sacrs symposium the 2008 market collapse

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SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse WHAT DO WE DO NOW? BOB MCCRORY EFI ACTUARIES MARCH 20, 2009 1

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SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse. What do we do now? Bob mccrory EFI Actuaries March 20, 2009. Today’s Discussion. Shifting Costs Hidden Costs Hidden Risk Things That Don’t Work Flying Pigs. Shifting Costs. Asset Smoothing Policy Amortization Policy Direct Cost Smoothing. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

SACRS SymposiumThe 2008 Market Collapse

WHAT DO WE DO NOW?

BOB MCCRORYEFI ACTUARIES

MARCH 20, 2009

1

Page 2: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Shifting Costs

• Hidden Costs

• Hidden Risk

• Things That Don’t Work

• Flying Pigs

2

Today’s Discussion

Page 3: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Asset Smoothing Policy

• Amortization Policy

• Direct Cost Smoothing

3

ShiftingCosts

Page 4: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Shifting Costs

Tools Asset Smoothing Amortization Policy Direct Cost Smoothing

Ask yourself: What are our choices? What are the rules? What is current practice? What are your limits?

4

Page 5: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Asset Smoothing Policy

ChoicesMarket value or actuarial

(smoothed) value?How much smoothing: Three,

five, seven, 15 years?Layered smoothing (one layer

for each year) or combined (rolling)?

Corridor around market value? No corridor?

5

Page 6: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Asset Smoothing Policy

Rules “Reasonable range” around market –

ASOP 44, and “Reasonable period of time” to converge to

market – ASOP 44; or “Sufficiently narrow range” or converges in

a “sufficiently short period” Current Practice

Five-year smoothing with 20% corridor is de facto standard (ERISA)

Combined, not layered smoothing, with factor of 15 and 20% corridor (CalPERS)

What is “reasonable”? What is “sufficient”

6

Page 7: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Amortization Policy

Choices Actuarial Funding Method: Each

produces different balance between normal cost and accrued liability

Layered amortization or combined? How long? Generally 10 to 30

years Level $ or level % of payroll

(increasing $)? Different bases and periods for

different sources? Gains/losses vs. amendments

7

Page 8: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Amortization Policy

Rules No more than 30 years (GASB) Level % of pay is “negative

amortization” after about 17 yearsCurrent Practice

Practice varies widely Gains and losses over a rolling 30-

year, level % payroll (CalPERS) Is level % of payroll reasonable if

employment is likely to drop?

8

Page 9: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Direct Cost Smoothing

Choices Actuarial cost Phase into actuarial cost over a

number of years Actuarial cost with limits on level

(e.g., cost must be less than 23.7%)

Actuarial cost with limits on growth (e.g., cost cannot increase more than 0.6% of pay per year)

Single stipulated cost

9

Page 10: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Direct Cost Smoothing

Rules CERL requires minimum of normal cost plus

30 year amortization of unfunded Any contribution less than the Annual

Required Contribution will create a Net Pension Obligation under GASB standards

Any limit on contributions could cause insolvency

Underpayments are paid back with interest Current Practice

Practice varies widely Limits always legislated Usually overrides and violates actuarial

practice Is this a loan?

10

Page 11: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Compensation Policy

• Disabilities

• Furloughs

• Early Retirement

11

HiddenCosts

Page 12: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Compensation Policy

Review pensionable earnings Earnings structure – therefore pensionable

earnings – may be bargained, subject to immediate change

Review last 50 or so retirements and disabilities. Jumps in pay at retirement (spiking)? Categories of pay not available to all

members? Special pay for some members? Benefit disparities among similarly situated

members? Terminal payments (unused sick leave or

vacation) increasing final average pay? Incentive bonuses?

12

Page 13: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Compensation Policy

Review seniority systems Can drive access to overtime, thus final

compensation and payroll What impact does this have? Do you want

to limit this? Goals

Not trying to reduce benefits Improve benefit predictability Improve adherence to pension policy

goals A pension plan, not a lottery

Rough Rule of Thumb: Save $15 in liabilities for every $1 reduction in benefits

13

Page 14: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Disabilities

Budgetary restrictions often cause increases in disability rates Encourage less productive employees to take

disability Reduce/privatize limited duty positions Balance department budget on back of the

pension plan Track changes in disabilities

Not just rates: Employee class and department as well

Ongoing monitoring, not just actuarial study Maintain consistency in disability policy Be sure policies for confirming disability,

income offsets are followed

14

Page 15: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Hidden Costs

Furloughs Decrease payroll; leave benefit

unchanged Increase cost as a percent of payroll Decrease payroll over which

unfunded liabilities and gains/losses are amortized

Early Retirement In general, earlier retirement

increases plan costs Subsidized early retirement adds

additional cost Also reduces payroll base

15

Page 16: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Plan Maturity

• Layers

• Layoffs

16

HiddenRisks

Page 17: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Plan Maturity

’37 Act Plans are maturingBaby Boom is retiringReplacement employees olderPlan improvements increasing

retirement benefitsGovernment employment

static, maybe declining (?)Result is increase in ratio of

assets to payroll

17

Page 18: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Plan MaturityAssets as a Percentage of Payroll

18

0%

100%

200%

300%

400%

500%

600%

700%

800%

900%

7/1/08 7/1/18 7/1/28 7/1/38 7/1/48 7/1/58 7/1/68

Ac

tua

ria

l V

alu

e o

f A

ss

ets

% A

cti

ve

Pa

yro

ll

Valuation Date

Actuarial Assets(As a percentage of active member payroll)

Page 19: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Plan Maturity

Increase in ratio of assets to payroll Typical ‘37 Act plan is increasing

from about 5X payroll to around 9X payroll

Represents a sensitivity ratio As the ratio increases, investment

gains and losses are larger relative to payroll

Produces more cost volatility Increasing risk is structural, permanent,

unavoidable In addition, OPEB benefits are starting

to be pre-funded

19

Page 20: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Layers

Layers (tranches?) in asset smoothing and unfunded liability add to cost volatility Cost steps – up or down – as

layers are established and retired Sometimes these cancel,

sometimes they reinforce each other

Layers bring advantages as well Each layer is eventually retired Layers are reasonably predictable

20

Page 21: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Layers21

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2008 2013 2018 2023 2028

Total Cost as a Percentage of Pay

AssumedProjected

Page 22: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Layers22

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2008 2013 2018 2023 2028

Total Cost as a Percentage of Pay

Assumed

Layered

Combined

Page 23: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Layers23

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

2008 2013 2018 2023 2028

Funding Ratio

Assumed

Layered

Combined

Page 24: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Layoffs

Our projections routinely assume constant active workforce Implies an increasing active payroll

Layoffs, hiring freezes, pay freezes all violate these assumptions Payroll decreases; benefits in pay status

unchanged Members near retirement not affected much Layoffs usually among younger members who

don’t cost much Increases cost as a percent of payroll Decreases payroll over which unfunded

liabilities and gains/losses are amortized

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Page 25: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Contribution Limits

• Downsizing

• Defecting to CalPERS

• Quid Pro Quo

25

Things That Don’t Work

Page 26: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Contribution Limits

Limit on level or growth of employer contributions Increase by no more than 0.6% of pay

per year Total contribution less than 23.7% of

pay CalSTRS bases maximum

contribution on 1990 formula, benefits, adjusted assets

Generally legislated Can lead to insolvency Must be monitored closely and managed

26

Page 27: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Contribution Limits: Funding Ratio27

84.01%

94.87% 97.48% 100.25% 103.51%107.46%

112.98%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

1/1/07 1/1/12 1/1/17 1/1/22 1/1/27 1/1/32 1/1/37

Fu

din

g R

ati

o

Valuation Date

Funding Ratio - Board Allocation(500 trials, 50 shown; average shown in red; 25th, 75th percentiles in green)

Page 28: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Contribution Limits: Chaos28

-100%

-50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

12/31/06 12/31/16 12/31/26 12/31/36 12/31/46 12/31/56 12/31/66 12/31/76 12/31/86 12/31/96 12/31/06

Fu

nd

ing

Rati

o

Valuation Date

Actuarial Funding Ratio(Actuarial assets a percentage of actuarial accrued liabilities)

Page 29: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Downsizing

Spinning off operations or subdivisions Lose active members and payroll Employer contribution decreases Often lose a revenue stream

Retirees and disabled remain Fewer active members and payroll

to support the Plan Volatility and risk of remaining Plan

increases Example: General Motors

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Page 30: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Defecting to CalPERS

Some participating employers are withdrawing to join CalPERS. Impact on Legacy Plan: Lose active members and payroll Retirees and disabled remain Fewer active members and payroll to

support the Plan Lose a revenue stream CalPERS amortizes initial unfunded and

gains and losses over 30 years – often longer than Legacy Plan amortization period

Therefore, employer contribution decreases

Volatility and risk of Legacy Plan increases

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Page 31: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Quid Pro Quo

“If the Retirement Board reduces our contribution we will…”

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Page 32: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• The Actuarial World is not the Real World

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FlyingPigs

Page 33: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Flying PigsProjected Actuarial Cost

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0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2008 2013 2018 2023 2028

Total Cost as a Percentage of Pay

AssumedProjected

Page 34: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Flying PigsSimulated Actuarial Cost

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23.01%

40.15%

34.33%

29.30%

15.55% 16.76% 16.04%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

7/1/08 7/1/13 7/1/18 7/1/23 7/1/28 7/1/33 7/1/38

Co

st %

Ac

tiv

e P

ayro

ll

Valuation Date

Actuarial Cost - Board Allocation(500 trials, 50 shown; average shown in red; 25th, 75th percentiles in green)

Page 35: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Work Together!

35

Best Friends

Page 36: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Work Together!

Pension stakeholders must work together Retirement Board Board of Supervisors and other

employers Employee organizations Retirees

Work together to develop: Shared vision Shared understanding of the

problems Common strategy and tactics Shared sacrifice

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Page 37: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

Work Together!

Share information Retirement Board presentations to

employers about current and expected costs

Employer presentations to Retirement Board on employer financial situation

Presentations to employee organizations and retirees on funding basics, current financial environment

Joint planning Working groups with retirement board,

employer, and employee participation Joint press policy

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Page 38: SACRS Symposium The 2008 Market Collapse

• Bob McCrory(206) [email protected]

• Graham Schmidt(415) [email protected]

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Contact Information