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Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla, Tingjun Chen, Columbia University GraphEx ’15

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Page 1: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Sample average approximation and cascadingfailures of power grids

Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla, Tingjun Chen, Columbia UniversityGraphEx ’15

Page 2: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

August 14 2003

Approximately 50 million people affected

Page 3: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Other large-scale cascading failures

• Italy, 2003

• San Diego, 2011

• India, 2012

At fault:

unexpected event, cascading mechanism, noise and human error

Page 4: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Generator

Load (demand)

Page 5: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 6: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 7: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 8: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 9: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

= lost demand

Page 10: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 11: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade cartoon

Page 12: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

A quote from:

Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the UnitedStates and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,

(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force)

Cause 1 of the blackout was “inadequate system understanding”

Page 13: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

A quote from:

Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the UnitedStates and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,

(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force)

Cause 1 of the blackout was “inadequate system understanding”

(stated at least twenty times)

Page 14: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

A quote from:

Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the UnitedStates and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,

(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force)

Cause 1 of the blackout was “inadequate system understanding”

(stated at least twenty times)

Cause 2 of the blackout was “inadequate situational awareness”

Page 15: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Very approximate cascade model

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

For t = 1, 2, . . . ,

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

Page 16: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Islanding

supply > demand

Page 17: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

The “swing” equation

• A second-order differential equation used to explain swings in a motor’sfrequency in response to a change of loads.

• To properly analyize islanding, we need to consider systems of swing equa-tions, plus physics of power flows.

•Which is a very difficult computational problem.

• Primary, secondary frequency response.

Page 18: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Very approximate cascade model

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

For t = 1, 2, . . . ,

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

Page 19: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Power flow problem in rectangular coordinates, simplest form

Variables: Complex voltages ek + jfk, power flows Pkm, Qkm

Notation: For a bus k, δ(k) = set of lines incident with k;V = set of buses

∀km : Pkm = gkm(e2k + f 2k )− gkm(ekem + fkfm) + bkm(ekfm − fkem) (1a)

∀km : Qkm = −bkm(e2k + f 2k ) + bkm(ekem + fkfm) + gkm(ekfm − fkem) (1b)

∀km : |Pkm|2 + |Qkm|2 ≤ Ukm (1c)

∀k : Pmink ≤

∑km∈ δ(k)

Pkm ≤ Pmaxk (1d)

∀k : Qmink ≤

∑km∈ δ(k)

Qkm ≤ Qmaxk (1e)

∀k : V mink ≤ e2k + f 2k ≤ V max

k . (1f)

Page 20: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Solving AC power flow problems

•When considering a grid in stable operation, Newton-Raphson or similarworks very well. Convergence in seconds

• But no theoretical foundation for this behavior exists.

•When studying a grid under distress, Newton-Raphson (or similar) doesnot work well. Non-convergence.

• Recently, renewed interest in semidefinite relaxations, and techniques fromreal algebraic geometry.

• These methodologies are much more accurate but also much slower.

• The mathematics is the same as that for systems of polynomial equations :Hilbert’s and Smale’s 17th problems.

Page 21: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Very approximate cascade model

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

For t = 1, 2, . . . ,

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3. The next set of faults takes place.

Page 22: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Line tripping

1. If a power line carries too much power, it will overheat.

2. At a critical temperature, the line will fail.

3. Before that point, the line will sag. A physical contact would lead toimmeadite tripping.

4. If a line is overloaded for too long, it will be protectively tripped.

5. Simplification: there is a line limit beyond which a line is consideredoverloaded.

5. IEEE Standard 738. An adaptation of the heat equation so as to takeinto account ...

Page 23: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Line tripping

1. If a power line carries too much power, it will overheat.

2. At a critical temperature, the line will fail.

3. Before that point, the line will sag. A physical contact would lead toimmeadite tripping.

4. If a line is overloaded for too long, it will be protectively tripped.

5. Simplification: there is a line limit beyond which a line is consideredoverloaded.

5. IEEE Standard 738. An adaptation of the heat equation so as to takeinto account ... the state of the universe, pretty much

(current work: appropriate stochastic variants of the heat equation)

Page 24: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Very approximate cascade model

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

For t = 1, 2, . . . ,

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3. The next set of faults takes place.

4. STOP if no more faults

Page 25: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Simulation of 2011 San Diego Event

Joint work with A. Bernstein, D. Hay, G. Zussman, M. Uzunoglu(EE Dept. Columbia)

• Initiating event: human error

•We do not have complete or exact data

•Nevertheless, in our simulations a cascade does take place,with similar characteristics at the initial stages

• “inadequate system understanding”

Page 26: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Beginning (partial picture: 13K buses total)

Page 27: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

More

Page 28: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

More

Page 29: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

More

Page 30: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

Page 31: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

For t = 1, 2, . . . , T

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

Page 32: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

For t = 1, 2, . . . , T

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3a.Obtain measurements.

Page 33: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

For t = 1, 2, . . . , T

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3a.Obtain measurements.

3b.Apply control.

Page 34: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

For t = 1, 2, . . . , T

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3a.Obtain measurements.

3b.Apply control.

3. The next set of faults takes place.

Page 35: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Cascade control

→ Initial fault event takes place (an “act of God”).

0. Compute control on the basis of initial data.

For t = 1, 2, . . . , T

1. Reconfigure demands and generator output levels (if islanding occurs).

2. New power flows are instantiated.

3a.Obtain measurements.

3b.Apply control.

3. The next set of faults takes place.

4. If t = T proportionally shed enough load to stop cascade.

Page 36: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

A basic form of affine control

• Control consists of nonnegative parameters u1, u2, . . . , uT .

• At time t, on an island C with max line overload κC, scale demandsby

1 + ut (1 − κC)

• κC > 1 implies loss of demand

• Easy to apply?

Page 37: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Clairvoyant control

• For any island C that exists at time t, a parameter ut,C.

• At time t, on island C with max line overload κC, scale demands by

1 + ut,C (1 − κC)

• κC > 1 implies loss of demand

• Easy to apply? Does it even make sense?

Page 38: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

A basic form of affine control

• Control consists of nonnegative parameters u1, u2, . . . , uT .

• At time t, on an island C with max line overload κC, scale demandsby

1 + ut (1 − κC)

• κC > 1 implies loss of demand

• Easy to apply?

Page 39: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

An even simpler form of affine control

• Control consists of nonnegative parameters λ1, λ2, . . . , λT .

• At time t, all demands scaled by λt

• Easy to apply.

• But conservative?

Page 40: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Theorem

On a network with m arcs, an optimal control of the aboveform can be computed in time

O(

mT

(T−1)!

)

Page 41: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Theorem

On a network with m arcs, an optimal control of the aboveform can be computed in time

O(

mT

(T−1)!

)

→ What is the mathematics to explain “games” of this sort?

Page 42: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

One-parameter control: s

• At time t, on an island C with max line overload κC, scale demandsby 1 + s (1 − κC).

Page 43: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

One-parameter control: s

• At time t, on an island C with max line overload κC, scale demandsby 1 + s (1 − κC).

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4

yie

ld (

%)

s

T = 5, Eastern Interconnect (23 K lines)

Page 44: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

One-parameter control: stochastic line failures

• At time t, on an island C with max line overload κC, scale demandsby 1 + s (1 − κC).

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4

yie

ld (

%)

s

average- 1 dev+ 1 dev

T = 5, Eastern Interconnect (23 K lines)

Page 45: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Robustness through noise: the sample average approach

• Let L̂j be the limit of line j, j = 1, . . . ,m (= number of lines).

Page 46: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Robustness through noise: the sample average approach

• Let L̂j be the limit of line j, j = 1, . . . ,m (= number of lines).

• For s = 1, . . . , S, sample values Lt,sj , 1 ≤ t ≤ T .

• Here, ELt,sj = L̂j for all t and s.

• Interpretation: Lt,sj is a noisy estimate for L̂j.

Page 47: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Robustness through noise: the sample average approach

• Let L̂j be the limit of line j, j = 1, . . . ,m (= number of lines).

• For s = 1, . . . , S, sample values Lt,sj , 1 ≤ t ≤ T .

• Here, ELt,sj = L̂j for all t and s.

• Interpretation: Lt,sj is a noisy estimate for L̂j.

• For a given s, the values {Lt,sj } are called a sample of the line limits.

Page 48: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Robustness through noise: the sample average approach

• Let L̂j be the limit of line j, j = 1, . . . ,m (= number of lines).

• For s = 1, . . . , S, sample values Lt,sj , 1 ≤ t ≤ T .

• Here, ELt,sj = L̂j for all t and s.

• Interpretation: Lt,sj is a noisy estimate for L̂j.

• For a given s, the values {Lt,sj } are called a sample of the line limits.

Optimization problem

Compute a control that maximizes the yield averaged across all samples.

Theorem. Can be done in O(S) power flow computations.

Page 49: Sample average approximation and cascading failures of ...dano/talks/graphex15.pdf · Sample average approximation and cascading failures of power grids Daniel Bienstock, Guy Grebla,

Experiment: robust vs. non-robust solutions(Table shows yield)

T 2 3 4 5

Non-robust solution 65.46% 65.46% 74.44% 86.84%and non-robust model

Non-robust solution 31.92% 30.46% 47.75% 23.07%and robust model

robust solution 62.19% 62.19% 70.73% 78.36%and robust model