safety i&c systems

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APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-N

Safety I&C Systems

Topical Report

Applicable Codes and Regulations

Safety I&C System Description

Overview

PPS

ESF-CCS

CPCS

QIAS-P

Data Communication

Software Development and V&V

Equipment Reliability

Design Acceptance Criteria

Summary

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1 APR1400 APR1400-R-I-I(EC)-11001-N

Topical Report 1

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Table of Contents

Topical Report (1/1)

Purpose

Scope

Applicable Codes and Regulations

I&C System Description

Software Reliability

Equipment Qualification

Equipment Reliability

References

Appendix A. Conformance to IEEE Std. 603-1991

Appendix B. Conformance to IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003

Appendix C. Conformance to DI&C ISG-04

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Applicable Codes and

Regulations

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10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria

GDC 1, “Quality Standards and Records”

− Conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, “Quality

Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants”

GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection against Natural Phenomena”

− Designed as Seismic Category I

− Installed in the I&C equipment rooms or MCR that provide protection

against other natural phenomena

GDC 10, “Reactor Design”

− Contributes to reactor design margin by providing conservatism in

setpoint calculations and fault-tolerant features

− Uncertainties and setpoint methodology will be submitted as a

separate technical report

Applicable Codes And Regulations (1/8)

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GDC 19, “Control Room”

− Equipped with manual reactor trip initiation switches and manual

ESFAS initiation switches in the MCR safety console

− Implemented with the displays for safe operation in the MCR.

GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability”

− Maintains the protection function in case of any single credible failure

− Allows periodic testing without reducing the availability of the

protection systems using bypass function


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GDC 22, “Protection System Independence”

− Consists of four independent measurement channels for each

protective parameter

GDC 23, “Protection System Failure Modes”

− Designed to fail into a safe state

− FMEA method will be described in the Topical Report

GDC 24, “Separation of Protection and Control System”

− Maintains physical separation from non-safety system


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Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Guide 1.22, “Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation

Functions”

− Provides complete overlap testing during the reactor operating at

power or when shutdown

Regulatory Guide 1.47, “Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for

Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems”

− Provides system level alarms when a component is bypassed or

inoperable

Regulatory Guide 1.53, “Application of the Single Failure Criterion to

Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems”

− Assures both the reactor safety and resistance to a spurious reactor

trip with four channel configuration


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Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Guide 1.62, “Manual Initiation of Protection Action”

− Provides manual initiation of a protective action at the system level for

RPS and ESFAS

− Provides manual switches on the MCR safety console

Regulatory Guide 1.75, “Criteria for Independence of Electrical Safety

Systems”

− Located in different geographic fire zones for each channel

− Electrically isolated using fiber-optic technology

− Physically separated

Regulatory Guide 1.97, “Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for

Nuclear Power Plants”

− Provides the accident monitoring instrumentation according to IEEE

Std. 497-2002


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Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Guide 1.105, “Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation”

− Setpoint methodology conforms to ISA-S67.04-1994

− Uncertainties and setpoint methodology will be submitted as a

separate technical report

Regulatory Guide 1.118, “Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection

Systems”

− Designed to be periodically tested in accordance with the criteria of

IEEE Std. 338-1987

− Provides overlapped testing for the RPS and ESFAS without initiating

a reactor trip or ESF actuation

Regulatory Guide 1.152, “Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems

of Nuclear Power Plants”

− Conforms to IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003


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Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Guide 1.168, “Verification, Validation, Reviews and Audits for

Digital Computer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP

− Conforms to IEEE Std. 1012-1998 and IEEE Std. 1028-1997

Regulatory Guide 1.169, “Configuration Management Plans for Digital

Computer Software used in Safety Systems on NPP

− Conforms to IEEE Std. 828-1990 and IEEE Std. 1042-1997

Regulatory Guide 1.170, “Software Test Documentation for Digital

Computer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP

− Conforms to IEEE Std. 829-1983

Regulatory Guide 1.171, “Software Unit Testing for Digital Computer

Software used in Safety Systems of NPP


Regulatory Guide 1.172, “Software Requirements Specifications for Digital

Computer Software used in Safety Systems of NPP



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Regulatory Guide

Regulatory Guide 1.173, “Developing Software Life Cycle Processes for

Digital Computer Software used in Safety Systems


Regulatory Guide 1.180, “Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and

Radio Frequency Interference in Safety Related I&C”

− Qualified according to the EMI/RFI requirements of MIL Std. 461E

Regulatory Guide 1.209, “Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of

Safety Related I&C in Nuclear Power Plants”

− Qualified according to the requirements of IEEE Std. 323-2003


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Safety I&C System

Description

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Overview (1/6)

Overall I&C System Architecture

Safety I&C system uses qualified PLC platform

Non-safety I&C system uses DCS platform

Provides 4 channel redundancy for safety I&C system except QIAS-P

− Installed in physically separated I&C equipment rooms

Electrical isolation, physical separation and communication independence

− Between redundant safety channels

− Between safety system and non-safety system

Diversity to cope with the CCF of digital safety I&C system

− Diverse Protection System

− Diverse Indication System

− Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Switches

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APC-S : Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety, CIM : Component Interface Module, CPCS : Core Protection Calculator System, DIS : Diverse Indication System,

DMA : Diverse Manual ESF Actuation, DPS : Diverse Protection System, ENFMS : Ex-core Neutron Flux Monitoring System, ESCM : ESF-CCS Soft Control Module

FIDAS : Fixed In-core Detector Amplifier System, ICI : In-Core Instrumentation , NIMS : NSSS Integrity Monitoring System, NPCS : NSSS Process Control System,

OM : Operator Module, P-CCS : Process Component Control System, PCS : Power Control System, QIAS-P/N : Qualified Indication & Alarm System - PAMI / Non-safety

Common platform for Safety I&C

Common platform for Non-safety I&C

Dedicated equipment for its function

Computer server, monitor & peripherals

Conventional H/W components

Legend

Safety network

Non-safety network

Hardwired Connection

Serial Data Link

Program Server

Gateway Server

Non-safety Components

(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)

FIDAS NIMS ALMS IVMS LPMS

RCPVMS

P-CCS BOP

Controls

NPCS PP&LCS

FWCS SBCS

DIS PCS RRS

RPCS DRCS

Remote I/O

ICI Sensors

Large Display Panel

Alarm Server

DB Server

QIAS-N

ENFMS Startup/ Control

Safety

Fission

Chamber

PPS (4 Ch)

ESF-

CCS (4 Ch)

QIAS-P (A, B)

CPCS (4 Ch)

Safety Components

(Sensors, Txs, Pumps, Valves, etc.)

MTP ITP

CIM APC-S (4 Ch) DIS

Control & Monitoring System

DPS

Information

FPD

CCG

ESF-CCS

Information

FPD

Process

Soft Control

APC-S

QIAS-P

CIM

Diverse Actuation

System

A

Ch. Confirm Switches

Safety Console

CPM

Dedicated H/W switches

ESFAS Initiation

Minimum Inventory

DMA Switches

OM QIAS-N DIS QIAS-P

CIM

RT Initiation

RTSS

ESF-CCS

Operating

Bypass

Setpoint

Reset

Gateway Server

Soft Control Network

QIAS-N Network

PPS /

M/G Set

Data Link Server

Non-Safety Network

Safety Network

DMA DPS

DIS

Protection & Safety

Monitoring System

ESCM

SDL

Overview (2/6)

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Overview (3/6)

Protection and Safety Monitoring System

Plant Protection System

− Initiates reactor trip or ESFAS whenever the monitored process

values exceed the pre-defined limits

Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System

− Controls the operation of ESF components

− Receives manual ESFAS actuation signals from safety console

Core Protection Calculator System

− Computes DNBR and LPD

− Provides the trip signal to PPS

Qualified Indication and Alarm System – PAMI

− Displays Type A, B & C variables required by Reg. Guide 1.97 and

the variables for inadequate core cooling monitoring

Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety

− Receives safety field signals and distributes them to PPS, ESF-

CCS, CPCS, QIAS-P and DIS

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Control and Monitoring System

Power Control System

− Controls reactor power level

− Includes Reactor Regulating System, Reactor Power Cutback

System and Digital Rod Control System

NSSS Process Control System

− Controls NSSS processes

− Consists of Pressurizer Pressure & Level Control System, Feedwater

Control System and Steam Bypass Control System

Process-Component Control System

− Controls BOP processes

Qualified Indication and Alarm System – Non-safety

− Supports continuous plant operation when Information Processing

System is unavailable

− Provides the indications required for EOP execution, safe shutdown

and critical operator action required by PRA and HRA

Overview (4/6)

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Diverse Actuation System

Diverse Protection System

− Provides defense against CCF of PPS/ESF-CCS (SECY 93-087,

BTP 7-19)

− Reduces the risk of ATWS (10 CFR 50.62)

Diverse Indication System

− Displays Position 4 variables (SECY 93-087, BTP 7-19)

Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Switches

− Provide Position 4 actuation (SECY 93-087, BTP 7-19)

Overview (5/6)

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Overview (6/6)

Human – System Interface

Large Display Panel

− Display of overall plant operation

Operator Consoles

− Monitor and control all processes

Safety Console

– Backup operation during total failure of the operator consoles;

− EOPs operation and safe shutdown

− Critical operator actions required by PRA and HRA

− Manual ESF system level actuation switches and reactor trip

switches

− Alarms, displays, controls needed to perform periodic surveillance

test

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Design Features

Plant Protection System (1/5)

Qualified PLC platform

Reactor Trip & ESFAS initiation function

− Mitigates the consequences of safety related design bases events

Four independent channels

Redundancy within each channel to enhance availability

Fail-safe design for component failure or loss of electrical power

Continuous automatic on-line testing

− Hardware self diagnostics

− Cross channel comparisons

Manual testing

− Computer-aided surveillance testing

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System Description


Bistable Processor

− Generates trip signals when the process value exceeds a setpoint

Local Coincidence Logic Processor

− Determines the trip state based on the state of the four channel

bistable trip inputs and respective bypasses

− Generates the initiation signal for RTSS or ESF-CCS

Maintenance & Test Panel

− Shared with ESF-CCS, CPCS and QIAS-P

− Provides manual control functions using soft control with Function

Enable Key switches to meet DI&C-ISG-04

− Displays system operating status

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System Description


Interface & Test Processor

– Transfers the safety system operating status to IPS and QIAS-N

– Supports surveillance test

Operator Module

– Shared with ESF-CCS and CPCS

– Located on the Safety Console

– Provides PPS control functions using conventional switches on the

Safety Console

• operating bypass, variable setpoint reset

– Displays system operating status

RPS Reactor Trip Initiation Switches

− 4 switches in the MCR Safety Console

− Hardwired directly to the RTSS

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System Configuration

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Testing Function


Self-testing

− Continuous and automatic diagnostics for detecting hardware and

software error

− Cross channel comparison for channel operability check

Manual testing

− Performs under administrative control

− Complete overlapped testing

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Design Features

ESF-CCS (1/3)

Common platform with PPS

Consists of 4 channels

Consists of Group Controller and Loop Controller

Group Controller

– Performs 2/4 logic using the ESFAS initiation signals from PPS

– Performs load sequence logic for emergency diesel generator

Loop Controller

– Performs the component control logic

PPS

ESF

Components

(Pump, Valve,…)

APC-S

I/E

Sensor

GC LC

2/4

Logic

Component

Control

Logic

ESF-CCS

RPS

ESFAS CIM

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System Description (CIM)

ESF-CCS (2/3)

Main Function

− Integrates component command signals from different control

platforms

− Arbitrates component command and prioritize control by system-

based and state-based priority.

Hardware-based safety grade module

− Diverse from safety platform (PPS & ESF-CCS)

− Permanent logic implemented by solid-state device technology

− Fully testable design

− Seismic Category I

− EMI/RFI qualification

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System Description (CIM)

ESF-CCS (3/3)

Priority Logic

− Hardware-based logic

− State-based priority (safe state first)

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System Description

CPCS (1/3)


Four independent channels

Generates the low DNBR trip and high LPD trip to PPS

Provides CEA Withdrawal Prohibit signals to the Digital Rod Control

System

Transmits all the CEA positions to the Information Processing System

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System Description

CPCS (2/3)

CPCS consists of CPC, CEAC and CPP

Core Protection Calculator

– Calculates Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio and Local Power

Density based on CEA position and penalty factor

– Generates Low DNBR / High LPD trip and CWP to PPS

Control Element Assembly Calculator

– Monitors CEA positions

– Calculates CEA position penalty factor

CEA Position Processor

– Performs A/D conversion for the signals from the Reed Switch

Position Transmitters

– Transmit the CEA positions to CEAC

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System Description (Function)

CPCS (3/3)

Receives the following signals from the process sensors, RSPT and

ENFMS

– RCS cold leg and hot let temperature

– Pressurizer pressure

– Reactor coolant pump speed

– Ex-core neutron flux power

– CEA positions

Calculates DNBR and LPD values

Compares the calculated DNBR and LPD values to setpoints

Provides the output to PPS

– Low DNBR trip, pre-trip

– High LPD trip, pre-trip

– CEA Withdrawal Prohibit

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System Description

QIAS-P(1/2)


Two channel redundancy (Ch. A & B)

Provides two separate FPDs (continuous and dedicated) at the Safety

Console

Displays accident monitoring instrumentation variables

– Type A, B and C parameters required by Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev.04

Displays inadequate core cooling variables (NUREG-0737, Sec.II.F.2)

– Primary coolant saturation margin

– Rx vessel level (HJTC)

– Core exit temperature

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QIAS-P (2/2)

QIAS-P Architecture

Safety network

Safety network

QIAS-P Cabinet Ch.A(B)

ITP

Data Link

Hardwired

Network Data

Data Link

QIAS-P Display Ch. A

Control & Monitoring Network

Ch.A(B)

DIS Display (Ch.A only)

CET

HJTC

AMI

Sensors


MTP

APC-S

Splitter

Isolator


DIS

QIAS-P QIAS-P Display Ch. A

QIAS-N


IPS

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Data Communication (1/6)

Data communication meets the requirements of R.G. 1.75

and DI&C-ISG-04

– Physical separation: distance between redundant channels

– Electrical isolation: fiber optic technology

– Communication independence: broadcast only

The serial data link transmission is used for transmitting safety

signals

– No acknowledgement from the other side

The communication and processing section processors share data

by means of dual-ported memory

– Interface via dual-ported memory separate functionally between

processing processor and communication processor

Data Communication Independence

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Data Communication Network

Non - Safety Network

BP CPCS LCL LC GC QIAS-P

IPS

Gateway

Server

ITP MTP

QIAS-N

Safety Network (Ch. A)

To LCL

in Ch. B, C, D

From BP

in Ch. B, C, D

From LCL

in Ch. B, C, D

ITP’s

in Ch. B. C, D

ITP Network

PPS to ESF-CCS Data Link CCC Data Link

Information Processing System

Safety to Non-safety Interface

CCC : Cross Channel Communication

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Data Communication between Redundant Safety Channels


PS : Processing Section

CS : Communication Section

Between PPS channels

Between CPCS channels

Between PPS and ESF-CCS channels

Between ITPs in each channel

Channel A Bistable processor Ch. A, B, C or D LCL

processors

Buffering Circuit Communication Interface Card

Electrical Isolation

PS CS

DPR

AM

CS PS

DPR

AM

FOM FOM

Serial data link between Bistable processor

and LCL processor for example

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Data Communication from Safety to Non-safety system

FOM

Interface & Test Processor QIAS-N


FOM


Internal Network Non-Safety Computer PS CS

DPR

AM

CI


IPS



Internal Network

MTP Gateway

Server FOM FOM CI

Between ITPs in each channel and QIAS-N

Between MTPs in each channel and Gateway Servers

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Soft Control Communication


Replaces the conventional dedicated pushbuttons and M/A station.

Enable operators to control all ESF components using the ESF-CCS

Soft Control Module (ESCM)

Safety related soft control

– Selects ESF component to be controlled on the Information FPD

– Information FPD sends component ID to ESCM

– Controls the selected ESF component using the component

control template the ESCM

– ESCM control signals are transmitted to the ESF-CCS via

Control Channel Gateway (CCG)

– The control signals are validated by channel confirm switches.

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Soft Control Communication


Information

FPD

CCG

ESF-CCS

CPM

Soft Control Network

A B C D

Ch. Confirm Switches

ESCM

Safety components

Hardwired

Serial Data Link

CPM : Control Panel Multiplexer

CCG : Control Channel Gateway

ESCM : ESF-CCS Soft Control Module

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Software Development

and V&V

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Software Reliability

Software Development and V&V (1/2)

Software design life cycle

– Software life cycle model consistent with IEEE Std. 1074

– Software life cycle activities consistent with NUREG 0800, BTP 7-14

– Major software plan documents

• software quality assurance plan – IEEE Std. 730

• software V&V plan – IEEE Std. 1012

• software configuration management plan – IEEE Std. 828

• software safety plan – IEEE Std. 1228

Software classification

– Classified according to the grade of importance (its function to be

performed)

– Software within a processor have the same classification

– Most rigorous V&V requirements are applied to protection grade S/W

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Software Classification

IEEE 1012-1998

Criticality APR1400 Software Classification

High

(Level 4)

Protection

(Safety Critical)

- perform RPS control actions

- perform ESFAS control actions

- perform safe shutdown control actions

Major

(Level 3)

Important to Safety

(ITS)

- monitor or test protection functions

- monitor plant critical safety functions

- provide supplemental means to perform protection functions

Moderate

(Level 2)

Important to Availability (ITA)

- maintain operation of plant systems and equipment that are necessary to operate the plant

Low

(Level 1) General Purpose

- perform functions other than that described in the previous classifications

- not installed in the on-line plant system.

Software Development and V&V (2/2)

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Equipment Reliability 5

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Types of Equipment Qualification

Equipment Reliability (1/3)

Environmental Qualification

– Located in mild environments where qualified HVAC is provided

– IEEE std. 323-2003, as endorsed by RG 1.208

Seismic Qualification

– Classified in Seismic category I

– IEEE std. 343-1987, as endorsed by RG 1.100

– To be qualified by test, analysis or a combination of both methods

Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

– Qualified for EMI/RFI emission / susceptibility and SWC

– MIL. std. 461E and IEC std. 61000 series, as endorsed by RG

1.180

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Reliability Analysis (FMEA)


Potential single failure analysis for hardware components

Assumes that one of the redundant PPS bistable trip channels is

bypassed for maintenance

Analysis to the level of replaceable modules

FMEA table includes

– Component and number

– Failure mode

– Symptom and local effect

– Effect on protective function

– Method of detection

– Fault classification

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Reliability Analysis (Unavailability)


Probabilistic analysis using fault tree model

– PPS fails to trip the reactor on demand

– ESF-CCS fails to actuate the ESF components on demand

Analysis considers

– Independent component hardware failures

– Common cause component hardware failures

– Unavailability due to trip parameter in bypass

– Human (operator) errors

Major components for impacting system reliability

– Reactor trip : CCF of RTSS, CCF of LCL DO module

– ESFAS : CCF of Component Interface Module

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Design Acceptance Criteria 6

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Digital Platform and Safety I&C System

Design Acceptance Criteria

System Design Area DC Phase

Digital

Platform for

Safety System

Hardware Component Detail Design

- Response Time

- Uncertainty

- Deterministic Performance

- System Diagnostics

Data Communication Independence

Equipment Qualification

Commercial Grade Dedication DAC

Safety System

- RPS

- ESF-CCS

- CPCS

- QIAS-P

- Data Comm.

System Description Detail Design

Design Bases Detail Design

Functional Design Detail Design

Software DAC

Set-point Calculations

Reliability Analysis

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SUMMARY 7

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Summary

APR1400 I&C system overview provides the information for:

– Common PLC for safety I&C and DCS for Non-safety I&C

– Design feature and system description of PPS, ESF-CCS, CPCS,

QIAS-P and data communications

– S/W design process

– Safety I&C reliability

I&C system licensing plan

– DAC is used for safety system digital platform and software

– Component design details will be provided for reference

Safety I&C systems topical report will be submitted

safety i&c systems

Documents