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Running Head: ETHICS OF CSR RHETORIC

Preprint version of a chapter submitted to the forthcoming book Communication as loving

struggle. Correct citation:

Ihlen, Ø. (in press). Wolves shopping for sheepskin clothes: The ethics of corporate

social responsibility rhetoric. In E. Garrett (Ed.), Communication as loving struggle. Heidelberg,

Germany: Springer.

Wolves Shopping for Sheepskin Clothes:

The Ethics of Corporate Social Responsibility Rhetoric

Øyvind Ihlen

U of Oslo

Ethics of CSR Rhetoric 2

Abstract

Corporations increasingly negotiate their relationship with society through the notion of corporate

social responsibility (CSR). It is more or less unthinkable that a corporation will declare its only

goal to be to make money for its shareholders. Instead, corporations claim to balance the needs of

society and the environment against the need to make a profit. The win-win argument is

frequently in use, often linked to the notion of enlightened self-interest. In this essay I discuss the

ethics of this type of rhetoric and pose the question: What would ethical CSR rhetoric look like?

To come up with an answer, I briefly discuss first the ethical debates that surround CSR and

second the ethical debates surrounding rhetoric. An argument is made for the principle of fairness

and then applied to the discussion of CSR motives and association techniques in CSR rhetoric.


Introduction

The rhetoric of corporate social responsibility (CSR) permeates present-day business

discourse (Ihlen, Bartlett, & May, 2011). Corporations declare themselves as responsible

corporate citizens in a response to the increased debate on issues such as sustainability, climate

change, human rights, and working conditions for their employees and the employees of

subcontractors. In other words, CSR is the corporate answer to accusations of unethical business

practice. The concept itself can be defined as an umbrella term that “captures the various ways in

which business’ relationship with society is being defined, managed, and acted upon” (Blowfield

& Murray, 2008, p. 16). Often a so-called business argument is touted, arguing that CSR is in the

long-term interest of corporations (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). For CSR to be ethical, however, it

has to move beyond self-interest. A minimum demand is that corporations express some concern

for the public interest and what is good for the community (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1999/2002).

To this end, corporations often use the win-win argument—it is argued that both business and

society profit from CSR.

In this essay, the following question is posed: What would ethical CSR rhetoric look like?

In order to arrive at an answer, the following two sections briefly discuss CSR ethics in general,

as well as the ethics of rhetoric. The sections centre on two particular issues in this connection:

first the limits posed for CSR engagement given the corporate instrumental rationality and second

the supposedly a-ethical character of rhetoric. An argument will be put forward centred on the

idea that rhetoric as a minimum needs an ethics regarding means. The notion of fairness is

discussed as a possible guiding principle. The final part of the essay turns to how the notion of

fairness can be applied to rhetoric regarding CSR motives and the association techniques of CSR

rhetoric.


Ethics of CSR

While there is a rich literature on CSR (e.g., Crane, McWilliams, Matten, Moon, &

Siegel, 2008; May, Cheney, & Roper, 2007), it could be argued that the approaches can mainly

be divided into those that are grounded in the notion of enlightened self-interest and those that are

based on the view that corporations have duties towards society and stakeholders. In the former

guise, corporate concessions and CSR are supposed to help profit, particularly in the long run.

CSR creates a better reputation, forestalls regulation, secures a more stable societal context for

business, and reduces operating costs by avoiding conflict. Thus, corporations have an incentive

to behave responsibly; there is a business argument for CSR (e.g., Carroll & Shabana, 2010).

The other main category of approaches points to the obligations corporations have

towards stakeholders—those that are affected by the corporation and vice versa—regardless of

whether these lead to profit or not (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Phillips, 2003). Because business

creates social problems it has an obligation to attempt to correct these problems. Some scholars

have also attempted to formulate a Kantian business ethics furthering the categorical imperative

for business, pointing to principles such as “the interests of all stakeholders should be

considered” and “those affected should have a say” (Bowie, 2002, p. 10).

Empirical research indicates that while corporations might talk about stakeholders, they

tend to argue from enlightened self-interest and adopt an instrumental perspective. CSR is

primarily a means for reputation building and, ultimately, profit (Hine & Preuss, 2009; Snider,

Hill, & Martin, 2003; Whitehouse, 2006). This type of thinking also permeates many political

institutions. A case in point is the European Union, which has published a green paper describing

CSR as an investment and something that will help companies increase their profitability

(Commission of the European Communities, 2001).

Furthermore, the business case is often coupled with an argument for voluntarism. It is


argued that voluntarism will maintain flexibility and bring out the best of business’s capabilities

in terms of resource use and innovation in ways that will produce the best effect for society

(Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Husted & Salazar, 2006). Since CSR pays,

business will also move in this direction. At least four counter-arguments can be made regarding

the above perspective:

(1) First of all, the empirical basis for the business case is questioned. Despite much

touting, the evidence for a positive effect seems inconclusive and the research quickly runs into

methodological problems. Thus, it has been argued that CSR should rather be seen as a niche

strategy that makes good business sense for some corporations in some sectors under certain

circumstances (Vogel, 2005). Also, the evidence suggests that the markets do not necessarily

punish those corporations that do not engage in CSR (Bendell & Bendell, 2007).

(2) Given the perspective of long-term profit maximization, some have questioned why

the issue of ethics is brought up in the first place. These scholars would like to reserve CSR as a

laudable term for those situations in which business forgoes profits in the interest of society at

large. It is argued that if CSR implies earning money, it is not a moral decision, just an economic

strategy (Hay, Stavins, & Vietor, 2005).

(3) The perspective of enlightened self-interest has also been criticized from a

deontological standpoint, where an instrumental approach is not recognized as a legitimate ethical

foundation (Bowie, 2002). Kant’s condition for moral action, the pure unselfish motives based on

a felt duty, does not sit comfortably with corporate strategizing on ethics. A good action is not

necessarily a morally praiseworthy action when using a Kantian perspective.

(4) The economic rationality in which corporations are bound up does not allow them to

see the Other in the full sense. Stakeholders remain a tool to be exploited and are only interesting

as far as they influence the bottom line and/or the corporations’ ability to attract employees


(Jones, Parker, & ten Bos, 2005). The corporate perspective on nature is extremely limited and

cannot “handle concepts of value beyond instrumentality” (Fisher & Lovell, 2003, p. 281). It is

the bottom line that inevitably will be privileged.

Together these arguments can also be used to criticize the idea of corporate self-regulation

as the best solution. The economic rationality and the self-interested perspective are impossible to

circumvent within a capitalist system. When corporations are faced with a choice between

following their own interest or following an action that will benefit the public (and be costly to

the corporation), it will choose the former. The market can create incentives in certain situations,

but cannot be relied upon to work in all contexts or in all periods of time. CSR voluntarism leads

to a piecemeal focus; only certain issues will be addressed, namely those whereby profit is

ensured. This then leads to calls for regulation and auditing (Gray & Milne, 2004).

The position taken in this essay is that CSR has an ethical potential. Currently, however,

the following sentiment seems true: “CSR can work, for some people, in some places, on some

issues, some of the time” (Newell, 2005, p. 556). The main argument put forward is that the

economic rationality of business poses a limit for claims to be ethical and for the business case of

CSR. CSR has an ethical potential building on the principle of integrity—there are certain things

you do not do, even if they secure you profit. Moral individuals, that is, moral corporate leaders,

quickly find themselves confronted with the economic rationality of the capitalist system.

Furthermore, given the instrumentality of corporations, their actions cannot be moral in the

Kantian sense as mentioned. Thus, we will probably “have to settle for business doing the

morally right thing, but we cannot realistically require that they have pure motives” (Ihlen, et al.,

2011, p. 555). A problem arises, however, when corporations do try to pass themselves off as

good, in other words as having pure motives. Before returning to this point, the ethics of rhetoric

in general is discussed.


Ethics and Rhetoric

Rhetoric, as defined by Aristotle, helps show which means are available for persuasion in

each particular case. In On rhetoric (trans. 2007), the ancient scholar portrayed the discipline as

morally neutral and as a discipline that can be used for both good and bad purposes. A major

point for Aristotle was that ethics could not be seen as a branch included within rhetoric. Moral

considerations belong to political science, and the functions of persuasion exist independently of

ethical or political considerations. At the same time, he argues that “true and better [facts] are by

nature always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a word, more persuasive” (1.1.12) and

“great harm can be done by unjustly using such power of words … for by using these justly one

would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm” (1.1.13). Said another way,

“something more than persuasive skills is needed if rhetoric is to carry out its proper function”

(Irwin, 1996, p. 145).

Aristotle’s contemporary, Isocrates (trans. 2000), argued for a model that would mix

rhetoric and philosophy. He maintained that only a good man could truly succeed with rhetoric.

Roman scholars like Cicero (trans. 2001) and Quintilian (trans. 1920/1996) also spoke about the

ideal rhetor as having certain qualities. The latter argued that the orator should possess

“genuine wisdom and excellence of character” (Quintilian, trans. 1920/1996, 3.8.13). Still, both

Cicero and Quintilian subscribed to a consequentialist ethics, where the means, including lying,

were justified by the goal. One-sided pathos appeals were only condemned if they were used to

make people choose something morally wrong (Andersen, 1995). Ethics would involve the

subject matter itself.

Later discussions of the ethics of rhetoric have focused on the goal of rhetoric, the

process of rhetoric, and the means of rhetoric. In the former category, some argue that rhetoric

should aim for self-discovery and social knowledge, rather than just persuasion. Others similarly


draw attention to the humanizing potential of rhetoric (Johannesen, Valde, & Whedbee, 2008).

Practical studies sometimes argue that persuaders should include sensitivity criteria that balance

the needs of the client with the needs of social responsibility (Edgett, 2002). The challenge for

the rhetor is to balance the intention of ethics that is directed inwards to the individual rhetor,

with the intention of rhetoric that is directed outwards (Aasland, 2009).

Discussions of ethics and rhetoric have often centred on whether one should use the

means rhetoric has helped to discover (Johannesen, et al., 2008). There is a focus on how the

audience is treated, and, as argued by Ricoeur, ethics introduces reciprocity into asymmetric

communication situations (Ricoeur, 1992). The process of rhetoric has been discussed as ideally

embracing principles of dialogue (e.g., Czubaroff, 2000). Resoluteness, openness, gentleness, and

compassion are what should characterize the dialogue (Johannesen, et al., 2008). It has been

argued that “true” ethical rhetoric involves listening for the sake of thinking about each other’s

arguments (Booth, 2004). This argument echoes the “true” rhetoric of Plato’s Phaedrus (trans.

1998), as well as Habermas’ discourse ethics (Habermas, 1990). In the ideal speech situation,

everyone can take the initiative and participate, all issues can be discussed, and the participants

yield to the better argument, rather than just following their self-interest.

This essay, however, will focus on the third level, that of means: several scholars argue

that it is possible to bracket the goal of the rhetor and evaluate the ethics of the means separately

(Johannesen, et al., 2008; Mikkelsen, 2002). It has, for instance, been argued that rhetors must

base their arguments on their honest moral conviction about what it is best to do or what the just

decision is (Irwin, 1996). However, the quintessential ethical question regarding means is

whether or not the rhetor speaks the truth. The simplest communication ethics principle is the

deontologically based you must not lie (e.g., Kant, trans. 2002). Of course, the immediate

question that is raised is: are there no situations in which a lie can be defended? Indeed,


rhetoric’s relationship to the truth has been debated since its inception. Some of the controversy

relates to the accusation of pandering to the audience since one of the keys to persuasion is to

adapt the rhetoric to the audience and build from premises that the audience accepts. Defenders

of rhetoric have argued that the rhetor should only accommodate the public as much as honesty

allows (Booth, 2004).

A problem arises, nonetheless, since rhetoric deals with uncertainties, with contingencies,

rather than the certainties and mathematical formulas of logic. Which is the better argument is

open to interpretation and rhetoric can be used to stretch the truth. Rhetoric can be used for spin

purposes. It can be used to put the best foot forward. Rhetoric can certainly leave open a grey and

messy area since it deals with probabilities and contingencies. Buying into the “rhetoric is

epistemic” perspective (Scott, 1999) does not rule out that you recognize that human suffering

and oppression exist, but it makes sure that you do not have a naïve perspective on what truth is,

as something that can be unearthed. There are some truths that are permanent, unchangeable, and

non-contingent; “rhetoric did make the reality of our discovery [of these], but it did not make the

ethical truth itself” (Booth, 2004, p. 13).

While acknowledging the sometimes problematic notion of what is truth, this essay will

proceed to discuss the notion of fairness as it has been suggested by the Danish scholar

Mikkelsen (2002). Mikkelsen has argued that fairness should be used as a norm and an

imperative in an ethics for strategic communication. The notion includes demands like “don’t

lie”, but also “don’t suppress or distort” information. It is a relational concept, that is, the

argumentation should not rely on the receiver being able to understand the argumentation basis.

Fairness relies on no fixed evaluation standard, but rather on qualified and pragmatic evaluation

of the rhetoric.

You cannot say something that is unfair, but you can be unfair when you say it.


Unfairness can be defined as ways of arguing that deceive the audience and at the same time

hides the reasons why a statement should be supported. This is not necessarily tied to the

intention of the rhetor. The main question is often which elements and which reasons have been

suppressed, and whether this is reasonable from the audience’s perspective. As rhetors we always

make selections, or as Burke opinioned: “Even if a given terminology is a reflection of reality, by

its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function

also as a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1966, p. 45). While this is not inherently unethical, the

ways in which it is carried out should be opened up for questioning.

A more or less rounded approach to the ethics of rhetoric might be achieved if the notion

of fairness is combined with the golden rule of behaving towards others as you would want them

to behave towards you. Several ethical questions can thus be raised in relation to the rhetoric that

is used: Are the comparisons that are made relevant to the subject matter? Is the rhetor

sidestepping important problems? Are the examples that are used relevant? In sum: rhetoric

should in practice, and as a minimum, be linked to an ethics regarding means. Building on

fairness as a guiding principle and judgement principle can help in this endeavour. Next, these

notions are used more specifically in a discussion of CSR rhetoric.

The Ethics of CSR Rhetoric

In the section on the ethics of CSR, I argued that the economic rationality of business

restricts the ways in which a corporation can be responsible. It was also claimed that this has

some implications for how corporations should portray their motives for engaging in CSR. In

other words, the analysis has a bearing on the ethics of CSR rhetoric. When also introducing the

notion of fairness, as discussed in the previous section, a few points of tension can be brought

forward when discussing CSR rhetoric:

Is it fair to portray the CSR motive of a corporation as anything but ultimate self-interest?


• Is it fair to pitch the business case, when this has severe limits?

• Is it fair to focus on win-win situations only in CSR rhetoric?

Most CSR reports seem to prefer to stay within the confines of the latter win-win

paradigm, extolling the virtues of partnerships between business and communities. The notion of

sustainability is typically treated as unproblematic (Ihlen & Roper, 2012). I would like to argue

that for CSR rhetoric to be ethical, it has to tread carefully when presenting corporate motives. At

the heart of CSR rhetoric there needs to be recognition of the economic rationality of business,

and the problems and dilemmas this creates. The flipside for practitioners, however, is that a

rhetoric built on such principles is far more likely to come across as trustworthy.

The CSR discourse collective that has established itself can be traced by looking at

similarities in metaphor use and ethos strategies in particular. In order to come across as credible,

corporations point to examples of how they have cleaned up their own act and how others—

typically authorities or NGOs—attest to their efforts (Ihlen, 2011). Furthermore, in

communicating about CSR two basic operations are used that underpin the techniques of

argumentation—association and dissociation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969/1971).

Corporations attempt to associate themselves with CSR values, and dissociate themselves from

accusations that they are in breach of these values. Looking at how corporations use these forms

can also help in analysing the ethics of CSR rhetoric beyond simply pointing out that

corporations lie about, for instance, their environmental engagement. Here, the three techniques

of association will be discussed more closely, with a view to determining how the notion of

fairness comes into play: the use of quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of

reality, and arguments trying to establish the structure of reality. In more detail:

(1) Quasi-logical arguments resemble the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics,

which provide them with their main persuasive power. However, as mentioned, rhetoric does not


deal with correct or incorrect demonstration, only with stronger or weaker arguments, and hence

this category is called quasi-logical. In rhetoric, one does not face contradictions in the sense of

formal logic, but incompatibilities. One cannot be accused of contradiction when supporting

environmental protection and economic development at the same time, but it could lead to

incompatibility if the local industrial plant needs more energy and the only way to provide this is

by developing the local waterfall. When a rhetor points to an incompatibility, he or she tries to

make a choice between the two goals unavoidable.

Other forms that borrow structures from logic are arguments by identity and transitivity.

The former includes the use of definitions that equate the defining expression with the term to be

defined. This is what happens when an environmental organization defines “environmentally

friendly” as what the organization itself says is environmentally friendly. Transitivity, however,

often mimics the syllogism. The transitive principle of inclusion sees X Productions included in

the category of industrial plants, hence X Productions also needs energy.

Another example is how, for instance, it is possible to charge corporate greenwashers with

relying on the topic of comparison in very strategic ways. The hybrid models of Toyota, Saab and

others are less polluting than many other cars. However, if you shift focus and compare cars with

other means of transportation—public buses, trains, etc.—the hybrid cars fall short. Hence,

consumer ombudsmen and authorities in some countries, for instance Australia and Norway, have

spoken out against what is called deceiving (or unfair) marketing practices from “green”

carmakers, “green” airlines, and “green” oil companies. Power gained from hydro power plants,

windmills, or solar energy panels has oil return to its original colour (Ihlen, 2009).

(2) Arguments based on the structure of reality (or what is accepted judgements) often

apply relationships of succession. The rhetor will search for causes, try to determine effects, and

evaluate facts according to their consequences. This might involve arguments that try to attach


two events together by pointing at a causal link. The increased use of freezers and refrigerators

and the thinning of the ozone layer are linked by the emission of so-called KFK gases. Another

type of argument is one that tries to point out a cause that has determined an event. Pointing to

acid rain in a region with forest death is an example of this. Yet another kind of argument is one

that points to the effect that must be the result of an event. This type of argument might also

involve a pragmatic tendency, pointing out that an action will lead to good consequences.

Climate researchers can point out that the thinning of the ozone layer has decreased since the use

of KFK gases was phased out.

The second main category of arguments based on the structure of reality applies

relationships of coexistence. Whereas arguments of succession relate to elements on the same

level, arguments of coexistence unite elements on different levels. Typically, a person is united

with his or her actions, or arguments are based on authority or ethos. A corporation might claim

that human-created climate change is a fact, since the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change (IPCC) has come to this conclusion.

Again applying the notion of fairness, one must look into whether the arguments based on

reality are lopsided. In interviews with oil executives I have been presented with the claim that a

particular oil company is sustainable since it cleans up an area after it has finished drilling and

since it has a no-spill policy (Ihlen, 2009). This, however, conveniently sidesteps the problem of

carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, when a corporation states that it is recognized as an

environmental leader by a public authority, it must be asked whether this is a lopsided and

strategic selection. Does the corporation present the “whole” picture? Does it sidestep important

criticism from NGOs?

(3) Arguments trying to establish the structure of reality often use inductive reasoning.

Wal-Mart argues, “Sustainability is built into our business. It’s completely aligned with our


model, our mission and our culture” (Wal-Mart, 2009, p. 1). To bolster its case, the corporation

points to how it has installed a number of solar panels in its stores. Again, such claims should be

evaluated against the notion of fairness. Are these lopsided or irrelevant examples? In what ways

do they contribute to the overall sustainability of the corporation? Are not Wal-Mart stores

typically located away from public transportation?

Another type of argument comprises illustrations that provide support for an already-

established regularity. The illustrations are meant to strengthen adherence to a rule that is already

known and accepted, and provide particular instances that clarify a general statement and

possible applications. A corporation might point to different sources of human-induced emission

of climate gases as illustrations of what should be curbed if climate change is to be slowed down.

Yet another form of argument comprises models or anti-models that are meant

respectively to encourage or to discourage imitation. If a prestigious person is tied to the

behaviour model, this might function as a “guarantee” that the adoption of the model has its

rewards. The frequent use of reporting guidelines like GRI (http://www.globalreporting.org) may

indicate that a corporation behaves responsibly. Again, however, there is a need to move further

and ask whether the corporations’ use of rhetorical examples seems fair or whether they seem

stretched.

Conclusion

Civil society needs a three-pronged strategy to unleash the potential of CSR. First,

corporate leaders could be encouraged to conceptualize CSR as integrity. There is no business

case for decency in accounting (Henriques, 2007). Similarly, CSR could rely more forcefully on

the idea of doing the right thing. The hunt for profit must be kept in check by business leaders’

conviction that there are moral boundaries for corporate action. Obviously, however, this begs the

question of whether business will ever be able to free itself from its instrumental agenda. A basic


insight, however, is that when you treat CSR as an instrument for reputation and self-interest, it

will not come across as a “good deed” in itself.

Secondly, market mechanisms can be used to a certain extent to further the greater good.

We can and should harness the corporate concern for reputation and attempt to make it work for

the public interest. There is a need for active citizenry, or in other words, an active public sphere

that discusses what a responsible corporate world looks like. A paradigm shift should be

encouraged in which corporations are rewarded when they move from a strictly economic

orientation towards a socio-economic rationality (Fisher & Lovell, 2003).

Finally, however, we fail if we only use what is ultimately an economic perspective to

solve a problem that has a social, systemic, and existential nature (Pedersen, 2009). That

individual corporations behave ethically is all well and good, but in order to obtain broader

societal benefits, this type of behaviour needs to be institutionalized for the whole sector (Zadek,

2001). In other words, there is a need for rules and regulations for those situations and contexts in

which the market mechanisms fail. The capitalist system has limits that must be addressed. A

stick and carrot approach should be used in an ongoing discussion of how CSR can work for

society, not only for the corporations (Banerjee, 2007).

If there is an ethical potential of CSR, there is also a potential for ethical CSR rhetoric.

While rhetoric in itself is morally neutral, it can still be confronted with ethical demands. The

notion of fairness is useful for evaluating specific rhetoric. This would mean that comparisons

should be relevant to the subject matter and that examples should be relevant, but also that

problems/dilemmas have to be dealt with.

One of the standard pieces of advice for reputation building is to achieve an alignment

between identity and image, that is, an alignment between what the corporation is and does on the

one hand and who the corporation says it is and what it says it does on the other (if it is possible


to uphold such an analytical difference, that is). This could also be formulated as an ethical

demand for CSR rhetoric. Corporations should not make inflated and/or unsubstantiated ethical

claims, and show greater openness about dilemmas and problems stemming from the tug of war

between the economic rationality of corporations and the demands of civil society. Fairness could

be the name of that rhetorical game.


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