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Sacrificial Investigations

Vincent P. Ciminna, Ph.D.

Chapter Three - Terminology ( Mimesis )

"Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one

of his advantages over the lower animals being

this, that he is the most imitative creature in the

world, and learns at first by imitation."

Aristotle, Poetics 1448b5-10

*****

3.0 - Background

If one could state the main 'formal' deficiency of Girard's exposition of the surrogate

victimage mechanism and of the theory of mimetic desire, it would have to be his vague or

'equivocal' use of terminology. Girard approaches the complex issues of violence and religion,

sacrifice and acquisitive mimesis from a decidedly 'rhetorical' perspective. This approach has done

more to 'obfuscate' these psycho-cultural issues than it has to illuminate them.

While it is certainly true that Girard's corpus of writings is far more accessible than the

work of Lacan or Derrida, two thinkers among others, whose ideas figure prominently in his

writings, his primary terminology, especially in VS , is woefully lacking in precision [1].

Throughout the entire range of his works, his discourse is ambiguous and/or characterized

by polyvalent meanings. In a deconstructionist idiom, one might say that the essential

nomenclature of 'desire' - mimetic desire, acquisitive imitation, conflictual imitation, etc. - is

inexact precisely because the central terms Girard employs are all 'floating signifiers'. Depending

upon the context in which they are used, these terms, expressions, etc. have multiple associations.

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Girard has not thought it necessary to develop a rigorous 'technical terminology' or

architectonic on the model perhaps of Jean-Michel Oughourlian in MND, or that of Paisley

Livingston in MD[2], two authors whose 'meta-languages' I will discuss towards the conclusion of

this chapter.

Girard's use of technical vocabulary oscillates between rhetorical phrasing and abstract

jargon. (Most of his 'jargon' can be found in Book One or Book Three of CC .) It is arguable that

this lack of conceptual rigor in his presentation of the generative theory of culture and the theory of

inter-dividual relations has largely been responsible for the dismissal of his 'hypothesis' in some

quarters as well as for its reformulation by others, including myself.

As a way of clarifying Girard's provocative, though controversial, assertions, and as a way

of providing a modicum of conceptual background, this chapter, a provisional genealogy of

'mimesis' under erasure is devoted to a highly selective examination of 'mimetic' ideas. I consider

how the 'term' has been used in both the humanities and the sciences. Let me emphasize at the

outset that my discussion is not intended by any means to be an exhaustive treatment. It only

serves as a preliminary orientation for my subsequent discussion of the Girardian theory of origin

in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight.

Let me begin this chapter by simply offering a few provisional 'definitions'[3].

3.1 - The Definition of Mimesis [4]

The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary (1991) provides the following definition of the word

mimesis: '...a close external resemblance of an animal to another that is distasteful or harmful to

predators of the first [5].

In the Ninth (i.e. 9th) Edition of Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott's Greek-English

Lexicon, 'mimesis' is described as being a 'transliteration' of the Greek term. It is not a translation

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of the word. 'Imitation' is the English equivalent. The second meaning provided is 'representation'

by means of art [6].

Thus, despite being cited in most dictionaries, including the Oxford English Dictionary, the

word has never been completely naturalized in English. In the OED, two entries allow for further

clarification. 'Imitation' is: '... the action or practice of imitating or copying...'; '...the adoption,

whether conscious or not, during a learning process, of the behaviour or attitudes of some specific

person or model...'[7]

As John Baxter states in his article "Mimesis" in the Encyclopedia of Contemporary

Literary Theory, the word:

"...declares insistently its Greek origin, not least in the suggestion

of action or activity. Though both terms denote an art of

representation or resemblance, the emphasis is different.

Imitation, a Latinate abstraction, implies something static, a copy,

a final product; mimesis involves something dynamic, a process,

an active relation with a living reality"[8].

From a Heideggerian perspective, one might contend that the interrogation of mimesis in

the 'age-old' debate, commencing with Plato and Aristotle under the epistemic designation of 'the

correspondence theory of truth', has actually obscured the critical importance of the term. In the

same way that the meaning of being (i.e. the 'Being' of being) has been obscured by the

transformation, which occurred in Greek thought after Plato, so also has the fundamental meaning

of mimesis been obscured [9]. (A more interesting question is the relationship between the Pre-

socratic thinkers and Girard regarding mimesis. This is a topic for another day.)

Jacques Derrida and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's respective discussions of philosophical

terminology and the effect of this closure on the nature of writing, are an appropriate starting point

for probing the 'ontological' ground of mimesis. Here, given the constraints of this chapter, I can

do little more than to make reference to their inquiries.[10]

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3.2 - Mimesis Before Plato

Since before the time of Plato, mimesis has been the central focus of 'aesthetics', the

science of beauty. The pre-Platonic uses of mimesis (____________) and its cognates, the verb

mimeisthai (____________) and the nouns mimos(________) and mimema (__________ ), have all

been collected and provisionally analyzed by the American classicist, Gerald F. Else (1908-1982)

in his 1958 paper. In this article, Else reviewed Herman Koller's monograph on mimesis that

appeared four years earlier [11]. He identified three nuances of meaning for this word group prior

to 450 B.C. The most common meaning and the one appearing to reflect the essential idea behind

the 'mim' (______) root is 'miming' or 'impersonation'. Else defined the latter as "...direct

representation of the looks, actions, and/or utterances of animals or men through speech, song,

and/or dancing"[12].

In the Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo (lines 162-613), probably dating from the seventh

century B.C., the poet praised the chorus of Delian maidens who '...know how to mime the voices

of all men' with such effectiveness that '...each man would say that he himself was singing.' The

Delian maidens could apparently mimic the different accents of visitors to the sanctuary of Apollo.

The same sense applies later to Aeschylus' Choephoroi (564), where Orestes and Pylades agree to

'mimic the tongue (dialect) of the Phocians'[13].

Else found a second possible meaning for mimeisthai (____________) in the work of

Theognis (370), where the poet claims that "...no one of the unwise is able to imitate me" implies

"...imitation of the actions of one person by another, in a general sense, without actual miming."

(The date and authenticity of this passage have been disputed.)

Applying to mimema (__________) only, a third meaning is 'replication': an image or

effigy of a person or thing in material form. It occurs in two fragments of Aeschylus, one referring

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to a frock that is a 'copy' of a Libyian cloak, the other to a painting or painted image that resembled

a 'likeness done by Daedalus'[14].

The semantic remarks above might refer to popular, dramatic performances, the mimos

(________) or 'mime'. Often abusive in nature, the mimos (_________) was developed especially

in Sicily. According to Else, this term was not used by Attic and Ionic writers because it possessed

a foreign or vulgar connotation [15].

Else also states that there is a trend away from the first meaning identified above - the

mimicry potential of the actual 'mime' - towards the second, more general meaning of doing what

someone else does, or following someone else's example without actual mimicry.

Examples of the above sense of mimicry occur in Aristophanes, Euripides, Herodotus,

Thucydides, and Democritus. As a typical illustration, we might cite Euripides Helen (940), where

she councils Theonoe to 'imitate the ways' (_____________________) of her righteous father.

Another illustration is Thucydides 2.37.1 where Pericles boasts that the Athenians are a model for

others, rather than 'imitators' (________________) of them.

In all of these passages, imitating does not refer to an abstract idea, but to the explicit

copying of another person's behavior.

3.3 - The Platonic View of Mimesis

As I already noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, the Platonic notion of mimesis

has a metaphysical - ontological - foundation. Elevating the term to a more abstract level of

philosophical significance accomplished two things. First, the range of possible meanings for

mimesis was greatly expanded. It was redefined as a category that included both poetry and the

plastic arts. Second, mimesis became a matter of controversy, and had a tremendous influence on

subsequent generations of artists, writers, and scholars.

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Because Plato's view of mimesis is contingent upon other elements of his philosophical

system, primarily his theory of education and his views on ethics, it is not possible here to present a

detailed, analytical treatment. Practically speaking, all I can do is elaborate upon the first of the

assertions above, leaving a systematic exposition of Plato's views on mimesis for a separate

treatment [16].

Two sections in the Republic, one in the third book (mainly 329Dff.), and the other in the

tenth book (597Aff.) contain Plato's primary discussion of mimesis. In the third book, mimesis is

explained in connection with the education of the guardians of the ideal state. In the tenth book,

Plato describes artistic creation as a whole.

Within his 'hierarchical' conception of reality, the image (i.e. the representation) possessed

no inherent value. Because mathematical ideas (i.e. 'the Forms') have the highest priority in Plato's

system of ideas, the surface representations of objects are insignificant except insofar as they

cultivate the human soul. Being by nature a copier of the 'real', an artist's creations are essentially

two steps removed from 'fundamental reality'. The artist knows little or nothing about the subjects

he represents in stone, on canvas, or in words.

Representations of natural objects must be taken to be at the same time duplicates of

objects as well as distortions of their essential nature. The image or representation of natural things

is quite distant from the realm of 'truth' in Plato's conception. He prioritizes eternal, mathematical

forms. Because the forms constitute the highest type of knowledge [17], only the human intellect -

reason – has access to them.

Poetry and painting are similar in being distortions of 'fundamental reality'

(__________). As a result, the artist, who produces images of natural objects, is creating 'literal

imitations'[18].

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Plato recognized another kind of mimesis, which might be referred to as 'imitation by

psychological association'. In this case, the formal constituents of a work of art, such as a musical

theme ( Leitmotiv) or a sculptural entity, embody 'states of mind': courage; sloth; vanity;

cowardice, etc. Art replicates human characteristics from the world at large. These 'states of mind'

are not so much copied as they are reconstituted by the artist.

Of course, these two types of imitation are not mutually exclusive. A drama 'models'

people and their everyday actions. Also, the appropriate words with their corresponding poetic

meter project an emotional tonality upon the dramatic action represented. Each kind of mimesis

might be further subdivided into a 'productive' and a 'receptive' type. The former refers to the artist

who creates the imitation; the latter to the listener or viewer, who is emotionally engaged by the

creative work of art [19].

There seems little doubt that Plato possessed a robust antipathy for the arts. He summed

up in the Republic (605ff.) his reasons for excluding poets, especially tragic poets, from his 'ideal'

society (state). He wanted to banish them because they created 'phantoms far removed from

reality'(________________________________________________________).

Although comforting to the irrational (or appetitive) apsect of the human soul, these phantoms

strengthened it at the expense of the rational or cognitive part. According to Plato, poets deceive

men and are sources of ignorance and mental instability [20].

Art, for Plato, could properly have only a very limited importance in a well-ordered society

(i.e. city-state). Since the arts have a critical role to play in the education and character formation

of the young, they should, he felt, be suppressed to guarantee that their moral effect or impact on

the impressionable minds of minors would always be beneficial and orient them toward the

summum bonum of the city-state.

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Discussions of Plato's philosophy generally, and his ideas about art, mimesis, etc. in

particular, have continued unabated throughout the entire course of Western intellectual history.

His position has held a prominent place in such modern works as Dialogue & Dialectic: Eight

Hermeneutical Studies on Plato by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), in

recent articles by Jean-Pierre Vernant [21], and countless others.

More importantly, as I noted in the previous chapter, Plato's 'essentialist' viewpoint of

mimesis is the 'subtext' of Girard, Oughourlian, and Lefort's 'dialogic interrogation' on the

limitations of Lacan's perspective of the psyche. The aim of Girard's 'argument' in CC suggests

that the Platonic view of mimesis has held its appropriative dimension under erasure.

It is the acquisitive or 'pre-representational' aspect of mimesis, which is the more

provocative and fundamental aspect of this 'concept'. It is this aspect that has generally been

overlooked by literary critics, psychoanalysts, philosophers, etc. According to Girard, it is the pre-

representational dimension of mimesis, which deserves fuller consideration in contrast to the

aesthetic view of mimesis, otherwise referred to as mimesis as representation.

Allow me to say a few words about Aristotle's position on mimesis.

3.4 - Aristotle's View of Mimesis

Like techne, with which it is closely associated, mimesis has a practical and cosmological

significance in Aristotle. On a practical level, Aristotle accepted the Platonic conceptions both of a

literal imitation and an imitation by psychological association.

Aristotle's views on mimesis are developed in his Poetics, a seminal work of aesthetics,

that is still relevant to critical discussions in literature and art today. (Else's seminal work,

Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument , a foundational work of literary theory, is a meticulous reading

of Aristotle's treatise.) Aristotle's first definitive statement about dramatic poetry and music is that

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they are mimeseis (___________) (1447a16), which have species differing in three ways: by the

generic means they employ; by the objects they imitate; and by the manner they use (within the

generic means) in achieving semblance [22].

The above remarks could apply to any category of art. In fact, Aristotle seems to have the

visual arts in mind in the first section of the Poetics, the part of his corpus in which his primary

assertions about mimesis are described. When Aristotle explains how the objects imitated can

differ, he presents the well-known analogy of the 'three ancient painters' (1448a5-6). Polygnotus

depicted men as better than they are. Pauson showed them as much worse than they are.

Dionysius represented men as they in fact are.

Aristotle again makes reference to painting later on, in his discussion of two of the most

essential elements by means of which the tragic genre of poetry achieves its effects, namely, plot

and character.

"A tragedy with a plot is more satisfying to the mind than one

without it, just as a simple black and white sketch is more

satisfying than a series of beautiful colors applied to a surface

at random...and tragedy can emphasize the representationof character, as do the paintings of Polygnotus, or it can ignore

it, as do the paintings of Zeuxis"[23].

In the Poetics, Aristotle added a further dimension to the interpretation of mimesis by

situating the 'concept' in everyday life. He has a somewhat more congenial viewpoint of the artist

and the poet's role in describing the world around them than Plato did. His analysis of what techne

consisted of made him more sympathetic to the so-called 'imitative arts'.

"His view that the rational process by which men produced works

of art mirrored the processes of 'nature' itself led him away from

the Platonic conception of painting as something 'twice removed'

from reality toward the view that a painting was a product resulting

from the application of specific, orderly actions to a specific

material with a specific end in view"[24].

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Aristotle's perspective is not governed by a hierarchical concept of reality. However, like

Plato before him, he does believe that the fundamental purpose of mimesis is to express universals,

a process, in his view, making poetry more philosophical in nature than history. The latter is

devoted to the study of particular events and personalities in the concrete flow of time [25].

In addition, Aristotle has a cosmological view of mimesis, in which the term is a definition of the

way techne duplicates the teleological processes of nature. Let us call this type of imitation, an

'imitation by process'. It is summarized in Physics (199a15-19).

The treatment of mimesis in the Poetics is more comprehensive than in the Republic.

In fact, mimesis defines man's 'being-in-the-world': his natural constitution. In the Aristotelian

formulation, universals are constituted in and through particular concrete events as well as within

human character. Aristotle's 'synthetic' conception stresses the direct connection between the

particular and the universal.

Like Plato's viewpoint, Aristotle's conception has also been extremely influential in

Western thought, perhaps even more so than his teacher. This assertion is substantiated by the

work of modern critics of literature, such as the Hungarian Marxist literary critic and philosopher

Gyorgy Lukacs (1885-1971) and the American poet and critic Arthur Yvor Winters (1900-1968),

who both applied Aristotelian conceptions in their respective investigations of literary realism [26].

In my view, the more significant contribution of Aristotle to the study of mimesis resides in

his interest in action as a mode of being as well as a mode of representation. Poets, dramatists, etc.

are creators of 'action'. The skillful organization of plot structure in a dramatic work, for instance,

serves as a vehicle through which universals may be expressed at the same time that the action of

the drama gives pleasure to the audience.

"Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages

over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative

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creature in the world, and learns first by imitation. And it is also

natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The truth of this

second point is shown by experience: though the objects

themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the mostrealistic representations of them in art, the forms for example of

the lowest animals and of dead bodies"[27].

Like Plato, Aristotle constructs his opinions on mimesis in terms of the visual arts and

literature (i.e. epic, lyric, drama, etc). He is primarily concerned with human action, and only

secondarily concerned with the artist's representation of action. Every action, for Aristotle, aims at

some good. The highest good at which human activity aims is 'happiness' (______________ ).

Happiness is traditionally defined as 'doing or living well' (___________________________ )

Ethics (1095a19-20).

Aristotle presents a realistic view of mimesis. Paintings and dramas have a pedagogical

and moral significance for an understanding of human life. What men imitate is typically what

they become. Therefore, since art and literature can influence character development and value

formation in either a positive or a negative direction, the producers of artistic representations - the

works of the imagination - must be held responsible for their cultural productions.

The moral dimension of mimetic activity involves the critical 'discernment' (i.e. judgment)

of the artist in his decision to focus attention upon one type of action rather than another. Also, the

represented action explores the consequences of human behavior consistent with the artist's

understanding of its dynamics. At its best, artistic representation can play an influential role in

strengthening moral attitudes, just as it can challenge an audience's firmly held moral convictions,

religious beliefs, and political attitudes.

For Aristotle, intellectual virtues such as speculative and practical wisdom, techne and the

like, are the basis of ethical virtues like temperance, generosity, courage and honesty. These are, in

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fact, 'trained habits' (__________) acquired by repeated efforts at making a proper 'fore-choice'

(___________) (1106b36ff) Nicomachean Ethics of the 'mean' in any given situation.

"It is this concept of hexeis, a habit that is the product of prolonged

conditioning, that determines Aristotle's moralistic evaluation of

the arts. In the conditioning process that leads to the establishment

of a moral hexis, it is important that the environment, of which the

arts are a prominent part, present nothing that would interfere with

the formation of that hexis or create a wrong one"[28].

In summation, Aristotle's view of mimesis is 'enactive'. It applies equally to the dramatist's

recreation of life on stage, the painter's graphic representation of natural objects, and man's

imitation of the behavior of 'models' in the process of character formation [29].

Subsequent conceptions of literature and of the plastic arts have been decisively influenced

by Aristotelian categories. His ideas were employed in the eighteenth-century, for example, to

provide a definition of literature. Thomas Twining (1735-1804), an English classical scholar who

translated the Poetics in 1789, held that only the drama was fully 'mimetic' in the Aristotelian sense

[30].

If one accepts the notion of 'enactment' as a 'regulative idea', it follows that poetry does not

describe, narrate, or offer argument. Its purpose, rather, is to dramatize or embody human

discourse and action[31]. (This purpose is consistent with a Girardian literary frame of reference.)

Let us move forward in time to some other significant investigations on the nature of

mimesis that have been conducted in the modern era.

3.5 - Modern Studies of Mimesis

Erich Auerbach, (1892-1952), a prominent German philologist and scholar of European

literature, examined the relationship between 'reality' and style in different literary genres in his

justly famous book, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature. Auerbach

contended that the representation of 'reality' in words has made textual exegesis the key to any

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subtle understanding of the occidental past [32]. Since mimesis is, in Aristotelian terms, realistic

by definition, and figura is a symbolic mode of representation, one of the contributions of scholarly

inquiry, according to Auerbach, has been to explain how societal and imaginary discourse

converge and intersect. Thus, Auerbach's study of literary mimesis examined the correspondences

between the representation of reality and the evolution of literary discourse. An essential point of

his work is that literature involves the act of reliving human experiences represented in symbolic

form.

In a short space it is not possible to do justice to Auerbach's subtle commentary on the

development of Western literature. Suffice is to say here that he has demonstrated the polyvalence

of mimesis and its historical significance in the evolution of literary forms ( genres). Auerbach

explored how imaginary discourses in the West have redefined the boundaries of artistic

representation. Mimesis, in his view, is a literary idea that has undergone continuous

transformation from antiquity up to the present[33].

Like Girard, one of Auerbach's strengths is that his famous, historically-oriented book

focuses on a close reading of the original texts rather than an evaluation based on secondary works.

Again, like Girard, Auerbach's remarks have been influential because of his penetrating insights

about the particular works he analyzes.

Whereas Girard concentrates primarily on realistic works, Auerbach evaluates the tension

between the rhetorical and the realist representation of reality. Both Auerbach and Girard seek the

'truth' inscribed within texts of the imagination.

Like Auerbach, the German literary scholar and philologist, Ernst Robert Curtius (1886-

1956), and the Austrian art historian Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich (1909-2001), have been

instrumental in exploring the nature of mimesis in Western intellectual history. Curtius's study[34],

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investigate the reception of Aristotle's views of mimesis in the Renaissance and its impact upon the

theory of art in that historical epoch. Gombrich's equally sophisticated investigations explain the

role mimesis has had in the history of the visual arts[35]. In his view, the forms of artistic

expression provided solutions to specific problems that come from specific needs.

Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), a modern German philosopher, social theorist, musicologist,

and musician, has reflected deeply on the nature of mimesis within the context of his complex

theory of aesthetics [36]. The way in which Adorno approaches mimesis is radically different from

the Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives noted earlier. Interestingly, his views bear a decided

resemblance to the Girardian position.

Adorno's point of view on mimesis is comprehensive. Mimesis is an all-encompassing,

synoptic category, having bio-anthropological, epistemological, social-psychological, and aesthetic

characteristics. Adorno's formulation also encompasses, a largely 'negative' or 'destructive'

element.

It is only possible to understand his views about mimesis against the backdrop of

'determinate negation', which he investigates at length in his book on aesthetic theory. Determinate

negation is his contention that "...texts, artworks, social and culture practices, and so forth are

vulnerable to and display an internal logic of disintegration"[37].

For Adorno as for Girard, the interpretation of mimesis as a mode of representation, the

view held by Plato and Auerbach, only expresses 'secondary' or 'derivative' features. Adorno's

conception is more profound; it probes the topic to a much deeper level. He emphasizes the

anthropological and psychological dimensions of mimesis.

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That is, Adorno is interested in rehabilitating the primary - or 'fundamental' - meaning of

mimesis which, like Girard, he defines as a mode of behavior (Verhaltensweise) with a

complementary attitude (Stellung ) toward the world.

The first, or 'bio-anthropological' dimension of Adorno's position on mimesis refers to the

continuity between the phenomenon of mimicry at work in the animal kingdom and special types

of mimetic bonding patterns, which can be located in human societies [38].

The second dimension is epistemological. It is concerned with the genetically earliest

relation of knowing between a subject and a field of objects. The epistemological dimension is

equally concerned with attunement and empathy.

The third dimension of mimesis is social-psychological. It applies to a domination-free or

'utopian' network among human actors in society. This network is to be distinguished from the

pathology of 'victimization' (e.g. 'anti-Semitism') impacting historical actors in 'real-time'[39].

The fourth, and final, dimension of his view is aesthetic. It is concerned with the

interaction among the individual elements of a work of art and its status as a 'transcendent' totality.

The artistic commodity for Adorno is a contradictory 'whole', which is always greater than the sum

of its individual parts.

Obviously, my account here cannot fully articulate Adorno's multidimensional point of

view on mimesis. Like Plato and Aristotle before him, Adorno's conception must be understood in

connection with his whole philosophy. This refers to his deep understanding of the implicit

connections among aesthetics, modern art, modern music, and 'negative dialectics'[40].

Adorno's reading of mimesis is, in certain respects, more elaborate than Girard's. But since

it is constructed in terms of an idealistic epistemic premise mentioned en passant in the last

chapter; it is, also perhaps, a 'pre-scientific' interrogation of mimesis. To put this last point in

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another way, Adorno's view emerges out of an Hegelian framework of mediation, a

phenomenological dialectic of subject and object. Although Adorno's schemata is elaborate, it is

seemingly limited by its epistemological signature. Categories of understanding, fostered by

ethology and psychology, have largely dated his 'ontological argument'. While ethological and

psychological factors are prominent in Girard's perspective too, his viewpoint is on a firmer

scientific footing than Adorno's position[41].

I have already made a passing reference to the French philosopher, P. Lacoue-Labarthe's

(1940-2007) view of mimesis[42]. In the essay 'Typography'[43], he offers an elaborate

'deconstructive' (philological) reading of this concept. Lacoue-Labarthe not only identifies the

limitations of Girard's approach in relation to Hegel's and Nietzsche's formulations, but he also

situates the Girardian concept of appropriation in relation to Heidegger's conceptions.

Lacoue-Labarthe's constructive distillation of Heidegger's and Derrida's views on mimesis

is complex. Essentially, his reading is an elegant, many-sided trace of the subtleties of mimesis,

which have not yet been fully explicated. He examines mimesis from a number of directions, such

that his exposition points out the limits and possibilities of Girard's appropriative conception.

3.6 - The Human Sciences & Imitation

What I have surveyed up to this point in this chapter can more or less be described as a

largely 'aesthetic'/'philosophical' orientation to mimesis. The ideas of a few prominent researchers

in the humanities have been surveyed. No more and no less. (For a more detailed, and

provocative exposition of the 'genealogy of mimesis' , I refer the reader to G. Gebauer and C.

Wulf's compelling exposition. Starting from the point where Auerbach left the issue of mimesis in

Western literature, Gebauer and Wulf subtle expose presents a full spectrum of meanings about the

concept.[44]

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As Girard's books, especially VS and CC , make vividly clear, mimesis is a 'double-sided' as

well as a 'metonymic' concept. While it can be approached from a 'literary' direction as a way of

highlighting its 'aesthetic' or 'representational' aspect, the complexity of mimesis mandates that it

also be investigated on another plane of intelligibility. This alternate 'level' corresponds, perhaps,

to Adorno's 'bio-anthropological' inquiry. This level elicits the dark, violent 'pre-representational'

side of mimesis. Like the forgotten aspects of Sein made transparent in Heidegger's work, this

deeper, conflictual side of mimesis has been in some sense 'hidden since the beginning of the

world'.

It is the negative or 'appropriative' aspect of mimesis, which is being investigated on a

number of exploratory fronts, mostly within a scientific frame of reference, otherwise referred to as

'analytical reason' [45].

An approach that has taken Girard's victimage mechanism as its direct antecedent provides

a concise illustration of current work on 'appropriative imitation'[46]. There is continuity between

the neurological and ethological approaches to imitation and l'hypothese Girardienne. This

continuity provides, in Oughourlian's phrase, the foundation for a 'pure psychology' of acquisitive

mimesis, unencumbered by any form of biologism[47]

Paul D. MacLean (1913-2007), an American physician and neuroscientist, at the National

Institutes of Mental Health, who made significant contributions in the field of physiology,

psychiatry and brain research, recently presented an account of the neurological characteristics of

imitative behavior in the monkey and squirrel [48]. (MacLean is noted for his 'triune brain theory',

which conjectures that the brain is really three brains in one: a reptilian complex ('complex R')

linked to a limbic system, both of which are joined to the neocortex.)

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In his article, MacLean propounded the following 'technical (operational) definition' of

imitation vis-a-vis 'animal mimesis' (i.e. mimicry), the pattern of behavior, in Girard's view,

preceding the threshold of hominization, the evolutionary 'heart of darkness' separating animality

from humanity.

"Prenon pour l'imitation la definition de travail suivante: form de

comportement reciproque dans laquelle deux ou plusieurs

individus se livrent aux memes activities (expressions

equivalents: copier; singer; faire la meme choses: faire

echo). Ceci a pour but de faire la distinction entre

l'imitation et le mimetisme, incluant l'auto-mimetisme, term

utilise par zollogistes pour designer des ressemblances

superficielles entre animaux et leur environment. En termesde mecanique, le mimetisme serait considere comme

'statique' alors que l'imitation serait 'dynamique'. Tous

deux sont impliques dans des processus attractifs ou

repulsifs destines a produire une dissimulation et une

protection ou a engendrer l'identite de groupe et la

reproduction" [49].

According to this definition, imitation is a reciprocal action involving two or more

organisms. Animals engage in symmetrical signaling displays[50]. In his article, MacLean further

distinguishes between 'imitation' and 'mimeticism'. (A fuller appreciation of this distinction is

contingent upon the notion of 'mirror neurons', which I referred to in the 'state of research' section

in Chapter One.) Mimeticism is a form of protective resemblance. It corresponds to a process of

copying, when an animal in a phobic state attempts to blend into or 'camouflage' itself in its natural

environment (i.e. habitat, niche, etc.)[51]

In contrast, imitation is a dynamic signaling display, or a mode of communication, linked

to specific releasing stimuli like aggression. Imitation is concerned with approach-avoidance

behavior within an animal's particular habitat[52]. Aggressive signaling displays play a vital role

in animal societies (groups). For example, dissension in a baboon troop is partially suppressed by

elaborate 'dominance patterns'.

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'Ritualized rivalries' among the male members of a troop (i.e. the 'alpha-male' versus

subdominant 'beta-males') are held in check by the 'mock' attack behavior of the troop leader

against his 'rivals', whose aim it is to topple him from his dominant position. When disputes arise

over 'objects' such as territorial boundaries, status hierarchies, and access to females, the alpha-

male engages in a ritualized - signaling performance, a dramatic production (of sorts) - to assert his

hegemony over the other male members of the troop[53]. (Robert Maurice Sapolsky (1957- ), an

American neuro-endocrinologist, who is the John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Professor of Biological

Sciences and Professor of Neurology and Neurological Sciences at Stanford University, has

focused his research on stress and neuron degeneration. Sapolsky has studied a population of wild

baboons in Kenya for more than twenty years in order to identify the sources of stress in their

environment. The relationship between personality and patterns of stress related disease in these

animals is an important scientific finding of Sapolsky's research. He has investigated the cortisol

levels between alpha-males, alpha-females, and subordinate baboons to determine relative degrees

of stress.)

It has been conjectured that specific 'neural' releasing mechanisms modulate 'static' as well

as 'dynamic' mimicry. Research in neuro-ethology is just starting to establish connections between

the neuro-biological substrate and 'pre-programmed patterns' of animal behavior [54].

There is an impressive body of research on imitation in the psychological literature.

Imitation's importance in 'social learning' was fully recognized a number of years ago by a

Canadian psychologist, Albert Bandura (1925- ), who specializes in social cognitive theory and

social efficacy. But little of this research has been directed to a fuller understanding of 'acquisitive

imitation'[55].

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In a recent investigation, Paisley Livingston suggested the subtopics that have drawn the

attention of psychologists: language acquisition in children; gender development; learned

aggression; the Werther effect [56]. The manner in which children learn imitation and the

advantages of imitation for the imitator are also important areas of contemporary research [57].

(Considerations of space preclude a fuller elaboration of these topics in social learning. Because it

relates directly to the subject matter of this study, I will, however, briefly allude to 'learned

aggression' research.)

Bandura and his colleagues at Stanford University have argued that social learning (i.e.

imitation) is a special case[58]. In 1963, Bandura, et.al. conducted experiments in which boys and

girls, who had watched a live actor model violence, were more likely to imitate this violence than

children who had not observed a violent model. Since the process of imitation apparently occurred

without reinforcement, these results would not have been predicted by operant conditioning

theories.

A second set of experiments was conducted in 1965, in which a group of young children

observed as a model was rewarded with candy for being aggressive. On another occasion, a

different group of children looked on as the same model was reprimanded for the same aggression.

The results of this experiment indicated that the consequences of the model's behavior

were very important in determining whether children will copy a model or not. The children who

had observed the model, and who received juice or candy for aggressive behavior became more

aggressive. The children who had looked on while the model was being admonished for

aggressive behavior rarely imitated the aggression.

There have been other important studies on imitation.

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As noted in a previous chapter, in France at the turn of the century, the French sociologist,

criminologist, and social psychologist, Gabriel de Tarde (1843-1904), produced an influential book

on the 'laws' of imitation [59]. He has been referred to as the predecessor of 'actor-network theory'

due to his criticisms of Durkheim's concept of the 'social'. (Tarde's research was extended by the

American communication scholar and sociologist, Everett Rogers (1931-2004) in his 1962 book

entitled Diffusion of Innovations.)

The principal representative of Gestalt theory, Paul Guillaume (1878-1962), a French

psychologist, composed studies on imitative behavior in children [60]. His work led him to make a

critical distinction between 'instinctive imitation' and 'automatic imitation'.

"The origins of automatism are instinct and habit and each is

very different from the other. Man imitates either deliberately or

automatically depending upon the complexity of his mental state

at the moment, but he is always capable of imitating. And we have

every reason to believe that this aptitude is definitely acquired at the

end of the second or third year [61].

Guillaume's viewpoint is complex, and therefore, not easily summarized in short scope.

He explained the differences between human imitation and animal imitation. In his work, he

discussed the affective aspects of assimilation: the role of sympathy, envy, and jealousy in social

development. More importantly, Guillaume defined the 'logic of appropriation', which figures

prominently in Girard's position in both VS and CC .

"Even if a child is not hungry, he will be envious of the piece of

cake someone else is eating. Doubtless in animals this feeling has

an instinctual root that is independent of everything that experienced

reality has taught them...children soon become envious of an object

to which they had remained indifferent until someone else obtained

possession of it. The object seems desirable only because it iscoveted by someone else"[62].

Accordingly, envy and jealousy exist from the very moment that a child sees another

person - another child - in possession of some 'object' he does not himself control. This sentiment

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is particularly robust when the objects involved are those the child considers, unconsciously

perhaps, to belong to him or which he subjectively desires.

The awareness of imitation is inseparable from the development of the 'self' (i.e. the ego)

of the child. This development enables him to see himself in the 'other'. In addition, according to

Guillaume, the learning process is crucial for developing a child's capacity to imitate other people.

Jean Piaget (1896-1980), a well-known Swiss philosopher, natural scientist, and

developmental theorist, presented his opinions on imitation in the context of criticizing Le Dantec's

concept. Piaget contrasted imitation and assimilation in his definition. His interest in imitation

resided in the transition between sensory-motor intelligence and representative imagery. Because

of its relevance in the study of social learning, I shall briefly elaborate Piaget's views on

imitation[63].

For Piaget, the logic of a child's thought is related to such factors as adaptation, imitation,

and assimilation. Imitation allows the child to construct mental images. Internalized imitation

involves memory. Imitation can be conceived as a type of modeling.

"Imitation makes its appearance...through a kind of contagion

or echopraxis. When someone performs in front of a child a

gesture, the child will imitate any gesture made by an adult,

provided that at some time or other this gesture has been

performed by the child himself"[64]

First, there is an apparently 'automatic' assimilation phase in which the child represents to

himself some external action. Next, there is a triggering phase when the child replicates these

schemes for the sake of the reproduction itself. This phase marks the appearance of the 'pre-

representative' function fulfilled by imitation.

"The child advances rather quickly to the point where he copies

gestures that are new to him, but only if they can be performed

by visible parts of his own body. An important new phase

begins with the imitation of facial movements...The difficulty

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is then that the child's own face is known to him only by

touch and the face of the other person by sight, except for

a few rare tactile explorations of the other person's face[65]"

The child connects visual and tactilo-kinesthetic sensations, extending imitation to the non-

visible parts of his body. Then, imitation is generalized. It plays a vital role in the child's

knowledge of his own form analogous to those of other children.

Piaget defines imitation as a 'representation in action'. He outlines six stages or 'moments'

in the development of imitation in the infant. The first stage is preparation through reflex. Infants

imitate through contagion as in echolalia (repetition) and echopraxia. The second stage is

characterized by sporadic imitation, in which the infant repeats the model's action. The third stage,

or systematic imitation, occurs when an infant does not make a clear distinction between its own

body and the external environment. The fourth stage involves repetitive - 'gross' - movements

already learned by the infant. The fifth stage occurs when the child accommodates his internal

schemata to the demands of the object. In this stage there is a systematic imitation of new models

and a precise use of intelligence. The sixth, and final stage, is known by the term 'deferred

imitation'. In the absence of a model, the child has internalized - represented - his own movements.

(A recent research initiative in brain science is concerned with the relationship between

mirror neurons and imitation. A scientific finding at UCLA demonstrates that there is a strong link

between a child's inability to imitate expressions on the faces of other people and a lack of activity

in the mirror neuron system.[65a])

3.7 - Lacan on Imitation

The psychodynamic view of the mind , or the position that unconscious motivation is

fundamental to human agency, began with Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the fin-de-siecle, Viennese

neurologist and founder of psychoanalysis. In the years following the appearance of Freud's

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provocative writings about the unconscious, dream-interpretation, and 'ego theory', many

refinements were introduced by neo-Freudian analysts as a way of throwing more light on his

profound, though controversial, understanding of the emotions, desire, etc. One of the most

important developments of Freud's ideas can be located in the difficult, often cryptic text, entitled

Ecrits, and the weekly seminars of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), who is oftentimes referred to as the

'French Freud'.[66]

While Lacan has produced a number of 'innovations' in the reading of orthodox Freudian

theory, such as the use of topology to study the relationship of time and the psyche, one of his most

important discoveries is the 'mirror stage'. In Lacan's thinking, the 'mirror stage' is critical to the

development of a child's ego. Lacan's views on imitation are implicit to his discussion of ego

formation.

The problem is that while Lacan surveys almost the same conceptual terrain as Girard vis-

a-vis the subject, object, desire, etc., the theoretical constraints of his acceptance of the Freudian

viewpoint condition his perception of how and why a child imitates others. To put this point in

another way, Lacan's understanding of imitation is 'locked-in' to the conventional Oedipal model

established by Freud. While 'rivalry' is alluded to as being fundamental to the imitative process, it

is in some sense less formative than in the Girardian position.

Second, in Lacan, imitation - ego formation - is linked to language in the form of speech

acts, paradox, and mis-recognition (meconnaissance). A child learns who he is from his or her

adult role models. These models express their beliefs and attitudes about character-formation in

verbal statements directed at the child. The latter acquires his sense of reality (e.g. 'being' as it

were) from outside himself by understanding the messages (i.e. information) transmitted to him by

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caregivers along a communication channel compromised by noise (entropy), which is inscribed

within a social ensemble.

At the same time, given the fact that Lacan's views are at one level 'Hegelian', or involve

dialectical thinking, there is a 'negative' aspect to character formation. The child misperceives -

misunderstands - her 'nature' (i.e. character), experiencing a fundamental 'self' alienation. In other

words, the 'mirror stage' generates a 'de-centered' subject, who from the very start is confused about

her relationship to a model, a significant 'other', and equally confused about her identity. This

precarious being-in-the-world makes imitative (identification) behavior problematic.

Identity is a 'double-edged' sword, therefore. While identity may be said to repeat in an

offspring, it is inherently unstable and malleable. More can be said about the Lacan-Girard

dichotomy. (I hope to have the opportunity of elaborating this dichotomy in a separate paper.)

3.8 - A Pure Psychology of Imitation

Jean-Michel Oughourlian's study MND, takes Girard's notion of mimetic desire as its

starting point. It provides a lucid description of psychological (inter-dividual) terminology. His

discussion refers back to the earlier Girardian discussion in Book Three of CC .

Throughout Oughourlian's book, but especially in Chapter One, he makes clear and

compelling distinctions, which are instructive for anyone coming to terms with Girard's 'argument'

within a naturalist framework: a realist, scientific epistemology a la the British-Austrian

philosopher Karl Raimund Popper's (1902-1994) falsification thesis. [67].

From pages ten to twelve of the English translation of MND entitled PD, Oughourlian

delineates the terminology of le systeme Girard [68].

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First, echoing the 'Aristotelian sentiment' I referred to earlier, he discusses how mimesis is

the essential condition for human life: man is a social animal (__________________________ ).

It is one man's relatedness to other men that makes a person truly human.

Second, Oughourlian draws a distinction between the phylogenetic (or biological) aspect

of the mimetic process, and the ontogenetic (psychological or neuro-cognitive) aspect.

"...mimesis is not in my view either an instinct or an urge. It is

a general law, a principle that governs the phylogenesis and

ontogenesis of the human species"[69].

The biological element of mimesis is the domain of instinct and need prevalent in the

animal kingdom, the proto-human world. Organic mechanisms and their coupling to a wide

variety of ritualization displays, which I referred to earlier in connection with MacLean's research,

are still poorly understood. This dimension of imitation is the natural or biogenetic 'precondition'

for understanding human functioning.

A human being is not, in either Oughourlian's or Girard's view, the captive of instinct (i.e.

the 'drive theory'). 'Mimetic desire' is neither instinctual nor is it determined by 'drives' as the latter

'theory' is currently formalized by human ethologists [70], such as the 'instinctivist' position

propounded by the Austrian zoologist, animal psychologist, and founder of ethnology, Konrad

Lorenz (1903-1989). His book on the subject is called On Violence [71].

Unlike Freud, Girard and Oughourlian both argue for a 'mimetic model' grounded in

'psychological' content, a social learning context. They assert that 'hominization', the evolutionary

transition phase leading from animality to humanity, involves a liberation of the human agent from

instinct and need.

As Oughourlian explains, the psychological dimension is governed by free activity, which

must be understood as being distinct from its biological determinants. He draws attention to desire

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as an intentional response of human agents who, in the context of social - inter-dividual - relations,

develop by means of 'learning' in a cultural environment.

Universal mimesis - imitation and repetition - is a learning mechanism common to all

human beings. It is composed of three parts: sociogenesis in space; psychogenesis in time; and

reproduction in the species. The first two parts refer to how human agents discover language,

acquire awareness of other agents, and assimilate models. The third part refers to the generative

function of acquisitive mimesis: the persistence of the activity through a multigenerational vector.

For Oughourlian and Girard, 'desire' is a relational dynamic in society rather than

something 'mental' or 'in the head' as it is for Freud and Lacan. As I have said already, desire is an

inter-dividual phenomenon that, in Oughourlian's terminology, can be inferred from universal

mimesis. It produces and animates the subject (self) in the sense that a particular agent initially

imitates a model during the activity of learning from or modeling other agents. Over the course of

time, however, the model changes into a 'rival', an obstacle, or a 'double' for the evolving pour soi

(i.e. novus homo). When the model and the self converge upon an identical object of mutual

desire, rivalry - mimetic conflict – is the result [72].

From the very beginning of human life, psychological phenomena are imitative. The only

act that deserves to be called a human act is one that is fully mimetic. It is acquisitive mimesis

alone that makes an individual human. Being 'double-edged', at the same time that it is the origin

of human conflict, acquisitive mimesis also allows for an individual's entry into the domain of

language [73].

To think about Oughourlian's assertions from another vantage point, psychological

actuality exists among human beings when an agent appropriates behavior patterns from a model

by means of learning. This 'appropriation' is the mechanism by which authentic selfhood comes

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into being. Equally important is the fact that at some moment in the flow of real time, the new self

will become the rival of its role model, sabotaging the latter's special or exclusive relation to an

'object'.

Rivalry commences when the self discovers (i.e. desires) the object that its model desires.

At that moment, desire is fully 'appropriative'. Appropriation typically leads to conflict between

the model and the newly emerging self. Then, each agent becomes 'locked into' a struggle with the

'other' for the possession (i.e. domination, control, exploitation, etc.) of the 'object'.

Appropriative mimesis changes into 'conflictual mimesis'. In this transformation, an

antagonistic 'bond' develops between the two rivals and the significance of the 'object', the original

point of contention, mysteriously loses its efficacy for both agents. It is the rivalry itself that has

more importance than the object[74].

Oughourlian sees his task in MND as the clarification of an inter-dividual psychology

founded upon a 'tit-for-tat' struggle ( Kampf ), a game-theoretic notion, between the 'self-holon' and

the 'other-holon'.

There are different types of mimetic interaction patterns that the 'self-holon' and the 'other-

holon' can participate in including a masochistic, a narcissistic, and a sadistic mode of interaction.

Each type can be represented in terms of the self (model)-object-other (rival) triangulation.

Psychological actuality is not located in the tranquil opacity of any 'body' or in the

wholeness of the self, but in a force field of inter-dividual configurations. To explain the nature of

these behavioral interactions is the raison d'etre of a 'pure' psychology. To trace the tense,

'friction-filled' space separating the model and the self from a mutual 'object' is one of the goals of

MND[75] to illuminate for the reader.

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Inter-dividual psychology - pure psychology - is the study of the types of interaction

configurations that are possible among an ensemble of holons. These strategies actively constitute

the praxis of each holon. Appropriative mimesis is the principle (law) that determines social

intercourse among holons in real time. It is a principle, so to speak, correlated to message

transmission (information transfer), linking one or more holons to a network of other holons.

Information transmission in space is determined by imitation, in time by repetition, and in the

species as a whole by reproduction [76].

While it is certainly the case that Girard does not utilize the 'holon' nomenclature in his

works, Oughourlian's systematic exposition of the genesis of mimetic desire from its biologistic

substrate to appropriative mimesis in cultural systems is consistent with Girard's exposition in CC

and adds clarity to it.

Undoubtedly, Girard's 'terminology' is not as unambiguous as Oughourlian's because the

former refers to both the aesthetic and scientific register of mimesis simultaneously. Girard utilizes

the same terminological discourse to represent rhetorical (imaginative) constructs as well as

behavioral (neuro-cognitive) ones.

Girard's 'use of terms' is somewhat obfuscatory for the reader because, as I have indicated

in this chapter, 'mimetic phenomena', and the nomenclature developed to refer to those phenomena,

are complicated. The aesthetic - rhetorical - terminology has a 'dual' use. It not only applies to the

humanistic interest in acquisitive mimesis vis-a-vis literary and artistic representation, noted earlier

in the chapter, but also to the 'behavioral matrices' which are the concern of social scientists[77].

I think that the imprecision of this 'dual usage' or linguistic condensation has given rise to

considerable confusion.

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Perhaps, we need to look at this 'terminological' dilemma from a Wittgensteinian

perspective. The 'ontological' aura still hovering around acquisitive mimesis in general, and

Girard's discussion of it in particular, can be 'demystified' by subjecting it to a closer 'reading', a

'critique' that delves into 'conditions of possibility'.

The rationale for digressing from a consideration of Girard's ideas to Oughourlian's has

been made because the latter's exegesis gives a lucid overview of le systeme Girard , the behavioral

patterns at work in all forms of triangular desire. Whereas the discussion in CC oscillates between

the aesthetic and behavioral dimensions of acquisitive mimesis, MND is concerned with a pure

psychology of mimetic desire [78].

3.9 - Appropriative Mimesis

Having attempted to clarify nomenclature by presenting an abbreviated genealogical

survey of how the 'word' mimesis has been employed in a small subset of humanistic and scientific

inquiries, I will now concentrate on 'appropriation' in more detail. Appropriation is fundamental to

Girard's discourse on mimetic desire. In the final pages of this chapter, my discussion considers

Girard's comments in CC , read through Oughourlian's terminology.

Girard's intention in CC is twofold:

First, he believes that it is necessary to liberate the study of mimesis from the problem of

'essences' or essentialism that currently surrounds it. Literary critics define mimesis too narrowly

in his view. The treatment of this concept in literary studies is obscured by a residual 'Platonism'

that obscures a deeper appreciation of mimetic phenomena in their full range.

A tacit ontology dominates the discussion of mimesis, obscuring aspects of it which are

more fundamental - more 'originative' - in Girard's view. What has been ignored is a 'pre-

representational' mimesis, or its appropriative dimension.

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Second, it is necessary to 'dismantle' the nonscientific, ideal rendering of mimesis so that

the appropriative dimension, represented in literature as a form of 'knowledge', and lived by men in

their 'everydayness' with other men, 'from the beginning of the world' up to the pure streaming

present, can be examined in greater detail. To put this in another way, a 'phenomenology' of

mimetic conflict is desirable[79].

Girard and Oughourlian differ with respect to their objects of study. The former deciphers

'victimage' in an 'imaginary' register: literary texts, aetiological myths. The latter considers the

victimage concept in a 'real' register, or on a 'psychiatric' plane of intelligibility.

It is clear that appropriative mimesis, in Girard's rendition of it, is neither concerned with

the phylogenetic aspect noted earlier, nor with neuro-cognitive mechanisms, fixed-action patterns,

or ritualization. Neurology and ethology explore need and instinct as these are manifested in the

animal kingdom (e.g. primates). Girard's position is situated on the human 'side' of the

hominization divide.

Like Oughourlian, he is concerned with inter-dividual conflict, or with the type of

antagonism that is the 'free' (learned) rivalry of human agents. This form of conflict is not

conditioned by ritualization or by instinct. The latter, pervasive in the animal kingdom, is still a set

of partially understood mechanisms, whose 'causality' ultimately resides in a deeper understanding

of so-called neural or 'biochemical' mechanisms.

Appropriative mimesis leading to conflict is a cognitively-based process in human beings.

It is the foundation upon which Girard's theory of violence is based.

What Girard proposes in CC is to explain, or better, 'speculate' about in pure 'theory', the

ontogenesis of the universal 'law of mimesis' at the so-called 'original', ' proto', or 'dark event'. One

might add that what is still at stake are the diverse ways in which his insights about appropriation

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might be interpreted, refined, and extended; or, in a word, subjected to dialectical (critical)

reformulation in the light of historically-based contingencies in a postmodern context.

What is omitted from his presentation are the limits and possibilities of non-

representational mimesis involved both in an understanding of 'facilitation'[80], as the

psychologists refer to it, and of the 'dialectical logic' of appropriative behavior in the practico-inert .

It follows that more investigation is required on the specific cases of appropriative mimesis, which

Girard and Oughourlian after him, have specified within an all-encompassing, universal category.

Simply defined, 'hominization' refers to the evolutionary bridge leading from animal

(primate) to man. But, as Paisley Livingston has recently pointed out, hominization follows a more

involuted trajectory than Girard's schemata allows. As a result, a fuller inquiry of the stages in the

evolution of mimetic appropriation is a desideratum [81].

There can be no doubt that if appropriation, is left unchecked within a human organization

(system), it will have a devastating, destructive outcome. (This impact, the contagion (or

dispersive, disseminative delirium) of violence, often cascades into more elaborate and far-

reaching conflicts). Appropriative mimesis must be constrained in all cultural ensembles, in micro-

scale as well as macro-scale ensembles. According to Girard, human institutions came into being

as a means of controlling conflictual mimesis, which inevitably results from acquisitive imitation.

The mechanism of scapegoating, the collective victimization of a single human actor by a

fused group of actors, is the cultural reaction to 'interferences mimetique' . Scapegoating - sacrifice

qua unanimous victimage as opposed to sacrifice as 'propitiation' - terminates the 'runaway' effect

of appropriative mimesis. It re-establishes social order (equilibrium, homeostasis), albeit a

temporary/intermittent one, because the recurrence of violence on an even grander scale, is always

possible in theory as well as in fact.

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The violence of all against one expels intra-specific aggression beyond the territorial

horizon of the group. Without the scapegoat effect in place as a principle of 'structuration',

aggression, a volatile phenomenon that generates 'surplus' energy, as Bataille might refer to it, will

increase within an ensemble, and eventually lead to a culture's degeneration (implosion) from its

own internal strife (destabilization). That is, the violence of each of the members of a culture

would not be turned outward or centrifugally on a nondescript, innocent victim of the group's

choosing, but inward or centripetally on the interstices of the cultural system itself. (In the post-

modern context, let us refer to this 'implosion' phenomenon as the 'Mogadishu effect'.)

Appropriation is different in character from so-called 'fixed-action patterns'. The latter

limit intra-specific aggression in primate societies like 'wild baboon troops', for instance.

Appropriation is not a ritualization pattern, but a 'ritual action' drama, otherwise referred to as the

dialectic of sacrifice. (In literature, it is possible to see these human dramas played out in

imaginary terms, but real life provides a more vivid, bloody characterization.)

Sacrifice is a dramatic phenomenon whose trajectory or cultural 'emplotment' can be

sketched out according to a 'regressive-progressive method'. A Sartrean schema, brought to bear

on both the theory of origin and the theory of relations, can make the structural (or better,

structurational) dynamics of sacrifice transparent[82].

The evolution of human culture entails a concomitant evolution of human freedom, which,

as Oughourlian states, allows for the possibility of rivalries unencumbered by instinctual drives and

the deterministic constraints of ritualization to come into the full light of day. 'Men in groups are

condemned to be free even though they often allow mimetic interferences to dominate their

conduct, thereby restricting human freedom,' turning it into a despair-filled determinism.

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Oughourlian's clarification of Girard has not thrown, in this reader's estimation, sufficient

clarity on the paradigm shift from biologistic roots in proto-hominid organization to the threshold

of culture, signaled by ritual killing (sacrifice)[83], and followed by collective reconstitution

(solidarity). The articulation of this totalizing dialectical process a la Sartrean categories, has still

not been elaborated but only conjectured. It can be used to help us more fully appreciate how

rituals ebb and flow dynamically, converge and dissipate exuberantly.

Human agents have devised intricate practices of self-effacement to inhibit mimetic rivalry

that are different in kind from corresponding patterns of behavior inherent in primate systems. The

restriction of spontaneous imitation is clearly necessary to alleviate disputes, which will, if left

unchecked, cascade uncontrollably like a wildfire through a group.

"Place a certain number of identical toys in a room with the

same number of children; there is every chance that the toys

will not be distributed without quarrels"[84]

The behavioral display of two or more toddlers simultaneously reaching for the same

'Barney doll' on the floor between them, or of two attractive, stylishly-dressed young cosmopolitan

women in Bloomingdales fighting over the same designer handbag among a bevy of other 'beta'

females, is a vivid illustration - a test case - of a pure psychology in action.

In the former instance, without some external cultural restraint being imposed upon the 'tit-

for-tat' rivalry-in-development by a third-party - a caregiver - the toddlers will 'lock horns like wild

elks in a forest', and vigorously struggle with each other until one of the two obtains the big payoff:

exclusive control (dominance) of the stuffed animal, while the other - the loser - goes screaming to

'mommy' to plead her case for justice, comfort, and a hoped for reprisal.

(Another expression here for the 'battle for the toy' is the 'doubling effect'. In its real world

occurrence (i.e. the handbag scenario), the 'object's implicit value' is swiftly reduced to a zero. The

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confrontation of two fashionista females, model and obstacle is nothing more and nothing less than

a 'death spiral'. Each 'bebe' cannot permit the other to claim title to the 'object'. Ironically, once

'possession' has been decided by Solomon (the third party), perhaps a level-headed sales associate,

the object fought for mysteriously loses its implicit value. That obscure object of desire coerces

the winner to turn her sights to yet another object, and then another, in the fashion jungle of the

naked city, a veritable human zoo. The outcome in the struggle for new objects in seriatum is

always the same: an insatiable striving for something new and different, a search for new models

in temporary possession of objects that entice rivals to appropriate them.)

In CC , Girard is primarily concerned with the metamorphosis, tending from appropriative

mimesis to conflictual mimesis at a 'utopian' or 'no-place' site in an uncharted 'zone' of prehistory,

in the mists of paleoanthropological time. This 'no-place' space was concretized in the

prehistorical moment when ritualization underwent transformation from instinctual impulse to

ritual action (unanimous victimage), a non-instinctual phenomenon.

Girard's view is that the human 'origin' of violence in appropriative mimesis (rivalry) is

different in kind from the forms of intra-specific aggression studied by Sapolsky in various animal

groups on the 'dark continent'. Instinctual preservation acts as an internal restraint or 'brake' as it

were on aggressive escalation in an animal troop.

In human associations, whether at the 'origin' in a proto-hominid quasi-culture, or in

'historical time' in an archaic culture, or in the 'heart of darkness' outside of time in an exotic or

primitive culture, or finally in 'current time' in a penitentiary setting (i.e. family, prison, school, or

office) in a mass, totalitarian anti-culture, there is not any instinctual control to speak of that limits

the ferocity and propensity of violence.

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In the first three non-state 'cultural modalities' ('ideal types'), it is sacrifice (victimage) that

provides the means by which the group defends itself from its inherent self-destructive proclivities,

the tendency for mimetic rivalry to reach a point of no return: the proverbial cascade threshold we

call 'runaway'.

Further, when sacrificial practices have been eroded, degraded, or perverted through the

passage of historical time, a cultural organization can no longer protect itself from the deleterious

effects of an out-of-control conflictual mimesis. For in a 'de-sacralized environment' – a judicial

environment - ritual action (ritual killing) is not an established, institutional mechanism any longer.

Violent behavior becomes an inoperable 'malignancy' that cannot be harnessed or held-in-check by

rituals or by mechanisms[85].

In CC , Girard has constructed an elaborate 'generative theory of culture' to account for the

origin and purpose of ritual killing, and for the necessity of religion in a cultural configuration.

Equally important is his reiteration of the stages of inter-dividual discord, when agents converge on

one and the same object with the intention of possessing it.

As already noted in the case of the disgruntled toddlers and lady shoppers, Girard further

emphasizes the relative insignificance of the object in the intensification of mimetic conflict. The

object is apparently - a momentary distraction, a shiny sparkler, a glittering prize, a status symbol -

in the ferocious 'tug-of-war' between the delirious acquisitive agents. It pales by comparison with

the 'doubling effect' itself.

The aggressive opposition intensifies and radiates outward from the primary conflict. It

eventually impacts additional 'bystander' agents, who are not participants in the original

confrontation. (To express the same thing more analytically: a two-player, sequential game

rapidly transfigures into a multi-player game. The collective dynamics of the latter, namely, a

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'swarm-phenomenon', are significantly more involuted than a two person 'tit-for-tat' model[86], and

take place at break-neck speed. More 'payoffs' come to the fore. More decisions or potential

moves among the players must be acted upon.)

In this intense cauldron of mimetic forces, the participants (the doubles) intensify their

struggle in the dubious belief that one of the two combatants will obtain a decided advantage over

the other. Each agent is both a model and an obstacle for the other one in the Girardian schema.

At a behavioral level, each is a mirror reflection of the other. The reason for mimetic antagonism

loses its importance during the confrontation. It is replaced by the need to justify the conflict,

which happens when one of the players obtains 'leverage' or a clear advantage.

However, the 'advantage' never actually materializes. It is sabotaged so to speak by the

rival, who will not yield. The disadvantaged player keeps on playing. The conflict continues. It

escalates. Only some outside controller can halt the warring 'sistas' from gouging out each other's

eyes out over a little 'barbie' doll, or the battling, bebe-clad cosmos from pulling each other's

bleached-blonde hair out at the roots to get the latest posh purse by ' Juicy Couture'. If left to their

own devices, greater damage will be generated by the toddlers and smart, sophisticated 'la dee da'

shoppers respectively.

'Tit-for-tat' is the expression used to describe a 'mimetic' conflict of two players from the

standpoint of analytical reason (i.e. 'game theory'). However, in the case above, the tit-for-tat

strategy is not governed by a rational, decision-making process. It is chosen on the basis of a

'personal unconscious', a 'lightning bolt exploding in the head', so to speak, as opposed to a

'collective unconscious', the unconscious of the mimetic battle. The lightning bolt is equivalent to

an agent's recognition of personal suffering, of a lack of being, etc.[87]

3.10 - Homo Mimeticus

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In the previous two sections of this 'orientational' chapter, an attempt was made to establish

the definition of appropriative mimesis. It was suggested that while Girard's work provides a

unique postmodern assessment of this idea, more study is required to explicate, in terms of a realist

epistemological paradigm, two issues: (i) the 'universal' structure of desire; (ii) the 'contagion

mechanism' of violence in real-time conflagrations[88]. The second issue shall be taken up in

more detail in Part Four of my study. Let me briefly elucidate the first point by referring to Paisley

Livingston's recent attempt at defining 'models of desire' in a more precise vocabulary than the

'rhetorical' discourse, hovering one minuscule level above 'fiction', that constitutes the Girardian

approach.

Livingston's investigation, mentioned earlier [89], is devoted to a 'reconstruction' of the

concept of mimetic desire. He has focused his attention primarily on Girard's 'theory of relations'

which, he asserts, is logically distinct from Girard's theological concerns, presented in Book Two

of CC . Livingston has also separated the 'fundamental anthropology' or 'theory of origin' from the

theory of relations in order to focus exclusively on the dynamics of a pure psychology, generated

by 'rivalry'[90].

Due to the general lack of analytical rigor in Girard's approach, which has led to some

confusions and criticisms (Supra Chapter One), Livingston suggests new avenues that may prove

particularly insightful and far-reaching. He draws upon 'action theory', and other psychological

ideas to transform the metaphor of mimetic desire into a 'theory' of mimetic desire. He argues that

although Girard's remarks about the 'triangular' nature of human conflict are 'brilliant', they do not

constitute a theory as such, at least not in the form in which Girard has so far presented them.

"Although much is to be learned from Girard's brilliant interpretations

of a wide range of important cultural documents, the hard-nosed reader

may question whether there is a 'theory' here at all, if by this is meant

an explanatory system having well-defined terms and an explicit

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argumentative structure. Girard frequently asserts that mimetic desire

functions as a mechanism, yet he has never backed this contention by

presenting anything remotely approximating a calculus, grammar, or

algorithm describing the putative mechanism's states and transitionlaws"[91].

Having read widely in the psychological literature, Livingston recognizes that to posit

imitation as a simple and sovereign explanatory principle, as Girard has done, to account for the

dynamics of imitative conflict, is insufficient given the complexity of the behavioral phenomena

being examined.

Without a precise understanding of the 'structure' of desire, or better, the triangular

'structuration' of desire, the delirious 'nomadic logic' desire displays 'in-the-world', it is impossible

to say anything substantive about its dynamics within a cultural field or space. To put this idea in

another way, as it stands, Girard's position - or prolegomena to a theory - has little operational

value except as a rhetorical 'intuition', no matter how profound or groundbreaking that intuition

might seem on the surface.

"When imitation was not explicitly set forth as the central

psychological concept, its place was often taken by someclosely related notion, such as contagion, copying, sympathy,

modeling, or identification. Imitation is neither simple nor

sovereign, however, as far as contemporary social psychologists

are concerned. They deny that imitation or any other single

notion can serve as a universal explanatory concept in the

study of social influence and interpersonal interaction.

Moreover, they assume that there are distinct types of

cognitive and motivational processes at work behind what is

vaguely identified as imitation, the term, then, does not

refer to a unique natural kind" [92].

Livingston suggests in MD that a more elaborate theory of mimetic desire, starting, of

course, from the Girardian formulation, be articulated. One of the first orders of business for this

new 'theory' is to take human motivation, an asymmetrical factor, into account. A fundamental

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question in this regard is: 'What is the implicit structure and essential orientation of the mimetic

system of motivation?'

In addition to reading mimetic desire within a psychological framework, another important

issue is to qualify the meaning of 'desire' as it relates to acquisitive mimesis. Here, three points can

be addressed. First, Livingston suggests that Girard's 'automating' of an entity called 'desire' carries

strong 'idealist' connotations. It also effaces important distinctions [93]. Desire, belief, and

intention are complex. The Girardian position takes no notice of this complexity, nor would it be

able to answer the question: 'What role does belief have in the activity of desiring?' For

Livingston, a set of beliefs is what makes a human agent into a model for another desiring agent.

"...the imitator's belief about the model's desire plays a crucial

role in the motivation of the mimetic agent's own state of desire...

This can only be true when another condition is satisfied, namely,

that the imitator has a tutelary belief that helps to motivate the

non-deliberate selection of the model, perhaps in a non-conscious

inferential process"[94].

Second, Livingston contends, quite correctly, I think, that not all desire is mimetic, and that

mimetic desire need not necessarily be triangular. Definitions of individual states, attitudes, and

episodes must be articulated to transform the monolithic concept of mimetic desire - the Girardian

formulation - into a theory of personality and social interaction. The latter can only be worked out

for Livingston in relation to specific socio-historical settings.

Part of the difficulty with le systeme Girard is that it has been elaborated as a 'context-free'

- 'universal' - mechanism. To overcome this deficiency, Livingston proposes a formalization of the

model of desire. In his book, he distinguishes two types (models) of 'mimetic desire': (i)

acquisitive (appropriative) mimesis; (ii) conflictual (antagonistic) mimesis. He suggests that in CC ,

Girard concentrates primarily on the elucidation of acquisitive mimesis, not on conflictual mimesis.

Clearly, each type is significant, but each also exhibits an idiosyncratic trajectory in the real world.

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Third, the claims about the explanatory power of le systeme Girard are exaggerated and

somewhat ambiguous. Multiple factors (i.e. variables), not simply a 'mimetic' one, must be utilized

to account for any history of violent retribution. Deviating too far from the 'practico-inert ' to

account for the causes of conflict compromises the analysis.

"My central point here is that the very interest of Girard's own

insights is sometimes obscured by some unnecessarily ambitious,

second-order claims about their explanatory range. And these

claims are too ambitious for two major reasons: first, because

the theory of the dynamics and mechanisms of mimetic desire

has never been accompanied by an actual, detailed mechanistic

model of the psychic stages and transitional laws in question

and hence the nomic rhetoric is a blank check; and second,because there are ample reasons to assume that the actual

manifestations of the putative mechanism are massively over-

determined by factors extraneous to the model. The latter

cannot be presented, then, as the determining or autonomous

mechanism producing phenomena as complex as personal

and world-historical change..."[95].

Livingston contends that if mimetic desire produces conflict, (i.e. rivalry and violence) this

transpires only under certain 'initial conditions'. The nature of these conditions is historical, and

not explicable in terms of an abstract mimetic mechanism. In his study, Livingston does not give

any indication of how one would go about 'formalizing' initial conditions and the progression of a

mimetic mechanism in real time.

It is my contention that a critique of victimage can throw light on this interface problem

between 'inter-dividual' psychology and historical contingency, or the force of circumstance. The

problem with Girard's psychology is that it is too far afield from 'history'. (One might be able to

argue that Girard has recently come to a recognition of this lacunae in his approach by seeing

resemblances between mimetic theory and Clausewitz's theory of war.)

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He presents a 'reified' psychology that does not actually refer to de-centered, delirious

subjects 'in the world', but only to imaginary characters who are situated, one might say, one level

below the rarified circle of paradiso or one level above the white hot fires of the inferno.

Fourth, a final consideration has to do with the construction of detailed models of violent

interaction from Girard's generative anthropology. Livingston proposes that a group's frenetic

convergence on a surrogate victim (i.e. a scapegoat) can be mapped out or 'represented'. An

important auxiliary problem here has to do with the representation at the 'phase' transition or the

point at which mimetic rivalry (i.e. inter-dividual behavior) becomes into a 'mob-on-the-

rampage'[96]. (This is a different 'phase transition' from the one that supposedly occurs at the

'original scene'.)

'In what conceptual categories can this concrete transition be articulated?' 'Can analytical

reason do justice to the complexity - the dialectical complexity - of this transition?' A related

question is: 'What interaction patterns result from unique initial conditions and configurations of

inter-dividual aggression?'

Given the constraints of space, it is not feasible to develop Livingston's provocative

criticisms of Girard's views on mimetic desire any further here. Suffice is to say that I will

elaborate Livingston's approach to the 'modeling' of acquisitive mimesis in terms of my own

'dialectical' explication of Girard's theory of sacrifice, the ultimate goal of which is to 'evolve' it

into a theory of mass violence[97] on both a 'micro' and 'macro' level. (Below, I only consider this

elaboration of Girard on a 'micro' level. This level is basically 'anthropological' as well as

'synchronic' in its aims.)

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Like Oughourlian's exposition, Livingston's position is instructive precisely because it

provides a more transparent 'framework of ideas' from which to extend and/or modify Girard's

mimetic monism.

3.11 - Conclusion

Terminology pertaining to both acquisitive and conflictual mimesis is complicated and

heterogeneous. Given this fact, a critical appraisal of nomenclature is an essential constituent of

any future theory of mass violence that will make use of mimetic rivalry, unanimous victimage,

etc. as core concepts. While provocative, Girard's rhetorical 'meta-language' on desire, has done

more to obfuscate basic issues than to definitively resolve them. Part of the reason for this

obfuscation is his equivocal use of terminology.

It appears that the conceptual deficiencies of Girard's monism have been partially

redressed by Oughourlian's 'pure' psychology and Livingston's analytical model of desire. Another

possible option - a 'dialectical' transformation of the Girardian monism into a critique of victimage

or a study of the de-centering of subjectivity in a postmodern context is provisionally offered in

Part Four below.

A dialectical transformation proposes a 'synthetic' model of human relations, a theory of

'situated' asymmetrical actors, in contradistinction to a 'pure' psychology, or a theory of social

learning, as a way of mapping out the turbulent trajectories of mimetic conflict in the empirical

territory of the practico-inert , otherwise referred to as 'everydayness'.

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This critique seeks to resolve the conceptual deficiencies in a rhetorically-based model by

reformulating it at a higher logical level in an historical, structurational anthropology, an

anthropology grounded in acquisitive imitation. Girardian revisionists, such as Oughourlian and

Livingston, can facilitate this transition, but ultimately, their formulations must also be superseded by

a 'critical theory,' which addresses the historical conditions one finds in mass (policed) culture that

provide a 'theater' for conflictual dramas to play themselves out.

sac invest chapter 3

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