RULING ELITES AND DECISION-MAKING IN FASCIST-ERA DICTATORSHIPS

António Costa Pinto is a professor of politics and contemporary Euro-pean history at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon. He has been a visiting professor at Stanford University (1993) Georgetown Uni-versity (2004), a senior associate mem-ber at St Antony’s College, Oxford University (1995) and a senior visiting fellow at Princeton University (1996) and at the University of California, Berkeley (2000). His research interests include fascism and authoritarianism, democratisation and transitional justi-ce in new democracies, the European Union and the comparative study of political change in Europe. He is the author of The Blue Shirts: Portuguese Fascism in Inter-war Europe (2000), and co-editor of Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministe-rial Recruitment (London: Routledge, 2003) (edited with Pedro Tavares de Almeida and Nancy Bermeo); and Charisma and Fascism in Inter-war Eu-rope (London: Routledge, 2006) (edi-ted with Roger Eatwell and Stein U. Larsen).

Dictators do not rule alone, and a governing elite stratum is always formed below them. This book explores an underdeveloped area in the study of fascism: the structure of power. The old and rich tradition of elite studies can tell us much about the structure and operation of political power in the

dictatorships associated with fascism, whether through the characterisation of the modes of political elite recruitment, or by the type of leadership, and the

relative power of the political institutions in the new dictatorial system. Analyzing four dictatorships associated with fascism (Fascist Italy, Nazi

Germany, Salazar’s Portugal and Franco’s Spain), the book investigates the dictator-cabinet-single party triad from a comparative perspective.

Contributors: Goffredo Adinolfi, Lisbon University Institute – ISCTE Rita Almeida de Carvalho, New University of Lisbon

Nuno Estevão Ferreira, University of Lisbon Ana Mónica Fonseca, Lisbon University Institute – ISCTE

Aristotle Kallis, Lancaster University Miguel Jerez Mir, University of Granada

Didier Musiedlak, University of Paris Oest, Nanterre António Costa Pinto, University of Lisbon

Filipa Raimundo, European University Institute, Florence

SOCI

AL S

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CE M

ONOG

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ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTOEdited by

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ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO

After the so-called ‘third wave’ of de-mocratisation at the end of the 20th century had significantly increased the number of democracies in the world, the survival of many dictatorships has had an important impact. Taking as starting point the dictatorships that emerged since the beginning of the 20th century, but mainly those that were institutionalised after 1945, the social science literature has retur-ned to the big question concerning factors that led to the survival and downfall of the dictatorships and dic-tators, and which the fascist regimes did not escape: the regimes’ capacity to distribute resources; divisions wi-thin the power coalitions; the political institutions of the dictatorships, and the cost-benefit analysis of rebellion. This book explores an underdevelo-ped area in the study of fascism: the structure of power. The old and rich tradition of elite studies can tell us much about the structure and opera-tion of political power in the dictator-ships associated with fascism, whether through the characterisation of the modes of political elite recruitment, or by the type of leadership, and the relative power of the political institu-tions in the new dictatorial system.

9 780880 336567

ISBN 978-0-88033-656-7

RULING ELITES AND DECISION-MAKING IN FASCIST-ERA DICTATORSHIPS

Capa.indd 1 09/10/04 18:14:58

RULING ELITES AND DECISION-MAKING

IN FASCIST-ERA DICTATORSHIPS

António Costa PintoEdited by

SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS, BOULDERDISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

2009

Copyright by António Costa PintoISBN 978-0-88033-656-7

Library of Congress Control Number 2009927610Printed in the United States of America

Acknowledgements ix

ListofTablesandFigures xi

Introduction: Political elites and decision-making in fascist-era dictatorships xv AntónioCostaPinto

1. Mussolini, charisma and decision-making 1 DidierMusiedlak

2. Political elite and decision-making in Mussolini’s Italy 19 GoffredoAdinolfi

3. Ministers and centres of power in Nazi Germany 55 AnaMónicaFonseca

4. Nazi propaganda decision-making: the hybrid of ‘modernity’ and ‘neo-feudalism’ in Nazi wartime propaganda 83 AristotleKallis

5. The ‘empire of the professor’: Salazar’s ministerial elite, 1932–44 119 NunoEstêvãoFerreira,RitaAlmeidadeCarvalho, AntónioCostaPinto

Contents

6. Political decision-making in the Portuguese New State(1933–9): The dictator, the council of ministers and the inner-circle 137 FilipaRaimundo,NunoEstêvãoFerreira, RitaAlmeidadeCarvalho

7. Executive, single party and ministers in Franco’s regime, 1936–45 165 MiguelJerezMir

8. Single party, cabinet and political decision-making in fascist era dictatorships: Comparative perspectives 215 AntónioCostaPinto

Contributors 253

Index 257

This book is the result of a research project undertaken at theUniversity of Lisbon’s Social Sciences Institute and funded by thePortugueseFoundationforScienceandTechnology(grantPTDC/HA17/65818/2006),underthetitle‘Politicalelites,singlepartiesanddecision-makinginfascist-eradictatorships:Portugal,Spain,ItalyandGermany’.

ThebasisforthisresearchprojectemergedwiththecreationoftheICSdatasetonthefascistelite,whichincludescompleteproso-graphicaldataontheministersofFascistItaly,NaziGermany,Fran-co’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal, and which proved to be a morecomplextaskthanmaybeimagined.ResearchonItaly,GermanyandPortugalwasundertakenbyAnaMónicaFonseca,FilipaRaimundo,GoffredoAdinolfi,NunoEstevãoFerreira,RitaAlmeidadeCarvalhoandSusanaChalante.MiguelJerezMir,incollaborationwithJavierLuque,JavierAlarcón,JoséManuelTrujillo,IsabelBernalandManue-laOrtegaconductedresearchonSpain.Theexaminationofsourcesonthecouncilofministersandsomeofthecasestudiesondecision-makingprocessesweretheresponsibilityoftheauthors.Oneexcep-tionwasthetranscriptionofSalazar’shand-writtendiaries,inwhichherecordedalmostallofhisdailyactivities,whichledtothecreationoftheICSdatasetonSalazar.

While the sources consulted in the preparation of this book’schaptersarespreadacrossmanyarchivesandlibraries, themainre-

Acknowledgements

Ruling Elites�

search took place in the Central StateArchive (Arquivio CentraledelloStato)inRome,theInstituteofContemporaryHistory(Insti-tutsfürZeitgeschichte)inMunich,theNationalLibrary(BibliotecaNacional)andNationalArchive(ArquivoNacional–TorredoTombo)inLisbonandtheNationalLibrary(BibliotecaNacional)inMadrid.

Somepreliminaryfindingshavebeenpresentedat seminarsandataconferenceattheUniversityofLisbon’sSocialSciencesInstituteduringOctober2008,withsomeofthepapersbeingpublishedinthePortuguese Journal of Social Science8(1)(2009).

Thedebtofgratitudetheeditorowesinthepreparationofcol-lectedworksisalwaysgreat,butIwouldparticularlyliketomentionthepatienceandvitalityofJuanJ.Linz,whoisbothafriendandamasterandwhohadcollaboratedinapreviousproject(PedroTavaresdeAlmeida,AntónioCostaPinto,NancyBermeo,eds.,Who governs Southern Europe?,London,FrankCass,2003)andwho,whileunabletoattendtheconference,waswillingtodiscussandcommentonsev-eralofthechapters.

Finally,Iwouldliketoexpressmythankstotheproject’sresearchassistant,ClaudiaAlmeida,forherassistanceinthepreparationofthechaptersandindex,toJoaquimAntónioSilvaforhispatientelabo-rationofthefiguresandtablesandforthecoverdesign,toStewartLloyd-Jonesfortranslatingandcorrectingthetextand,lastbutnotleast,toProfessorStephenFischer-Galati,editoroftheSocialScienceMonographs.

António Costa PintoLisbon,July2009

ListofTablesandFigures

Tables

2.1 MinistersontheFascistGrandCouncil 30

2.2 MinistersontheFascistGrandCouncil(byyearsinoffice) 30

2.3 AveragenumberofCabinetsandministers(Italy) 37

2.4 Mobilityofministersthroughportfolios(%)(Italy) 38

2.5 Continuitywiththeliberalregime(Italy) 40

2.6 Politicalofficesheldbyministers(%)(Italy) 41

2.7 Ministers’partymembership(Italy) 42

2.8 PartyrepresentationinMussolini’sgovernment(%) 43

2.9 Averageageofministers(%)(Italy) 45

2.10 Educationallevelofministers(%)(Italy) 47

2.11 Fieldsofhighereducationofministers(%)(Italy) 48

2.12 Occupationaldistributionofministersaccordingto employmentstatus(%)(Italy) 48

2.13 Ministers’occupationalbackground(%)(Italy) 50

3.1 Educationallevelofministers(%)(Germany) 63

3.2Universitydegreeofthecivilianministers(%)(Germany) 63

3.3Fieldsofhighereducationofministers(%)(Germany) 64

3.4Ministers’occupationalbackground(Germany) 65

Ruling Elites�ii

3.5Politicalofficesheldbyministers(Germany) 67

3.6Politicalofficesheldbyministersunder theWeimarRepublic 69

3.7Ministers’previousparliamentaryexperiencein democraticliberalregime(Germany) 70

5.1Durationofministerialcareersbyministerialportfolio (Portugal) 125

5.2Ministers’occupationalbackground(%)(Portugal) 126

5.3Politicalofficesheldbyministers(%)(Portugal) 130

6.1Topicsdiscussedatthecouncilofministersby category(%)(Portugal) 148

6.2Meetingswithministersbefore,duringandafterholding office(Portugal) 152

6.3Meetingswithotherpoliticalofficeholders(Portugal) 157

7.1Frequencyofmeetingsofthecouncilofministers 1938–45(Spain) 185

7.2Political‘family’towhichcabinetmembersbelonged (1938–45)(Spain) 194

7.3Subjectsofagreementsatmeetingsofthecouncilof ministers1939–45(%)(Spain) 195

7.4Ministerialportfoliosheldbythemilitary(Spain) 199

7.5Agedistribution(%)andaverageageofministers(Spain) 200

7.6Educationallevelofministers(%)(Spain) 202

7.7Universitydegreeofcivilianministers(%)(Spain) 202

7.8Fieldsofhighereducationofcivilianministers(%)(Spain)202

7.9Ministers’occupationalbackground(%)(Spain) 204

7.10Politicalofficesheldbyministers(%)(Spain) 206

7.11Politicalofficesheldbyministersindemocraticregime (%)(Spain) 207

7.12Ministers’previousparliamentaryexperiencein democratic-liberalregime(%)(Spain) 207

�iii

7.13Durationofministerialcareers(%)(Spain) 208

7.14Mobilityofministersthroughportfolios(%)(Spain) 208

8.1Ministers’occupationalbackground(%)(Portugal, Spain,ItalyandGermany) 235

8.2Politicalofficesheldbyministers(%)(Portugal,Spain, ItalyandGermany) 237

Figures

2.1MeetingsofthecouncilofministersandoftheFascist GrandCouncil 28

2.2PortfoliosheldbyMussolini 29

2.3MinisterialturnoverinMussolini’sgovernments 32

2.4Durationofministerialcareers(years)(Italy) 38

2.5Regionaloriginsofministers:geographicalareas(%)(Italy) 46

6.1Numberofmeetingsofthecouncilofministers (1933–9)(Portugal) 147

7.1Frequencyofmeetingsofthecouncilofministers (1938–45)(Spain) 185

7.2MobilityofministersinFranco’sgovernment1939–45 192

List of Tables and Figures

Aprudentsovereignwillrelinquishsomeofhispowervoluntarilywhenhelearns…thatlimitationsplaceduponhiscapricemarkedlyincreasehisca-pacitytogovernandtoachievehissteadyaims.JeanBodin�

After the so-called‘third wave’ of democratisations at the endof the20th centuryhad significantly increased thenumberof de-mocracies in theworld, the survivalofmanydictatorships and theemergenceofnewdictatorialregimeshavehadanimportantimpact.Takingasourstartingpointthedictatorshipsthatemergedsincethebeginningofthe20thcentury,butmainlythoseinstitutionalisedaf-ter1945,thesocialscienceliteraturehasreturnedtothequestionofthefactorsthatledtothesurvivalanddownfallofthedictatorshipsanddictatorsandwhichthefascistregimesdidnotescape:thecon-structionoflegitimacy;theregimes’capacitytodistributeresources;divisionswithinthepowercoalitions;thepoliticalinstitutionsofthedictatorships;theircapacityforsurvival;andthecost-benefitanalysisofrebellion(Gandhi2008).

Asmonocratic regimes,dictatorshipshavebeencharacterisedasbeing‘theselectorateofone’:thedictator,whosepowerremainssig-nificant(Putnam1976:52–3).However,dictatorsdonotrulealoneandagoverningelitestratumisalwaysformedbelowthem.

�CitedinHolmes(1995:11).

Introduction:Rulingelitesanddecision-makinginfascist-eradictatorshipsAntónio Costa Pinto

Ruling Elites�vi

Thisbookexploresanunderdevelopedareainthestudyoffascismandright-wingdictatorships:thestructureofpower.Theoldandrichtradition of elite studies can tell us much about the structure andoperationofpoliticalpowerinthedictatorshipsthatwereassociatedwithfascism,whetherthroughthecharacterisationofthesocio-pro-fessionalstructureorbythemodesofpoliticaleliterecruitmentthatexpress theextentof itsruptureand/orcontinuitywiththe liberalregime,thetypeofleadership,andtherelativepowerofthepoliticalinstitutionsinthenewdictatorialsystem(Lewis2002;Almeida,PintoandBermeo2003).Analysing four regimes associatedwith fascism(NaziGermany, Fascist Italy, Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal)fromthisperspective,thebookinvestigatethedictator-cabinet-singlepartytriadfromacomparativeperspective.

Locating power in fascist-era dictatorships: political institutions and elites

ItalianFascismandGermanNationalSocialismprovidedpowerfulinstitutionalandpoliticalinspirationforotherregimes,theirtypesofleadership, institutions andoperatingmethods already encapsulatedthedominantmodelsofthe20th-centurydictatorship:personalisedleadership,thesingleordominantpartyandthe‘technico-consulta-tive’politicalinstitutions.

Thedictatorshipsassociatedwith fascismduring thefirsthalfofthe20th centurywerepersonaliseddictatorships (Payne1996). It isinterestingtoseethateventhoseregimesthatwereinstitutionalisedfollowing military coups and even military dictatorships gave birthtopersonalistregimesandmoreorlesssuccessfulattemptstocreatesingleordominantparties.Thepersonalisationofleadershipinthere-gimeswastransformedintoadominanttrait.Morethanhalfofthe172dictatorshipsofthe20thcenturythathadbeen‘initiatedbymilitaries,parties,oracombinationofthetwo,hadbeenpartlyorfullyperson-alisedwithinthreeyearsoftheinitialseizureofpower’(Geddes2006:164).However,autocratsneedinstitutionsandelitestoruleandtheirrolewithintheregimesisoftenunderestimated,takingthecentralisa-tionofdecision-makingwithinthedictatorshipsasagiven.

�vii

Inorder to avoid their legitimacybeingundermined and theirauthorityusurped,dictatorsneedtoco-optelitesandcreateoradaptinstitutions that are a locus for negotiation and decision-making:‘withoutinstitutionstheycannotmakepolicyconcessions’(Geddes:2006:185).Ontheotherhand,asAmosPerlmutternotes,noauthori-tarian regime can survive politicallywithout the support ofmod-ernelites,suchasbureaucrats,managers,technocratsandthemilitary(Perlmutter1981:11).Thepolitical institutionsof thedictatorships,even those that are‘nominally democratic’, are not mere windowdressing:theydoaffectpolicymaking(Gandhi2009).Autocratsalsorequire‘compliance and cooperation’, and in some cases, in order‘toorganisepolicycompromises’, theyalso‘neednominallydemo-craticinstitutions’thatcanserveasaforuminwhichfactionsandcanforgeagreements(Gandhi2009:viii):‘nominallydemocraticinstitu-tionscanhelpauthoritarianrulersmaintaincoalitionsandsurviveinpower’(Geddes2006:164).

Whenwelookatthe20th-centurydictatorshipswenoteanenor-mousdegreeof institutionalvariation.Theparties, cabinets,parlia-ments, corporatist assemblies, juntas and the whole set of institu-tionsthatPerlmutterdefinesas‘theparallelandauxiliarystructuresof domination,mobilisation and control’, are symbols of theoftentense diversities that characterise authoritarian regimes (Perlmutter1981:10).

ItalianFascismandGermanNationalSocialismrepresentedat-temptstocreateanewsetofpoliticalandpara-stateinstitutionsthatwere,inoneformoranother,presentinotherdictatorshipsoftheperiod.Aftertakingpower,boththeNationalSocialistandFascistpartiesbecamepowerfulinstrumentsofaneworderasagentsofaparalleladministration.Transformedintosingleparties theyflour-ished as breeding-grounds for a new political elite and as agentsfor a newmediation between the state and civil society, creatingtensions between the single party, the government and the stateapparatus in the process (Linz 2007).These tensions were also aconsequence of the emergence of new centres of political deci-sion-makingthattransferredpowerfromthegovernmentandthe

Introduction

Ruling Elites�viii

ministerialeliteandconcentrateditintothehandsofMussoliniandHitler(Pinto2002).

Theinteractionbetweenthesingleparty,thegovernment,thestateapparatusandcivilsocietyappearsfundamentalifwearetoachieveanunderstandingofthedifferentwaysinwhichthevariousdictator-shipsofthefascisterafunctioned.Thepartyanditsancillaryorgani-sationswerenotmerelyparallel institutions; theywere also centralagentsforthecreationandmaintenanceoftheleader’sauthorityandlegitimacy.

Thefascistregimeswerethefirstideologicalone-partydictator-ships situatedontherightof theEuropeanpolitical spectrum,andtheirdevelopment—alongsidetheconsolidationofthefirstcommu-nistdictatorship—decisivelymarkedthetypologiesofdictatorialre-gimes elaborated during the 1950s (Roberts 2006; Brooker 2009).WhileFriedrichandBrzezinskirecognisedthatthesinglepartyplayedamoremodestrolewithinthefascistregimesthanitdidwithintheircommunist peers, part of the classification debate about Europeanfascismcontinuedtoinsist,eventuallyexcessively,thatthetheoriesoftotalitarianism‘deformed’theirrole,oftenwithoutanyempiricalsup-port(FriedrichandBrzezinski1956).

Theinherentdilemmainthetransformationofthesinglepartyasthedictatorship’s‘rulinginstitution’intotheleader’s‘instrumentofrule’issomewhatdifferentinright-wingdictatorshipsthanfortheirsocialistequivalents(Pinto,EatwellandLarsen2007).Someauthorsspeakofthedegenerationofthepartyasarulerorganisationintoan‘agentofthepersonalruler’inthecaseofthecommunistpartiesinpower(Brooker1995:9-10).Inthedictatorshipsassociatedwithfas-cism,thesinglepartywasnottheregime’s‘rulinginstitution’:rather,itwasoneofmany.

Manycivilianrulersdonothavea‘ready-madeorganisationuponwhichtorely’(Gandhi2008:29),andtocounteractthatprecariouspositionciviliandictators tendtohavetheirowntypeoforganisa-tion.Intheinter-warperiodsomefascistmovementsemergedeitherasrivalstoorinstablepartnersinthesingleordominantparty,andoftenasinhibitorstotheirformation,makingtheinstitutionalisation

�i�

oftheregimesmoredifficultforthedictatorialcandidates.However,therelationshipbetweenthedictatorsandtheirparties,particularlyinthosethatexistedpriortothetakingofpower,iscertainlyverycom-plex.Forexample,ItalianFascismseemstoprovideagoodillustra-tionofthethesisthat‘whereapartyorganisationhasdevelopedpriortotheseizure(ofpower)inwhichablelieutenantshavemadetheircareers,possiblydevelopedregionalbasesofsupport,andcommandtheloyaltyofmenwhofoughtunderthem,partymembersalsohavegreaterabilitytoconstrainand,ifnecessary,replaceleaders”(Geddes2006:162),whichisverydifferentfromthecasewithGermanNa-tionalSocialism.

The centre of decision-making is also very different across thedictatorships.Asmanycasestudieshaveshown,‘tomitigatethethreatposedbyelites,dictators frequentlyestablish inner sanctumswhererealdecisionsaremadeandpotentialrivalsarekeptunderclosescru-tiny’(Gandhi2008:20).Dictatorsusuallyestablishsmallerformalandinformalinstitutions‘asafirstinstitutionaltrenchagainstthreatsfromtherulingelite’(Geddes2006:164).

Thisbook,then,analysesthisrelationshipbetweenthesinglepar-tiesandthepoliticaldecision-makinginstitutionswithinthosedicta-torshipsassociatedwithfascism,focusingontherelationshipbetweenthedictators,thesingleparties,thecabinetandthegoverningelites.Theauthorsalsoseektoidentifythemaincentreofdecision-makingpower,themaininstitutionalvetoplayersandtheinteractionbetweentheformalandinformalpowerstructuresineachoftheregimesbe-ingstudied.

Introduction

Ruling Elites��

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