binding andvalid even though not all of the debts actually outstandingwere paid before the partition was made. The discovery ofan unpaid obligation after partition does not destroy thepartition. It simply furnishes ground for the application ofthe creditor for the appointment of an administrator. Thediscovery of a debt after partition does not permit thewhole property in possession of the partitioning parties tobe thrown into administration. Only so much of theproperty is subject to such administration as is sufficientto pay the claim discovered, leaving the partitioningpersons in undisturbed possession of the remainder.Evenafter the discovery of a debt subsequent to partition, thepartitioning persons may prevent any administrationwhatever by paying the debt discovered, therebypreserving the partition intact in all its parts.

GERONA V. DE GUZMANdela Cruz, Kyzeth

FACTS:

Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion,Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged thatthey are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona andPlacida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9,1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzmanand his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; thatafter the deathof his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married CamilaRamos, who begot him several children, namely,respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica,


Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; thatMarcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; thatsubsequently, or on May 6, 1948 respondents executed adeed of "extrajudicial settlement of the estate of thedeceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulentlymisrepresenting therein that they were the only survivingheirs of the deceased although they well knew thatpetitioners were, also, his forced heirs. Thatrespondentshad thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing thetransfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land,issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled andnew transfer certificates of title to be issued in their ownname, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest foreach; that such fraud was discovered by the petitionersonly the year before the institution of the case; thatpetitioners forthwith demanded from respondents theirshare in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th Interestthereon.

Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifyingsaid deed of extrajudicial settlement, insofar as itdeprives them of their participation of 1/8th of theproperties in litigation. On the other hand, respondentsmaintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placidade Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate ofMarcelo de Guzman, shebeing merely a spurious child ofthe latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by thestatute of limitations.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the actionhas prescribed, which decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul theextrajudicial settlement executed by the respondents hasprescribed.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’sdismissal of the case on the ground that the action hasprescribed.

Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they andthe respondents were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action forpartition does not prescribe.

The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action forpartition among coheirs does not prescribe, this is trueonly as long as the defendants do not hold the property inquestion under an adverse title. The statute of limitationsoperates, as in other cases; from the moment thepossessor of the property asserts such adverse title.When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicialsettlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs ofthe deceased, and secured new transfer certificates oftitle in their own name, they thereby excluded thepetitioners from the estate of the deceased, andconsequently, set up a title adverse to them.


The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlementupon the ground of fraud may be filed within four yearsfrom the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemedto have taken place when said instrument was filed withthe Register of Deeds and new certificates of title wereissued in the name of the respondents exclusively.

PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALSDe guzman , Jabrielle

FACTS:

Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiatedproceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoptionof herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI grantedthe petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner andRosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguelsestate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportionthe estate of Miguel. Private respondents filed an action toannul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City.CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption.Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision tothe Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, theRodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement withrespondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel andof another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative ofthe heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except hisbrothers and sisters. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal butupheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner. Thereafter,petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their shareof the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refusedsaying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since theywere not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaintto annul the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amendedon March 25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts

toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and thedefendants, but the same failed. The Regional Trial Courtdismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed thedecision of the trial court.

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed ofExtrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)whether or not said deed is valid

HELD:

Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had noticeof the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when theprovisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly compliedwith, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent havetaken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented bythemselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the recordsconfirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicablein her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)years. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filedon January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after thequestioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, wasexecuted, we hold that her action against the respondents onthe basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable ruleon publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact ofthe extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be publishedin a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided inthe next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlementshall be binding upon any person who has not participatedtherein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without


the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, theextrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. Therule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon,i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in thesaid deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after,which was when publication was done in the instant case.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when thedeed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on theground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executedwithout including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge ofand consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elenais an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes thecollateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. Theprivate respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were notaware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an actionto annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim thattheir actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena wasstill being questioned at the time they executed the deed ofpartition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filedonly twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patentlya much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheritingfrom her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was validand existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that privaterespondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith withintent to defraud Maria Elena.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to thepartition in question which was null and void as far as theplaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions.The partition in the present case was invalid because itexcluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares

in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicialsettlement shall be binding upon any person who has notparticipated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partitionwas a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it wasnot correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challengethe partition had prescribed after two years from its executionin 1941. To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina inthe partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, onlyrepresented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estateautomatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares.Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguelsestate but only Pilars estate.

Petition is GRANTED.

ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREONDe guzman , Jabrielle

FACTS:

Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance ofRizal summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M.Francisco. Alleging that they had three minor children who werehis legal heirs, and that the deceased left a parcel of land withhouse thereon, and no creditors, she asked for declaration thatthe persons entitled to share in his estate are the said threeminor children, with herself as usufructuary. She requested forappointment as guardian ad item of her three minor children,and her request was granted in due course. Petition wasapproved and was registered.

Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to thesisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was dulyregistered. Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale,


to the aforesaid creditors, her interest and participation in theland. This sale was likewise inscribed in the office of theRegister of Deeds.

However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda.de Francisco,mother of the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly inrepresentation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averredthat this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased,with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previousproceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco hadconcealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflictwith those of her three sons, the truth being that the land wasprivate property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could nothave been awarded a portion in fee simple.

When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing,Macaria Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal,without prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand forrecognition. Her request was granted.

Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon hadwithdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matterbecame a closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. deFrancisco, as guardian ad item of the three legitimate,submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practicallythe same allegations of her previous motion and prayed foridentical remedies — except those touching the recognition ofJose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling objections, the courtadmitted the amended motion, heard it granting the interestedparties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,and rendered judgment holding the realty was private propertyof the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four yearsbefore his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that thewhole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate

children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of thewidow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by RosaAldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued otherappropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.

ISSUES:

WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion forreopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from thelitigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of themortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probatecourt.

HELD:

Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing tothe three legitimate children, and that it could not be"amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reasonto prevent the court below from considering such amendedmotion as a new and independent petition in the expediente,filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children. The matterof time might conceivably be material in regard in consideringthe "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case ithappens to be immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74such motion may be lodged with the court within one year afterthe minors have reached majority; and they are still minorsnow. Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants'contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been initiatedwithin two years after November 8, 1947.

Appellants may not justly complain that they thought suchpetition for readjustment or reopening could take place onlywithin two years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and asannotated in the certificate of title; because they areconclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions ofsection 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:


But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage withthe encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74,Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the factthat section 4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have beensufficient warning to them that the title was subject to theinterest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicialnotice of the fact that in the adjudication in summarysettlements more often that not, the order merely says that thesale shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. Thisis the case because the Court can not foresee whether themovant would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition ofthe law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of Section4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it wassubject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third personwho accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk ofinterferring with the rights of minors as provided under section5, Rule 74.

Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot bedirected against the bond which, according to appellants,should have been demanded under section 3, Rule 74, becausethat section applies where personal property is distributed — notwhere, as here, realty is the subject of partition.

Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceedingsome of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of thedecedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has nojurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in aseparate suit". But here there is no question that the realtybelonged to the decedent; and a separate suit wasunnecessary, specially remembering that in these summarysettlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and"without delay""to determine who are the persons legallyentitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divideit among them."

The resolution under review apportions property admittedlybelonging to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is noobjection that it affects the herein appellants. They knew orought to know the rule permitting such to reapportionmenteven after two years, and they have been given every chanceto be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded asparties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (whichmust be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5,Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir hislawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding anytransfers of such real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon.All this implies that, when within the amendatory period therealty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among theheirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation inthe same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessaryto do so. To require the institution of a separate action for suchannulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule andthe spirit of these summary settlements.

From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicialerror was committed by the lower court, whose order is,consequently, affirmed with costs.

SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALSDimaliwat, Dianne

FACTS:

Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoroleft four parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs hiswidow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces.Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia (his widow) executedan affidavit (Exhibit A) stating that "the deceased Teodoro Toleteleft no children or respondent neither ascendants oracknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews


or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife ofthe deceased, the one and only person to inherit the aboveproperties”. Leoncia then executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B) ofall the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo. Bennythen sold (Exhibit C) the parcels of land to Honorato Salacup.These three documents were registered in the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Pangasinan.

Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for theadministration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The complaintalleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to executethe affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquiredno rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had BennySampilo acquired any right to the said properties

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right ofaction to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the landsin question had not prescribed at the time the action to recoverwas filed.

RULING:

It is argued that as the action was instituted almost fouryears after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", wasregistered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan,the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed andlapsed because the same was not brought within the period oftwo years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules ofCourt.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 ofextrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended thatsuch settlement or distribution would affect third persons who

had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of theextrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention ofsuch effect is made, either directly or by implication.

Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in thecase of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and sohold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barringdistributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partitionafter the expiration of two years from such extrajudicialpartition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participatedor taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, inaddition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 havebeen strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs ofthe decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement orare represented by themselves or through guardians.

The case at bar fails to comply with both requirementsbecause not all the heirs interested have participated in theextrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found thatthe decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and niecesliving at the time of his death.

RULE 75Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

US VS. CHIU GUIMCODimaliwat, Dianne

FACTS:

Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many yearsin the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while


visiting China. Before his departure from the Philippines he hadexecuted a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, inwhich Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. ChiuGuimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother.

Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate ofhis deceased brother, entered into an agreement with hisbrother’s Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims tothe estate for a consideration. He also entered into anagreement with Uy Cuan, his brother’s Chinese wife, for thedistribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on herinterest in the real estate. No payments have, however, beenmade by Guimco.

Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter toGuimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for theinstitution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith.Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in hispossession and that he had never seen it.

A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code ofCivil Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce thewill within the time required by law. The court found theaccused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800.Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in hispossession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco still failed todo so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in theprovincial jail.

ISSUE:

Whether the judge was acting within his power when heordered the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?

RULING:

No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (nowsection 5 of Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a personwho neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testatorwithout reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court isacting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administrationof the estates of deceased persons. Where administrationproceedings are not already pending, the court, before takingaction under this section, should require that there be before itsome petition, information, or affidavit of such character as tomake action by the court under this section appropriate.

The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure isclearly a totally different remedy, having no relation with thatprovided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is notpermissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimposeupon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additionalpenalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.

To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trialunder Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself,since the mere production of the will by him would beconclusive that he had possession of it as charged in thecriminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of theprovision of law which says that in a criminal action thedefendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.

GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRADimaampao, Mahadodin

PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOSDumapias, Gay

FACTS:


June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will andtestament. Availing himself of the provisions of the new CivilCode, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of FirstInstance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, heinstituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C.Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang tothe probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged naturaldaughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored insaid will thus impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsicvalidity or to the legality of the provisions of the will.

July 6, 1956 – court issued an order ADMITTING the will toprobate. After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity ofthe will, the court issued another order declaring oppositor tobe the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofaras it impairs her legitime, with costs against petitioner.Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his willavailing himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, whichpermit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetimefor the allowance of his will.ISSUE:

WON the opposition can be entertained/heard.RULING:

NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will hasbeen executed in accordance with the requirements of the law,much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that theoppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly hasbeen ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in aseparate action. This is especially so when the testator, as inthe present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition forthe allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after hisdeath.In Montañano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of thewill decides no other questions than such as touch upon thecapacity of the testator and the compliance with thoserequisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for thevalidity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implicationprejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may beimpugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding itsauthentication. The questions relating to these points remain

entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will hasbeen authenticated."On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during thelifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that hecannot alter or revoke the same before he has had a chance topresent such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings afterthe testator's death would be in order".The reason for this isthat the rights to the succession are transmitted from themoment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new CivilCode.).Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annullingthe portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime ofthe oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is anextraneous matter which should be treshed out in a separateaction.

FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBADumapias, Gay

FACTS:The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes

have petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court ofAppeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,in a Special Proceeding, admitting to probate the alleged lastwill and testament of the deceased, and overruling theopposition to the probate.

On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent),submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for theprobate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioneras the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition wasset for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, EusebioReyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar,Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to beheirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probateasked. Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the willby two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estatemade by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and


1944, but conveyances were finally set aside by this SupremeCourt.

CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; butdeferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation"until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity ofthe provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication ofthe properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned forreconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues ofestoppel and revocation be considered and resolved.Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to askfor the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties theright to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportunetime."1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for thesole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and thiswas done on February 9, 1960.

On the question of whether the execution by thetestatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate infavor of the testamentary heir, subsequent to the execution ofher 1930 testament, had revoked the latter, the trial Courtresolved against the oppositors and held the will of the lateBenedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by thedeeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case tothe Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will toprobate had become final for lack of appeal.(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling theestoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise becomefinal. (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes hadbeen impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds ofconveyance in favor of the proponent.RULING:

(a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally anddefinitively settles all questions concerning capacity of thetestator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last willand testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid

and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is finaland appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109 specifically prescribesthat "any interested person may appeal in special proceedingsfrom an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment:(a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trialCourt's resolution on the other grounds of their oppositionbefore taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be amultiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention iswithout weight.The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, thesame had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellatecourts may no longer revoke said decree nor review theevidence upon which it is made to rest. The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not anexpress one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of thetestatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the originalintention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. Assuch, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merelythe particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absoluterevocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).

(b) The presentation and probate of a will arerequirements of public policy, being primarily designed toprotect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled torespect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership andright of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the dutyimposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to theCourt, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation(Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow publicpolicy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.

(c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 ofthe Code of 1889), which recites:Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates thething bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood thatin the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effectonly with respect to the part thus alienated. If after thealienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even ifit be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise


shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall havebeen effected by virtue of the exercise of the right ofrepurchase.As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any suchchange or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by thecircumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appelleeDimagiba. As found by the Court of Appeals in its decisionannulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever waspaid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers,thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveyingthe property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended tocomply in advance with what she had ordained in hertestament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in thecircumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the CivilCode of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.If the annulment was due to undue influence, then thetransferor was not expressing her own free will and intent inmaking the conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either,that such conveyances established a decision on her part toabandon the original legacy.The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reasonof the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. Analienation through undue influence in no way differs from onemade through violence or intimidation. In either case, thetransferor is not expressing his real intent, and it cannot be heldthat there was in fact an alienation that could produce arevocation of the anterior bequest.Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALSDorado, Czaybeeh

IN RE JOHNSONEspino, Carla

FACTS:

Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalizedcitizen of the United States. He died in the city of Manila leavinga will. The will is an holographic instrument, being written in thetestator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and twowitnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A petition, however, waspresented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila forthe probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at thetime of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United Statesof America; that the will was duly executed in accordance withthe laws of that State; and hence could properly be probatedhere pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thehearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and threeweeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila DailyBulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order ofthe court.

However, after the will had been probated, her daughterfrom first marriage, EbbaIngeborg, moved for the annulment ofthe decree of probate and put the estate into intestateadministration, thus preparing the way for the establishment ofthe claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of herfather. She contended, among others, that the order admittingthe will to probate was made without notice to her. In theargument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the timethe court made the order of publication, it was apprised of thefact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that asdaughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probateof the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should haveappointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in thefuture to permit the petitioner to be present either in person orby representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thusto postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringementof that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared thatproperty shall not be taken without due process of law.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the order admitting the will to probatewas beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because it wasmade without notice to the petitioner; and

RULING:

The proceedings for the probate of the will were regularand that the publication was sufficient to give the courtjurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will tobe probated.

In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "theproceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem,and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a widelatitude in determining the character of the constructive noticeto be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolutepossession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where acourt would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of hisproperty without due process of law, the proceeding beingstrictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the groundthat the constructive notice prescribed by the statute wasunreasonably short."

Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedureprovides that “Upon such terms as may be just the court mayrelieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment,order or other proceeding taken against him through hismistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided,That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, butin no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, orproceeding was taken.” The use of the word "judgment, order orother proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on thepart of the Legislature to give wide latitude to the remedy hereprovided, and is not to be restricted to judgments or orders

entered in ordinary contentious litigation. In other words theutility of the provision is not limited to actions proper butextends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. The word "party,"used in this section, means any person having an interest in thesubject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to beconcluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.

Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrineannounced in the Davis case, the petitionerin this case couldhave applied at any time within six months for March 16, 1916,and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearingin the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had nocontrol and that the order admitting the will to probate hadbeen erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon asupposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court wouldhave been authorized to set the probate aside and grant arehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under thecircumstances, a very short period of time within which toexpect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest theprobate with the proof which she might have desired to collectfrom remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowedfor the making of such application was inconveniently short, theremedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in thiscase by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in facthere appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to theorder admitting the will to probate.It follows that the order ofMarch 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probatecannot be declared null and void merely because the petitionerwas unavoidably prevented from appearing at the originalhearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question.

MANAHAN VS. MANAHANEspino, Carla

FACTS:


The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted specialproceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of thedeceased Donata Manahan. The court set the date for thehearing and the necessary notice required by law wasaccordingly published. It, later on, entered the decree admittingthe will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated onSeptember 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner as theexecutrix. On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, EngraciaManahan, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial,praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacatedand the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. Sheclaimed that she was an interested party in the testamentaryproceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have beennotified of the probate of the will.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and shouldhave been notified of the probate of the will: and

(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on theground that the external formalities prescribed by theCode of Civil Procedure have not been complied with inthe execution thereof.

RULING:

(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfoundedand untenable. She was not entitled to notification of theprobate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it,inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filedan opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Herallegation that she had the status of an heir, being thedeceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notifiedon the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the

appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being aforced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

(2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respectto the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on anyof the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in anyseparate or independent action or proceedings. Also, inasmuchas the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem,the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate waseffective and conclusive against her, in accordance with theprovisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedurewhich reads as follows:

SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or inrespect to the probate of a will, or the administration of theestate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person thejudgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, thewill or administration, or the condition or relation of the person:Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters ofadministration shall only be prima facie evidence of the deathof the testator or intestate; . . . .

ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALSHipolito, Nina Anthonette

FACTS Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate

of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad ProvidoElevencionado a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedentand the executor of her will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed theprobate of the will and directed the issuance of letterstestamentary to respondent


Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening ofthe probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestateheirs of the decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction overthe petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees,defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.

will could not have been probated because: a) thesignature of the decedent was forged; b) the will was notexecuted in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed tosign below the attestation clause; c) the decedent lackedtestamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; d) the willwas executed by force and under duress and improper pressure;e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time ofaffixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the propertiesto be disposed of, having included in the will properties whichno longer belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion 1)petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publicationand that the deficiencyin the payment of docket fees is not aground for the outright dismissal of the petition. 2) RTC’sDecision was already final and executory even beforepetitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed apetition to annule RTC’s decision a.CLAIM: there was acompromise agreement between petitioners and respondentsand they learnt the probate proceeding only in July 2001 b.CA’sRULING: petition dismissed 1) no showing that petitioners failedto avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal,petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remediesthrough no fault of their own.

ISSUE:W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be

annulled for failure to mention the petitioners asparties

RULING: No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legateenamed in a will, or any other personinterested in the estatemay, at any time after the death of the testator, petition thecourt having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of thetime and place for proving the will must bepublished for three

(3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation inthe province, as well as furnished to the designated or otherknown heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator b.Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the noticeof hearing 2.The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motionfor new triala.The ruling became final and executor because themotion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of thedecision 4 months after they could have filed a petition for relieffrom judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. 3.Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure tocomply with the substantive requisites, a. An action forannulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of thecase where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set asideso that there will be a renewal of litigation. 4. Notice is requiredto be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees ofthe testator a. the will states that the respondent was institutedas the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligationto mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personallynotify them.

RULE 76Allowance or Disallowance of Will

SANTOS VS. CASTILLOHipolito, Nina Anthonette

FACTS:Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian

of the minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased,filed a petition for probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She alsofiled a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. Atthe hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores,legitimate children of the deceased filed their opposition, on theground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction on the case.Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdictionbecause she did not allege that she had the custody of the will,and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate and


furtherance because the will that should be probated is theoriginal and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by thepetitioner. Petitioner filed an amended petition prayingthatrespondents be required to present the copies of the will andthe codicil in their possession. Court issued an order denyingthe petition for the appointment of a special administrator bypetitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the lastwill and testament and all other documents in relation thereto,to deliver said papers to the court within the date from notice.Consequently, petitioner filed a motion praying that heramended petition be admitted. However, before this motionwas decided, respondents, after their father's death, presentedthe original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they beadmitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing thepetition filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court

acquired jurisdiction over the case

RULING:Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that

no will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it isproved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626 provides thatthe person who has the custody of he will shall, within 4 daysafter he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will tothe court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in thewill. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive means to compela person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the courtwhich has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceaseddesignated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directedhis nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, tokeep one in his possession, and to turn over the other twocopies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect thatif petitioner or his son failed to present said will for probate,Manuel should take charge of presenting it to the court. +akingeverything into account therefore, it is of the court's vieww thatJose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the willbecause the original thereof was turned over to him. For thesake of argument, however, admitting that the testator had

designated nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be deniedthat his act of subsequentl$ making a codicil and entrusting thecustody thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified hislast will. In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to hislegitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner.Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custodyof the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could,had the right and where bound by law to apply for the probateof their father' last will. In order that the court may acquirejurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for theadministration of the properties left by a deceased person, theapplication must allege, in addition to the residence of thedeceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, thatthe applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who hadcustody of the will to be probated. The original of saiddocument must be presented or sufficient reasons given tojustify the nonrepresentation of said original and theacceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as theserequisites had not been complied with in the application filed bythe petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed injurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.

PEREZ VS. PEREZKatigbak , Paula Margareth

FACTS:On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a

deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bankof the Philippines over the property located in Bataan assecurity for an agricultural loan of P6,500.00. The mortgagecontract was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan. Theplaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted DBP inextrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filedAnd the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and postedby the deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong,Bataan, where the mortgaged property is located and dulypublished for three (3) consecutive weeks in the OlongapoNews. On December 19, 1978, the public auction sale wasconducted at the municipal building in Morong, Bataan, wherein


Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for P11,000.00.Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued andregistered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellantsfailed to exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property,original defendant Democrito Perez executed an affidavit ofconsolidation which resulted in the issuance of a new TCT. On1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction Sale withDamages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer forRestraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against therespondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga,Bataan. The case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appealalleging that the RTC erred in holding that the public auctionsale of the subject mortgaged property was valid despite thelack of notice to them, thus, depriving them of their right toproperty without due process of law. They further alleged thatthe notice of public auction sale was not validly published in anewspaper of general circulation, as required by law. But CAaffirmed RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed butthe same was denied.

ISSUE/s: WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE

REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NOPUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATIONWHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED.

RULING:No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in

Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz:Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale fornot less than twenty days in at least three public places of themunicipality or city where the property is situated, and if suchproperty is worth more than four hundred pesos, such noticeshall also be published once a week for at least threeconsecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in themunicipality or city. Their position that the puericulture centerand the municipal building should be considered one and thesame place because they were located in one place is purefallacy and totally unacceptable for being contrary to the actualstate of things. The petitioners further contend that even after

the sheriff had posted the notice, he may not have posted itanymore for the remaining nineteen (19) days, as required byAct No. 3135. It could also be, according to petitioners, thatafter the notice was posted, the same may have been removedfrom where it was posted either by an act of man or by an act ofnature. But such contention was not supported with evidence.As correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, thedeputy sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his officialduty was regularly performed. The petitioners herein wereunable to topple this presumption in the trial court, the Court ofAppeals, and now in this Court. -No. To be a newspaper ofgeneral circulation, it is enough that it is published for thedissemination of local news and general information; that it hasa bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it ispublished at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also bedevoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of aparticular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religiousdenomination. The newspaper need not have the largestcirculation so long as it is of general circulation. Based from thetestimonies of the witnesses, it was proven that Olongapo Newswas indeed a newspaper of general circulation. That although in1978, it was not published in Morong, Bataan, under P.D. No.1079, it is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper orperiodical published in the locality, the same may be publishedin the newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulatedin the nearest city or province. Since no newspaper of generalcirculation was being published in Morong, Bataan, in the year1978, then the respondents were right in availing themselves ofthe services of the Olongapo News, which, as found by the trialcourt, was the nearest publication in Bataan.

DE ARANZ VS. GALINGKatigbak , Paula Margareth

FACTS: On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante

filed RTC Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of thelast will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola.The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein


petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court issuedan order setting the petition for hearing. Said order waspublished in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulationin Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearingwas then reset and private respondent presented his evidenceex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentarywitnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings,private respondent was appointed executor. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, nonotices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of theRules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period often (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probateof the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for certiorariwas filed and referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence,present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of

notice on heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a proceduralconvenience to satisfy the requirements of due process?

RULING: Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4.

Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mailor personally.— The court shall also cause copies of the notice ofthe time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed tothe designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees ofthe testator resident in the Philippines at their places ofresidence, and deposited in the post office with the postagethereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, ifsuch places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must inlike manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if hebe not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executornot petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personalservice of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before theday of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. It is clear from theaforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearingfor the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designatedor other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the

Philippines at their places of residence, if such places ofresidence be known. There is no question that the residences ofherein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to theprobate court. But despite such knowledge, the probate courtdid not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. Therequirement of the law for the allowance of the will was notsatisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three(3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

BASA VS. MERCADOLee, Mariline

MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALSLee, Mariline

ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTLectura, Erika

GAN VS. YAPLectura, Erika

RODELAS VS ARANZALim, Justin

RULE 76Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the

Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder

LEON & GHEZZIE VS.MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS.Lim, Justin

SUNTAY VS. SUNTAYLubay, Angela

VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETELubay, Angela

FACTS:


Subject of this case is the probate of the will of SpousesDr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who becameAmerican citizens and practicing doctors in New York, U.S.A. Thespouses executed separate wills for the benefit of each other.The spouses and their family perished when they were trappedby fire that gutted their home.

Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with theSurrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then,petitioner who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filedfor the reprobate of the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Malolos, Bulacan. The will was denied probate for the reasonthat the documents did not establish the law of New York on theprocedure and allowance of wills. The petitioner’s motion forreconsideration to be given sufficient time to prove New Yorklaw was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that theevidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allowprobate of will. ISSUE:

WON it was necessary to prove the foreign law.

RULINGS:NO.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or

allowance of wills which have been probated outside of thePhilippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will inaccordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has hisdomicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3)the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) thefact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the lawsof a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Exceptfor the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted allthe needed evidence.The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws uponwhich the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled bythe fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifthrequirement above as in fact she moved for more time tosubmit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York lawsbut which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While theprobate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should

relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the bestevidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purportedwill is probated or denied probate

Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner areasonable time within which to submit evidence.

ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGONMercado, Trish

ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON

GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006

TOPIC: Rule 77 –Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Twoyears after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project


of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when heis left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution

of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

RULE 78Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When

and to Whom issued

NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUAMercado, Trish

NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA

GR NO. L-17091; Sept. 30, 1963

Facts:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance ofRizal appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estateof the deceased Chung Liu.

Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, filed apetition to be appointed administratix of the estate of theaforementioned deceased. The petition was opposed by thechildren of the deceased claiming that Ngo Hua is morally andphysically unfit to execute the duties of the trust asadministratix, and that the she and the deceased procured anabsolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court found that Ngo Huaand the deceased were validly divorced in Taipei. The courtissued an order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administratorinstead.


Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon thevalidity of the divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the deceasedand upon the filiation of the oppositors?

Held:

No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only takeplace after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been paid. Acursory reading of the pertinent section discloses that what thecourt is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution ofthe residue of the deceased’s estate before the above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid.Nowhere from the said section may it be inferred that the courtcannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction ofthese obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court inmaking the appointment of the administrator did not purport tomake a declaration of heirs.

MEDINA ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALSMansul, Nabral

MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPSMansul, Nabral

REPUBLIC VS. MARCOSPangilinan, Legis

TORRES VS. JAVIERPangilinan, Legis

DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOCRabanal, Michelle

FACTS:

Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving awill. The deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, withwhom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Anaand Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted asecond marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did nothave any child.

On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court ofFirst Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicialadministratrix of the properties of the deceased Proceso deGuzman. On the 8th of the same month of January, 1937,Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that thisappointment be set aside and that she had namedadministratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as thewidow. The court denied this petition and sustained theappointment of Nicolasa. From these resolutions, Angelaappealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in not appointing heradministratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzmanand in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrixwithout first setting the case for hearing.

RULING:


The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for herappointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceasedwith his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutuallabor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, nothaving acquired any property during his second marriage withAngela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind. It istrue that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishingthese allegations, but when Angela asked for thereconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did notdeny these allegations and merely stated that they do notjustify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angelato deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted, thecourt was justified in considering them when it denied thereconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained theappointment of Nicolasa.

If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman wereacquired during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children,among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his nowwidow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way ofusufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of thechildren who has received no betterment.

TORRES VS. SICATRabanal, Michelle

FACTS:On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to

Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, TarlacSeven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of theconjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the

Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter ofadministration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for thepurpose of settling the estate of the deceased.

Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, andclaimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. She saidthe only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimateminor children, besides herself.

RTC:

The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submittednone. Then the trial judge, disregarding the preferenceestablished by law for the surviving widow, entered on August16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus asadministrator.

Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a persondies intestate, administration should be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be

(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, ornext of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent orunwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of the principalcreditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, itmay be granted to such other person as the court may select.

The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. Buthe expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying ineffect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value ofthe conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditorsdeserves paramount consideration. Now inasmuch as the widowhas shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing theircredits, she is therefore unsuitable, for having adverseinterests."

A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferentialrights of the surviving spouse to the


administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if theperson enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the courtmay appoint another person.

Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist inadverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediatelyinterested in the estate of such an extent as to render theappointment inadvisable.

"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has alwaysconsistently refused to recognize the credits" and manifestedher determination to "resist the claims of creditors."

ISSUE:Whether RTC’s appointment should be upheld, ignoring

the surviving widows preferential right.

RULING:In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the

administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimicalto the interests of the creditors. The administration of theintestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and thecreditors. but by creditors we mean those declared to be so inappropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fullyestablished they are not "creditors" within the purview of theabove principle. So it is not improper — it is even proper — forthe administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment assuch, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claimsadvanced against the estate. "The propriety of contestingparticular claims must frequently be left largely to his discretionand no presumption of bad faith or misconduct will be madeagainst him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)

At the hearing of the petition for the appointment ofadministrator, this widow practically did nothing more than toinform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honorit." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to realcreditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, becauseshe did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, shecould not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she

acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward witha claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, evenharmful, both to the heirs and the actual creditors.

Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, andconsidered, only after the regular administrator has beenappointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the courtcould not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interestsof those whose credits were in dispute. And counsel for hereinappellant did well in opposing the presentation of evidence ofthe objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part,

. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can evenentertain the presentation of those exhibits because the stageof presenting claims has not yet arrived. Consequently, thiscourt can not even receive as evidence the said documents asevidence of indebtedness, because if those evidence will beaccepted then we will be in a position to rebut them and toenter into actual trial to show that they are not really evidenceof indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate becausethen we will be contending as to whether those were reallyexecuted or really contracted. ...

On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that theevidence "showed clearly that the surviving widow is fullycompetent in a high degree to administer the intestate of herdeceased husband", plainly indicates that except for hersupposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for the trust.Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per seconstitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarilydeclare and enforce her superior right to appointment asadministratrix under Rule 79.

Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. DeJesus is annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuanceby the court a quo of letters of administration to the widowappellant subject to such terms and conditions as areappropriate under the Rules. Costs against the appellee.


SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAYRivera, Hiezll Wynn

FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr.Federico died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Suntay(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the timeof her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner EmilioSuntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begotthree children, namely: respondent, Isabel; Margarita; andEmilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled.Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio IIIand Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent andher siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from theirfather and paternal grandparents. After her spouse’s death,Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III andNenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for theissuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filedhis opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he iscapable of administering her estate and he should be the oneappointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the massof conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accordedlegal preference in the administration. After a failed attempt bythe parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed aManifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adoptedson, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on hisbehalf. The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Interveneconsidering his interest in the outcome of the case. In thecourse of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial courtrendered a decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, asadministrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved,respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed andset aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters ofAdministration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’sstatus as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred fromrepresenting his deceased father in the estate of the latter’slegitimate mother, the decedent.

ISSUE :Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified toact as administrator of the decedent’s estate.

HELD:The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate

succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumedwill of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will. The basisfor Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtainbar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtainingherein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina,on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normalrelationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III was reared frominfancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,who both acknowledged him as their grandchild. Emilio III is alegally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in thedistribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degreefrom Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimatefather, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred

in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’sestate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in theestate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as theinterest therein of respondent, considering that the CA evendeclared that under the law, Federico, being the survivingspouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of theexclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share inthe conjugal partnership.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order ofpreference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters ofadministration granted. If no executor is named inthe will, or the executor or executors areincompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,or a person dies intestate, administration shall begranted:


(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the casemay be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretionof the court, or to such person as such survivinghusband or wife, or next of kin, requests to haveappointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the casemay be, or next of kin, or the person selected bythem, be incompetent or unwilling, or if thehusband or widow, or next of kin, neglects forthirty (30) days after the death of the person toapply for administration or to request thatadministration be granted to some other person,it may be granted to one or more of the principalcreditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent andwilling to serve, it may be granted to such otherperson as the court may select. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it

depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of eachcase. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of anadministrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Inthe main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this casenecessitate, at the least, a joint administration by bothrespondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristina’sestate.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accuratelyreflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends,for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between herlegitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did herhusband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status ofEmilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimatechild. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakinglypointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legalpresumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist

animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimatedescendants of a deceased.

The petition is GRANTED.

RULE 79Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary,

Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration

GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGASRodriguez, Maria Lorraine

FACTS: In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only

heirs her surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces —daughters of a deceased brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez.Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay,a petition for Letters of Administration , and was appointedadministrator of the estate. In the petition, he named asintestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceasedwife. Under the unverified manifestation signed by AdelaGutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled"Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", renounced all her rights ,interests and participation in the estate of Irene in favor of hersister.

However, Adela averred that the deed of assignment ofher rights, participation and interest in the estate of IreneSantos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraudpracticed by the administrator upon her and were vitiated bymistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated that due tostringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested theadministrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. Theadministrator refused on the ground that it is against the law,but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sisterRizalina, offering to help. Thereafter, the administrator informedAdela that he was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to


give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. Adelawas then brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of theirlawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could notread. The lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, whichhe said was to be presented in Court and explained thecontents of the document signed the day before. It was onlythen that Adela came to know that said document was a deedof sale. When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the mattercould be discussed better in his house. During the discussion,Villegas informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 whichRizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, wasprobably more than what she would get in the estate, becausethe estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. AlthoughAdela did not want to accept the money, Villegas refused totake them back. When she was made to sign the deed ofassignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate.

The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied theallegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.

Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motionpraying that the administrator and/or his attorneys be requiredto furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in theintestate proceedings, it appearing that the administratorpresented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof.

An opposition was interposed by the administrator, whoalleged that the movant, although originally a party to theprobate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted frombeing so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights,interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer anylegal standing in the case.

CFI: Favored Adelina and ordered the administrator tofurnish the former copies of pleadings.

Rizalina and the Administrator appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to

intervene in the probate proceeding.

RULING:

YES. It cannot be successfully denied that Adela SantosGutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings inquestion. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it wasestablished at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is truethat she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact thatshe asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pendingbefore the CFI-Pasig Although Adela had filed a manifestationdropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewiththe supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, neverthelessfails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probateCourt. Every act intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, acompromise, or any other transaction. No serious argument canbe offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estateunder probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution ofthe Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature ofextrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and theheirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over theestate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignmentand desistance. Even if the partition had been judiciallyapproved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment, anaggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.Adela was not a third person; she was an original partytherein.

DURAN VS. DURANRodriguez, Maria Lorraine

FACTS:Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are

Josefina, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters;nephews and nieces.

Subsequent to his death, Cipriano, one of the survivingbrothers, executed a public instrument assigning andrenouncing his hereditary rights to decedent’s estate in favor ofJosefina for consideration. However, a year later, Cipriano filedin CFI-Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio’sestate and an ex parte motion to be appointed as SpecialAdministrator. Josefina opposed and moved for the dismissal


upon the ground that the petitioner is not an interested personin the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation,in the alternarive, she asked to be appointed administratrix.Whereas Cipriano alleged that Josefina was not the decedent’swife and that the deed of assignement was procured throughfraud, with gross inadequacy of consideration and vitiated bylesion.

Meanwhile, Miguel, another brother of decedent, filed apetition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina movedto strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervenein the case.

CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for lack of interestin the estate premised on the deed of assignment signed byCipriano.

Cipriano and Miguel appealed.ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Cipriano can be considered as an “interested person” in the estateRULING:

No.Petitioner Cipriano is not an interested person in theestate of the decedent. In the present case, there was really nosettlement proceedings. The remedy of the petitioner is torescind or to annul the deed of assignment or the extrajudicialpartition. The assignment took place without pendingsettlement proceeding. The properties subject matter of theassignment were not under the jurisdiction of the settlementcourt. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partitionbetween the assignor and assignee, the same does not needcourt approval to be effective between parties. An extrajudicialpartition is valid as between participants even if the requisitesof Sec. 1 Rule 74 are not followed, since such requisites are forpurposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only.

Under the Rules of Court, a petition for administrationand settlement of an estate must be filed by an interestedperson. And in the meanwhile, the assigning heir cannotinitiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed ofassignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid andeffective against him, so that he is left without that “ interest”in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.

TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLORSalayog, Benny Rico

FACTS:Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for

the issuance of letters of administration over the estate ofIsmael Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate children of Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but they didn't have any children of their own.

Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and onemotor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. Petitioner promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as their share in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle. Petitioner only gave half.

Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to dispose of the properties of Ismael to the respondents prejudice, Petitioner opposed this petition of TG asserting that the properties were purchased by her using her own money, she even denied all of petitioners allegations.

Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole owner of the properties by presenting TCTs. She also averred that it was necessary for respondent to show proof that she was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition. DENIED. CA also denied petitioners motion and directed the trial court to proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the allegation of respondent that she is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without the need to state that she had been recognized or acknowledged.


Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael's estate. Because the claim of filiation should not be allowed to be proved in an action for settlement of an estate.

ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that she merely alleged she is an illegitimate child?

RULING: YES.Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct.

The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement ofthe intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child which may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Petitioner’s ground is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer establish her filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the fact that respondent's successional rights may be established not just by judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged.

Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation because of petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to determine if her petition is actually one to compel

recognition or whether she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit. So, the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices even without stating that she has been recognized or acknowledged.

This petition by petitioner is DENIED.

RULE 80Special Administrator

FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALSSalayog, Benny Rico

FACTS:- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.- Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) àpet for letters of admin & exparte appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna - Motion was granted. - Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child - opposed

- failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & impropervenue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased as

required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) - death certs presented byFule show QC as deceased’s last residence

- Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mereillegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeeding

from him2

1Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the

appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration asnext of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed

2NCC Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.


- CFI - denied opposition- CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.

ISSUES/HELD a) Venue v. Jurisdiction➢ JURISDICTION –power/authority of court over subject matter

o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIsindependently from the place of residence of thedeceased (Judiciary act 1948)

o Not changed by procedureo There are cases though that if such power is not

exercised conformably w/ procedure, court loses powerto exercise it legally. However, this doesn’t amount toloss of jurisdiction over subject matter but only over theperson or that judgment may be rendered defective forlack of something essential to sustain it.

➢ VENUE –place where each case shall be broughto Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of

settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance ofletters of admin) - place of residence of deceased /province▪ Death Certificate àdeceased resided in QC at the

time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna wasimproper (death cert admissible to prove residenceof deaceased at time of his death)

o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue

3RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines atthe time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters ofadministration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which heresides at the time of his death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFIof any province in which he had estate.The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement ofthe estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence ofthe decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

▪ Clause “so far….”▪ Caption “Settlement of estate of Deceased Person.

Venue and Processes▪ Contained in a law of procedure - merely a matter of

method & convenience to partieso Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver

▪ but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested foralternative remedy to assert her rights as survivingspouse

b) What does the word “resides”in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean➢ Resides –“actual residence”

- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a givenplace

- In statutes fixing venue“residence”&“domicile”synonymous àeven when statueuses “domicile”, it is still construed as residence & notdomicile in its technical sense

- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of theobject or purpose of the statute or rule in which it isemployed.

- Popular sense –the personal, actual or physicalhabitation of a person, actual residence or place ofabode

- No particular length of time required but must be morethan temporary

➢ legal residence or domicile –requires bodily presence and anintention to make it one’s domicile.

DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED.

DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZSumaway, Dylan

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instanceof Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special


Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtueof a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; that a motion for the appointment of a special administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor.The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator.ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order d denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special administrator RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of thedeceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rulesis broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or incases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by thedeceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the herein private respondents.Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978.The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:The reason for the practice of appointing a special administratorrests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to greatwaste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however.


Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs. It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.

RELUCIO VS SAN JOSESumaway, Dylan

FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., Upon petition filed on June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which the petitioner filed an opposition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order on January 15, 1951, appointing RolandoRelucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner.Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved for the immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator.The court merely made reference to the letters of administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion for immediate execution.Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers, documents, titles and properties of the estate under her administration. In the order dated April 10, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner from the order of January 15, 1951.RULING: From the very position taken by the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is plain that the motion for immediate execution of the order of January 15,

1951, was in effect denied, with the result that the petitioner must be deemed as having the right to continue as administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of. It is noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix but as executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio in virtue of the appealed order of January 15, 1951 is not for any cause, but is based solely on the circumstance that Rolando Relucio is an heirThe cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal fromthe allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause,the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim,have the same power and be subject to the same liability as thegeneral administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend suchclaim."There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under either section 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view ofthe case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix.

DE GUZMAN VS ANGELESTomarong, MarianFACTS:

On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed apetition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de


Guzman before RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges amongothers that petitioner as the surviving spouse of the decedent ismost qualified and entitled to the grant of letters ofadministration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion for writ ofpossession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of thesaid deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of thede Guzmans and in order to preserve the assets of her latehusband, but which are at present in the possession of PR’sfather-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro de Guzman.

On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appointpetitioner as Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito deGuzman”. Hearing was set on June 5, 1987, however, no noticewas given to petitioner. In the order dated June 5, 1987, the RTCgranted the PR’s motion to be appointed as specialadministratix. The RTC issued another order dated June 8, 1987,granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by PRfor appointment of two deputy sheriffs with somemilitary/policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of herlate husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicleson the ground that they were his personal properties.Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to annul the RTC’s ordersdated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that the appointmentof a special administrator constitutes an abuse of discretion forhaving been made without giving petitioner an opportunity tooppose said appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate court may appoint a specialadministratix and issue a writ of possession of allegedproperties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate ofthe said deceased person even before the probate court causesnotice be served upon all interested parties

HELD:

No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondentcourt acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filingof a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by theprivate respondent. Verily, notice through publication of thepetition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person isjurisdictional, the absence of which makes court ordersaffecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void andsubject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice asmandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Courtwas caused to be given by the probate court before it acted onthe motions of the private respondent to be appointed asspecial administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of allegedproperties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and togrant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate ofManolito de Guzman.

A special administrator has been defined as the "representativeof decedent appointed by the probate court to care for andpreserve his estate until an executor or general administrator isappointed." The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similarinterest in the preservation of the estate as the privaterespondent who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolitode Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by theRules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly whatemergency would have ensued if the appointment of anadministrator was deferred at least until the most interestedparties were given notice of the proposed action. Nounavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administratoris apparent from the records.

HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIELTomarong, Marian

On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of LorenzoAlmoradie, died in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable


inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.A month after her death, Crisanta’s mother commenced anintestate proceedings before RTC of Malabon City docketed asSpc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She prayed among others that theletters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga,brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.However, the marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta wasdeclared void for being bigamous. Then, RTC removed Lorenzoas administrator and appointed Mariano.

On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion forintervention, claiming that she is the only legitimate child ofLorenzo and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died.On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC apetition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance ofletters testamentary in his favour. He alleged that he discoveredhis mother’s will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he was institutedas the sole heir and designated as alternate executor for thenamed executor therein, Francisco Yanga, brother of Crisanta,who had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon Citydismissed the intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN.The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as specialadministrator of his mother’s estate. However, on April 16,2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores filed a Manifestation andMotion where she informed the probate court about herhusband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitutein place of her late husband and be appointed as administratixas well. Heirs of Belinda opposed to it contended that she wasnot Crisanta’s next of kin. RTC appointed Dolores as specialadministratix. The Heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider but itwas denied by the probate court. CA affirmed the decision ofthe lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix byprobate court is proper

HELD:

Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of aspecial administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probatecourt. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent,appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve hisestate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as arepresentative of the agent of the parties suggesting theappointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate,and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he issubject to the supervision and control of the probate court andis expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate,especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement.The principal object of appointment of temporary administratoris to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of personfully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors andheirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators forthe estates of decedents frequently become involved inprotracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to greatwaste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect thedebts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. Theoccasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, forsome cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proofof the will, regular administration is delayed. The new Ruleshave broadened the basis for the appointment of anadministrator, and such appointment is allowed when there isdelay in granting letters testamentary or administration by anycause, e.g. , parties cannot agree among themselves. It needsto be emphasized that in the appointment of a specialadministrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until aregular administrator is appointed), the probate court does notdetermine the shares in the decedents estate, but merelyappoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue ofheirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution,and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties inthe administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the


preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, orcontrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. Thepetitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of theRules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointmentof regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on theother hand, applies to the appointment of a specialadministrator. It has long been settled that the appointment ofspecial administrators is not governed by the rules regardingthe appointment of regular administrators

CORONA VS COURT OF APPEALSTresvalles, Kris

FACTS:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in NewYork, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will datedOctober 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondentRomarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formalWill sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeksthereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting toconcubinage, which is a ground for legal separation underPhilippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares toher sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and GloriaL. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way;and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as herExecutrix. On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition forthe probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of

Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as Administratorbecause she (Rowena) is presently employed in the UnitedNations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte asSpecial Administratix. On On December 12, 1980, the survivinghusband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" andprayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed forhis appointment as Special Administrator because the SpecialAdministratix appointed is not related to the heirs and has nointerest to be protected. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P.Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and took her oath of officebefore a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Courtset aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita asSpecial Administratrix, and appointed instead the survivinghusband, Romarico as Special Administrator for the reasons thatunder Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the survivingspouse is first in the order of preference for appointment asAdministrator as he has an interest in the estate; that thedisinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the groundsof disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that thenext of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is notcompetent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that theExecutrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece,and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of theunliquidated conjugal partnership property.

ISSUE:

Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding theappointment of the surviving husband as special administrator

HELD:

This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition takinginto account the allegations, arguments and issues raised bythe parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner'snominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special


Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator,considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude ofdiscretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to thehighest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment ongrounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowedby the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of thedeceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband berepresented in the management of the decedent's estate.

En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administratorsthat while they may have respective interests to protect, theyare officers of the Court subject to the supervision and controlof the Probate Court and are expected to work for the bestinterests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and itsearliest settlement.

MATIAS VS GONZALESTresvalles, Kris

FACTS:

On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said specialproceedings with a petition for the probate of a documentpurporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, GabinaRaquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years.The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except theproperties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely,Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matiasand Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument, AureaMatias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, withoutbond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed theprobate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings,the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued an order,

sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate.Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal.Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved forthe dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator ofthe estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead ofRamon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on Feb 23, 1956but was postponed to Feb 27, 1956. Although notified of thisorder, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned.Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional timewithin which to answer the charges preferred against him byBasilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing.This motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introducedevidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondentJudge by an order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguezguilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estateof the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as specialadministratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece,Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreterand adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who ishereby appointed as co-administrator."

Aurea asked that said order be set aside and that she beappointed special co-administratix with Horacio on the groundthat Basilia is over 80 years of age, totally blind and physicallyincapacitated to perform the duties of said office and the saidmovant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the personappointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. Thismotion was denied and maintained the appointment of thethree. However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered herresignation as special administratix by reason of physical


disability, due to old age and recommended the appointment ofvictorina Salud.

Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents RamonPlata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect therents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceasedand to collect all the produce of her lands, which was grantedon June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filedanother motion praying for permission to sell the palay of thedeceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province ofCavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Lateron, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present actionagainst Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata,for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders ofrespondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had beenissued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner argued that she should have preference in the choiceof special administratix of the estate of the decedent being theuniversal heiress to said estate and the executrix appointed inthe alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance— which has not, as yet, taken place she has a special interestin said estate, which must be protected by givingrepresentation thereto in the management of said estate; that,apart from denying her any such representation, themanagement was given to persons partial to her mainopponent. That the Rules of Court do not permit theappointment of more than one special administrator and thatRamon and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents andsell the palay without previous notice to petitioner.

Respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with thescope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion;that petitioner can not validly claim any special interest in the

estate of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged willand testament of the latter — upon which petitioner relies — hasbeen denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of theproceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud andRamon Plata have not done anything that would warrant theirremoval.

ISSUE: whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretionfor not appointing the named executrix and the propriety ofappointing more than one administratix

HELD:

Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of themotion for his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the recordshows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion ofFebruary 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearingthereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, datedFebruary 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27,1956, was not served on petitioner herein.

In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for thedismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of RamonPlata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had,therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, andthe latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would beconsidered for the management of said. As a consequence, saidpetitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment ofBasilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, asher assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956,to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.

The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson to the effect that "onlyone special administrator may be appointed to administratortemporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered inthe light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

appointed therein one special administrator for some propertiesforming part of said estate, and a special administratrix forother properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate andindependent special administrators. In the case at bar there isonly one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall beexercised jointly by two special co-administrators. Moreover,there are authorities in support of the power of courts toappoint several special co-administrators.

ROXAS VS. PECSONTuason, Jannelle

FACTS:

Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. Thepetitioner, widow of the deceased, filed a petition for theprobate of an alleged will of her deceased husband and for herappointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will.Petitioner was appointed as special administratrix and qualifiedas such over the objection of the respondents who sought theappointment of Maria, sister of the deceased. Upon petition bythe respondents, the respondent judge rendered his resolutionappointing the petitioner as special administratrix only of all theconjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as specialadministratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusivelyto the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court'sjurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of theestate of the deceased.

RULING:

Yes. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separateadministrators. As under the law, only one general

administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate anddistribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly followsthat only one special administrator may be appointed toadminister temporarily said estate, because a specialadministrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointedto act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delayin granting letters testamentary or of administration occasionedby an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or fromany other cause, the court may appoint a special administratorto collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased untilthe questions causing the delay are decided and executors oradministrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and takecharge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of thedeceased and preserve the same for the executor oradministrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose maycommence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sellsuch perishable and other property as the court orders sold. Aspecial administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of thedeceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)

DE GALA VS. GONZALESTuason, JanelleFACTS:

Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, aniece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix diedleaving no heirs by force of law, and Serapia, through hercounsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, anephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on theground that it had not been executed in conformity with theprovisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapiade Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate ofthe deceased.

On the other hand,Sinforoso, husband of the deceased, filed amotion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as specialadministratrix be cancelled and that he, be appointed in herstead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzalesand by Serapia de Gala, but it was nevertheless granted.Serapia


was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed specialadministrator in her place, principally on the ground that he hadpossession of the property in question and that his appointmentwould simplify the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be removed as a specialadministratix of the estate of the deceased

RULING:

Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely inthe sound discretion of the court; the function of such anadministrator is only to collect and preserve the property of thedeceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be suedby a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. Thefact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of aspecial administrator indicates that both his appointment andhis removal are purely discretionary, SC cannot find that thecourt below abused its discretion in the present case. Inremoving Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessorof the property pending the final determination of the validity ofthe will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.

LIWANAG, vs. REYESUmbalin, Norissa

FACTS:

On July 14, 1960, the late Liwanag executed in favor of themortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage ona parcel of residential land to secure the payment of a loan. Itwas stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amountof mortgage debt shall be fully paid on or before July 14, 1961.Before the one year period expired, Liwanag died intestate.

As the mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fullypaid, the mortgagee, instituted a complaint for foreclosureagainst the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as

administratrix of the estate before the RTC. The action alsoprayed for the appointment of a receiver.

Gliceria filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that she maynot be sued as special administratrix. She also filed anopposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ ofreceivership on the ground that the property subject of theforeclosure proceedings is in custodia legis, since administrationproceedings had already been instituted for the settlement ofthe estate of the deceased.

ISSUES:

1. WON Gliceria Liwanag can be sued as specialadministratix.

2. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of thelower court in the issuance of its order for theappointment of a receiver.

HELD:

1. YES.

Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit makingthe special administratrix a defendant in a suit againstthe estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverseeffects of the statute of limitations running against themin cases where the appointment of a regularadministrator is delayed. So if the court is to deny thepresent action on this technical ground alone, and theappointment of a regular administrator will be delayed,the very purpose for which the mortgage wasconstituted will be defeated.

2. NO.

It is to be noted that the contract of mortgagebetween the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing,


states the in case of judicial foreclosure, the “Mortgagorhereby consents to the appointment of the president ofthe mortgagee corporation or any of its officers asreceiver, without any bond, to take charge of themortgaged property at once, and to hold possession ofthe same, and the rents and profits derived from themortgaged property, before the sale, x x x.” Hence, thewill of the deceased himself allowed that, in case offoreclosure, the property be put into the hands of areceiver, and this provision should be respected by theadministratrix of the estate. The cases cited bypetitioner in favor of the theory that property in custodialegis can not be given to a receiver is not applicable,considering that this is an action to enforce a superiorlien on certain property of the estate and theappointment of a receiver, which is a very convenientand feasible means of preserving and administering theproperty, has been agreed upon by the contractingparties.

ANDERSON VS. PERKINSUmbali, Norissa

FACTS :

Special proceedings were commenced by Dora PerkinsAnderson seeking the probate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins’will. Dora also filed an urgent petition for the appointment ofAlfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate. Onthe same day, Alfonso was appointed upon his posting of aP50,000 bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse ofEugene, entered an opposition to the probate of the will. Later,the special administrator Alfonso submitted an inventory of allthe assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging toEugene at the time of his death.

About two years later, special administrator Alfonsosubmitted a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away tosome charitable or educational institution/s, some personaleffects (clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc.)which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value.The court required a specification of the properties sought to besold. Instead, the special administrator submitted a copy of theinventory of the personal properties belonging to the estatewith the items sought to be sold marked with a check in redpencil.

Idonah filed an opposition to the proposed sale. But, thelower court approved the proposed sale. Idonah moved toreconsider on the following grounds:

1. The order in effect authorized the specialadministrator to sell the entire personal estate of thedeceased;

2. There was no showing that the goods sought to besold were perishable;

3. The goods sought to be sold represented herlifetime savings and collections;

4. There were unauthorized withdrawals from theproperties of the estate, and the sale of theinventoried lot would prevent identification andrecovery of the articles removed; and

5. There is evidence showing Idonah’s separaterights to a substantial part of the personal estate.

ISSUES:1. Is the special administrator’s power to sell limited to

“perishable property.” 2. WON the lower court erred in authorizing the special

administrator to sell certain personal properties of theestate. – YES. It was premature. RATIO

HELD:


1. NO.

Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, providesthat the special administrator "may sell such perishableand other property as the court orders sold", whichshows that the special administrator's power to sell isnot limited to "perishable" property only. The function ofa special administrator is only to collect and preservethe property of the deceased until a regularadministrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specificproperty of the estate which is to be preserved, but itsvalue as well, as shown by the legal provision for thesale by a special administrator of perishable property. Itis in line with this general power to preserve not only theproperty of the estate but also its value, that Section 2,Rule 81 also empowers such administrator to sell "otherproperty as the court ordered sold".

2. YES. It was premature.

The records show that up to the time theproposed sale was asked for and judicially approved, noproceeding had been taken to segregate the allegedexclusive property of Idonah from the mass of the estatesupposedly left by Eugene or to liquidate the conjugalpartnership property of the spouses. Until the issue ofthe ownership of the properties sought to be sold isheard and decided, and the conjugal partnershipliquidated or at least an agreement be reached withIdonah as to which properties of the conjugal partnershipshe would not mind being sold to preserve their value,the proposed sale is premature. Also, there are noreasons of extreme urgency to justify the proposed saleover the strong opposition and objection of Idonah whomay later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion ofthe personalities in question. After all, most of the itemssought to be sold can easily be preserved in either orboth of two residential houses (Manila and Baguio City).

Re: special administrator Alfonso’s claim thatIdonah should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture"which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so

is an indication of her unmeritorious claim – Idonah wasnot given a reasonable opportunity to point out whichitems she did not want sold. Her opposition and motionfor reconsideration were overruled by the lower courtwithout reasons. The records do not even show that aninquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of heropposition.

CO VS. ROSARIOUy, Charles

FACTS:Upon the death of the father of herein parties, Co Bun

Chun, the RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co as co-administrator together with a Vicente Yu. Subsequently,petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, as special co-administrator, which motion was granted by the trial court.About four years later, numerous criminal charges have beenfiled against Alvin Co, and at the basis of the same, the otherheirs asked that he be removed as special co-administrator.Said motion was granted by the trial court. Aggrieved,petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but upon thedenial of the same, he brought the matter to the CA under Rule65. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this appeal

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to dismissthe services of Alvin Co on the basis of the criminal chargesfiled against him even if he had not yet been convicted

RULING:The Court ruled in the affirmative. As a special co-

administrator, Alvin Co may be removed by the trial court evenif the grounds for his removal are not enumerated under therules. This is because he is a special administrator, not a regularadministrator, and special administrators are not covered by


the rules covering regular administrators. The appointment ofspecial administrators are left to the sound discretion of thecourts, and thus, the removal of special administrators are alsoleft to the sound discretion of the courts.

ALCASID VS SAMSONUy, Charles

FACTS:

An application for the issuance of letters ofadministration was filed by herein respondents in favor of oneof their numbers, herein respondent Jesus V. Samson, in the CFIof Albay. Such application was granted and on the same day,Jesus Samson was appointed special administrator for theestate. Said appointment was opposed by herein petitionerJosefina Samson, the widow of Jose Samson, the deceased,together with her three minor children. They asked thatJosefina, and not Jesus be appointed administrator. After twoyears of hearing, the trial court appointed Antonia Codia, citytreasurer, petitioner, as regular administrator. The court alsoordered Jesus to turn over to Codia all papers regarding theadministration of the estate in the March 12, 1956 order. Uponmotion of the widow, the April 3, 1956 Order was issued,ordering Jesus to turn over all documents to Codia within threedays. It would appear, however, that respondents opposed theappointment of Codia but their motion was denied, hence, theywent up to the CA who decided in favor of herein respondentson the basis of Cotia v Pecson where it was ruled that theappeal stayed the appointment of Codia. Aggrieved, petitionersfiled this petition before the Court

ISSUE:

Whether or not Codia qualifies as administrator of theestate

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it mustbe noted that the appointment of Jesus Samson was as specialadministrator, while that of Codia was of a regularadministrator. The appointment of a special administrator isdiscretionary upon the court, hence, the court may also removethe said special administrator, including when a regularadministrator is appointed. Section 3, Rule 81 of the Rules ofCourt provides that the authority of the special administratorends when a regular administrator is appointed. Even assumingthat Cotia v Pecson applies – which it does not because that isthe removal of a regular administrator – still, the authority ofJesus Samson has ended because the April 3 Order is a specialorder as was required by Section 2, Rule 39. It boils down to thefact that the appointment of special administrators is up to thediscretion of the court.

JUNQUERA VS. BORROMEOViernes , Wayne

RULE 81Bonds of Executors and Administrators

COSME DE MENDOZA V. PACHECO, 64 PHIL 134 (1937)

FACTS:

Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estateof Cosme. As such administrator, he filed a bond forP5,000 with Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero assureties. When an account was made, Soriano wasindebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court orderedthe execution of his bond.

Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrixentered into a settlement whereby Soriano ceded


certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducinghis indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now questionthe jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a probate court has the power to orderthe execution of an administrator's bond?HELD:

To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court toselect an administrator of the estate of a deceasedperson. Before an administrator, or an executor, entersupon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentaryor of administration are issued, the person to whom theyare issued is required to give a bond in such reasonablesum as the court directs, with one or more sufficientsureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance ofhis trust. The administrator is accountable on his bondalong with the sureties for the performance of certainlegal obligations.

It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercisingprobate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filingof the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof,and to hold it accountable for any breach of theadministrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and overadministration proceedings, a Court of First Instance ina probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authorityto execute and make that bond answerable for the verypurpose for which it was filed. It is true that the lawdoes not say expressly or in so many words tat suchcourt has power to execute the bond of an administrator,but by necessary and logical implication, the power isthere as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocalterm.

WARNER, BARNES & CO. VS. LUZON SURETY CO, INC.Vizcarra, William

FACTS:Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.(WBC), filed a complaint

against Luzon Surety Co., Inc.(LSC), of the recovery of the sumof P6,000. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum ofP6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of theIntestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No.452, the condition being that said bond would be void if theadministratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the Court acorrect inventory of all the property of the deceased which mayhave come into his possession or into the possession of anyother person representing him according to law, if headministers all the property of the deceased which at any timecomes into his possession or into the possession of any otherperson representing him; faithfully pays all debts, legacies, andbequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividendswhich the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a justand true account of his administrations to the Court within ayear or at any other date that he may required so to do, andfaithfully executes all orders and decrees of said court."

It was alleged in the complaint that WBC had a duly approvedclaim against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum ofP6,485.02, plus 2 per cent annual interest; that theadministratrix violated the conditions of her bond "(a) by failingto file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate thathad come into her hands; (b) by failing to pay or discharge theapproved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a trueand just account of her administration in general, and of thesaid war damage payments in particular."; that the defendant,as surety in the bond, failed to pay to the plaintiff,notwithstanding the latter's demand.

The LSC filed an answer setting up the special defenses that thecomplaint did not state a cause of action.

On January 6, 1953, the WBC filed a motion for summaryjudgment, alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by theLSC in her Answer raise only questions of law, and the WBC


believes that LSC cannot produce counter-affidavits that wouldraise any 'genuine issues as to any material facts.'The CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing LSC to payWBC the sum of P6,000. From this judgment the defendantappealed.

RULING:Under the first assignment of error, LSC contends that

the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liabilityunder the bond in question, because it is only the probate courtthat can hold a surety accountable for any breach by theadministratrix of her duty, citing the case of Mendoza vs.Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It is, however, noteworthy that while thecitation is to the effect that the probate court has jurisdictionover the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond,it was not held therein that the same matter may not belitigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the court offirst instance.

Under the second assignment of error, LSC claims that there aregenuine controversies between the parties litigant, and that,contrary to the allegations of the complaint, the administratrixmade a return to the court of the war damage payments shereceived; the administratrix cannot be charged with havingfailed to pay plaintiff's claim because there is no showing thatshe was ever authorized to pay approved claims; theadministratrix may be presumed to have rendered anaccounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordancewith section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it issufficient to state that the allegations that the administratrixfailed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and torender a true and just account of her administration, are factualand remained uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which theappellant could have easily filed.

Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted forLSC that the bond in question was executed in favor of theRepublic of the Philippines and that the proper procedure wouldseem to be that it might be enforced in the administrationproceedings were it was filed. This view is likewise not tenable.

Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, thebond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees andcreditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. Thereis no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his nameenforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.

Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the WBCshould have first filed a claim against the Estate of thedeceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity withsection 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Wherethe obligation of the decedent is joint and several with anotherdebtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if hewere the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of theestate to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apartfrom the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in amotion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived(section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it appears that evenas late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint wasfiled, (more than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga),there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate,with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability.Moreover, it is to be noted that the LSC had also chosen to file athird-party complaint in the present case against RomualdoAraneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceasedadministratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter'sestate.

Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant issentenced to pay to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum ofP6,000, plus the cost, the same is hereby affirmed.

LUZON SURETY CO., INC. VS. QUEBARVizcarra, William

FACTSLuzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf ofdefendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy andLipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko boundthemselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreementwhere both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every


year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiumsand the documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved theproject of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demandedpayments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in thesame year when the court granted the motion of the defendantsto have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff files a case in theCFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since thebonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. TheCourt of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court onquestions of law.

ISSUE:

Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962

RULING

YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, theadministrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose ofindemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It isconditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator'strust. Hence, the surety is then liable under the administrator'sbond.

Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar asadministrator still had something to do. The administration is forthe purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution ofthe residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation meansthe determination of all the assets of the estate and thepayment of all debts and expenses. It appears that there arestill debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.

Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it willterminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remainsunpaid. Hence, it does not necessarily extinguish or terminatethe effectivity of the counter bond in the absence of an expressstipulation to this effect. As such, as long as the defendantremains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held

liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensivewith the administrator.

RULE 82Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation

and Removal of Administrator or Executor

BORROMEO VS BORROMEOYatco, NathanielFACTS:

Dr. MaximoBorromeo died testate designating BorromeoBrothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His brother CanutoBorromeoacted as executor of the said will. The said corporation is ownedby the testator and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings havebeen instituted. The widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo filed anUrgent Motion to remove the executordue to negligence in theperformance of duties and unfitness to continue as executor.While the action was still pending, CanutoBorromeo withdrewhis joint bank account with the decedent and deposited it on hisand his other brother Exequiel’s joint account without authorityfrom the Court. In time the petition was heard and the judgerelieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that ofthe unauthorized withdrawal of the decedent’s joint accountwith the executor.Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that theywere joint owners of such account and either of them (decedentor Canuto) has right over it. ISSUE: WON a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawalmade by Canuto which is a ground for removal as executor ofthe estate.RULING:

Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken fromthe joint account in the Bank was done by Canuto withrepresentation as executor of the estate of deceasedDr.Maximo. There was bad faith in the concealment of propertybelonging to the decedent’s estate. Canuto should havedeposited the P23, 930.39 on the estate andnot at his disposal.It then constituted as hiding such property from the widow andhe, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of


the said property.Conflict between the interest of the executorand the interest of the deceased is ground for removal orresignation of the former, who has thereby become unsuitableto discharge the trust. According to Rule 82, sec 2, if anexecutor neglects to settle his account and settle the estateaccording to law, the court may remove him or, in its discretionpermit him to resign.

OCAMPO VS OCAMPOYatco, Nathaniel

FACTS:

Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3children namely Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblingsdivided the profits of the decedents’ estate among themselves.Subsequently, Leonardo died leaving his surviving spouseDalisay and 3 children namely Vince, Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr.When Leonardo died, Renato and Erlinda took over to theexclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay.Dalisay and her 3 childrenfiled a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate ofVicente, Maxima and her deceased husband Leonardo. It seeksto settle the estate and appoint an administrator to divide suchas they were not receiving any profit anymore. RespondentsRenato and Erlinda countered assailing the petition defective asit sought two estates in one proceeding (Estate of Vicente andMaxima; and Leonardo’s estate.)There was a motion to appointRenato and Erlinda as administrators but was countered byDalisay as it would cause further injustice and nominated BinanRural Bank as administrator. Trial Court accepted thatrespondent Renato and petitioner Dalisay be appointed as jointadministrators. Petitioner Dalisay was revoked of herappointment as her nomination of Binan Rural bank constituteda waiver and the court found that she is unfit to suchoffice.Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, wasordered by the court to produce a true inventory of the estate.RTC later on revoked the appointment of Renato and Erlinda forfailure to comply with the order and failure to pay the bond asprescribed by the rules and that there was an alleged sale madeby them involving a real property belonging to the estate.

Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein) appealed to the CAand CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretionin appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay) as a regularadministrator.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion onthe revocation of the respondents as special administrators andappointment of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay) as regularadministratrix.

RULING”

The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocationbut finds it improper for Merlinda to be a “regular”administratrix. The probate court may at its discretion appointor remove special administrators toher than thegroundsenumerated in the Rules. The respondents were notable to comply with the payment of the bond which is requiredin Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the part ofthe respondents as administrators when an alleged sale of theproperty included in the estate was done thru a conditionaldeed of sale. As a result of such transaction, it deprived theestate of profits accruing from the said real property (monthlyrentals.) Such reason of the probate court being groundedon equity, justice and legal principles. As to the appointment ofMerlinda, it must be as a “special” administrator and not a“regular” administrator. Rule 78 determines the persons to beappointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir or acreditor to the estate. However, the SC held her as a specialadministratrix due to her competency in filing the bond and trueinventory of the estate as soon as the RTC appointed her ofsuch responsibility. Such acts clearly manifested her intention toserve willingly. Pending the proceeding for regularadministration, Merlinda is designated as special administratrixof the estate.

RULE 83


Inventory and Appraisal . Provision for Support of Family

SEBIAL VS. SEBIALAlvarez, Miguel Lorenzo

GARCIA VS. GARCIAArcilla, Jay

CUIZON VS. RAMOLETEAzarcon, Pia Lea

FACTS:As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the

registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketedas L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his propertybetween his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the saltbeds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Ireneexecuted a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involvingthe said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al. Althoughthe decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T.was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In thatsame year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in questionwas issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978. During theextrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother ofFrancisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Ireneincluding the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed ofConfirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rightsand interests and participation she may have in the property inquestion in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated inT.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued infavor of the petitioners. In 1978, Domingo Antigua, whoallegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as

administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estateand asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt tohim. The Cebu CFI granted the same.

ISSUE:

Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings hasjurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issuedin favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedingsif the said parcels of have been?

RULING:

No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one incharge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannotadjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a partof the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outsideparties. All said court could do is to determine whether theyshould or should not be included in the inventory of propertiesto be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, thenthe administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to anordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claimsof title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instantcase, the property involved is not only claimed by outsideparties but it was sold seven years before the death of thedecedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who arenot party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court heldthat “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, thepresumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given dueweight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to thecontrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the ownerof the property in controversy until his title is nullified ormodified in an appropriate ordinary action.” Having beenapprised of the fact that the property in question was coveredby a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent


court should have denied the motion of the respondentadministrator and excluded the property in question from theinventory of the property of the estate.

GUINGUING VS. ABUTON

Balanay, Rendel Bryan

FACTS:

Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets ofchildren by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whomhe had 12 children and 3 already died. Second from, TeodoraGuinguing whom he had 4 children, all still living. Uponallowance of the will, Gabriel Binaoro was appointed asadministrator. Binaoro submitted the inventory to the court buthe included only the lands which the testator had devised to thechildren of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessedby him at the time of his death and which were claimed by thechildren of the first marriage as having been derived from theirmother.

This prompted Teodora Guinguing to file a motion, askingthat the administrator be required to amend his inventory andto include therein all property pertaining to the conjugalpartnership of Ignacio Abuton and DionisiaOlarte, includingproperty actually in the hands of his children by her which (themotion alleged) had been delivered to her four minor children

as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force thefirst set of children to bring into collation the properties that hadbeen received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of theCivil Code; and the motion was based partly on the suppositionthat Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation ofthe conjugal property pertaining to himself and DionisiaOlarte.

This motion was formally opposed by two of the childrenof the first marriage, namely, Agapito and CalixtoAbuton yOlarte.

The trial judge found that after the death of the first wifethe testator had acquired no property after the first marriageand the testator liquidated the ganacial estate and had dividedamong the first set of children all of the property that pertainedto the first wife in the division, with the exception of the home-place in the poblacion, in which the testator had continued toreside till death. The share pertaining to the testator in saiddivision was, so the court found, retained in his own hands; andthis property constituted the proper subject matter of thepresent administration proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisional inventory should includeall property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of thedeceased.

RULING:


Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of apreliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusionof property therein or the improper omission of propertytherefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons ininterest. In addition, the inclusion of a property in the inventorydoes not deprive the occupant of possession; and if it is finallydetermined that the property has been properly included in theestate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest onlyfrom the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ.Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference tocollation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs withrespect to the obligation to collate may be determined in thecourse of the administration proceedings.

Among the properties remaining in possession of IgnacioAbuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered bya composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name ofDionisiaOlarte. At the same time that this title was issued,AgapitoAbuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his ownname. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued inthe name of DionisiaOlarte the opponents, theAbutons , appearto believe that this land was her particular property and shouldnow vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous.There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No.11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage,and the circumstance that the title was taken in the name ofthe wife does not defeat its presumed character as ganacialproperty. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of thefirst marriage it was within the power of the surviving husbandto assign other property to the first set of children as theirparticipation in the estate of their mother and to retain in hisown hands the property for which a composition title had beenissued in the name of the wife.

RULE 84General Powers and Duties of Executors and

Administrators

WILSON VS REARBorja,Catherine

FACTS:

July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of public lands. J.J. Wilson qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925.

Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800, of which the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a report of claims against the estate, but by reason of the fact that it was claimed and allegedthat the administrator did not have any funds to pay, on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a portion ofthe property.

After due notice, the public sale took place, and the property was sold to Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26, 1927,

March 23, 1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was amended on June 10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous and specific objections, including that Wilson, as special administrator and as administrator, was neglectful and imprudent and he committed waste. He is, therefore, liable.

ISSUE:


Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable?

RULING:

The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant case there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course of business, the administrator should have wound up and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his appointment.

When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law imposed upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent business man would handle his own personal business. When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer,settle, and close the administration in the ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the administrator on his own volition and without any authority or process of court continued the operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which was appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the deceased of only

P1,655.54, was all wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of P1,809.69.

SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBREBorlagdatan, April

FACTS:

-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administratorleased a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent)

-Terms of the lease : 3yrs

-It is executed without previous authority or approval of theCourt where the proceedings was pending

-Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the courtand one SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead

-Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute alease contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner for 5years from 1961

- Nombre opposed this alleging that to grant such motion by thenew administrator would nullify the contract of lease validlyexecuted

RULING OF TRIAL COURT:

-It held that the contract with Escanlar was null and void, forwant of judicial authority and that unless he would offer thesame as or better conditions than the prospective lessee - SanDiego


-No good reason why the motion for authority to lease theproperty to San Diego should not be granted

RULING OF CA:

-It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in theabsence of such special powers, a contract or lease for morethan 6 years is not entirely invalid

-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator togrant a lease of property placed under his custody is providedfor in the present law

-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease isto be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot beinstituted without special authority

-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court itauthorizes a judicial administrator, among other things, toadminister the estate of the deceased not disposed of by willwhich includes leasing the property

ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease propertyof the estate without prior judicial authority and approval

RULING:

-The court denied the petition & affirmed CA's ruling.

-While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicialadministrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act inrepresentative capacity), are in some respects, identical, theprovisions on agency this should not apply to a judicialadministrator

-A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is notonly the representative of said Court, but also the heirs andcreditors of the estate.

-A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, isrequired to file a bond.

-This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is onlyanswerable to his principal. The protection which the law givesthe principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent,stems from the fact that control by the principal can only bethru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administratorare subject to specific provisions of law and orders of theappointing court.

JARODA VS. CUSIBueno, Jirene

FACTS:

Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondentcourt stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille diedintestate leaving estates consisting of his conjugal share in realand personal properties and some of them are shares in the co-ownership in Juna Subdivision and cash on bank.


The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9)children (among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A.Jaroda), and four (4) grandsons, among them the hereinrespondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After Respondent Tan wasappointed special administrator he petitioned for the withdrawalof sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the PhilippineNational Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition foradministration as among the properties left by the deceasedinstead actually belong to and were held in trust for the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedlysigned by the co-owners authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrilleto sell the lots in the Juna Subdivision and to deposit theproceeds thereof with the Philippine National Bank wereexhibited. The court granted the petition.

Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the JunaSubdivision a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell (or) dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectaresubdivision. Tan filed before the court for the approval of thepower of attorney executed authorizing himself to sell the lots,which the court also granted.

Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order thatallowed the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as theorder which approved the power of attorney which was grantedby the respondent court. Jaroda appealed but it was alsodismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed the present petition forcertiorari with preliminary injunction alleging, among otherthings, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate asrespondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivisionlots on the strength of the respondent court's order, to herirreparable prejudice and that of the other heirs which the Courtgave due and issued an order restraining the respondent fromselling the share of the intestate estate.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent Judge gravely abused hisdiscretion when it granted the withdrawal of the bank deposits,as well as the order which approved the power of attorney ofSpecial Administrator Tan to sell or dispose the lots co-owned bythe deceased in Juna Subdivision.

RULING:

Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the specialadministrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in thename of the decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreignto the powers and duties of a special administrator, which, asSection 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides, are to —takepossession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits andestate of the decease and preserve the same for the executoror administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purposemay commence and maintain suits as administrator. He maysell only such perishable and other property as the court orderssold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debtsof the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, andhearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of thebank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession andcharge of the credits of the estate, and apparently within thepowers and duties of a special administrator; but actually, saidwithdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a primafacie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank depositsin favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were


allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator inhis motion.

The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they,therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. Anduntil the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the properstage, when money claims may be filed in the intestateproceedings, the special administrator is without power to makethe waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appearsto be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on theground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sellfor valuable consideration property of the estate requires priorwritten notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, ordevisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice isequally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously ofassets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, nosuch notice was given, and without it the court's authority isinvalid and improper.

b) The order approving the power of attorney executed byadministrator Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact tosell the subdivision lots for a price at his discretion is, likewise,void for want of notice and for approving an improper contractor transaction.

As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court ,power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of theestate requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, andlegatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" andadmittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice.

It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of hertestator's estate as a trustee and that an executrix will not bepermitted to deal with herself as an individual in anytransaction concerning the trust property.

The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule,auto-contracts are permissible if not expressly prohibited andthat there is no express provision of law prohibiting anadministrator from appointing himself as his own agent, even ifcorrect, cannot and should not apply to administrator ofdecedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary relationship thatthey occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and theirresponsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary rulingwould open the door to fraud and maladministration, and oncethe harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.

A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorizeagent Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he cansell it for more he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells thelot for P150.00; he retains P100.00 and deposits in the bankP50.00 "in the name of Antonio V. A. Tan, in trust for JunaSubdivision" (as worded in the power of attorney. Annex "F-1");thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate for the sale ofthe lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would havebeen actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agentTan in his individual capacity.


The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in theadministrator's petition after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille theadministrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced saiddeceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision by authority ofthe other co-owners. By the court's questioned orderempowering him to represent the interest of the deceased inthe management of the subdivision, the administrator Tan cameto be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals:the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, andthe majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, inmanaging and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dualagency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable ofindependent defense of the estate's interests against those ofthe majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if not improper,that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with propertyunder his administration, should have to look to the wishes ofstrangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. Ajudicial administrator should be at all times subject to theorders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard bythe court in all matters affecting the disposal of her share, andthat the administrator should primarily protect the interest ofthe estate in which she is a participant rather than those of thedecedent's co-owner. The partial partition approved by thecourt has no effect, one way or the other, upon the orderscontested in the present case because it is not definite whetherthe lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreementcorrespond to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in thepower of attorney.

MANANQUIL VS. VILLEGAS

Cadavis , Lloyd

FACTS:

• A verified complaint for disbarment case filed by MauroMananquil against Atty. Villegas w/ gross misconduct ormalpractice committed while acting as counsel of recordof one Felix Leong in the latter’s capacity asadministrator of the Testate Estate of the late FelominaZerna. The complainant was appointed specialadministrator after Felix Leong died.

• March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel ofrecord for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the lateFelomina Zerna, who was appointed as administrator ofthe Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna.

• A lease contract was executed between Felix and theHeirs of Jose Villegas represented by respondent’sbrother in law Marcelo involving, among others, sugarlands of the Estate.

• Felix Leong was designated as administrator and owner,by testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels ofland.

• The lease contract was for 4 sugar crop years, w/ 10%yearly rental of the value of the sugar produced from theleased land.

• April 20, 1965,the formal partnership of Hijos De JoseVillegas was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas, ofwhich respondent was a member.

• Another lease contract was executed bet. Felix and thepartnership, containing basically the same terms and


conditions as the 1stcontract , w/ Marcelo signing againas representative of the lessee.

• After the demise of Marcelo, respondent was appointedmanager of Hijos De Jose Villegas by the majority ofpartners.

• Renewals of the lease contract were executed bet. Felixand Hijos De Jose Villegas and respondent signingtherein as representative of the lessee.

• In 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephewGeronimo Villegas as the manager of the familypartnership.

• Villegas was both counsel of Felix Leong and a partner inthe partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas.

• When Felix died, this disbarment case was filed byMananquil. He alleged that the lease contracts weremade iniquitous terms and conditions. He also allegedthat Villegas should have notified and secured theapproval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate beforecontracts were renewed, Villegas being counsel of thatestate’s administrator.

ISSUES: 1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probatecourt’s approval regarding the lease?

2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?

RULING:

1. NO. Pursuant to sec.3 of the Rule 84 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to thepossession and management of the real as well as the personal

estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for thepayment of the debts and the expenses of administration. Hemay, therefore, exercise acts of administration without specialauthority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. Forinstance, it has long been settled that an administrator has thepower to enter into the lease contracts involving the propertiesof the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Felix was notrequired under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seekprior authority from the probate court in order to validly leasereal properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Felix,cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court ofthe various lease contracts involved herein and to secure itsjudicial approval thereto.

2. NO. there is no evidence to warrant disbarment, althoughVillegas should be suspended from the practice of law becausehe participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involvingthe properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership ofHijos De Jose Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code,“lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may bethe object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtueof their profession” are prohibited from leasing, either in personor through the mediation of another, the properties or thingsmentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence,suspension for 4 months.

RULE 85Accountability and Compensation of Executors and

Administrators

JOSON VS. JOSONCastillo, Shain Ann


FACTS:Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving

behind heirs and properties. He married three times and wassurvived by nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren byhis first wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by hissecond wife Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and survivingwidow Dominga M. Joson.

Upon his death, his will was presented to the RTC of Nueva Ecijaby his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, said willhaving been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointedadministrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed aninventory of the properties left by the deceased.

The administrator filed his first account and second account forthe year 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 respectively. This wasordered by the court to be examined by the clerk of court butthe same has never been approved.On, 1948, the administratorfiled another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon motionof the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering theproperties under his administration.

Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all theaccounts filed by theadministrator where he alleged that theadministrator diminished the shares of the heirs and hadpadded his expenses of administration.

The heirs were able to compromise their differences andentered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of theentire estate under the provisions of the Rules of Court whichprovides for the settlement of the estate without courtintervention. This settlement was contained in two documentsexecuted on the same date wherein they manifested that theyare entering into it because of their desire to put an end to thejudicial proceeding and administration.

Without said accounts having been heard or approved,the administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedingsclosed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such.

Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, afterhearing, the court issued an order declaring the proceedingsterminated and relieving the administrator not only of his dutiesas such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs'opposition to said accounts.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

ISSUES:(1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of hisadministration a mere incident which can be avoided once theestate has been settled?

(2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mereexecution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without thenecessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard andapproved by the court?

(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty ofproving his account from the moment said partition has beenexecuted?

RULING:(1) No.The duty of an administrator to render an account is nota mere incident of an administration proceeding which can bewaived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that itis a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by thecourt before the administration is finally ordered closed andterminated.

The trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so itdisregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to thesettlement of accounts of a judicial administrator specificallySection 1, Section 8,9 and 10.

(2) No. The proceedings is not deemed terminated by the mereexecution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The factthat all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicialsettlement and partition in order to put an end to theirdifferences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the


objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by theadministrator not only because to so hold would be aderogation of the pertinent provisions of our rules but alsobecause there is nothing provided in said partition that theaforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.

(3) No.The administrator is not yet relieved of his duty ofproving his account.While the attitude of the heirs in concludingsaid extrajudicial settlement is plausible and hascontributed tothe early settlement of the estate, the same cannot however beconsidered as release of the obligation of the administrator toprove his accounts.This is more so when, according to theoppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts ashortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly cannotjust be brushed aside by a mere technicality.

TUMANG VS. LAGUIOCastillo, Rochelle Jane

FACTS: In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of

the late Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court ofFirst Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namelyMagdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will,filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitelyterminated and closed with respect to herself and two of herchildren — Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. Thepetition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs hadalready acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated tothem, and in order for such properties to be transferred in theirnames, there was need for an order of the court declaring theproceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. Thepetition was opposed by appenee's daughter, Guia T. Laguioand her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrixand executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicatedto them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there couldbe no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, theadministratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court should have required the

executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stockdividends received after the approval of her final accounts.

RULING:Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or

administrator shall render an account of his administrationwithin one (1) year from the time of receiving letterstestamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render suchfurther accounts as the court may requite until the estate iswholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by theexecutrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that thedividends sought to be accounted for are not included in thefinal accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that theinterests of all the parties will be better served and the conflictbetween petitioners and respondent will be resolved if suchadditional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that anexecutor or administrator who receives assets of the estateafter he has filed an account should file a supplementaryaccount thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it isonly with respect to matters occuring after the settlement offinal account that representatives will be compelled to filesupplementary account." It is only in a case where the petitionto compel an executor to account after he has accounted andhas been discharged fails to allege that any further sums cameinto the hands of the executor, and the executor specificallydenies the receipt of any further sums that the accountingshould be denied.

RODRIGUEZ VS. SILVADela Cruz, Kyzeth

PHIL. TRUST CO., VS. LUZON SURETYDeguzman, Jabrielle

FACTS:Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R.

Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased


James R. Burt upon a bond. Thereafter he submitted and theCourt approved his bond in the required amount, with appellantLuzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. Court dismissed Picard, asadministrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in hisplace. The latter submitted an inventory-report showing that theonly asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into itspossession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance ofthe checking account of said deceased with the PhilippineNational Bank. A review, however, of the record of the casereveals that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed aninventory of the estate of the deceased, from which it appearsthat the sole property he found was the amount of P8,873.73 incurrent account with the Philippine National Bank. This amountwas reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom hisexpenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him inhis petition , the further expenses in the amount of P865.20were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33. Courthereby orders said Francis Picard, to deliver within 48 hoursfrom the receipt of a copy of the order the difference ofP7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine TrustCompany. Picard, submitted an itemized statement ofdisbursements made by him as administrator of the estate,showing that the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that hereported to the Court additional expenses incurred amountingto P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that thereafterhe disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expensesof the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33; that onseveral occasions he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptiveson of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of moneytotalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. Afterconsidering this statement, the Court, issued an order findingPicard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amountingto about P8,000.00, without authority. Picard was prosecuted forestafa. Having pleaded guilty to the charge, judgment ofconviction was accordingly rendered, and he was, besides, heldcivilly liable. Court issued an order requiring appellant LuzonSurety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bondfiled by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated.Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order. Court deniedappellant's motion and ordered the confiscation of its bond.

After the denial of appellant's lotion for reconsideration, it tookthe present appeal.

ISSUES: WON (1) the Court cannot order the confiscation of theadministrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors,legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having beenshown, and (2) a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu,prosecute the probate bond.

RULING: Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio

motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of anadministrator's bond, is clearly without merit. Whatever may bethe rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours probate court ispossessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring butalso in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting anadministrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of anadministrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part andincident of the administration proceedings as much as its filingand the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that theprobate court may have said bond executed in the sameprobate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of theadministrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shallfaithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if hedid so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shallremain in full force and effect. In having been established thatPicard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, theconclusion follows that he had and his surety became boundupon the terms of their bond. Appellant also contends that itwas not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation ofits bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir orother interested person has been proved. This is also withoutmerits. According to the record, the claims against the estatefiled by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probatecourt but the same have remained unpaid because of lack offunds. Finally, appellant claims that it had been released fromliability as surety because it received no notice of theproceedings for the determination of the accountability of theadministrator. This contention we also find to be untenable.


From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety onan administrator's bond — which makes him privy to theproceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded,in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against hisprincipal, even though said surety was not a party to theproceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil.135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liablethereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding againstthe administrator, nor were they notified in connectiontherewith prior to the issuance of the court order for theconfiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account ofan executor or administrator, his sureties "may uponapplication, be admitted as a party to such accounting." Theimport of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled tonotice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of theaccounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leaveto do so in due time. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed fromis hereby affirmed, with costs.

QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS.Dimaliwat, Dianne

FACTS:

Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987.On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of hisintestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy ConsueloTriviere, before the RTc of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia andAtty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representingthe widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of thedeceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty.Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes,security services, and the preservation and administration ofthe estate, as well as litigation expenses.

In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filedbefore the RTC a Motion for Payment of

their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the saidmotion in May 1955.

In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. RedentorZapata also of the Quasha Law Office,

took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, andcontinued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filedanother Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for theirrespective clients.

On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimantagainst the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filedits Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN counteredthat the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment oflitigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Paymentfiled by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of theadministrators to submit an accounting of the assets andexpenses of the estate as required by the court.

Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion forPayment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, thenfiled a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied bythe RTC. Recourse was then resorted to the Court of Appeals.On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decisionessentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appealsconceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as theadministrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, wereentitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, theycould not claim the same from the funds of the estate.

ISSUE:Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment

of the expenses incurred as executor or administrator of theestate of Triviere.

HELD:No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court,

which reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowedexecutor or administrator. Not to charge for services as


attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unlessrenounced. When the executor or administrator is an attorney,he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees forlegal services rendered by him.

The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal andneeds no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exemptitself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Officepresents conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney'sfees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the awardof attorney's fees was payment for its administration of theestate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renouncethat it was an administrator.

SISON VS. TEODOROMahadodin Dimaampao

UY TIOCO VS. IMPERIALDorado, Czaybeeh

RULE 86Claims against Estate

AFAN VS DE GUZMANEspino, Carla

FACTS:

On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the specialproceeding for the settlement of intestate estate ofArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly due from Afan, withinterest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as setforth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22,1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of theclaim upon the ground, among others, that it had been filedlong after the expiration of the period for the presentation of

claim against said estate. The lower court issued the orderrefusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De Guzmaninvokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rulesof Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to thedistribution of the estate of the deceased. Further, he nowalleges, for the first time, a "cause" why the lower court shouldallegedly have considered his claim. He says, in his brief that hehad no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of thedeceased was then already in the process of settlement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted

RULING:

No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Time within which claims shall be filed.—In thenotice provided in the preceding section, thecourt shall state the time for the filing of claimsagainst the estate, which shall not be more thantwelve nor less than six months after the date ofthe first publication of the notice. However, atany time before an order of distribution isentered, on application of a creditor who hasfailed to file his claim within the time previouslylimited, the court may, for cause shown and onsuch terms as are equitable, allow such claims tobe filed within a time not exceeding one month.

The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority topermit the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated inthe first sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to thefollowing conditions, namely (1) there must be tin applicationtherefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission should


be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filingof the claim shall not exceed one (1) month.In this case, DeGuzman has not sought permission to file the claim. Moreover,the same does not allege any reason why he should be excusedfor his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within theperiod stated in the Rules of Court.

Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge ofthe fact that the estate of the deceased was then already in theprocess of settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actualknowledge of the present proceeding long before the filing ofhis claim therein on July 27, 1957. It appears that, during thelifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De Guzman instituted,against him, a civil case to recover the amount of thepromissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision ofthe trial court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial denovo. Sometime after the records had been remanded to thelower court, Afan died. On August 15, 1955, that court issued anorder requiring counsel for his heirs to submit to the court thenumber of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceasedArsenio R. Afan. This order was complied with on August 30,1955 and a copy of "notification" containing the requiredinformation was served upon counsel for De Guzman, asplaintiff therein. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in saidcase a motion for the appointment of a legal representative ofthe deceased Afan, to substitute him as defendant therein. OnJanuary 24, 1956 De Guzman filed, therefore, a statement,entitled "compliance", setting forth the names, ages andaddresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by therecords in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instanceestate of Arsenio R. Afan' before the Court of First Instance ofManila," with the prayer that said "heirs be substituted as partydefendants" in Case No. 1148, "in place of the deceased ArsenioR. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his claim in suchproceeding until July 27, 1957, one year and a half after the

filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of furnishing a"cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for thefiling of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fullyjustifies the denial of such extension and the order appealedfrom. In one case, the Court have already held that failure to filea claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole groundthat the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs forpayment, is not sufficient to justify extension. Lastly, the Courtalso ruled in another case that where a claimant knew of thedeath of the decedent and for four or five months thereafter hedid nothing to present his claim, this can hardly be consideredas a good excuse for such neglect.

Therefore, De Guzman’s claim should not be granted on theground that it was filed out of time.

HEIRS OF PIZARRO vs. CONSOLACIONHipolito, Nina Anthonette

FACTS: Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding

case filed by private respondent Luis Tan for the settlement ofthe estate of the late Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan,allegedly the only surviving son of Dominga Garcia who diedsometime in 1930 in Canton, China, filed for the issuance of theletters of administration in favor of Alfonso Atilano. Garcia left aparcel of land located in Davao City which is under thepossession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court setthe petition for hearing and the said order and petition wereduly published. After the private respondent Tan had begunpresentation of evidence, the parties entered into a compromiseand the petitioners withdrew their opposition to the intestateproceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the City of Davao fileda joint motion asking the respondent court to take notice of theagreement which in substance seeks to proceed with thedetermination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall bedeterminative of their respective claims against the estate.


Petitioners filed their opposition and the respondent courtissued an order taking note of the agreement. Privaterespondent Tan filed a motion to drop and exclude thepetitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to beheirs of the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed bothclaims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred forhaving been filed out of time.ISSUE:

WON the order of the respondent court which directedthat the filing of claims against the estate be filed within 6months after the first publication of the notice is null and voidand violative of Sec 2, Rule 86 of Revised Rules of Court.

RULING:Yes. The range of period specified in the Rules is

intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix periodfor the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by therule to set the period provided it is not less than 6 months normore than 12 months from the date of the first publication ofnotice. Since the notice issued and the period set by the courtwas not in accordance with the requirements of Sec 2, Rule 86,what should apply then is the period as provided for by therules which is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 monthsfrom the date of first publication. The first publication of noticein the Mindanao Times was on March 30? 1978. Thus, the twoclaims of the petitioners against the estate which were filed onMarch 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectivelu were filed ontime.

GUTIERREZ VS. DATUKatigbak, Paula

FACTS:In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of

fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased to Ricardo Gutierrez for aterm to expire on May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it wasfound that the dikes were opened, resulting in their destructionand in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to the damageand prejudice of the lessee.

Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, fileda complaint for 2 items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00representing advance rentals he had to the decedent andsecond, the sum of P60,000.00 as damages in the concept ofearned profits, that is, profits which the claimant failed torealize because of the breach of the lease contract.

On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civilaction against the executrix of the testate for the recovery ofthe same amount of P60,000 referred to as the second item. InJuly 1957 appellant amended his claim in the testateproceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of P60,000.00,leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum ofP32,000.00.

After the issues were joined in the present, the courtdismissed the action for abandonment by both parties.Appellant moved to reconsider; the court denied the motion forreconsideration on the ground that the claim should have beenprosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civilaction.

ISSUE:Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on

unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of thedeceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?

RULING:Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the

presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generallyconstrued to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary naturewhich could have been enforced against the deceased in hislifetime and could have been reduced to simple moneyjudgments; and among these are those founded upon contract.The claim in this case is based on contract — specifically, on abreach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87"Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime,even though they were personal to the decedent in liability, thepersonal representative is answerable for the breach out of theassets." A claim for breach of a covenant in a deed of the


decedent must be presented under a statute requiring suchpresentment of all claims grounded on contract.

The only actions that may be instituted against theexecutor or administrator are those to recover real or personalproperty from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, andactions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,real or personal. The instant suit is not one of them.

AGUAS VS. LLEMOSLee, Mariline

BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOSLectura, Erika

IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVIDLim, Justin

STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLICLubay, Angela FACTS:

Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS forthe construction of roadways and drainage systems in RAG'scompound. JDS does so andfiles the required compliance bondwith Stronghold Insurance acting as surety. The contract is 5.3Mthe bond is 795k. JDS falls woefully behind schedule, promptingRAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliancebond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire fuses topay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishesthe obligation.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s liability under the performance bondwas automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, theprincipal.

RULING::

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or thedebtor does not extinguish the obligation.Obligations aretransmissible to theheirs, except when the transmission isprevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or thenature of the obligation.Only obligations that are personal or areidentified with the persons themselves are extinguished bydeath.Furthermore, the liability of petitioner is contractual innature, because it executed a performance bond, as a surety,petitioner is solidarilyliable with Santos in accordance with theCivil Code.

Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows theprosecution of money claims arising from a contract against theestate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are notactually extinguished.What is extinguished is only the obligee’saction or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting asa probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligationsSantos had under his contracts with respondent were notintransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision oflaw. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment ofthose obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to hisestate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set upto wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death toescape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPMercado, Trish


METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONG.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

FACTS:On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc.

(SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned tothe RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaintthat it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532,140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, andwere all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’sGeneral Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at the time AMCfiled its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could not be found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or for payee’s account only

ISSUE:Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against

Chua’s estate should be allowed.

HELD:YES.

RATIO:The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules

of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section

11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims,including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merelyapply suppletorily.

SANTOS VS. MANARANGMansul, Nabral

ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYESPangilinan , Legis

SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUALRabanal Michelle

RULE 87Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators

HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKERRivera, Hiezll Wynn

FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualifiedas his administrator. The administrator filed his inventory of theassets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in whichinventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrenscertificate of title and containing an area of more than 930hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against theestate of Ankrom for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, orP70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the SupremeCourt of the Republic of Panama. It appears that the totalrecognized claims against the estate amounted originally toP76,645.13, but four of the creditors, having claims in theamount of P1,639.82, have been paid in full, leaving a balanceowing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater part of which is


comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of theestate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to besufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestateproceedings were being conducted, the administratordiscovered that a year and a half before his death, Ankrom hadexecuted a mortgage on the property here in question in favorof the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this mortgagehad been executed, Ankrom appears to have made anassignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to oneJ. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration ofthe sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. Inview of these conveyances by his intestate, the administratorpresented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tractof 930 hectares with its improvements thereon, the same beingthe land covered by the transfers above mentioned. The courtmade an order, approving of the omission by the administratorof said property from the inventory; and its is from this orderthat the present appeal is here being prosecuted.

HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of anexecutor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and whenthe deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulentconveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right orinterest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, anycreditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if theexecutor or administrator has not commenced such action,commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of theexecutor or administrator, an action for the recovery of thesame and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such realor personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But suchaction shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court abond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge,conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator againstthe costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien uponthe judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and

such other expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedyof the heirs of Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify theadministrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institutean action in the name of the administrator to set aside theassignment or other conveyance believed to have been made infraud of creditors.

SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUALRodriguez, Maria Lorraine

FACTS:The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of

the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940, while theproceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduardade los Santos were pending in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, SinforosoPascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga against Ponciano S.Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract ofsale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly executedwithout consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favorof the defendants.

Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want ofcause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendencyof another action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground thatthe action should have been brought by the executor oradministrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directedthe plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff filed an amendedcomplaint. However, RTC declared that such amendment did notcure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action.

ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by theexecutor and not by the plaintiff-heir?HELD: No.

Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court,actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights ofthe deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted ordefended by his executor or administrator. Upon the


commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings theheirs have no standing in court in actions of the abovecharacter, except when the executor or administrator isunwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs mayact in his place.

Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made tothe defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being theexecutor appointed by the probate court. Such executornaturally would not bring an action against himself for recoveryof the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied.And this brings the case under the exception. It should be notedthat in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond bedelivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicatingthat the action is brought in behalf of the estate of thedeceased.

VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGESalayog, Benny Rico

RIOFERIO ET. AL. VS COURT OF APPEALSSumaway, Dylan

MODESTO VS. MODESTOTomarong, Marian

FACTS: Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them,Cerilio Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of theintestate proceeding, Jesus, acting as administrator of theestate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of Tacloban, Leyte, motion tocite and examine under oath several persons, especially Cerilioregarding the properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulentlyconveyed which was granted by the lower court. Jointcommissioners were appointed by CFI. Thereafter, submittedtheir report. Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio toturn over to him the personal properties belonging to the

intestate supposed to be in Cerilio’s possession. Thereafter, writof execution was issued. By virtue of it, the provincial sheriffissued notice of attachment against the real property describedin COT of the Register of Deeds and under the tax assessmentin the name of Cerilio. Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set asidethe writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction whichwas opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and JesusModesto named as the highest and only bidder. Then,Certificate of final sale in favour of Jesus was issued by theProvincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion for reconsideration,however, it was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to the writ ofpossession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued anotification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the realproperty sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to annulthe proceedings had before the CFI of Leyte.

ISSUE:

Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether theproperties, real or personal belong to the estate or to thepersons examined

HELD:

No.

If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals inthe estate of the deceased, complains to the court havingjurisdiction of the estate that a person/s are suspected ofhaving possessed or having knowledge of the properties left bya deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled orconveyed any of the said properties of the deceased, the courtmay cite such person/s to appear before it and may examinehim or them on oath on the matter of such complaint. In suchproceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whetheror not said properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or


to the persons examined. If, after such examination there isgood reason to believe that said person or persons examinedare keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the nextstep to be taken should be for the administrator to file anordinary action in court to recover the same.

VALERA VS. INSERTOTresvalles, Kris

FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestateestate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and ConsolacionSarrosa — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera hadbeen appointed administrators — the heirs of a deceaseddaughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion askingthat the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for herfailure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabadoreplied that no accounting could be submitted unless JoseGarin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, deliveredto the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, BarotocNuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved forthe return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitionedamong the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for thefishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property wasowned by his children and this was why it had never beenincluded in any inventory of the estate.

The Court viewed the Garin Heir's motion for contempt, as wellas Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purviewof Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The incident was setfor hearing and thereafter, the court issued an ordercommanding the heir of Teresa Garin to reconvey immediatelythe fishpond to the estate of the spouses.

There seems little doubt, however, that the Court'spronouncement regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was

merely provisional in character, made solely to determinewhether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventoryof estate assets. So it was evidently understood by theadministrators who have more than once asserted that "theprobate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of thefishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of theproperties. So it was made clear by the Probate Court itselfwhich, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter wasmeant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond shouldbe included as part of the estate and whether or not the personholding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to theestate. And so it was emphasized in another Order, denyingreconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980. Judge Adilafterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution ofthe order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforcethe direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to theestate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana,the supposed caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, anddeclaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabianavoluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to thesheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.

Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention withthe Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to thepossession of the fishpond, based on a contract of leasebetween himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 ButJudge Adil dismissed his complaint.

In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion forreconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil(declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in whichhe asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction,had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond, 22which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal fromsaid Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as


aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the orderpending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action forcertiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer forpreliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: whether the probate court had jurisdiction to takecognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpondbeing claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses

HELD:

Jurisdiction of Probate Court

Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now RegionalTrial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limitedjurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of anddetermine the issue of title to property claimed by a thirdperson adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and allthe Other parties having legal interest in the property consent,expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to theProbate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third personsare not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception beingthat the question of whether or not a particular matter shouldbe resolved by the Court in the exercise of its generaljurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.,probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictionalbut in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practicewhich may be waived.

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for theapplication of the exception to the rule. As already earlierstressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to theparties that if cognizance was being taken of the question oftitle over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the

issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, thequestion being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinarycivil action," but merely to determine whether it should orshould not be included in the inventory. This function ofresolving whether or not property should be included in theestate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the ProbateCourt's competence, although the Court's determination is onlyprovisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to thefinal decision in a separate action that may be instituted by theparties. 32

The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by theProbate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on theissue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over thefishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section isintended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of thedecedent from persons suspected of having possession orknowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, orconveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claimto the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to theestate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues theappropriate direction for the delivery of the property to theestate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right tothe property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Courtwould have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate actionmust be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.34

Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, theProbate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance ofFabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consentof all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over thequestion of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of


objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint inintervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.

Possession of Fishpond Pending

Determination of Title Thereto

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question oftitle to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on theproperty with any character of authority, definiteness orpermanence, having been made only for purposes of in.conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at thehearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject ofexecution, as against its possessor who has set up title inhimself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whoseright to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in anappropriate action. These considerations assume greatercogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is notin the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which thisCourt has already had occasion to rule.

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold thatif a property covered by Torrens title is involved, thepresumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given dueweight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to thecontrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner ofthe property in controversy until his title is nullified or modifiedin an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in thecase at bar, possession of the property itself is in the personsnamed in the title

ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANTuason, Jannelle

FACTS:

Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits chargingprivate respondents of several violation of penal laws when theywent to the premises of ABS CBN and informed the employeesthereof regarding the forced closure of the premises of thestation and stoppage of its operation due to the LOI No. 1 issuedby then Pres. Marcos during Martial Law.

Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan and the principalstockholder of RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcastduring martial law, rented the studios owned by ABSCBN andoccupied the same during negotiation about the monthlyrentals. Due to failure to reach the desired monthly rental rate,the counsel for petitioner demanded RPN 9 to vacate thestudios and pay rentals but respondents refused to do so. At theend of Marcos’ regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez’ andallowed operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previouslyfiled were dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probablecause. Hence, the present petition. Noteworthy is the fact thatBenedicto died during the pendency of the case and wasdropped as party herein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even afterhis death, which extinguished his criminal liability.

RULING:

No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upondeath, is extinguished together with his criminal liability, haslong been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his convictionextinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil


liability based solely thereon. As opined by JusticeRegalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused priorto final judgment terminates his criminal liabilityand only the civil liability directly arising from and basedsolely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability exdelicto in sensostrictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survivesnotwithstanding the death of accused, if the same mayalso be predicated on a source of obligation other thandelict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates theseother sources of obligation from which the civil liabilitymay arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x xx

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained inNumber 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may bepursued but only by way of filing a separate civil actionand subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civilaction may be enforced either against theexecutor/administrator or the estate of the accused,depending on the source of obligation upon which thesame is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear aforfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action byprescription, in cases where during the prosecution ofthe criminal action and prior to its extinction, theprivate-offended party instituted together therewith thecivil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on thecivil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendencyof the criminal case, conformably with provisions ofArticle 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid

any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right byprescription.

Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the caseat bench survives because the civil liability of the respondentssubsists is stripped of merit.

RULE 88Payment of the debts of the Estate

ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDOROUmbalin, Norissa

BUAN VS. LAYAUy, Charles

FACTS:

A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya againstthe intestate estate of the deceased Florenica and RizalinaBuan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that aPhilippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the spousesBuan, collided with a private car resulting to the death of JuanLaya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus wascharged with homicide and serious physical injuries throughreckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs ofJuan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action,and they did so. Administrators of the estate opposed thecontingent claim, arguing that the same could not be allowedbecause it has not been filed before the death of the spouses.The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portionof the estate be set aside to answer for the claim. Counsel foradministrator then moved to set aside the order, but beforethey could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila wasdeclared premature because the criminal conviction is not yetfinal, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an amended

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/oct2008/gr_133347_2008.html#fnt15


complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissedthe contingent claim on the ground that the reason for thesame had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amendedcomplaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been actedupon.

ISSUE

Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted

RULING

The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is onethat, by its nature, is dependent upon the happening of anuncertain event. it may or may not develop into a valid claim,depending upon that uncertain event. Whether or not the heirsof the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the actionbrought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of thedeceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is theuncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of theclaim presented in the administration proceedings depends.

While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has noclaim upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only ariseafter the event happened. As such, the contingent claim maynot be dismissed. Contingent claims follow the result of theaction, and as such, the fact that the case is temporarilydismissed may not terminate the claim, as only the final resultsof the action could do that. The rules provide that a contingentclaim is to be presented in the administration proceedings inthe same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when thecontingency arises which converts the contingent claim into avalid claim, the court should then be informed that the claimhad already matured.

DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIAViernes, Wayne

RULE 89Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property

of decedent

GODOY VS. ORELLANOVizcarra, William

FACTS :

In consideration of P1,000 received by Felisa Pañgilinan,a document was executed by her giving Eusebio A. Godoy, anoption to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appearsfrom that document that the dredge is the common property ofthe vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo,Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that the condition wasthat Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge withintwenty days; and that said option was granted in accordancewith the power of attorney executed by her coowners whoreserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, oroption granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter'sco-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before theexpiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to makecomplete payment of the price, but Pañgilinan failed to deliverthe dredge. Then the Godoy brought suit in the CFI againstFeliza Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, DemetrioOrellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying thatthey be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him ofthe sum of P9,000; to pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages,


and to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 should thecarrying out of the sale become impossible.

The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a generaldenial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a specialdefense, alleged that the dredge in question was the propertyof the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, andunder the administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that Godoyperfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial control andcould not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that thecourt has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaintfiled herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, andAlfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and thedefendant Paz Orellano is a married woman who had notobtained the consent of her husband before executing thepower of attorney in favor of the Pañgilinan.

The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer,and alleges: that Godoy, as well as the defendants, and thenotary who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all awareof these facts, and they led her to believe that she had theauthority to dispose of the dredge in her name and bythemselves; that believing herself to be under obligation tocomply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the courtof probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum ofP10,000; that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her co-defendants who had themselves authorized her by means of apower of attorney on the ground that there were higher biddersand the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; that inview of this opposition, Pañgilinan asked the court that it be soldat public auction, and the court authorized said defendant tosell it at public auction; that the Pañgilinan did not at any timerefuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that itwas the court that would not give her the authority to do so;and that she is all times ready to return the P1,000 received

from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it several times, butthat the Godoy refused to accept it.

The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering Pañgilinanto pay Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the option contract between Pañgilinanand Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court.

RULING:

Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorizethe sale of properties like the one under consideration and thepower of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor ofPañgilinan, without authority of court, has no legal effect, andthis is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age,and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided inthe aforesaid power of attorney.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, thatthe Pañgilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrixof the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized tosell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estatewithout the authority of the court, and the contract entered intoby her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaintagainst the appellant Felisa Pañgilinan is hereby dismissed.

CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALSYatco, Nathaniel


FACTS:

Elena OngEscutin, executrix of testate estate of latePoncianoOngLacson asked for authority from probate court tosell a real property to pay taxes and claims against the estate.It was granted and thus was sold to GanHeng for P400K. Thesale was perfected and taxes were paid for the estate. Felix Ongfiled an opposition on the approval by the court of such sale andoffered P450K for such real property and prayed for theacceptance of such offer. Probate court dismissed Felix Ong’spetition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, theCA found that the probate court committed grave abuse ofdiscretion as such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price andthus more beneficial for the estate.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion onthe probate court’s approvale of the sale to GanHeng.

RULING:

Yes. The sale to be annulled was a private sale and notthru public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality toimpugn such sale of real property to GanHeng. Felix was neithera creditor nor an heir to the estate. Also, he did not comply withthe bond requirement of Rule 89, sec 3 of the Rules. Personsinterested on such property of the estate may be prevented byposting a bond which is fixed by the court. Furthermore, thesubsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the saleas the property in question is now worth P1M is denied.GanHeng was a purchaser in good faith and the estate hadalready benefitted from the payment made by GanHeng. TheSC affirmed the private sale made by the executrix andGanHeng.

JARODA VS. CUSIAlvarez, Miguel Lorenzo

Facts:

The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan(Tan) allegingin the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille diedintestate and that his heirsare his surviving spouse, 9 children(among them is petitioner NatividadJaroda) and 4 grandsons,among them respondent Tan.

Tan was appointed special administrator.

Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNBalleging thatthese sums were registered in the name of thedeceased but they wereactually held in trust for co-owners ofJuna Subdivision. CFI grantedthis motion.

CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed apetition allegingthat the deceased was a manager and co-ownerof Juna Subdivision andpraying for approval by the court of thepower of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the intestateestate, appointing himself to sell share ofthe estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.

Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied themotion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal ofbank deposits was in abuseof discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? .

(2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power ofattorney is valid.


Ruling:

On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in theaffirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powersand duties of a specialadministrator. (Rule 80.2)

The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearingof, the heirs ofthe deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may beviewed aswithin the powers and duties of a specialadministrator; but actually, it isa waiver by the specialadministrator of a prima facie exclusive right ofthe intestateestate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of theJunaSubdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of thedeceasedso they belong prima facie to his estate after his death.And until thecontrary, the special administrator is without powerto make the waiveror to hand over part of the estate to otherpersons on the ground that theestate is not the owner thereof.

On the second issue, the High Tribunal ruled in thenegative. The CFI order is void for want of notice and forapproving animproper contract or transaction.

An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself asan individual in any transaction concerning trust property.This isbecause of the n view of the fiduciary relationship thattheyoccupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased andtheirresponsibilities toward the probate court.

By the CFI’s order, administrator Tan came to be theagent of two different principals: the court and the heirs ofthe deceasedon the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the

subdivisionon the other, in managing and disposing of the lots ofthesubdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapableofindependent defense of the estate's interests against those ofthemajority co-owners.

PAHAMOTANG VS. PNBArcilla, Jay

RULE 90Distribution and Partition of the Estate

GATMAITAN VS. MEDINAAzarcon, Pia Lea

FACTS: On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition,

seeking his appointment as administrator of the property of hiswife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina andDominica Medina, as heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an opposition, praying that GorgonioMedina, or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan andGorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator oradministrators of the estate. The court appointed FelicisimoGatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a bond andGorgonio Medina as co-administrator without compensation andbond. On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed anamended inventory of the estate but was opposed on theground that the same did not represent the true and faithful listof the properties left by the deceased. In view of the opposition,the hearing and consideration of the amended inventory waspostponed until further assignment. On April 2, 1957, the heirsof the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for PartialPartition and Distribution," The court heard counsel for


administrator Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, butwithout receiving any evidence whatsoever. The administrator,Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration, calling attentionto the fact that, contrary to what the order states, "he has notagreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the mannercontained in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered tobe partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstancesobtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner ofdistribution will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirsthemselves". Motion was denied for lack of merit. Gatmaitanfiled a notice of appeal from the foregoing orders. Appellantfiled a record on appeal and notified counsel for the oppositorsof the date he would move for the approval thereof by thecourt. The court approved the record on appeal presented byappellant for failure to file written opposition thereto as requiredin the order of the court notwithstanding the length of time thathad already elapsed. In his brief, appellant only made oneassignment of error, and it reads thus: The lower court gravelyabused its discretion in directing a partial distribution of theintestate estate of the deceased Veronica Medina in favor ofappellees, without requiring the distributees to file the properbonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of theRevised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in

directing a partial distribution of the intestate estate of thedeceased Veronica Medina in favor of appellees, withoutrequiring the distributees to file the proper bonds pursuant tothe provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules ofCourt.

RULING:

The lower court, erred in rendering the order appealedfrom. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending thefinal termination of the testate or intestate proceedings shouldas much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless inextreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not

be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious —courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate ofthe decedent to the end that the creditors thereof beadequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of theirshares in the inheritance. Why the appealed order isunwarranted is evident on three counts. Firstly, the partialdistribution was prematurely ordered by the lower court. Itappears that at the time the questioned order was rendered,the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator-appellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still underconsideration by the court, in view of an opposition to theadmission thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems thatnotices for the presentation of claims by possible creditors ofthe estate had not yet been published, so that the period forthe presentation of claims had not as yet elapsed.Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had asufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of theproperties, having in mind the adverse effects that it mighthave on the rights of the creditors and the heirs alike. Second,and more important, no bond was fixed by the court as acondition precedent to the partial distribution ordered by it, abond which, because of the reasons already adduced, becomesall the more imperative. Rule 91, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,specifically provides as follows: When the debts, funeralcharges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to thewidow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate inaccordance with law, have been paid, the court, on theapplication of the executor or administrator, or of a personinterested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shallassign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to thesame, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which isentitled, and such persons may demand and recover theirrespective shares from the executor or administrator, or anyother person having the same in his possession. . . . Nodistribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations


above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless thedistributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be fixedby the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligationswithin such time as the courts directs. Appellees contend thatthe order of partial distribution having been issued pursuant toan agreement of the parties, the same could not now beassailed by the appellant. While the wording of the appealedorder seem to indicate that it was rendered with the conformityof the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just amistaken impression on the part of the court. Soon after theorder was rendered, the administrator-appellant filed a motionfor reconsideration, among other things, calling the attention ofthe court that he never agreed to the partial distribution of theestate in the manner ordained in the appealed order. Althoughsaid motion was denied for lack of merit, the court did not denycategorically appellant's imputation, which could have beeneasily averred to by it; nor did the appellees at any time prior tothis appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of theadministrator. There is plausibility in appellant's statement thatthe agreement referred to in the order was actually onebetween the appellees among themselves. It should be noted,furthermore, that the bond required by the Rules is not solelyfor the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also for thebenefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have notagreed to the advances. Lastly, appellees urged that this appealwas prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formallyobjected to the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged orderof the court, dated May 16, 1957. The tenor of the order of May16, 1957, as well as the fact that neither said order nor the"constancia" of appellees are included in the Record on Appeal,indicates that the belated offer to file a bond amounted to nomore than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular issuebetween the parties that was rejected by the appellant. Thatthe record on appeal was approved much later, on July 15,1957, and yet without the written opposition . . . required in the

order of this Court dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding thelength of time that has already elapsed and the absence ofproof that the bond offered was ever filed and approved by theCourt, fortify that conclusion. Anyway, since the purpose of thebond required by section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule 91 is to protectnot only the appellant but also the creditors and subsequentclaimants to the estate, in order that they may not beprejudiced by the partial distribution, the amount of the bondcould not be fixed without hearing such interested parties, andthere is no showing that they were consulted. Hence, the bondoffered could not affect the merits of this appeal, although theCourt below is not precluded for approving a new bond.Wherefore, the order of partial distribution appealed from is setaside, without prejudice to the issue of another order after strictcompliance with the Rules of Court. The records are orderedremanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONSTRUCTION*Balanay, Rendel Bryan

FACTS:

In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate andthe proceedings for the settlement of his estate were institutedby his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia(Syquia) and Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the QuashaLaw Office, representing the widow and children of the lateRaymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administratorsof the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquiaand Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of realestate taxes, security services, and the preservation andadministration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty.Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion forPayment of their litigation expenses.


RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit anaccounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate underadministration in May 1995.

In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata(Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as thecounsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty.Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002,Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment,for their own behalf and for their respective clients, claiming forthe payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimantagainstthe Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in SpecialProceedings, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTChad already resolved the issue of payment of litigationexpenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed byAtty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators tosubmit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estateas required by the court.

Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstandingand chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere;thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have beenpaid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, theclaim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviereamounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets ofthe estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the latterinsolvent.

RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs ofthe deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not receivedtheir respective shares in the Estate, declaring that there wasno more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of theestate considering that the estate has no more assets exceptthe money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines andthat both the Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceasedare entitled to the payment for the services they have renderedand accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased

as they have over a decade now spent so much time, labor andskill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last timethe administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.

LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, thatthe awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, asthere still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sumof P6,016,570.65.

CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, asthe administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses,they could not claim the same from the funds of the estatereasoning that the award of expenses and fees in favor ofexecutors and administrators is subject to the qualification thatwhere the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall notcharge against the estate any professional fees for legalservices rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals heldthat the attorney's fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha LawOffices should be borne by their clients, the widow and childrenof the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.

The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 shareand P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to the children andwidow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basisthat Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribesthe distribution of the residue of the estate until all itsobligations have been paid.

Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not beconstrued as a final order of distribution, but a mereinterlocutory order that does not end the estate proceedings.Only an order of distribution directing the delivery of the residueof the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestateproceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to theadministration and relieves the administrator of his duties. Thatthe said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from thefunds of the estate to the petitioner children and widow of thelate Raymond Triviere considering that they have not receivedtheir respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out


of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the estate, the petitionerchildren and widow were being awarded by the RTC, theirshares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, theremaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. Theintestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC stillhad to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against theestate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can itdistribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner,children and widow constitute a partial distribution of the estateand is proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitionerchildren and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not adistribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court inapplicable.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - Whenthe debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, theallowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeableto the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,on the application of the executor or administrator, or of aperson interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice,shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled tothe same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to whicheach is entitled, and such persons may demand and recovertheir respective shares from the executor or administrator, orany other person having the same in his possession. If there is acontroversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs ofthe deceased person or as to the distributive shares to whicheach person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall beheard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of theobligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum tobe fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of saidobligations within such time as the court directs.

While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widowmade in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet adistribution of the residue of the estate, given that there wasstill a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitutea partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, thepetitioner children and widow were already being awardedshares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had beenpaid or provided for.

Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expresslyrecognizes advance distribution of the estate, thus:Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. -Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal inproceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem properand just, permit that such part of the estate as may not beaffected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among theheirs or legatees,upon compliance with the conditions set forthin Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the RevisedRules of Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to thepayment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that"the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to befixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of saidobligations within such time as the court directs."

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether ornot to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exerciseof such discretion should be qualified by the following:

[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pendingcontroversy or appeal may be the subject of advancedistribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and


[2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court,conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of theestate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).

There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitionerchildren and widow their shares in the estate prior to thesettlement of all its obligations, complied with these tworequirements or, at the very least, took the same intoconsideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. Itjustified its grant of the award in a single sentence which statedthat petitioner children and widow had not yet received theirrespective shares from the estate after all these years. Takinginto account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the lateRaymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, alreadyin excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of theestate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approvingthe advance distribution of the same.

Petitioners invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,wherethe Court sustained an Order granting partial distribution of anestate.

However, in Dael is the estate has sufficient assets to ensureequitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with lawand the final judgment in the proceedings and it does notappear there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule90, for which provisions should have been made or a bondrequired, such partial distribution may be allowed.

No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence ofany outstanding obligations of the estate of the late RaymondTriviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is apending claim by LCN against the estate, and the amountthereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.

Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partialdistribution of the decedent's estate pending final terminationof the testate or intestate proceeding should as much aspossible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extremecases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be

countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts shouldguard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedentto the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protectedand all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in theinheritance.

TORRES VS. ENCARNACIONBorja, Catherine

FACTS:

The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondentJudge to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed directing them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners’possession and to which they assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator’s remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate proceeding.

It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, thecommissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8,1944, a project of partition, in which the land in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borja’s heirs. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja’s estate was the party named in the partition in behalf of that estate, the present petitioners took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had been declared their father’s sole heirs in the settlement of their father’s estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate estate.

ISSUE:


Can the remedy to recovery the property be done by motion in the same intestate proceeding?

RULING:

Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is section 1 of Rule 91 which provides as follows:

"When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath.

"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum tobe fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."cralairtua1aw library

Applying this Rule, the probate court, having the custodyand control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding,

said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performedwithout the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action.

IMPERIAL VS. MONOZBorlagdatan, April

FACTS:

-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceasedFermina Bello Santos, who died intestate filed SpecialProceeding No. 1049, entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina BelloSantos", in CFI Bulacan

-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, asthere was no opposition filed by the only other heir, hereinpetitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial

-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial enteredher appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedingsas Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the regularadministrator to render an accounting

-This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967of the project of partition with the following awards:

1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age,married to Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, ishereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8)share in each of the above-described properties; and

2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines, ofage, married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos, Bulacan,is hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided THREE-EIGHTH(3/8) share in each of the properties described above;


Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both theAmended Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court onJune 6, 1967, and the Final Partial Project of Partition of March22, 1968, likewise approved by the same court on April 26,1968, claiming that the partition submitted to the Court waserroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling laiddown in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda

-Luis contended that he should get the propertiespartitioned while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion SantosImperial, the only child (adopted), should get only the remainingof the estate.

ISSUES:

WON:

(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestateproceedings approving a project of partition which clearly fixedthe distributive share to which each heir is entitled is merelyinterlocutory in nature so that the probate court can correct andset aside the same anytime; or is final and, therefore,appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and

(2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous finaldecision after it had become final and executory.

RULING:

(1)

-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of thecourt a quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as thesame have determined the distributive shares of the knownforced heirs, finds support in the very same case cited by therespondents as their authority.

-This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding theissue as to whether the order of the lower court is final andappealable, went on to say:

It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,therefore, appealable to this Court.

Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in specialproceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance wheresuch order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate towhich such person is entitled."

The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, shouldhave been appealed by the party adversely affected within the30-day reglementary period provided for appeal. This was notdone.

(2)

-The contention of petitioner that an order which has alreadybecome final and therefore executory is not subject tocorrection, finds support in Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where itwas held that an erroneous decree or judgment althoughgranted without legal authority and contrary to the expressprovision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal wastaken, the decree must be conceded to have full force andeffect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.

-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore,executory because of the failure of the herein respondent LuisU. Santos to appeal on time by allowing the period for appeal tolapse before filing his motion for correction on June 18, 1968, hehas to suffer the misfortune brought about by his ownnegligence and fatal inadvertence

LOPEZ VS. LOPEZBueno, Jirene

FACTS:


Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings ofthe deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledgednatural daughter of the deceased and praying that she bedeclared his universal heiress entitled to a summary award ofhis estate, same being valued at less than six thousand pesos(P6,000). The oppositors-appellants filed an opposition, denyingpetitioner’s claim and praying that, as they are nephews andnieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to theproperty.

Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, allegingthat, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth ninethousand pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distributioncould not be made summarily but thru regular administrationproceedings. Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who,but appellants filed a motion that they be declared heirs of thedeceased. The court issued an order declaring the petitioner anacknowledged natural daughter of the deceased entitled to therights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged naturaldaughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving nolegitimate descendants, ascendants or widow.

RULING:

Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of thedeceased and is the only heiress.

Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that aperson claiming to be an acknowledged natural child ofa deceased need not maintain a separate action forrecognition but may simply intervene in the intestateproceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or herstatus as such, and claiming accordingly the right toshare in the inheritance.

The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestateproceedings is alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is

no prayer therein that she be declared an acknowledged naturalchild, but only that she be adjudged universal heiress, of thedeceased. In the body of the petition there is an allegation thatshe is a natural child of the based and has been in anuninterrupted possession of such status.

The court ruled that inasmuch as the recognition of her status isa prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she bedeclared universal heiress implies a like prayer that shebe recognized as an acknowledged natural child.Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings,applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer forrelief, though part of the pleading, is no part of thecause of action or defense alleged therein, and thepleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts dulypleaded may warrant. In previous cases, similar factswere held to be sufficient to entitle a natural child torecognition.

Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petitionfor the declaration of heirs or of the date set for the hearingthereof. We find in the record no evidence affirmativelyshowing that they had no such notice; therefore, thepresumption of regularity of proceedings should stand.

In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack ofnotice is alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides,according to the record Attorney Simplicio B. Peña was thecounsel for both the administrator and the oppositors-appellants. The petition for declaration of heirs, although signedby Attorney Simplicio B. Peña as "abogado del administrador",was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositors-appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted andprayed for. Under these circumstances, there exists sufficientground for holding, as we do hold, that the oppositors-appellants had notice of the petition as well as of the hearingwhere the said attorney was present.

GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS


Cadavis, Lloyd

FACTS:

• Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille OanesWei, represented by their mother Remedios filed apetition for letters of administration.

• Private respondents alleged that they are the dulyacknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, whodied intestate leaving an estate valued at P10mconsisting of real and personal properties. His knownheirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and childrenEmy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael.

• Private Respondents prayed for the appointment of aregular administrator for the orderly settlement of SimaWei Estate. Prayed by Petitioner Michael, son of thedecedent, be appointed as special administrator of theestate.

• Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. Heasserted that his father left no debts and that his estatecan be settled without securing letters of administrationpursuant to sec.1, rule 74. He argued that privaterespondents should have established their status asillegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima weipursuant to Art.175 of the family code.

• The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss on theground that the certification against forum shopping hasbeen signed by the private respondents and not theircounsel. They contended that Remedios should haveexecuted the certification on behalf of her minordaughters.

• Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that privaterespondents claim have been paid, waived, abandonedor otherwise extinguished by reason of RemediosRelease and waiver of claim stating that in exchange forthe financial and educational assistance received frompetitioner, Remedios and her minor children dischargethe estate of SimaWei from any and all liabilities.

• RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as thesupplemental motion to dismiss. It ruled that while theRelease and waiver of claim was signed by Remedios, ithad not been established that she was the dulyconstituted guardian of her minor daughters. Norenunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejectedpetitioner’s objections on the certification against forumshopping.

• Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. Hefiled a petition for certiorari before CA which affirmedthe RTC orders. CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.

• Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing ruleson certification against forum shopping; that the releaseand waiver of claim executed by Remedios released anddischarged the Guy family and estate of Sima Wei fromany claims or liabilities; and that private respondents donot have the legal personality to institute the petition forletters of administration as they failed to prove theirfiliation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

• Private respondents contended that their counselscertification can be considered substantial compliancewith the rules on certification of non-forum shopping.


ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissedfor failure to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forumshopping?

2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludesprivate respondents from claiming their successional rights?

3. whether private respondents are barred byprescription from proving their filiation?

RULING:

1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification onnon-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or theprincipal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall because for dismissal of the case. However, liberal application ofthe rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would beserved. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled that while a petition mayhave been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shoppingwas signed only by counsel and not by the party, thisprocedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest ofsubstantial justice. So it is in the present controversy where themerits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate therules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasonsto temper the strict application of the rules.

2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the samedoes not bar private respondents from claiming successionalrights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched inclear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to theintention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legallypertains to him. In this case, we find that there was no waiver ofhereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does notstate with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely statesthat remedies received 300k and an educational plan for herminor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full

settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kindagainst the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Consideringthat the document did not specifically mention privaterespondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, itcannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rightsof private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’sclaim. Under article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may nottherefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards withoutjudicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, theRelease and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and willnot bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirsof the deceased.

In the present case, private respondents could not havepossibly waived their successional rights because they are yetto prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children ofthe deceased.

3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agreewith the CA that a ruling on the same would be prematureconsidering that private respondents have yet to presentevidence. Before the family code took effect, the governing lawon actions for recognition of illegitimate children was article 285of the Civil code, to wit:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children maybe brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,except in the ff.cases:

1) If the father or mother died during the minority of thechild, in which case the latter may file the action beforethe expiration of 4 years from the attainment of hismajority;


Xxxx

In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years fromthe finding of the document.

We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children whowere still minors at the time of the Family code took effect andwhose putative parent died during their minority are given theright to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years fromattaining majority age.

Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child isestablished by a record of birth appearing in the civil register ora final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a publicdocument or a private handwritten instrument signed by theparent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought bythe child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action isbased upon open and continuous possession of the status of anillegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules orspecial laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of thealleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue ofprescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced byprivate respondents in proving their filiation. However, it wouldbe impossible to determine the same in this case as there hasbeen no reception of evidence yet. This court is not a trier offacts. Such matters may be resolved only by the RTC.

RULE 91Escheats

INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCOCastillo, Shainn

FACTS:This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama,

administrator of the estate of the decedent Bernardo RafananLao Sayco, aliasSaya, and guardian of the minor Lay Chuytingfrom the judgment rendered in a special proceeding.

The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the saidproceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died inthat pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor,thereal and personal property left by the said decedent within thedistrict of the property left by the said decedent within thedistrict of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to thelatter. The administrator also prayede that his administration beclosed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay Chuyting,requested that the property referred to be delivered to thelatter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan.

The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed thatit was entitled to the said property, opposed the delivery of theproperty to the alleged heir.

The lower court, rendered judgment ordering that theproperty left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, beassigned to the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis,to be administered by its municipal council and placed at thedisposal of the school in the same manner as other propertyintended for the same use.

ISSUE:Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the

property left by the decedent.


RULING:No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for

filing a petition for escheat. In the present case,it does notappear that there was made, at the request of counsel for thepresident and the municipal council of Mambajao, theinquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompaniedby any certified copy of the investigatory of the real andpersonal property that belonged to the said decedent, with astatement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover,the notice summoning the persons who believed they wereentitled to his property should have been published for at leastsix consecutive weeks, and not for three.Furthermore, theperson who lays claim to the property left by the decedent atdeath, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identityand rights.

In the present case, counsel for the municipality ofMambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for theadjudication in behalf of the municipality of the propertyaforementioned; he did not comply with the provisions of thelaw by furnishing the required proofs in regard to the mattershereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of aninvestigation.REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALSCastillo, Rochelle Jane

FACTS:

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985)private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-aroundpersonal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widowand a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and mostespecially during the waning years of her life, respondentSolano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companionsince no close relative was available to tend to her needs. Inrecognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donationinvolving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and

7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged thatshe misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to befound. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republicfiled a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankinsbefore the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During theproceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by RomeoSolano, spouse of private respondent, and one GaudencioRegosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trialcourt for the reason that "they miserably failed to show validclaim or right to the properties in question." Since it wasestablished that there were no known heirs and persons entitledto the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower courtescheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitionerRepublic of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction todeclare the same escheated in favor of the state.

RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding,unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, byvirtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personalproperty of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In theabsence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state toforestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the statemay, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits thetime within which a claim to such property may be made. Theprocedure by which the escheated property may be recoveredis generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposedwithin which such action must be brought. (b) In thisjurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file hisclaim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment,such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if


sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for theproceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shallbe barred forever." The 5-year period is not a devicecapriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; onthe contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-beclaimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwisethey may lose them forever in a final judgment. (c) In a specialproceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 thepetitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Anyperson alleging to have a direct right or interest in the propertysought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and mayappear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case,the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appearedalleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de SanPedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusiveowner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to bethe lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with theformer (underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheatproceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdictionis conclusive against all persons with actual or constructivenotice, but not against those who are not parties or priviesthereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment of escheatwas held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement toall persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners ofany dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or inany way injure him, constitutes due process of law, propernotice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-yearperiod therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost herright to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds ofdonation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheatjudgment which has long attained finality.

RULE 109Appeals in Special Proceedings

TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA.DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCANDela Cruz, Kyzeth

REPUBLIC VS. NISHINADe guzman, Jabrielle

FACTS: Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by

her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC ofMalolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birthrecord and change of surname. In her petition, respondentalleged the following: She was born on October 31, 1987 inMalolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanesefather Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later died.Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. Asthey could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civilregistry, respondents mother caused the late registration of herbirth under the surname of her mothers second husband,Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced. Hermother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, wholater adopted her by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court.It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila. Itsurfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at theMalolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida SumeraNishina,hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition prayingthat her second birth certificate bearing the surnameHakamada, issued through late registration be cancelled; andthat in light of the decree of adoption, her surname Nishina inthe original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. Afterhearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition anddirected the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the secondbirth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it fromNISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion todismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrongmode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal asrequired under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs)of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate courtdismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since respondents


petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding,petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a recordon appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007Order granting respondents petition, and by not filing a recordon appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

RULING:SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings whichmay be the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders orjudgments from which appeals may be taken. An interestedperson may appeal in special proceedings from an order orjudgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a)Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawfulheirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of theestate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows,in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceasedperson, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offsetto a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor,administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, inproceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of adeceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian,a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the partyappealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from theappointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final orderor judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantialrights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting ordenying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. Theabove-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during thependency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in additionto the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the originalrecords of the case should remain with the trial court to enablethe rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate anddistinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. Inthe present case, the filing of a record on appeal was notnecessary since no other matter remained to be heard and

determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed ordergranting respondents petition for cancellation of birth recordand change of surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, thepetition is GRANTED.

RULES 99-100Adoption and Custody of Minors

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILESDorado, Czaybeeh

REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSEEspino, Carla

FACTS:

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born USCitizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became anaturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala,a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial courtgranted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral appealed contending that the lower court erred ingranting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adoptunder Philippine Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

RULING:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of thePhilippines, private respondents spouses Clouse are clearlybarred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the personswho are not qualified to adopt, viz.:


(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative byconsanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or herFilipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adoptjointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of thelatter.

Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adoptFilipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-countryadoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A.Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala underany of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In thefirst place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural borncitizen of the United States of America. In the second place,Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinitynor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, whenprivate respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition toadopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, privaterespondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen.She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as acitizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, mayappear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. Shewas a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her youngerbrother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot begranted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 whichmandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in thefollowing cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of theother.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, acondition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife ismandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of jointparental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. Asthe child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimatechild, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

REPUBLIC VS. MILLERHipolito, Nina Anthonette

FACTS: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American

citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition toadopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under theprovision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowsaliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits givingtheir irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWDrecommended approval of the petition on the basis of itsevaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decisiongranting the petition for adoption. On August 3, 1998, theFamily Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of aFilipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to thegranting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.


ISSUE: Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino

child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to theeffectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

RULING: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and

Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filingof the petition, acquired a vested right which could not beaffected by the subsequent enactment of a new lawdisqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code, effectiveAugust 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who arealiens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has becomevested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shallbe governed by the law then in force. A vested right is onewhose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend uponevents foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include notonly legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, butalso an exemption from new obligations created after the righthas vested. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient inform and substance in accordance with the law in governanceat the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction andretains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, thejurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force atthe time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdictionof a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attachescannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,although of a character which would have prevented jurisdictionfrom attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an alien who fileda petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code,although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,may continue with his petition under the law prevailing beforethe Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramountconsideration. They are designed to provide homes, parentalcare and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned childrenand give them the protection of society and family in the personof the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons toexperience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a childin the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their

natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should besustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionateobjectives of the law.

IN RE MICHELLE LIMKatigbak, Paola Margareth

FACTS:

Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession.On 1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, theyregistered the minor children entrusted to them by certainAyuban as their own----named Michelle P. Lim and Michael JudeP. Lim.

When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), anAmerican citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children byavailing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to thoseindividuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption ofMichelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the petitions foradoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, whileMichael was 18 years and seven months old.

RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since thepetitioner had remarried, she should have filed the petitionjointly with her new husband. Motion for reconsideration wasfiled but was denied. Mere consent of the husbend wasinsufficient because the law gives additional requirements, suchas residency and certification of his qualification, which thehusbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees arealready emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the jointexercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even anemancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents andassumes certain obligations and responsibilities. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE:


Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singlyadopt? RULE:

Denied. Under Section 7 of RA 8552, the use of theword “shall” means that joint adoption by the husbandand the wife is mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried atthe time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointlyadopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only bypetitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,the trial court was correct in denying the petitions foradoption on this ground.

Even if Olario gave his consent, there are requirements thatmust be complied, as set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations withthe Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living inthe Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to thefiling of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain suchresidency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legalcapacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee isallowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adoptedchild. None of these qualifications were shown and provedduring the trial. These requirements on residency andcertification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewisebe waived pursuant to Section 7. Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymorenecessary since the children have been emancipated havingreached the age of majority. This is untenable. It is true thatwhen the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, whenhe attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipationterminates parental authority over the person and property ofthe child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all actsof civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of theeffects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated inArticle V of RA 8552.

Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible sinceOlario already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court

ruled that until and unless there is a judicial decree for thedissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, themarriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption bythe husband and the wife is required.

CANG VS. CLAVANOLectura, Erika

DSWD VS. BELENLim, Justin

REPUBLIC VS HERNANDEZLubay, Angela

FACTS:

The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin EarlBartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayertherein for the change of the first name of said adoptee toAaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andradewhich he acquired consequent to his adoption.

Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of namein the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of thepetition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name ina single proceeding, arguing that these petition should beconducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition forchange of name are two special proceedings which, insubstance and purpose, are different from and are not relatedto each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets oflaw and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the lawallows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matterof right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural


consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought isthe change of the registered given or proper name, and sincethis would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, apetition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordinglybe instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisitestherefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed thepetition for adoption with a prayer for change of namepredicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissivejoinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suitsand in line with the policy of discouraging protracted andvexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition inthe Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of namebeing pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in asingle petition.

ISSUE:

WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for thechange of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petitionfor adoption.

RULING:

No.

Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legaleffect of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to bea legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquirethe reciprocal rights and obligations arising from therelationship of parent and child, including the right of theadopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation,to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of thedecree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname tofollow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessaryconsequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically becontained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayedfor by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known asthe first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as itwas originally registered in the civil register. The creation of anadoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter alicense to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or firstname. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon theadoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree ofadoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of anadoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtivelyinserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannotproperly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in thecivil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’sname is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictlycomplying with the substantive and procedural requirements fora special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of theRules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons orgrounds therefor can be threshed out and accordinglydetermined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strictcompliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensablein order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. Itis an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and byitself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot begranted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a


mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceedingwould be to denigrate its role and significance as theappropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIAMercado, Trish

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIGG.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein

petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.

ISSUE:May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural

father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

HELD:YES.

RATIO:An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by

law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,

including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted byher natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

BRIONES VS. MIGUELDumapias, Gay*

SY VS. COURT OF APPEALSRivera, Hiezll Wynn

FACTS:

On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petitionfor habeas corpus against Wilson Sy before the Regional TrialCourt of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No.94-69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued orderingWilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiahbefore the court and that after hearing, their care and custodybe awarded to her as their mother.

In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of theminors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained thatMercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors. He adducedthe following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her familyin 1992; secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, shecannot provide proper care to the children.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be

given to the mother.2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide

financial support to the minor children not in hiscustody.


RULING:1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that: “In case of separation of the parents, parental authority

shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. TheCourt shall take into account all relevant considerations,especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,unless the parent is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separatedfrom the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons toorder otherwise.”

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, thesole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational,social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking intoaccount the respective resources and social and moralsituations of the contending parents.

However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit andproper person to have custody of her children so that they maynot only receive her attention, care, supervision but also havethe advantage and benefit of a mother’s love and devotion forwhich there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude anddevotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and areworth more to a child of tender years than all other thingscombined.

2. Yes.Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation

to give support is demandable from the time the person whohas a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but itshall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicialdemand.The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as supportfor the minor children. As found by both courts, petitioner’srepresentations regarding his family’s wealth and his capabilityto provide for his family more than provided a fair indication ofhis financial standing even though he proved to be less thanforthright on the matter. In any event, this award of support ismerely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered inaccordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needyparty and with the means of the giver.

RULE 103Change of Name

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992)Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine

FACTS:Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of

Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and ahalf years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and hissister Margaret Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were, with theconsent of their natural parents and by order of the court,adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was aninsurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high schoolteacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remainedchildless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of22, private respondent, by then married and a juniorEngineering student, filed a petition to change his name toMaximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surnameWong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives andfriends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truthand in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslimcommunity, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoeverof alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying aChinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire torevert to his former surname.

RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that,the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.

Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The SolicitorGeneral contends that private respondent's allegations ofridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were


unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change ofname. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside thename of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memoryof the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive,despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further,the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wongto his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code,which requires an adopted child to use the surname of theadopter.CA: Affirmed.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his

petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper towarrant the granting of said petition.

RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General wasunacceptable. The testimony of private respondent in the lowercourt bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid forchange of name: that he observed that “Wong” as a surnameembarrassed him to his friends and when he goes with Chinesefriends he cannot talk Chinese; that private respondent wasliving in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one canbelieve that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business ofFurniture but has little customer because no one believes thathe is Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondentappellate court. The purpose of the law an allowing of change ofname as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of theRules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve hispersonality and to provide his best interest.In granting ordenying the petition for change of name, the question of properand reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. Theevidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court andnot all the best evidence available is required.In the presentcase, the court had exercised its discretion judiciously when itgranted the petition.

Justice dictates that a person should be allowed toimprove his social standing as long as in doing so, he does notcause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or otherpersons .Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this casethat such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or ofother persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner mustshow not only some proper or compelling reason therefor butalso that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and officialname. Among the grounds for change of name which havebeen held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)When the change results as a legal consequence, as inlegitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d)Having continuously used and been known since childhood by aFilipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sinceredesire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of formeralienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and(f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is noshowing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulentpurpose or that the change of name would prejudice publicinterest.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, thequestion of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sounddiscretion of the court. The evidence presented need only besatisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, whatis involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance ofthe request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency andpropriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant andwith the sole prerogative for making such determination beinglodged in the courts.

While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code isto the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of theadopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change


of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident ratherthan the object of adoption proceedings.0 The act of adoptionfixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, itis an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation arerecognized as legally existing between persons not so relatedby nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family ofthe child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferringon it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose ofan adoption proceeding is to effect this new status ofrelationship between the child and its adoptive parents, thechange of name which frequently accompanies adoption beingmore an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 Thewelfare of the child is the primary consideration in thedetermination of an application for adoption.

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLICSalayog, Benny Rico

PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHANSumaway, Dylan

REPUBLIC VS. AQUINOTomarong, Marian

REPUBLIC VS. MARCOSTresvalles, Kris

FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed byprivate respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizenof Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipinocitizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth onJanuary 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian aliasHuang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth toa daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused herdaughter to be registered as an alien under the name of MaryPang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's

father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always usedthe name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio ChinesePatriotic School where she studies; that on August 16, 1966,petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that asher daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather,Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt anduse his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "MaryPang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; thatAlfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signingat the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not madefor the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year olddaughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution ofa judgment as she has never been sued in court, and thepetition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to anythird person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed tochange her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to MaryPang De la Cruz.

On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting thehearing of the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock inthe morning and inviting all interested persons to appear andshow cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. Theorder also directed that it be published at the expense of thepetitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once aweek for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to bemade as soon as possible. The order also commanded that theSolicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnishedcopies of the order and petition.

On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called forhearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner'scounsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or hisdeputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang ChaQuen.


Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias ManmanHuang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary PangDe la Cruz.

The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to theSupreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contraryto law

ISSUE: whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petitionalthough private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduceproper and reasonable cause for changing the name of theminor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."

HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken.

1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for achange of name to be valid, the title thereof should include,first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any. this Courtexplained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of thename sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases ofthe applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of thepublished order. It is that the ordinary reader only glancesfleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of thepetition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only ifthe caption or the title strikes him because one or all of thenames mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to readthe contents of the order. The probability is great that he willnot notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they arementioned only in the body of the order or petition.

In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition datedMarch 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court datedApril 4, 1968 read, thus:

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIAALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHAQUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)

The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captionsof the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose ofthe publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did notacquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., thevarious names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished tochange to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."

2. The following have been considered valid grounds for achange of name:

(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremelydifficult to write or pronounce;

(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as inlegitimation;

(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs.Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563,November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);

(4) having continuously used and been known since childhoodby a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina AngChay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or

(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs offormer alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody(Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).

As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, thereasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter


are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to loveand recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father. (2) to affordher daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo de laCruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity atthe foot of this pleading"

Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. Thegeneral rule is that a change of name should not be permitted ifit will give a false impression of family relationship to anotherwhere none actually exists. we specifically held that our laws donot authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of aperson not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surnameof their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result inconfusion of their paternity.

Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of nameis that it was not filed by the proper party.

Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by theperson desiring to change his/her name, even if it may besigned and verified by some other person in his behalf. In thiscase, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not byMay Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, aliasMary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority,may file the petition to change her name. The decision tochange her name, the reason for the change, and the choice ofa new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It mustbe her personal decision.

IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANGTuason, Jannelle

FACTS:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City toparents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then notyet married to each other. When his parents subsequently gotmarried, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son sothat the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan toJulian Lin Carulasan Wang

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay inSingapore for a long time because they will let him study theretogether with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was bornin Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maidensurname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, theyanticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminatedagainst because of his current registered name which carries amiddle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whetherthey are brother and sister since they have different surnames.Hence, they filed a petition for change of name and/orcorrection/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian LinCarulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name andhave his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC deniedthe petition because the reasons for the change of name werenot within the grounds recognized by law. Appeal made thereonwas subsequently denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name wasproper.

RULING:

Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is thatthere be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change issought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner mustshow not only some proper or compelling reason therefore butalso that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and officialname. Among the grounds for change of name which have beenheld valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable orextremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the changeresults as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when thechange will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuouslyused and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, andwas unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a


Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faithand without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surnamecauses embarrassment and there is no showing that the desiredchange of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that thechange of name would prejudice public interest.16

The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether.Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for changeof name usually deal with requests for change of surname.There are only a handful of cases involving requests for changeof the given name and none on requests for changing ordropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to dropthe middle name from his registered name? We have to answerin the negative because middle names serve as to identify thematernal lineage or filiation of a person as well as furtherdistinguish him from others who may have the same givenname and surname as he has.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner forthe dropping his middle name is convenience. However, howsuch change of name would make his integration intoSingaporean society easier and convenient is not clearlyestablished. That the continued use of his middle name wouldcause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper andreasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTEUmbalin, Norissa

RA 9048 & 10172Clerical Error Law

BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRARUy, Alexander

FACTS:

Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minorchildren, Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The

surnames were taken from then name and alias of their father,Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy. Petitioner and Sioma Luy werenever married, and Sioma Luy is married to another woman.Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the father sothat the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter wouldbe Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court onthe grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner whosupplied the information in the birth certificate of her son, andthat entries in the records of birth are correctable only if theeffect would not change status, citizenship, or any substantialalterations. Such changes must be decided in the appropriateproceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the name change could be allowed

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes soughtby petitioner would not affect the status of the children becausethey are illegitimate in the first place. The law requires thatillegitimate children should carry the surname of their mothersand that is precisely what the petitioner was trying to achievehere. A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying orwriting, the making of wrong entries in the public recordscontrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it wouldbring about a substantial change.

LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_159966_2005.html#fnt16


OCTOBER 11, 2001Meiki , Merlin

FACTS:The private respondents are the children of Lee TekSheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. Thepetitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng and hisconcubine, Tiu Chuan.

Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee TekSheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, LuciaK. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee,Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Migueland Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions forthe cancellation and/or correction of entries in therecords of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo Lee, AlbinaLee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, CatalinoK. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee.

A case was filed against all petitioners, except EmmaLee, before RTC Manila assigned to respondent JudgeLorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar petition against EmmaLee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and assignedto the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the falseand erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth ofpetitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein thename of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and bysubstituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, whois allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions thatthey are the legitimate children of spouses Lee TekSheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married inChina.

Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his familyas their new housemaid but immediately became his

mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuangave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents,every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of thepetitioners, their father, falsified the entries in therecords of birth of petitioners by making it appear thatpetitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who tookcare of the petitioners. They all lived in the samecompound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondentswere residing in. All was well, therefore, before privaterespondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraudperpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted thatthe names of all his children, including those ofpetitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of theformer’s death that was to be published in thenewspapers.

The private respondents requested the NBI to conductan investigation. After investigation, the NBI prepared areport that the false entries in the records of birth ofpetitioners made it appear that the latter werelegitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.

It was this report that prompted private respondents tofile the petitions for cancellation and/or correction ofentries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lowercourts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitionson the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improperwhere the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacyand filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which isessentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filedprematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has alreadyprescribed.


Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion todismiss for failure of the petitioners to appear at thehearing of the said motion.

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued anOrder stating that the petitioners have complied withthe jurisdictional requirements for the Court to takecognizance of this case.

Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of theabove-mentioned orders failed and they appealed to theCA. The CA, however, found no merit in their argumentsand dismissed their petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the RevisedRules of Court is proper 2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suitsamounted to a collateral attack against petitioner’slegitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding

HELD:The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing aparticular fact, status and/or right. The thrust of saidproceedings was to establish the factual truth regardingthe occurrence of certain events which created oraffected the status of persons and/or otherwisedeprived said persons of rights.

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes thestatus or right of a party, or a particular fact. Thepetitions filed by private respondents for the correctionof entries in the petitioners’ records of birth wereintended to establish that for physical and/or biologicalreasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to haveconceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown intheir birth records.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitionsbefore the lower courts were actually actions to impugnlegitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare thatpetitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng,but to establish that the former are not the latter’schildren. There is nothing to impugn as there is noblood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng andpetitioners.

In Republic vs. Valencia, this Court, held that evensubstantial errors in a civil register may be correctedand the true facts established provided the partiesaggrieved by the error avail themselves of theappropriate adversary proceeding. A proceeding forcorrection and/or cancellation of entries in the civilregister under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in natureand takes on the characteristics of an appropriateadversary proceeding when all the proceduralrequirements under Rule 108 are complied with.

“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedingswhere all relevant facts have been fully and properlydeveloped, where opposing counsel have been givenopportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, andwhere the evidence has been thoroughly weighed andconsidered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

‘SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of anentry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrarand all persons who have or claim any interest whichwould be affected thereby shall be made parties to theproceeding.’

‘SEC. 4.Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of thepetition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time andplace for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonablenotice thereof to be given to the persons named in the


petition. The court shall also cause the order to bepublished once in a week for three (3) consecutiveweeks in a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince.’

‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any personhaving or claiming any interest under the entry whosecancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the lastdate of publication of such notice, file his oppositionthereto.’“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to aproceeding concerning the cancellation or correction ofan entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar,and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest whichwould be affected thereby. Upon the filing of thepetition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issuean order fixing the time and place for the hearing of thepetition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to bepublished once a week for three (3) consecutive weeksin a newspaper of general circulation in the province.The following are likewise entitled to oppose thepetition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any personhaving or claiming any interest under the entry whosecancellation or correction is sought.“If all these procedural requirements have beenfollowed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation ofentries in the record of birth even if filed and conductedunder Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can nolonger be described as “summary”. There can be nodoubt that when an opposition to the petition is filedeither by the Civil Registrar or any person having orclaiming any interest in the entries sought to becancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is activelyprosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversaryproceedings.” (Underscoring supplied.)

According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedingstaken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction

of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in thelower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.

We agree. As correctly observed by the Court ofAppeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/orcorrection of entries of birth was filed by privaterespondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the ordersetting the case for hearing was ordered published oncea week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaperof general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the ordersetting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once aweek for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both casesnotices of the orders were ordered served upon theSolicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila andKalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both ordersset the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrarsand the other respondents in the case below to file theiroppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismisswas consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo,Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, allsurnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila,and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filedby the private respondents in the courts below by wayof a special proceeding for cancellation and/orcorrection of entries in the civil registers with therequisite parties, notices and publications could verywell be regarded as that proper suit or appropriateaction. (Underscoring supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making theproceedings adversarial does not give trial courts thelicense to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which islimited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412


of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of aharmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point tothe case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a laterdate than Republic vs. Valencia, where thisCourtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting theextension of the application of Rule 108 beyondinnocuous or harmless changes or corrections.Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. CivilRegistrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108would render the said rule unconstitutional as the samewould have the effect of increasing or modifyingsubstantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the citedcase of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason wedeclared null and void the portion of the lower court’sorder directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil statusand the filiation of one of her children as appearing inthe latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 wasinappropriate to effect such changes, but becauseLabayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court failed toimplead all indispensable parties to the case.

Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling inLabayo-Rowe vs. Republic[ does not exclude recourse toRule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effectsubstantial changes or corrections in entries of the civilregister. The only requisite is that the proceedingsunder Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceedingas contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.Thus:

“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/orcorrection of entries in the civil register] is merely tocorrect the clerical errors which are visible to the eye orobvious to the understanding, the court may, under asummary procedure, issue an order for the correction ofa mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changeswhich may affect the civil status from legitimate to

illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial andcontroversial alterations which can only be allowed afterappropriate adversary proceedings depending upon thenature of the issues involved. Changes which affect thecivil status or citizenship of a party are substantial incharacter and should be threshed out in a proper actiondepending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,and wherein all the parties who may be affected by theentries are notified or represented and evidence issubmitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, andproof to the contrary admitted. x x x.” (Underscoringsupplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadingsand a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedygranted upon mere application or motion. But this isnot always the case, as when the statute expresslyprovides. Hence, a special proceeding is not alwayssummary. One only has to take a look at the procedureoutlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplatedtherein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4).The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all personswho claim any interest which would be affected by thecancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrarand any person in interest are also required to file theiropposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice ofthe petition, or from the last date of publication of suchnotice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although thecourt may make orders expediting the proceedings, it isafter hearing that the court shall either dismiss thepetition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling inRepublic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108, when all theprocedural requirements thereunder are followed, is theappropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantialcorrections and changes in entries of the civil register.It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic


vs. Valenciathere continues to be a seesawing of opinionon the issue of whether or not substantial corrections inentries of the civil register may be effected by means ofRule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court ofAppealsand Republic vs. Labradordo seem to signal areversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited thescope of application of Article 412 to clerical ortypographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantiverights, such as those involving the legitimacy orillegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize thecancellation of any entry regarding “marriages” in thecivil registry for any reason by the mere filing of averified petition for the purpose. However, it is not assimple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that canbe canceled or corrected under this Rule aretypographical or clerical errors, not material orsubstantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes orobvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or atranscriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs.Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless andinnocuous change such as a correction of name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of theoccupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’

‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry willchange the civil status of petitioner and her childrenfrom legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot begranted except only in an adversarial x x x.’

‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedureunder Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 ofthe Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his

and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and oftheir three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’

“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in acivil registry will change the status of a person from“legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case,the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to theconfusion sown by pronouncements seemingly inconflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,stem the continuing influx of cases raising the samesubstantial issue.The basis for the pronouncement that extending thescope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections isunconstitutional is embodied in the early case of TyKong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated theextent or scope of the matters that may be changed orcorrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion wasreached that what was contemplated therein are merecorrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature andnot those that may affect the civil status or thenationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If thepurpose of the petition is merely a clerical error thenthe court may issue an order in order that the error ormistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantialchange, which affects the status or citizenship of aparty, the matter should be threshed out in a properaction depending upon the nature of the issue involved.Such action can be found at random in our substantiveand remedial laws the implementation of which willnaturally depend upon the factors and circumstancesthat might arise affecting the interested parties. Thisopinion is predicated upon the theory that theprocedure contemplated in article 412 is summary innature which cannot cover cases involving controversialissues.”


This doctrine was taken a step further in the case ofChua Wee, et al. vs. Republicwhere the Court said that:

“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules ofCourt on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule ofcourt prescribing the procedure to secure judicialauthorization to effect the desired innocuousrectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuantto Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of theRevised Rules of Court now provides for such aprocedure which should be limited solely to theimplementation of Article 412, the substantive law onthe matter of correcting entries in the civil register.Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules ofCourt, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuantto its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIIIof the Constitution, which directs that such rules ofcourt ‘shall not diminish or increase or modifysubstantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extendedbeyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections oferrors which are visible to the eye or obvious to theunderstanding, so as to comprehend substantial andcontroversial alterations concerning citizenship,legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy ofmarriage, said Rule 108 would thereby becomeunconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifyingsubstantive rights, which changes are not authorizedunder Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”[43](Underscoring supplied).We venture to say now that the above pronouncementsproceed from a wrong premise, that is, theinterpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clericalerrors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectivelyexcluding from its domain, and the scope of itsimplementing rule, substantial changes that may affectnationality, status, filiation and the like. Why thelimited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tindoes not satisfactorily answer this question except to

opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 issummary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover casesinvolving controversial issues. Subsequent cases havemerely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without,however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412contemplates a summary procedure.First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that providesas follows:“No entry in a civil register shall be changed orcorrected, without a judicial order.”It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to befollowed except to say that the corrections or changesmust be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot begleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated forobtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 usesboth the terms “corrected” and “changed”. In itsordinary sense, to correct means “to make or setright”;“to remove the faults or errors from” while tochange means “to replace something with somethingelse of the same kind or with something that serves as asubstitute”. The provision neither qualifies as to thekind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does itdistinguish on the basis of the effect that the correctionor change may have. Hence, it is proper to concludethat all entries in the civil register may be changed orcorrected under Article 412. What are the entries in thecivil register? We need not go further than Articles 407and 408 of the same title to find the answer.

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed byCongress on February 8, 2001 substantially amendedArticle 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical orTypographical Error and Change of First Name orNickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed


or corrected without a judicial order, except for clericalor typographical errors and change of first name ornickname which can be corrected or changed by theconcerned city or municipal civil registrar or consulgeneral in accordance with the provisions of this Act andits implementing rules and regulations.”

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographicalerrors in entries of the civil register are now to becorrected and changed without need of a judicial orderand by the city or municipal civil registrar or consulgeneral. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambitof Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors inentries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for thescope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changesand corrections in entries of the civil register. This isprecisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and othercases of its genre had said, perhaps another indicationthat it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 isCongress’ response to the confusion wrought by thefailure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-calledsummary procedure for changes or corrections of aharmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from thatappropriate adversary proceeding for changes orcorrections of a substantial kind. For we must admitthat though we have constantly referred to anappropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed tocategorically state just what that procedure is. RepublicAct No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedurewhile Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding.Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided onthe basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospectiveapplication. Hence, the necessity for the precedingtreatise.

REPUBLIC VS. KHOGR. NO. 170340JUNE 29, 2007Meiki , Merlin

FACTS:

On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael,Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC ofButuan City a verified petition for correction of entriesin the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes intheir respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked thecourt in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, toorder the correction of some entries in their birthcertificates.

In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in hisbirth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to"Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion ofthe word "married" opposite the phrase "Date ofmarriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho andEpifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legallymarried. The same request to delete the "married"status of their parents from their respective birthcertificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael,Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birthcertificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the dateof his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing intheir marriage certificate.


On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an AmendedPetition3 in which it was additionally prayed thatCarlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from hisrecord of birth; and that the name and citizenship ofCarlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate becorrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to"Chinese," respectively.

On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered itsappearance with an authorization to the city prosecutorof Butuan City to appear in the case and renderassistance to it (the OSG).

On January 31, 2002, respondents presenteddocumentary evidence showing compliance with thejurisdictional requirements of the petition andtestimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies ofCarlito and his mother, Epifania. During the samehearing, an additional correction in the birth certificatesof Carlito’s children was requested to the effect that thefirst name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to"Marivel."

RTC Ruling:

The trial court directed the local civil registrar of ButuanCity to correct the entries in the record of birth ofCarlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of hismother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"from his name; and (3) delete the word "married"opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The lastcorrection was ordered to be effected likewise in thebirth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona,and Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for thecorrection in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minorchildren are granted. Further, the trial court granted thecorrection prayed for in Carlito’s marriage certificate.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTCDecision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting

the petition for correction of entries in the subjectdocuments despite the failure of respondents to impleadthe minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable partyand to offer sufficient evidence to warrant thecorrections with regard to the questioned "married"status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and thelatter’s citizenship.

CA Ruling;

By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CAdenied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision ofthe trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’sparents rendered the trial short of the requiredadversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgmentvoid. NO

HELD:

A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court ofAppeals. That case stemmed from a petition forcorrection of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her realfather (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly changeher surname. The petition was granted by the trialcourt.

Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fatheredalso by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trialcourt’s decision, claiming that she should have beenmade a party to the petition for correction. Failure toimplead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, shecontended.


In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that thepublication of the order of hearing under Section 4 ofRule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensableparty.

The essential requisite for allowing substantialcorrections of entries in the civil registry is that the truefacts be established in an appropriate adversarialproceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court, which states:Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction ofan entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrarand all persons who have or claim any interest whichwould be affected thereby shall be made parties to theproceeding.

x x x xUndoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to inSection 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by thepetition for correction, as any judicial determinationthat June was the daughter of Armando would affect herward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x.

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in thepetition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out thatthe defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule108, which requires notice by publication x x x.

x x x xThe purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bindthe whole world to the subsequent judgment on thepetition. The sweep of the decision would cover evenparties who should have been impleaded under Section3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x

x x x xVerily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, anaction against a thing and not against a person. Thedecision on the petition binds not only the partiesthereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is

validated essentially through publication. Publication isnotice to the whole world that the proceeding has for itsobject to bar indefinitely all who might be minded tomake an objection of any sort against the right soughtto be established. It is the publication of such noticethat brings in the whole world as a party in the case andvests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to ruleon whether Marivel or respondents’ parents should havebeen impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may notbe amiss to mention, however, that during the hearingon January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was actingas representative of the OSG did not raise any objectionto the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents asparties to the proceeding.

Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivelwas unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries inher children’s birth certificates, especially since thenotices, orders and decision of the trial court were allsent to the residence she shared with Carlito and thechildren.

It is also well to remember that the role of the court inhearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civilregistry is to ascertain the truth about the factsrecorded therein.

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito andMarivel, their certificate of marriage25 shows thatindeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not onApril 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared thatthe date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,adding that he was not married to Marivel at the timehis sons were born because his previous marriage wasannulled only in 1999.Given the evidence presented byrespondents, the CA observed that the minors wereillegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bringabout no change at all in the nature of their filiation.


With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that shedeclared at the witness stand that she was not marriedto Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony wasnot challenged by the city prosecutor.

The documentary evidence supporting the deletion fromCarlito’s and his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry"Married" opposite the date of marriage of theirparents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued onNovember 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parishpriest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho andEpifania had been living together as common law couplesince 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.

A certification from the office of the city registrar, whichwas appended to respondents’ Amended Petition,likewise stated that it has no record of marriagebetween Juan Kho and Epifania. Under thecircumstances, the deletion of the word "Married"opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birthcertificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito,"the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of theRules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, thecancellation or correction of entries involving changes ofname falls under letter "o" of the following provision ofSection 2 of Rule 108:

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries inthe civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation;(e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgmentsdeclaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments ofnatural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss orrecovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicialdetermination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of

a minor; and (o)changes of name. (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103(which governs petitions for change of name) were notcomplied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108suffices to effect the correction sought for.

More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of recordfrom the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate ofeligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voterregistration record satisfactorily show that he has beenknown by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likelyto arise from the dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chineseto Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s birth record was alsoproper. Of note is the fact that during the crossexamination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he didnot deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure tooppose the correction prayed for, which certainly wasnot respondents’ fault, does not in any way change theadversarial nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates ofCarlito’s siblings uniformly stated the citizenship ofEpifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction inCarlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship wouldperpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstancesof the siblings who are unquestionably born of the samemother and father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course,is the correction of the name of Carlito’s wife from"Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical ortypographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, butis also obvious to the understanding considering thatthe name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlitoand his wife is "Marivel."


Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing theappellant’s Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio"amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. Thechange of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu toEmperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuousalteration, which can be granted through a summaryproceeding. The same ruling holds true with respect tothe correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate of hisfather’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except insaid marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" wasuniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito andof his siblings.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

KILOSBAYAN VS. ONGG.R. NO. 177721JULY 3, 2007Meiki , Merlin

FACTS:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, inrepresentation of the Office of the President, announcedan appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ongas Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up thevacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 ofAssociate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointmentwas reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by themajor daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reportedthat the appointment was "recalled" or "held in

abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the questionrelating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.There is no indication whatever that the appointmenthas been cancelled by the Office of the President.

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reportedthat respondent Executive Secretary stated that theappointment is "still there except that the validation ofthe issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council(JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended torespondent Ong through respondent ExecutiveSecretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary,whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinesecitizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and thathis own birth certificate indicates his Chinesecitizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birthcertificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birthcertificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time ofrespondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father wasChinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that "No person shall be appointed Member ofthe Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unlesshe is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines ."Sec. 2 ofArt. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who arecitizens of the Philippines from birth without having toperform any act to acquire or perfect their PhilippineCitizenship."

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted thateleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father wasfinally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization,


that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong anatural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari beissued annulling the appointment issued to respondentOng as Associate Justice of this Court.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed anUrgent Motion for the Issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued,in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent andrestrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasingthe appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent andrestrain respondent Ong from assuming the office anddischarging the functions of Associate Justice of thisCourt.

Executive Secretary’s Comment:

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed hisComment, essentially stating that the appointment ofrespondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court onMay 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant tothe powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of theConstitution, thus:

SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judgesof lower courts shall be appointed by the President froma list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicialand Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointmentsneed no confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that thePresident appointed respondent Ong from among thelist of nominees who were duly screened by and borethe imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII,Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent furtherstated: "The appointment, however, was not released,but instead, referred to the JBC for validation ofrespondent Ong’s citizenship."

Ong’s Comment:

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment withOpposition, maintaining that he is a natural-bornFilipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to filethe present suit; and that the issue raised ought to beaddressed to the JBC as the Constitutional bodymandated to review the qualifications of those itrecommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, thepetitioners in his view failed to include the Presidentwho is an indispensable party as the one who extendedthe appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces hisancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan,born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly aFilipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinesecitizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which MariaSantos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at thattime Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos therebyalso became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’smother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spousesJuan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, whowere married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’smother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy GuiokSantos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong HanSeng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that whenrespondent Ong was eleven years old his father, EugenioOng Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, hisbrothers and sisters, and his mother were included inthe naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureauof Immigration and the DOJ a certification and anidentification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizenunder Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he wasborn.


Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in whichthey asserted their standing to file this suit on thestrength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g.,Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case isone of transcendental importance. They claim that thePresident’s appointment of respondent Ong as SupremeCourt Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore,attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate thatrespondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected byjudicial order in non-summary proceedings for thepurpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence ofwhat it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinesecitizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when hewas a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipinocitizen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-bornFilipino citizen. NO

HELD:

He is still required to submit evidentiary documents.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14,1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondentOng alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to thePhilippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipinocitizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because hisfather, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, wasnaturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was aminor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby becamea Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support ofhis petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the

naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificatestates that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that hismother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and hisfather, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinesecitizen.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath andthe submitted evidence of naturalization that this Courtallowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thealleged subsequent recognition of his natural-bornstatus by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannotamend the final decision of the trial court stating thatrespondent Ong and his mother were naturalized alongwith his father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, nosubstantial change or correction in an entry in a civilregister can be made without a judicial order, and, underthe law, a change in citizenship status is a substantialchange.

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that asummary administrative proceeding to correct clerical ortypographical errors in a birth certificate cannot applyto a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to thenationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civilregistry should, therefore, be effected through apetition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt.

The series of events and long string of alleged changesin the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, byvarious births, marriages and deaths, all entail factualassertions that need to be threshed out in properjudicial proceedings so as to correct the existing recordson his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence wouldhave to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s


mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what stillappears in the records of this Court. Respondent Onghas the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestraltree as well as his citizenship under the time-line ofthree Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ongcannot accept an appointment to this Court as thatwould be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason,he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.