running in place in mindanao

8/3/2019 Running in Place in Mindanao

1/12

Policy BriefingAsia Briefing N88

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2009

The Philippines: Running in Place in MindanaoI. OVERVIEWSix months after the collapse of autonomy negotiationsbetween the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)and the Philippines government, low-intensity conflictcontinues but moves are under way to resurrect talks.It is not clear whether negotiations will resume and ifthey do, with what agenda. Certainly no settlement is

likely during the remaining tenure of President GloriaMacapagal Arroyo; the two sides are too far apart, thepotential spoilers too numerous, and the political willtoo weak. The best that can be hoped for is progressaround the edges.

The priority should be a ceasefire in central Mindanaothat would allow displaced civilians to return home. Itwould also help to strengthen the structure for talks toensure that if and when another agreement is reached,it will have a better chance of surviving than the ill-fatedMemorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD or MOA) that was dead on arrival in August2008. Two measures already underway deserve moreattention: consultations that would allow potentialspoilers to raise concerns in a way that could feed intothe negotiations, and development aimed at strength-ening human resources in the proposed autonomousregion.

Even if these aims were achieved, the task of reachinga formal agreement is daunting. A Supreme Court rulingin October 2008 that the MOA was unconstitutionalmakes it impossible to go back to the August text,

even though the MILF continues to insist it is a donedeal. If it decides to resume talks, the MILF will haveto decide whether it will go for a revised agreementon land or a final comprehensive compact thatincorporates key principles from the MOA. Publicly,the MILF insists that a separate agreement on landmust come first, but if the right formula were found, itmight be more flexible.

None of the political obstacles that killed the MOA havebeen removed; if anything, positions have hardened. TheSupreme Court decision effectively makes constitu-

tional change a prerequisite for any power-sharingarrangement between Manila and the future Morohomeland known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

(BJE). An arrangement that the current constitutionwould permit would be unacceptable to the MILFbecause it would entail too much central control; theMILF, to be credible to its own supporters, has tosecure greater self-government and control over moreland and resources than was obtained in a 1996 agree-ment by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),the group from which it split in 1981. President Arroyosopponents believe she would exploit any effort at char-

ter change to try and extend her own term in office,so no moves in that direction are even thinkable untilafter a new president is elected in May 2010. At present,none of the possible contenders seem to consider thepeace process a priority.

Even then, there will still be conservatives worriedabout dismemberment of the republic, powerful non-Muslim groups in Mindanao with no desire to comeunder Moro control, and a military convinced it cancrush the guerrillas. The Arroyo government made noeffort to bring these groups on board while the MOA

was being negotiated, nor did it make any effort todefend the agreement reached by its own peace panel.It is unlikely to have much political will to deal withthe spoilers as the 2010 elections approach, and it isquestionable whether any successor government willhave more but a contact group of interested donorscould give it much-needed incentives. Consultationsand dialogues are not going to help unless they arefocused enough to provide creative new options tonegotiators or concrete reassurances to nervous non-Moros.

In the meantime, military operations against three ren-egade MILF commanders continue in a large swatheof central Mindanao, with relatively few deaths but large-scale displacement. The military says the operationswill cease when the three, whose units were involvedin attacks on civilians, are captured or the MILF turnsthem in; the MILF says it should be up to an inter-national monitoring team to determine whether the menwere responsible for ceasefire violations. Both sides faceinternal pressure to take an uncompromising stance, butthere are several ways out of the stalemate, and a goodmediator could find them.

Forward movement on some of the side issues shouldlead to no illusions, therefore, that a final settlement is


2/12


3/12

The Philippines: Running in Place in Mindanao

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N88, 16 February 2009 Page 3

people in Mindanao, many of whom were opposed to theMemorandum of Agreement (MOA). The Teduray, inNorth Cotabato, were particularly outspoken againstit. Pangandaman, Secretary for Agrarian Reform and aMuslim, is the only carry-over from the earlier paneland was not known for his activism.

On 13 December, President Arroyo flew to Qatar,primarily to seek investment but also to suggest thatQatar could play a major role in the peace process,building on its role in Lebanon. Qatar by all accountswas eager to take part, but the MILF treated Arroyosoverture with some scepticism.9

On 26 December, the MILF issued a five-point state-ment, signed by its chair, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, stat-ing that before talks resumed, it wanted:

international guarantors to ensure that both sideswould implement any agreement reached;

resolution of the MOAs status; return of the IMT in a way that would enable it to

discharge its functions, including investigations ofall violations since July 2008;

cessation of all operations by the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines (AFP) against the MILF, even inthe guise of running after its three rogue comman-ders; and

continuation of Malaysia as facilitator.An MILF negotiator, however, later said these were notnecessarily preconditions but rather issues that neededto be resolved.10

On 21 January, Arroyo appointed a new PresidentialAdviser to the Peace Process (PAPP), former Philip-pines National Police commander Avelino Razon, toreplace General Esperon.11 The MILF was not enthused:Always changing the peace team is one factor that

hinders peace talks from prospering, said MuhagherIqbal, the MILFs chief negotiator.12

On 22 January, Seguis left for Kuala Lumpur to try topersuade Malaysia to return as facilitator but with a

9Qatar offers to broker RP-MILF talks, Philippine DailyInquirer, 2 January 2009.10Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 22 January 2009.11Esperon was appointed head of the prestigious PresidentialManagement Staff (PMS) but even so, his removal was seenas a way of easing him out after the MOA debacle.12Esperon out, Razon in as new Peace Adviser; Dureza isnew chief counsel, Mindanews.com, 21 January 2009.

change in terms of reference and possibly personnel.As of early February, no answer had been forthcoming.

In the meantime, high-level visitors continued to offerhelp and advice. Two men involved in the NorthernIreland peace process, Sir Jonathan Powell and Gerry

Kelly, had meetings in Manila and Mindanao on 14-16 January, organised by the Geneva-based Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue, in what all sides appear tohave seen as a useful visit. The message to the MILFwas to keep channels open because one never knewwhen a breakthrough would occur. They stressed tothe military that the Northern Ireland breakthroughcame when the British military realised it could notachieve its aims through force. A senior Philippines gov-ernment official, however, said he had recently heldtalks in Mindanao with AFP officers engaged in oper-ations against the MILF, and almost to a man, they

thought that given a green light and enough resources,they could wipe them out....We have a long way to go.13

III.GETTING A CEASEFIRE INCENTRAL MINDANAO

Even if a settlement is a distant prospect, an importantshort-term objective is to secure a ceasefire in centralMindanao where military operations are continuingagainst the MILFs renegade commanders, UmbraKato of the MILFs 105th base command and AbdullahMacapaar alias Commander Bravo of the 102nd. Athird commander, Aleem Sulaiman Pangalian of the103rd, also named as a target of the operations, is lessimportant.

The conflict is low intensity, and in many encounters,the two sides exchange fire without any casualties. Inother hit-and-run clashes, neither side knows the otherstoll. From 10 August 2008 through 7 January 2009, 42soldiers, twelve militia members, and 101 MILF fight-ers were killed, according to the militarys figures; manysuspect the military death toll is much higher and thatsome of the MILF deaths are actually civilians.14 Inlate December, the number of displaced in evacuationcentres was about 75,000, with an additional 230,000

13Crisis Group interview, Manila, 23 January 2009.14Arroyo orders peace panel to press for rebel talks,Min-danao Examiner, 14 January 2009. The National Disaster Co-ordinating Council listed a total 163 deaths as of 24 Decem-ber. If the armys figures are correct, it would mean that only

nine civilians had died. Non-governmental organisation (NGO)sources have much higher figures of civilian casualties. SeeNational Disaster Coordinating Council, NDCC Update,Sitrep No.80 re IDPs in Mindanao, 29 December 2008.


4/12



displaced living elsewhere.15 Many had returned totheir villages, but they keep their bags packed, readyto flee when the next mortar hits, according to oneNGO worker.16

Murder charges have been filed against all three ren-

egades for killings that took place in August. The gov-ernments position is that the targeted actions will onlystop if they are captured or if the MILF turns them in.The MILF argues that if the men committed ceasefireviolations, these should be investigated by the IMT,which now no longer exists but may be reestablished.It also assured civil society groups it would undertakeits own internal investigation, but while there are rumoursthis was completed in November, the results have neverbeen made public.17

The government argues that the men are criminals, not

merely ceasefire violators, and the MILF has shownneither the will nor capacity to deal with them. In par-ticular, officials argue that between 8 and 12 August,the MILF leadership issued a written instruction to Katoordering him to withdraw his men from North Cota-bato, then sent a personal envoy, both to no avail. MILFleaders say they were not given enough time, and thateventually Kato did withdraw. An army officer in Cota-bato said this was only because of military operationsand not because of MILF instructions. In any case, offi-cials in Manila say, it is now politically impossible toaccept the MILFs demand for an IMT investigationbefore the men are captured because the public wantsto see them behind bars.18

If an investigation were to be held after their arrest,government officials say, it would more appropriatelybe carried out by the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group(AHJAG), a body created in 2002 to go after lawlesselements and thus distinguish criminals from insurgents.This is another non-starter. Not only would AHJAGsmandate have to be renewed, since it expired in Novem-ber 2008, but the MILF would never agree to designa-

ting the two men as criminals.

The two cases are very different. Kato, a respectedustadz (religious teacher) trained in Saudi Arabia withthousands of followers, is loyal to the MILF chair, AlHaj Murad Ebrahim; both are of Maguindanon ethnic-ity. By contrast, Bravo is a thug who does not listen toMurad and is from a different ethnic group, the Mara-

15Ibid.16Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 21 January 2009.17Where is Commander Bravo? Iligan officials ask, www.mindanews.com, 14 January 2009.18Crisis Group interview, Manila, 23 January 2009.

nao. The MILF has no interest in alienating Kato andcannot control Bravo.

The operations are producing nothing except more dis-placed and more Moro resentment of Manila. In onemilitary officers view, they are actually counterpro-

ductive in counter-terrorism terms. Some MILF leaders,opposed to the presence of Indonesian and Malaysian

jihadis, might be willing to turn them in, he said,especially given the bounties on their heads. But thepunitive actions are restricting the movements ofthese leaders and thus their ability to track where the

jihadis are.19

Others say regardless of how little the operations areachieving, they are an important way for the militaryto let off steam, and that Mindanao, as was the casewith East Timor and Aceh for the Indonesian military,

is where Philippine soldiers earn their promotions.20The official line is that Kato and Bravo committedserious crimes against civilians in July-August 2008,and the government has to show the people that it canprotect them.21

The trick to securing a ceasefire is to find a formulathat would allow both sides to save face. The MILFwould have to restrict the commanders movements ina way that ensured they had no ability to mount oper-ations. They may have already done this with Kato,according to one source, by pulling him back to an

area near MILF headquarters at Camp Darapanan inMaguindanao. They cannot pull Bravo, an ethnic Mara-nao, into a non-Maranao area, and would have to finda way of identifying an area in Lanao where the samekind of restrictions could be imposed a difficult butnot impossible task.22

A solution also would have to involve formal acknowl-edgment of the two commanders responsibility forattacks on civilians, but the government might be able tomeet MILF demands for an investigation by a recon-stituted IMT (perhaps with technical advice from aprofessional international human rights investigator)as long as the commanders were under some form of

19Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 21 January 2009. Two ofthe most wanted among the foreign jihadis, Malaysian Zulki-fli bin Hir alias Marwan and Indonesian Hari Kuncoro aliasBahar, have been repeatedly rumoured to be moving aroundthe Liguasan Marsh area while their better known colleagues,Dulmatin and Umar Patek, remain in Jolo.20Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Manila, 23 Jan-uary 2009.21Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila,23 January 2009.22Crisis Group interview, senior Manila-based journalist, 23January 2009.


5/12



physical restriction first. The MILF will insist that allreported violations by the military be investigated aswell. It would be far simpler, of course, if both sidesagreed on a ceasefire first and agreed to work on theissue of Kato and Bravo later.

The conflict shows no signs of spreading to other areasof Mindanao, but Basilan and Jolo are a questionmark, since the militarys pursuit there of the AbuSayyaf Group (ASG) tends to push them into MNLFand MILF areas. This is where the abduction of threeInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)staff in January might have larger consequences, ifmilitary operations against the ASG are stepped up asa result.23

IV.STRENGTHENING THEFRAMEWORK FOR THE TALKS

As the Arroyo government struggles to get the struc-ture in place for resuming talks, the question is whetheranyone has given much thought to changing the majorcomponents and, if so, how and toward what end.Before the collapse of MOA, Malaysia was the facili-tator and leader of the IMT, which also had small con-tingents from Libya, Brunei and Japan. A governmentpeace panel its negotiating team reported to theOffice of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Pro-cess (OPAPP). Its MILF counterpart was led by chiefnegotiator Mohagher Iqbal. As noted above, each sidealso had its local monitors, the CCCH.

Arroyos new peace panel has received lukewarmreviews. The MILF, which has kept its own teamintact, would have preferred not to start from scratchwith a whole new set of players. But as one of itsnegotiators said, For us the composition of the peacepanel is not important. The big question is, whats theagenda?24 That said, even one of Arroyos adviserssaid it would have been better to have included atleast one local government official from Mindanaowho understands Moro concerns. One name that cameup in many conversations was Muslimin Sema, mayorof Cotabato and chairman of the MNLF, who hasgood relations with both the government and the MILF

23Mary-Jean Lacaba, a Filipina, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian,and Andreas Notter, a Swiss national were abducted on 16January 2009 in Sulu and as of early February reportedly

were being held by a group loyal to ASG commander AlbaderParad. They were still in the hands of their captors when thisbriefing went to press.24Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 21 January 2009.

leadership.25 But unless one of the five men justappointed drops out, it is unlikely that new memberswill be added. Chief negotiator Rafael Seguis hasattempted informal meetings with MILF leaders butthe MILF team has ruled out back-channel talks andnegotiations through the media, saying if talks

resume, the points in Murads 26 December statementneed to be addressed first at the very least, the gov-ernment needs to make clear its position on the MOA.26

Malaysias role as facilitator may also be open to mod-ification. President Arroyo said in January 2009 thatshe was inviting Malaysia back, as demanded by theMILF. But it was no secret that Manila was veryunhappy with Dato Othman Abdul Razak, the chieffacilitator. During the MOA negotiations, according toone source, Othman had dictated the terms and paceof the talks. One of Seguiss tasks during his visit to

Kuala Lumpur on 22-23 January was reportedly to seeif Othman could be replaced and to renegotiate theterms of reference for facilitation.27 The Malaysianswant Manila to make clear where it stands on the MOAbefore responding. Not for the first time, the messagethe Arroyo government is conveying in the media thateverything is on track is far from accurate.

The tension between Malaysia and the Philippines pro-vides an opening to put together a structure that has abetter chance than the last one of reaching a negotia-ted settlement that the public and Supreme Court willaccept. One question is whether there should be supple-mental facilitators, both to provide a buffer, in casepolitical problems with Malaysia heat up, and to helpsell any eventual agreement to a sceptical domesticaudience. Many in the Manila political elite believeMalaysia is overly sympathetic to the MILF and has usedthe peace talks to further its own interests, particularlyto undermine the Philippines long-term claim to theeastern Malaysian state of Sabah. Asked if Malaysiawould accept the invitation to return to the talks, onePhilippine official said, Yes, if only to spite us! He

25Crisis Group interview, Manila, 24 January 2009. One per-son the MILF would have liked to see on the panel is Rodri-go Duterte, the controversial mayor of Davao, who has beensupportive of a settlement but whose use of death squads incombating crime has given him an unenviable reputation forhuman rights abuse. Crisis Group interview, MILF members,Cotabato, 21 January 2009.26Seguis met with Aleem Abdulaziz Mimbantas, the MILFschair for military affairs, who in December issued a state-ment calling Seguiss appointment a meaningful gift to theMoro people. Other MILF leaders were less enthusiastic. See

Talks, not War, Key to Peace in South MILF MilitaryHead,Daily Tribune, 5 December 2008.27Email communication to Crisis Group, Manila-based polit-ical analyst, 2 February 2009.


6/12



suggested that even if Malaysia agreed, the two countrieswould be on a diplomatic collision course, becauseMay 2009 is the deadline for Malaysia to submit itsbaselines or sea boundaries to the UN. The baselineswill include Sabah, and the Philippines will raise objec-tions, making Malaysias role as facilitator somewhat

awkward.

As of mid-February the only other country the Arroyogovernment was considering as an additional facilita-tor was Qatar, but probably for reasons that had littleto do with the peace process. It had given no thoughtto any countries outside the Organisation of the IslamicConference (OIC), in part because the original talkshad begun under OIC auspices. But if persuading poten-tial spoilers to accept an eventual agreement is a goal,then it might be worth thinking about a supplementalfacilitator whose leverage that can be put to good use

down the road. The European Union or one or two ofits member states come up frequently as possibilities,but there is wariness from Manila about further inter-nationalising the peace process, and from the MILFabout drawing in countries that have a long history ofsupport for the Philippines government or a problema-tic image in the Muslim world.28 The more directinvolvement of a few donor countries, either as supple-mental facilitators or as participants in the IMT, how-ever, might help meet the MILFs desire for interna-tional guarantors of any agreements reached.29

Another consideration in bolstering the structure forthe peace process is how to strengthen the role of theIMT. A stronger mandate for investigations might pro-duce a solution to the problem of Kato and Bravo thatcould then lead to a ceasefire. However, there wouldbe little point in Malaysia returning as a facilitator, letalone discussing supplemental facilitators, if the MILFheartland remained off limits to a new IMT mission.But one senior military official on the CCCH said evenin the areas where the ceasefire still holds, the inter-national monitors are sorely missed. We need a third

party, he said. Its like boxing without a referee.

30

It would be worth looking in more detail at the man-date the IMT has had since its first mission in 2004 toinvestigate and rule on alleged ceasefire violations,and see if any modifications could be made that mightincrease the likelihood that violators would be pun-ished. An NGO leader in Cotabato suggested it was

28Bringing Qatar on board would obviously weaken the argu-ment against internationalisation.29The MILF is looking at the CPA in Sudan as a model forthis, but closer to home, the role of the EU behind the AcehMonitoring Mission might be worth closer examination.30Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 21 January 2009.

less a question of the wording of the mandate than howthe IMT itself interpreted it; the first two IMT mis-sions were more activist than the last two in monito-ring troop movements, paramilitary activities and weaponstransfers and taking preventive action.31 He suggestedthat a new IMT could usefully get the Philippines gov-

ernment to agree its findings should be made public, tohelp pressure both sides to accept its recommendations.

Instead of trying to strengthen the IMTs security role,the government is talking about adding two other com-ponents, economic development and DDR. Accordingto one official, this would both place the IMT fullywithin Arroyos new peace paradigm and help makethe monitors more palatable to domestic critics.32 Itmay also be a bid for additional funding from interna-tional donors, particularly Japan, which has taken astrong interest in development in conflict-affected

areas. But if development and DDR rest on getting aceasefire and a settlement, adding new functions tothe IMT at this stage seems unnecessary.

V. HEADING OFF SPOILERSAfter the MOA collapsed amid outraged howls fromvarious constituencies that they were never consulted,Arroyo said a new peace process would be based onauthentic dialogue with people in conflict-affected

areas. As of late January 2009 there were two con-sultations being planned, but no one had given muchthought to how the results would feed into the formalpeace process. If done well, these consultations couldbe used in a strategic plan to head off potential spoilers,but some in the Arroyo government seem to see themas a way of gathering support for a harder line towardthe MILF.

One independent consultation that has received inter-national funding is being undertaken by the Bishops-Ulama Council (BUC), an independent interfaith forumof Catholic, Protestant and Muslim clerics founded in1996 in the aftermath of the peace agreement betweenthe government and the MNLF. Working through par-ish and mosque networks under the supervision of anacademic research team, focus groups across Mindanaowill be asked to address four questions: what is yourvision of peace, what are your recommendations to thepeace talks, what can you recommend on the broaderpeace process and what can you personally contributeto the process?33 Before answering the questions,

31Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 20 January 2009.32Crisis Group interview, Manila, 23 January 2009.33Consult Mindanaw! draft concept paper, January 2009.


7/12



respondents will be given a summary of the key issues,prepared by the researchers and approved by the BUC.Results of the focus group discussions will then becompiled in a report, with the whole process expectedto take ten months.

Some of those involved in the BUC are worried thatthe questions are too broad and the mechanics tooweak to give some stakeholders a sense that they weregenuinely consulted, although the study design was stillundergoing modifications in late January.34 One Cath-olic leader also said that while the church hierarchyfrom the bishop to the parish priest could be mobi-lised to get the focus groups organised, but there wasno equivalent structure for the Muslim communities.

But the bigger problem with the proposed study, hesaid, is that it did not get at the crux of the issue: land.

The reason many of his parishioners were opposed tothe MOA was because it envisaged some Christianmajority villages and others with substantial Christianpopulations coming under the control of the BJE. Itwas not just a question of consultation. Unless thesefears are discussed in very concrete terms and over-come, opposition to the MOA or a future agreementwill remain.35

The designers of the BUC consultation may not havegiven much thought to how the results would be fedback into the peace process, other than by publishing

a book about the findings. Their main concern was tobe independent of the government, including in termsof funding, and to reach as many different groups aspossible. Whether this proves useful will depend onthe sharpness of the final analysis and its translationinto useful policy recommendations.

The second dialogue will be government-run, under thesupervision of Attorney Camilo Bong Montesa,assistant secretary for peacemaking and peacekeepingin OPAPP. While the details are still being worked out,the aim would be to involve community leaders andgovernment officials in the areas where opposition tothe MOA was strongest, including Zamboanga, Iliganand North Cotabato; elicit specific concerns and objec-tions; and then design a social marketing strategy toaddress them. It is not clear how long this will take. Inthe meantime, officials in the Arroyo government aredivided. Some believe that any dialogue can be usedto demonstrate how much public sentiment has swung

34Those involved in designing the survey said the questionswere deliberately broad; they worried that if the questions werespecifically about reactions to the MOA, groups opposed mightnot cooperate. Crisis Group interview, 22 January 2009.35Crisis Group interview, Manila, 23 January 2009.

against the MOA and wring more compromises fromthe MILF. A few, but they are very much in the minor-ity, see it as helping to identify and overcome thehurdles on the way to a settlement.36

A comparison of the peace process between the Indo-

nesian government and the Free Aceh Movement in2005 demonstrates how infinitely more complex theMindanao situation is. There, there were only two groupsof potential spoilers, the Indonesian military and mem-bers of parliament. Indonesian President Yudhoyono,a retired general, took on the first, and Vice PresidentKalla, chairman of the party with the largest numberof parliamentary seats, took on the second. There wasvery little opposition within Aceh itself. In Mindanao,opposition comes not only from the armed forces andmembers of Congress, but from many living in theproposed territory of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

(BJE) itself: powerful political families, Christian com-munities and indigenous groups. Even if Arroyo andher vice president were willing to spend the politicalcapital to press for acceptance of the MOA and theyhave not been it is not clear the results would be assuccessful as in Aceh.

VI.SUBSTANTIVE ISSUESIn all its statements about reconstituting the peace panel

and resuming talks, the Arroyo government has notmade clear whether those talks would be aimed atnegotiating a new agreement on ancestral domain orworking directly toward a final agreement, the so-calledcomprehensive compact. One official suggested thegovernment would like to discuss an agreement basedon the same three strands that it wants for the IMT:security, development and DDR, but that will be a non-starter for the MILF.37 The MILFs demand for clarifi-cation about what the government is willing to talkabout is thus wholly warranted.

The MILF is going to have to do some clarification ofits own, especially on where it stands on Philippinessovereignty. The Supreme Court, in its October 2008ruling, suggested that the MOAs reference to anassociative relationship between the BJE and thePhilippines government implied a partnership of near-equals. The MILF deliberately left the concept ambigu-ous, both because it intended for the details to beworked out in another agreement, and in part becauseit had to play to its own audience, many of whom

36Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Manila,23 January 2009.37Ibid.


8/12



were still dubious about giving up armed struggle forless than full independence. Privately, some MILFleaders say they aim at having something like theU.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, but there may not befull consensus on this point.38 Nevertheless, at somestage, they will have to be more straightforward about

accepting Philippines sovereignty if the peace processis to gain broader public support.

The other big issue is land. Much of the local opposi-tion to the MOA relates specifically to the territoriesincluded in the agreements annex, listing those con-sidered part of the BJE. In addition to the core areathat now constitutes the Autonomous Region of Mus-lim Mindanao (ARMM), the annex listed 737 villages(Category A) that could opt in through a plebiscite tobe held within a year of the agreements signing, and1,459 villages (Category B) of about 1,500 mostly

Christian majority villages with some Muslim residentsthat would have affirmative action programs, then beoffered a plebiscite in 25 years. Category B struckfear into the hearts of the settler population, becauseto suggest their lands were even considered part of theMoro ancestral domain was to invite land grabs byarmed Moro elements (a few of which took place rightafter the MOA was announced). One critical way ofreducing opposition might be to drop Category Bentirely but MILF negotiators will not agree. Theysay they have already cut back substantially on the

historical Bangsamoro homeland, and that if theycannot argue to their own people that they are secu-ring genuine self-government over a territory signifi-cantly larger than that which emerged from the 1996agreement that produced the ARMM, there is no pointin talking.39

Given the Supreme Court ruling, there is almost no wayMoro aspirations can be accommodated without a con-stitutional change, and only when this government orits successor is willing to contemplate that prospectand agree in principle to fight for it is there any real

chance of resolving the conflict.

38Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in associa-tion with the U.S. Its residents are U.S. citizens but withoutrepresentation in the U.S. Congress.39Crisis Group interview, Cotabato, 21 January 2009.

VII. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEThe MILF has always been sensitive to the possibilitythat the government would use development aid as asubstitute for political concessions, but it has been very

receptive when assistance has reinforced the peaceprocess, as with the establishment of the BangsamoroDevelopment Agency (BDA) in 2001 and the Bangsa-moro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) inMay 2008. A new, more dynamic BDA head may givethat institute a new boost; the BLMI hopes to becomea centre for training professional cadres that will even-tually take on key roles in the BJE. To the extent thatassistance to these two MILF-linked agencies can helpinculcate values of ethical, merit-based governance andaccountability and more involvement of women, itwill be helping prepare the Moros for running their ownaffairs. Aid for human resource development throughscholarship programs and aid to schools is also moneywell spent.

A huge amount of development aid is already pouringinto Mindanao. The U.S. Agency for International Devel-opments Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)project has a budget of $190 million over five years(2008-2012). Much of the work of the multi-donorMindanao Trust Fund for Reconstruction and Devel-opment is aimed at building institutional capacity; the

World Bank is the fund adminstrator. Since October2008, the European Union has spent more than 10.5million on Mindanao.40 Aid projects are also under wayfrom Japan, Canada, Australia, Sweden and New Zea-land, many of them directly focused on helping conflict-affected communities.

At this stage, it is not additional funds that are neededso much as creative thinking about how existing allo-cations could be used to maximum benefit. One area,for example, where targeted assistance could be usefulis in planning now for the reintegration programs that

will be critical if and when an agreement is reached,even if it seems a distant prospect now. Finding train-ing and jobs for thousands of MILF combatants will bethe problem. It might be worth working through theBDA and a local university to undertake some prelimi-nary surveys of combatant educational levels and voca-tional skills and how those mesh with local labour mar-kets in areas where the ceasefire is still in place.

406.5 million in relief, 3 million on longer term rehabilita-tion, and 1 million on conflict resolution projects.


9/12



VIII.CONCLUSIONSPeace is not around the corner in Mindanao. No oneshould have illusions that the governments movetoward reestablishing its negotiating team presages a

new political will to address the complex issues thatscuttled the MOA. But if a settlement seems unlikelyduring the Arroyo administration, there is still muchto be done now that might help make a future peacestronger. The MILF negotiators have studied many ofthe autonomy agreements reached around the world inthe last decade, but there are still lessons to be learnednot just in what provisions were included but how com-promises were reached and what tactics were used.

For the moment, all parties should concentrate on find-ing a formula for ending the military operations in cen-

tral Mindanao. If a negotiated peace agreement, for themoment at least, is not possible, the focus should beinstead on a solution that will address the issue ofrenegade commanders, halt displacement and allowhundreds of thousands to return home.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2009


10/12



APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES

Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin


11/12



APPENDIX B

MAP OF MINDANAO

This map was produced by the International Crisis Group


12/12

International Headquarters

149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38

Email: [email protected]

New York Office

420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York 10170 Tel: +1 212 813 0820 Fax: +1 212 813 0825


Washington Office

1629 K Street, Suite 450, Washington DC 20006 Tel: +1 202 785 1601 Fax: +1 202 785 1630


London Office

48 Grays Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT Tel: +44 20 7831 1436 Fax: +44 20 7242 8135


Moscow OfficeBelomorskaya st., 14-1 Moscow 125195 Russia Tel/Fax: +7-495-455-9798


Regional Offices and Field RepresentationCrisis Group also operates out of over 25 different locations in Africa,

Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

See www.crisisgroup.org for details.

www.crisisgroup.org

running in place in mindanao

Documents