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. . . . July August September 2019 Issue 20

Interview with

Prof. Neil Macfarlane on

Russia’s Role in

World Politics

by Dr Ozgur Tufekci

Development of

Counter-Insurgency

Capacity of the British

Army

by Alasdair Bowie

The Crescent in the

Antarctic: Isolationism,

Science and Foreign

Policy in Turkey

by Dr Hüsrev Tabak

The Impact of Groupthink on

Decision Making Case Study:

The Afghanistan and Iraq

Wars

by Dr Sharifullah Dorani

Editor: Dr Ozgur Tufekci Executive Editor: Dr Rahman Dag

Eurasian Studies: Maria Tran South Asian Studies: Dr Sharifullah Dorani Conflict and Peace Studies: Dr Aytac Kadioglu Middle Eastern Studies: Dr Rahman Dag Religious Studies: Dr Abdurrahman Hendek Applied Economics: Dr Hakan UsluInternational Finance: Nijat Huseynov

Research Assistants: Alasdair Bowie

Miguel Angel Zhan Dai Faruk Dundar Furkan Sahin

©2019 By

the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis.

All rights reserved. Political Reflection and its logo are trademarks of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis, which bears no responsibility for the editorial content; the views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher.

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The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

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Contents

World News

by Furkan Sahin

The Crescent in the

Antarctic: Isolationism,

Science and Foreign

Policy in Turkey

by Dr Hüsrev Tabak

Interview with

Professor Neil

Macfarlane on Russia’s

Role in World Politics

by Dr Ozgur Tufekci

P LITICAL REFLECTION

Development of

Counter-Insurgency

Capacity of

the British Army

by Alasdair Bowie

The Groupthink Model

The Impact of

Groupthink on

Decision Making

Case Study: The

Afghanistan and Iraq

Wars

by Dr Sharifullah Dorani

05 - 08

9 - 14

16 - 19

21 - 26

28 - 32

39 - 64

VOL. 5 - NO. 3 JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER 2019 “ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

G-20 Summit Held in Osaka

The fourteenth G20 meeting was held in Osaka. G20 is a forum of 19 countries and the EU that together represent most of the world economy. It was held on 28–29 June 2019 at the International Exhibition Centre in Osaka. It was the first G20 summit to be hosted by Japan.

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, declares Japan’s first G20 a success. “We want to make it a meeting that focuses on where we can agree and cooperate rather than highlighting differences,” he said. Despite Abe’s statement, the G20 has become a stage where tension between bilateral relations was obvious. For instance, hand-shaking between Theresa May and Vladimir Putin was a clear indication of tense relations between London and Moscow.

World leaders agreed on certain issues but the summit also revealed deep divides, especially regarding climate change.

World News By Furkan Sahin

Political Reflection

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World News

Huawei vs Google: Global Economic War

The decision by Google to withhold its software from future Huawei smartphones, even if it will continue to support those presently on the market, comes after considerable pressure from the US government. After Google, many other tech companies, such as Facebook, declared their support.

This can be seen at a technological level as part of the ongoing trade wars between the US and China. The struggle over Huawei is not really about technology. It is rather about whether China or the US can be the master. But there are no winners in this war. It is likely that both sides will suffer.

Theresa May to Resigns Prime Minister


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By Furkan Sahin

Theresa May announced her resignation after failing to get her Brexit deal through parliament.

The Prime Minister tried on several occasions to convince MPs to support the Withdrawal Agreement that she had agreed with the European Union, but she was unable to do so.

May said: “It is, and will always remain, a matter of deep regret to me that I have not been able to deliver Brexit. It will be for my successor to seek a way forward that honours the result of the referendum.”

Theresa May’s official resignation date is Friday 7 June, but that does not mean that she will leave 10 Downing Street straight away.

She will remain as the Prime Minister until a replacement has been chosen by the Conservative Party.

Netanyahu Will Annex West Bank if He Wins Israel Election

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says that he will not 'evacuate any community', nor divide Jerusalem: 'A Palestinian state will endanger our existence'

He will start extending Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank if he was re-elected as prime minister in the election.


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World News

The West Bank is a territory sandwiched between Israel and Jordan named for its location: the western bank of the Jordan River. About 2.5 million Palestinians and 400,000 Jewish Israelis live there.

Jordan conquered the West Bank after Israel’s 1948 War of Independence. Israel captured the territory from Jordan in the Six-Day War of 1967, but never fully annexed it into the country. For more than 50 years, the West Bank has been controlled by Israel, but its status has been under debate.


9 Magazine | Issue 20

Development of Counter-Insurgency Capacity of the British Army

Development of

Counter-Insurgency Capacity of

the British Army

Alasdair Bowie* [email protected]

n recent years the British Army has become embroiled in a series of long campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been relatively costly in human and financial terms. Fighting long and protracted military campaigns against insurgencies are nothing new; since the end of the Second World War the British Army has operated in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Northern Ireland. In all of these military campaigns the British Army faced insurgents who were seeking their independence from Britain. In this article, I will use the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) to illustrate how the British Army learnt to combat this form of warfare.

Firstly, insurgent campaigns were not completely new territory for the British Army. The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) is an example of a colonial war in which the Boers, who were well armed and highly mobile, showed their flexibility by initially mounting a conventional campaign, showing their willingness to engage the British Army and relying on their knowledge and use of terrain. After the loss of their capitals, the Boers resorted to waging a guerrilla campaign using hit-and-run tactics. They were willing to trade territory in the vast interior of South Africa for time, only engaging the British Army when the local conditions were favourable. To secure victory over the Boers, the British used tactics such as concentration camps and scorched earth to finally compel the Boers’ surrender.

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) pitted British and Commonwealth Security Forces against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its armed wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MLNA). Stuck between Second World War and the beginning of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Malayan Emergency, like many other post-Second World War campaigns is largely a forgotten conflict in Britain. At a time when the British Labour Government was setting up the National Health Service, the public interest in the Empire was waning. The British Army was heavily dependent on National Servicemen. By 1952, some battalions rotating

I

* Research Assistant at

Cesran International


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By Alasdair Bowie

through Malaya consisted of 50% Corporals, 90% Lance Corporals and 60% Privates who were National Servicemen.1 These soldiers were young men. The National Service Act 1948 required that all healthy males aged 17-21 did 18 months compulsory military service; by 1950 this had been extended to 24 months. Until its conclusion in the 1960s, National Servicemen provided much of the needed manpower that supported the regular army.

Elements of the MCP had fought with and, ironically, received training from the Special Operations Executive at the time of Japan’s occupation of Malaya during the Second World War. There instated British colonial administration had agitated them. Certain groups within the MCP increasingly resorted to violence; on 16 June 1948, three British plantation workers were murdered. On 18 June 1948, the British High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir Edward Gent, declared a state of emergency in the Federation of Malaya.

Following this declaration, British and Commonwealth Security Forces were given special powers to arrest and detain, carry out search and seizure of property and impose curfews.2 By authorising the use of special powers, the British Colonial administration hoped that the Security Forces would be able to clamp down on the insurgents’ attacks.

In the first year of the Malayan Emergency only ten infantry battalions were available in Malaya, which included two British, five Gurkha and three Malayan supported by 9,000 Police.3 In addition, all of the battalions in Malaya were understrength, short of equipment. The insufficient readiness of the Security Forces in Malaya provided the Insurgents with the opportunity to take control of large areas of the country. This lack of force preparedness showed that the Security Forces in Malaya were expected to undertake colonial policing rather than high intensity Counter-Insurgency operations. By the end of 1952, the Security Forces could field 40,000 military personnel supported by 67,000 police as well as some 300,000 Malayan Home Guards.4 With reinforcements arriving at the peak of operations in 1953, 23 infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya – these numbers were maintained until 1957.5 This was truly a multi-national effort with troops from Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Britain’s African colonies serving alongside the British Army.

During the early phase of the Emergency, the effects of the Second World War on the British Army were clear to see. Major-General Charles Boucher

1 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1960, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 45. 2 Mackay, D. The Domino that Stood: The Malayan Emergency 1948-60 (London, Brassey’s UK Ltd, 1997), p. 32. 3 Nagl, J. Counterinsurgency Lessons for Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport: Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 64. 4 Thomas, M. Fight or Flight Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 138. 5 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1960, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 18.


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committed the Security Forces to a series of futile, large-scale search and destroy operations, which achieved nothing other than the acclimatisation and frustration of the troops involved.6 The effect of the Second World War was to condition both troops and commanders, to expect they would always be presented with an enemy who was willing to commit to a pitched battle.

Following his appointment in late 1948, the new British High Commissioner to Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, asked for a Director of Operations to be appointed. Field Marshall Sir William Slim, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, persuaded Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs to come out of retirement to take up the post. Firstly, Briggs sought to create a truly coordinated civil and military plan to fight and defeat the insurgency.7 In doing so, Briggs laid the groundwork for others to complete. By coordinating the civilian government and military’s actions, both could work together towards agreed goals and targets. It also reduced the risk of one element of the Counter-Insurgency campaign having a negative effect on the other.

Secondly, Briggs’ solution to the insurgency, known as Briggs Plan, was brutal in its simplicity. Security Forces needed to cut off and deny the insurgents’ access to the population; this necessitated the large-scale forced relocation of Chinese squatters and estate labourers who lived on the edge of the jungle.8 In doing so, Briggs intended to deny the insurgents access to both the intelligence and food, which were provided by these populations. By the end 1950, over 177,000 people had been relocated to 140 New Villages, which were surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by the police and the Malayan Home Guard. By 1952, the New Villages had grown to 509 with a population of 461,822.9 Within the New Villages, intelligence officers, supported by Chinese translators, checked people’s identity, as well as the movement of goods, people and money.10 This meant that the Security Forces could prevent the insurgents recruiting and gathering resources to further their campaign. Through monitoring the population movements, the Security Forces could also gather intelligence on the insurgents alongside protecting the population.

The end of 1951 was a difficult time for the Security Forces, with Gurney’s assassination and Brigg’s departure due to ill-health. These events had a serious effect on the morale of not only the Security Forces, but also the colonial administration. Despite this, Briggs’ successor Lieutenant-General

6 Mackay, D. The Domino that Stood: The Malayan Emergency 1948-60 (London, Brassey’s UK Ltd, 1997), p. 44. 7 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1960, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 19. 8 Thomas, M. Fight or Flight Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 138. 9 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1960, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 20. 10 Thomas, M. Fight or Flight Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 138.


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By Alasdair Bowie

Lockhart resolved that the Security Forces should not let up in the intensity of military operations, and in some areas Search and Destroy operations were stepped up. However, it was at this point that events outside of Malaya begin to play their part in the course of the Emergency. In Britain, the Labour Government of Clement Attlee was replaced by a Conservative Government led by wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill saw the insurgency in Malaya as part of the Cold War between the Western Nations and the Soviet Union. It was feared that if Malaya fell under Communist control, the nations bordering it would fall like a stack of dominos.

This was a reasonable view, as simultaneous to the British campaign in Malaya, the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh were posing a serious and ultimately fatal challenge to French colonial rule in French Indochina (Vietnam). To prevent Malaya falling, a new high commissioner and director of operations were needed. The man picked by the British Government was Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Templer. He had a distinguished war-time service record as a divisional commander. In addition, he had headed up the German Directorate of the Special Operations Executive and post-WW2 and had served as Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. These experiences, especially running intelligence organisations, had taught Templer the importance of good, actionable intelligence to the success of military operations. This was one critical factor in the Security Forces’ campaign that Templer would leave his mark upon.

The British Government invested Templer with wide-ranging powers: he was a military-politico supremo with the powers of both offices. There was little doubt that under Templer’s energetic and inspired leadership the British and Commonwealth Security Forces would win their ongoing battle against the insurgents. Shortly after his arrival in Malaya, Templer stated that it was the British Government’s intention that Malaya should become a fully self-governing nation.11 This statement committed the British colonial government to laying the foundations for Malaya’s independence; whilst it also undermined the support for the insurgents, who had an identical goal.

In term of the pacification campaign against the Insurgents, a key addition to the Security Forces’ strategy was the creation of White Areas. These were areas, deemed clear of insurgents, in which many of the more irksome Emergency regulations, such as food controls, curfews and restrictions on the movement of goods and people were relaxed or removed entirely. By the time of Templer’s departure from Malaya in mid-1954 around 1,300,000 people mostly living along Malaya’s coastline were in White

11 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 24.


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Areas.12 These cleared areas allowed the population to return to their normal pre-emergency existence, as well as seeing the benefits of supporting the Government and the Security Forces. With these areas declared clear, British and Commonwealth battalions could be redeployed to new areas, with the Federal Police and Home Guard being left in the White Areas to maintain security and to prevent the resurgence of the insurgency.

Templer also benefited from technological advances that increased the tactical and operational effectiveness of the Security Forces. During recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, helicopters proved their continued utility, lifting both troops and supplies around the theatre of operations. In Malaya, initial small-scale trail operations proved the concept’s feasibility and so it was executed on a larger scale. In May 1953, during Operation Commodore, helicopters airlifted 564 troops to capture insurgent political leaders.13 Helicopters provided the Security Forces with the capability of rapid movement, which allowed operations to be undertaken without the need for arduous marches through the jungle. During the first day of Operation Commodore there was no contact with the enemy. Based on fresh intelligence the troops were airlifted to a new location resulting in 9 insurgents killed and 12 camps destroyed. In an operation, which lasted two weeks, eight helicopters lifted a total 1,623 troops and 35,000 pounds worth of stores in 415 sorties.14 The capability that helicopters provided a military commander to redeploy troops rapidly meant that should the situation change or new intelligence come to light, Security Forces had the flexibility to take advantage of these opportunities. Over the course of the Malayan Emergency, helicopters, which were still in their infancy, carried 110,000 troops and were responsible for carrying troops into the depths of the Malayan jungle.15

In conclusion, during the Malayan Emergency the British Army adapted to fighting an insurgency. The result was unquestionably a British military and political victory. It provided a campaign template that the British Army would seek to use on future campaigns. This article only covers the general course of the campaign, as the Malayan Emergency shows the complex interconnected nature of Counter-Insurgency operations. The Briggs plan laid the foundations for Sir Gerald Templer, who ultimately deprived the insurgents of their access to the population, driving them deeper and deeper in to the Malayan jungle. These were coupled with an approach: the Security Forces showed that one could use hard tactics, such as food controls and curfews as well as offering citizenships and Independence, to

12 Stubbs, R. Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), p180 13 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p.99. 14 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p. 99 15 Jackson, R. The Malayan Emergency & Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011), p.101.


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By Alasdair Bowie

weaken the enemy. The approach showed the population the benefits of supporting the Security Forces, while making it clear to them that supporting the insurgents was costly. The use of new technology, such as the introduction of helicopters, allowed the Security Forces greater operational and tactical mobility, increasing their effectiveness in tackling the insurgency. In doing so, the insurgent safe areas were well within the range of the Security Forces.

Call for Papers

The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policymakers to share their knowledge and experience in the discipline of international relations and its subfields: international security, international political economy, international organisations, foreign policy analysis, political history, etc.

The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development is an open-access, double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The journal is published at its own website https://therestjournal.com/The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4.000-9.000 words articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Author Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the website https://therestjournal.com/ Contributors are urged to read the author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent through the “MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION” page at the website.

Dr. Ozgur TUFEKCI - Editor-in-Chief Dr. Husrev TABAK - Executive Editor Dr. Rahman DAG - Managing Editor


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Magazine | Issue 20

The Crescent in the Antarctic: Isolationism, Science and Foreign…

The Crescent in the Antarctic:

Isolationism, Science and Foreign

Policy in Turkey

Dr Hüsrev Tabak* [email protected]

urkey is establishing a research base in Antarctica. At first sight, this may be seen as a relatively minor issue, and even irrelevant, considering the broader foreign policy priorities of the government. It, accordingly, is an exemplar process disclosing the extent to which the recent isolationism arguments regarding the assertion that Turkey is breaking away from the West are null, and the populist nationalism accompanies and unexpectedly enhances the internationalist openings in the foreign policy domain. This article thus elaborates Turkey’s efforts to establish a scientific research base in the Antarctic, with reference to the internationalist concerns both alternating the tendency of nationalist isolationism and enhancing the willingness of becoming part of the international environmental risk society.

The foreign policy between worldliness and isolationism

Turkey has for a while been experiencing isolationism, particularly due to its uneven and occasionally confrontational relations with the US, the EU and many of the neighbouring and regional countries – described as worthy-loneliness. This is the case in spite of the terminologically rich and peace-championing foreign policy discourses of the previous Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments. Especially with the transition to the presidential system and following the formation of the people’s alliance, a nationalist electoral front, the dominant language in domestic and foreign politics became established by the discourses of state survival and by the grand narratives emphasising historical and moral superiority of Turkey in the world and regional politics. In fact, moral superiority discourses merely functioned to escalate the confrontational and isolationist attitudes in Turkey’s international politics. As a result, Turkey’s area of influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean has been substantially narrowed; it is constantly criticized by the EU on issues such as human rights, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; and it came to be searching for

T

* AssociateProfessor of

International Relations,

Deputy-Director of

CESRAN International


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By Dr Husrev Tabak

alternatives to the Western security umbrella due to its adversary relations with the US.

We have, indeed, every reason to become more pessimistic about Turkish politics. The measures targeting certain political groups and politically-inclined intellectuals adversely contribute to the country’s international image. The state survival discourses and the marginalising attitudes towards the opposition get widespread criticism, especially from the Western intellectual and political circles. In the Western media outlets and scholarly publications, there exists an unspoken consensus describing Turkey as a country with anti-democratic, autocratic and dictatorial tendencies. What makes this negative perception prevailing is the discrediting attitudes of the business circles and investors towards Tukey.

Despite all these, it is not possible to talk about foreign policy isolationism in Turkey's international policies; and this is not only because isolationism is not a sustainable or feasible political attitude for any of the present-day states. Turkey has held civilization-based internationalism long before putting it into the centre of its foreign policy narratives – it experienced expectations of such a responsibility as early as the late 1940s in the Middle East or as seen in the example of the April 23 Children’s Day, it long developed global concerns. With the AKP governments, these global concerns and responsibilities have unprecedentedly moved into the heart of the policy agenda. Turkey has become a leading humanitarian aid provider in the world for the last decade, solidified its relations with the historical kin communities in the broader former Ottoman hinterland, built a number of public diplomacy institutions equipped to reach the peoples of the foreign publics, opened new diplomatic representation offices in tens of countries, became a willing contributor to the international risk communities on refugees and other vulnerable people worldwide, and involved in conflict resolution processes in the Third World. Moreover, the transnational networks and ties of the political parties, civil society or business circles have unprecedentedly increased, making the people of the country well integrated into global scientific, trade or public policy processes.

All these international involvements and awareness continue despite the loneliness –worthy or not– experienced in foreign policy. They often, in fact, make the claim of loneliness a null one. Turkey sees itself, both as a country unjustly alienated by the Western international community and as the contributor to and defender of Western values and standards. This reveals itself explicitly in Turkey’s recent science-based internationalism towards the Antarctic, and it seems that now the science became a ground for Turkey to see itself a responsible member of the international community aiming to contribute the global problem-solving capacity.


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The Crescent in the Antarctic: Isolationism, Science and Foreign…

The Turkish Flag in the Antarctic

The responsibility borne over the issues the world and its people face is a duty of cosmopolitan kind imposed by international regulations and institutions. Yet, practically, not all countries make equal use of such responsibilities – some simply ignore them, while others utilise them in a hegemonic manner in order to increase their control over less capable nations. The same is the case in their dealing with the common heritage of humanity, including the Antarctic. So far, only limited number of nations have joined the global governance regime over the Antarctic – Turkey desires to be the 30th country to ratify the Antarctic Treaty hence become a consultative party in Antarctica with a right to participate in the decision-making processes. It is, therefore, for Turkey, a step towards joining the international community as a responsible member with sheer concerns for the fate of mankind. The government has also vastly articulated the national benefits of becoming part of the Antarctic regime; the rationale behind it will be dealt with below.

Antarctica has never been a concern for Turkey – no interest had been shown until the mid-1990s. The first ever Turkish-descent scientists visited the continent was in 1967, long after the continent was discovered, accepted as a non-sovereign sphere, and begun to be used for scientific studies. These individual endeavours were fruitful, as the names of some of these Turkish scientists were given to certain geographical places in the continent as a recognition of their contribution to science and research on the continent. These places are Karaali Rocks taken after Professor Atok Karaali, Inan Peak after Professor Ümran İnan, and Tilav Cirque after Professor Serap Tilav. In 1995, Turkey, unexpectedly, decided to sign the Antarctic Treaty, however, since Turkey did not have a national programme on the Antarctic, in the scope which the country conductedregular or seasonal scientific activities, it, therefore, opened research facilities in the continent, which remained as a non-consultative party.

Nonetheless, two decades later, Turkey ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) as a complementary step and introduced a National Polar Science Program in 2017. As part of this program, since 2017, a science expedition team has been sent to Antarctica in order to prepare the necessary legal and practical grounds for the establishment of an initially seasonal, and later permanent, research base in the continent. In organising the expedition trips and in setting the ground for the permanent research base, close cooperation is held with Chile – an experienced county operating several seasonal and permanent research bases in the continent.

Turkey’s national polar programme was fiercely criticised (by some) in domestic politics because it was seen as an unnecessary involvement, costly and targeting a geographically remote place. As a response, the government had to develop a counter-narrative, putting forward the cognitive proximity of the continent, the civilizational responsibilities Turkey bore towards the


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By Dr Husrev Tabak

humankind, and the advancement of national interests as a justification for being in Antarctica. It is accordingly argued with reference to the historical Piri Reis map (dated back to 1513), which showed the Antarctica centuries back before it was discovered, that it is a civilizational heritage to show presence in the continent. It was suggested to name the to-be-established research base after Piri Reis within this very scope. Nonetheless, the civilizational heritage discussion paved also the way for Turkey to suggest the necessity for the country to claim a right in deciding the future of the continent. This later was heavily discussed as part of geopolitical and geo-economic values of the continent for the prospective national interests of the country – in fact against the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. In the media discussions on the subject, that is, opposing Turkey’s opening a research base while the small states’ (such as Czechia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria) having research bases in the continent, was presented as an assault to the national pride of the country. Complementarily, waving the Turkish flag in Antarctica became a motto of the programme’s campaigns: the Turkish scientific expedition team’s use (and test) of nationally-developed and geared high-tech machines in their research has been proudly announced, accordingly.

Finding Turkey’s place on earth

Depicting Turkey’s foreign policy as isolationist is not only incorrect but is also incomplete and improper, as it would make it impossible to observe how integrated the country to the world, in both governmental and non-governmental domains, is. Although the nationalist discourses are becoming dominant in the country, which makes the internationalist discourses an open target in public discussions, the country is well integrated into transnational networks of several kind and epistemic communities worldwide.

So, the goal to establish a research base in Antarctica means that Turkey endeavours to face the realities of the world concerning the entire humanity and that it redefines the geography-based cognitive references dominant in the country. As a common occurrence, the harsh nation-state experience in the country has forcefully contained the responsibilities of the people to the national borders and establishing the base was perceived as a practice of favouring others at the expense of your own. This had been the case despite the development of internationalist frames and pan-ideologies.

The polar research programme, therefore, is another progressive phase in Turkey – a necessary step for the country to become a contributing member of the environmental risk society. However, having seen the political reasoning for the involvement in the continent, it also represents a phase in Turkey’s quest to have a further say in world politics. It also shows that there is no way Turkey’s contemporary troubled relation with its neighbours or with the Western countries would mean the country is isolated or would choose to become one.

Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to

engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a

multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations,

development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law,

political history, and human geography.

As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial

Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http://

www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the

journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences.

Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged.

Prospective authors should submit 5.000 - 10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-

compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the

Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts.

Contributors are urged to read CESRAN‘s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting

articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - [email protected]

Publication date: Spring issue — April

Autumn issue — October

JOURNAL

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CONFLICT

TRANSFORMATION

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Magazine | Issue 20

The Impact of Groupthink on Decision Making


The Impact of Groupthink on

Decision Making

Case Study:

The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars

Dr Sharifullah Dorani* [email protected]

This short essay contains two sections. Section one briefly reviews what the Groupthink Model is. Section two deals with how the approach can be applied to inform a foreign policy case by examining George W. Bush and Barack Obama’s decision making styles for Afghanistan and Iraq. The essay ends with some concluding remarks. The central aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the Groupthink Model can be utilised to explain and understand a foreign policy decision, as the author of this short essay has made extensive use of the model in his recently published book: America in Afghanistan.1


In Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) there have been approaches involving the effect of large and small group decision-making on foreign policy. Most decisions relating to foreign policy are made in small group settings, and one of the popular approaches has considered the effect of the dynamic of ‘small group of policy makers’ (about ten or more policymakers) upon foreign policy.

One analysis of a number of small group decisions by Irving L. Janis, entitled Groupthink2, discovered that there was always fear of exclusion and rejection by members of the group, and the primary purpose became to keep the group cohesive. As this occurred, there was the existence of ‘groupthink’, meaning the purpose of keeping the group cohesive replaced the purpose for which the group was built. Decisions were made, even though some members of the group did not agree but went ahead anyway for fear of exclusion. This had ‘dysfunctional consequences’ for the group

* South Asiaand the Middle

Eastern Editor


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process, which in turn had ramifications for foreign policy choices.3 The ‘dysfunctional consequences’4 of groupthink included: conformity or a sense of ‘we can easily’ achieve the objectives; discouraging an atmosphere of open debate between opposing camps/policymakers; disregarding warning signals from the rival groups and instead stereotyping their views; refusing to consult lower officials as well as experts; and failing to consider alternatives.

The Effect of Groupthink on the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars

The effect of ‘groupthink’ – that is, especially a sense of ‘we can easily’ achieve the objectives of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to root out terrorism by underestimating the enemy and chances of failure – was present during the decision making for the GWOT in September 2001: Bush and his advisors downplayed the shortcomings of ‘the counterterrorism strategy’ and exaggerated the usefulness of ‘the light footprint strategy’ (using a small number of American troops and resources); they did not discuss alternatives to the invasion of Afghanistan (and Iraq); they did not consider what to be done if things went wrong in Afghanistan and Iraq; they did not take dissent seriously from Secretary of State Colin Powell; they did no ascertain more precise information about the history, culture, society and traditions of Afghanistan (and Iraq) and its decades-long disputes with Pakistan.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Steven Hurst and the Afghan expert Amin Saikal argue that being ignorant of Afghanistan and Iraq’s details was one major destructive factor, causing the United States (US) to announce objectives impossible to achieve. Learning in detail about the Af-Pak disputes, Bush might have requested concrete pledges from President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, and, most importantly, kept a close watch on Pakistan’s double game post-Taliban defeat. Had Bush properly debated the way the Afghans perceived the warlords, he might have found alternatives to them, or at least developed a strategy to minimise their influence after the Taliban was defeated. Most importantly, Bush might have discovered alternatives to the decision to invade Afghanistan. In the end, an entirely different decision might have resulted. Instead of discussing the details regarding Afghanistan (and Iraq) as well as the wisdom of the GWOT, the discussion centred on developing a war plan, the issue of how wide terrorism was, and whether Iraq could be included at the first stage of the GWOT.5 American journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran wrote a bestseller on how unaware American policy makers were of the way of life in Iraq.6

But unlike Bush, Obama regarding the Afghanistan War used all the necessary methods to minimise the ‘dysfunctional consequences’ of groupthink: conformity or a sense of ‘we can easily’ achieve the objectives. Obama’s ‘rational’ approach required decisions to be made on the basis of ‘information’ not ‘emotions’. Obama preferred to have a deliberate and highly analytical process in which all contrasting views and options were analysed. The President, therefore, invited not only his immediate advisors




to the decision making, but also career diplomats and experts (even from outside of the administration) to directly confront their policy suggestions, disagreements and, at times, themselves in front of the President.

Obama did not want to repeat the disorderly decision making process of President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 and Bush in 2002–3, in which both presidents failed to examine the reasoning, assess the consequences and debate the alternatives. It, therefore, took Obama three months to review all suggestions by the opposing camps to make his ‘surge decision’ in 2009. Furthermore, Obama’s analytical decision making style was one of the main reasons the review led to being debated in public.7

The Groupthink Model is a vital approach of FPA. It has been employed by foreign policy researchers to analyse foreign policy choices. This short essay has, likewise, explained in relation to the Bush and Obama Administrations’ decision making towards Afghanistan and Iraq that how a faulty operating style could lead to poor foreign policy decisions.

References

Allison GT and Zelikow P (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman.

Baker P (5 December 2009) How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan. New York Times.

Chandrasekaran R (2006), Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s Green Zone. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Clinton HR (2014) Hard Choices. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Desch MC (27 October 2009) ‘Obama and His General’, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general.

Dobbins J (2007) Who Lost Iraq?, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq.

Dodge T and Redman N (2011). Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Dorani S (2019) America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Gates RM (2014) Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. Alfred A. Knopf.


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Hudson VM (2019) Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.

Hurst S (2009) The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Janis, IL (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Mann J (2012) The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking.

Marshall JM (2003) Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives. Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives.

McGurk B (22 June 2011), ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan’, CNN, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/.

Mullen MG (21 May “009) ‘Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MullenTestimony100518a.pdf.

Neack L, Hey J and Haney PJ (1995) Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall

Pfiffner JP (2008) Policymaking in the Bush White House. Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner.

—— (2011) Decision Making in the Obama White House. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 2 (June).

Rashid A (2009) Descent into Chaos: The World’s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security. London: Penguin.

Saikal A (2014) Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

Smith T, Hood L and Dobbins J (2007) Losing Iraq. Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq.




Will GF (1 September 2009) Time to Get Out of Afghanistan. Washington Post.

Woodward B (2010) Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Notes: 1 Dorani S (2019) America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2 Janis IL (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3 Janis IL (1982), pp. 1–13. 4 They (and the methods to avoid them) are found in Janis IL (1982), pp. 1–13; Neack L, Hey J and Haney PJ (1995) Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 108–9; Hudson VM (2019) Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, pp. 72–3; Allison GT and Zelikow P (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, p. 284. 5 For the impact of groupthink in the Bush Administration, see Dorani S (2019), chapter five. See also, Pfiffner JP (2008) Policymaking in the Bush White House. Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner. —— (2011) Decision Making in the Obama White House. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 2 (June); Dobbins J (2007) Who Lost Iraq? Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq; Smith T, Hood L and Dobbins J (2007) Losing Iraq. Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq; Rashid A (2009) Descent into Chaos: The World’s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security. London: Penguin, pp. XLI, XLII, XLVI–XLVII; Marshall JM (2003) Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives. Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives; Gates RM (2014) Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 49, 589; Clinton HR (2014) Hard Choices. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 135; Saikal A (2014) Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. London: I.B. Tauris & Co, pp. 5–8, 15–59, 143–77; Hurst S (2009) The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 7, 182–223. 6 Chandrasekaran R (2006), Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s Green Zone. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 7 For the impact of groupthink in the Obama Administration, see Dorani S (2019), chapter seven. See also Gates R (2014), pp. 289, 360, 367–70, 566, 585–6; Woodward B (2010) Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 157–9, 173–7, 197; Mann J (2012) The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, pp. xx, xix, 14–17, 135–6; Pfiffner JP (2011); Mullen MG (21 May “009) ‘Statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MullenTestimony100518a.pdf; McGurk B (22 June 2011), ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan’, CNN, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/; Desch MC (27 October 2009) ‘Obama and His General’, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general; Dodge T and Redman N (2011). Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 61; Baker P (5 December 2009) How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan. New York Times; Will GF (1 September 2009) Time to Get Out of Afghanistan. Washington Post.

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Interview with Professor Neil Macfarlane

Interview With

Professor Neil Macfarlane

on Russia’s Role in World Politics

Dr Ozgur Tufekci [email protected]

ussia Federation as the core successor of the Soviet Union has been profoundly influential in world politics under the prolonged Putin’s administration. Yet, the current world politics is not the same with the conditions when the Soviet Russia dismantled. It is claimed that multi-polarity is embedded in world politics. With these new world dynamics, Russia is/will be one of the key international actor to define current and future of world politics. Therefore, the role of Russia in world politics is worth to discuss.

Ozgur Tufekci: I would like to start with a specific question. In one of your papers, published in 2006 “The ‘R’ in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?”, you were claiming that “Russia is more properly seen as a state that has recently experienced substantial damage and is attempting to stop the bleeding.” Do you believe that Russia has stopped the bleeding and recovered?

Neil Macfarlane: No, I do not. It is true that the rise in energy prices in the 2000’s reduced the bleeding and allowed Russia to begin a rebuilding process both in the economy and in the state. The concentration of power in the hands of Mr. Putin and his inner circle added a new sense of direction to Russian policy. They have substantially rebuilt a smaller, but effective, military apparatus. However, the 2007-8 financial crisis was deeply damaging to Russia, as was the 2014-2016 collapse of global oil prices, and revenue. Since the Russian state has largely failed to diversify beyond the energy sector, they are now struggling. Growth has slowed, investment is sluggish, and sanctions are biting, as is the cost of Russian intervention in Ukraine. So, they are better off in comparison to 2006, but they still have a long way to go. It is not clear whether they are going forward or back at the moment.

R

Professor MacFarlane is a specialist on Russian foreign policy and the regional dynamics of the former Soviet Union, with particular reference to that regions southern tier.

After a career in the United States and in Canada, he moved to Oxford in 1996 as the first Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations. From 2005 to 2010 he was Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations. From 2008 to 2010 he was Deputy Head of the Social Sciences Division at Oxford. He is currently a member of the Council of the University and serves on numerous University committees.


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Ozgur Tufekci: What is your opinion on Russia’s long-term plan about the Ukraine crisis? Do you think that it will affect the Russia-EU relations negatively in the spheres of security, economy and politics?

Neil Macfarlane: I am not sure they have a long-term plan, other than to ensure the destabilization of Ukraine. If they do have a plan (for example the taming of Ukraine’s government and the inclusion of Ukraine in the Eurasian Economic Union), they are very far away from achieving either one.

The annexation of Crimea and the intervention in eastern Ukraine have already had significant negative effects on EU-Russia relations and on Russia’s standing in world politics.

Three other points – first, the sanctions do have a significant effect on Russia economically; second, the possible departure of the UK from the EU may have a significant effect on the durability of the EU sanctions regime; and, third, although the EU does not have much of a military role re. Russia, NATO does. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had a deeply negative impact on NATO-Russia relations, not least in that they provoked forward NATO deployment and consequent risks of inadvertent collisions.

Ozgur Tufekci: What do you think about Russia’s strategy on the future of the Syrian civil war?

Neil Macfarlane: Russia wants a durable base in the Middle East-Mediterranean region. They also want status as a global strategic player. Their support of the Assad regime in Syria has served both purposes, for the moment, but at considerable cost.

Ozgur Tufekci: Do you think the cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Russia could help to establish a peace agreement in Syria?

Neil Macfarlane: This depends on the domestic politics of Syria, and on the capacity of the three to develop and sustain a joint perspective. On the first, that would depend on how far their joint position suits Assad and the opposition (what is left of it) in Syria. In particular, how would the three reconcile with the Kurds? This relates to a larger point. Academic and policy work on international mediation of peace generally underestimates the capacity of local actors to veto.

Then there is the question of whether peace can be achieved without the United States – another veto player. Will the Americans continue to support the Kurds? If they do, the prospect of agreement among the mediators and parties, and also the prospects of a peace agreement, will be reduced.


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Ozgur Tufekci: I would like to carry on with a saddening issue, “the Jamal Khashoggi murder”. Why does not Putin criticise Saudi Arabia for the killing of Khashoggi? Is it because the murdered is a journalist (who maybe deserves to be punished to his mind) or because of some political and economic expectations? Is it more an ethical or political/economic stance?

Neil Macfarlane: Putin may be too busy with other things. More seriously, he may not wish to be a hypocrite – remember the murders of Anna Politkovskaya (a journalist) and Boris Nemtsov (an opposition politician). On the basis of his professional formation, he may think that killing annoying people is just part of the game.

Finally, getting to your political economy point, he may see an opportunity here to develop a more solid relationship with Saudi Arabia, an important player in the global economy. That is particularly important, given Russia’s sensitivity to energy prices and Saudi market power. He does not lose anything by silence, and he would be foolish to jeopardise initiatives towards better relations with Saudi Arabia over an issue like this.

I stress that this is pretty speculative, but I would guess it is some combination of the three.

Ozgur Tufekci: What do you think on Russia’s role in Eurasia? Would it be affected by the China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

Neil Macfarlane: I take this to be an enquiry concerning Russian policy in what it considers to be its regional space. Given the general view that Russia has a single policy in its region, it is striking how different Russia’s role in Central Asia differs from that in Ukraine and the Caucasus. On Russia’s western border, it is assertive and coercive; they invade and interfere. In Central Asia, they negotiate and accommodate. How do we account for the difference? At the systemic level, one basic reason is that the West (Russia’s significant other) challenges Russian preferences in institution building and institutional enlargement, threatening Russia’s own regional institutional project. This challenge is not significant in Central Asia.

That is related to a common view on governance in Central Asia. That view is largely consistent with Russian preferences. There is no danger of potentially threatening demonstration effects from neighbouring states. To the contrary, they share Russia’s concerns about soft power penetration. At the regional level, for the most part, they participate in Russian-led regional cooperative institutions in the political, economic, and security spheres.

You asked about BRI. I guess the major point here is that BRI does not challenge Russia’s core interests in the short term. Again, quite the contrary. It is anticipated that Russia is on the road. Chinese investment permits infrastructural development and natural resource investment that Russia cannot afford on its own. Moreover, BRI networks through Afghanistan and


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Pakistan give Russia more efficient access to South Asian markets. If all of this works, then the BRI payoff for Russia is greater than the potential costs of their neighbours developing alternative transport networks for their goods. Much depends here on the evolution of the Russia-China relationship, leading me to the next question.

Ozgur Tufekci: What kind of future do you anticipate for the China-Russia relationships? Would it be possible for the both countries to build a new world order in the foreseeable future?

Neil Macfarlane: The China-Russia relationship has a short term and long-term dimensions. In the short term, many of the factors that explain the relationship between Russia and its Central Asian neighbours also help to understand the Russia-China relationship. China is also anti-western. It is hostile to democratization and to the American model of unbridled economic liberalism. So one principal source of the tensions and conflict in the western part of the neighbourhood is absent in the cross-regional Central Asian relationship. Despite the increasing dominance of China in Central Asian trade and investment, the relationship continues to be positive. This is bolstered by Russia’s cooperation with China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In that organization, China and Russia have important shared interests, not least in counter-terrorism. Moreover, reflecting on Russia’s status concerns, and given China’s position as an external, much stronger state, on the borders of Russia’s neighbourhood, it is significant that in the SCO China considers Russia to be equal. That contrasts starkly with the pattern of NATO and EU treatment of Russia in the West. Finally, the two states share a number of positions on the broader international order, not least their unhappiness with unipolarity and commitment to multipolarity. This is associated with close coordination in the UN Security Council.

The latter point brings me to the second question. China and Russia already do cooperate in the hope of generating a new world order. They do so not only through their shared antipathy to American and western dominance, but also through their support of institutions such as the BRICS.

However, there is a question whether this joint effort is sustainable over the long term. This has two aspects, at least. The first is the growing asymmetry in the power of Russia and China. As the imbalance continues to grow, it is reasonable to suggest that Sino-Russian relations will become more problematic. In addition, many Russian analytical and strategic observers take the view that the longer-term existential threat to Russia is not the West (which in their view is declining), but China, with whom Russia has an historically troubled relationship. In other words, the short-term perspective is reasonably positive, but the longer-term perspective is ambiguous. In fact, some in Russia are already speaking of the need to rebuild relations with the West in order to balance China. If that phenomenon grows more widespread, then one might expect a rebalancing towards the status quo and away from attempts to replace it.


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The final point is that, trump notwithstanding, the US will resist efforts to replace it at the top of the pile.

Ozgur Tufekci: This question might be hypothetic but I can not refrain myself to ask, what would be Russia’s position in case of western-centric world order was changed? Would it be one of the co-founders or superseding the US.

Neil Macfarlane: Russia has long advocated an alternative world order, as has China, as noted in the previous response. Given the seeming decline in US relative power that may become feasible. One caution here is that this is not the first time American decline has been predicted. Predicting American decline among American IR academics after Vietnam and into the 1980s. It did not happen.

It is true that the US under its current president says it wants to withdraw from managing the world and to focus on its own interests. But, since its interests are profoundly entwined with its management of the world, this idea doesn’t seem credible.

I do expect some change in world order, but it is likely to be slow and negotiated rather than abrupt and conflictual. Russia would not be a co-founder. It is too small, and its constituency is also too small.

Ozgur Tufekci: Current US-EU relations seems to be chattering because Trump’s demand of previous cost of NATO to protect the Europe from Soviets and his claim of unfair trade relations with Europe. Do you think that there is even a slight chance Europe would side with Russia against the US?

Neil Macfarlane: That begs a prior question. Who is Europe? Are we talking about the core (France, Germany, the Benelux)? Or are we talking about the dissenters (Poland, Hungary, Italy). Moreover, the core states have severe differences among themselves. Leaving aside whether Europe is cohesive enough to take such a decision, the US is Europe’s security guarantor, not least against Russia. I am not sure the Europeans would agree to dump that in pursuit of Russia, which has, in the meantime, returned to its old status as Europe’s major traditional threat. In short, for this to happen you would need Russia to change fundamentally, the US to change fundamentally, and Europe itself to change fundamentally.

Ozgur Tufekci: Thank you for your time and sincere answers.

Thank you.

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