Rev.November19,2019

RussiaResurrected:

ItsPowerandPurposeinaNewGlobalOrder

KathrynStoner

StanfordUniversity

Draft:ForthcomingOxfordUniversityPress,2020NotforCitation.Version:November8,2019

Rev.November19,2019

ChapterOne:

IsRussiaResurrected?

AssessingStatePowerandItsDomesticDeterminants

"Russiawasneversostrongasitwantstobe,andneversoweakasitisthoughttobe."

—VladimirPutin,May20021

If after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was widely dismissed by the

international community as nothing more than a regional power whose global influence had died

with communism, then its flexing of its international muscle slightly more than a mere twenty-

five years hence has shown that reports of Russia’s death as a global power have been greatly

exaggerated. FromthesuddenseizureoftheCrimeanPeninsulafromUkrainein2014,the

rapidmilitarydeploymentinSyriain2015tocyberinterventionsinWesterndemocracies,

mostnotablyinterferenceintheUnitedStateselectionsin2016,Russiahasreasserted

itself,takingmanyprofessionalandcasualobserversby surprise.

A common argument among many analysts has been that Russia has a weak hand in

international politics, but plays it well. This book argues instead that Russia’s cards may not be

as weak as we in the West have thought. The realist approach to power sees a world organized

by interests, in which states are capable of exercising influence according to their material

capacities alone. Viewedthroughthislens, asimpletallyofRussia’simportanceintheglobal

economy,itshumancapital,thesizeofitsmilitary,wouldhardlyconvinceanobserverof

Rev.November19,2019

itsdisproportionatepoweroverothercountries’decisionsininternationalpolitics.Afterall,

twentyfiveyearsafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Russiahada3.15%shareofglobal

grossdomesticproduct,comparedto15.59%fortheUnitedStates,17.76%forChina,and

7.23%forIndia,accordingtotheInternationalMonetaryFund.2Withanestimated144.1

millionpeople(includingtheannexedterritoryofCrimea),Russia’spopulationsizewas

lessthanhalfthattheUnitedStates(321.4million),onlyatenthofChina’s(1.37billion),

andIndia’s(1.31billion),andwithflattonegativegrowthprospects.3Russiaalsorankeda

distantthird(at$70.3billionUS)behindtheUnitedStates(atUS$611billion)andChina

(US$215billion)inmilitaryspending,despitemovestomodernizeitsmilitarybeginningin

2008.4

Yet the focus on these sorts of metrics of power has led scholars and policy makers alike

to discount Russia’s actual ability to influence international politics in the 21st century.

Undeniably, contemporary Russia does not compare in realist terms to the power resources of the

United States or China. Nonetheless, Russia has developed an outsized ability to exercise

considerable influence abroad. I argue that under Vladimir Putin’s long rule, Russia has

developed and deployed both traditional and new means of influence abroad, and on a variety of

new dimensions. Putin’s Russia demonstrates that a state does not have to be a great power that

is at parity in all realms with the United States, Europe or China -- but it can be good enough to

dramatically alter the balance of power in a new global order. Howandwhyhasthis

happened?IscontemporaryRussiastrongorweak?WhatdoesRussia’sevident

resurrectionasaglobalpowertellusabouttheactualdeterminantsofstatepowerinthe

internationalpoliticsofthe21stcentury?Thesearethequestionsatthefoundationofthis

book.

Rev.November19,2019

In important ways, Russia is distinct from the former Soviet Union and from its fellow

significant powers today. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has reestablished itself on the global

stage as a great disrupter rather than a traditional great power, with a much higher tolerance for

risk than its international competitors or its Soviet predecessor state. Contemporary Russia has

proved willing to assert itself against its regional neighbors, but has also moved far outside of its

traditional sphere of geographic influence abroad, while clearly lacking the traditional means of

power of its competitors. How has this happened?

In a metaphor that aptly characterizes how Putin’s Russia has managed to resurrect itself

in international power projection, David Baldwinemphasizestheimportanceof

understandingthegamebeingplayed,ratherthanjustjudgingaplayer’sabilitytowin

basedonthefacevalueofthecardssheholds:

Discussionsofthecapabilitiesofstatesthatfailtodesignateorimplya

frameworkofassumptionsaboutwhoistrying(ormighttry)togetwhomto

dowhatarecomparabletodiscussionsofwhatconstitutesagoodhandin

cardswithoutspecifyingwhichgameistobeplayed…agoodhandatbridge

isabadoneatpoker.5

Perhaps then a misunderstanding of Russia’s goals and motivations abroad (the game Russian

policymakers are playing) has led to an underestimation of its ability to project power and the

resources it has amassed to do so? Policymakers in the West have declared in public and in

private that Russia is not an equal as a global power, so there is no need to bow to its complaints

about containment or NATO expansion. Undoubtedly, it is partly in response to this belittling

Rev.November19,2019

perspective from rivals that Russia under Vladimir Putin has sought to reassert itself as deserving

of global respect. History also demonstrates that Russia also has undeniable geo-strategic

interests in its immediate neighborhood that any Russian leader might want to protect. It is

important to consider, however, whether a Russian president other than Vladimir Putin would

have made the same foreign policy choices over the last twenty or so years. That is, is Putin

pursuing Russia’s global strategy as any leader of a fallen “great power” would do? I think not.

Instead, I argue that Russian grand strategy under Putin has been a choice. Russia has not

been historically, nor is it inevitably, an enemy of Europe or the West, including the United

States. Rather, the new global rivalry with the West is a strategic choice on Putin’s part to “make

Russia great again” – especially in the eyes of its own people. In this way, Russia’s evident

resurrection as a global power is also a response to Russian domestic politics, and an overarching

concern with the stability and preservation of the regime Putin has built, and from which he has

profited, since entering the presidency in 2000.

A“Normal”Country?TheExtentofRussia’sRevival

OnDecember25,1991,thehammerandsickleflagoftheSovietUnionwaslowered

forthelasttimeovertheKremlin,andtheRussiantri-colorflagwasraised.Thismoment

markedthedefinitiveendtoavastcommunistempirethatstretchedfromEurope’s

borderstoJapan’s,andfromtheArcticOceantoAfghanistan.Itsdemisebroughtaboutthe

simultaneousendtotheColdWarbetweenEastandWestthatdefinedpost–WorldWarII

internationalrelations,andmarkedtheconclusionofanideologicalandexistentialstruggle

betweensuperpowersplayedoutthroughproxiesintheMiddleEast,SouthandCentral

America,EasternEurope,AsiaandAfrica.

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ThecollapseoftheSovietsystemwaslongincomingoverdecadesofdeclinein

productivityandlegitimacyinthe1970sand1980s,yetlargelyunanticipatedwhenit

finallyarrivedin1991.6WesternanalystsprovidedevaluationsoftheSovietUnioninthe

1980sthatcharacterizeditasideologicallybankrupt,itseconomyinstagnation.Few,

however,predicteditsrelativelypeacefuldemiseandtherapidestablishmentofRussiaas

itssuccessorstateininternationalaffairs,althoughapalecomparisontothesuperpower

thatwas—atleastintheimmediateaftermathofthecollapse.7In1990and1991,Russia

wastherecipientofinternationalloansfromlendersoflastresortliketheInternational

MonetaryFundandWorldBank.FoodaidwasdistributedonthestreetsofMoscow.As

communismslippedawayandthenewRussianFederationemerged,theeconomywas

alreadyatitsknees.SixyearsofunevenreformsbyMikhailGorbachev,thelastGeneral

SecretaryoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,hadworsenedthealreadybad

situationwroughtbytheinefficienciesandwastefulnessoftheplanningsystemofthe

preceding60years.Russiafacedagrowingbudgetdeficitof(conservativelyestimated)

20%ofGDP,thethreatofhyperinflation,economicgrowththatwasatbeststalledandat

worstnegative,shortagesthroughouttheeconomy,virtuallynothinginforeigncurrency

reserves,andgrowinginternationalloancommitments.8

Facedwiththisdismalsituation,Russia'sfirstelectedpresident,BorisYeltsin,

assignedateamofyoungneo-liberalreformers,ledbyactingPrimeMinisterYegorGaidar,

todraftandimplementanambitiousreformprograminJanuaryof1992.Thereforms

attemptedtofreepricesfromSoviet-erapricelists,opentheeconomytoarushofimports,

andrapidlyprivatizestateenterprises.Theideawastoshaketheeconomylooseofthe

trappingsofthecommunistsystem.Yeltsin’steamofliberaleconomistscreatedastock

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marketandrealestatemarketsandundertookamassiveprogramofprivatizationofsmall,

medium,andlargeenterprisesbetween1992and1997,suchthatareported70%ofGDP

camefromtheprivatesectorbetween1997and2004.9Theyopenedtheeconomyto

foreigntradetoamelioratesomeoftheshortagesintheRussianeconomy,butthereforms

andthehangovereffectsof74yearsofcommunisteconomicsalsoproducedmanynegative

andlargelyunanticipatedeconomicoutcomes.From1992to1998,Russiaranroughly9%

annualbudgetdeficits,resultinginaneventualdefaultoninternationalloanobligations

andcurrencycollapseby1998.

Evenwiththeseeconomicwoes,theyearsimmediatelyprecedingandfollowingthe

collapseoftheSovietUnionwereyearsofsignificantchangeinRussia.Forallthe

instabilityduringhistenureaspresident,Yeltsinalsocarriedoutenormoussocialand

politicalchangesthateffectivelykilledoffanypossibilityofthereturnofcommunism.In

transformingtheSovietplannedeconomyintoaroughandreadyformofmarket

capitalism,hecreatedstakeholdersinaneworderbasedonprivateownershipandsupply

anddemand.Electionsforalllevelsofgovernmentwereheldwithregularity,althoughnot

alwaysfreeandfullyfairinthe1990s,andthemediawasremarkablyopen.

Thelate1980s,1990sandearly2000swerealsoyearsofnotablecooperation

betweenRussia,theUnitedStates,andEurope.Intheearly1990s,Westerncountries

providedbillionsofdollarsinaid,thoughnotsubstantialortimelyenoughtoavertthe

crisisof1998.Inthepolicyarena,greatergainsweremade.Afewyearsearlier,whenthe

SovietUnionstillexisted,MikhailGorbachevsignedlandmarknucleararmamentreduction

treatieswithPresidentsReaganandGeorgeH.W.Bush.UnderBorisYeltsin’spresidencyof

therebornRussia,U.S.PresidentBillClintonpushedfor,andgainedadmissionintotheG-8

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nations,evenwhenRussia’seconomyclearlydidnotmeritmembershipamongtheworld’s

strongest.Intheearlyyearsofhisfirstadministration,between2000and2003,President

PutinhimselfmadefriendlyoverturestoPresidentGeorgeW.Bush.Putinwasthefirst

foreignleadertocallBushafterthe9/11terroristattackintheUnitedStates;AngelaStent

notesthatPutinlookedforwardtoaninternationalcoalitionledbytheU.S.andRussiato

combatinternationalterrorism.10ButunderBush,Putin’sambitionstobefriendtheWest

werethwartedbytheAmericanwarinIraq(whichRussiadidnotsupport),andU.S.

supportoftheOrangeRevolutioninUkrainein2004,andGeorgia’sRoseRevolutionin

2003,bothofwhichusheredinnewgovernmentsontheborderslessfriendlytoRussian

interests.WiththeunilateralU.S.withdrawalfromtheAnti-BallisticMissile(ABM)treatyin

2002andthethreatofanewU.S.missiledefensesysteminEuropethereafter,U.S.-Russian

relationsdippedtoanall-timepost1991low—orsoitwasthoughtatthetime.

Afteratumultuoussixyearsofcontentiousmarketreform,punctuatedbythe

economiccrisisof1998,by1999,theeconomywasgrowingagain.Adramaticriseinglobal

oilandgaspricesreversedRussia’seconomicfortunes:by2003,Russia’sgrowthshotup

rapidlyandremarkablysuchthatGDProseonaverage7%everyyearuntil2008andthe

globaleconomiccrisisthatfall.Between2003and2008,asRussia’seconomyboomed,

analystsandobserversbeganreferringtoRussiaasa“normal”country,meaningthatits

remainingdevelopmentalchallengeslikeeradicationofcorruption,weremoreorless

typicalofacountryatitsstageof“middleincome”economicdevelopment.11Daniel

TreismanandAndreiShleifer,writingin2005,argued:“ThatRussiaisonlyanormal

middle-incomedemocracyis,ofcourse,adisappointmenttothosewhohadhopedforor

expectedmore.ButthatRussiatodayhaslargelybrokenfreeofitspast,thatitisnolonger

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“theevilempire,”threateningbothitsownpeopleandtherestoftheworld,isanamazing

andadmirableachievement.”12TreismanandShleiferwerenotwrong,norweretheyalone

intheiradmirationofRussia’seconomicachievementsbytheearlytomid2000s.In2003,

GoldmanSachsanalystscoinedtheterm“BRICs”todescribethegroupofhighgrowth

transitionaleconomiesthatincludedBrazil,Russia,India,andChina.13Ofthisgroup,

accordingtoanalystsDominicWilsonandRoopaPurushothaman,Russiawasastandout.

TheypredictedthatitwouldsurpassthepooreroftheG-6economies(France,Italy,and

theUKortheG-7withoutCanada)inpercapitaincomeby2050.14

Thesesanguine,andasitmayyetturnout,overlyoptimisticassessmentsofthe

trajectoryofRussia’sdevelopment.Theywerebasedprimarilyonthesteady,highgrowth

ofRussia’sGDPfromroughly1999-2008,growthinforeignanddomesticinvestment,

balancedbudgets,astableruble,theendofhugeforeigndebttolendersoflastresortlike

theWorldBankandIMF,andthetriplingofpercapitaincomesofRussianworkers.Bythe

thirdquarterof2008,Russiahadbecometheworld’ssixthlargesteconomy,thepeakofits

growthstatisticsandaremarkableachievementconsideringtheextentofthecrisisthat

Russia’spost-Sovietleadersinheritedwhenmarketreformsbeganinearnestin1992.The

RussianrealestatemarkethadbecomethehottestinEuropeby2006andRussian

billionaireswerebuyingsportsfranchisesabroadandexpensivepropertyinEuropean

capitalsandNewYorkCity.Internally,Russiawasboomingwithanastoundingexpansion

inthenumberofcarsonitsroads,thenewlyconstructedhighwayscrisscrossingthe

heartland,amodernizingarmy,risingsalaries,andincreasingintegrationintotheglobal

economy.WithWashington’ssupport,RussiaevenjoinedtheWorldTradeOrganizationin

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2012—amere20yearssinceitembarkedupontheradicaltransformationofits

communistbuilteconomy.

ButtheresourcerevenuedependenceofRussia’seconomyprovedbothablessing

andacurse.Asthegloballydeterminedpriceofcrudeoil,Russia’smainexportfell,sotoo

diditsGDPtumbledramaticallyinthefourthquarterof2008attheonsetofwhatwouldbe

aglobaleconomiccrisis.Nonetheless,althoughitsdeclinewasfarsharperthanthatofthe

otherBRICeconomies,theRussianeconomyrecoveredrelativelyquicklyfromthecrisis

throughastutemacro-economicpolicyaimedatsupportingtherubleusingreservesfrom

Russia’ssovereignwealthfundsandcontinuedpaymentofpensionsthroughitsstate

pensionfund.Astherestoftheworldrecoveredthrough2009and2010,thepriceofoil

graduallyrecoveredtoo,furtheraidingRussia’sreboundtolower,butrespectablegrowth

ratesof3–5%annuallyuntil2014.

TheperiodofRussia’sreturntoeconomicstabilityandgrowthwasalsoatimeof

fluctuatingrelationswiththeUnitedStatesandtheWestmorebroadly.WhenBarack

ObamatookoverfromPresidentBushin2009,thenewU.S.presidentintroducedapolicy

of“reset”withRussia.ThegoalwastoputU.S.–Russianrelationsonamoreconstructive

pathandtoencouragecooperationbetweenthetwocountriesinthemutualinterestof

bothnations.Duringtheheightofthereset,PresidentObamaandthen–PresidentofRussia

DmitriMedvedev(asofspring2008)workedtogetheronseveralprojectstoimprovethe

securityandprosperityofbothcountries.15In2010,theysignedandsubsequentlyratified

theNewSTARTTreaty,whicheliminated30%ofnuclearweaponsheldbytheU.S.and

Russian,16andalsokeptinplaceacomprehensiveinspectionsregimethatallowedboth

countriestoverifycompliance.Inthatsameyear,theWhiteHouseandtheKremlinworked

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togethertopassUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1929,themostcomprehensive

setofsanctionsagainstIrantobeadopted.Together,theUnitedStatesandRussiagreatly

expandedtheNorthernDistributionNetwork(NDN)ofair,rail,andtruckroutesthrough

Russia,theCaucasus,andCentralAsiatosupplyU.S.soldiersinAfghanistanandreduceU.S.

militarydependencyonthesouthernroutethroughPakistan.Over50%ofsuppliestoU.S.

forcesinAfghanistanweretransportedviatheNDNby2011.17

TheUnitedStatesandRussiaalsocollaboratedinavoidingconflictduringthereset

era.WhiletherewascontinuedtensionoverSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziaaftertheRussian–

Georgianwarof2008,andRussiacontinuedtoeffectivelyoccupythosepartsofGeorgia,

violentconflictwascurtailed.WhenanotherpopularuprisingtoppledPresidentBakiyevin

Kyrgyzstanin2010,dozensofpeoplediedintheinitialfighting(almostasmanyaswere

shotinMaidanSquareinKyivin2014),andtensofthousandsofethnicUzbeksfled

southernKyrgyzcities,fearingthattheregimechangemightunleashanethniccivilwar.18

Inresponsetothiscrisis,theUnitedStatesandRussiacouldhavesquaredoff,yettheWhite

HouseandKremlinworkedtogethertohelpdiffusethisdangeroussituation.Perhapsmost

remarkably,PresidentMedvedevagreedtoabstainonUNSecurityCouncilResolutions

1970and1973,therebyauthorizingtheuseofforceagainsttheLibyanregimeof

MuammarGaddafiinthespringof2011.NoRussianleaderhadeveracquiescedtoan

externalmilitaryinterventioninasovereigncountry,(indeed,thedecisionwasso

controversialwithinRussianforeignpolicydecisionmakingcirclesthatitmaywellhave

beenthereasonthatVladimirPutin,whostronglydisagreedwithMedvedevonLibya,

decidedthathemustre-assumetheRussianpresidencythereafter).19

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Inadditiontosecurityissues,theObamaandMedvedevgovernmentscollaborated

onseveralprojectstoincreasetradeandinvestmentbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussia

duringtheresetyears.TheUnitedStateshelpedRussiaobtainmembershipintheWorld

TradeOrganization(WTO).TradebetweentheUnitedStatesandRussiaalsoincreased

dramaticallybetween2009and2012,asdidforeigndirectinvestment.20Anewvisaregime

expandedthenumberofRussianstravelingtotheUnitedStates,andviceversa.Andeven

biggerplanswereafootpriorto2014,includingthemassivejointventurebetweenExxon-

MobilandRosneft,alargeoilcompanymajority-ownedbyRussia.

Duringtheseyears,NATOremainedaboneofcontention,thoughnottothedegree

thatPutin,oncebackinthePresident’schairin2012,madeitouttobe.Infact,asidefrom

theadditionofCroatiaandAlbaniain2009,twocountriesfarfromRussia,NATOdidnot

expandintheObama–Medvedevera.DespitepressurefromGeorgeW.Bushatthe2008

NATOBucharestsummit,otherNATOalliesrefusedtoallowGeorgianmembership.After

Russia’sinvasionofGeorgiainAugust2008,theissuediedwithinthealliance.Evenunder

PresidentYushchenko,theleaderoftheOrangeRevolutionin2004,Ukraineneverpushed

forNATOmembership.TherewassimplynosupportwithinUkrainiansocietyatthattime.

AfterPresidentYanukovychwaselectedpresidentofUkrainein2010,theideafaded

completely.Consequently,duringtheresetyears,neitherPresidentMedvedevnorPrime

MinisterPutineverobjectedtoNATOexpansion.Indeed,PresidentMedvedevevenechoed

otherWesternleadersinwaxingeffusivelyaboutNATO–Russiarelationswhenheattended

theNATOsummitinLisboninNovember2010.“Incidentally,”hesaid,“eventhe

declarationapprovedattheendofourtalksstatesthatweseektodevelopastrategic

partnership.Thisisnotachancechoiceofwords,butsignalsthatwehavesucceeded

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inputtingthedifficultperiodinourrelationsbehindusnow.”21Medvedevalsopraisedthe

reset,statingduringhislastmeetingwithObamainhiscapacityaspresidentinMarch

2012,“[W]eprobablyenjoyedthebestlevelofrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesand

Russiaduringthosethreeyearsthaneverduringthepreviousdecades.”22

Butonlytwoyearslater,withVladimirPutinbackintheKremlinasRussia’s

President,boththesuccessesoftheresetandpositiverelationswithNATOwereconsigned

tothepast.AfinalrepudiationoftheNATO-RussiaCouncilappearedinthe2014Russian

MilitaryDoctrine,whichidentifiedtheexpansionofNATOastheprimarythreatto

Russia.23Inthespringof2015inaninterviewairedaspartofadocumentarymarkinghis

15yearsinpubliclife,Mr.PutinindicatedthathehadevenbeenreadytoputRussian

nuclearforcesonalertduringRussia’sinvasionofCrimeainthespringof2014sincehe

fearedNATO’sresponse.24Further,MikhailVanin,theRussianambassadortoDenmark,

threatenedtotargettheDanishnavywithnuclearweaponsshouldDenmarkjoinNATO’s

missileshieldprogram.PerhapsthiswaswhyRussiawasdeemedanexistentialthreatto

theUnitedStatesinthesummerof2015byseveralprominentU.S.militaryfigures,

includingMarineCorpsGeneralJosephDunford,nomineeforChairmanoftheU.S.Joint

ChiefsofStaff;U.S.AirForceGeneralPaulSelva,nomineeforViceChair;andtheoutgoing

ArmyChiefofStaff,Gen.RayOdierno.25Inthefallof2015,GeneralPhilipBreedlove,then

SupremeCommanderofNATOandUnitedStatesCentralCommandinEurope,insistedthat

Russiawas“rewritingtheColdWarsettlementusingforce.”26

ThequestionofwhetherRussiahassufficientlyrecoveredfromtheeconomic,social,

andpoliticaldevastationwroughtbythecollapseoftheSovietUniontorewritetherulesof

internationalpoliticsisoftenansweredwithattentiontothemanwhohasbeenatitshelm

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forthemajorityofthoseyears.VladimirPutinistheclearauthoroftheassertive

resurrectionofRussia’sinfluenceininternationalpolitics.Withoutmeditatingon

counterfactuals,itisunlikelythatanotherleaderwouldhaverespondedtothesetof

problemsfacingthecountryinpreciselythesameway.Putin’sleadership,andthesystem

ofgovernmentthathehasbuiltovertwodecadesinpower,hashadmarkedinfluenceon

theextentandtheaggressivedirectionofRussia’sresurgenceglobally.

“ACountrythatCanStandUpforItself:”ResurgenceUnderPutin

Justasfewpredictedcompletesystemicbreakdownby1991,equallyfewobservers

couldhavefullyanticipatedtherockyroadtorevivalthatRussiahasfollowedsince.A

combinationofcircumstances,suchasglobaloilandgasprices,andpolicydecisionswere

responsibleforthesechanges,butMr.Putin’sascenttopowermarkedaturningpoint.

AfterBorisYeltsinsteppeddown,VladimirPutin,ashishand-pickedsuccessor,ruled

Russiaduringtheremarkableeconomicgrowththatensuedinthe2000s.Hispolicy

decisionsstroveforfurtherdevelopmentoftheRussianeconomyandsociety,butnot

towardgreaterdemocracy.Instead,Putinreinsertedtheprimacyofstateoversocietyin

Russia.By2008,hedeclaredtoRussia’sparliament:“AtlastRussiahasreturnedtothe

worldarenaasastrongstate—acountrythatothersheedandthatcanstandupfor

itself.”27InFebruary2014,Russiatriumphantlyre-introduceditselftotheworldasmodern

andoutwardfacinginhostingtheverysuccessful,elaborateWinterOlympicGamesin

Sochiatanestimatedcostof$50billion.Lessthan25yearsaftertheSovietcollapse,Russia

lookedtoberesurrectedasaneconomicpower,andseeminglypoliticallystableunder

fifteenyearsofleadershipbyVladimirPutin.

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Alongwiththepolitical,economicandsocialtransformationsthatthecountry

experiencedafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,therewasaconcomitant

renewalinRussia’sforeignpolicypresence.Despitefriendlyandsometimesmutually

supportiveeconomic,political,andmilitaryrelationswithNATO,theUnitedStates,muchof

Europe,andChinafromthecollapsethroughtheearly2000s,Russianforeignpolicy

graduallybecamemoreassertive,atrendwhichhasintensified,asPutin’ssystemof

governingevolved.Initially,Russiaflexeditsmuscleabroadintraditionalways.Post-

SovietRussianleadersusedmilitaryforcetoinvadetwosovereignneighbors(Georgiain

2008andUkrainein2014),remainedinvolvedintwootherconflictsinformerSoviet

states—overTransnistriainMoldovaandNagorno-Karabakh,aterritorythatisclaimedby

bothArmeniaandAzerbaijan.ButtheRussianmilitary’shastyrefurbishmentofanold

SovietairbaseinSyriainthelatesummerof2015anditsinterventiontherewasthefirst

deploymentoftheRussianmilitaryoutsidepost-Sovietbordersinover25years.28Priorto

that,theRussianmilitaryreintroducedtheSovietpolicyofflyingmissionsoverNorwegian

andSwedishairspace,aswellasintotheEnglishChannel,withoutpilotsfilingflightplans

orinformingtheaffectedcountriesinadvance.Since2015,Russiansubmarineshavebeen

detectednotfarfromU.S.territorialwatersandarethoughttobepatrollingdeepseacable

lines,possiblylookingforvulnerabilitiestodisableAmericanaccesstotheInternet.29

Further,sincethecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Russiahasrefutedits“nofirstuse”

policyonnuclearweapons,andinsuccessivemilitarydoctrinessince2000hasforeseen

thepossibilityofusingstrategicnuclearweaponsintheeventofconventionalwarwithan

overpoweringadversary(likeNATO)thattheRussianpresidentdeemsan“existential

threat.”30By2015,inlightoftensionsbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStatesoverUkraine

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andSyria,andtheircommitmentstomodernizingtheirrespectivenuclearforces,

therefore,itwasunsurprisingthattheBureauofAtomicScientistsmovedtheatomicclock

tothreeminutestomidnight,theclosesttonucleardestructiontheworldhasbeensince

theCubanmissilecrisisattheheightoftheColdWarin1962(forperspective,ithadbeen

17minutestomidnightin1991whentheSovietUnioncollapsed).31

Throughoutthesedevelopments,VladimirPutininsistedthatRussiawasmerely

protectingitshistoricalinterestsinitsnaturalsphereofgeo-politicalinterestandsecurity.

ForPutin,Russiahadreturnedtointernationalpoliticstoretakeitsnaturalstandingasa

“greatpower”andtochallengeanunfairColdWarsettlementimposeduponitbythe

UnitedStates.InexplainingRussianactionsingrabbingCrimeafromUkrainein2014,for

example,PresidentPutinassertedtheessenceofRussia’s“new”foreignpolicy:

…theUkrainiancrisiswasnotcausedbytheRussianFederation.Ithas

emergedinresponsetotheattemptsoftheUSAanditswesternallieswho

consideredthemselves‘winners’ofthecoldwartoimposetheirwill

everywhere.Promisesofnon-expansionofNATOtotheEast(givenyettothe

Sovietauthorities)haveturnedouttobehollowstatements.Wehaveseen

howNATO'sinfrastructurewasmovingcloserandclosertowardsRussian

bordersandhowRussianinterestswerebeingignored.32

ThesecommentsareemblematicoftherhetoriconRussia’srestoredgreatnessthat

characterizesitsrevanchistapproachtointernationalrelations.

MostnotablyregardingRussia’sreturntoprominenceininternationalpolitics,

perhaps,wasitsapparentinterference,throughstate-employedhackers,intheUnited

Statespresidentialelectionsof2016.NofewerthanseventeenAmericanintelligence

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agenciesconcludedthatthroughcybertheft,Russianoperativeswereabletogainaccessto

theDemocraticNationalCommittee(DNC)andRepublicanNationalCommittee(RNC)

during2016inordertostealconfidentialemail.Accordingtothecongressionaltestimony

ofthen–FBIDirectorJamesComeyonMarch20,2017,onlytheDNCemailswerepassed

throughanintermediarytoWikiLeaks,whichthenpublisheddailydigestsofemail

allegedlyselectedtoembarrassanddiscreditHillaryClintonpriortotheelection.Inthis

way,RussiawasabletostrikeattheverylegitimacyofAmericandemocracy.Thismarked

anunprecedenteduseofcybertacticsaspartofahybridstrategytounderminecountries

Russia’sleadershiphaddecidedweregeo-politicalcompetitorsandsowdiscord,rather

thanpursueoutrightconfrontation,whichhasprovenakeymechanisminRussia’sexercise

of21stcenturypower.

WhileRussia’smilitaryincursionsandallegationsofcyberinterventionareproofof

anincreasinglyassertiveforeignpolicy,thestoryofRussia’ssuccessful“normalization”has

not(yet?)cometoitsfairytaleending.Thecountry’sstillundiversifiedeconomyhas

provenvulnerabletotheunpredictabilityofglobalcommoditiesmarketsasthereturnto

deficitbudgetsanddeclineinGDPdemonstratedafterthedropinglobaloilprices

beginninginthesummerof2014.Whileithasbeenre-classifiedbytheOrganizationfor

EconomicCooperationandDevelopmentasan“uppermiddleincome”countrybecauseof

itsriseinaverageGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)percapita,bymanyconcretemeasures,

Russiaby2016wasacountryclearlyinchroniceconomicdecline.In2015,ithadagrowth

rateof-2.8%,farbelowthatofotheremergingeconomieslikeIndia’s+7.9%rateorChina’s

+6.9%.33Itsgrossdomesticproductwas$1.37billionU.S.in2015anddropping.compared

to$18.1billionintheU.S.and$11.1billioninChina,makingitin2015the12thlargest

Rev.November19,2019

economyintheworld,forexample.34ItwasneitheraninnovationeconomylikeEstonia,or

evenIndia,norwasitanimitationeconomylikeChinaorTaiwan.Otherthangas,oil,and

weapons,itisdifficulttofindimportedproductsstamped“madeinRussia.”Despitea

highlyeducatedpopulation,Russiahasnouniversitiesintheworldtop100;labor

productivity(asmeasuredbyoutputperpersonemployedconvertedtoUSdollarsat

purchasingpowerparity)slowedafter2014,whichhurtsthefuturecompetitivenessofits

economy.Indeed,laborproductivitywasthesecondlowestinthecountriesmonitoredby

theOECD,andlessthanhalfthatoftheG7countries’averagein2014.35Inaddition,foreign

directinvestmenthaddroppedbymorethantwo-thirdsfrom2013.36RussianGDPper

capitaatpurchasingpriceparitydeclinedto$25,186in2015,puttingitjustbelowthatof

Poland(at$26,862)andHungary(at$26,458)andsignificantlybelowtheBalticstatesof

Lithuania($28,936)andEstonia($28,988),allofwhichhadbecomemembersofthe

EuropeanUnion,andnoneofwhichhavebenefittedfrompreviouslyhighoilandgasprices

intheearly-tomid-2000s,asRussiadid.37

WhileRussia’sdevelopmentwasundeniablyimpressiveineconomicterms,

especiallybetween1999and2008,thisdidnottranslateintodramaticchangesinhuman

development.Russia’smalelifeexpectancyat66yearsofagein2015,althoughmuch

improvedfromanall-timelowin1994of57.6years,wasstillfarbelowthatofPoland(73),

Hungary(72),andallthreeBalticstates.Itisonparwithcountrieswithfarlower

GDP/capitalikeElSalvador,Cambodia,andBhutan38;theUnitedNationsHuman

DevelopmentReportrankedoveralladultlifeexpectancy,at70.1years,justlowerthanthat

ofBangladesh.39Collectively,thesefeaturesshowtheimportanceofdomesticfactorsin

understandingRussiaasaglobalpower,andalsosuggestthatdomesticandforeignpolicy

Rev.November19,2019

aremoreinterrelatedthanissometimesassumed.Thesearevitalcharacteristicsof

Russia’sstrategiesandintereststhatthisstudy’sapproachtopowerseekstoreconcile.

IsRussiaStrongorWeak?TheMultipleDimensionsofPower

Powerisoneofthemostcentralconceptsinpoliticsandinternationalrelations,and

muchtimeandtroublehasbeentakentodefineandattempttomeasureit.JoeNyehas

infamouslysaid:“Powerislikelove,easiertoexperiencethantodefineormeasure,butno

lessrealforthat.”40ThelevelofpowerRussiaenjoysisdebatedbyspecialistsandnon-

specialistsalike.Ina2016surveyof1600Russianadultsover16yearsofagebythe

LevadaCenter,arespectedandstillindependentRussianpollingservice,65%of

respondentsindicated“definitelyyes”or“probablyyes”tothequestion“Doyouthink

Russiaisagreatpower?”41Thisimpliestherearesomecommonlyacceptedmetricsof

power.What,then,arerealandreasonablemeasuresofacountry’spowerinpractice

versuspotential?Oneofthegoalsofthisbookistoundertakeathoroughanalysisofthe

availabledataandmeaningfullyassesschangesinRussianpoweringlobalaffairssincethe

collapseoftheSovietUnionin1991.Withthesetoolsandamorenuanced

conceptualizationofpowerintheforeignpolicysphere,thisstudyseekstoanswerthe

questionsofwhetherRussia’sresurrectionisrealormerelyimagined,howwecantell,and

whyitmatters.

Theunderstandingofpowertobeappliedinthisstudystemsfromthereasonable

consensusonasocialscientificdefinitionofpower,encapsulatedinRobertDahl’s

deceptivelysimplerenderingin1957:“AhaspoweroverBtotheextentthathecangetBto

dosomethingthatBwouldnototherwisedo.”42Thisshortstatementpacksmanylogical

Rev.November19,2019

punches.First,powerisarelative(orinDahl’swords“relational”)conceptbetweentwoor

moreactors.Second,power,control,coercion,andinfluenceappeartobeeffectivelythe

samething—theexerciseofanyofthesebyactorAcausesachangeinthebehaviorofactor

B.Third,partiestoapowerrelationshipcanbeindividuals,groups,states,corporations,“or

otherhumanaggregates.”43

RealisttheoristslikeKenWaltz,HansMorgenthau,andeventuallyJohn

Mearsheimer,whilegenerallyadoptingDahl’sdefinition,haveplacedemphasisonthe

meansofpowerthatastatemightpossess,suchaspopulationsize,territory,money,and

weaponryasthemostimportantfactorsindeterminingthedistributionofpoweramong

states.44Thelogicalconclusionfromthisapproachisthatifoneweretotallyupnational

wealth,population,andthesizeofthemilitaryinanyparticularstate,aroughorderingof

nationalpowerwouldemerge.“Great”powerswouldbeatthefarendofthespectrumwith

thehighestwealthandtherefore,presumably,strongestmilitary,whileweakerpowers

wouldbepoorwithweakmilitaries.

Otherscholars,however,likeDavidBaldwin,havefurtheredthe“relational”

conceptualizationofpowerfoundinDahlandchallengedtherealistmeans-basedapproach

topower.Therelationalapproachhasengenderedtwoimportantarguments.First,power

canbeanactualorpotentialrelationship.ThecaseofNorthKoreademonstrates,for

example,thatpowerresources,likenuclearweapons,arenotnecessarilyactualpoweras

muchastheyarepowerinpotential.45Second,Baldwin,alongwithMichaelBarnettand

RaymondDuvall,havearguedthatpowerisfarmoremultidimensionalthantraditional

realistswouldallow.This“relational”schoolnotesthatstatesoftenseemtohavemore

Rev.November19,2019

powerorinfluenceininternationalrelationsthanthesumofthestrengthsoftheir

economiesormilitarieswouldindicate.

IntryingtodiscernthesourcesofRussianpowerininternationalrelations,

recognizingthatpowerismulti-dimensionalhelpsustounderstandwhyitisthatRussia

seemstoexerciseinfluenceininternationalaffairsthatisdisproportionatetoasimpletally

ofitsglobalcapabilitieseconomicallyormilitarily.Inordertoexplorethoroughlysources

ofRussianpower,therefore,Iemploythisbroaderconceptualizationoverthenarrow,

realistunderstandingthatfocusesalmostexclusivelyontraditionalmeansalone.Following

DahlandBaldwininconsideringpowerasrelationalandmulti-dimensional,Iunderstand

thethreecentraldimensionsofrelationalstatepowertoinclude:

1) PolicyScope:Acrosswhatissuesdoesanactor’sbehavioraffectotheractors?

A’spoweroverBincreasesinrelationtothenumberandimportanceofissues

ofB’sactivitythatareaffectedbyA,

2) GeographicDomain:HowmanyactorsaresubjecttoA’sinfluence?In

Baldwin’swords,“howbigisB?HowmanyB’sarethererelativetoA?Domain

recognizesthat“astatemayhaveagreatdealofinfluenceinoneregionofthe

world,whilehavinglittleornoinfluenceinotherpartsoftheworld.”46

RelatedtothemeasureofactorA’spolicyscopeandthegeographicdomainofits

influenceoverotherstates,wemightaskhow“big”actorAisandhowcostlytheexercise

ofA’spowerisintheseareasofpolicyandgeography.Thisentailstwosub-measures:first,

weight—howregularlyorreliablycanAinfluenceB,andwhatistheprobabilitythatBcan

orwillbeaffectedbyA?Thiscanvaryacrosspolicyissuesandacrossgeographicdomain

foranyparticularstate.Second,costs—whatarethestakesforAofusingpowerina

Rev.November19,2019

particularpolicyareaorgeographicarea?DoesitcostalittleoralotforAtoinfluenceB?Is

itcheapforBtocomplywithA?IfitcostsalotforBtocomplywithA,thenAmayexercise

morepoweroverBthanifitwerecheapforBtocomply.

Finally,returningtothedimensionsofrelationalpower:

3) Means:ThroughwhatcapabilitiesdoesAexercisepoweroverB?Meanscan

includeeconomic,military,diplomatic,culturalor“soft”power,sometimes

calledsymbolicmeansorthe“pull”ofastateratherthanthe“push”;thiscan

include,forexample,culture,ideology,ormembershiporleadershipin

internationalorganizations.

Figure1.1.TheMultipleDimensionsofStatePowerinInternationalRelations

MEANS

DOMAINSCOPE

Rev.November19,2019

Thefactthatpowerismultidimensionalmeansthatitisdifficulttoarriveatasingle

metricthatprovidesacomprehensiveestimateofanactor’spower.Figure1,above,

demonstratesalsothatdifferentdimensionsofpoweroverlap,andmayalsovary

independently:anincreaseinonedimensionofpowermayoccursimultaneouslywitha

decreaseinanotherorviceversa—inotherwords,thecirclescanchangeinsizerelativeto

eachother.Forexample,astatemayhaveawidegeographicdomainofinfluence,butits

meansforactuallyexercisingthisinfluencemightbesmall.

Mostimportantly,amulti-dimensionalapproachallowsananalysttoanswer

foundationalquestionsregardingastate’scapabilities:poweroverwhatorwhom,and

powertodowhat?Italsorecognizesthatmeansthatareconsidereda“powerasset”inone

situationmaybealiabilityinanother.Astatemaylacktherelativemeanstoexercise

powerinonesituation,buthavemorethanenoughinanother.Bringingintoconsideration

thedifferentdimensionsofpowerhelpsustounderstandunderwhatcircumstancesa

statehasthecapabilitiestoachieveanyparticularpolicygoalininternationalrelations.

Iarguethatbyalmostanymetric,Russiahasmanyofthetrappingsofagreatpower,

butitislessclearwhetheritisagreatpowerindramaticdeclineratherthanindynamic

recovery,despiteitsmoreassertiveforeignpolicystanceofthelastdecade.Ifwe

understand“greatpower”tomeanacountrywithglobalmilitary,economic,andpolitical

reach,acountrythatinfluencesglobalpoliticsandinternationalrelationsnotjustthrough

hardpower,butthroughsoftpowerresourcestoo,thenRussiaiscertainlyintheballpark.

GiventhepolicyscopeandgeographicdomaininwhichRussia’scontemporaryleadership

isabletoemployitspowerresources,andtheagilityofdecisionmakingunderade-

institutionalizedandincreasinglypersonalizedpoliticalsystem,Russiaisachallengerto

Rev.November19,2019

thestabilityofthepostwarinternationalsystem.Thatis,whileperhapsnotanymore(or

notyetagain?)a“greatpower”intherealistsense,itisa“goodenough”powerinthatit

hastheabilitytouseadroitlythemeansatitsdisposaltodisrupttheprevailing

internationalorder.

DomesticLeversonRussianForeignPolicy

Iargueinthisbookthatdomesticpoliticalvariablesareasimportant,andoften

moreimportant,indeterminingRussia’sabilityandwillingnesstoprojectitspower

resourcesabroad.Theinteractionsbetweenpowerresources,andthedomesticpolitical

contextthatRussianpolicymakersfaceatanyparticularmoment,playacrucialand

frequentlyunderestimatedandunderemphasizedroleindeterminingcontemporary

Russianbehaviorininternationalpolitics.Itistheregime’sinteractionwithsociety,in

combinationwithperceptionsofexternalthreatsandinterests,thatoftendetermines

when,whether,andhowRussiacanprojectdifferentdimensionsofitspowerabroad.

Thisargumentposesanimportantcorrectivetothe“reactive”argumentthat

focalizesRussia’sresponsetoWesternactionsandeconomicfactorsinexplainingtheshift

inforeignpolicy.ThisargumentisespousedbyPutinandleadingRussiancommentators

onforeignpolicy,aswellasafewAmericananalysts,whohaverepeatedlyblamedtheWest

forcelebratingthe“defeat”oftheSovietUnionintheColdWarandbeingpoorpartnersto

Russia.EvenMikhailGorbachev(referringtohimselfinthethirdperson)tookupthis

themeinremarksontheoccasionofthe25thanniversaryoftheSovietcollapse:

They[Westernleaders]didnotwanttheSovietUniontobecomeapowerful

democraticstate.Itwouldguaranteethatneitherthepolicyofunilateral

Rev.November19,2019

measures,northepolicyofUSdominationinglobalaffairswouldwork,and

someAmericanpoliticianssawGorbachevasanobstacletotheirplans.And

then,whentheymadeabidforBorisYeltsin,theirgoalwasthesame-to

preventtheemergenceofRussiaasapowerfuldemocraticstate.Remember,

whenthe[Soviet]Unioncollapsed,whatwastheWest'sreactiontothis

tragicevent?Theysaid,“thisisagiftfromGod.”47

Intriguingly,notableAmericanscholarshavealsoarguedthatRussia’saggressiveforeign

policyinUkraineforexampleafter2014wasanaturalreactiontoWesternprovocation

followingthecoldwar.JohnMearsheimerinsistedthat“ThetaprootofthetroubleisNATO

enlargement,thecentralelementofalargerstrategytomoveUkraineoutofRussia’sorbit

andintegrateitintotheWest.”48

InspecificcontrasttothisperspectiveofRussianforeignpolicyasanaturaland

inevitablereactiontoWesternprovocation,Iarguethatitisjustasmuchareactionto

domesticpoliticalexigenciesandanattempttomeettheneedtomaintainpopularsupport

foranincreasinglyunpopularregime.Between2003and2008,Mr.Putinpresidedovera

boomingeconomyalmostcompletelydependentonoilandgasexportrevenues.Atleast

50%ofRussia’snationalstatebudgetwasgeneratedbyoilandgassalesabroad.The

dramaticdropinoilpricesin2014wasquicklyfollowedbya43%declineinthevalueof

theruble.InJuly2015,inflationhit15.5%.In2015,second-quarterresultsfromthe

RussianStatisticalServiceindicatedthatRussiawasfirmlyinrecession.49Contrarytothe

argumentonforeign“enemies”thatPresidentPutinblamesforRussia’scurrent

predicament,"theWest"didnotputRussiainthissituation.Inhisfirsteight-yeartenureas

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Russia’spresident(2000-2008),Mr.Putindidlittletoreformthefundamentalsofthe

economy,andtookcreditforthefive-yeareconomicboom(2003-2008)onthebackofhigh

globaloilprices(overwhichheobviouslyhadnocontrol),havingtofacetherepercussions

whenthosepricesinevitablydropped.

Factorsofideologyandtheeconomyshouldalsonotbeoverstatedinexplaining

Russianpower.DespiteMr.Putin’sreferencestoEurasianismasacounterweighttothe

EuropeanUnion,andevocationsofthevisionofaRussianWorld(RusskiiMir)—regionsof

theworldwiththecommonbondofRussianlanguage,theRussianOrthodoxChurch,and

Russiannationalism—neitheroftheseideasconstituteatransformational,expansionist

guidingideology.Further,whilePresidentPutinhasexploitedaconservative,anti-Western,

pan-Slavicphilosophyinjustifyingsomeofhisforeignpolicydecisions,thisisnotwidely

shared(althoughtherehasbeensomeinterestinpartsofEasternEurope)orcloselylinked

tomilitaryactivity—althoughitcontributedtopost-hocjustificationsforannexingCrimea

andcontinuingasimmeringconflictinEasternUkraine.50ThisisnottodenythatRussia

mayhave“historicalinterests”andgoalsininternationalpoliticsindependentfromthe

ebbsandflowsofdomesticmattersthatanyRussianleadermightpursue.51Butinterests

arenotalwaysfixedorconstantintheirdegreeofimportance,andtheyarenottheonly

driversofcontemporaryRussianforeignpolicydecisions.Foriftheywere,thengiventhe

sameresourcesathand,anyRussianleadermightrespondtochangesintheinternational

systemthesameway.Obviously,thishasnotbeenthecasesince1991andthecollapseof

theSovietUnion.Asnotedearlier,throughthreepresidentsandfourpresidencies—

PresidentYeltsininthe1990s,PresidentPutin’sfirstpresidencyin2000-2004,andMr.

Medvedev’sin2008-2012—RussiawasperfectlycapableofcooperationwithEuropeand

Rev.November19,2019

theUnitedStates.

Further,economicexigenciesarenotdeterminativeofRussia’sabilitytoprojectits

powerresourcesbeyonditsborder.ItistruethatRussiawasnotdisruptivein

internationalrelationswhenitseconomywasatall-timelowsbetween1992and1998,but

becamesoin2008inGeorgiaasitseconomypeaked.Yetitwaspreciselyatanother

particularlyloweconomicpointin2015thatthePutinleadershipchosetodeployRussian

forcesinSyria.Economicfortunesandthemeansofpowertheycangenerate,then,donot,

strictlyspeaking,driveRussianforeignpolicy,sincetheyappeartoexplainboth

internationalcooperationandconfrontation.

Thismeansthen,thatsocietyhasbecomeanimportantinfluenceoverRussian

conductabroadandthelongevityanddurabilityofitsrevivalasapowerofglobal

significance.TheprimarygoalofthecontemporaryRussianleadershipistomaintainthe

regimethatithasdevelopedunderMr.Putin’sleadershipsince2000.JustastheSoviet

Unioncollapsedfromwithin,anddespitePutin’sargumentstothecontrary,external

powerscannotengineeranoverthrowoftheRussiangovernment.TheRussianstateunder

Putinisinservicetoanelitethatwantstoenrichitsmembers,whilepromotingeliteand

stateinterests(whichhavebecomeintricatelyintertwined)abroad.Theonlyrealthreatto

thissystemcomesfromwithin:Mr.Putinfears,aboveall,hisown“street,”andRussian

perhapseliteswhohavebenefittedgreatlyfromhisregime.Russiansocietyatlarge

thoughmustbekeptpacifiedor,failingthat,openlyrepressedfortheregimetosurvive.

Afterall,Russiaenduredtwogreatrevolutionsinthe20thcentury—in1917and1991.

In the quarter century that has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has

transitioned from a weak democracy to a hardening autocracy, one often classified with

Rev.November19,2019

adjectives—competitive, electoral, soft, personalistic, conservative.52 While this too helps

explain the more confrontational stance against Western democracies,53 it is not autocracy alone

that has changed the conduct of Russian foreign policy. After all, the Soviet Union was an

autocracy—but one of a very different type. Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of the

exercise of Russian power abroad is how very different it is in many ways from that of the Soviet

Union. Gone is the centralized planning and the rigid, expansive state controls over private life

that determined where Soviet citizens were educated, housed, and got their food, and even

whether they were able to buy a car. The much-maligned Federal Security Service (FSB), though

still powerful given the place of the siloviki among the elite, is only a pale shadow of its Soviet

KGB predecessor—the current regime allows some forms of free speech and tolerates the

existence of a weak opposition; seldom do agents kick in doors in the middle of the night to drag

away dissidents.

In contrast to the exercise of power during the Soviet period, while the means overlap to

some degree (especially the use of military power), they vary greatly in many areas. The

flexibility and speed of decision making that now characterizes contemporary Russian foreign

policy is one of the biggest differences in comparison to the Soviet Union prior to 1985. The

absence of institutional constraints on Presidential power (Putin faces a compliant Duma and

dependent courts, and appoints the Senators of the Upper House) is in stark contrast to the

General Secretary’s accountability to a Politburo that could (and did with Nikita Khrushchev, for

example) overrule and overthrow him. In Putin’s Russia, in partial contrast to the post-Stalinist

Soviet Union, the source of regime legitimacy is based on performance more than ideology or

violence, although there are signs that state violence against opposition forces is increasing.Yet

dissent is not without peril in contemporary Russia. One of the troubling things about Russia

Rev.November19,2019

today is that the rules of politics and society seem to constantly change. Analysts have to stop

and think of the ramifications of what they have said on television (and many critics of the Putin

regime are no longer allowed on television). The media is no longer completely state-controlled,

as in Soviet times, but it is still heavily scripted by the state, and is more often than not a tool to

maintain public support of the regime that Vladimir Putin has built.

Broadly,however,pacificationofthemassesislessexpensivethanrepressionas

longastheeconomyisdoingwell.Theeconomicbargainthatwasimplicitlystruck

betweenRussiansocietyandPresidentPutinintheearly2000swasthataslongasthe

economycontinuedtogrow,andrealincomeseffectivelytripledbetween2003and2008,

thenregimesupportwasstronganditslegitimacywasunquestioneddespitegrowing

socialinequalities,weakruleoflaw,andpervasivecorruption.Butaseconomicdeclineand

stagnationratherthangrowthbecamethemostsalientfeatureoftheRussianeconomy

after2011,theregimeneededanewfoundationforitslegitimacy.

ThepopularproteststhattookplaceonthestreetsofMoscowfollowingPutin’s

announcedreturnaspresidentinthefallof2011,andparliamentaryelectionsthat

DecemberfortheStateDuma,thatwerewidelyviewedasriggedinfavoroftheruling

party,UnitedRussia,followedbyprotestsagainstPutinhimself,presentedachallengeto

regimelegitimacy.Inresponse,theregimebecamegraduallymorerepressivebyincreasing

finesforprotesters,introducingfurtherrestrictionsoncivilsociety,andplacingmembers

oftheoppositioninjailorontrial.Theeffectwastoeviscerateanalreadyweakpolitical

oppositionandsuppressotherformsofsocialprotest.Butevenaftertakingthesedrastic

measures,Mr.Putin’sapprovalratingsremainedlowerthantheyhadbeensincehefirst

cametopowerin2000.

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AsIargueinthisbook,anassertiveforeignpolicyhasbecomethebasisofthe

regime’slegitimacy.Thisincreasinglyaggressivedirectioninforeignpolicyhasbeenatool

todemonstratetoRussiansthattheircountryunderPutinisstrongandinfluentialin

internationalrelations,evenintimesof(temporary)economicstruggle.Severalexamples

ofthisstrategyareworthhighlighting.First,Mr.Putineffectivelynegotiatedtheremovalof

Syria’schemicalweapons,challengingtheUnitedStates’influenceandresolveinremoving

BasharalAssad.Thishadtheeffectofdemonstratingtocitizensathomethattheircountry

wasagreatgeopoliticalforcetobeproudof.Second,withinRussia,theregimelaunchedan

assaultagainstforeigndonorsandRussiancivilsocietyorganizationsthatacceptedmoney

fromabroad.Third,andmostsignificantly,Mr.PutinintervenedinUkraineinconvincing

(former)PresidentYanukovychtoforegoatradeagreementwiththeEuropeanUnionin

favorofjoiningtheEurasianUnion,headedbyRussia.TheensuingprotestsinUkraine

beginninginNovember2013weredepictedwithinRussiaasafascistcoup,aperspective

stemmingfromtheregime’sfearthatthecontagionofprotestmightspreadtoRussia.The

impulsive(notstrategic)decisiontoinvadeCrimeaattheendofFebruary2014,therefore,

waspresentedinnationalisttermstotheRussianpeople.Ratherthananinvasionofa

sovereignUkraine,thenarrativeintheRussianmediawasthatthemilitaryincursionthere

wastodefendtheRussiandiasporainCrimeafromUkrainiannationalistsandtheirNATO

allies;thesamenarrativewasappliedinEasternUkraine.Increasingly,nationalistand

conservativerhetoricdominatedthepress.Russia,byitsownmedia’saccount,wasa

nationundersiegegeographically,economically,andculturally.Perhapsevidencethatthe

tacticsucceededinbolsteringpublicapprovalandshoringupregimelegitimacyisthefact

thatPutin’sapprovalratingshotupfrom60%inFebruary2014,attheendoftheSochi

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Olympics,to80%onlyamonthlater,followingtheannexationofCrimea,asindicatedin

Figure1.2,below.

Figure1.2:VladimirPutin’sApprovalRating1999-2015.55

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DoyouApproveoftheJobPresident(PrimeMinister)PutinisDoing?

Rev.November19,2019

Thepurpose of Russia’s resurrection in global politics alluded to in the title of this book,

therefore, is to project power in ways that maintain the current regime’s apparent legitimacy at

home and ensure its continued hold on control domestically.Thisargument,andthestudy’s

emphasisonthedomesticpoliticalcontextasacrucialconsiderationinunderstanding

Russianforeignpolicy,isanimportantadditiontocurrentunderstandingsofRussian

foreignpolicy.IdonotviewRussianusesofitspowerabroadasonlyreactivetoexternal

provocations,nordoIacceptthatRussianforeignpolicyunderPutinispurelythe

continuationofRussiantraditionalinterestsspanningcenturies.Thesealone,cannot

explainallRussianforeignpolicydecisionsoverthelasttwodecades.Myemphasis,

instead,isthatRussia’srevanchismcomesfromtheinteractionoftheseinterests,Russia’s

powerresources,andthecontemporarydomesticpoliticalenvironment.

ContributiontotheFieldandPlanoftheBook

ThisstudyisdistinctivefromotherliteratureonRussia’srecentforeignpolicyin

severalways;asaresult,whatfollowsshouldbeofusetotheareaspecialistaswellasto

theinformed,generalreader.First,itaimsaspotlightontheinteractionbetweendomestic

politicsandforeignpolicyintereststoexplainhowandwhyRussianleadershavemadethe

choicestheyhaveininternationalaffairs,overthelast20yearsinparticular.Thereisgood

workthatfocusesonRussiancultureandhistoryasthemainexplanationforRussian

politicsathomeandbehaviorabroad.AndreiTsygankov,forexample,arguesthathow

Russianleadersdefinenationalinterestandidentitygreatlyinfluencestheirconductof

internationalrelations.56Undeniably,Russia’simperialandcommunistlegacieshave

impressedacertainglobalperspectiveonRussianinterestsonits21st-centuryleadership.

Rev.November19,2019

Asacknowledgedearlier,IdonotdebatetheideathatRussiahassomeinternational

interestsfixedbyitsgeography,norcananyreasonableanalystdenythathistorymatters.

ButIdonotthinkeitherisdeterminativeinunderstandingthearcofRussianforeign

policy,sincetheearly2000sinparticular.Historyandgeographyhaveremainedthesame

overthelasttwodecades(savefortheannexationofCrimeafromUkrainein2014),yet

Russia’sprojectionofitspowerabroadhasobviouslychanged.

Anotherdistinguishingfeatureofthisstudyisitsfocusonrelativepower,as

opposedtoRussia’srelationswithoneorseveralotherstatesorregions.IevaluateRussia’s

relativepoweringlobalpoliticsusingamulti-dimensional,notstrictlyrealist,framework.I

employsomeinternationalrelationstheory,butImakenoclaimtoanygreattheoretical

innovationinthefield,asmuchasIseektooperationalizetheoreticalapproachesput

forwardbyothersinordertoexaminerelativepowerin21st-centuryglobalpolitics.Other

recentstudieshavefocusedonRussianrelationswithaparticularcountryorregions,as

doesAngelaStentinherexcellentstudyofU.S.-Russianrelations.57NikolasGvosdevand

ChristopherMarshhavealsoproducedanexpansiveoverviewofthedifferentregionsor

“vectors”ofcontemporaryRussianforeignpolicy.58Whilethesebooksareimportantand

inherentlyvaluable,theydonotlookattheissueofrelativepowerexplicitlyorempirically

inthewaythisstudydoes,andtheywerewrittenpriortoRussia’smorecontroversial

foreignpolicymovesinUkrainein2014,Syriain2015,anditsinterferenceinUSelections

in2016.Similarly,BoboLo’smorerecentbooklooksathowRussiaischallengedbythe

post-ColdWarorder,buthedoesnotprovideasmuchconsiderationofhoworreallywhy

Russiaitselfhasbecomesuchachallengetoglobalstability.59DmitriTrenin,too,has

providedvaluableevaluationsofRussia’sreemergenceinglobalpoliticsinits“near

Rev.November19,2019

abroad,”andalsoaninsightfulbutlargelypolemicalargumentregardingwhethertheWest

shouldfearRussia.60Butneitherofthesestudiesincludescleardiscussionsorsystematic

evaluationsofthemultipledimensionsofRussianpower,norwithconsiderationexplicitly

ofRussianinternalpolitics.

Finally,thestudyisempiricallyrichinexploringRussianpowerresourcesandthe

regime’sdecisionstousethem.OtherrecentstudiesofRussiahavefocusedprincipallyon

Mr.PutinasamastertacticianwhohasseeminglyoutmaneuveredtheWestatalmost

everyturn.Toooften,domesticpoliticalconsiderationsinthesestudiescanbeoverlooked

infavorofelitebehavioraloneinexplainingRussianforeignpolicy.Indeed,thereis

sometimesanassumptionthatMr.Putincontrolsthesystemtosuchadegree,thatthere

areinfactnopoliticsinRussia.61Thisperspectivecanplacetoomuchemphasisexclusively

onVladimirPutinandhispsychologywithrespecttoforeignpolicy.Necessarily,suchan

approachshineslightononlyonepartoftheelephantinunderstandingwhatkindof

animalweareviewing,sotospeak,whereasIseekabroaderawarenessoftheinteraction

ofdomesticpoliticsandforeignpolicy.Insum,clearlythereisplentyofroomforadifferent

perspectiveonwhyRussiaactsasitdoesinternationally.

Fromatheoreticalstandpoint,thisbookisalsodistinctinitsemphasisonhow

politicalscientistsevaluatestatepowerininternationalrelations.Iseektoassessthrough

whatmeans,where,andwhenRussiacananddoesinfluencethebehaviorofotherstates.

Indoingso,Itrytoprovideamoreexpansiveunderstandingofthetoolsstateshaveat

theirdisposalsinthetwenty-firstcenturybeyondairplanes,ships,tanks,troops,missiles,

andmoney.Russiahasalloftheseinstruments,althoughcomparativelyfewerofeachthan

theUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion28,andChina,respectively,yetithasemergedasa

Rev.November19,2019

threattoallthree.Mr.Putinhimselfhasbeencalled“themostpowerfulmaninthe

world,”62yethedoesnotpossessevenremotelythetraditionalmeansofpowerofthe

AmericanorChinesepresidents.ThischaracterizationofhisandRussia’sinfluencemay

wellbewrong,ofcourse,butsomightourtraditionalmetricsofpower.Evenwithout

having“themost”ofanyofthesemeansofpower,Russiahasmanaged,rather

unexpectedly,todisruptinternationalrelations.Itishightime,then,torethinkthese

frameworksinordertobetterunderstandstatepower.ItistoooftensaidthatRussiahas

“playedaweakhandwisely”ininternationalrelationsunderMr.Putin.63Thereissome

elementoftruthtothis,especiallyifoneadaptsarealistviewonthemetricsofpower.But

ifweexpandourunderstandingofwhatthemeansofpowerareincontemporaryglobal

politics,thenRussia’shandhasafewverystrongcards,dependingonthegamethatis

beingplayed.

Theremainderofthisstudydevelopstheseargumentsasfollows.SectionIIgoeson

toassessthegeographicdomainandpolicyscopeofcontemporaryRussianpower,

includingsoftpowersuchasmediapresenceandculturalinfluencethat,asJosephNye

argues,can“shapethepreferencesofothers.”64Inthissection,Chapters2and3

respectivelyexaminethesecomponentsofRussianpowerfirstintheformerSoviet

republicsandinchapter3,inrelationtoothercontemporarygreatpowers(theUnited

States,China,andtheEuropeanUnion)towhichMr.PutingamelycomparesRussia.Inthe

chaptersthatcomposeSectionIII,Iuseavarietyofsourcestocomparethemeansthrough

whichRussianleadersmaypropagatepowerandinfluencebeyonditsborders:economic

mechanismsinChapter4,itshumancapitalinChapter5(includingthephysicalhealth,

education,andproductivecapacityofitscitizenry)inChapter6hardpower(troopsand

Rev.November19,2019

weapons,includingcyberweaponry)softpower(powersofattractionliketheculture,its

diasporaandmedia)anditscyberbased“sharp”meansofpower.InSectionIV,Iassess

instancesinwhichRussianleadersemploythepowerassetsattheirdisposal.Specifically,

Chapter7presentstheargumentthatstateandsocietyrelationswithinRussiaplayakey

roleindetermininghowRussianpolicymakersusepowerresourcesabroad,andChapter8

concludeswithpolicyrecommendationsforWesternpowers.Thebook’sfinalassessment

oftheimplicationsofRussia’sresurrectionordeclineforinternationalrelationsandthe

currentinternationalsystemmakesanargumentagainsttheinevitabilityofarenewed

ColdWarbetweenRussiaandtheWest.

Asthisintroductorychapterhasshown,Russia’sbalancesheetofchangeandrevival

isdecidedlymixed,andthisfactthrowsintoquestionitsstatusasaresurrectedglobal

power.Nonetheless,asthequotethatopensthisintroductiondemonstrates,Russiais

complex:itisneitherasweakaswethink,norasstrongasitsleadershipwouldlikeittobe.

Mr.Putinhasrepeatedlyinsistedthathiscountryshouldbetreatedwiththerespectit

deservesasamajorglobalpoweronparwiththeUnitedStatesandEurope.Itisthese

factors,andelites’interestinmaintainingthedomesticstatusquo,thathavelentpurpose

toRussia’sresurrectionontheglobalstageandauniquehandintheinternationalgameof

power.

1Putinwasparaphrasingthefamoussaying,attributedvariouslytoOttovonBismarck,KlemensvonMetternich,CharlesMauricedeTalleyrandandWinstonChurchill,amongothers:"Russiaisneverasstrongasshelooks;Russiaisneverasweakasshelooks."See,MarkN.Katz,“IsRussiaStrongorWeak?,”Washington,UI,July10,2006http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/07/10/Policy-Watch-Is-Russia-strong-or-weak/39541152565695/accessedDecember1,2015

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2SourceistheInternationalMonetaryFund,WorldEconomicOutlookDatabase.Statisticsongrossdomesticproductassharesoftheglobaleconomycanbefoundat:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx,accessedMay2,2017.3WorldBank,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.Dataareasof2015.4StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI)MilitaryExpenditureDatabase.Figuresarefor2015andavailableat:https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex,accessedMay2,2017.5DavidBaldwin,“PowerandInternationalRelations,”chapter11ofHandbookofInternationalRelations,WalterCarlsnaes,ThomasRisse,BethSimmons,eds.,LosAngeles,2013),p.277.6ValerieBuncemadeasimilarobservationaboutthecollapseofcommunisminEasternEuropein1989inSubversiveInstitutions:TheDesignandDestructionofSocialismandtheState,(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).7Seeforexample,TimothyJ.Colton,DilemmaofReformintheSovietUnion,(NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,1986)foraserious,butintheendpositiveassessmentofthechancesfortheSovietUnion’scontinuedsurvival,publishedonlyfiveyearsbeforetheregimecollapsed.8AndersAslund,HowRussiaBecameAMarketEconomy,(Washington,DC:Brookings,1995),pp.41-50.9“Russia’sEconomicRevival,”inAndersAslundandAndrewKuchins,eds.,TheRussiaBalanceSheet,(Washington,D.C:PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsandCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,2009),p.44.10AngelaStent,TheLimitsofPartnership:US-RussianRelationsinthe21stCentury,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014),p.69.11AndreiShleiferandDanielTriesman,“ANormalCountry:RussiaAfterCommunism,”JournalofEconomicPerspectives,vol.19,no.1,winter2005,pp.151-174.12ShleiferandTreisman,p.152.13DominicWilsonandRoopaPurushothaman,“DreamingwiththeBRICs:ThePathto2050,”GoldmanSachsGlobalEconomicsPaper99,AccessedNovember16,2015,at:http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf14WilsonandPurushothaman,p.5.

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15Thenext6paragraphsdrawfromKathrynStonerandMichaelMcFaul,“WhoLostRussia(ThisTime)?VladimirPutin,”TheWashingtonQuarterly,vol.38,no.2,September2015,pp.167-187.16AronBernstein,“IsPresidentObamaReducingtheProbabilityofNuclearWar?”MITFacultyNewsletter,22,no.4(March/April/May2010),http://web.mit.edu/fnl/volume/224/bernstein.html.17KennethKatzman,Afghanistan:Post-TalibanGovernance,Security,andU.S.Policy,(Washington,DC,CongressionalResearchService,April,2013),p.31.18“EthnicUzbeksFleeViolenceinKyrgyzstan,”TheNewYorkTimes,slideshow,June14,2010,http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2010/06/14/world/0614-Kyrgyzstan.html?_r=0.19GorbachevdidnottrytostopthefirstGulfWar,buttheU.S.responsethere,incooperationwithmanyothercountries,wasinresponsetoIraqiinterventioninKuwait.20“TradeinGoodswithRussia,”U.S.CensusBureau,https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html.21Medvedev’scommentscanbeheardinRussianat:http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/audio/audio_2010_11/20101120_101120f-01.mp3accessedJune9,2015.22MedvedevpressconferenceSeoul,SouthKorea,March272012,transcriptavailableinEnglishat:http://seoul.usembassy.gov/p_rok_032612e.htmlaccessedJune9,2015.23The2014RussianMilitaryDoctrineisavailableinEnglishat:https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf;theNATOthreatreferenceisinArticleII,point12“MainExternalMilitaryDangers.”24StevenJ.Pifer,“Putin’sNuclearSaber-Rattling:WhatisHeCompensatingFor?“BrookingsBlog,June172015,http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/06/17-putin-nuclear-saber-rattling-pifer,accessedNovember16,2015.Thedocumentaryiscalled“President”andairedonRossiyaTVOneonApril26,2015.EpisodescanbeviewedinRussianat:http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c7f_1430284031andinEnglishat:http://www.stankovuniversallaw.com/2015/05/president-putins-15-years-in-power-en-subtitles-video/BothsiteswereaccessedNovember16,2015.25ForstatementsbyGeneralSelvaandGeneralDunfordsee,PaulMcLeary,ForeignPolicy,July14,2015,http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/more-pentagon-generals-line-up-to-

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proclaim-russia-existential-threat-to-u-s/(accessedAugust12,2015).ForOdierno’sstatements,seeKristinaWong,“TopUSGeneral:RussiaisMostDangerousThreat,”August12,2015,availableat:http://itk.thehill.com/policy/defense/250962-odierno-russia-is-the-most-dangerous-threat-to-us(accessedAugust12,2015).26GeneralPhilipBreedlove,publicaddressatStanfordUniversity,November9,2015,Stanford,California.27VladimirPutin,speechtoexpandedmeetingoftheFederationCouncilonRussia’sDevelopmentStrategythrough2020,February7,2008,availableat:http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type82913_159643.shtml,accessedOctober28,2015.28KnowledgeablereaderswillthinkofRussia’sparticipationinpeacekeepinginKosovoin1999,butthiswasnotanoffensivemissionaswasthe2015missioninSyria.RussiaparticipatedinKosovoaspartofaNATO-Russiancoalition.29DavidE.SangerandEricSchmitt,“RussianShipsNearDataCablesareTooCloseforUSComfort,”NewYorkTimes,October25,2015,availableat:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?_r=0,accessed,September7,2016.30FormoreonrecentchangestoRussiannucleardoctrine,seeforexample,StephenBlank,Editor,RussianNuclearWeapons:Past,PresentandFuture,(Carlisle,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,2011),availableinPDFformatat:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1087.pdf;andformoreonnucleardoctrinesee,http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/accessedSeptember7,2016;fornuclearwarintheRussianmediaseeforexample,StevenEnnis,RussianMediaLearntoLovetheBomb,”BBCMonitoring,Feb.23,2015,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31557254,accessedSeptember7,2016.31Thedoomsdayclocktimelineisavailableat:http://thebulletin.org/multimedia/timeline-conflict-culture-and-change32PresidentVladimirV.Putin’sinterviewwithAl-HaramNewspaper,February9,2015,availableat:http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47643,accessedAugust3,2015.ArepresentativeRussianperspectiveonRussia’scomplaintsagainsttheUnitedStatesbySergeiKaraganovcanbefoundathttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russia-and-the-US-A-Long-Confrontation-1699033ForcomparativeGDPgrowthratesbycountrysee,http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.

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34Seehttp://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-tableforGDPdataincurrentUSdollars,accessedMay9,2017.35Laborproductivitydatacomesfromhttps://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=The-Conference-Board-2015-Productivity-Brief.pdf&type=subsite(accessedAugust12,2015).36FordataonforeigndirectinvestmentseeTheWorldDataBank,WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsathttp://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=RUS&series=&period=(accessedAugust12,2015).37NumbersarecurrentGDPpercapitaatpurchasingpowerparityincurrentUSdollars.Dataavailableat:http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD,accessedMay9,2017.38FormoreonRussiancomparativelifeexpectancyandmortalitytrendsincomparisontoothercountries,seeUnitedNations,HumanDevelopmentIndex,athttp://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trendsandhttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.MA.IN?locations=RUbothaccessedSeptember7,2016.39See“Table1:HumanDevelopmentIndexandItsComponents,”in2015UNHumanDevelopmentReport,p.208-2011,availableat:http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf(accessedSeptember7,2016).40JosephS.Nye,Jr.,SoftPower:TheMeanstoSuccessinWorldPolitics,(NewYork:PublicAffairspubl.,2003),p.1.41ThedataareavailableattheLevadaCenterwebsite:http://www.levada.ru/en/2017/01/09/russia-as-a-great-power/accessedMay2,2017.42RobertA.Dahl,“TheConceptofPower,”BehavioralScience,vol.2,no.3,July1957,pp.202-203.43Dahl,p.203.44HansMorgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations(1948),KennethWaltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,1979,andJohnMearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,(2001).45Baldwin,p.27746Baldwin,p.275.47MikhailS.Gorbachev,“Westspreadsitsdemocracylikecoffeeinbags,butpeopleneedto

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makeownchoice,”RussiaToday, August19,2016,availableathttps://rt.com/gorbachev,accessed,August22,2016. 48JohnMearsheimer,“WhytheUkraineCrisisIstheWest’sFault,”ForeignAffairs,September/Octoberissue2014,availableat:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault49SeeAnnaAndrianova,“RussianGDPPlunges4.6%”BloombergBusiness,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-10/russian-economy-shrinks-4-6-as-oil-slump-risks-deeper-recession(accessedAugust12,2015).50See,“Putin’sPhilosopher:IvanIlyinandtheIdeologyofMoscow’sRule,”ForeignAffairs,September20,2015,availableat:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-09-20/putins-philosopher,accessed,September2,2016.51Seeforexample,RobertLegvold,“TheThreeRussias:Decline,RevolutionandReconstruction,”inRobertA.Pastor,ed.,ACentury’sJourney:HowtheGreatPowersShapetheWorld,(NewYork:BasicBooks,1999),pp.139-190.52 Seeforexample,SteveLevitskyandLucanWay,StevenLevitskyandLucanA.Way,“ElectionsWithoutDemocracy:TheRiseofCompetitiveAuthoritarianism,”JournalofDemocracy13(April2002),51–65;seealsotheirbook,LevitskyandWay,CompetitiveAuthoritarianism:HybridRegimesaftertheColdWar(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010);Timothy J. Colton, “Regimeness, Hybridity, and Russian System Building as an Educative Project”; and M. Steven Fish, “What Has Russia Become,” both prepared for a special issue of Comparative Politics, forthcoming, 2017, edited by Kathryn Stoner. 53LegvoldmakesthisargumentregardingRussianforeignpolicyandthelegacyofauthoritarianismin“TheThreeRussias,”forexample.55ThedataherecomefromtheLevadaCenter,http://www.levada.ru/eng/,accessedSeptember7,2015.56AndreiTsygankov,Russia’sForeignPolicy:ChangeandContinuityinNationalIdentity,FourthEdition,(Lanham,Maryland:RowmanandLittlefield,2016);ontheinfluenceofcultureonRussianforeignpolicyseealsoRobertNablandov,NotByBreadAlone:Russia’sForeignPolicyUnderPutin,(Lincoln:PotomacBooks,UniversityofNebraskaPress,2016).57Stent,2014.58NikolasGvosdevandChristopherMarsh,RussianForeignPolicy:Interests,VectorsandSectors,(London:ChathamHouse,2014).SeealsoJefferyMankoff,RussianForeignPolicy:TheReturnofGreatPowerPolitics,(NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,2012).

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59BoboLo,RussiaandtheNewWorldDisorder,(Washington:Brookings,2015).60SeeDmitriTrenin,PostImperium:AEurasianStory,(Washington:CarnegieEndowment,2007)andShouldtheWeFearRussia?(NewYork:PolityPress,2016).61AperusalofrecenttitlesofbooksonRussianpoliticsdemonstratestheemphasisonPutinalone.See,forexample,StevenLeeMeyers,TheNewTsar:TheRiseandReignofVladimirPutin(NewYork:VintageBooks,2015);FionaHillandCliffordGaddy,Mr.Putin:OperativeintheKremlin(Washington,DC:Brookings,2013).62M.StevenFish,WhatHasRussiaBecome?,2017.63AsimpleGooglesearchofthisphrasebringsupliterallydozensofreferences.64JosephNyecoinedtheterm“softpower.”See,forexample,JosephS.Nye,Jr.,SoftPower:TheMeansToSuccessinWorldPolitics,(NewYork:PublicAffairs,2004).