russia’s arctic policy...prominent in russia’s arctic policy but neither the perception of the...
TRANSCRIPT
Russia’s aRctic Policy
Pavel K. Baev BRiEFiNG PaPER 73, 17 December 2010
73
GEoPolitics, MERcaNtilisM aND iDENtity-BuilDiNG
• Russiahasre-evaluatedtherisksofgeopoliticalcompetitionintheFarNorthandnowprefersapatternofbalancedcooperativebehaviour,asexemplifiedbythemaritimeborderagreementwithNorway.
• This cooperative track fulfils Russia’s ambitions only to a degree, soMoscowwill try to limitglobalizationoftheArctic,insistingontheprivilegesofthelittoralstatesandprioritizingtiesamongthe‘Arcticfive’.
• Development of the hydrocarbon reserves, particularly off-shore, requires the engagement ofWesternpartners,whoremainreluctanttoinvestduetoapoorinvestmentclimateandconsiderableuncertaintyoverdemand,whileGazpromandRosneftarealsoinnohurrytolaunchnewprojects.
• ThemainfactorundercuttingRussia’splansandambitionsfortheArcticinthemid-termwouldbethescarcityofresourcesdeterminedbytheslowrecoveryfromthemassiveeconomiccrisis.
Russia’s aRctic Policy
Pavel K. Baev
Research Professor
Peace Research institute, oslo (PRio)
Briefing Paper 73
17 December 2010
GEoPolitics, MERcaNtilisM aND iDENtity-BuilDiNG
the international Politics of Natural Resources and the Environment research programme
the Finnish institute of international affairs
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The maritime border delimitation deal betweenRussia and Norway sensationally announced byPresidentDmitriMedvedevinOsloon27April2010andsignedinMurmanskon15September2010war-rants a re-appraisal of Russia’s Arctic policy.Thepenchant forsensationalismoftenspillsover fromthemedia intopolicyanalysis,whichrecyclesper-ceptionsofthe‘struggleforresources’reachingtheintensityofa‘greatArcticgame’andescalatingintoa‘newColdWar’.1Inreality,however,Moscowhasnotoversteppedtherulesof international lawandhas remained committed to the ‘club regulations’ofseveralArcticinstitutions,so2010mightsetthetrendtowardsade-escalationoftensionsintheHighNorth.Itwouldhavebeentoosimplistictoexplainaway thepronounced emphasis on cooperation inRussia’sforeignpolicywithreferencestotheimpactoftheeconomicrecession,whichhasundercutthepreviousriseofambitiousself-assertiveness.Rather,theArcticpolicyisshapedbyadynamicinterplayofpoorlycompatibleRussianinterestsandintentions,andthispaperseekstodemonstratethatthisinter-play cannot be reduced to an equation of securityimperativesandeconomicdriversbecauseimmate-rialideasaddtoitscomplexity.
The softening of ‘hard security’
Thegeopolitical perspective on theArctic interac-tions typically passes for a ‘scientific approach’in Moscow and remains popular among Western
1 Themost cited anticipationof ‘an armedmaddash for its
resources’isBorgerson(2008).
adherents to traditional ‘realism’ (Howard, 2010).Thereisindeedacertainallureindrawingfrontiersand fault-lines, but the solid foundation for suchexercises could only be provided by constructingbalances of military power, and the High Northprovides rather unpromising data.The infrequentflightsofRussianstrategicbomberssincemid-2007have succeeded in capturing media attention, asdida fewCaribbeanandMediterraneancruisesbytheNorthernFleet,buttheplainfactisthatRussiaisfirmlysetonthetrendofArcticdemilitarization,albeitwithoutadmittingit.
The ambitious document ‘The Foundations of theRussianFederationStatePolicyintheArcticto2020’,approvedbyPresidentMedvedevinSeptember2008,prescribes‘buildinggroupingsofconventionalforcesin the Arctic zone capable of providing militarysecurity in differentmilitary-political conditions’,butRussianofficialshaveclarifiedthatnoincreasesin any component of military might are planned(Keffrpütz,2010).ThebrutallyradicalreformoftheRussianArmedForcesexecutedsinceautumn2008by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov involvessignificant downsizing and dismantling of the oldinfrastructureformassivemobilization(Baev,2010).
The central problem for theNorthern Fleet in theshort term remains the introduction of the newBorey-class generation of strategic submarinesarmedwiththeBulavaSLBM.TheBulavaprojecthasbeen in serious trouble since themid-2000s, andwhile the test inOctober2010was successful, theriskoffailureremainshigh.Ifthemissileweretobeapprovedfordeployment,themajorpartofthenavalbudgetfortherestofthedecadewouldgotowards
an encounter in the arctic: polar bears meet with the attack submarine USS honolulu that
surfaced close to the North Pole. Photo: alphonso Braggs / US Navy.
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nuclear weapons, which could still be reducedthroughunilateralinitiatives.Overall,MoscowhasdiscoveredtherisksofgeopoliticalgamesintheHighNorthandwillmostprobablyseektodemonstratesoberlybalancedbehaviour.
The devaluation of resource riches
TheperceptionoftheHighNorthasa‘treasurechest’ofnaturalresourceshasbecomethegospelinbothpolicy-makingforandpublicattitudetowardsthedevelopment of Russia’s vast northern periphery.While visiting a research station in Yakutia lastAugust, Prime Minster Vladimir Putin informedscientists that ‘According to rough estimates, thereservesdiscoveredtodateareworthapproximately$5trillion,includingoil,naturalgas,coal,goldanddiamonds.’ (Putin, 2010). The problem with thisstatementisnotthattheseestimatesareunverifiable,butthattheteamofRussianandGermanscientistsinvestigating climate change did not see any rel-evanceinthese‘data’.Infact,thereisnominimallyreliable Russian assessment of mineral resourcesbeyond the Arctic Circle, so all speculations takeastheirpointofdeparturethefiguresfromtheUSGeologicalSurvey,typicallygrosslymisinterpreted.2
Russian energy ‘majors’, in particular the state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft,which by law haveexclusive rights when it comes to developing
2 Thedefinition‘undiscovered’ isusuallyomitted inRussian
referencestothesedata,whichareavailableat(http://pubs.us-
gs.gov/fs/2008/3049/).
modernizationofthestrategiccapabilities.Thebestoption is that by 2025 sixBorey-class submarineswould enter service,while all Delta III-class andDeltaIV-classsubmarineswouldberetired,sothatthe numerical strength of this ‘armada’would bereducedbyahalf.TheworstoptionisthattheBorey-classsubmarineswouldberetrofittedforadifferentmissile,withtheresultthatby2015onlysixDelta-IVclasssubmarineswouldbeoperational,andfurtherprospectswouldremainunclear(Myasnikov,2010).
ThecostsoftheBorey/Bulavaprogrammearecertaintobeevenhigherin2010-2015thantheywereinthelate2000s,sothemodernizationoftheconventionalcapabilities and the infrastructure of the North-ernFleetwouldbe severely reduced.Further, themuch-debatedpurchaseoftheMistralamphibiousassaultshipwillnotaddtotheNorthernFleet’slistof ships (there is nomaintenance facility for heli-copters),andifmoreshipsofthisdesignarelaidupinRussianshipyards,Severodvinskishardlygoingtowin this contract.The only element of Russianmaritimepowerwhichhasbeenstrengthenedinthelast decade is the icebreaker fleet, but its deploy-mentforsecuringnavigationalongtheNorthernSearouteisprohibitivelyexpensiveincommercialterms(Zhurenkov,2010).
ThesumtotalofRussia’sdeployablemilitarycapa-bilitiesintheNorthern‘theatre’isstillgreaterthanthecombinedforcesofitsneighbours,butMoscowhasgood reason to feelvulnerable,particularly asfar as its strategic ‘bastion’ on theKola peninsulaisconcerned.HencethepronouncedreluctancetointeractwithNATOonArcticmatters;hencealsothenegativeattitudetowardsopeningtalksontactical
the change in the Northern Fleet order of battle. source: Military Balance, IISS, 1980-1981, 1989-1990, 2000-2001, 2010.
1980 1990 2000 2010
Strategic submarines 49 38 14 8
Attack submarines 126 120 23 22
Principal surface combatants 73 77 12 10
Patrol and coastal combatants 76 40 26 12
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offshoreoil andgasfields, presumablyoperate onthebasisofmorepreciseestimates.Theyare,how-ever,innohurrytoinvestincostlyprojectsontheArcticshelfandhaveevencutexplorationbudgets,withYuriTrutnev,ministerfornaturalresourcesandecology, arguing for reforming the legislation andopeningtheoffshore‘green-fields’toforeigninves-tors (Melnikov, 2010). Gazprom and Rosneft caneasilyblocksuchinitiatives,buttheycannotmakeaconvincingplanfordevelopingthelicencesthattheyhaveamassed.Speakingatthegasindustryconfer-ence inOctober 2010, Putin set a goal to increaseproductionfrom650bcmto1,000bcmayear,butGazprom’strackrecordprovesthatthegiantcom-pany is chronically unable to build its ‘upstream’base(Putin,2010b). Intheearly1990s, itsaverageannualproductionwasabout550bcm,and in themid-2000sitmanagedtoclimbtothesameplateau,beforeplungingto460bcmin2009andmakingapartialrecoveryat500bcmin2010.3
AttheheartofGazprom’sstrategicplanisthedevel-opment of Yamal, principally the giant Bovanen-kovskoegasfield.Fromthecompany’sperspective,thismovetotheArctic fromitscorebaseatNovyUrengoi just below the Arctic Circle makes littledifference in termsof technologyorworkingcon-ditions, and the fragile tundra ecologywill sufferjustthesamedevastatingdamage.Whatmakesthisprojectsohardistheneedtobuildbasicinfrastruc-ture,andeverydelaypushesthecostestimatesevenhigherasunfinishedworkdeteriorates.Thesituation
3 SeeInozemtsev(2010)foracriticalanalysisofGazprom’sper-
formance.
isverydifferentwiththeShtokmanproject,whichforGazpromisanexperimentalenterprisegenerat-ing valuable ‘know-how’ on the offshore produc-tion. Total and Statoil have good reason to doubtthe organization of this joint venture, since theconditionsthatlookedattractiveinthemid-2000shavebecomerather lessso in thesaturatedglobalgasmarket.Delaysovertheinvestmentdecisionareaperfectlyrationaltacticinanuncertainsituationwherepoliticalrisksremainafactor,despitePutin’spersonalcommitment.
The inflated perceptions of Arctic hydrocarbon‘treasures’aredisconnectedfromthepracticalitiesoftheRussianenergypolicy,whichgrantsamonopolyonexploitingtheseunder-researchedreservestotwostate-controlled companies that show little inter-est in tapping into them.What ismore, therehasbeenmuchspeculationthatMoscowwasmotivatedprimarilybyoilandgasinterestswhenstrikingthecompromiseborderdealwithNorway,butoncloserinspection it is hard to find any ‘hidden agenda’(Socor,2010).Indeed,GazpromkeepsreshufflingtheteamdealingwithShtokmanandremainsambivalentaboutfurtherstagesoftheproject,whileRosneftiscontenttoletStatoilcarryoutalltheinitialexplora-tion.GreedmaybeafactorinRussia’sArcticpolicyaimed atpreventingothers fromgaining access toresourcesthatRussiaisunabletodevelopinthefore-seeablefuture,butprofitmaximizationclearlyisnot.
The oddity of identity-building
Both‘hardsecurity’andmercantilismarecertainlyprominent in Russia’s Arctic policy but neither
the perception of the high North as a ‘treasure chest’ is
partly exaggerated, as estimates of the arctic hydrocarbon
reserves are unverifiable. Photo: Gazprom.
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provides an adequate explanation for its remark-able intensity.Putin’svisits toYamalclearlyserveGazprom’sinterests,butsomethingelseismotivat-inghimtotraveltoplaces likeFranzJosefLandorTiksi.Thepersistentdesireto‘GoNorth’cannotberationalizedintermsofcost-efficiencyorstrategicinterests, butmakes good sense in the context ofimages,discoursesandother‘intangibles’.
Russia’s state identity remains shaky twentyyearsinto its post-Soviet history, and the loudly pro-claimedintentiontoexpanditsNorthernbordersbysecuringcontroloveramillionsqkmoftheArcticshelfisbestunderstoodasanattempttoconsolidateit. Strictly speaking, the claimon this inaccessibleseabeddoesnotsignifyanyterritorialexpansionbutreferstotheratherhypotheticalexclusiveeconomicrights. Moscow first submitted it without muchpoliticalfanfaretotheUNCommissionontheLimitsof the Continental Shelf (CLCS) back in December2001 andwasnot reallydisappointedwhen itwasreturnedwitharequestformoredatahalfayearlater.
The claim was indeed rather poorly prepared astheattachedmapillustrates.Immediatelyafterthesensationalflag-plantingexpeditioninAugust2007,
Putinorderedthedocumenttobere-submitted,buttodatethepaperworkisstillnotready.4Thereareanumberoftechnicalproblemsrangingfromthelackofsamplesofdeep-waterdrilling(thereisnoequip-ment)tothelackofgoodmaps(theyremainmilitarysecrets),butthemainissueconcernstheobjectionsfrom theUS and Canada.Moscow had pinned itshopesontheratificationof theUNConventionontheLawof theSeaby theUS Senate,whichcouldhavepaved theway for thefinal settlementof themaritimeborderquestion,buttheObamaadminis-trationhasobviouslymisseditschancetogatherthenecessaryvotesforthistreaty.5
International recognition of Russia’s ‘ownership’ofahugechunkof theArcticshelf isnotgoingto
4 Anoverviewof the52claimssubmitted in the last sixyea-
rscanbefoundontheCLCSwebsite(http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm).
5 Visiting Vietnam in July 2010, US State Secreta-
ry Clinton confirmed that the Convention ‘has strong
bipartisan support in the United States, and one of our dip-
lomatic priorities over the course of the next year is to se-
cure its ratification in the Senate’; see Clinton (2010).
the map that Russia used when submitting its claim to the uN commission on the limits of continental shelf.
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happenanytimesoon,soMoscowhastotonedownitsmessage of ‘conquering theNorth’,which stillresonates with the electorate.There is no simpleexplanationforthispositivepublicattitudephenom-enon,whichisrootedinsubconsciousperceptionsof‘Northernness’asakeyfeatureofRussia(Medvedev,2001).The leadership isclearly trying toexploit it,combiningStalinistpropagandamethodswithmod-ernPR technologies;hencePutin’spatronageoverthe‘NorthPole–38’expeditionlaunchedinOctober2010–andhencealsohispoint‘Tobehonest,Russiaisanortherncountry’attheArcticForuminMoscow(Putin,2010b).Theproblemisthatgreaterpoliticalattention to theHighNorth inevitablybrings intofocustheproblemsofenvironmentalpollutionanddecayinginfrastructure,andtheabilitytochanneltheinvestmentsaccordinglyinatimeofprotractedrecessionisdoubtful.
Conclusions
Theclimateofinternationalcooperationisdefinitelywarming intheArcticasMoscowisseekingtode-escalate geopolitical tensions and turn the pageon the recent quasi-ColdWar.The engagement ofWestern partners is necessary for developing thehydrocarbon reserves in theHighNorth, but this
plainfactdoesnotimplyanyurgentaction:GazpromandRosneft are innohurry to startnewprojects,andWesternoil‘majors’arenotverytemptedtoputmoneyintocostlyjointventuresthatcouldbesub-jecttopoliticalpressure.ThecooperativetrackfulfilsRussia’sambitionsonlytoadegree,sincethevisionoftheArcticasa‘commonheritage’doesnotchimewiththeprevalentRussianperceptionsof‘conquer-ing’and‘owning’theHighNorth.MoscowwilltrytolimitglobalizationoftheArcticbyinsistingontheprivilegesofthelittoralstatesandprioritizingcoop-erationamongthe‘Arcticfive’,whoshoulddividetheshelfintonationalsectorsandthenjointlyman-agethecross-borderproblems.SustainingthehighArcticprofileisataskthatcannotbeaccomplishedonthecheap,andthe‘scarceresources’cursemightfrustrateRussia’sbestandworstintentions.
Pavel K. Baev
Research Professor
Peace Research institute, oslo (PRio)
isBN 978-951-769-290-8
issN 1795-8059
cover photo: Gazprom
layout: Juha Mäkinen
the Finnish institute of international affairs 2010
www.upi-fiia.fi
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Selected literature:
Baev, Pavel K., 2010. ‘Military reform against heavy
odds’, in anders Åslund, andrew Kuchins and sergei
Guriev (eds), Russia after the Economic crisis.
Washington: Peterson institute for international
Economics.
Borgerson, scott G., 2008. ‘arctic Meltdown’, Foreign
affairs, March/april, pp. 63-77.
clinton, hillary R., 2010. Remarks at the National
convention center, hanoi, 23 July (available at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm).
‘The Foundations of the Russian Federation state
Policy in the arctic to 2020’, 2008 (available in Russian
at the security council website at
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html).
howard, Roger, 2010. ‘Russia’s new front line’,
survival, april-May 2010, pp. 141-156.
inozemtsev, Vladislav, 2010. ‘Enemy of
modernization’, Vedomosti, 5 april (in Russian).
Kefferpütz, Roderick, 2010. ‘on Thin ice? (Mis)
interpreting Russian Policy in the high North’, CEPS
Policy Brief no. 205, February (http://www.ceps.eu/
book/thin-ice-misinterpreting-russian-policy-high-
north).
Medvedev, sergei, 2001. ‘Glenn Gould, Finland, Russia
and the North’, international Politics, March , pp. 91-
102.
Melnikov aleksei, 2010. ‘Dog on the shelf’, Gazeta.
ru (in Russian), 5 February (http://www.gazeta.ru/
comments/2010/02/05_a_3320064.shtml).
Myasnikov, Viktor, 2010. ‘No alternative for Bulava’,
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 15 october (in
Russian).
Putin, Vladimir, 2010a. Meeting with researchers of
the lena-2010 expedition (official translation available
at http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/ru/11848/
events/11882/).
Putin, Vladimir, 2010b. Remarks at the conference
on the general scheme for gas industry development
until 2030, Novy urengoi, 11 october (official
translation available at http://premier.gov.ru/eng/
visits/ru/12528/events/12539/)
Putin, Vladimir, 2010c. speech at the international
forum ‘The arctic: territory of Dialogue’, 23 september
(official translation available at http://premier.gov.ru/
eng/events/news/12304/).
socor, Vladimir, 2010. ‘Russo-Norwegian treaty paves
way for joint energy projects in the arctic’, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 17 september 2010.
trenin, Dmitri and Pavel Baev, 2010. ‘The arctic: a View
from Moscow’, carnegie Report, CEIP: Washington DC,
september, (available at http://carnegieendowment.
org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41592).
Zhurenkov, Kirill, 2010. ‘Northern illusions’,
Kommersant-ogonyok, 27 september (in Russian).
Photo: tom thiel.