ruling-setting aside of granishee nisi-ogunmola vs. …
TRANSCRIPT
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF NIGERIA
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
ON MONDAY 7TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2013
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON JUSTICE O. A. ADENIYI
SITTING AT COURT NO. 26 APO – ABUJA
SUIT NO: FCT/HC/CV/134/12 MOTION NO: M/6553/13 MOTION NO: M/8999/13
BETWEEN:
SUNDAY O. OGUNMOLA JUDGMENT-CREDITOR/RESPONDENT
AND
NIGERIAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE JUDGMENT-DEBTOR/APPLICANT
CORPORATION (NDIC)
AND
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA GARNISHEE/APPLICANT
RULING
On 27/03/2013, this Court made an Order nisi, pursuant
to the ex parte application filed by the Judgment-
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Creditor, requiring the Garnishee, that is the Central
Bank of Nigeria, to show cause why judgment-debt
awarded in favour of the Judgment-Creditor, with
accrued interests, all totalling the sum of
N25,890,862.00, shall not be paid to him from funds
standing to the credit of the Judgment-Debtor (on
record), that is the NDIC, in her custody.
Upon being served with the Order nisi, the Garnishee
filed a motion on notice on 25/04/2013, whereby she
prayed this Court for the reliefs set out as follows:
1. An Order extending time within which the
Garnishee can apply for the setting aside of the
Garnishee Order nisi made by this Honourable
Court on 27th March, 2013, attaching the sum of
N25,890,862.00 (Twenty-five Million, Eight Hundred
and Ninety Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty -
two Naira, Sixty - two kobo), belonging to the
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation
(Judgment-Debtor/Respondent) and in the
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custody of the Central Bank of Nigeria
(Garnishee/Applicant), for the satisfaction of the
debt allegedly owed to the (Judgment-
Creditor/Respondent), by the Judgment-
Debtor/Respondent for want of jurisdiction.
2. An Order setting aside the Garnishee Order nisi
made by this Honourable Court on 27th March,
2013, attaching the sum of N25,890,862.00
(Twenty-five Million, Eight Hundred and Ninety
Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty - two Naira,
Sixty - two kobo) only, belonging to the Nigeria
Deposit Insurance Corporation (Judgment-
Debtor/Respondent) and in the custody of the
Central Bank of Nigeria (Garnishee/Applicant),
for the satisfaction of the debt allegedly owed to
the (Judgment-Creditor/Respondent), by the
Judgment-Debtor/Respondent for want of
jurisdiction.
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3. An Order discharging the Garnishee/Applicant
from the Garnishee proceedings.
4. An Order deeming the processes filed in this
application as having been properly filed and
served, the proper fees having been paid.
The grounds upon which the application was brought
were also set out in the body of the motion paper.
Also, upon becoming aware of the Order nisi, the
Judgment-Debtor (on record), in turn filed a motion on
notice on 24/06/2013, whereby she prayed this Court
for the reliefs set out as follows:
1. An Order extending the time within which the
Applicant may apply to set aside the order of this
Honourable Court joining the Applicant as a
party to this suit in place of Liberty Bank Plc.
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2. An Order setting aside the order joining the
Applicant as a party in this suit in place of Liberty
Bank Plc.
3. An order striking out the name of the Applicant
(described as Judgment-Debtor), from the
Garnishee proceedings as leave of Court was
not obtained before the name of Liberty Bank
Plc. was substituted with the name of the
Applicant.
4. An Order nullifying the proceedings against the
Applicant as the requisite Pre-Action Notice was
not served on the Applicant.
5. An Order nullifying the proceedings against the
Applicant, particularly the Garnishee
proceedings describing the Applicant as a
Judgment- Debtor, as it is in violation of sections
414, 417 and 425 (1) (a) of the Companies and
Allied Matters Act.
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6. An Order striking out the name of the Applicant
from the Garnishee proceedings describing it as
Judgment-Debtor as it cannot be sued in its own
name in the circumstances of this matter.
7. An Order striking out the Garnishee proceedings
as it affects the management of a company
under liquidation and this Court lacks jurisdiction
to entertain a matter concerning the
management of a company under the
Companies and Allied Matters Act.
8. An Order striking out the Garnishee proceedings
as it affects the appointment and conduct of a
Liquidator appointed by a Federal High pursuant
to the provisions of the Companies and Allied
Matters Act and this Honourable Court lacks the
jurisdiction to entertain such a matter.
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This Ruling is now with respect to the two applications
which were consolidated and heard together on
02/07/2013.
In proceeding, let me quickly observe that the
Garnishee had attached an Affidavit captioned as
"AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," to her motion on notice in
consideration. She further filed what is also captioned
as "FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," on
13/05/2013. As it is a well known procedure, a motion
on notice, without an Affidavit filed in support, cannot
be said to be a complete or competent process of
Court. It becomes a bare process and any decision
that results from such a bare motion is at best
academic or void. See Mobil Producing Nigeria
Unlimited Vs. Monokpo [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346;
Chief of Air Staff Vs. Iyen [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 922) 496.
In the circumstances here therefore, it will be taken that
the two affidavits referred to in the foregoing,
purporting to be Affidavit to show cause, are Affidavits
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in support of the Garnishee's application under
consideration, filed on 25/04/2013.
The provision of section 83 of the Sheriffs and Civil
Process Act, does not, in my view, contemplate the
lumping of facts purporting to show cause with those in
support of a separate and distinct application filed by
the Garnishee, as in the instant case. An Affidavit to
show cause must be filed as a separate process from
Affidavit in support of a separate application brought
by the Garnishee.
In the instant case therefore, I hold that the Garnishee
has not filed any Affidavit to show cause, in response to
the pending Order nisi as required by section 83 of the
Act. The Affidavits captioned "AFFIDAVIT TO SHOW CAUSE,"
and "FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," shall in the
circumstances be treated as Affidavits filed to support
the motion of 25/04/2013.
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That cleared, I have proceeded to consider the totality
of the processes filed to support and oppose the two
applications, together with all the documents annexed
as exhibits. I have also given a careful consideration to
and taken due benefit of the totality of the written and
oral submission of all learned counsel for the
contending sides. The purport of the two applications
ultimately is to set aside the Order nisi made by this
Court on 27/03/2013, for different reasons; the
dominant ground, however, being that the Judgment-
Debtor (on record), the NDIC, was not a party to the
suit that resulted in the judgment that is sought to be
executed and that leave of the Court was not
obtained to so substitute the said original Judgment-
Debtor (Liberty Bank Plc., [now in liquidation]), with the
Judgment-Debtor (on record), in these Garnishee
proceedings.
For proper appreciation, it is perhaps pertinent to set
out a brief history of this case as gathered from the
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materials on record. Many years ago, the Judgment-
Creditor filed an action at the High Court of the Federal
Capital Territory for possession, arrears of rent and
mesne profits against the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., now
in liquidation, who was a tenant in his rented premises.
Judgment was delivered on 18/03/2005, whereby the
Court awarded the sum of N3,120,000.00 in favour of
the Judgment-Creditor from 01/11/2001 until the date
of judgment; and thereafter mesne profits in the sum of
N260,000.00 per month, from the date of judgment until
possession is given up. The total judgment debt was
also ordered to be paid at the interest rate of 10% per
annum from the date of judgment until the same is
finally liquidated. According to the Judgment-Creditor,
the total judgment-debt stood as N13,260,000.00 from
01/11/2001 until 18/03/2005, when the judgment was
delivered. The Judgment-Debtor was stated to have
given up possession of the premises in context on
20/09/2006.
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It further turned out that in his bid to execute the
judgment, the Judgment-Creditor was able to recover
a sum of N1,491,000.00, which was the proceed of the
auction of some of the bank's properties which were
recovered in part execution of the judgment.
In the meantime, the original Judgment-Debtor, Liberty
Bank, Plc., appealed against the Judgment being
sought to be executed; but whilst the appeal was still
pending, the bank went into liquidation and the
present Judgment-Debtor, the NDIC, by the Orders of
the Federal High Court, made on, 30/10/2007, was
appointed the Liquidator.
The said appeal was eventually struck out on
22/12/2012, on the ground that the said Liberty Bank
Plc., the Appellant, had ceased to exist as a Bank.
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeal, and in
view also that the Judgment-Debtor (on record), had
taken oven the liquidated bank, the Judgment-
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Creditor has come before this Court to recover the
outstanding judgment debt, which now stand as the
sum of N25,890,862.62, against the Liquidator.
Now, in my considered view, and from the totality of
the submissions of all learned counsel, the two
applications instant have thrown up three focal
questions, which I shall now proceed to determine,
namely:
1. Whether or not it is proper in law for the
Judgment-Creditor to bring these Garnishee
proceedings against the NDIC as the Judgment-
Debtor, being the Liquidator of and in place of
the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., the original
Judgment-Debtor, without leave of Court;
2. Whether, in view of the provisions of section 251
(1) (e) and (j), of the Constitution, it is not the
Federal High Court, to the exclusion of this Court,
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that has jurisdiction to entertain these Garnishee
proceedings.
3. Whether or not the Garnishee Order nisi was
competently made by this Court in view of the
provision of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil
Process Act, requiring the consent of the
Attorney General of the Federation to be
obtained.
In proceeding, it is also proper to restate the position of
the law that, as an exception to the general rule, any
Court of record including the Supreme Court has the
inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment given
in any proceeding in which there has been a
fundamental defect, such as one which goes to the
jurisdiction and competence of the Court. Such a
judgment is a nullity and a person affected by it is
therefore entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside,
either by an application to the Court that delivered the
judgment or by another action. See Adeigbe Vs.
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Kusimo [1965] NMLR 284; Olabanji Vs. Odofin [1996] 2
SCNJ 242 @ 247; A.C.S. Plc. Vs. Losada (Nigeria) Limited
[1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 206; Ezeokafor Vs. Ezeko [1999] 9
NWLR (Pt. 619) 513; Mark Vs. Eke [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt. 865)
54.
In Associated Discount House Limited Vs Amalgamated
Trustees Limited [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 392) 1781 @ 1840,
the Supreme Court further expatiated on this legal
principle by stating the circumstances under which a
superior court of record has inherent powers to set
aside its judgment as follows:
1. Where the judgment is obtained by fraud or
deceit;
2. Where the judgment is a nullity such as when the
court itself was not competent;
3. Where the court was misled into giving the
judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties
consented to it;
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4. Where the judgment was given in absence of
jurisdiction;
5. Where the procedure adopted was such as to
deprive the decision or judgment of the
character of a legitimate adjudication.
See also Skenconsult Nigeria Limited Vs. Ukey [1981] 1
SC 12; Arcon Vs. Fasasi [No. 4] [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 42;
Alao Vs. A.C.B [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 264; A G,
Federation Vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited [1999] 9
NWLR (Pt. 618) 187; Igwe Vs. Kalu [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt.
787) 435.
On the basis of the principle of law highlighted in the
foregoing, therefore, I am not in doubt that the present
applications are competent to be heard by this Court.
Furthermore, it must also be considered whether any of
the conditions set out above are present in the
circumstances here that would compel the Court to set
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aside its Order nisi granted on 27/03/2013, of which it is
ordinarily functus officio.
I must also quickly dismiss the contentions of Mr.
Okpanachi, of counsel for the Judgment-Creditor, that
the Garnishee's application instant is incompetent in
that it was brought under wrong Rules; and that the
applicable Rules, that is the provisions of Order VIII
Rules 1 - 12, of the Judgment Enforcement Rules, made
pursuant to the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, do not
envisage applications for extension of time to apply to
set aside Order nisi.
It had been settled by the apex Court in a plethora of
cases that where an Applicant in an application refers
to the wrong law in support of a motion, it should not
necessarily bar the Court from considering the merits of
the application once there is a specific relief and
procedure covered by the law or by equity. See Falobi
Vs. Falobi [1979] 1 NMLR 169; Asims (Nigeria) Limted Vs.
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L.B.R.B. Development Authority [2002] 8 NWLR (Pt. 769)
349.
Furthermore, since the issue raised touches on the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Garnishee
proceedings, I consider it even needless for both the
Garnishee and the Judgment-Debtor (on record), to
have prayed for extension of time, for the simple reason
that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage
of the proceedings in a suit. It is never too early or too
late to raise it. See Kotoye Vs. Saraki [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt.
296) 710; Chacharos Vs. Ekimpex Limited [1988] 1 NWLR
(Pt. 68) 88; Elabanjo Vs. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt.
1001) 76.
On the strength of the foregoing therefore, I hereby
hold that the instant applications are competent to be
entertained by this Court.
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ISSUE ONE
This issue deals with whether or not it is proper in law for
the Judgment-Creditor to bring these Garnishee
proceedings against the NDIC as the Judgment-
Debtor, being the Liquidator of and in place of the
defunct Liberty Bank Plc., the original Judgment-
Debtor, without first obtaining the leave of Court.
Learned counsel for the Garnishee had submitted that
one of the conditions that must be present in order for
a Court to be competent to entertain an action, that is,
competence of parties before the Court, is absent in
the instant case. Mr. Eke submitted, relying on the
decision of Akindele Vs. Abiodun [2009] 11 NWLR (Pt.
1152) 380, that a party is one by or against whom a
lawsuit is brought; and that the competence of parties,
whether as plaintiff or as defendant, is very vital and
important as it goes to the foundation of a suit and
consequently touches on the jurisdiction of the Court.
Learned counsel further submitted that an action can
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succeed if the parties to it are shown to be the proper
parties to whom rights and obligations arising from the
cause of action attach; therefore that for a Court to be
competent and have jurisdiction over a matter, it is
necessary that the condition that the proper parties
must be identified is fulfilled.
Learned counsel further contended that the party
against whom judgment is sought to be enforced
through the Garnishee in the present proceedings is not
a proper party, since it was not a party to the suit from
which the judgment sought to be enforced arose.
Learned counsel further submitted that the NDIC was
not a defendant in the suit that resulted in the
judgment now sought to be enforced, and that it is
erroneous for the Judgment-Creditor to equate the
defunct Liberty Bank Plc. with the NDIC, her Liquidator,
since the Liquidator is distinct and separate from the
company in liquidation; and that the Judgment-
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Creditor cannot by fiat confer the status of Judgment-
Debtor upon the NDIC.
This brings me to the contentions also of Mr. Ojeh, of
counsel for the Judgment-Debtor (on record). It is not in
dispute that by the Orders of the Federal High Court of
30/10/2007, Liberty Bank Plc., was wound up and the
NDIC was appointed as Liquidator. A copy of the Order
of the Federal High Court was attached to the
Garnishee's present application. It is also not in
contention that the judgment-debt, subject of the
present Garnishee proceedings was awarded against
Liberty Bank Plc., in 2005, before it was liquidated; and
a substantial part thereof had remained unsatisfied
ever since.
Now the question posed by Mr. Ojeh, is whether the
Judgment-Creditor can unilaterally substitute the name
of the defunct Judgment-Debtor with the name of the
Judgment-Debtor (on record), the NDIC?
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Before I proceed to resolve this question, let me quickly
resolve in passing, the question of competence of a
Judgment-Debtor to intervene in a Garnishee
proceedings, as raised by the learned counsel for the
Judgment-Creditor, in his address.
The general principle is that a Judgment-Debtor is
merely a nominal party in Garnishee proceedings and
that in all ramifications, it is only the Garnishee that is
expected to react if the law was not properly followed
or observed with respect to the conduct of the
proceedings. See UBN Plc. Vs. Boney Marcus Industries
Limited [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 656; P.P.M.C Vs. Delphi
Petroleum Incorporated [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 458.
However, in exceptional circumstances, the Judgment-
Debtor is permitted to intervene in the proceedings,
especially in the peculiar circumstances considered by
the Court of Appeal in Purification Technique (Nigeria)
Limited Vs. Attorney General, Lagos State [2004] 9
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NWLR (Pt. 879) 665, where it was held, per Galadima,
JCA, as follows:
"I am of the opinion that the only possible ground
upon which the lower court could have
entertained the application of the judgment
debtor, and set aside the garnishee order nisi was
that there had been some procedural irregularity in
the proceedings of such serious nature that the
order ought to be treated as a nullity. The
complaint about the breach of provisions of
section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap.
407, Laws of the Federation, 1990 can only be
addressed by way of appeal."
In the circumstances therefore, I consider as
misconceived, the contention of the Judgment-
Creditor's learned counsel that the Judgment-Debtor
(on record), is an outsider to these Garnishee
proceedings; and I have also been satisfied that the
instant application of the Judgment-Debtor (on record)
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has raised very fundamental issues touching on the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Garnishee
proceedings. I therefore agree with the submissions of
Mr. Ojeh, that the Judgment-Debtor (on record), in the
circumstances here, is competent in law, to intervene
and be given a hearing in these proceedings. I so hold.
Now, as to the poser raised by Mr. Ojeh, learned
counsel had contended that the Judgment-Creditor
ought to have sought and obtained the leave of Court,
substituting the NDIC with Liberty Bank Plc., before
commencing the Garnishee proceedings; that failure
to do so amounted to abuse of Court process and self
help; and for which reason the Order nisi made by the
Court, is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel submitted that before a Liquidator
can become a party to a suit with respect to the affairs
of the company being wound up, the leave of Court
must first be sought and obtained, relying on the
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provision of section 425 (1) (a) of the Companies and
Allied Matters Act (CAMA), which provides as follows:
"The Liquidator in a winding up by the Court shall
have power, with the sanction either of the Court
or the Committee of Inspection to bring or defend
any action or other legal proceeding in the name
and on behalf of the company."
Learned counsel submitted that a Liquidator does not
bring or defend an action in its own name on behalf of
a company in winding up; and where it does, it must
add the capacity in which it is so doing, as Liquidator to
the company.
Without having to necessarily delve into the issues as to
the orders of ranking in settling the liabilities of a
company in winding up and issue of subrogation raised
and touched upon by Mr. Ojeh, one point that leaves
no one in doubt, at least not this Court, is that in
appropriate circumstances, the present Judgment-
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Debtor (on record), is entitled to settle the instant
judgment-debt. But the crucial issue that the Court has
been confronted with here is whether it is proper for the
Judgment-Creditor to commence these Garnishee
proceedings against the NDIC without first obtaining
the leave of Court to so join her; and whether the Order
nisi made by this Court on 27/03/2013, is not thereby
rendered a nullity and liable to be set aside in the
circumstances.
Of crucial relevance to the resolution of this issue is the
provision of section 417 of CAMA. It provides as follows:
"If a winding up order is made or a provisional Liquidator is
appointed no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or
commenced against the company except by leave of the court
given on such terms as the Court may impose."
This provision has been given judicial interpretation in a
number of decided cases. The Court of Appeal, in Ini
Okon Utuk Vs. The Official Liquidator (Utuks Construction
and Marketing Company Limited) [2008] LPELR 4323,
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considered the issue as to whether the learned trial
Judge was right in holding that the Applicant, in that
case, should have obtained leave of the Federal High
Court before bringing the application against the
Liquidator in view of the provision of section 417 of
CAMA, and the Court held, per Omokri, JCA, as follows:
"This issue readily brings to mind the provisions of
section 417 of the CAMA. . .
The wordings of section 417 of the CAMA are so
clear, unambiguous and plain, therefore the court
must give it its literal, plain and ordinary meaning.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, the courts are precluded from
resorting to any aid or any other cannon of
interpretation. See Ibori Vs. Ogboru [2005] 6 NWLR
(Pt. 920) 102; Ibi Vs. INEC [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046)
565; Elobanjo Vs. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001)
76 and F. R. N. Vs. O. Shon [2006] 5 NWLR (Pt. 973)
361. . . .
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It is not is dispute that the 1st Respondent was
Appointed Liquidator of Utuks Construction and
Marketing Co. Ltd. on 26/6/95. Therefore with effect
from 26/6/95 no action or proceeding shall be
proceeded with or commenced against the
company except by leave of the court given on
such terms as the court may impose. The Appellant
argued in his brief that leave of the lower court was
not necessary as a condition precedent to bring an
action against the Liquidator for acts done or
omitted to be done by the Liquidator. The
submission of the appellant is misconceived. The
provisions of section 417 of the CAMA are clear
and unambiguous and it provides that such leave
is a condition precedent. See Abheke Vs. NDIC
[1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 228 @ 242; FMB Limited Vs.
NDIC [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 226 @ 243 and Klifco
Limited Vs. Philip Holzmann A. G. [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt.
436) 276 @ 282."
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In view of the position of the law as encapsulated in the
authorities sighted in the foregoing, I am compelled to
agree with the submissions of learned counsel for both
the Garnishee and the Judgment-Debtor (on record),
that leave of Court is required before any proceedings
can be commenced against the NDIC, as Liquidator to
the defunct Liberty Bank Plc. The provisions of sections
417 and 425 of CAMA are statutory provisions; as such
this Court is incompetent to waive compliance with the
same.
Where a party commences an action which requires
the fulfillment of a condition precedent or pre-
condition for the commencement of the action, that
condition must be fulfilled before the action can be
validly commenced. And where there is non-
compliance with a stipulated pre-condition for setting
the legal process in motion, any suit instituted in
contravention on that condition is incompetent and
that Court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit.
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See Madukolu Vs. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All NLR 581;
Rossek Vs. A.C.B Plc. [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 20; Nnonye
Vs. Anyichie [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt 639) 66.
In the instant proceedings, there is nothing to show that
the Judgment-Creditor obtained the leave of Court in
order to proceed against the NDIC as Liquidator to the
original Judgment-Debtor, Liberty Bank Plc. This
omission, no doubt, is fatal to the entirety of the steps
already taken in these proceedings, as this Court lacks
the jurisdiction, as it stands, to have entertained the
proceedings. See also Provisional Council, OSU Vs.
Makinde [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 613.
The situation here is akin to what obtains in the regular
civil proceedings, whereby upon the death of a party
in an action, which survives him, leave of Court is
ordinarily sought and obtained before a new party is
substituted for the dead party.
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I must therefore resolve the issue under consideration
against the Judgment-Creditor; and having done so, I
consider that the succeeding two issues have been
rendered academic. It is thus needless to proceed to
determine them, the Court having held the position
that it lacked jurisdiction to have entertained these
proceedings so far.
Before I draw the curtains on this Ruling however, my
last word would be that since it is not in contest that the
there is a judgment-debt in favour of the Judgment-
Creditor, which is ordinarily enforceable against the
NDIC, as Liquidator to the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., if
the proper procedure had been adopted by the
Judgment-Creditor; and since the Appeal lodged
against the judgment awarded in favour of the
Judgment-Creditor has been struck out by the Court of
Appeal, one wonders why the NDIC has consistently
refused to tow the path of honour, assuage the
hardships suffered over the years by the Judgment-
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Creditor and pay the judgment-debt that was validly
owed the poor landlord/Judgment-Creditor since 2001,
when the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., then as tenant, had
refused to pay her outstanding rents; rather than
wielding a technical defence? This is perhaps one of
such instances that technicality seems to have delayed
justice; but then, the law must be applied as it is, not as
the Judge wishes it to be!
In any event, the effect of this decision is not to drive
away the Judgment-Creditor from the seat of justice,
but merely to require him to follow the appropriate
channel in approaching the seat of justice.
In the final analysis, the two applications succeed, on
the consideration of the sole ground that the
Judgment-Debtor so described in the present
proceedings, is not competently joined in these
proceedings, the leave of Court having not been
sought and obtained as required by law. In the
circumstances, the Garnishee order nisi made by this
32
Court on 27/03/2013, together with the entire
Garnishee proceedings, shall be and are hereby
accordingly set aside. I make no orders as costs.
OLUKAYODE A. ADENIYI
(Presiding Judge)
07/10/2013
Legal representation:
P. D. Abalaka, Esq. (with Aduojo Abah, Esq.) – for the Judgment-Creditor
D. A. N. Eke, Esq. – for the Garnishee
A. O. Ojeh, Esq. - for the Judgment-Debtor (so described)