safety in the nuclear industry · 2019. 10. 28. · nuclear safety improvement 1) essential to keep...

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SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 21st 1999- "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

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CONTENTS (1)

Nuclear safety definition

Nuclear safety as control of "states"

Limits of nuclear safety definition

Nuclear safety as control of risk -.

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Nuclear safety, historical perspective

Safety culture definition

Safety culture for EDF

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 l st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONT 2

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CONTENTS (2)

• Identifying risk factors

• Nuclear safety management

• Nuclear safety improvement

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• Appendix 1 : nuclear safety basic.principles

• Appendix 2 : nuclear safety organization

• Appendix 3 : nuclear safety indicators

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 3

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NUCLEAR SAFETY DEFINITION (1)

Nuclear safety is "the actions taken to protect man and the environment against the dispersal of radioactive substances"

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999- "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" -J.M.MORONI 4

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NUCLEAR SAFETY DEFINITION (2)

• It depends on the various provisions made at all stages in the design, construction, operation and decommissionning of nuclear facilities

• It depends on reliability of equipment, actions of people and efficiency of organizations

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

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NUCLEAR SAFETY AS CONTROL OF ''STATES''

• The acceptable level of risk is defined by Safety Authority and translated into safety r equirements

• Operator main responsability : comp~iance with requirements

This nuclear safety concept has produced good results

but ...

EDF/DPN/DSN - TMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

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LIMITS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY DEFINITION

• The definition of nuclear safety is a designer perception : safety is "what we do" to guarantee safety

• It is viewed through compliance to regulatory body requirements

- . • The definition only allows a negative assessment by

counting up incidents and descrepancies

• For plants staff and first line management, safety often appears in opposition with availability or cost control

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999- "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 7

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• For further progresses we need liberating people strengths while recognizing their weaknesses :

PEOPLE AT THE HEART OF SAFETY

PREVENT AND CONTROL RISK


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SAFETY AS CONTROL OF RISK

• The risk is the objective side of safety

• An operator can identify risk and work to reduce it

• Identifying risk provides a concrete objective for moral responsability

• Safety defined as the fight against risk ; dynamic value

• Safety thus defined, takes on a more positive, valueenhancing role for the operator

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

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SOCIAL

TECHNICAL

~~UMAN /I/

ORGANIZATION

QQ D D

FROM A DESIGNER SAFETY TO


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NUCLEAR SAFETY, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Years

90

80

TECHNICAL

? •

70 DESIGN COMPLIANCE HUMAN ROLE SAFETY

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 11

Years

90

80TMI

70

HUMAN FACTOR (ERGONOMY)

TECHNICAL

DESIGN COMPLIANCE

SAFETY

EDF/DPN/DSN - !MIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

OBJECT

Source of Errors

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HUMAN ROLE

12

Years

90

TCHERNOBYL

80TMI

70

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SAFETY CULTURE

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE

INTELLIGENCE

HUMAN FACTOR (ERGONOMY)

TECHNICAL

DESIGN COMPLIANCE

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SUBJECT

Source of Performances Actor Involvment

OBJECT

Source of Errors

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HUMAN ROLE

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - JM.MORONI 13

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SAFETY CULTURE DEFINITION (IAEA)

Safety culture is "the combination of properties and attitudes which, in organizations and individuals, cause issues relating to the safety of nuclear power plants to receive proper attention in due time!'


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SAFETY CULTURE FOR EDF

As a nuclear power plants operator, EDF's safety culture can therefore be defined on two levels :

• Awareness of our moral responsibility as a nuclear operator with regard to the risk that this industry presents

• Integration of essential attitudes :

- Controlling technological risks,

- Preventing risks inherent to human and organizational factors,

- Preventing risks of internal and external disunity

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - JM.MORONI 15

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IDENTIFYING RISK FACTORS

• Technological risk controled by compliance with basic safety and policy requirements

• Risks inherent to human an socio-organizational factors prevented by quality of actions, organizations and decision making processes

• Risk of internal and external disunity (social aspect) prevented by maintaining a climate of trust, cooperative social relations and quality of managemnet

These three kinds of risks are of equal importance and the

link between them should be considered


NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT (1)

CLARIFY RESPONSABILITIES

CHECK

DEBATE ABOUT SAFETY

MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMBITIONS AND REQUIREMJ

EDF/DPN/DSN - !MIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 17

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NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT (2)

1) REQUIREMENTS

• TO MASTER TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS AND SOME ORGANIZATIONAL

ONES • COMPULSORY COMPLIANCE • CLARIFICATION AND SIMPLIFICATION • PLANT CONDITION INDICATORS

2) AMBITIONS FOR PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS

• POLICIES, STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, OBJECTIVES • ACTORS INVOL VMENT TO CHOOSE THE BEST WAY • RISK ANALYSIS, SELF ASSESSMENT, SELF DIAGNOSIS ... • MANAGEMENT INDICATORS

EDF/DPN/DSN - JMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 18

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NUCLEAR SAFETY IMPROVEMENT

1) ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ESSENTIAL TO BENEFIT FROM THE CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT THAT THE 58 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS REPRESENT

2) BASED ON OPERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK ON SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES AND TRAINING

• DESIGN AND OPERATING PROCEDURES MODIFICATIONS • MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS : PREVENTIVE, CORRECTIVE AND

RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE • ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND AUTHORISATIONS • ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT METHODS • QUALITY MANAGEMENT

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMlA MEETING - SEPT 2 l st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 19

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APPENDIX 1

NUCLEAR SAFETY BASIC PRINCIPLES

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING- SEPT 2lst 1999- "SAFETY IN TIIE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 20

NUCLEAR SAFETY BASIC PRINCIPLES (1)

• Def ense in depth

prevention to stop a failure from occuring

monitoring or detection to anticipate a failure

or to detect it as soon as pos~~ble

means of action to mitigate the consequences

of failures


NUCLEAR SAFETY BASIC PRINCIPLES (2)

• Barriers

fuel cladding

reactor coolant system

containment

• Safety functions

reactivity control

fuel cooling control

radioactive material containment control

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 21 st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M MORONI 22

APPENDIX2

NUCLEAR SAFETY ORGANIZATION


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EDF GENERAL MANAGER

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NPP OPERATION DIVISION

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NPPMANAGER

SHIFT SUPERVISER

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SAFETY TECHNICAI: COMMITTEE

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 l st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI

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GENERAL INSPECTOR FOR NUCLEAR

SAFETY

VICE PRESIDENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY

NUCLEAR SAFETY NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT INSPECTORATE

SAFETY QUALITY MISSION

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SAFETY ENGINEER J

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SAFETY INDICATORS

MEASURING SAFETY IS NOT SIMPLE

WE NEED A SET OF INDICATORS

EDF PROPOSES 3 CATEGORIES


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~ SAFETY CONDITION INDICATORS

~SAFETY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS

~ POTENTIAL RISK INDEX

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2Jst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 27

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SAFET co_ D T ON

PHYSICAL PARAMETERS WITH LIMITS SET IN SR ORTS

MEASURES COMPLIAN.CE WITH SAFETY REQ.UIREMENTS


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SA ~ :T J\!IA AG 1~MJE r· , N iCATORS

OBJECTIVE SET BY~MANAGEMENT

MEASURES SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY JN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 29

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POTE.NTI1 · .L RIS.I( ND JE)( (PR )

CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF FUEL DEGRADATION - ·

MEASU.RES POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INCIDENTS


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SAFETY CONDITION INDICATORS

I- CONDITION OF SAFETY BARRIERS

1 st Barrier Cladding conditions (primary coolant contamination) : W ANO indicator

2nd barrier RCS Global leak rate (I/h)

SG leak rate (lib)

usage factor on 2 RCS zones

3rd barrier Containment leak rate in normal operation : Nm3/h with ~p 60 mb

Number of activity peaks to the stack > 4 105 Bq/m3


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II - AVAILABILITY OF SAFETY FUNCTION

-7 r eactivity control

-7 cooling control

-7 containment control

-7 plant support control

Plant systems and components serve one or several safety function

T .S. define allowed available time limit for safety system or component

actual equipment unavailability duration

time spent in the reactor mode of operation

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 l st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONT 32

3,0%

2,0%

1,0%

0,0%

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Safety function down times from January

to May 1998

(reactor in production)

Reactivity Cooling Containment

D Tr2 D Tr3 • Tr4 • Tr5


Support

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ADVANTAGE - Objectivity

- Close to basic safety concepts

INCONVENIENT - Difficult to measure improvements

- Measure design, construction as well as operational aspects


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SAFETY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS

Example

-7 Number of reactor scram I 7000 h critical W ANO indicator

-7 Number of days without reactor scrams

-7 Number of TS non compliances

-7 Number of line up errors

-7 Number of work order backlog

EDF/DPN/DSN - !MIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 35

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Reactor scrams per 7000 hours' criticality per reactor-year

value at end May 98 for

sliding l 2 month period

2,5

2

1,5

1,4 1,5

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N M 'Wj- It) (£) r-- 00 (j) (j) (j) ij) ij) f:1) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) f:1) ij)

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3,4

3,2

3

2,8

2,6

2,4

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Number of non-compliances with

operating specifications per reactor-year

3,2

value at end May 98

for sliding 12 month period

1995 1996 1997 1998

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 21st 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 37

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SAFETY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS

ADVANTAGE - Challenge of plant personnal

- Measure improvement in quality of operation

SIDE EFFECT - might affect openness

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2lst 1999 - "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - JM.MORONI 38

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POTENTIAL RISK INDEX

7 Incident of the "initiator type"

quantification of the remaining def ense line

7 Degradation of defense in depth

quantification of the consequences if any one of the initiators had occurred

EDF/DPN/DSN - IMIA MEETING - SEPT 2 lst 1999- "SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY" - J.M.MORONI 39

safety in the nuclear industry · 2019. 10. 28. · nuclear safety improvement 1) essential to keep...

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