russia’s defence reformminister serdyukov. however, at the same time, serdyukov “did not...
TRANSCRIPT
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Russia’s defence RefoRm
Katri Pynnöniemi fiia BRiefinG PaPeR 126 • march 2013
U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I
U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T
THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S
126
assessinG the Real ‘seRdyuKov heRitaGe’
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• TheRussianArmedForcesareundergoingalongandexpensivereform,whichaimsatpreparingthecountrytonewsecurity threats.Thereformswere initiatedduringthe termof the formerministerofdefence,AnatolySerdyukov.HisdismissalinNovember2012initiatedadebateonthefutureofthereforms.
• Asofyet,thechangesmadebythenewministerofdefenceSergeiShoiguarecorrectionstotheexistingplan,andnotanoverallrevisionofitscontours.Themostpronounceddifferenceisashiftinfavourofdomesticmilitaryindustry.
• In its current condition,Russia’s defence industry isnot able to absorb themajor increase inmilitaryspending inanefficientmanner.Fromthe technologicalandmanagerialperspectives,mostofthemilitary-industrialenterprisesfunctionfarbelowtheinternationalaverage.
Russia’s defence RefoRm
fiia Briefing Paper 126
march 2013
assessinG the Real ‘seRdyuKov heRitaGe’
the eu’s eastern neighbourhood and Russia research programme
the finnish institute of international affairs
U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I
U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T
THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S
Katri Pynnöniemi
Researcher
the finnish institute of international affairs
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 3
Introduction
ThereformofRussia’sArmedForceshasbeenpor-trayedasoneofthesuccessstoriesrealizedbythecountry’s current leadership in the last ten-yearperiod.Thereformwasalsothoughttobeirrevers-ible. The dismissal of Defence Minister AnatolySerdyukovonNovember6,2012,andhisreplace-mentwitharmygeneralSergeiShoigu,theformerMinister of Emergency Situations and governorof theMoscow region,hasunderminedpreviouscertainty.Forbetterorworse,ithasalsosparkedadebateonthefutureofthedefencereform.
Indeed,thedebateinRussiaoverthereal‘Serdyukovheritage’hasbroughttotheforetheinherentweak-nessesofthecurrentpoliticalsystemanditslimitedcapacitytosteersuchamajortransformation.Butmore than anything, the ‘Serdyukov heritage’ isareminderofthefactthatanyreform–howeveressential itmaybe– issubjectto incompletenessandtherecurrenceofallthingsoldinanewform.
Thepurposeofthispaperistoilluminatetherealcontoursofthedefencereform,andthustopointout the key factors that aid in understanding itsincompleteness.ThepaperwillalsoparticipateinthedebateonRussia’smilitaryprocurement,insofarasitpaysattentiontosomerecentchangesinthepoliticalsignificanceofthiscolossaltask.QuestionsrelatingtoRussia’sevolvingsecuritylandscapeandstrategic thinking remain, however, outside thescopeofthispaper.
The defence reform will be polished not reversed
Theimplementationofthe‘NewLook’(Novyi Oblik)reformhasbeenregardedasanessentialstepthatneedstobetakeninordertoprepareRussiafor21stcenturywarfare.ThechangewasoutlinedbyPresi-dentVladimirPutinbackin2006,butthereformprocesswas not activated until after the August2008war with Georgia. Although Russia gainedwhatitwasfightingforinthatconflict,theopera-tionofRussia’sArmedForcesduringthewarwasfarfromsatisfactory.ThereformplanwasformallylaunchedinOctober2008underPresidentDmitryMedvedev’s supervision, andwas set to prepareRussia’sArmedForces for theneedsof local andregionalconflicts,asopposedtolarge-scalemobi-lizationàlaColdWar.
Themaincomponentsofthereform,summarizedintheSwedishDefenceAgencyreport,include:down-sizing of the officer corps, dismantling of emptycadreunits,andtheintroductionofanewcommandsystemaswellasanewarmsbranch.Inaddition,70percentoftheweaponryandequipmentsoftheArmedForces shouldqualify asmodernby 2020.Whatmadethedifferencetopreviousattemptsatreformwasanideato“simultaneouslychangetheorganization, introduce modern command andcontrol technology,and improveproceduresandthecompetenceofofficers”.1
According to an announcementmade byMinis-terSerdyukovinNovember2011,the‘NewLook’reform of the Armed Forces had been fulfilled.Indeed, far-reaching changes have taken place.Yet, for external analysts this conclusion seemspremature as far as the implementation of the‘permanent readiness’ objective and the transi-tiontoa‘non-mobilization’armyareconcerned.Thecritics,amongthemmilitaryanalystRogerN.McDermott,saythatthenewelementsintroducedin the course of the reformprocess are blendedwith “the old army and itsmanifold problems”,and the outcome of the reform is incomplete atbest.2Itisthisincompletenesscharacterizingthereformthatmakesitvulnerabletocallstoreversethewholeprocess.
However,PresidentPutin’smessagetonewDefenceMinister Shoigu has been unambiguous in thisregard.“Thefutureleaderofthisvitallyimportantministry,”Putindeclaredtohimattheirfirstmeet-ingonNovember6,2012,“mustbeabletocontinueall the positive initiatives that have been carriedout in recent years and guarantee the dynamic
1 CVendilPallin,Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year
Perspective,FOI,2012,p.15;SeealsoAArbatov&VDvorkin,
Novaja Voennaja Reforma Rossii,WorkingPaper2,Carnegie
MoscowCenter,2011.URL:http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/WP2-2011_military_rus.pdf,retrievedonApril5,2012.
2 MCarlssonandJNorberg,‘TheArmedForces’,inCVendil
Palin,opuscited,p.100.RNMcDermott,The Reform of
Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces. Problems, Challenges
and Policy Implications,TheJamestownFoundation,Wash-
ington,2011,p.400.Asimilarargumentwasalsomadeby
Russianmilitaryanalystsinareportpublishedinearly2011.
AArbatovetal.,Novaya Voennaya Reforma Rossii,Carnegie
MoscowCenter.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 4
development of the nation’s Armed Forces”. Heemphasized“mattersthathadnotbeenaddressedforyears”,suchasapay increase forservicemenand solving the housing problem. Later, at theexpandedmeetingoftheMoDBoardon27February2013,Putinacknowledgedthemajorchangesmadetocommandsystemsatthetacticalandoperationallevels, and underlined that the reform processingeneralwasontherighttrack.Thesubsequentchangeswouldnotimplythereversaloftheearlierdecisionbutwouldbeabout“polishingandfine-tuning”,Putinstated.
Butwherewillthis‘fine-tuning’leadthereform?Can the steps taken so farbyShoigubringaboutmorecomprehensiveadjustments toPutin’splanthanwereperhapsoriginallyintended?Andfinally,howdeeplywillthereal‘Serdyukovheritage’–theset of arrangements used in implementing thereform–bere-adjusted?Notallofthesequestionscanbeanswereddirectlyatthemoment.Thispaperfocusesonthelastquestionsinceitcertainlyshedslightonsomeofthemainproblemsofthereformprocess,aswellastheoverallpoliticalconstraintsofthereform.
Thethreespheresthatarecriticalforunderstandingwhatthe‘Serdyukovheritage’isallaboutincludeoutsourcing,themanagementofMoDproperty,andthe implementation of themilitary procurementprogramme.Thefirsttwospheresareatthecoreofthedefencereformasfarasthereorganizationofthearmyunitsandreductioninpersonnelarecon-cerned.However,thethirdspheretouchesontheconflictbetweentheMoDandthedomesticmilitaryindustryovermilitaryprocurement.
ThechangesintroducedbySerdyukovwereaimedat‘optimization’oftheexistingresources,includ-ing minimizing corruption and maximizing theuseofscarcehumanresourceswithintheArmedForces.Interestinglyenough,bothoutsourcingandpropertymanagementwerehandledthroughthestate-rundefenceministrycompany,Oboronservis.ItisthiscompanythatiscurrentlyattheheartofthecorruptionscandalthatledtothedismissalofMinisterSerdyukov.
However, at the same time, Serdyukov “did notencouragetransparencyandindependentscrutiny,but instead concentrated power and control inhimself”, as a recent report on theRussianMoD
concludes.3This latter factormay imply, at leastin theory, that the newminister has significantadministrative leverage over the reform process.However,withhindsight,itissafetosaythatthemethods chosen to implement the objectives ofthe ‘NewLook’reformhavecreatedanewsetofproblems.Itisthispartofthe‘Serdyukovheritage’thatismostdifficult,ifnotimpossible,toaddressunderthecurrentpoliticalsystem.Inthefollowing,thethreemaincomponentsofthisheritagewillbescrutinized.
The ‘Serdyukov heritage’ under review
Outsourcing as a partial fix for a fundamental challenge
For theRussianArmedForces, themaindefencereformissuehasbeentheplannedcutsinthenum-berofofficersandtheshiftfromalargemobiliza-tionarmy toamorecompactbutallegedlymoremobilestructure.Accordingtotheinitialscheme,over90percentofarmyunitsandalmosthalfoftheairforceandnavyunitsweretobeabolished.Inearly2011theoriginalplantoreducethenumberofofficersfrom320,000to150,000wasreversedandthecurrentobjectiveistohave220,000officersintheArmedForces.4Thestepsawayfromthemass-mobilization army towards the ‘NewLook’weredeemednecessarygivenRussia’schangingsecuritylandscapeand the actual scarcityof resources tomaintainthemilitaryinitspreviousform.
Consequently,themostsignificantstructural fac-torbehindthedefencereformisthedemographiccrisisandthepoorstateofpublichealth,whichbothunderminethepurportedgoalofhavingamillionstrongarmy.Between2011and2020, theannualnumberofmenreachingtheageof18willbeonly600,000to700,000.This isatapproximately thesamelevelastheannualrecruitmentraterequiredtoreachthenumericalstrengthofonemillionmen.
3 MCarlsson,The Structure of Power – an Insight into the
Russian Ministry of Defence,FOI,November2012,p.40.
4 MinisterShoiguhaspubliclywelcomedtheideatolookinto
caseswhereanofficerhasbeendischargedunfairlyand
offertheseindividualsachancetoreturntoservice.How
far-reachingthisreversemovementwillbe,isdifficultto
estimateatthemoment.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 5
AnalystshavesuggestedthatthesizeoftheArmedForces is likely to diminish to between 500,000and700,000menby2020.ThisevidentlyalsohasimplicationsforRussia’sabilitytoachievethegoalofcreatingfullymanned,combat-readyunits.5
Giventhissituation,twoissuesshouldbetackledsimultaneously:armyserviceshouldbemademoreattractivetoyoungRussianmen,andtheeffective-nessofthemilitarytrainingshouldbeconsiderablyimproved.Outsourcingwasofferedaspartofthesolution.SinceJanuary1,2012catering,cleaning,electricity,centralheatingandthemaintenanceofhousingandtrainingfacilitieshavebeentransferredto independent commercial companies,many ofwhichweresubsidiariesofthestate-ledcompany,Oboronservis.The ideawas thatby relieving theunitsofnon-corefunctions,suchascleaningandcatering,theeffectivenessofconscripttraining(thedurationofwhichwasreducedtotwelvemonths)could be enhanced. Other changes were alsointroducedinthehopeofattractingmuch-neededspecialists capable of conducting modern, high-technologycombatoperations.6
Thosewhochoosetorejectthispartofthe‘Serdyu-kovheritage’haveemphasizedthattheoutsourcingmodelwas, in itself, detrimental to themilitarycapabilityandonlyfacilitatedtheembezzlementofstatefunds.Inhisfirstinterview,MinisterShoigureferredtoinformationaccordingtowhich35-37percentofthe120,000personnelworkinginclean-ingandcateringare“notcitizensofRussia”,thusimplyingthat theoutsourcingcontributedto theinfluxoflow-paidimmigrantworkers.Accordingtotheminister,thepreferenceinthefuturewouldbetotransferjobsto“thoselivinginthemilitarytowns”. Reportedly, the responsibility for clean-ingthebarrackshasbeentransferredbacktothesoldiers,butinotherrespects,thechangesaimedat‘humanizing’armylifewillbemaintained.7Allinall,
5 MCarlssonandJNorberg,‘TheArmedForces’,inCVendil
Palin,opuscited,p.102-103;MBarabanov‘Kontraktnaya
armiyavazhneekontraktovnazakupkutehniki’,Vedomosti
,26.02.2013.
6 ANikolsky,‘Oboronservis–whatawaitsSerdyukov’slega-
cy’, Moscow Defence Brief 6,2012.
7 ´Reformearmiinuzhenzdravyismysl’,Komsomolskaya
Pravda,10February2013,retrieved13February2013,
http://www.kp.ru/print/26030/2947853.
therestructuringoftheOboronserviscompanywillresultinchangestothecurrentpractices,althoughinprinciple,outsourcingcertain functionstothecommercialsectorwillcontinue.
Property management under Serdyukov
Inessence,thedefencereformisaboutrearrangingtheproperty andpeople that theRussianArmedForceshaveaccumulatedovertheyears.Thispro-cess affects close to onemillion people and callsfortherelocationand‘optimization’ofenormousquantitiesofmilitaryhardware,thousandsofgar-risons,andotherinfrastructure.
Thestate-ledcompanyOboronserviswascreatedin 2008 tomanage the ‘optimization’ ofmilitaryproperty.Ithasover200subsidiariesthatmanagepropertyandrealestate,construction,maintenance,aswellasthegrowthanddeliveryofagriculturalproducts. In November 2008 the company wasgrantedexclusiverightstosellministryrealestate.Thisthecompanydid,focusingespeciallyonprop-erty located in Moscow and St. Petersburg.Theinvestigation intocorruptionatthecompanyhasrevealedthatithasbeeninvolvedinauctioningoffmilitarypropertybelowmarketprices,andinotherschemeswhich,accordingtopreliminaryestimates,haveresultedinaround4billionroublesinlossesforthestate.8
Accordingtomediareports,oneofthebiggestcon-structioncompaniesinRussia,theSU-155,hasbeennamedasoneof thebeneficiariesofdealsunder-taken by Oboronservis. Between 2009 and 2010,theMoDorderednewapartmentsfromSU-155tothetuneof21billionroubles,andinearly2012thesamecompanysecuredanewhousingcontractfor13billionroubles.During2012,thecompanybuiltfouroutoffifteenassignedresidentialbuildingsinMolzhaninovonearMoscow.TheareawaspreviouslyearmarkedfortheIntekocompany(ownedbythewifeoftheformerMayorofMoscow,YuriLuzhko),
8 ISafronovetal.,‘Voentorgokonchen’,Kommersant,7
November2012,retrieved7November2012,http://kommer-
sant.ru/doc/2061535/print;‘Serdyukovapprovedtermsof
Oboronservissales,reportsays’,Moscow Times,February
252013,retrievedMarch18,2013,http://www.themoscow-
times.com/news/article/serdyukov-approved-terms-of-
oboronservis-sales-report-says/476021.html.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 6
andwouldserveasanalternativethoroughfarefortheMoscow-St.Petersburgmotorway.Shouldtheroadbebuilt,thevalueofpropertyinMolzhaninovoislikelytoincrease.9
From theviewpointof themilitary, theproblemwiththis(andother)projectsisthattheresidentialbuildingsbuiltfortheministryareoflowquality,sometimes lack hot water or electricity, or arelocatedininconvenientplaces.Therearealsocaseswhere thebuildingshavebeenconstructedwith-outpermissionaltogetherorcosttwiceasmuchasapartmentsinadjacentareas.Apartfromthepos-sibleembezzlementofgovernmentfunds,thesitu-ationposesseriousobstaclestosolvingthe‘housingproblem’,contrarytoPresidentPutin’sstatementabove.
Duetooftencontradictoryorsimplyunavailablefigures, it is difficult to grasp the dimensions ofthehousingproblemwithanydegreeofaccuracy.Officersdischargedfromservicemayhavewaitedinlineforadecadeforhousingwhich,accordingtothelaw,thestatemustprovideforthemwithinthreemonths.InNovember2007,PresidentPutinorderedthethennewministerofdefencetosolvethematterby2012.Over330billionroubles(9bil-lioneuros)wereallocatedforthistaskin2008,andtheplanwastobuildover300,000newapartmentsfortheministry inthethree-yeartimeframe, inaddition to thealreadyexistingpoolof 226,000apartments.
Accordingtooneestimate,intheperiod2008-2012,130,000 apartmentswere built. Nevertheless, inearly2012almost80,000officerswerestillinlineforhousing.By theendof theyear, thisnumberhad dropped to 33,000, only to climb again by24,000duetopeopleneedinganapartmentin2013.Inhisfirstinterview,MinisterShoiguarguedthatinsteadofmanagingtheconstructionprocessitself,theministry shouldprovide those in linewith amonetarytransferthatwouldallowthemtobuyanapartmentonthepropertymarket.Adecisionhas
9 EMaetnaya&GPetelin‘Vdele“Oboronservisapoyavilis’
stroiteli’,Izvestiya,9January2013.
alreadybeenmadetoallowlump-sumpaymentsforofficers,startingonJanuary1,2014.10
Signals aremixed on the future direction of theMoD’spropertymanagement.ShoiguhasindicatedthatOboronserviswillbereorganized,andrelatedtothis,theministry’spropertymanagementwillbe‘de-commercialized’.Ontheotherhand,thepre-viouspolicylineregardingthemilitarytownshasbeenmaintained.Theirnumberwilldecreasefrom23,000(in2008)tobetween400and500(not200asoriginallyplanned).11
Theresponsibilityforpublicinfrastructures,includ-ingthehousingofofficersandservicemen,heatingsystems,electricityprovidersandother facilitiesin these townswill be transferred from themili-tarytoregionalandmunicipalgovernments.Thisprocess got underway a few years ago and willcontinueunderShoigu’ssupervision.Yet,giventhedire economic straits thatmanyRussian regionsandmunicipalitiesareinatthemoment,coupledwiththelowgrowthprospectsforthefuture,thistransformationmayleadtothefurtherdegenerationofpublicinfrastructuresontheRussianperipher-ies.This,inturn,willcontributetoincreasing,notdecreasing disparity between the rich and poorregionsinthecountry,andgrowingsocialtensions.
The Russian military industry: from oblivion to the centre of politics
Thelastpieceofthe‘Serdyukovheritage’isperhapsthe fundamental one. It concerns the conflict ofinterests between the MoD and Russia’s domes-tic military industry over the implementationof the arms procurement programme.The latter
10 VSolovev‘Voennayareforma2009-2012godov’,Nezavi-
simaya Gazeta,12December2008;EKozichev,‘Chemza-
pomnilsyaAnatolySerdyukovnapostuministraoborony’,
Kommersant,7November2012,retrieved7November2012,
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2061562/print;‘Reformearmii
nuzhenzdravyismysl’,Komsomolskaya Pravda,10Febru-
ary2013,retrieved13February2013,http://www.kp.ru/
print/26030/2947853.
11 TheMinistryofEmergencySituationsisplanningtoturn
someofthepreviousmilitarytownsintooperationalcent-
ers.Emercom,20March,2013,http://www.mchs.gov.ru/
articles/interview/Pressa/item/390302/,retrieved25March
2013.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 7
(GPV-2020)wasacceptedin2010andisworth22.5trillionroubles,about550billioneuros.Thisisasig-nificantincreasecomparedwiththepreviouspro-gramme(until2015),whichwasallocatedaround5trillionroubles(approx.113billioneuros).
Theargumentputforwardbyex-chiefoftheGeneralStaff,GeneralNikolaiMakarov,andDeputyDefenceMinister Vladimir Popovkin, was that the MoDwouldoptforforeignsystemsaslongasthemilitaryindustrywasunabletoprovidesatisfactoryprod-uctsatareasonableprice.Insteadofplacingorderswithdomesticindustry,theMoDsoughtpartnersabroad. It both purchased ready-made westerntechnologiesand initiated jointprojectsbetweenRussianandwesterncompanies,theFrench-builthelicopter carrierMistral being themost famouscase.TheconflictbetweentheMoDandthemilitaryindustryhascontinuouslyledtoasituationwheretheannualprocurementplanhadtoberesolvedatthehighestpoliticallevel.
AfterSerdyukov’sdismissal,speculationsurfacedintheRussianpressthattheMoDhadwantedtobypass the very fundament of Russia’s militaryexport structure: the state-owned arms importand export intermediary Rosoboronexport anditsde factohead,SergeiChemezov.Chemezov isPresidentPutin’sformercolleaguefromDresdenandhehasbeeninstrumentalintheconsolidationof themilitary industry under vertically ownedstatecorporationsthroughoutthe2000s.Currently,he is thehead of theRussianTechnologies StateCorporation(Rostec),whichwascreated in2007andcomprisesover600companies,oneofwhichisRosoboronexport.Rumourhasitthattheunoffi-cialfunctionofOboronserviswastoestablishlinksabroadindependentlyofRosoboronexport.MinisterSerdyukov’sdismissalledtotheabruptdemiseofthisscheme.12
As alreadynoted, corrections and changes intro-ducedbythenewminister,Shoigu,havenotbeenintendedasacomprehensiverevisionofthedefencereform,althoughitmaywellbethatinthecourseof implementation, the ‘Serdyukovheritage’willbe reformed. This is at least the main hypoth-esisvoicedbymanyRussianmilitaryanalysts.But
12 ANikolsky,‘Oboronservis–whatawaitsSerdyukov’s
legacy’,Moscow Defence Brief6,2012.
whenitcomestotheimplementationofthearmsprocurementprogramme and themodernizationofthemilitaryindustry,thesituationseemstobedevelopingtheotherwayaround.
TheDeputyPrimeMinister,DmitryRogozin,whois responsible in theRussiangovernment for thedevelopment of themilitary industry, hasmadeitknownhowdissatisfiedhewaswith theprevi-ousministerandtheexistingpracticesregardingthe implementation of the arms procurementprogramme. Inhisannualreportonthedevelop-ments in themilitary industry,Rogozindeclared2012astheyearoftransitionfrom‘manualcontrol’to‘automaticregime’.Withthis,hewasimplyingthatthetenserelationsbetweentheMoDandthemilitaryindustryneededtonormalize,andthatthetaskofimplementingthemilitaryprocurementplanwouldbecomea‘normalroutine’.Recently,Minis-terShoiguwentsofarastodeclarethattheMinistryofDefencewouldliketoseeotherministriestakingitsplaceinnegotiationswiththemilitaryindustryoverpricesofweaponry.13
Inthesamespeech,Rogozinalsoannouncedthatthemilitaryprocurementorderhadbeenfulfilledby99percentin2012,andby100percentwhenitcametothenuclear industry. Inanotherconnec-tion,Rogozinhas,however,confirmedthatatotalof7,200correctionswererequiredtotheoriginalplanbeforeitwasactuallyfulfilled.
Accordingtoinformationleakedaboutthediscus-sionthat tookplacearoundthesametime intheRussian Duma, only 20 per cent of the existingmilitary-industrialenterprisesevencomeclosetointernationalstandardstechnologically.Overhalfoftheindustryhasalreadygonebeyondthestagewhereitsrevivalwouldmakeanysense,auditoroftheAccountsChamberoftheRFAleksandrPiskunovisreportedtohavesaid.Theformulationofanewprocurementprogrammefortheyears2016-2025,aprocessthatwasinitiatedrecently,couldthereforebereadasanindicatorofproblemsinimplementingthecurrentone.14
13 VKuzminandOPrasolov‘OPKvkadre:Oboronkepoobesh-
chalinovyevozmozhnosti’,March20,2013,retrievedMarch
212013,http://www.rg.ru/2013/03/20/opk-site.html.
14 AGolts,‘Otechestvapoluzashchitniki’,Ezhednevny
Zhurnal ,22February2013.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 8
Russianmilitaryanalystshavepointedoutthatthegapbetweenpublicannouncementsconcerningthemilitaryindustry,anditsactualcapacitytoperform,aredivergingratherthanconverging.Theexcessivesecrecyunderwhichthedefencebudgetisprepareddoesnotallowforindependentscrutinyofthesitu-ationorpublicdiscussionofthesematterstoevolve.ThechairmanofthepresidiumoftheCouncilofFor-eignandDefencePolicy,SergeiKaraganov,recentlyreferredtothealarming“absenceofanacademicand public discussion of military priorities” inRussia. The few ‘liberally-minded’ analysts areoverwhelmedbythoserepresentingtheviewsofthemilitaryindustry,Karaganovwrites.Theabsenceofpublicdiscussionmayleadto“manymistakestobepaidfortoodearly”,heconcludes.15Therhetoricusedtolegitimizetheincreaseindefencespendingisanothercauseforconcern.
Wordssuchas‘saboteur’,‘foreignagent’and‘Gos-plan’16 have special connotations in the Russianpoliticallexicon.Allofthesewordshavereturnedtothepublicsphere,includingdebatesoverdefencereformandthefulfillmentofthearmsprocurementprogramme.ThechoiceofRogozin isnoaccidentinthiscontext.Russia’sformerenvoytoNATOandformerleaderofthenationalistpartyRodina,Rogo-zinisexpectedtoplayoffthenationalistic-patrioticsentimentsandtraditionalthreatperceptionsthatprevailamongthegeneralpublicagainsttheimageofRussiaportrayedbythosewhodonotwanttoseetheRussianmilitaryindustrycapitalizingonitspastsuccess.
TherearetwopossibleandplausibleexplanationsforRogozin’snewrole.First,his task is to speakin favourof themilitary industryand toprovidecoverfortherealrestructuringofthealmost1,400existingdefenceenterprises.Ontheeveofhisthirdpresidential term,Putinblessedtheplantomod-ernize500strategicallyimportantcompaniesinthedefence industryby 2015.Only those companiesinvolvedintheimplementationofthemilitarypro-curementplanmaybeadmittedtothemoderniza-tionprogramme.Implicitinthisdiscussionistheideathattheremainingcompanieswillbeclosed
15 SKaraganov,‘SecurityStrategy:WhyArms?’,Russia in
Global Politics,26October2012.
16 Gosplanwasthecommitteeresponsibleforeconomic
planningintheSovietUnion.
down,althoughanydirectreferencetothispossi-bilityisusuallyavoidedinthepublicdebate.17Somerestructuringisevidentlyongoing,butwhetheritwill leadtoanactualimprovementinproductionperformanceisdifficulttojudge.
TheotherplausibleexplanationisfarsimplerandislinkedtogeneraldevelopmentsinRussianpolitics.StartingwiththeparliamentaryelectionsinDecem-ber2011,thepoliticallandscapeinRussiahasbeendivided into Kremlin supporters and anti-Putinactivists.Rogozinis‘atthefront’toplacatethesitu-ationinthemonotownsontheRussianperiphery,aswell as in the vicinity ofMoscow, by offeringthema‘rayofhope’intheformofdividendsfromthedefencebudget.Eitherway,theKremlintacticmaywork.ButasmanywhohavefollowedRogo-zin’scareersay,hemaybeaskillfuldemagogue,butheisalsounpredictableandthereforeadangerouspoliticianforRussiatohaveatthepresenttime.
In conclusion: greater attention required, not alarmism
ManyRussian liberal politicians or analysts havedrawntheconclusion that the incompletenessofthedefencereformand,morespecifically,thecir-cumstancessurroundingthedismissalofDefenceMinisterSerdyukov,provethatthecurrentpoliticalregimehasexhausteditsresourcesforchange.Thefamous‘FourI’s’slogan–institutions,infrastruc-tures,innovationandinvestments,hailedasessen-tialdriversofchangeatthebeginningofMedvedev’spresidency, is activelyomitted frompresent-daydebates.Thepossibilityoftheevolutionarychangesimagined by Medvedev has been replaced withuncertainty.AnalystsinRussiaareaskingwhetherPutinhasembarkedupona‘revolutionarystrategy’,and is about to undo the ‘corruption for loyalty’scheme, a development that would effectively“underminethepositionofRussia’scurrentruling
17 ‘V.V.Putinprovelsoveshtshanieporealizatsiizadatsh
postavlennyhvjegopredvybornyhstatjahvkatshestvekan-
didatanapostPresidentaRF’,22March2012,http://archive.
premier.gov.ru/events/news/18490/,retrieved18March
2013;‘PrimeministerV.PutinchairsmeetinginKomsomol-
sk-on-Amurongovernmentpolicyonthedefenceindustry’s
developmentto2020andbeyond’,20February2012,http://
archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18194/,retrieved
18March2013.
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the finnish institute of inteRnational affaiRs 9
class”.18Thus,theweakeningofthestatecapacitytoactuallycarryoutandgovernitsimplementationisthemaincauseforconcernintheRussiandomesticdebate, whether it concerns outsourcing or theintroductionofanewtypeofcontrolmechanism,suchasthe“verticallyintegratedmulti-levelsys-temofautomatedcontrol”.19
Expectations in theWest about Russia’smilitarybuild-up seem to be at odds with the Russiandomesticdebates.TheRussianhabitofannouncingfar-reachinggoalsforreform,anddeclaringthemcomplete before long, has clearly contributed tothe discussion on the heightenedmilitary threatfromRussia.However, thealarmismwithwhichtheincreaseinRussianmilitaryspendinghasbeenmetintheWestseemsmisplaced.Aseriesoffactsderived from the ongoing investigation into thecorruptionscandalattheMoDattestthatRussia’sdefencereformisgoingtobealongandexpensiveprocess.
Inturn,commencingtheserialproductionofnewmodern weapon systems as required under thecurrentarmsprocurementprogrammeremainsanopenquestion.Thisisparticularlypertinentif,assomeanalystshavesuggested,therivalrybetween‘foreign imports’ versus ‘domestic production’ isactuallyabouttheredirectionandmanagementofillicit flows accumulated in this sector.The rela-tivebackwardnessoftheRussianmilitaryindustryclearlydoesnothelp in achieving thepurportedgoalseither.
AsSergeiKaraganovputsitintheabove-mentionedarticle,“themilitarybuildup isexpectedtocom-pensatefortherelativeweaknessinotherrespects– economic, technological, ideological and psy-chological”.Trappedbythis‘theweakgetbeaten’mentalityandsurvivalist strategies,Russia’scur-rentleadershipwillmostlikelycontinuetoconfuseWesternpoliticiansinthefutureaswell.Thereisno
18 KEggert‘Putin’srevolutionarymessagetoRussia’sruling
elite’,RIANovosti,18.01.2013,retrieved15March2013,
http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20130118/178864441/Due-
West-Putins-Revolutionary-Message-to-Russias-Ruling-
Elite.html.
19 SeealsoVLitovkin,‘Armiiprikazanonesharahatsya’,Neza-
visimaya gazeta,28February2013,retrieved8March2013,
http://ng.ru/printed/279538.
foreseeableeasywayoutinthissituation.Therefore,attention to the evolving Russian security land-scapeanddomesticdriversofthereformprocessisrequired,aswellasprofoundknowledgeofthedetails.Butalarmismwouldbeprematuretosaytheleast,ifnotentirelymisplaced.
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